Kandidatuppsats i Statsvetenskap
Putin’s authoritarian state –
the consolidation of an authoritarian
x regime through the use of ‘soft powers’
Författare: Rebecca Esselgren
Handledare: Daniel Silander
Examinator: Helena Eklund
Termin: HT18
Ämne: Statsvetenskap
Nivå: III
Kurskod: 2SK30E
Abstract
Putin’s authoritarian rule reaches all areas of Russian society, this can be attributed to the soft
powers that the regime uses to further establish their power. The basis of this research is a
theory from the book Authoritarianism goes global, where the authors describes the
importance of soft powers in an authoritarian regime. The soft powers analysed include
election monitoring, disinformation, cyberspace security and civil society repression. The aim
is to examine which soft powers play a part in the consolidation of the Russian regime, and
the strategies used to further legitimise their political agenda. The three questions answered in
this research is how did Putin’s first eight years in power affect the use of soft powers in
Russia today? What soft powers have led to the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in
Russia? And how does Putin use these soft powers to further legitimize his political agenda?
A qualitative text analysis was performed to answer the questions. The conclusions drawn is
that Putin’s actions today are heavily influenced by his first presidency. Furthermore he
extensively use the soft powers, and they have a significant influence on how the Russian
authoritarian regime manage to consolidate power. Moreover the proficiency shown while
manipulating these arenas leads to Putin being able to further legitimise his political agenda.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Purpose and questions .............................................................................................. 2
1.2 Method ..................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Material .................................................................................................................... 5
2. Previous research and theoretical framework .......................................................... 5
2.1 Previous research .................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................. 9
2.3 Definitions.............................................................................................................. 10
2.3.1 Election Monitoring ...................................................................................... 10
2.3.2 Disinformation .............................................................................................. 11
2.3.3 Cyberspace security ...................................................................................... 13
2.3.4 Civil society repression ................................................................................. 14
2.4 How do these soft powers interact with each another? .......................................... 15
3. Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 16
3.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 16
3.2 The importance of Putin’s first eight years in power ............................................. 17
3.3 Putin’s use of Election Monitoring in Russia ........................................................ 18
3.4 Putin’s use of Disinformation in Russia ................................................................ 20
3.5 Putin’s use of Cyberspace security in Russia ........................................................ 22
3.6 Putin’s use of Civil society repression Russia ....................................................... 24
4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 26
5. Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 28
1
1. Introduction
For the past century there has been an increase of nations moving from authoritarian regimes
to liberal democratic countries. There are many underlying reasons as well as developments
that enable these states to advance from a restricted authoritarian state to a free liberal
democracy.1 However it seems as though some non-democratic countries are better at
resisting the changes that have the possibility of contributing to the development of a
democracy. One of these countries is Russia.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Boris Yeltsin elected president of Russia, in what
was considered a free and fair election. Yeltsin’s time in office was defined by a spark of
positive development with the introduction of the first democratic statute as well as a free and
strong press.2 Though Yeltsin advanced some areas in society, Russia was still characterised
by economic and political difficulties during his eight years in power. The chaos in both the
economic and political sphere was not resolved until Vladimir Putin came to power in the
year of 2000. Putin started his time in office by instating major reforms in the economic
spectrum and managed to reverse the issues, and the economy started to thrive. Behind the
scenes Putin was also centralising the power and started to constrict the media and the civil
society as well as increasing his control over the political arena.3
Putin’s time in office has been defined by restrictions on almost every area in society. The
constraints introduced to the media, the political domain as well as the resilient economy
together with a strong military has led Russia down a path from democratic development to
an authoritarian constraint.4 Right from the beginning Putin’s commitment to Russia has
never been a commitment to democracy which has meant not only a standstill for the possible
development of a democracy but a reversal of the already developed areas.5 Authoritarian
regimes now have a different agenda in that they no longer just want to stop democratic
development in their countries they want to reverse all traces of the democratic surge.6
1 L. Diamond, Spirit of democracy, – the struggle to build free societies throughout the world, New York,
HENRY HOLT and COMPANY LLC, 2008, p. 6. 2 S. Skott, Det nya Ryssland och arvet efter Sovjet, 2nd edn., Finland, Hjalmarsson & Högberg, 2009, p. 298. 3 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik – nio politiska system, Spain, Studentlitteratur, 2015, p. 220. 4 S. Skott, Det nya Ryssland och arvet efter Sovjet, p. 298. 5 Ibid, p. 339. 6 L. Diamond, M. Plattner, and C. Walker, Authoritarianism goes global – a challenge to democracy, Baltimore,
John Hopkins University Press, 2016, p. 7.
2
The few signs that existed of a possible democracy in Russia during the 90s is today
something that is only a memory. There is no real threat to the sitting regime and Putin has
managed to establish his authoritarian state in every aspect of society.7 The mechanisms
called soft powers are used by regimes to assert their power both internationally and
nationally, these soft power arenas will be the focus of this research.8
Putin succeeded to set the foundation of his authoritarian state to such an extent that when his
growing power was noticed by the population it was hard for them to reverse the emergent
authoritarian regime.9 Coups by authoritarian forces was believed to be the real threat to the
growing democracy however the real threat turned out to be Vladimir Putin and his
supporters. They have managed to gain unhindered power while still holding elections, the
reasons for their stems from the government’s skills in manipulating the population, the
media and the political arena.10
1.1 Purpose and questions
The aim of the research is to investigate what soft powers play a part in the consolidation of
the authoritarian regime in Russia and what strategies the current regime uses to further
legitimise its political agenda. Manipulating different areas in society is something that
authoritarian regimes show great expertise in. Therefore, this research will investigate
different reforms of Russia, the areas included in the analysis is election monitoring,
disinformation, cyberspace security and civil society repression. These areas are chosen due
to the theoretical framework presented later in this study.
The purpose of this research is to examine what factors continue to affect the consolidation of
power in Russia and to what extent they affect the further development of an authoritarian
state. To answer the questions in the best way possible the timeframe for the investigation
will be focused on Putin’s time in office since 2012, this is because it relates to the
authoritarian regime in Russia today. To complement this a question regarding Putin’s first
presidency will be asked to give a further understanding of the conditions that exist in Russia
at the moment.
7 M. Bader and H. Schmeets, ‘Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from
Russia’, Journal of Representative Democracy, vol. 49. No. 4, 2013, p. 1-14. 8 L. Diamond, M. Plattner, and C. Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 3. 9 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 221. 10 A. Evans, ‘The failure of democratisation in Russia: a comparative perspective’, Journal of Eurasian Studies,
vol. 2, No. 1, 2011, p. 40-51.
3
This research is relevant because examining this area is not just scrutinising Russia and Putin
but rather it is about researching the importance of a strong leader in an authoritarian state
and the use of different power mechanism to consolidate power, both which are ongoing
discussions within the social sciences. So in other words this study is a case of investigating
strategies used by regimes to stay in power.11
From a societal perspective this research is relevant because Russia is constantly discussed in
the media. Their supposed involvement in the US election, their participation in the Syrian
civil war as well as their constant place on the UN Security Council means that Putin has a
significant influence on the international arena. This means that what transpires in Russia
affects not just the local population but also the surrounding world. The importance of Russia
and their position in the world should not be underestimated.12
The questions that this research will answer is:
- How did Putin’s first eight years in power affect the use of soft powers in Russia
today?
- What soft powers have led to the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Russia?
- How does Putin use these soft powers to further legitimize his political agenda?
1.2 Method
To complement the purpose and questions presented above the next part will discuss the
method that will be the outline of the analysis in this investigation.
The theory used will be the base of the entire research. This means that the formation that
will be used is theory-consuming. What will be discussed and analysed is based around the
specific case and the rest of the material that will be collected is in some way related to the
factors that will be analysed.13 The theory-consuming foundation that will be used is to some
extent also theory-testing since the theory-testing formation assesses the reliability of theories
and investigate the conditions of the theories used.14
11 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan – konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, 4th edn., Vällinby,
Nordstedts Juridik, 2012, p. 32. 12 D. Herspring, Putin’s Russia – past imperfect, future uncertain, 3rd edn., Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2007, p. 203. 13 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 41. 14 A. George, and A. Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, BCSIA,
2005, p. 75.
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However to execute the analysis, the empirical research will be examined in relation to how
the theory works. Therefore the theory-consuming structure is the primary chosen formation
due to the fact that the theory chosen provides the foundation of the entire research, and the
factors discussed to explain the theory are secondary sources.15
There are many theories that discuss authoritarian states and the factors that affect the
regimes power, the present theory was chosen as it presents an extensive view of different
factors. The different areas of the theory manage to explain ways in which an authoritarian
state manages to stay in power and this is why it was chosen. Other theories could also have
been used, however to limit the research and answer the questions within a certain boundary
it was deemed appropriate to only use this theory. The method that will be used is a
qualitative text analysis. This method was chosen because the text that will be read is
analysed to see if there is a relation to the questions that will be asked. In this way of writing
the researcher has a focus on the importance of the text that is being investigated and whether
it is possible to draw any conclusions from the text.16
In this research this text analysis will be accomplished using the chosen theory and trying it
against different empirical material such as articles to see if the conclusions that are drawn in
the theory are trustworthy. What must be taken into consideration when using this method is
the issue of reliability since the texts analysed have the possibility of bias, to circumvent this
issue several texts will be analysed in hope that it strengthens the validity of the research.
Furthermore it is important to consider the researcher’s possible interpretations since
experiences and background can affect the understanding of a certain text. This issue can be
tackled by the researcher through trying to recognize their own particular understanding and
try to identify what social contexts and scientific culture the research is taking place in.17
There is a risk with using this type of research because when choosing different articles it is
possible to miss essential material since it is impossible to read every text about every
subject. However this method is deemed preferable as opposed to other methods due to the
fact that the entirety of the text is caught when using this type of research.18
15 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 42. 16 Ibid. 17 G. Bergström, and K. Boréus, Textens Mening och Makt – metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text och diskurs
analys, 2nd edn., India, Replika Press Pvt Ltd, 2005, p. 35. 18 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 210.
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The central message of the text is the focus point and to find the fundamental arguments in a
text is believed to be more important than only concentrating on parts of the text.19
Since the terms used in the research is defined early on it is easier to decide what relevant
areas in the texts should be used this means that the research becomes more achievable.20
1.3 Material
Now the basis of the material will be explained by going through how the material was
collected and how it will be used in the research.
The main material that will be used for this research is sourced from the book
Authoritarianism goes global – a challenge to democracy written by Larry Diamond, Marc F.
Plattner and Christopher Walker. The other material that will be collected is from other books
that discuss Russia as an authoritarian state. However the main source the material is
allocated from academic sources online, as there is a vast array of information available
electronically. Books will be used as the basis and to provide facts however the main
information will be taken from articles found through the Linnaeus University’s search
engine as well as Google Scholar. The articles found on these sites are considered to increase
the validity of the research and provide the analysis with high value sources since the articles
from these sights have been published in various journals. Though the journals used in the
research are respected academically in the international sphere and known to be non-biased
the fact that western authors as well as western based journals are used is kept in mind
throughout this investigation.
There are endless sources that can be chosen for this research however to limit the scope of
the investigation the articles that are chosen are deemed directly relevant for answering the
questions in the analysis.
2. Previous research and theoretical framework
In this part, previous research will be explained to further the understanding of the research
and gain knowledge surrounding other studies done in this area. Moreover the theoretic
framework will also be discussed, the entire research will be formed around the theory
presented and the analysis will be assembled with the main theory as its core.
19 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 210. 20 Ibid, p. 217.
6
Further, the terms used in the research will be defined so that there can be no misconception
regarding the expressions in the investigation. In addition the different arenas will also be
discussed in relation to how they interact with each other.
2.1 Previous research
In this part an overview of prior studies will be presented to get a comprehensive outlook on
the research problem presented earlier. To understand this research one has to understand
how states achieve legitimacy. Further one must also recognise the importance of the shift in
the power mechanism of how states exercise their use of power. This part of the research is
discussed to explain the decision to have soft powers as the focus of this investigation and
consequently explain the indicators that this research is based on.
Researcher Bo Rothstein challenges the idea that a democratic country automatically achieve
legitimacy just because they represent the people in a direct way through elections.
According to Rothstein achieving legitimacy depends on the efficiency of the government
rather than the input side of the political system. Legitimacy needs to be created and
maintained and depends on the output of the government. People might accept their leaders
not just because of a fair election but also based on tradition, appeal and the government’s
success, or a belief of success. However, it is easier to reach legitimacy through an election
since the people feel as if they have taken part in the process and therefore accept that the
government officials represent them in a fair way. That is not to say to that legitimacy cannot
be achieved through other ways, it just means that the most direct way is through elections
according to the western belief. The population of a country can believe that the government
warrants legitimacy when in truth they are misled by the government.21
Traditionally states exercised their power through a hard approach which entailed military
operations done to cripple other states, this was the only way for a state to achieve legitimacy
both internationally and nationally. The use of hard powers seek to damage the initiatives of
the other state so that they submit to the will of the other. This differs from the soft power
approach in that instead it focuses on changing the ideals of a state through peaceful means
by for example education and counselling.22
21 B. Rothstein, ‘Creating political legitimacy – electoral democracy versus quality of government’, American
Behavioural Studies, vol. 53, No. 3, 2009, p. 311-330. 22 S. Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied, ‘Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: soft and hard power
approaches’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 47. No. 6, 2011, p. 652-665.
7
The introduction of the soft approach led to the regimes finding it hard to justify the use of
violence when soft tactics has been seen to be successful. The development of soft powers
subsequently led to a change in the power mechanisms used by states. 23
Previously the common way to handle a security risk was to show off one’s military might
but suddenly the entire concept of defence started to mean social unity instead. That is not to
say that the hard power approach is not seen in today’s conflicts however a hard action can
only be taken when an issue has already arisen, by using a more soft method the roots of the
issue could be solved before the challenge has even presented itself. The decline in
acceptance of the hard approach has led to a development in the use of power mechanism
approaches.24 Therefore there lies an importance as to how states now use the soft power
approach, and it has become the more common way to exercise power.
Coalitions in modern times are more complex than they were previously in history since with
new actors in world politics comes new dimensions to security.25 The researcher Joseph Nye
states that since the mechanisms of power have changed so have the strategies of regimes.
The focus no longer lies on military force but rather on economic and ecological issues that
are now more important to people meaning they are more important to politicians.26 The
world’s leading countries are less able to use more traditional power resources to further their
influence, the reasons for this could be the new developments in economy, transnational
actors, the progresses in technology, and the changing issues in the political arena.27
Without the use of military force, information has become a central component in world
politics and so information has become power and especially if a regime is able to control it
whether that be by changing the information provided or containing it all together. With this
new information-based economy material resources have become less important and the
expertise of organisations have gained a greater importance. With these trends the regimes
that are successfully able to achieve their goals might get smaller states to follow their ideals.
So in this modern world it is more beneficial for a regime to use soft powers to change the
wants of a country rather than ordering them to change their beliefs.28
23 S. Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied, ‘Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: soft and hard power
approaches’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 47. No. 6, 2011, p. 652-665. 24 Ibid. 25 J. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 80. No. 153, 1990, p. 157. 26 Ibid, p. 158. 27 Ibid, p, 161. 28 Ibid, p. 166.
8
Additionally, as the scholar Geun Lee writes, soft powers are used when different regimes
choose to focus on changing or creating their own perception of an idea to the public of a
certain country. The tactic is used to set a certain agenda to achieve the goal of the regime,
the construction of the ideal the regimes project is done through symbolic resources that lead
to a behavioural change in others. The usage of soft powers is often applied when regimes
wants to settle an issue through peaceful measures rather than through military operations or
economic sanctions. That is not to say that using soft powers means the elimination of a hard
tactic as well, rather it means that the focus lies more on ideal than on material resources.
Using a soft power tactic relies on domestic support since failure can lead to national political
repercussions therefore it is important for regimes to consider their policy goals both
nationally and internationally before projecting their perception onto their population.29
Moreover as Martin Jacques claims in his article “The beginning of a new world order”
democracy is only one part of what decides a countries legitimacy, a high level of satisfaction
also represents a part in ensuring legitimacy of a country. As the relationship that the Western
world have with the developing world changes so could the current world order. Therefore
one can say that using soft power mechanism challenge the political hegemony currently held
by the West. It might seem implausible that the Western world would want to imitate the
governance of China for example since their regime does not have democratic values,
however by using soft powers successfully it could lead to a recognition of other strengths in
their state. In the Western world, democratic views are highly valued since they are believed
to be the best alternative at the present time and soft powers have the ability to change this or
at least make citizens question the importance of democracy.30
To sum up one can say that legitimacy is essential for a government to be able to stay in
power, and it can be achieved through many means, although elections are the most common.
Furthermore, previously power mechanisms was used to gain legitimacy through a hard
approach, but there has been a shift in how states exercise power. This has been influenced by
the development of globalisation and subsequently as information has become more
important, so has the use of soft powers.
29 G. Lee, ‘The clash of soft powers between China and Japan: synergy and dilemmas at the six party talks’,
Asian Perspective, vol, 34. No. 2, 2010, p. 113-117. 30 M. Jacques, ‘The beginning of a new world order’, New statesman, vol. 141. No. 5102, 2012, p. 22-27.
9
The purpose of the discussion in this part was to broaden the understanding of legitimacy and
the power mechanisms that exist in both democratic and authoritarian states. These earlier
studies present the interpretation done relating to legitimacy and soft powers leading to a
clarification to the tools that will be used in this research.
2.2 Theoretical framework
To limit the research done, solely one theory will be the focus of this analysis. The theory is
taken from the book Authoritarianism goes global – a challenge to democracy written by
Diamond, Plattner and Walker. The authors claim that since the mid-2000s there has been a
backlash against democracy where regimes began to restrain independent voices in society.31
They refer to something called the ‘big five’ which is a reference to the countries that led the
backlash. These countries according to the theory is China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela. As stated in the introduction the authors believe that these countries now have a
different agenda; they no longer just want to stop democratic development, rather they want
to reverse all traces of the democratic surge. The main focus of this research will be around
what the authors call soft powers, which are mechanisms used by the different regimes to
assert their power both internationally and nationally.32 There are multiple soft powers but for
the purpose of this research, the following have been selected:
- Election monitoring
- Disinformation
- Cyberspace security
- Civil society repression
According to this theory these four areas are either manipulated or used in authoritarian
countries for the regime to further establish their power. In the first chosen soft power the
theory claims that election monitoring has become an essential part of democracy in that in
watches over the civil representation and the accountability of the government. Authoritarian
regimes are able to undermine this part of the election process by evading responsibility
while using certain tactics to avoid being caught.33
31 L. Diamond, M. Plattner, and C. Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 3. 32 Ibid, p. 7. 33 Ibid, p. 10-11.
10
The second chosen arena is disinformation which is when the state decides to convey their
ideas to the public by spreading false information rather than the truth.34 The third chosen soft
power is cyberspace security which in the last couple of years has turned into a powerful tool
that authoritarian states use to their advantage. The development of the internet means that
authoritarian regimes have another area of society that they are able to control by suppressing
and shrinking the space of the opposition.35 The last soft power chosen is civil society
repression, the space that the civil society offers in democratic countries is essential since it
represents the interest of the people. Authoritarian states chose to limit their countries civil
society by destroying all independent institutions due to the risk of potential opposition. Civil
society repression is necessary for authoritarian states in order to restrict the platform of the
opposition.36
2.3 Definitions
In this part of the research the different soft powers will be introduced so that the
understanding of the arenas are the same for all readers.
2.3.1 Election monitoring
Election monitoring is a common practice that countries use in today’s society, it has been
used for a long time however it was not until during the so called third wave during the
1970’s that it became an essential part of the democratic process. Election monitoring allows
for citizens and international organisations to view the election process to ensure that there is
no tampering during the course of the election. To achieve legitimacy both nationally and
internationally it has become a democratic norm to use this practice. The aim of using
election monitoring is to make sure that the citizens in a country vote in an election that
contains no deception.37 To establish credibility to an election, transparency must be present
and to uphold this transparency organisations act as the eyes of the citizens by implementing
the process of election monitoring and thereby confirming the elections’ validity.38
34 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 10-11. 35 Ibid, p. 12. 36 Ibid, p. 13. 37 Ibid, p. 139. 38 Ibid.
11
Having elections are considered to be crucial to a democratic society therefore it is important
to make sure that the process retains a high standard. Election monitoring wants to uphold
this standard by ensuring freedom of expression and that everyone is able to participate.39
Election monitoring observe the media, the states transparency as well as equal treatment for
the entire population. The election monitoring observers note these factors to ensure the
validity of the election process. If even one of the factors are seen to be manipulated the
entire election comes into question, and loses its validity.40
For the monitoring organisations the process begins with a formal invitation from the state
where they will gain access to documents that they normally would not be allowed to
observe. The regime has some control of this process since they can decide on who they want
to invite to monitor their election, so some areas of the election process still lay in their
hands.41
Authoritarian regimes are still hesitant in allowing election monitoring to take place in their
country despite them having some control over preforms the monitoring. This is due to the
fact that many authoritarian states are known to manipulate their election and by allowing
observers into their country their manipulations are at a higher risk of being discovered. If
many different monitoring institutions come to the same conclusions about their election
process it could possibly undermine the power of the state in question.42 Different tactics are
therefore employed by the regimes to uphold a genuine election when it is anything but.
Because while the authoritarian states must use election monitoring to have legitimacy at the
same time they also have to manipulate the election process to be able to stay in power.43
2.3.2 Disinformation
Transparency is a vital component of a democratic country since the population should be
able to rely on their own government and trust that they provide them with the correct
information.44
39 J. Kelley, ‘Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The rise of the International Election Monitoring’,
International Organisation, vol. 62. No. 2, 2008, p. 221-255. 40 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 141. 41 J. Kelley, ‘The more the merrier? The effects of having multiple international election monitoring
organisations’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 2009, p. 59. 42 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 141. 43 Ibid. 44 D. Fallis, ‘What is Disinformation?’, Library Trends, vol. 63. no. 3, 2015, p. 401-426.
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Nevertheless it is common for authoritarian regimes to use oppression to further their stance
in society where one of the most common forces of oppression that regimes employ are
disinformation. This is when a regime deliberately misinform the information that is given to
the public.45 Misleading the public by giving them wrongful information have the possibility
of being harmful and does have a significant impact on the people. Disinformation can be
used through many different channels but in every route it is when the regime purposely give
wrongful information to the public to gain trust or do harm. A common way to use
disinformation is through deceiving advertisement that the regime provides to the public by
projecting an image they want their citizens to see and believe.46
Disinformation is something that has been used for a long time so it is not a new concept
however it has grown in the last couple of years due to the development of new technological
channels. These new developments such as social media has made the use of this practice
much easier since regimes has the ability to forbid certain websites and therefore
disinformation has become more common in recent years.47
Through time regimes have become apt at using the media and other areas to their advantage
and they have many strategies of gaining more control. For instance the information provided
to the public holds just enough truth about real events that are twisted in a skilful way so that
it works in the regime’s advantage. Through this the regime is able to increase their
authenticity.48 Disinformation, on the other hand, is more than just the regime providing their
population with wrongful information; it is qualified systematic disturbances by the
established order which are made through strategic planning meaning that for the average
citizen this deception is hard to detect.49 In a democratic country is it essential to be given
trustworthy information through the media and the freedom that this provides and its
importance cannot be underestimated. When information is given properly to the population
through all channels it has the possibility of increasing the validity of the regime and the
respect as well as the integrity of the government.50
45 D. Fallis, ‘What is Disinformation?’, p. 401-426. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline in
democratic order’, European Journal of Communication, vol. 33, no. 2, 2018, p. 124. 49 Ibid. 50 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 150.
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It takes more than simply providing proof that the information given to the population is
false, in order to overcome the issue of using disinformation. The change needs to go deeper
and this is done by repairing broken political institutions and developing the democratic
values of the citizens.51
2.3.3 Cyberspace security
The new developments in technology has led to an entire new arena emerging that
authoritarian states now use to their advantage.52 This arena is called cyberspace and it is
where electronics are utilised to exchange information through different network systems and
corporeal organisations. This arena is not specifically the internet, though internet is a part of
the cyberspace. Cyberspace is a man-made domain that is the result of the world-wide
interconnectedness that is globalisation. It has provided a forum through which ideas and
thoughts can be shared globally with half of humanity.53
The areas in which this component plays a major role is within the economic, political and
social sphere. This has led to cyberspace becoming a well-respected domain that to many is
considered equal to sea, space air and land.54 The new development of this area has also led
to new challenges for the authoritarian regimes, since they have had to adapt to the situation.
Autocratic regimes has shown great resilience to the new threats this arena presents and also
a good capacity for being able to tackle the new problems that has arisen.
It is often believed that authoritarian regimes do not have the ability to develop, however in
this case they have shown that they are anything but non-adaptable.55 To be able to control
the cyberspace the authoritarian regimes will apply more restrictions by filtering the content
the population have access to and limiting the internet access as well as monitoring the
behaviour of their citizens. The regimes can also use this area to their advantage by
promoting their interests and giving out their own perception of information that will further
legitimise their power.56
51 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order’, p. 125. 52 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 199. 53 R. Deibert, and R. Rohozinski, ‘Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of Cyberspace Security’,
International Political Sociology, vol. 4, no. 1, 2010, p. 15-32. 54 Ibid. 55 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 198. 56 S. Kalathil, and T. Boas, ‘The internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, Cuba and the
counterrevolution’, First Monday, vol. 6, no. 8, 2001.
14
Since cyberspace is available to people in every part of the world it also means that it
presents a new security risk, since the information is no longer contained just within a single
country. The state systems are not able to counter the threats this arena has created in the
same way. It is not possible for an authoritarian regime to claim control over the entire
cyberspace since it is such a vast space that is always evolving leading to some areas always
being able to avoid state control.57
2.3.4 Civil society repression
In a democratic country the civil society needs to be a well-functioning part of society that
works independently away from the state.58 The civil society in democratic countries is an
area that is respected since it allows for the state, organisations and individuals to create
bonds of cooperation. The economic and political arena both benefit from having a successful
civil society therefore it is considered advantageous to have an independent civil society,
further it also promotes democracy.59
For an authoritarian regime this is why they are hesitant in allowing a flourishing civil society
since it widens the opportunity for a democratic culture to develop.60 Having an independent
population where people have a chance at controlling their own lives and beliefs is for an
authoritarian regime a high risk. This is because the citizens could develop a more critical
view of the government and this is something that authoritarian leaders want to avoid to
further secure their own power.61 When there are no independent organisations the population
turns to the state-driven ones since they are the only ones left available, and when all
institutions are run by the sitting regime there is no space available for the individual to be
independent.62 The ultimate aim is to have a civil society that allows the citizens a safe haven
from the state powers and if it is fully functioning it should balance the power of the state so
that the quality of life is equal for everyone.63
57 R. Deibert, and R. Rohozinski, ‘Risking Security’, p. 15-32. 58 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 153. 59 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social capital, civil society and development’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 1, 2001, p.
7. 60 Ibid. 61 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 153. 62 Ibid, p. 155. 63 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social capital, civil society and development’, p. 8.
15
In the case of a non-functioning civil society the government can intervene to try and sort out
the individuals they feel are not capable of fixing the issues themselves. It is possible that
when this opening is presented to the state it is easy for them to insert a hand into the civil
society and through there into every part of society leading to a low level of opposition.64 The
social interaction that people have with each other are shaped by social capital which has a
close relation to the civil society.65
However social capital can only exist when there is a strong relationship between individuals
and this is only possible if there is a well-functioning civil society, since social capital is seen
in the patterns of behaviour of the interaction between individuals.66 The bonds of trust that
the civil society creates are important since it unites the population through cooperation and
through that the country’s social capital is endorsed. The collaboration between individuals
should not be underestimated since good cooperation leads to a stronger society. When the
average citizens is encouraged to work for independence it increases the development,
however having an independent society is something that every authoritarian regime fear.67
2.4 How do these ‘soft powers’ interact with each other?
The different soft powers chosen for this investigation are effective independently however
together they permit the regime to implement more control. The interaction between the soft
powers advance both the use of them as well as their efficiency. The information provided in
this part consists of conclusions drawn based on the different definitions presented above.
The regime uses disinformation to misinform the population and to twist the truth in their
favour.68 This enables the other soft powers since they all depend on the population not
protesting against the regime. Hence if the population is not aware of the full extent of the
regime’s strategical moves, forming an opposition is not something they consider doing.
Further repressing the civil society means that the connections between individuals are
limited and the citizens do not have a place to form their own ideas.69
64 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social capital, civil society and development’, p. 8. 65 A. Tewari, ‘Social capital, civil society and development: key to contemporary administrative reforms
approach’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 53, no. 3, 2007, p. 456-457. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order’, p. 123. 69 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 153.
16
The actions of the regime are often defended in the media with immense skill, so that when
critics point out certain areas that do not correlate such as election manipulation or
questioning restrictions, the calculated management done by the regime of the highest skill is
hard to object.70 The expertise that regimes exert when manipulating the media enables them
further use the soft powers since their actions are veritably undetectable. Alone these soft
powers could work, but together they act more efficiently and that adds strength to the regime
contributing to a solid affirmation of their powers.
3. Analysis
In this part of the investigation the questions of the research will be answered. This will be
done by applying the soft powers presented on a specific case which is in this study is the
Russian regime and Putin. Examples and articles obtained will be discussed to support the
evidence provided in relation to Putin’s Russia. To present a broader view of the
circumstances that exist in Russia at the moment the first part of the analysis will present a
brief background view of Russia. Then Putin’s first term in office between 2000 and 2008
will be discussed to see if his first presidency in some way enabled the use of soft powers at
the present. The second part of the analysis will present a view on Putin’s use of the different
soft powers and how they affect the current conditions in Russia.
3.1 Background
Russia was greatly affected by the fall of the Soviet Union since it resulted in an extensive
split in the region where the Eastern European countries found it problematic to move away
from the shadow of the former Soviet state, resulting in the authoritarian features managing
to take hold in their countries.71 When Boris Yeltsin came to power after a significant power
struggle in 1993 the country’s economy and political powers merged with each other when
personal friends where invited into the regime. This created a society where millions of the
population were living below the poverty line and starving due to the instability of the
government. Because of this the population began to associate democracy with an unravelling
society and when the economic crisis hit in 1998, the situation gradually worsened.72
70 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order’, p. 124. 71 L. Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, p. 191. 72 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 220.
17
The fact that the situation was not resolved until Putin was elected, made the population
grateful for the positive changes in their lives. The economic, social, and for some the
political, lives were improved by Putin. This fact has significantly influenced his ability to be
able to stay in power for so long.73 The goals that Putin had were clear from the start with a
defined focus on centralising the power by restoring state control through limited political
competition and taking control over communication areas, some of his goals went unnoticed
by the population due to his popularity.74
3.2 The importance of Putin’s first eight years in power
To understand how Putin uses the soft powers to consolidate his authoritarian regime and
how he uses them to further legitimise his current political agenda one needs to understand
how the present conditions have been impacted by Putin’s first presidency and his earlier
reforms. This part of the analysis will therefore present the conditions that have enabled Putin
to use the soft powers in today’s Russia.
Winston Churchill once said that “Russia is a riddle wrapped in an enigma” which still holds
true today.75 And in many ways this riddle has become much harder to solve since Putin
came to power due to the fact that he has managed to insert his influence into every area of
society while sill upholding his popularity and at the same time run a strong authoritarian
state. Why Putin is such a strong figure in Russia today has many reasons however the
conditions he inherited from Yeltsin is one important factor.76
Firstly it is important to point out that at the start the branches of government such as the
Duma were very vulnerable and the population was susceptible to change. These
circumstances allowed Putin to set the rules of the game and gave him the ability to further
cultivate his ideas. Furthermore Putin decided to reshuffle his cabinet under the guise of
diminishing the corruption and changing the government to a modern administration.77
73 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 220. 74 S. Fish, ‘Putin’s Path’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 4, 2001, p. 71. 75 A. Applebaum, ‘Putin’s Grand Strategy’, South Central Review, vol. 35, no. 1, 2018, p. 22. 76 G. Graeme, ‘The Basis of Putin’s Power’, Russian Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2016, p. 46-69. 77 S. Hashim, ‘High-modernism and its limits – assessing state incapacity in Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008’
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 50. No. 3, 2017, p. 195-205
18
This could sound as an admirable idea, however in truth this only gave Putin the capability to
decide who he wanted in his government which means he could remove those who he
thought might oppose him.78 At the same time Putin also removed the elections for governors
and mayors which meant he could appoint those he deemed appropriate leading to even less
opposition in his government.79 This meant that the regime Putin established allowed him to
interfere at his own convenience in all areas of society these include, among others, the
judicial, military, economic and private spheres. This became possible due to the lack of
resistance that Putin created with his reforms. Further the elite became dependent on Putin
and his will which established his position even more.80 Together with this the economy was
for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union thriving leading to millions of Russian’s
joining the middle-class, which in turn made the population less worried when certain
questionable reforms became law.81
3.3 Putin’s use of Election Monitoring in Russia
Using election monitoring has become a democratic norm and Putin knows this so he uses
election monitoring to his advantage to be able to stay in power. However by holding up the
pretence that Russia is somewhat of a democratic country Putin is also putting himself and
his one party state at risk when the electoral rules to some extent also applies to his regime.
By keeping up the democratic appearances Putin is taking a greater risk by giving his
opponents a way to undermine his power. This means that maintaining a high standard in his
manipulations of the electoral process is necessary.82
A strategic move by Putin’s government is to specifically invite a certain amount of critics
and equally as many supporters meaning that a statement made by either side can be
disapproved by the other.83 Putin upholds this way of thinking in many areas, for example if a
protest is taking place with critics of his regime he allows this only if there is also a protest in
another part of Russia that showcases his supporters, by doing this neither side can have the
upper-hand. This also gives the illusion of democracy since he allows them to demonstrate.84
78 S. Hashim, ‘High-modernism and its limits’, p. 195-205. 79 P. Smith, ‘Putin’s Russia’, New York Times Upfront, vol. 145. No. 3, 2012, p. 16-17. 80 C. Monday, ‘Privatization to Putinization: the genesis of Russia’s hobbled oligarchy’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, vol. 50. No. 4, 2017, p. 303-317. 81 P. Smith, ‘Putin’s Russia’, p. 16-17. 82 S. Sestanovich, ’Putin’s invented oppositon’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18. No. 2, 2007, p. 122-V. 83 J. Kelley, ‘The more the merrier? The effects of having multiple international election monitoring
organisations’, p. 59. 84 J. Nichol, ‘Russia’s March 2012 presidential election: outcome and implications’, Current Politics and
Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, vol. 37. No. 3/4, 2012, p. 357-373.
19
It can be said that election monitoring is done not only to please the population but also
allows a country to maintain legitimacy in the global arena, to gain international respect the
practice continues to be important. However, just because an election monitoring
organisation is considered trustful by the majority one has to consider that they can all be
impartial to some extent.85
One of the most prominent election monitoring organisations is the OSCE which stands for
Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This organisation is the head of many
smaller monitoring organisation, their final report holds a high value in the international
sphere.86 In their report of the 2012 election they do not state outright that the election was a
scam, however in some areas it is implicated; they claim that there was obvious bias towards
a specific candidate and the favour of the ruling party was clear. While they did not detect a
direct observation of fraud it is indicated in their report that certain actions can clearly point
to manipulations.87
As can be seen in the numbers of how many people voted in the election, the turnout being
exceptionally high is beneficial to Putin and his party, however conversely the numbers were
disproportional in that they were suspiciously close to round numbers which could have been
an indication that there was some fraud in the process; nevertheless, there is no concreate
evidence of this.88 The Western observers during this election did in the end conclude that the
election was free but not fair, their statement was disapproved by another election monitoring
organisation called CIS, also known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. This
organisation is made up of 10 former Soviet countries and in their report they claim that
democratic values were upheld which indicates that a fair election was held, their statement
directly opposes the Western organisations claims.89
85 J. Kelley, ‘Election observers and their biases’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 21. No. 3, 2010, p. 158. 86 Bader, M, and H. Schmeets, ‘Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from
Russia’, p. 1-14. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 W. Clarke, ‘The 2012 presidential election in Russia: Putin returns’, Electoral Studies, vol. 32, no 2, 2013, p.
374-377
20
Furthermore Putin is aware that there are doubts of his legitimacy and the authenticity of his
election, and he counteracts these doubts with confusion. The Central Election Commission
of Russia is the institution that provides the international organisations with the data collected
from the election, the information the Commission has is provided by the regime meaning
that they have direct control over what numbers they want to share.
Therefore the monitoring organisations cannot explicitly see if manipulation of the election
has taken place, all they can do is investigate other countries where fraud has been known to
happen and see if the numbers correlate. Meaning that their reports can be more easily
disapproved since the election monitoring organisations are not able to prove their claims to a
high level of certainty.90
To sum up, it can be concluded that Putin uses the election monitoring on his own terms, he
upholds some of the election principles while still manipulating the process just enough to not
get caught in the act. He does this by inviting a specific amount of election observers that are
made up of critics but also of supporters. He also manages to confuse the observers by
controlling the information that they are provided with. All of this indicates a high level of
skill.
3.4 Putin’s use of disinformation in Russia
In Russia the population gets most of their information from the government through the
television or through newspapers; this is what will be discussed in this part of the analysis.
Social media can also be considered an area that is affected by disinformation however that
part of the research will be brought up when cyberspace security is discussed since it falls
under that category. The more traditional ways of disinformation will be the focus during this
part.
Despite the fact that the internet has become a widespread phenomenon, it is something that
the rural population of Russia is not able to take part in. As a result, the television becomes
their primary source of information.91
90 M. Bader and H. Schmeets, ‘Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from
Russia’, p. 1-14. 91 O. Lazitski, ‘Media endarkenment: a comparative analysis of 2012 election coverage in the United States and
Russia’, American Behavioural Scientist, vol. 58. No. 7, 2014, p. 899.
21
In Russia the regime has complete control over the state television and channels that do not
follow the ideals of the regime are threatened and can face forceful suppression by the
government.92
Additionally the sanctions that were installed in Russia after their involvement in the
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula had the ambition of damaging the elite of the country.
The economic difficulties that the sanctions presented affected the many rather than the few
at the top.93 The intention of restricting the regime instead impeded the opposition, when the
smaller competition companies were pushed out of the market leading to them having to give
their shares to the major stakeholders which are made up of either the regime, or strong
supporters of the regime. So while the intentions of the West might have been well founded
their actions only benefited the state-owned media companies. 94
Despite his violations of free speech, Putin is still considerably popular in Russia. This has
several reasons one of them being the Kremlin’s information war.95 The image that is showed
in the media of Putin is that he is a friend of all Russians, and those who oppose him are foes
to the normal Russian and wants to destroy the sovereignty of their homes. Political
campaigns in the media portray Putin in mortal combats where the morality of the opposition
is always presented as a threat.96
Putin even said this in his victory speech after the election in 2012, here it is important to
note that the media did not analyse Putin’s speech at all they just broadcasted what he said
meaning that the facts in his speech are not scrutinized for the population, they are just
presented as truth.97 A central part of how Putin manipulates the media is through
representing himself as a superhero; not many people have missed Putin riding bare chested,
scuba diving, or even arm wrestling. By presenting himself in this way Putin crafts an image
of himself as a remarkable man that takes actions when needed. If the portrayals of him are
true it is not a stretch for the population to believe that Putin is able to solve their problems
without much resistance.98
92 T. Hopper, ‘Pressing for change: Russia’s 2012 presidential election’, Harvard International Review, vol. 33.
No. 3, 2011, p. 9-10. 93 I. Kiriya, ‘The impact of international sanctions on Russia’s media economy’, Russian Politics, vol. 2. No. 1,
2017, p. 80-97. 94 Ibid. 95 T. Hopper, ‘Pressing for change: Russia’s 2012 presidential election’, 2011, p. 9-10. 96 O. Lazitski, ‘Media endarkenment’, p. 913. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid.
22
Further the manipulations of the non-Putin centred media is done through what some call a
‘staged play’ where fake interviews are conducted to display just enough truth together with
fabrications so for a normal citizens it will be hard to detect where the actual truth lies. Actors
are hired to play ‘victims’ of certain situations to portray a controlled image, fiction and fact
are mixed together and serious events are portrayed as an exciting TV-show rather than
news.99 The aim of the regime is not only to confuse the population by presenting critics such
as Ukraine and the United States as threats but in the long run prove that democracy is as bad
as the regime has claimed. This is done by spurring on conspiracy theories they themselves
have planted by using disinformation.100
To sum up one can say that using disinformation has not only one goal but several, these
include supressing the opposition by portraying them as threat while at the same time
presenting Putin as the saviour of Russia. Alongside this, the aim of undermining democratic
values always play a role in the misinformation given to the population.
3.5 Putin’s use of cyberspace security in Russia
Disinformation is closely intertwined with cyberspace, since the information that is provided
through social media and other parts of the World Wide Web is to some extent controlled by
the Russian regime. The focus of this part will be on more modern ways of information flows
as opposed to the earlier analysis of the more traditional ones. Though the cyberspace is not
explicitly the internet, though the internet is included in its spectrum and the importance of it
will therefore be a large focus.
Though the development of social media and the internet is fairly new, Russia has already
developed an efficient way of dealing with the difficulties that this area presents. Large
restrictions on how the citizens are allowed to use social media is already in place.101 In the
beginning regimes undermined the importance of the interconnectedness the internet would
create; today the internet encourages communication and transparency in the political process
and the effectiveness of discussion between the state and its subjects.102
99 P. Pomerantsev, ‘The Kremlin’s Information War’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 26. No. 4, 2015, p. 40-41. 100 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 50-51. 101 U. Mejias and N. Vokuev, ‘Disinformation in the media: the case of Russia and the Ukraine’, Media, Culture
and Society, vol. 39, no. 7, 2017, p. 18. 102 Z. Yu, ‘Political Activity of Russia’s Internet Audience on a Regional Level as a Constituent of Civil
Society’, European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 1. No. 1, 2015, p. 65-69.
23
The cyberspace can be considered to hold strategic competitions and Russia therefore sees
this arena as a chance to shift the global internet narrative in their favour and take back the
leverage that the United States currently has over the international internet governance. The
internet has for the regime in Russia turned in to a valuable foreign policy tool and their
stance on policy making in this arena is influenced by their traditional views of sovereignty,
so their actions in global internet matters are influenced thereafter. This can be exemplified
by the regime’s attempt at trying to get a resolution through at the United Nations that would
prohibit information aggression which can be deduced to mean that they do not want
ideological attempts to be able to undermine the stability of their regime.103
The importance of social media during the Arab Spring is something that the Kremlin is
acutely aware of, the internet is therefore perceived as a threat in Russia. Therefore they seek
to regulate the internet’s infrastructure and the social networks on different platforms, to
avoid a similar situation of Arab Spring happening in their own country. The fact that mass
demonstrations after the election in 2012 were coordinated on different social media
platforms raised the regimes anxiety over the power that the cyberspace has not only for them
to strengthen their position but also the chance it gives the opposition to strengthen theirs.104
Restricting social media cannot be done in the same way as traditional media is constrained
since taking away networks or restricting access is an obvious move while strategically lying
on television is something that can go unnoticed by the average citizen. The restrictions on
social media has decreased the loyalty to the Kremlin which poses a bigger threat to Putin.
The manipulations in this arena must therefore hold a higher standard since it is not as easy to
control.105 The regime is constantly promoting further boundaries on internet use by arguing
that different networks pose a threat to Russia’s autonomy leading them to be reviewed and
then restricted since they could be considered a risk to the national security.106 Russia
currently has laws that allow the government to observe all internet traffic and usage of the
population without having to get permission. This has allowed the regime to gain influence in
the social media sphere and even though this arena is impossible to fully control due to its
vast space, Russia has managed well to use what they can to their advantage.107
103 J. Noceti, ‘Contest and Conquest’, International Affairs, vol. 91, No. 1, 2015, p. 111-130. 104 Ibid. 105 N. Bode, and A, Makarychev, ‘The New Social Media’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 60. No. 2, 2013,
p. 53-62. 106 J. Noceti, ‘Contest and Conquest’, p. 111-130. 107 J. Stevenson, ‘The Trump-Russia connection’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no 3, 2017, p. vi-viii.
24
To sum up one can say that the Russian government sees both opportunities and
disadvantages with the existence of the cyberspace. To further their political agenda they are
trying to insert their ideas into cyberspace to influence other countries. However since the
cyberspace also gives the opposition and the general population a platform it needs at the
same time be restricted.
3.6 Putin’s use of civil society repression in Russia
A free civil society has the ability to pose a real threat to the Russian regime so to contain the
development of one Putin has restricted his country’s civil society. He justifies the reforms by
saying that they will improve Russia when in truth they just limit the space for the individual
and brings power to the regime.108 A fully functioning civil society could have the possibility
of the opposition growing stronger so restricting this area is a vital component to Putin’s
politics. However at the same time Putin has realised that some sort of civil society is an
essential component to having an active society, and therefore an important piece to be able
to stay in power.109
The regime strategy in Russia is to hold a firm distinction between the state and society so
that the Kremlin can dominate the civil society and leave little room for development. This
distinction allows for a certain leeway for the government’s strategy. By funding specific
organisations that the regime calls non-governmental organisations they are deceiving the
population into believing that the regime does support a thriving society. However, in truth
these non-governmental organisations are run by the state, and is dependent on their funding
as well as their continued support. This means that the organisations do not allow for
opinions that differ much from the regime and so Putin is still in control while at the same
time giving his society a space to function.110
108 S. Henderson, ‘Civil Society in Russia: state society relations in the post-Yeltsin era’, Problems of Post-
Communism, vol. 58, no. 3, 2011, p. 11. 109 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 159. 110 J. Richter, and W. Hatch, ‘Organising civil society in Russia and China: a comparative approach’,
International Journal of Politics, vol. 26. No. 4, 2013, p. 323-347.
25
When Putin was re-elected in 2012, further restrictions was instated on organisations that the
regime deems to be involved in political activities that they claim pose a threat. They use the
so called Foreign Agents Act as a means to be able to justify their anti-democratic actions
that are enforced in Russia. This Act means that civil society organisations must comply with
the ideological view of the government to be able to continue their activities, those few
organisations that do not want to comply has to do so in secret since the punishment for not
following the Russian ideals are something that they fear.111
To understand the Russian civil society one must not only understand Putin’s intentions but
also the mind-set of the population. When the new civil society was implemented in Russia
under Yeltsin during the 90’s it only produced negative social issues and the political and
economic domain suffered heavy consequences.112 So when Putin later managed to reverse
these issues that had left the Russian population in a vulnerable state through a centralisation
of power his ideas regarding the restrictions to the civil society did not seem so extreme due
to the earlier hardships that this area had produced. To this day Russians that grew up or that
lived during the troubling times of the 90’s still have a deep distrust of the whole public
sphere, so when Putin talks about new reforms it is not far-fetched for the population to
believe that what he says is justified because his previous action led to an improvement for
the majority of Russians which is something that the population remember.113
The people.s disinterest in the public and political lives is therefore an important reason as to
why the civil society in Russia has a hard time to establish itself; the tough restrictions does
play a part as well. However it is harder for a regime to supress a bigger crowd than it is to
supress a smaller one. Many Russians do not view their social and political sphere beyond
that of their family members therefore it is a stretch to believe that they would be willing to
sacrifice that to move against government officials. Nevertheless, there have been signs of an
increased protest activity in Russia.114 As time moves on so does the population and with
time fewer citizens will have experienced the harrowing situation during the 90’s and will
just have experienced repressions by Putin.
111 A. Sarang, ‘Civil society and drugs in Russia: moving towards the conservative agenda’, The Lancet, vol.
390, No. 10102, 2017, p. 1621-1622. 112 Z. Golenkova, ‘Civil Society in Russia’, Sociological Research, vol. 37, no. 4, 1998, p. 87. 113 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 220. 114 A. Evans, ‘Protests and civil society in Russia: The struggle for the Khimki Forest’, Communists and Post-
Communist studies, vol. 45. No. 3/4, 2012, p. 233-242.
26
In summary one can say that a flourishing civil society poses dangers to Putin’s regime,
however allowing Russia’s civil society to function on his terms is favourable both to the
people and to the government. Further the disinterest of the population that stemmed from
their dreadful experiences in the 90’s also contributes to the current civil society.
4. Conclusion
The aim of this research was to investigate what soft powers play a part in the consolidation
of an authoritarian regime in Russia and what strategies the present regime use to further
legitimise their political agenda. The analysis did not only seek to investigate Russia and
Putin but also examine the importance of a strong leader in an authoritarian state and use of
different power mechanism to consolidate power. To make the purpose of the research
possible three questions were asked, and together with the evidence presented in the analysis
the response to the questions will now be presented. The questions will be answered
separately and the conclusions drawn will be based on the results obtained in the analysis.
The first question that the research sought to answer was how did Putin’s first eight years in
power affect the use of soft powers in Russia today? In response to this one can say that the
strong position that Putin established during his first presidency has resulted in him being
able to use the soft powers to his advantage. The earlier reforms enabled the current situation
in Russia and increased Putin’s place in the Russian society. The circumstances such as a
vulnerable Duma and a susceptible population that Putin took control over allowed him to
conduct his political agenda in the way that he wanted, which have in turn affected how he
uses the soft powers at the present. The foundations on which Putin’s power is based on has
had a significant influence over how he has managed to stay in power for so long. If this
investigation would have focused on the use of soft powers during Putin’s first period in
office the analysis would look profoundly different, since Putin’s actions today is heavily
influenced by his first presidency.
The second question this research sought to answer was what soft powers have led to the
consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Russia? The theory that this investigation is
based on suggested that authoritarian states use election monitoring, disinformation,
cyberspace security, and civil society repression to maintain and consolidate their power. As
can been seen in the analysis of this research, Russia is no exception. The Kremlin uses all of
the soft powers that are mentioned in the main theory of this investigation, some have a
greater importance however they all make an imperative imprint on the Russian society.
27
With the use of these soft powers Putin has managed to maintain a strong position in Russia
for a significant amount of time. Additionally the Kremlin shows a high level of expertise
while using all of these mechanisms to further consolidate his power. Only speculations about
Putin using these soft powers can be done meaning that the proficiency that Putin has in these
areas should not be underestimated.
The third question this research sought to answer was how does Putin use these soft powers to
further legitimize his political agenda? Putin uses all of the soft powers that the theory
suggested, he uses disinformation to deceive the population by converting the truth to fit his
political goals, this enables the other soft powers among them election monitoring. Putin can
convince the public that his elections are free and fair when in truth the election process in
Russia is manipulated to achieve the desired outcome. Additionally the cyberspace security
arena is a useful tool that is used to influence other countries however since it also gives the
opposition and the population the regime restrict it. The last arena is civil society repression,
this is an area that Putin allows to function on his own terms since a flourishing civil society
poses a real threat to the regime.
One can say that the Russian regime and consequently Putin uses all of the soft powers in
unique ways that are individually crafted to fit the goals that he has for that area, one thing
the arenas have in common though is the skill that the regime have when they manage them.
The Kremlin sees both opportunities and disadvantages with using soft powers however they
have decided that the additional prospects that the soft powers present to the regime should
not be undervalued. The soft powers are used on terms that are specifically created by the
regime and the manipulations of the different parts of society further legitimise the Kremlin’s
political agenda, this can be seen in the way that the soft powers are handled. Putin succeeds
in manipulating soft powers while seemingly maintaining an image of innocence this
indicates a high level of skill since his actions can never be fully proved.
To conclude one can say that the aim of the research was fulfilled. The three questions were
answered and even though more extensive research could have been done with more accounts
of the Russian regime discussed or more examples given, the purpose of the research was
achieved. Putin uses the soft powers to his advantage to further consolidate his power. With
time more challenges might appear for Putin to overcome however at the moment the
capability that the Russian regime illustrates when using the soft powers should not be
underestimated.
28
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