POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)
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POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)
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Volume 31: October 2016
ISSN 2414-6633
https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31
Editorial Board
Editor-in-Chief: Jaroslava Barbieri (Italy, Ukraine)
Luca Arfini (Italy)
Lorand Bodo (Germany)
Andrés Lopez Rivera (Ecuador)
Alice Martini (Italy)
Dorothea Tommasi (Italy)
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Table of Contents
Editorial Note ........................................................................................................................... 4
Articles Parliamentary ombudsman (ouvidoria) and its democratic potential: The Brazilian case /
Thales Torres Quintão .................................................................................................................. 5
The impact of societal preferences on national monetary policy outcomes: A revival of
economic pluralism / Christoph Steinert ................................................................................ 26
Determinants of Re-Autocratization: An Empirical Analysis from 1996 to 2013 /
Kristin Eichhorn ........................................................................................................................ 53
Call for Papers ........................................................................................................................ 78
Instructions for Authors ....................................................................................................... 79
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Editorial Note
Dear Reader,
Our Editorial Board is proud to present Volume 31 of Politikon, the flagship academic journal of the
International Association for Political Science Students.
The current issue will certainly prove a fascinating reading for this part of the year.
In this eclectic collection, you will be able to explore the institutional designs of the parliamentary
ombudsman in Brazil and the pattern of action that prevails from his/her relationship with the
public. You will have the chance to investigate how the size and strength of different economic
actors are the central determinants for monetary policy outcomes. Finally, you will have the
opportunity to read about re-autocratizations, namely the collapse of electoral democracies in the last
decade, with a specific emphasis on effects for economic growth rates and governance performance.
We hope you will enjoy the following highly dense 70 pages of valuable academic work from young
scholars across the globe.
While this volume has collected papers that use mainly quantitative analysis, we believe that with
such a varied yet fascinating range of topics each reader may find something that will catch their
interest. Hopefully, you will get inspired and submit your own article to one of our IAPSS academic
journals.
We are looking forward to reviewing your work!
Your Editors
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)
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Parliamentary ombudsman (ouvidoria) and its democratic potential: The
Brazilian case
Thales Torres Quintão
https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31.1
Thales Torres Quintão, 29, from Belo Horizonte (Brazil), is currently a PhD Candidate of Political Science at the
Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). He graduated with a Bachelor’s in Social Sciences in 2009 (PUC –
Minas). He has a specialization degree in Management, 2012 (UFMT). In 2015, he earned a Master’s degree in
Political Science at UFMG. His research interests are: civil society, democratic theory, political participation,
democratic innovations, and participation and deliberation mechanisms of the legislative branch in Latin America.
Abstract
This research aims to map and analyze the institutional designs of the parliamentary ombudsman in Brazil and the
pattern of action that prevails from his/her relationship with the public. A qualitative approach was used for this case
study, focusing on document analysis of formal resolutions of state assemblies as well as the information provided on
their websites. A case study of the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG) was also created in order to better
understand how the work of the ombudsman is structured and how the interactions of such with other officials may be
relevant to his/her performance. The case study determined that the parliamentary ombudsman is constituted as an
access mechanism for citizens, amplifying the opportunities for them to present their demands. However, the ombudsman
is neither a communication nor a participation channel.
Keywords
Accountability, Institutional Design, Parliamentary Ombudsman, Political Participation
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Introduction
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (also known as the Constitution of the Citizen) recognizes,
establishes, and formalizes the political participation of citizens in Brazil. In other words, democracy
and participation are perceived as mutually constituent phenomena. Based on institutionalized
participation in the state, the public ouvidoria1 (the office of the ombudsman) was formed, as a means
of citizen participation.2 In 1986, Curitiba was the first city to establish a public ouvidoria. However,
the Federal Constitution of 1988, which set out the principles of impartiality and publicity related to
government actions, indirectly spread public ouvidorias across the country in different branches and
government levels, each with a diverse structural configuration. An assessment made in August 2014
indicated that there were 1,123 public ouvidorias in Brazil (Ouvidoria Geral da União,3 2014). Although
this number is significant, it is important to bear in mind that they may include organizations that,
while referred to as ouvidorias, do not fully exercise their intended purposes.
In general, the public ouvidorias analyses prevail in the executive branch, but also have some in the
judicial branch. But even so, these studies are quite inexpressive. The studies done on the office of
the ombudsman concentrate on the analyses of formal resolutions and normative instruments of the
organization without collecting primary data as a methodology, which would enable the identification
of political forces and officials involved or even the flow of communication played by this
mechanism.
The goal of this research paper is to understand the scope and the purpose of this legislative
mechanism for the effectiveness of democratic participation, social inclusion, population control,
horizontal accountability, and public justification (Vera and Lavalle, 2012). For said purposes, we
utilize the institutional design framework. As a premise, the institutional design can influence the
distribution of power of the state legislature’s ouvidorias.
1 Ouvidorias are not exclusive in Brazil. There are ouvidorias in privates companies, whose concern is the quality of the product, the service offered, or customer loyalty (Lyra, 2014). 2 The public ouvidoria does not act in the judiciary field, neither does it possess coercive power nor a high functional status and is not part of the constitutional plan. The ombudsman is appointed to consolidate the external control from a power to another. However, the ouvidoria deals with the internal control of different public organizations (Gomes, 2000). Therefore, using the term ouvidoria in this paper. 3 The Ouvidoria Geral da União (Federal Ombudsman) is a part of the office formerly known as Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), which was terminated as a result of the ACA (Anti-Corruption Agency). Nowadays the Federal Ombudsman is linked to the Department of Transparency, Supervision, and Control.
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1. Public Ouvidoria and Institutional Design
The public ouvidoria is an organization that aims to achieve the constitutional principles that control
public administration while also guiding the provisions of public services: legality, impersonality,
morality, publicity, and efficiency. Beyond that, there are the main attributions of a public ouvidoria,
which are change induction, damage repair, and promotion of democracy (Lyra, 2004, p. 144).
This mechanism should allow for the promotion of social and political inclusion,4 along with the
creation of a democracy between citizens and public administration (Antero, 2014; Lyra, 2011). The
ouvidoria serves as mediation between Brazil and the people, so as to resolve conflicts in a non-judicial
way and guarantee the rights of citizens, acting on recommendations given by the higher power; in
the public justification (Vera and Lavalle, 2012); and the exercise of power in transparent ways
(accountability as answerability) (Schedler, 1999).
The readings on public ouvidorias indicate that the institutional design can be more “modernizing”
(focusing on instrumental rationality) or more “democratic” (focusing on dialogic rationality), both
pursuing social justice while also stimulating public participation. The institutional design aims to
shape institutional structures and processes to achieve the desired results (Olsen, 1997) through
controlling landmarks, formal resolutions, organization charts, and procedures. As the designs are
not neutral and reflect the ideas and interests of the officials, their variations and changes will have a
direct impact on the end result of the organizations (Goodin, 1996).
Studies show the interrelation between the performance of democratic innovations and the design
adopted for the promotion of political participation (Avritzer, 2009; Smith, 2009). Fung (2003, 2006)
demonstrates the importance of the design for equality, social inclusion, participation, and
deliberation in “mini-publics.” For him, the design offers parameters and limits, defining rules and
procedures that directly affect the selection and recruitment of the participants, how public
deliberation will be made, where it will happen, the rate of participation, social accountability, etc.
The integration of the aforementioned and their respective designs shape what the author calls a
“democracy cube,” meaning that those elements are intertwined within each other, influencing the
political outcomes of those spheres.
4 The concept of social and political inclusion is the efficiency capacity of presentation demands and requirements to their needs (Miguel, 2013).
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The institutional design is not the only factor influencing political participation. However, it should
be recognized as a fundamental vector to assert certain patterns of interference and engagement of
citizens as well as the typical obstacles of democracy, which are exemplified by cynicism, apathy, and
low political efficiency. These aspects are related to the political design organizations that make up
the country and their relationship with the public (Marques, 2010).
Considering the ouvidoria to be a kind of democratic innovation that involves a citizen-state
relationship (Isunza and Hevia, 2006), it is still considered to be quite fragile. The hegemonic model
of the ouvidoria is created top-down, with the norms established by the same organization of that
which will be supervised. The appointment of the ombudsman is of the supervised organization’s
own choosing; the selection is done in such a way as to promote efficiency and administrative
modernization, all while maintaining citizens’ rights. Those elements reveal the flaws of the ouvidorias’
public autonomy, forming a closer relationship between the government and society, which has a
more social and horizontal accountability. For Quintão (2014) three key factors contribute to the
optimization of the ouvidoria: public autonomy; cooperation between government bodies in order to
foster its recommendations; and performance capacity.
In order to be autonomous and democratic, ouvidorias need to have the following attributes: (1) the
ombudsman selection must be made through an independent third party; (2) an advisory council
chosen by the people, proposing procedures and supervising the work and actions of said
organization; (3) the duration of the term to allow for the possibility of renewing ideas and maintain
the status quo;5 (4) financial and administrative autonomy of the ouvidoria; (5) the obligation of a
quick response time from the leader, under legal penalty, setting priority and matter of urgency; (6)
the disclosure of their action and their analytical reports in the media, allowing extensive access to
the public; (7) confidentially of the person who looked for the ouvidoria, guaranteeing that he/she
does not suffer damages or sanctions (Cardoso, 2012; Lyra, 2011; Zaverucha, 2008).
Having an ombudsman is one of the crucial aspects of autonomy, and consequently, for the
efficiency of the public ouvidoria as well. Being a single-member position, the ombudsman focuses on
the management of this mechanism and its respective attributive functions (Silva, 2012). The role of
an ombudsman is essentially political and deals with the power relationship between the leader of the
5 The duration of the term of the ouvidor should not coincide with the political term. “The political calendar would be uncoupled from the administrative calendar with the objective of making it institutionally clear that the ouvidoria is much more an organization of the people than that of the government” (Zaverucha, 2008, p.226).
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ouvidoria and the institution over which he/she resides. The idea is that ouvidorias cannot be organized
or controlled by the supervising institutions; otherwise, it would jeopardize their public purpose.
For a greater social and public legitimacy, the authors researched suggest the selection of the
ombudsman should be through an indirect election by an advisory council outside the political power
(Lyra, 2014). After being issued a ballot with three names, it would be sent to public authorities that
would then determine the ombudsman. 6 However, this model only accepts people with low
representation. Often the least voted in the ballot, drawn up by public authorities, is the chosen one.
In other words, the government-owned institution has the final say over the chosen ombudsman.7
Nonetheless, there is still a lack of information on how the ballot process is made. For instance: how
is the public deliberation in these forums and meetings conducted; which organizations have voices
and participate in this process, why do some participate and others do not; where does the
deliberation occur; how many representatives from each organization are there; how is the voting
done; what are the possible asymmetries of power in the decision-making process, etc. The
aforementioned are unanswered questions about the dynamics of the indirect election of the
ombudsman. Moreover, it is crucial to do a more systematic analysis for the ombudsman nomination
in order to better understand the distinct political projects (Dagnino, Olvera, Panfichi, 2006) marked
by the heterogeneity within society and the government itself, indicating that the relationship
between them is not stable but accented by multiplicity of conflicts, political will, and in certain
contexts, distinct projects.
2. Methodology
The research strategy of this paper consists of two steps. First, a comparative research was made
analyzing the design of all 13 state legislatures as well as the Federal District. We used the
documentary research technique, based on a qualitative approach, to examine the data collected on
the ouvidorias of the state assemblies. A content analysis was held on formal resolutions (creation
decrees, internal regulations, operating manuals, etc.) to measure how this mechanism operates. In
addition, a website of the assemblies was made in order to comprehend how the ouvidorias are
6 This format began with the Police Ombudsman in the state of São Paulo in 1995. 7 Therefore, when the IX National Conference on Human Rights occurred in 2004, a model was created where the most voted on the ballot would automatically be appointed as the ombudsman, if fifty percent of the votes came from public organizations.
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included in these institutional organizations, with a look at accessibility and the information made
available (Raupp and Pinho, 2013).
Furthermore, the methodology of the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG) case study was
adopted in order to understand the distribution of power and political officials involved directly or
indirectly in the performance of the parliamentary ouvidoria. Eight individual in-depth interviews were
held with ombudsmen and also with civil servants (four for each group). The selection of civil
servants to be interviewed was based on the snowball technique. The case study in ALMG is justified
because it was one of the first assemblies to establish an ouvidoria (in 2002), consequently encouraging
communication between state legislatures and the people.
According to Gerring (2007), said case study applies to a complete description and understanding of
the factors of each situation and context. This paper has the objective of developing studies and
further a theoretical development on a topic that, until now, was poorly investigated or relatively new
(Babbie, 1986).
3. Parliamentary Ouvidorias in Brazil
3.1. Concepts and communication methods
Parliamentary ouvidorias are a direct communication channel established between state legislatures and
the people, where the public can contribute to the improvement of services and functions. It allows
for the participation of any individual at various time periods as well as offer citizen protection and
control of public administration. Furthermore, these mechanisms have a purpose: to indicate paths,
alternatives, and suggestions directed to the Board of Directors, providing a mediation space not
only for the people but also for the government workers of the state legislatures (Federal Senate,
2013; Queiroz, 2012; Federal Chamber, 2010; Tromska, 2004). Being that the final recipient of the
aforementioned purposes is the Board of Directors, this shows that it is a crucial factor for providing
more effective ouvidorias.
In general, the ouvidorias can act in three different dimensions: as a house of information, where
citizens can acquire data about the legislative administration, with the implementation of the Law on
Access to Information (LAI)8 facilitating the process; as a communication platform, which involves
the principle of direct incidence of the flow of interaction between the government and the people;
8 The LAI was promulgated on November 18th of 2011 (Law n°12.527).
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or as a diffuse control mechanism to develop accountability, either from an internal and horizontal
control or from an external and social control. They have the idea to establish a closer and more
horizontal relationship between the representatives and the represented, as well as the development
of the legislative proposals.
State legislature’s ouvidorias are established by ordinary laws, which differ from state to state. Hence, it
is important to analyse the different policies that contribute to their organization. As previously
mentioned, 14 assemblies have established an ouvidoria.9 The states with an ouvidoria are: Amazonas,
Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Paraíba, Piauí, Rio Grande do Sul,
Roraima, Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and Tocantins. The Federal District also has an ouvidoria. Almost
half of the states do not have this organization10 (Appendix 1). The first state that formed an
ouvidoria was Espirito Santo in 2001, and the last was Roraima in 200811 (Appendix 2). In just seven
states (Amazonas, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and
Tocantins), this organization is recognized in the Internal Regiment (RI) of the assembly, which
allows for more legal support, since it decreases political weakness (Appendix 3).
We can only measure the efficiency of a communication channel if the people know it exists. In
order to have a mechanism, such as the ombudsman, working and available, it is necessary to
disclose its existence through its own institutional media or by making appearances in different
communities. The set of existing communication channels in the state legislatures are shown in Chart
1 (absolute numbers).
Out of the 14 ombudsmen analyzed, the communication methods used mostly was the Internet (e-
mail and forms) (Appendix 4). The data above shows it is possible to group the ombudsmen based
on how well a certain communication method works. If we consider that each positive response to a
communication method receives a score equal to one and a state assembly uses all available means of
communication, it would achieve a score of seven.
9 Four independent variables were tested on the existence of the ouvidoria in state assemblies: region, state HDI, GDP per capita, and population of the state. We had hypothesized that states with a larger population, HDI, and GDP per capita would have greater financial, human, and technological resources to implement an ombudsman. Data for the last three variables were taken from estimates of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for the year 2014. None of the four variables obtained statistical correlation (Pearson test) with the dependent variable (ouvidoria), which showed the difficulty of explaining the reason for implementing an ouvidoria and that it be related to a political order, not socioeconomic factors. 10 In total, Brazil has 26 states, not including the Federal District. 11 Nationally, the first parliamentary ouvidoria was created in the Chamber of Deputies in 2001. The Senate only installed this mechanism in 2011.
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Chart 1 – Communication Methods of Parliamentary Ouvidorias
Source: Author’s elaboration. Estimate made in June 2015.
Only one state (Mato Grosso) provides every means of communication, in other words, it achieved a
score of seven, while Rio Grande do Sul reached a score of six (not available in person). Roraima has
the minimum score of one, offering only e-mail as a means of communication. Piaui, Santa Catarina,
Sergipe, and Tocantins all have a score of two (the most common), having only e-mail and contact
forms as a means of communication (Appendix 6).
The diversity of communication methods may mean expanding access for citizens, as well as a quick
response time, even with just the single-member official of the ouvidoria, which allows for individual
political participation. In states with a lower HDI and GDP, the free communications methods, such
as calling the Toll Free Number or having a meeting in person, could be strengthened and prioritized
so as to increase representation. Furthermore, the preference for using digital media can, in such
cases, mean exclusion and limit the scope of communication and citizen involvement, especially in
more remote areas with a lower quality Internet.
Given the importance of the information and communication technologies, especially the Internet, it
seemed relevant to see how ouvidorias are presented in the websites of the assemblies and also show
its potential for interaction with the people. The purpose of the study of these websites was to
examine two variables: placement and provision of information on the ouvidoria.
The first verified variable was where the ombudsman or the link to him/her is on the home page of
the website, as an indicator about how much thought went into facilitating the search of the
14
9 9
54 4
3
E-mail Form Phone In Person Toll FreeNumber
Fax Letter
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ombudsman, in addition to demonstrating how strategic the ouvidoria is for the legislative
development.
Out of 14 ouvidorias, only three states (Mato Grosso, Piauí, and Sergipe) have their own access
button, placing it on the home page of the state legislature’s website. Two other states (Paraíba and
Roraima) provide the link with his/her name at the top of the home page. In nine other states, the
link to the ouvidoria is placed as an option on the home page. However, Internet users must use the
scroll bar to find the link, which can limit the amount of access per day. It also means Internet users
have more screens and clicks to reach the information or the contact forms to register their
complaint, making it more difficult to understand the portal and its navigation (Pinho, 2008). The
more clicks and screens Internet users have to go through, the more likely they are to give up
searching and move on.
It is expected that the websites of the assemblies make a wide range of information available to the
public. Some examples include: its features and objectives, a picture of the ouvidor, if there is a
mandate assignment as well as his/her term and the possibility of re-election, contact forms, the type
of messages to be sent to the ombudsman, legislation and normative acts, and performance rating of
the ombudsman. The aforementioned is the minimum amount of information that must be included
on the website.
The information is concise and refers to the concept, functions, objectives, and contact information.
None of the state assemblies has all the information listed above. Only five assemblies indicate who
the ombudsman is (Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Minas Gerais, and Paraíba) and only two state
assemblies depict the selection process of the ombudsman (Minas Gerais and Paraiba). Only one lists
each ombudsman and his/her occupation (Ceará). The disclosure of the ombudsman is considered
extremely important because of the single-member position, since only one person is responsible for
the duties of said occupation. Lastly, three state assemblies (Piauí, Sergipe, and Tocantins) do not
provide any information on the ombudsman and only offer a contact form.
None of the ouvidorias make their analytical reports containing the comments received and replies
public, as it happens in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate where it is possible to access
statistical reports about a certain person (state, age, gender, and education, message content, etc.). In
addition, in the assemblies’ websites there is no disclosure on the ombudsman activity, which is
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consistent with low visibility of this organization among citizens and can damage the principle of
accountability and, the most worrying effect, can verify it is an inert medium.
Among the assemblies that have ouvidorias, there is still little exposure in their institutional websites,
materializing what could be classified as “under information: completely insufficient information that
discredits the news” (Sartori Apud Pinho and Winkler, 2007, p. 2), i.e., information is not relevant
from a political standpoint.
3.2. Designs of the Ouvidorias in State Assemblies
In this section we will see the different structures that contribute to the performance quality of the
ouvidoria. We will examine the following factors that contribute to the improvement of democratic
potential and autonomy in these ouvidorias: selection process of the ombudsman, period of mandate,
possibility of re-election and possibility of public hearings.
The majority of who is selected for the ombudsman position is a state legislator (deputy
ombudsman) (Chart 2). The Board of Directors of the assembly chooses the ombudsman, which is a
similar process to that of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Out of eight ouvidorias that have
this structure, three ouvidorias have determined the length of the term to be two years, two ouvidorias is
one year, and the rest did not make said information available. Re-election is possible in four cases;
however, in two states re-election is not allowed (Appendix 5).
The length of the term is important so as to provide employment security, preventing the
ombudsman from being fired by a higher power. Though the possibility of several re-elections of the
ombudsman can be damaging in the future, it can generate a dependency between the organization
and the ombudsman.
In two other assemblies, the Board of Directors appoints a government worker as the ombudsman
(civil servant ombudsperson) to re-enforce the political role of the Office of the Ombudsman. This
system takes place in two states: Mato Grosso and Santa Catarina.
Finally, there is the position denominated as societal ombudsperson. In this case, a third party
advisory council creates a ballot (three candidates only) and sends it to the president of the assembly.
Among these three candidates, the president nominates the ombudsman, to be discussed later. This
process only happens in Paraíba, where the ombudsman is a non-legislative member and has a two-
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year term with the possibility of only one re-election. Yet studies show that the chosen ombudsman
is the one less voted on the ballot, has little exposure, and is not involved in politics (Lyra, 2008).
Chart 2 - Profile of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of state assemblies
Source: Author's elaboration. Estimate made in June 2015.
It may seem that the societal ombudsman is the one that provides more autonomy to the ouvidoria,
having a greater capacity to develop control over the public and make proposals. However, the
deputy ombudsman can be more popular with the other deputies, and could establish a better
dialogical relationship with them. This is so because the ombudsman has the same position and
social equality as his/her co-workers. We either improve communication internally (deputy
ombudsperson) or create a stricter control model (societal ombudsperson).
The crucial role of the ouvidoria is to integrate the relevant aspects of the individual demands as one,
that is, understanding the personal complaints as part of a collective structure that needs to be
discussed and re-thought (Trombka, 2004). It would be crucial for these organizations to require
public hearings, since they are one of the main instruments of participation. Public hearings could be
a social interface that enables communication with the people about the structure of the ouvidorias.
Eight parliamentary ouvidorias (Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Espiríto Santo, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Sul,
Roraima, and Tocatins) recognize the right of the ombudsman to request a public hearing (Chart 3).
In conclusion, legislative ouvidorias follow an institutional design that allows it to be: (1) a consultative
space for government workers and deputies, so as to publicly ratify the rulers actions previously
decided, (2) a mechanism to receive allegations, when the ombudsman role would only be to “pass
along” said allegations to other institutions, such as the Public Prosecution’s Office, to investigate the
problem.
8
21
3
DeputyOmbdusman
Civil ServantOmbudsman
SocietalOmbudsman
Noinformation
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Chart 3 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and the Requirement of Public Hearings
Source: Author’s elaboration. Estimate made in June 2015.
3.3. The Case Study of the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG)
The ALMG established an ouvidoria in 2002. The president, in agreement with other party leaders,
elected a state legislator as the ombudsman. Since its creation, five different ombudsmen have had
this position. However, one state legislator assumed the position three different times, in distinct
legislatures, which can be a problem as that leaves little room for improvement and new ideas.
In the case study, it is evident that the ouvidoria is a political mechanism and acts in favor of
parliamentary decorum. This mechanism is linked to the Ethics Committee of the House and the
ombudsman is more of an instrument of control and supervision for the legislators. Therefore, the
design attributed to the ouvidoria is to receive complaints and criticism about the misconduct of the
officials from any citizen, allowing each one to file a formal complaint against an official. The final
decision to continue or not with the complaint depends on the Board of Directors. As a result, the
ouvidoria is not a political participation mechanism but rather related to other social communication
methods of ALMG with the people.
Confusions between what would be the ouvidoria’s responsibility and that of the internal affairs
(individual interviews) can occur when focusing on parliamentary decorum. For example, a civil
servant said corregidor numerous times when he/she should have said ouvidor. Comparato (2012)
demonstrates that the concept of accountability involves three aspects: supervision, investigation,
and punishment. The first aspect is the only one that is of the ouvidoria’s responsibility, which often
happens upon demands. The other two is that of the internal affairs’ responsibility.
Through the case study it was possible to identify the variables that directly affect the work of the
ouvidoria. First, the nature of the ombudsman can affect his/her performance. Some critiques were
made about the political leadership of the deputy ombudsman.
8
4
2
Yes No No information
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The chosen ombudsman is an unknown member. It is a political decision. Usually the ombudsman is
not an active legislator in the political party. The older the member, the more respected he/she is for
the position. (Civil Servant 3.)
The position of ombudsman is not attractive for legislators. The president of ALMG appoints a
legislator that was recommended to him/her and the legislator accepts the position. From the
political standpoint, being the ombudsman is not an important position, from the political
standpoint. An ombudsman in the past said, “Ouvidoria was always one of the last positions to be
filled.”
No one knew [who the ombudsman was]. It was not a known position. It had no visibility. Not even
the deputies knew who the ombudsman was. I went to a public hearing in Uberlândia. The deputy
asked me, “Is there an ombudsman at this hearing?” And I answered, “I am the ombudsman.”
(Deputy ombudsman 2.)
The second variable is the Board of Directors of the assembly, who has the power to decide future
actions. The Board has the power to archive or implement inquires made by the ombudsman.
Finally, there is a crucial component that limits its autonomy: the corporatism. As the ouvidoria takes
action based on suggestions and proposals, it interrelates with other political officials.
I had no autonomy. When it was related to a government complaint, the Board of Directors of the
assembly said, “This is not going forward.” If the governor is badly criticized, the Board will have
it removed. There was a conspiracy. There was some control over personal issues, i.e. harassment.
There is more control over these issues than that of government work. Corporatism is involved
when dealing with these matters. (Deputy Ombudsman 3.)
The ALMG office of the ombudsman does not have many responsibilities. Government workers are
satisfied with the model adopted, where the ouvidoria is not only a piece of the puzzle with the
objective to promote participation and social control, but also relates to the decorum of parliament.
On the other hand, the officials that accept the position desire a more independent and more
important role in the legislative process, so as to gain more political capital inside the assembly. In
other words, there is a conflict of interest between the attributions and the concepts of an ouvidoria.
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4. Conclusions
If we consider the parliamentary ombudsman as a means of communication, as it is written in formal
decrees, it is expected to reinforce the bond between the government and the people, develop a
democratic stance in the legislative branch, and stimulate political and social inclusion. Those who
associate with an ouvidoria want to be connected with the organization, regardless if it is a complaint
or a suggestion.
From a performance and evolution standpoint, the ombudsman can be understood in three distinct
ways: (1) access: receiving demands, complaints, and criticism; (2) communication method: mutuality,
disclosure of actions, bilateral relations, and closer relationships with the people; (3) citizen
participation instrument: incorporation of citizens in a system of important matters and human
rights.
Nowadays, this instrument is inserted predominantly in the first step because the ouvidoria is a social
interface expanding the platforms that people have to express their demands and complaints, but it’s
unilateral and in favor of the government. The media does little to advertise the ouvidoria to the
public. One example is the difficulty to obtain certain information about the designs and the work of
the ouvidoria. It was not possible for us to get this data, even after sending several e-mails, making
numerous phone calls, and requesting data on the Law on Access to Information (LAI). For the
ouvidorias to have true transparency, the data must be made available to the public. There is little to no
exposure about the ouvidoria in the media.
Also, the people who seek the ombudsman are not included in the aftermath of their
complaint/suggestion. They are not a part of the deliberation process of these public policies, which
could stimulate new considerations on the public sphere and expand the political field, having greater
involvement of “ordinary citizens” and discursive accountability (Dryzek, 2000).
The motivation for the creation of theses mechanisms in the state legislature is to portray an image
that the organization has credibility. The ouvidoria is a symbol that shows the public the state cares
about their opinions. Nevertheless, the political involvement is quite unorganized and not well done.
It is a “trivial participation” (Fung, 2015), a kind of participation that is not relevant to the political
process and residuals.
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Conclusively, it was evident that the role of the ouvidoria of the state legislature is not institutionalized
and still unfamiliar, especially if we compare them to the ouvidorias in the executive branch, which
increased the amount of public services. However, in order for the ouvidorias of the state legislatures
to undertake the concept of citizen participation, structural changes must be made so they can be
autonomous and democratic in the future. This organization can be classified as a “sleeper
institution” (Pereira, 2013), initially ineffective, but later strengthened, becoming more effective when
combining political will and commitment, pressure from society, institutional design, etc.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – Relation of the Parliamentary Ouvidorias
Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Ouvidoria
1 Amazonas Ouvidoria-Internal Affairs
2 Bahia Ouvidoria
3 Ceará Ouvidoria
4 Espírito Santo Ouvidoria
5 Minas Gerais Ouvidoria
6 Mato Grosso Ouvidoria
7 Paraíba Ouvidoria
8 Piauí Ouvidoria
9 Rio Grande do Sul Ouvidoria
10 Roraima Ouvidoria
11 Santa Catarina Ouvidoria
12 Sergipe Ouvidoria
13 Tocantins Ouvidoria
14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) Ouvidoria
15 Pernambuco Institutional email
16 Rondônia Institutional email
17 Acre System Contact Us
18 Amapá System Contact Us
19 Goiás System Contact Us
20 Maranhão System Contact Us
21 Pará System Contact Us
22 Rio Grande do Norte System Contact Us
23 Alagoas System Contact Us
24 Paraná System talk to the Legislative
25 Mato Grosso do Sul System talk to the Assembly
26 São Paulo Contact Center
27 Rio de Janeiro Hello - Assembly of Rio de Janeiro
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Chamber of Deputies Ouvidoria
Federal Senate Ouvidoria
Appendix 2 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and Year of Creation
Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Year of Creation
1 Amazonas No information
2 Bahia 2007
3 Ceará 2007
4 Espírito Santo 2001
5 Minas Gerais 2002
6 Mato Grosso 2002 - Law in the approval
stage
7 Paraíba 2002
8 Piauí No information
9 Rio Grande do Sul 2001
10 Roraima 2008
11 Santa Catarina 2003 - Law in the approval
stage
12 Sergipe No information
13 Tocantins No information
14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) 2002 * Unregulated
Chamber of Deputies 2001
Federal Senate 2011
Appendix 3 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and Internal Regiment
Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies In the Internal Regiment
1 Amazonas Yes
2 Bahia No
3 Ceará Yes
4 Espírito Santo Yes
5 Minas Gerais Yes
6 Mato Grosso No
7 Paraíba No
8 Piauí No
9 Rio Grande do Sul Yes
10 Roraima No
11 Santa Catarina Yes
12 Sergipe No
13 Tocantins Yes
14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) No
Chamber of Deputies Yes
Federal Senate No
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Appendix 4 – Parliamentary Ouvidorias and Ways of Contact
Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Contact Toll Free Number
1 Amazonas E-mail (form Internet)/Phone/Letter Yes
2 Bahia E-mail/Phone/Letter No
3 Ceará E-mail (form Internet)/Phone/Fax No
4 Espírito Santo E-mail/Phone/In person No
5 Minas Gerais E-mail (form Internet)/Phone Yes
6 Mato Grosso E-mail (form Internet)/Phone/In
person/Fax/Letter Yes
7 Paraíba E-mail/Phone/In person No
8 Piauí E-mail (form Internet) No
9 Rio Grande do Sul E-mail (Internet)/Phone/Fax/Letter Yes
10 Roraima E-mail No
11 Santa Catarina E-mail (Internet) No
12 Sergipe E-mail (Internet) No
13 Tocantins E-mail (Internet) No
14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) E-mail/Phone/In person/Fax Yes
Chamber of Deputies E-mail/Phone/Fax/Letter Yes
Federal Senate E-mail/Phone/Letter Yes
Appendix 5 – Profile of the Parliamentary Ombudsman
Number Ouvidorias States Assemblies Profile of the Ombudsman
1 Amazonas Deputy ombudsman
2 Bahia Deputy ombudsman
3 Ceará Deputy ombudsman
4 Espírito Santo Deputy ombudsman
5 Minas Gerais Deputy ombudsman
6 Mato Grosso Civil servant ombudsman
7 Paraíba Societal ombudsman
8 Piauí No information
9 Rio Grande do Sul Deputy ombudsman
10 Roraima Deputy ombudsman
11 Santa Catarina Civil servant ombudsman
12 Sergipe No information
13 Tocantins No information
14 Distrito Federal (Federal District) Deputy ombudsman
Chamber of Deputies Deputy ombudsman
Federal Senate Deputy ombudsman
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Appendix 6 - States by Media Communication
States
Scale Media Communication
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Roraima Piauí/Santa
Catarina/Sergipe/Tocantins Bahia/Espírito Santo/Paraíba
Amazonas/Ceará/Minas Gerais
Federal District
Rio Grande do Sul
Mato Grosso
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The impact of societal preferences on national monetary policy outcomes: A revival of economic pluralism
Christoph Steinert
https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31.2
Christoph Steinert, 24, from Ravensburg has graduated in Political Science and Public Law at the University of
Mannheim. He is going to start his Master in International Relations at the University of Oxford in October 2016.
His main areas of interest are the fields of conflict research and international political economy. He has professional
experience in the State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, the Human Rights Centre of the University of Potsdam
and in the German Institute of Global Area Studies in Hamburg. Furthermore, he was working for three years at the
chair of International Relations in a project on pro-government militias. During his undergraduate studies he has
published two papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
Abstract
This study investigates how societal preferences impact policy choices in the trade-off between exchange rate stability and
monetary policy autonomy. Building on the theoretical approach of economic pluralism, it is argued that the size and
strength of different economic actors are the central determinants for monetary policy outcomes. Times-series cross-
sectional regression analysis and a fixed effect model are used to analyse the predictors for domestic monetary policy
outcomes in a timespan from 1960 up to 2010 (N=467). The results suggest that the size of the export sector, the
banking sector and the share of workers to gross capital formation are the central determinants for monetary policy
outcomes. Being in line with economic pluralism, the finding stands in contrast to the previous assumption that the
partisan character of governments plays the decisive role. This implies a dominance of lobby groups over government
discretion in monetary policy choices.
Keywords
Economic pluralism; exchange rate stability; government discretion; government ideology; monetary
policy; monetary policy autonomy; Mundell-Fleming trilemma
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Introduction
The question of who holds the reins in a country and determines the direction of public policy has
always fascinated academic scholars and political theorists (e.g. already Aristotle 4th-centruy BC;
Machiavelli 1532). In democracies, the basic principle of rule of the people entails that the will of the
population has to be translated in some way into policy outcomes. However, it is debatable how
these translation processes occur and which channels between the people and the state are the main
platforms of policy-creation.
Some scholars have argued that governments have a significant degree of discretion in policy-
creation and that their ideological orientation is the central determinant for policy outcomes (e.g.
Bearce 2003; Bjørnskov 2008; Potrafke 2009). They assume that governments are mainly motivated
by policy-seeking goals and always try to implement their favored policies. Other scholars doubt the
discretionary power of politicians and emphasize the crucial impact of powerful interest groups (e.g.
Berger 1983; Lijphart 1975; Pizzorno 1981). In this vein, Becker has once compared the role of
politicians with managers of firms. He argued that politicians are hired to further the collective
interests of pressure groups, who could fire or repudiate them with the next elections in case they
deviate from their interests (Becker 1983, 396). According to this logic, politicians are reduced to
mere puppets which have to serve the interests of powerful groups in the society.
The question who determines the direction of a country is in particular relevant with regard to highly
controversial topics where conflicting interests are competing with each other. One of those topics is
the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability which each state faces in
an environment of international capital mobility (Mundell 1964). While it is beneficial for some
groups in society to pursue an autonomous monetary policy, others held a distinct preference for
stable exchange rates. This paper aims to shed light on the translation of societal preferences into
policy outcomes with focus on exactly this dilemma of monetary policy. Consequently, this analysis
aims to answer the following research question:
“How do societal preferences shape policy outcomes in the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange-
rate stability?”
Hereby, this paper will built on an analysis by David Bearce in 2003 entitled “Societal Preferences,
Partisan Agents and Monetary Policy Outcomes” (Bearce 2003). Bearce argues in his influential paper that
the ideology of government parties is the central determinant for the decision in the trade-off
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between monetary policy autonomy and exchange-rate stability. Based on a principal-agent model he
suggests that leftist parties are the agents of all societal groups which prefer monetary policy
autonomy and that rightist parties are the agents of all societal groups with a preference for
exchange-rate stability. Thus, he concludes that the partisan character of a government determines
the monetary policy of a country whereas he regards the size and strength of different societal groups
as irrelevant. He underpins this assumption with empirical evidence of twenty-two OECD countries
in the period between 1975 and 1992 and he supplies his findings with further evidence from a
historical case study about lobbying for monetary policy in the US. His quantitative evidence
illustrates that the ideology of government parties is indeed the central determinant for a country’s
monetary policy and that the strength of different societal groups emphasized by the economic
pluralism is of minor importance. However, his analysis is based on several theoretical and
methodological flaws which will be elucidated in the following. In particular, a re-analysis of his study
with a newer dataset and a more sophisticated measure of the central explanatory variable will
demonstrate that the power and willingness of government parties to shape the monetary policy of a
country is actually smaller than previously thought.
This paper will proceed in the following way. First, the Mundell-Fleming model - which represents
the foundation of this study - will be introduced. Secondly, I will demonstrate with several theories
about preference formation why different actors in the society have different priorities regarding
monetary policies. In a next step, the two central theories for the translation of societal preferences
into policy outcomes will be contrasted with each other. Hereby, I will critically discuss Bearce’s
party-as-agent model and its implications. Afterwards, I will explain in the methods section the
databases and the statistical model used for this re-analysis. Hereby, I will supply a times-series cross-
sectional OLS regression analysis with a fixed effects model which accounts for several problems of
pooled data. Finally, I will summarize the findings and explain why economic pluralism is still the
dominant theory for the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes.
1.) The implications of the Mundell-Fleming trilemma for monetary policy
The Mundell-Fleming model of international macroeconomics was developed by Robert A. Mundell
(Mundell 1960/ 1961a/ 1961b/ 1963/ 1964) and Marcus Fleming (1962). Its central contribution
was the systematic analysis of the impact of international capital mobility on determining the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies under different exchange rate regimes (Frenkel and Razin
1987, 567). The core of the Mundell-Fleming model is the so-called “impossible trilemma”
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(Aizenman 2011) which posits that economies cannot simultaneously maintain free capital
movement, a fixed exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy.
Marcus Fleming argued in his seminal study on international macroeconomics that the stimulus to
employment, income, and output resulting from a given increase in public expenditure will be larger
with a floating exchange rate than with a fixed one (Fleming 1962, 372). Underpinning this
assumption, Robert Mundell demonstrated that under a floating exchange rate monetary expansion
puts downward pressure on the interest rate and induces capital outflow, further depreciating the
exchange rate and creating an export surplus, which in turn increases, via the multiplier effect,
income and employment (Mundell 1963). Hence, Mundell showed that monetary policy becomes a
powerful tool of stabilization policy under flexible exchange rates when the condition of capital
mobility is given (Mundell 1963). The same impact cannot be achieved under a fixed exchange rate
since the maintenance of the exchange rate thwarts the effect triggered by a depreciation of the
currency. The contemporary international economy is characterized by a great mobility of capital
across national borders (Frieden 1991), i.e. the condition of capital mobility is fulfilled for almost all
developed economies. Thus, the choice of any exchange-rate system in each country is based on the
trade-off between domestic economic independence on the one hand and exchange-rate stability on
the other (Oatley 2012, 205).
The question arises which of those two conflicting monetary policy goals is more desirable for states.
It can be assumed that in democratic states the choice for one of those monetary policy goals is
determined by societal preferences since the people should be the sovereign of the country.
Therefore, I will discuss in the next section how societal preferences towards the trade-off between
monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability emerge and which opposing interests are
competing.
2.) Societal preferences for monetary policy outcomes
To understand how societal preferences for monetary policy outcomes emerge, it is necessary to
identify different societal actors which are affected in distinct ways by the degree of realization of the
conflicting monetary policy goals. Since the impact on societal actors is of economic nature, it makes
sense to differentiate them according to their economic activities. I follow hereby the classification
scheme from Bearce by identifying different economic actors under the frameworks of economic
sectors and production factors.
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The idea of production factors is based on the influential Heckscher-Ohlin model. This model
assumes that all factors of production within countries are mobile across sectors, that there are
constant returns to scale in production and that markets are perfectly competitive (Mansfield and
Mutz 2009, 427). Based on those assumptions, the Heckscher-Ohlin model distinguishes in its basic
form between two main production factors, namely capital and labor. While the model was originally
developed to explain trade policy preferences (Oatley 2012, 70f.), diverging preferences of capital and
labor can be also identified with regards to other national economic policies. In this vein, it has been
argued that the production factor labor is more tied to the local economy than capital and that it
therefore prefers domestic monetary autonomy (Kapstein 1996). This can be explained by the fact
that domestic actors can benefit from currency depreciations processes induced by monetary
policies. And because of its prevailing domestic economic activity, the production factor labor is less
affected by varying exchange rates. In the contrary, the production factor capital has a highly mobile
nature. Therefore, it relies more on stable exchange rates and less on an autonomous monetary
policy by national states which shapes its preference the other way around. Taken together, the
framework of production factors predicts that capital has a preference for exchange rate stability
whereas labor holds a preference for domestic monetary policy autonomy.
In a second step, I will consider the differentiation of economic sectors emphasized by the Ricardo-
Viner model. The Ricardo-Viner model assumes, in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, that
factor specificity is very high, i.e. that some factors cannot move at all among industries (Alt et al.
1996, 690). Consequently, we except coalitions to form not along the lines of factors but along the
lines of export- versus import-competing industries or sectors (Alt et al. 1996, 692). Labor and
capital interests within a sector can be expected to unite since these factors are specific to the
respective sector (Bearce 2003, 367). The advantages of a fixed exchange rate are that cross-border
trade, payments and investments become more predictable (Hefeker 1998, 6). This is in particular
advantageous to the export sector which therefore holds a strong preference for exchange rate
stability. If companies rely on the export of their goods, they prefer a certain degree of reliability of
currency movements to anticipate their future revenues. The same applies to international investors
and the banking sector which also depend on transactions across currencies. The downside of
exchange rate stability is that the currency cannot be depreciated to make domestic goods more
competitive (Hefeker 1998, 6). Consequently, companies operating in the import-competing sector
desire a certain degree of monetary autonomy. They are not affected by the uncertainty associated
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with varying exchange rates and therefore have no fundamental interest in stable currencies. This
applies also to producers of non-tradable services who do not operate in an international context.
In summary, it can be stated that all internationally oriented actors prefer currency stability, while
domestically oriented actors accept the costs of greater currency instability and prefer monetary
autonomy (Frieden 1991, 446). Considering the predictions made by the production factor and the
economic sector model, several different groups with preferences for either monetary autonomy or
for exchange rate stability can be identified. Namely, the production factor labor, the import-
competing sector, and the non-tradable services sector have a preference for monetary autonomy,
whereas the production factor capital, the export-competing sector, the banking sector, and
international investors prefer exchange rate stability.
3.) Translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes
After the identification of different preferences for either monetary autonomy or exchange rate
stability, it is necessary to scrutinize in a second step how those preferences are translated into
monetary policy outcomes. There are two main theoretical frameworks for those translation
processes which will be introduced and contrasted below.
3.1) Economic pluralism
The theory of economic pluralism argues that policy outcomes are a function of the political
competition between different societal actors which is determined by their relative power and their
propensity for collective action (Garrett and Lange 1995, 628). Rooted in a liberal theory of
international politics (Moravcsik 1997), pluralism assumes that the dominant groups in a society will
finally implement their favored policies. Therefore, Dahl has connected the emergence of pluralism
to a particular kind of regime termed ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl 1978, 191). While hegemonic regimes thwart
the development of pluralism, polyarchies are more open to organised opposition and thereby induce
the formation of a pluralistic order.12 In such political systems, political institutions regard interest
groups as partners rather than as opponents. They try to establish cooperation with each other,
relying on mutual acquiescence and approval (Hill and Varone 2014, 27). Pluralism assumes that
various interest groups have open and equal access to policy-making and shape the policy process
according to their respective aims (Chari and Kritzinger 2006, 44). As a consequence, pluralism leads
to a balance of interests as it satisfies each tendency in the society in proportion to its relative
12 Democractic states come most close to the polyarchic ideal and are therefore most suitable for pluralism.
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representation in the population (Pizzorno 1981, 259). Following the logic of pluralism, government
institutions just provide the arena for group competition and do not exert a significant impact on
policy decisions themselves (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988, 7). Therefore, politicians have
not an autonomous role of policy shaping but instead they follow the will of the powerful actors in a
country which emerge as dominant pressure groups (Becker 1983, 396).
Applied to the trade-off between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability, the pluralist
theory suggests that a state will either strive for monetary policy autonomy in case that groups with
such a preference predominate in a society or pursue exchange rate stability in case that groups with
the opposite preference are superior. Thus, the distribution of the size and strength of different
societal groups will shape monetary policy outcomes. Connecting this rationale to the preference
patterns discussed above, it can be assumed that the respective size of those economic actors shapes
the monetary policy choice. More specifically, according to the pluralist logic it is expected that the
size of the export-competing sector, the import-competing sector, the banking sector as well as the
size of unionized workforce influence the choice between monetary autonomy and exchange rate
stability. Based on this assumption, I will examine the following hypotheses to test the theory of
economic pluralism:
H1: Countries with higher percentages of exports to total GDP have higher degrees of exchange rate
stability.
H2: Countries with higher percentages of imports to total GDP have a higher degree of monetary
autonomy.
H3: Countries with a higher percentage of unionized workforce to total salary earners have a higher
degree of monetary autonomy.
H4: Countries with a larger banking sector have a higher degree of exchange rate stability.
H5: Countries with a higher percentage of workers to gross capital formation have a higher degree of
monetary autonomy.
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3.2) The ‘party-as-agent model’ from David Bearce
David Bearce provides in his paper an alternative theory for the translation of societal preferences
into monetary policy outcomes. Building on a principal-agent approach, he emphasizes the crucial
role of the partisan character of governments for the choice of monetary policies.
His point of departure is the fact that leftist parties are traditionally the protectors of labor interests
and that rightist parties often form close alliances with capital owners. By focusing on the US
context, Bearce argues that less-skilled manual workers in the import-competing manufacturing
sector and white-collar workers in the service sector are a solid leftist constituency. In contrast,
skilled-manual workers which often work in export-oriented industries, capital-intensive industries
and investment banks are closely aligned with the political right. Considering the different preference
patterns elucidated above, Bearce infers that leftist political parties advocate the interests of societal
groups with preferences for monetary autonomy and that rightist political parties represent the
interests of societal actors with preferences for exchange rate stability. He assumes that a delegation
process from actors with particular monetary policy preferences to political parties takes place,
whereby he regards the societal groups as principals and political parties as agents. In the desire to
fulfil the policy preferences of their respective principals, leftist governments pursue an autonomous
monetary policy and rightist governments implement stable exchange rates. Thus, the central
indicator of a country's monetary policy is the partisan character of its respective government.
Since this theory is grounded on the rather utopian assumption that governments are solely
interested in the preferences of their voters, Bearce also introduces a variation of his theory. This
variation accounts for the fact that vote-seeking governments care also about the interests of
powerful actors within a society. In the framework of the principal-agent-model, governments are
perceived as ‘shirking’ when they act against the preferences of their principals. Terming his variation
approach as party-as-agent model with significant shirking, he tries to make sense out of the fact that
governments pursue also strategic vote-seeking goals and that they are not pure policy-seekers. While
the party-as-agent model with significant shirking assumes an interplay between economic pluralism
and discretion of government parties, I will focus here on testing the party-as-agent model in its pure
form. If there is cumulative evidence for economic pluralism and the party-as-agent model, then the
party-as-agent model with significant shirking would be the theoretical framework which the
strongest predictive power. But a necessary condition therefor is that I find in a first step evidence
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for an impact of government ideologies on monetary policy outcomes. Thus, I examine the party-as-
agent model in its pure form by testing the following hypotheses:
H6: Countries with more leftist governments have higher degrees of monetary autonomy.
H7: Countries with more rightist governments have higher degrees of exchange rate stability.
3.3) Critical discussion of David Bearce’s ‘party-as-agent model’
Several points of criticism should be considered with regard to the party-as-agent model. First, the
party-as-agent model makes very optimistic assumptions about the ability and willingness of
government parties to pursue the favored policies of their voters. It assumes that a government is
determined to implement the preferred policies of its voters irrespective of opposition from various
powerful actors in the society. Previous research has demonstrated that governments are not
immune against pressures from interest groups and especially not against pressure from powerful
business entrepreneurs (Golden 1998; Klüver 2009; Yackee and Yackee 2006). A remarkable
example for the significant influence of interest groups on policy outcomes is the lobbying of the
National Rifle Association in the US against gun control which is successful against the majority’s
preference for a more restricted gun control (Dearden 2015). Ignoring such impacts, the party-as-
agent model treats government parties as pure policy-seeking actors which try to implement the
policies they promised to their voters. In contrast to this assumption, a multitude of studies showed
that governments are also motivated by vote-seeking goals and that they often act strategically to
reassure their re-election (Crisp et al. 2004; Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer 2007).
Secondly, it is not entirely clear why leftist parties should always support monetary autonomy and
rightist parties categorically prefer exchange-rate stability. Bearce’s theory is rooted in the US-context
where skilled manual workers are often found in the export-oriented industries whereas less-skilled
manual workers are generally trapped in the import-competing manufacturing sector (Bearce 2003,
381). However, in several other OECD countries this generalization does not hold. For example in
Norway many low-skilled manual workers work in the export-oriented crude oil industry
representing typical clients for left-wing parties. It seems to be an oversimplification to regard leftist
parties categorically as agents of actors with preferences for monetary autonomy and rightist parties
always as agents of actors who prefer exchange-rate stability.
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Thirdly, Bearce employs a one-dimensional left-right heuristic of party ideologies which is a strong
simplification of reality. This might work for the American context with only two parties to be
classified but the party structure in other OECD countries is often far more complex. Taking into
account this polymorphic character of ideology, it has become a standard to differentiate between
the economic and sociopolitical dimension when classifying party ideologies (Bräuninger and Debus
2011). Bearce fails to acknowledge those different dimensions and treats party ideologies as one-
dimensional categorizing them on a scale ranging from 1 up to 5. This problem will be encountered
with a more fine-grained measure of party ideology which will be elaborated in the methodological
section below.
4.) Methods
The methodological section is divided into three parts. First, I will critically evaluate the measures
used by Bearce. Afterwards, I describe my own variables and their operationalizations and
subsequently I introduce my statistical model.
4.1) Critique of David Bearce’s methods
The central weakness of Bearce’s study is the fact that he measures his central theoretical innovation,
namely the party-as-agent model, with a rather superficial and crude proxy variable. The ideological
complexion of the respective government in power is captured with a five-point scale where lower
values indicate more right-wing ideologies (Bearce 2003, 386). This variable is taken from the Party
Government Data Set established by the University of Amsterdam (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge
2000). They categorize the ideology of parties in a highly simplistic way as either left, central, or right.
In a second step, they account for the relative strength of parties in government by transforming the
proportional shares of right, center and left parties into scores ranging from 1 till 5 representing the
degree of representation of the different ideologies. The grounding of Bearce’s study on such a crude
variable, based on a breakdown of the complex issue of ideology to a three categories indicator,
raises severe doubts to the validity of his results. Additionally, the operationalization of his central
dependent variable, namely monetary autonomy, seems to be prone to measurement errors. Bearce
measures monetary autonomy with the differential between a country’s domestic interest rate and the
prevailing world interest rate (Bearce 2003, 385). Hereby, the prevailing world interest rate is
operationalized with the average interest rate of the US, Japan, Germany, Britain and France. Bearce
does not provide a theoretical justification for choosing those countries and in an increasingly
globalized world, it seems questionable whether the monetary policy of countries like Britain and
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France is as influential as the monetary policy of raising economic players such as China, India or
Brazil. The recent inclusion of the Chinese Yuan to the SDR basket of reserve-currencies by the IMF
(Mathew 2015) illustrates the growing importance of other currencies and shows that they also
significantly impact the prevailing world interest rate. Acknowledging the difficulties of capturing
such latent concepts as monetary policy autonomy and government ideology, this analysis aims to
improve their measurement by using more sophisticated and fine-grained measures that have been
developed by other scholars.
4.2) Variables and Data Sources
For the purpose of my re-analysis, I use the same variables as Bearce, but the variables originate from
other sources with different operationalizations.13
The main dependent variable ‘monetary autonomy’ will be operationalized with the so-called
monetary independence index taken from Aizenman’s open economy trilemma dataset (Aizenman,
Chinn, and Ito 2008). Aizenman has developed a remarkable dataset which quantifies the degree of
achievement along the three dimensions of monetary independence, exchange-rate stability and
financial openness. He standardizes the extent of realization of the three conflicting monetary policy
goals with three indices ranging from 0 to 1 whereby higher values indicate higher achievement of
the respective policy goals.14 By comparing a country’s monetary policy to a respective base country,
he is able to detect autonomous policy choices along these three dimensions. The choice of the
respective base country builds on a study by Shambaugh who classifies countries’ currencies as
pegged or nonpegged and identifies to which country the monetary policy is most closely linked to
(Shambaugh 2004). The application of Aizenman’s monetary independence index has two significant
advantages. First, it does not rely on an arbitrary choice of the prevailing world interest rate but
compares closely connected currencies. Secondly, the standardization between 0 and 1 facilitates the
interpretation of the achievement along the three dimensions of the impossible trilemma.
The proxy variable for the party-as-agent model tries to overcome the weaknesses of Bearce’s
simplistic measure of government ideology discussed above. In contrast to Bearce, I use a very
sophisticated and fine-grained indicator developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to
13 In distinction from Bearce, I do not control for central bank independence, the size of the non-tradable service sector and outward foreign direct investments since the amount of missing cases for those variables decrease the number of observations used for the analysis in an inadequate way. 14 Further information about the operationalizations of the three dimension of the impossible trilemma is illustrated in the appendix.
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measure the ideological orientation of a country’s government (Lehmann et al. 2015). The CMP
provides a left-right indicator for parties’ ideological orientations based on content analysis of their
manifestoes. The variable ranges from -100 to +100 whereby lower values indicate a more leftist
ideological orientation. The information is derived from coding of quasi-sentences in party
manifestoes and their categorization according to pre-defined rules into a left-right dichotomy.15 To
account for the fact that many governments consist of more than one party, I weigh the respective
CMP-scores of government parties with their seat shares in parliament following the procedure
proposed by Williams (Williams 2012). It is advantageous to use the CMP data compared to Beace’s
left-right indicator since the classification of political parties’ ideology is grounded in an extensive
analysis of party’s manifestoes with various different nuances and not on a rough classification
without predefined rules.
The central explanatory variables for the theory of economic pluralism are the ratio of the working
population to gross capital formation, the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union
members to the total number of wage and salary earners, the percentage of exports and imports of a
country’s total GDP, and the size of the financial service sector as a percentage of total GDP. The
data for the ratio of the working population to gross capital formation is based on Graham’s
international political economy data resource (Graham 2015). The trade union density
operationalized by the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members divided by the
total number of wage and salary earners is derived from the OECD (The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 2015b). Data for the percentage of exports of goods and services of a
country’s total GDP is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (The World Bank 2015).
Data on the percentage of imports of total GDP is used from the OECD (The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development 2015a). The financial system deposits as percentage of
GDP are operationalized with data taken from the World Bank (The World Bank 2015).
In line with Bearce, I include control variables for GDP growth, inflation rate, capital openness,
government fractionalization and a dummy variable for proportional representation systems. The
annual percentage of GDP growth and the annual inflation rate are taken from the World Bank
Development Indicators (The World Bank 2015). Capital openness is measured with the Financial
Openness Index based on Aizenman’s quantifications of the three dimensions of the impossible
15 For additional information on the coding process of the CMP consult “Party Policy and Government Coalitions” by
Laver and Budge (1992).
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trinity (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008). The degree of fractionalization is operationalized with the
probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of
different parties and the information is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.
2001). Finally, the proportional representation dummy originates from a publication by Strøm et al.
about arrangements of powersharing (Strøm et al. 2013).
5.) Statistical model
In line with Bearce, I analyze the total of OECD countries since for those countries a sufficient data
basis exists. However, I will not only use data for the timeframe between 1975 and 1992, but also
cover the whole period between 1960 and 2010.16
The use of OLS regression with time-series cross-sectional data has some difficulties which have to
be reflected in the analysis. Data which varies also in the time-dimension is more problematic for
OLS than pure cross-sectional data since observations are usually not independent (Plümper,
Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329). This leads to four common violations of OLS assumptions with
panel data, namely (a) serial correlation of errors, (b) heteroscedasticity of errors, (c) correlated errors
across units due to common exogenous shocks and (d) non-spherical errors in both the cross-
sectional and the serial dimension (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329). These violations cause
estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients to understate their actual variability (Beck and
Katz 1995, 634). To encounter those difficulties, I use panel-corrected standard errors, which have
been shown to be very accurate estimates of sampling variability (Beck and Katz 1995). I hereby
follow the mainstream approach in the political science literature since 66% of the regression
analyses published between 2009 and 2012 in the American Political Science Review apply robust
standard errors to encounter model misspecifications (King and Roberts 2014, 1). I do not include a
lagged dependent variable because there is no plausible logical explanation why the value of the
dependent variable 'monetary policy independence' in year t+1 should be always influenced by the
value of this variable in year t. Since a new government could pursue a completely different monetary
policy to its predecessors the monetary policy in one year is not necessarily affected by the monetary
policy in the previous one. If there is no theoretical explanation for the inclusion of a lagged
16 I exclude all countries of the European Monetary Union from 2000 onwards since the introduction of the EURO has
finished monetary autonomy of the member states. Thus, the theoretical assumptions of the party-as-agent model and
economic pluralism do not hold anymore for those countries.
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dependent variable, there is the risk that the lagged dependent variable dramatically affects other
coefficients in the model and in the meanwhile exaggerates the model fit (Achen 2000, 3).
In a second step, I cross-check the results of OLS regression with a fixed effects model. In so doing,
I deviate from Bearce’s analysis which is only based on the results of his OLS regression analysis. But
using OLS is generally problematic with pooled data since it ignores the panel structure of the data
(Schmidheiny 2005, 5). It simply lumps all the observations together and treats them as one cross-
section. To overcome this problematic simplification, I run a model which accounts as well for the
time-variation of the data. In a first step, I decide whether a random or a fixed effects model is
suitable. The main distinction between fixed and random effects models is based on “whether the
unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model”
(Greene 2008, 183). By applying the Hausman test, I check whether those unique errors are
correlated with the explanatory variables (Torres-Reyna 2007, 29). The significant test result suggests
that a fixed effects model is suitable for this analysis. Fixed effects models are designed to analyze the
causes of changes within an entity (Kohler and Kreuter 2009, 245). Thus, the fixed effects model is
here exploring the relationship between the predictors and the outcome variable within countries and
shows how intra-country variations of the strength of economic actors and governments’ ideologies
affect the level of monetary autonomy. The central assumption of fixed effects models is that
something within the individual may bias the independent or dependent variables and that we need
to control for this bias (Torres-Reyna 2007, 9). The results of both analyses – the OLS regression
with robust standard errors and the fixed effects model – will be displayed in the next section. Below
I illustrate the equation on which the OLS regression analysis is based.
Monetary.Independence.Indexit = β0 + β1 × GDP.Growth + β2 × Capital.Mobility + β3 ×
Government.Fractionalization + β 4 × Central.Bank.Independence + β 5 × Inflation + β 6 ×
Proportional.Representation + β7 × Government.Ideology + β8 × Capital.Worker.Ratio + β9 ×
Import + β 10 × Export + β 11 × Unionized + β 12 × Banking + + ∑(α × Countryjit) +
∑(α × Yearjit)
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6.) Results
At first, I run the OLS regression model with robust standard errors. However, testing the basic
regression assumptions demonstrates that there is an unacceptable problem of multicollinearity
within the model. The pairwise correlation between the two explanatory variables import and export
is 0.95. The Variance Inflation Factor which indicates the degree of multicollinearity has a value of
20.20 for those two variables. Acceptable Variance Inflation Factors are only values up to 10. The
high correlation between the import- and the export-variables is not surprising since they are both
proxies for the same theory, namely economic pluralism. Also previous research has demonstrated
that there is a high correlation between the percentage of imports to GDP and the percentage of
exports to GDP (Bebczuk 2008). Thus, I re-run the OLS regression in two models with the export-
variable and the import-variable separately. The results are displayed in table 1.
Table 1: Results of the OLS regression model with robust standard errors
(1) (2) Mon.Indep. Mon.Indep.
GDP.Growth 0.00687* 0.00691* (2.24) (2.30) Inflation 0.00144 0.000950 (1.58) (1.03) Cap.Mobility -0.120** -0.135*** (-3.03) (-3.54) Unionized 0.000682 0.000640 (1.61) (1.51) Cap.Worker. 0.0158 0.0278 Ratio (logged) (0.63) (1.10) Banking 0.000150 0.000135 (0.61) (0.56) Government. -0.000156 -0.000154 ideology (-0.34) (-0.34) Government. -0.0455 -0.0469 Fractionalizat. (-1.40) (-1.46) Proportional. 0.0279 0.0307 Representation (1.61) (1.76)
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Export -0.00300*** (-4.66) Import -0.00352*** (-5.20) _cons 0.593** 0.729*** (2.84) (3.43)
N 467 467 adj. R2 0.198 0.204 t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Graph 1: Results of the OLS regression model (model with export-variable)
The central finding is the non-significance of the variable which indicates the government ideology.
At odds with the party-as-agent theory, both models indicate no significant influence of the
ideological orientation of the government on monetary independence. Underlining the explanatory
power of economic pluralism, two proxies capturing the size and strength of different societal groups
are statistically significant. A one percentage increase of the size of the export sector is associated
with a 0.003 decrease on the monetary independence index, supporting the assumption posited in
hypothesis 1. The variable capturing the size of the import sector has also a statistically significant
GDP Growth
Inflation
Capital Mobility
Capital Worker Ratio
Unionized
Export
Banking
Government Ideology
Government Fraction.
PR
-.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05
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effect on monetary independence.17 The model indicates as well significant effects of two control
variables: Higher degrees of capital mobility are associated with reduced monetary independence,
while the existence of higher rates of GDP growth is associated with higher monetary independence.
The model fit is fairly good for both models with adjusted R2-values of roughly 0.2.
In a second step, I control the results of the OLS regression analysis with a fixed effects model. The
results are depicted in table 2. Supporting the results from the OLS regression analysis, the fixed
effects model shows also no significant impact of the government ideology variable. In line with the
assumptions of economic pluralism, the fixed effects model indicates significant effects of the
import-, export- and banking-variables. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis four, larger banking
sectors in a country are associated with less monetary independence. A one percentage increase of
financial deposits related to the GDP is associated with a -0.002 decrease on the monetary
independence index. Confirming hypothesis one, a one percentage increase of the export sector
related to total GDP decreases the values on the monetary independence index by 0.007 points.
Also, the import-variable shows again a statistically significant effect. Additionally, the control
variable capturing capital mobility indicates a statistically significant negative effect on monetary
independence. The model fit is satisfactory with adjusted R2-values of 0.17 and 0.18.
Table 2: Results of the fixed effect model
(1) (2) Mon.Indep. Mon.Indep.
GDP.Growth 0.00165 0.00249 (0.49) (0.75) Inflation 0.00104 0.00134 (1.17) (1.44) Cap.Mobility -0.161** -0.110 (-2.88) (-1.78) Cap.Worker. 0.0410 0.0539 Ratio (logged) (0.51) (0.73) Banking -0.00167* -0.00140 (-2.23) (-2.01)
17 The sign is in the opposite direction as predicted by hypothesis two. The same applies for Bearce’s study where the import- and export-variables have also signs in the same directions in two models at odds with his hypotheses. This is due to the fact that imports as percent of total GDP is not exactly measuring the potential political strength of the import-competing sector. A better measure would have been to subtract exports from total manufacturers. However, for the purpose of the re-analysis, I decided to follow the measure used by Bearce.
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Unionized -0.00225 -0.00197 (-1.21) (-1.06) Government. -0.000414 -0.000262 ideology (-0.84) (-0.51) Government. -0.0389 -0.0304 Fractionaliza. (-0.67) (-0.53) Proportional. -0.0521 -0.0518 Representation (-0.90) (-0.93) Import -0.00672* (-2.39) Export -0.00687** (-3.30) _cons 1.286 1.342* (1.93) (2.12)
N 467 467 adj. R2 0.170 0.182 t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Graph 2: Results of the fixed effect model (model with export-variable)
GDP Growth
Inflation
Capital Mobility
Capital Worker Ratio
Export
Banking
Unionized
Government Ideology
Government Fraction.
PR
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
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Finally, as a further robustness check, I control the results by replacing the dependent variable
monetary autonomy in the fixed effect model with a variable capturing exchange rate stability18. The
results are displayed in table 3. Both variables represent opposing poles, the effects should be the
same just in the inverse direction. And indeed, the robustness check confirms the absence of a
significant effect of government ideology on the trade-off between exchange rate stability and
monetary autonomy. Further underlying the meaningfulness of economic pluralism, the capital to
labor ratio has here a statistically significant impact on the exchange rate stability. Countries with
higher shares of workers to gross capital formation have lower degrees of exchange rate stability.
This confirms the assumption of hypothesis 5.
Table 3: Robustness-Check with the dependent variable exchange rate stability
(1) (2) Ex.rate.stability Ex.rate.stability
GDP.Growth 0.00635 0.00600 (1.25) (1.17) Inflation 0.00100 0.000811 (0.69) (0.57) Cap.Mobility 0.0835 0.0540 (1.44) (0.95) Cap.Worker. -0.224* -0.235* Ratio (logged) (-2.29) (-2.40) Banking -0.00123 -0.00136 (-1.30) (-1.38) Unionized 0.00317 0.00297 (1.09) (1.04) Government. 0.000109 0.0000295 ideology (0.19) (0.05) Government. -0.00905 -0.0142 Fractionaliza. (-0.12) (-0.20) Proportional. -0.0146 -0.0174 Representation (-0.17) (-0.20) Import 0.00425 (1.46)
18 The operationalization is also based on Aizenman’s quantifications of the impossible trinity (Aizenman 2011).
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Export 0.00388 (1.40) _cons -1.783 -1.828 (-1.98) (-2.01)
N 467 467 adj. R2 0.121 0.123 t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Graph 3: Robustness-Check with exchange rate stability (model with export-variable)
Conclusion
This paper set out to re-analyze the findings of the study “Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents and
Monetary Policy Outcomes” (2003) by David Bearce who argued that the ideology of government parties
is the central determinant of monetary policy outcomes. By using a more up-to-date dataset
comprising all OECD countries between 1960 and 2010 and by applying more sophisticated and up-
to-date measures for the central variables, this analysis demonstrated that the ideological orientation
of governments has no significant influence on monetary policy outcomes. In contrast to Bearce’s
findings, this analysis revealed robust evidence for the theory of economic pluralism. In particular,
evidence was found for the hypotheses one, four and five which are all grounded in the theoretical
GDP Growth
Inflation
Capital Mobility
Capital Worker Ratio
Banking
Unionized
Government ideology
Government Fraction.
PR
Export
-.4 -.2 0 .2
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framework of economic pluralism. In line with hypothesis one, bigger export sectors in a country are
associated with more exchange rate stability. The same applies for larger banking sectors which are
associated with less monetary policy autonomy as predicted in hypothesis four. Finally, higher shares
of workers to gross capital formation are associated with higher degrees of monetary autonomy
confirming hypothesis five. Derived from this evidence, it can be concluded that the size and
strength of different societal groups are indeed the central determinants of domestic monetary policy
outcomes. Thus, this study can be interpreted as a revival of the liberal theory of economic pluralism
which is superior to the party-as-agent model in predicting translation processes of societal
preferences into monetary policy outcomes.
Several limitations have to be considered when drawing inferences from the results. First, even
though the applied measures strive to be more sophisticated than the ones used by Bearce, it is still
questionable whether they are able to capture the latent concepts of monetary autonomy and
government ideology in an adequate way. Secondly, this analysis cannot overcome the problems
associated with a one-dimensional measure of government ideology. The measure based on CMP is
also ignoring the differentiation between the economic and the sociopolitical dimension of party
ideologies. Thirdly, an extended analysis including the non-OECD countries would enhance the
generalizability of the results but could not be realized due to data limitations. Fourthly, the analysis
is based on the assumption that every citizen has at least any preference towards the trade-off
between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability. This is highly questionable since
some basic economic knowledge is essential to understand the implications of the trade-off predicted
by the Mundell-Fleming model. Furthermore, even if societal groups held preferences for one or
another goal, it is doubtful whether they are able to organize themselves to promote their interest.
Especially large groups face always a collective action problem (Olson 1965) and often fail to
organize lobbying. Therefore, it would be necessary to buttress the evidence for economic pluralism
with qualitative evidence of lobbying by different societal actors towards the achievement of
monetary policy goals.19
Being aware of those limitations, this study claims nevertheless to make a modest contribution to the
understanding of the translation of societal preferences into monetary policy outcomes.
19 Bearce claims that such lobbying was historically often non-existent but he infers this assumption by considering only the US-context.
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47
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Appendix
The in index for the degree of monetary independence is defined as:
IMI = 1- 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑖
𝑖,𝑖𝑗)−(−1)
1−(−1)
In the equation i refers to home countries and j refers to the base country. The maximal possible
value is 1 and the minimal possible value is 0. Higher values indicate more monetary independence
(Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008).
ERS = 0.01
0.01+𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(∆(log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒))
For the measurement of exchange-rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange
rate between the home country and the base country are included in the formula above to
standardize the index between 0 and 1. Higher values of the index represent more stable movement
of the exchange-rate against the currency of the base country (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008).
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Determinants of Re-Autocratization: An Empirical Analysis from
1996 to 2013
Kristin Eichhorn
https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.31.3
Kristin Eichhorn, 28, from Chemnitz (Germany), received her Master’s degree in East European Studies at Free
University in Berlin in July 2015. She wrote her Master’s thesis on re-autocratizations. Currently she works as a
research assistant at the Institute for Political Sciences at the Technical University of Chemnitz. Her interests include
political systems, transformations, electoral systems, and political parties.
Abstract
During the 1990s, research in the political sciences within the framework of the transition paradigm focused mainly on
democratization and consolidation. However, in recent years a growing debate concerning the decline of democratic
quality and breakdown of democracies has emerged. In this paper, the collapse of electoral democracies (referred to as re-
autocratizations) will be operationalized using a minimalistic conception of democracy and analyzed globally in the
timeframe from 1996 to 2013 using logistic regression. Significant effects for economic growth rates and governance
performance are found.
Keywords
Breakdown of democracy, re-autocratization, regime change, transformations, transitions, logistic
regression analysis
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)
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Introduction20
The third wave of democratization resulted in a worldwide increase of the number and quality of
democracies. Especially the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union led to optimistic expectations
concerning the trajectories of those transformations. The transition paradigm assumes that all countries
of the third wave moving away from autocracy are on the way to become a democracy (e.g.
Carothers 2002: 6; Levitsky and Way 2015: 49). Consequently, academia focused mainly on the
determinants of democratizations and democratic consolidations (Ambrosio 2010: 375f.; Erdmann
2011: 7).
Since the mid-2000s, the transition paradigm has been increasingly challenged. As early as the mid-
1990s –at the peak of democracy optimism– Huntington proclaimed that third wave democracies
might face a reverse wave as well: “History unfolds in a dialectic fashion. Any substantial movement
in one direction tends eventually to lose its momentum and to generate countervailing forces” (1996:
5). Whether we are currently facing a reverse wave is much debated. On the one hand it is argued
that the empiric data is not yet sufficient support for assumption of an arising reverse wave21. On the
other hand, increasing numbers of hybridizations and losses of democratic quality are identified and
interpreted as a sign for a possibly upcoming reverse wave22.
This debate gave an impetus to the research on autocracies (Thiery 2015: 419). Furthermore, the
research on autocracies was invigorated by the fact that not all countries that previously were
considered in transition actually ever reached full democracy. Many introduced democratic institutions,
but reasonable doubts concerning the democratic quality remain (Schmotz 2015: 561). Gero
Erdmann (2011: 28ff.) makes a strong plea for the study of reverse transitions and broadly traces the
contours of a potential future research agenda.
This paper examines why some democracies endure, while in other cases autocracies or hybrid
regimes are re-established, henceforward called re-autocratizations. The applied conceptualizations of
re-autocratization rests on a minimalistic institutional definition of democracies. After terminological
20 This paper is a shortened and revised version of my master thesis. The original thesis was published in German language and can be accessed here: http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/politik/publikationen/AP81.pdf. I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Dr. Klaus Segbers and Cosima Glahn for their valuable inputs and support. 21 Schmitter (2015) argues that there is a crisis of democracy due to dissatisfaction with its way of functioning despite a general desire for democracy. Levitsky and Way (2015) argue that new democracies are strikingly robust. Currently we do not face a reverse wave, but a saturation. 22 Based upon the Freedom in the World Index, Puddington (2008) views the developments as a setback for democracy. Diamond (2015) claims that if the current democratic recession eventuates in “swing states” such as India it might be the forerunner of a reverse wave.
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preliminary considerations and a review of available literature, the mainly endogenous determinants
of re-autocratizations are analyzed in a logistic regression for 1382 country years (102 countries in
between 1996 and 2013), of which 32 are considered re-autocratizations.
Literature Review
Köllner and Kailitz (2013: 2) decompose the research on autocracy and autocratizations in two
phases. The first phase emerged after the Second World War and focused on totalitarian regimes and
classifications (Hartmann 2015: 100ff). Nevertheless, the three volume work The Breakdown of
Democratic Regimes by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1978) can be considered a cornerstone of the
research on re-autocratizations. With increasing democracy optimism however, the academic interest
in autocracies wore off until the late 1990s. At the latest since the color revolutions, the field of
research experienced renewed interest. In this new phase, the emphasis is placed on autocratic
stability (e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2006), instability or the breakdown of authoritarian and hybrid
regimes (e.g. Geddes et al. 2014; Brownlee 2009), or classification of autocratic systems (e.g. Cheibub
et al. 2010). Furthermore, conceptual and empiric research on re-autocratizations was performed.
Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) operationalize autocracy and democracy as a dichotomy using selected
variables of the 21-point Polity Index (PI). For a country year to be considered democratic, the score
of the variable Executive recruitment needs to be six or above, and Competitiveness of Political Participation
needs to score above three. In an event-history model they find that wealthy democracies are less
prone to regime changes in support of assumptions of modernization theory. However, they do not
find a significant correlation between presidentialism and the chance of re-autocratization and
therefore challenge previous structural assumptions.
Kapstein and Converse (2008a) analyze failed democratizations between 1960 and 2004. Referring to
open questions and contradictions regarding the application of modernization theory to young
democracies, they argue that the main focus should be placed on political institutions. They find that
reversals are more likely in parliamentary democracies. Due to the weak status of parliaments in
young democracies, they cannot live up to their intended role and put constraints on the executive
power. Kapstein and Converse chose a dichotomous differentiation between democratizations and
their reverse based on the PI. A democratization is measured when the PI increases within three
years by six points. Conversly, an autocratization is measured when PI decreases by six points within
three years. Kapstein and Converse find 123 democratizations, of which 56 were reversed. However,
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of the 123 measured democratizations 40 did not reach the level of a full democracy, but remained
partially democratic (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 2f.). In theory, cases where a six-point decrease
results in a anocratic regime are possible. Those would be placed in the same category as six-point
decreases, which result in (full) autocracies.The authors acknowledge this problem, but do not
further investigate it, for the lack of empiric cases (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 2f.). However, it
needs to be questioned whether autocratizations where the outcome is anocratic (i.e. a score of -1)
are subject to the same mechanisms as autocratizations, where a fully-fledged autocracy (i.e. a score
of -6 or below) is the result. The same applies on the democratic end of the scale. Therefore, using
intervals seems to be more suited to measure the loss of democratic quality rather than regime
changes. Furthermore, Vreeland (2003: 7) finds that the PI is not a continuous measure and claims
that it can be considered ordinal at most. Therefore, the assumption of equidistant values cannot be
made. Ordinal scales can be subject to a ranking, but are not suitable for addition or subtraction.23
Ko Maeda (2010) differentiates between endogenous and exogenous breakdowns of democracy.
Endogenous breakdowns originate from within the government, exogenous breakdowns from
without (Ibid.: 1130). A breakdown of democracy is measured when the PI falls below the threshold
value of six points. With a survival analysis between 1950 and 2004, Maeda finds that endogenous
breakdowns are not correlated with the macroeconomic situation, while exogenous breakdowns are
less frequent the better the economic situation (Ibid.: 1141ff.).
These studies use a continuous measure of regime type which is based on a broad conception of
democracy. However, for the empirical analysis, they define thresholds or intervals that allow a
recoding as a nominal variable (measuring whether the regime change occurred or not). Both Maeda
and Kapstein & Converse use the same data set but define different thresholds for the measurement
of the breakdown of a regime.
In contrast to these studies, Milan Svolik (2008) chooses a minimalist conception of democracy and
focuses on the length of democratic spells. He splits his data in failed democracies and currently
existing democracies and performs a survival analysis. He finds that the chance for survival increases
with the age of a democracy. The hazard rate for re-autocratization is among others increased by
poor economic development, presidentialism, and a military authoritarian legacy. This however only
applies to transitional (young) democracies. Therefore, Svolik advocates to distinguish between
23 Same criticism applies to the level of measurement of the Freedom in the World Index (Vreeland 2003: 5).
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factors that increase the hazard rate for autocratizations and factors that support consolidation
(Svolik 2008: 166)
Gero Erdmann (2011) also examines whether the conditions which make democratization possible
differ from those for the decline of democracy. He analyzes changes in the Freedom in the World Score
in between 1974 and 2008. Changes with the result “not free” are operationalized as collapse of
democracy, and changes with the result “partly free” as hybridizations. He finds 52 cases of
democratic decline, of which only four lead to a breakdown of democracy. Bringing those categories
to a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), he finds that younger democracies are more likely to
experience decline of democracy. Furthermore, correlations with the macro-economic development
and economic performance are confirmed. Erdmann concludes that the loss of democratic quality
does not necessarily lead to hybridizations or collapse of democracy (Erdmann 2011: 17).
Besides the empirical studies, there is also a conceptual debate on the hypothesis, whether re-
autocratizations are facilitated by mechanism of diffusion. Lucan Way argues that there is an
increased “authoritarian aggressiveness” (Way 2016: 74). Autocrats attack democracy promotion by
offering autocratic alternatives. However, these tactics are still ineffective and in some cases
unintendedly lead to democratization (Ibid.: 71ff.). Especially Russia and China are identified as main
players in this field and much attention is paid to the increasingly difficult circumstances of non-
governmental organizations (Ambrosio 2010; Cooley 2015).
The concept of re-autocratizations
Transformations from democracy to autocracy can be as diverse as their democratic counterpart.
Recently, Nancy Bermeo has described this diversity as follows:
Backsliding can take us to different endpoints at different speeds […] Democratic
backsliding can thus constitute democratic breakdown or simply the serious weakening
of existing democratic institutions for undefined ends. When backsliding yields
situations that are fluid and ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes
particularly difficult." (Bermeo 2016: 6)
The terminology applied to those different types of transformations is still under construction.
Firstly, the loss of democratic quality has been inter alia named democratic backsliding (Aleman and
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Yang 2011)24, hybridization (Erdmann 2011) or democratic erosion (Bermeo 2016). The outcome of
those processes remains undefined. Especially the term hybridization refers to diminished subtypes
of democracy as an outcome. Secondly, complete regime changes have been called collapse of
democracy (Diskin et al. 2005), breakdown of democracy (Maeda 2010) or (re-)autocratization
(Merkel 2010). The former two terms are ambiguous: The collapse of a regime does not
automatically lead to the introduction of an opposite regime. As noted above, not all transformations
of the third wave of democracy did in fact lead to the consolidation of democratic institutions and
norms. The same applies to regime changes in the opposite direction: breakdown of democracy does
not necessarily imply that the initial democracy won’t be followed by another democratic regime. The
term re-autocratizations shall bypass this ambiguity.
From Electoral Democracy to Re-Autocratization
Re-autocratizations are considered regime changes which replace a democracy with an autocracy.
The liberal qualities of the initial regime are not taken into consideration. Regimes are socially
constructed (Albrecht and Frankenberger 2010: 49). For the purpose of measurement they need to
be attributed to observational concepts. The accentuation or disregard of characteristic indicators is
dependent on the conceptualization of the regime type in question. There are countless
conceptualizations and operationalizations of democracy. Autocracy however, is in most cases
conceptualized as the residual category of democracy: anything non-democratic is considered
autocratic (Ibid.: 38). This democracy bias is also reflected in the available data sets. Whereas their
objective is to measure all regime types, they are more or less a measurement of the degree of
democracy (Hartmann 2015: 149).
I conceptualize re-autocratizations on the basis of a minimalistic democracy concept focusing on the
institution of elections. For elections to qualify as democratic, certain standards summarized under
the concept of contestation need to be met: “1) ex ante uncertainty, 2) ex post irreversibility, and 3)
repeatability” (Cheibub et al. 1996: 49). The focus on the institution of elections is based on a
Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy as a method:
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter 1950: 269)
24 However, the term backsliding has also been applied on complete regime collapses, e.g. by Ulfelder and Lustik (2007).
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Whereas this operationalization draws a clear line between democracies and autocracies, doubts on
the democratic qualities of electoral democracies are reasonable. Given the emergence of hybrid
regimes and especially competitive authoritarianism, this dichotomous approach might be outdated.
Therefore, the conceptualization of re-autocratization on the basis of electoral democracies bears the
risk of oversimplification.
The alternative approach would be the usage of a broad democracy concept including political
freedom or the regimes responsiveness to the preferences of the people (Schmidt 2010: 212f.).
However, these broad concepts make it difficult to define a line between autocracy and democracy.
Therefore, these conceptualizations prove very useful when analyzing the loss of democratic quality,
but have weaknesses when looking specifically at the breakdown of democracies and the
introduction of autocratic ruling.
Operationalization of Re-Autocratizations
As the conceptualization of re-autocratizations is based on a minimal concept of democracy, a
nominal indicator differentiating between autocracy and democracy is sufficient. For the
measurement, the list of electoral democracies provided by Freedom House is used. The list of
electoral democracies indicates whether a country is considered an electoral democracy. This
classification is based on the evaluation of the electoral process in the Freedom in the World data set.
The data is available annually from 1989. To represent re-autocratizations the data set will be recoded
as follows.
0 = no Re-Autocratization
1 = Re-Autocratization
As re-autocratizations only occur in electoral democracies, only years marked as such are coded 0. All
autocratic country years are coded missing values. The first year of an autocratic spell is coded 1.
Furthermore, generally instable states which oscillate between electoral democracy and autocracy on
a regular basis could degrade the validity of the data. Therefore, a temporal minimal requirement is
introduced. Electoral democracies must have existed for three years prior to a regime change for this
regime change to qualify as a re-autocratization. Any earlier regime changes are considered indicators
of general instability of the regime in question. The duration of three years has not been chosen
arbitrarily. This minimal temporal requirement encompasses that at least half of the first legislative
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60
period was an electoral democracy.25 Therefore, cases in which an autocrat used democratic elections
to rise to power to then introduce autocratic ruling are censored out. Three years exceeds the
criterion introduced by Brownlee (2009: 528) whereby three out of four years need to be democratic
to be considered a democratization and exceeds Erdmanns (2011: 11) criterion of two years.
Operationalization of Explanatory Variables
Different theoretic approaches allow the analysis and explanation of re-autocratizations. The basis of
the research on regime changes are the transformation theories, focusing on the functional
differentiation of the system, structural properties, culture and the choices of political elites.
It is assumed that regime changes are a complex phenomenon. Therefore mono-causal explanations
are insufficient (e.g. Erdmann 2011: 18; Merkel and Thiery 2007: 192). In this paper, assumptions of
modernization theory and structuralist assumptions are combined. The explanatory variables are
grouped in two dimensions: a socio-economic dimension and a politico-institutional dimension.
Socio-Economic Dimension
Building on modernization theory, the socio-economic dimension includes the effect of the degree
of modernization, GDP growth rates and the income distribution.
The Degree of Modernization (IV1) is operationalized using the Human Development Index (HDI),
which includes the components life expectancy, educational level and GDP. It is hypothesized that
the higher the human development, the lower the chances for re-autocratization.
The effect of economic growth rates is puzzling. The theoretic assumptions and empirical findings
on their correlation with democratic stability are conflicting. Even though high growth rates are
associated with improvements of the living standard, they might challenge democracy due to a
sudden crash of traditional values. Lipset hypothesized a functional interdependence between
different factors of modernization, such as income, education or democratic values. Unbalanced
development in these factors might challenge democracy:
We know that development efforts, projects that interrupt the life styles and the social
relationships of people and change level of expectation, as a result, may make people
25 I am not aware of a global analysis of the length of legislative periods. The argument is based on a study of the length of legislative periods in six consolidated democracies between 1960 and 2005. The average length of legislative periods was 3.5 years. The maximum constitutionally legal legislative period was 5 years (Markwardt 2008: 93).
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vulnerable to recruitment by extremist movements, religious or secular.” (Lipset 1994:
17)
In contrast, Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 167f.) find that growth generally correlates positively
with democratic survival and that bad economic performance is rather a thread to democratic
survival.
In this paper both extreme growth and economic crisis are hypothesized to be destabilizing factors
for democracy and therefore increase the chance for re-autocratization. In order to test this u-shaped
correlation, a transformed version of the annual per-capita GDP is included. Based on the per-capita
GDP for each country year, the relative change of the GDP over the 5 past years is calculated. Crisis
does not necessarily mean negative growth. Growth that is below the average can be experienced by
the poulation or instrumentalized by non-democratic forces as a crisis. Therefore, the growth rates
for each country year will be centered on the median26 of the growth rates in this country during the
period under research. As it is hypothesized that both crisis and excessive growth are destabilizing,
the absolute values of the centered growth rates are used. This variable then indicates the strength of
the deviation of the relative growth of the per-capita GDP over the past five years from the average
growth, irrespective whether it is positive or negative. The variable is named Growth (IV2). The higher
the Growth (meaning the higher the positive or negative deviation from average growth rates) is the
higher is the chance for re-autocratization.
The assumption of power dispersion, as a structuralist enhancement of modernization theory, is that
power resources need to be distributed equitably for democracy to be stable.
Democracy […] is a delicate political arrangement that comes into place under a very
special set of circumstances. Have too much inequality and asset specificity and a
country is almost certain to be perennially under dictatorship. If by chance democracy is
introduce in a country whose levels of inequality and/or asset specificity exceed a
certain threshold, the country is likely to experience political unrest and revert back to
authoritarianism.” (Aleman and Yang 2011: 6)
A widely available measure of distribution of resources is the Distribution of Income (IV3). Even though
this relates only to one specific power resource, it still might bring interesting results. The
26 The centering is conducted on the median in order to minimize the impact of outliers.
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distribution of the income is included using the GINI-Index. It is hypothesized that the more
dispersed the income the lower the chances of re-autocratization.
Politico-Institutional Dimension
Within the structuralist approaches to democratic (in)-stability and transformations, the focus is put
on institutions and structure of power (Merkel and Thiery 2007: 192). The constitutional design of a
democracy is a central factor. One prominent assumption advocated by Juan Linz (Linz 1990: 51) is
that parliamentary democracies are more stable than presidential democracies. The dual power
legitimation and the winner takes all elections are assumed to have destabilizing potential. However, as
seen in the literature review, the empirical results are contradictory. I follow Linz’ argumentation and
hypothesize that in presidential and semi-presidential democracies the chance for re-autocratization
is higher than in parliamentary democracies. For the variable System of Government (IV4) presidentialism
and semi-presidentialism will be included as dummy variables.
Furthermore it is assumed that inefficient and ineffective governance lead to general dissatisfaction
with the political system and thus instability. Only good governance allows the effects of
modernization and economic growth to have a stabilizing effect on a democracy:
Without significant improvements in governance, economic growth will not take off or
be sustainable. Without legal and political institutions to control corruption, punish
cheating, and ensure a level economic and political playing field, pro-growth policies will
be ineffective and their economic benefits will be overshadowed or erased.” (Diamond
2008: 42)
If politics for example are shaped by corruption or the general perception of ineffectiveness and
inefficiency, the political system will be instable. The World Governance Indicator (WGI) measures
perceived governance in six components. However, on the basis of conceptual doubts27 only three of
those components are included: Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. All
three components capture the citizens perception of the issue (Kraay et al. 2010: 3). As the
components are highly correlated, for the statistical analysis they will be combined to the variable
27 The component Voice and Accountability inter alia includes whether citizen can select the government. Political
Stability and Absence of Violence measures the likelihood that a government will be overthrown violently. Both are
directly related to the concept of re-autocratization. Rule of Law is not directly related to the concept of electoral
democracy, however, I assume that rule of law is an integral part of contestation. To avoid circular argumentation, all
three are omitted.
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Perceived Governance Performance (IV5). Even though this is a subjective measure, it is assumed that the
perception on these issues might be determining actions. It is hypothesized that high Perceived
Governance Performance (IV5) decreases the chances for re-autocratization.
Method
To test the determinants of re-autocratizations, a stepwise binary logistic regression is performed.
This method allows the estimation of the (logarithmized) chance for binary dependent variables on
the basis of the influence of independent variables. As re-autocratizations are rare events, logistic
regression analysis is useful: non-linear relationships between dependent variables and independent
variables are allowed (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007: 437).
Due to restrictions on the availability of data the analysis will be performed for the years 1996 to
2013. All countries with at least 1 000 000 inhabitants that experienced a democratic spell of three
years or longer during the research period are included in the analysis. 28 In total 102 countries
summing up to 1382 country years are analyzed.29
Appendix 4 provides an overview of the tested independent variables. As some of the indicators for
the independent variables are not available annually, trends were calculated in order to avoid
excessive occurrence of missing values. However, the use of these trends might lead to data
smoothing and ignore possible volatility. This is especially the case for the variable Income Distribution.
In the data set 32 cases of re-autocratization occur. This rarity requires specific consideration in the
construction of the regression model. Firstly, regression models applied to rare data tend to
underestimate the chance of the event (King and Zeng 2001: 138).30 Secondly, as a rule of thumb
there should be 10 cases in the smaller category of the dependent variable per included independent
variable. Otherwise the model might suffer from overfitting, meaning that with each additional
variable the measures of goodness increase while the variables remain insignificant (Tabachnick and
Fidell 2007: 442). Applied to the analyzed data, this means that in each model not more than three
28 Due to restrictions in the data availability (especially the World Governance Indicator and the GINI-Index) micro states cannot be included in the analysis. Appendix 1 provides an overview of all excluded states. 29 The number of country year does not equal 102 countries * 17 years. Firstly some countries were democratizes during the research period. They are only included in the analyses, after the minimal temporal requirement has been met (see Appendix 2). Furthermore in some countries data is missing, therefore those years cannot be included in the regression analysis. 30 To avoid this effect, King and Zeng (2001) propose to over- or undersample the data for the DV in order to improve the estimations. Despite conceptual doubts, both approaches were tested. The results were not much improved in comparison to the classical regression model used here.
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variables should be included. Therefore, the regression is performed stepwise for each dimension.
Firstly, the all the variables of one dimension are added to the model. Then insignificant variables are
dropped. A final model will combine the best variables from both dimensions.
Analysis and findings
To avoid multicollinearity the variables should not be correlated. Appendix 5 shows the correlation
coefficients in a cross table. Most of the correlations are on a low to moderate level and therefore
acceptable. However, IV1 Degree of Modernization and IV5 Perceived Governance Performance are strikingly
high correlated (0.81). for the stepwise regression models in the dimension this is no problem, as IV1
and IV5 are in different dimensions. However, in a final model these variables should not be
combined.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the logistic regression model. In the socio-economic dimension,
IV1 Degree of Modernization has a significant negative effect and IV3 Growth shows a significant positive
effect on the chance of re-autocratization. The variable IV2 Income Distribution is not significant.
Dropping it in Model II has only a marginal effect on the measures of goodness. In the politico-
Table 1: Determinants of Re-Autocratizations 1996-2013
Socio-Economic
Dimension
Politico-Institutional
Dimension
Final
Model
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Degree of
Modernization
-0.0724**
(-6.477)
-0.0715***
(-6.382)
Growth 0.0141***
(3.667)
0.0144***
(3.743)
0.0085
(2.178)*
Income Distribution -0.0125
(-0.598)
Presidentialism
(Dummy)
-0.4784
(-0.911)
Semi-presidentialism
(Dummy)
0.2198
(0.414)
Perceived governance
Performance
-2.6466***
(-5.864)
-2.6240***
(-5.944)
-2.6091***
(-5.859)
Constant -1.4193*
(-2.401)
-1.6992***
(-4.583)
-4.3964***
(-9.350)
-4.5361***
(-12.925)
-4.8956***
(-12.055)
R² (Nagelkerke) 0.1927 0.1914 0.2440 0.2337 0.2478
Likelihood-Ratio Test 53.658*** 53.291*** 68.279*** 65.347*** 69.384***
N=1382
Binary logistic regression analysis. Dependent Variable: re-autocratization.
Shown are the coefficients and in parentheses the z-values.
Significance levels: *p<=0.05; **p<= 0.01; ***p<= 0.001, insignificant effects in grey
Source: Author (data: see Table 1)
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65
institutional dimension only IV5 Perceived Governance Performance is significant and shows a negative
effect on the chance of re-autocratization.
The dummy variables for the System of Government Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism are not
significant. This might stem from the small number of events for each of the dummy variables and
the reference category. For example only 6 cases of re-autocratization occurred in parliamentary
democracies. The same problem occurs when including other classifications that split the data set,
such as region or classification of income distribution. As these rarely create significant effects,
preliminary conclusions on possible correlations can only be drawn from the comparison of
frequencies (Appendix 6).
Final Model
Due to the high degree of correlation between IV1 and IV5 only one of them shall be included in the
final model. As the degree of modernization shows a lower level of significance than perceived
governance performance, this variable is dropped. In comparison to Model II the final model shows
an increase in the measures of goodness. For the case of an average growth 31 and a Perceived
Governance Performance of 032 the model estimates a chance for re-autocratization of 0.007533. If
governance performance is perceived good, the chance decreases. Increasing deviation of the growth
rates from the average deceases this chance.
For the final model, outliers and influential cases were investigated (Appendix 7). Influential cases
have a disproportional high effect on the estimation of parameters in the regression model. Cases
which experienced re-autocratizations despite a relatively low predicted chance yield high residuals.
Cases without re-autocratizations despite a high predicted chance show high leverage. High leverage
and residuals combined identify influential cases.
Four cases are identified as influential, all of which are re-autocratization. The data on outliers and
influential cases encompasses important information. Firstly, e.g. the case of Liberia in the year 2000
shows high leverage. However, in the following year a re-autocratization occurred, which meets the
criteria for an influential case. Therefore, the approach might be improved by a refinement of the
time steps: Yearly observations do not distinguish between re-autocratizations at the beginning of the
year or at the end. However, a re-autocratization in the first half of a year might be provoked by the
31 Meaning that the deviation from the average Growth over 5 years in the country is 0. 32 Slightly under average (See Appendix 4) 33 Odds (ea)
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66
IVs in the previous year. Furthermore, it might be necessary to not only look at yearly developments,
but also include the effect of mid- and long-term developments on the chance of re-autocratization.
Repeated Re-Autocratizations
Despite the minimal temporal requirement, we can find countries in the data set that experienced
two re-autocratizations in the period of research. Affected are Georgia (2003 and 2008), Guinea
Bissau (200334 and 2010), Niger (1996 and 2009), Central African Republic (2001 and 2008), and
Haiti (2000 and 2010). Due to the low number of cases, a split population analysis would not
produce reliable results. However, comparing the mean values of the independent variables for the
countries that did not experience a re-autocratization with those that experience re-autocratization
once or twice, tendencies are revealed. The degree of modernization in countries that experienced re-
autocratization twice is considerably lower than in countries with one re-autocratization. If the
median is taken into consideration the distribution is obviously skewed to the left. Georgia has a
relatively high degree of modernization and therefore increases the mean of the whole group.
The variables Growth and Perceived Governance Performance also confirm the hypothesized correlations.
The perceived governance performance is lowest in countries with two re-autocratizations.
Furthermore, the deviation of growth rates from the average growth rates are more erratic than in
countries without or with single re-autocratizations.
Table 1: Single and Repeated Re-Autocratizations in Comparison
No Re-Autocratization Re-Autocratization (AV=1)
74 countries
1150 country years
once
23 countries
202 country years
twice
5 countries
30 country years
Degree of Modernization 74.80
(76.85)
52.92
(54.15)
41.94
(37.05)
Growth 32.64 %
(23.37 %)
33.08 %
(23.24 %)
39.64 %
(37.21 %)
Perceived Governance
Performance
0.57
(0.54)
-0.51
(-0.51)
-0.90
(-1.07)
Displayed are the mean and in parentheses the median.
Source: Author
34 This re-autocratization not in the regression model, due to missing values for the independent variables.
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67
Conclusions
Re-Autocratizations are more likely in countries with relatively low human development and the
perception of bad governance (high corruption, low government effectiveness and regulatory
qualities). Furthermore, excessive deviations from the average growth in a country, be it economic
crisis or excessive economic growth, increase the chance for re-autocratization.
As discussed above, the low number of 32 re-autocratizations in the analysis is a challenge. An
expansion of the data set or application of other methods such as QcA could improve the
estimations. The results presented here only give a rough impression, as the level of abstraction
especially in case of the dependent variable is very high, and seems not suitable when taking hybrid
regimes and electoral authoritarianism into consideration. Furthermore, whether the identified
explanatory variables are genuinely determining democratic instability and re-autocratization, or if the
same variables are applicable on authoritarian breakdowns and subsequent democratizations requires
further investigation. Countries that experienced re-autocratization twice are assumed to not only
have instable democracies, but also to not be able to stabilize autocratically.
The minimal temporal criterion was only applied to the democratic spell. Of the 28 countries that
experienced one or more re-autocratizations during the research period 14 were again considered an
electoral democracy in 2013. Some were re-autocratizations that were followed shortly by electoral
democracies. Georgia (2003) and Bangladesh (2007) did not experience an autocratic spell after the
re-autocratization. How do those cases differ from countries that took much longer until the next
democratization or were not yet democratized again? What implications does the length of an
autocratic spell following a re-autocratization have for the following democratic regimes and vice
versa?
Looking at the regional distribution of re-autocratizations, more occurrences in Asia and Africa.
However, these categories were not included as variables due to the small number of cases in each
class. It might be interesting to investigate, whether there are specific mechanisms of diffusion in
place in this region.
The absolute values for the centered growth rates did result in a significant effect. However, looking
at the distribution of the growth rates, we find that the variable is not normally distributed: over
average economic performance is more common than economic crisis. Furthermore the variable
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ignores globalization. Looking at the annual trends globally (see Appendix 8), variance in the
distribution is obvious and needs further investigation.
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)
69
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Appendices
Appendix 1: List of Excluded Countries
Countries that did not experience a democratic spell of at least three years during the research period: Afghanistan,
Algeria. Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burma, Cambodia,
Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Mauretania, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, The Gambia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Counties with a population below 1 000 000: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti , Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Liechtenstein,
Luxemburg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Montenegro, Nauru, Monaco, Palau,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Gren., Suriname, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Appendix 2: Countries in the Population without Re-Autocratization
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil. Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic (from
1999), East Timor (from 2005), Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana
(from 1999), Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi (from 1997), Mauritius, Mexico (from 2003), Moldova (from 1998),
Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru (from 2004), Tanzania (from 2013), Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States of America, Uruguay.
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Appendix 3: Overview of Countries that Experienced Re-Autocratizations
Country
Co
de
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Armenia ARM Bangladesh BGD
Bosnia u. Herzegovina BIH Burundi BDI
Central African Republic CAF Georgia GEO
Guinea-Bissau GNB
Haiti HTI
Honduras HND Kenya KEN
Kyrgyzstan KGZ Lesotho LSO
Liberia LBR Madagascar MDG
Mali MLI Mozambique MOZ
Nepal NPL Nicaragua NIC
Niger NER Nigeria NGA
Pakistan PAK Philippines PHL
Republic Congo COG Russia RUS
Sri Lanka LKA Thailand THA
Venezuela VEN Zambia ZMB
Explanatory Note Democratic year (dependent variable = 0) Minimal temporal requirement. (dependent variable = missing value) Year of re-autocratization (dependent variable = 1) Missing value on the side of the independent variables. Country year cannot be included in the
regression analysis.
Autocratic year (dependent variable: missing value).
Source: Author (Data: Freedom House 2015b)
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Appendix 4: Independent Variables
Variable Indicator (Source)
Information Hypothesized correlation
Socio-economic dimension
IV1 Degree of Modernization
HDI (UNDP 2014)
possible domain {0,100} 0 – no human development 100 – highest human development realized domain {0,70.1}i
mean 46.46 median 48.7
Negative
IV2 Growth (absolute value centered)
Centered absolute value of the relative growth rates over 5 years of the GDP per capita in a country (World Bank 2014a, own calculations)
domain{0; 251.2} 0 – average growth rate 251.2 – largest deviation from average growth rate mean 32.92 median 23.80
Positive
IV3 Income Distribution
GINI (Worldbank 2013)
possible domain{0,100} 0 – maximum diffusion of income 100 – maximum concentration of income realized domain {0,46.70}i
mean 16.64 median 13.9
Positive
Politico-institutional dimension
IV4 System of Government
Presidentialism [Dummy] Semi-Presidentialism [Dummy] (Cheibub et al. 2010)
0 – no presidentialism 1 – presidentialism 0 – no semi-presidentialism 1 – semi-presidentialism Reference category: parliamentary system
Positive
IV5 Perceived Governance Performance
Index of three components of WGI -Control of Corruption -Government Effectiveness -Regulatory Quality (Worldbank 2014b)
Possible domain {-2.5,2.5} realized domain {-1,66,2.27} mean 0.38 median 0.20
negative
i For the purpose of the logistic regression the lowest value of the original distribution of the variable was set 0, in order to ease the interpretation of the regression constant. It then indicates the additive effect unit for each unit above the lowest value in the dataset. The empirical distributions are IV1 {24.30,94.40} and IV3 {23.1,69.8}. Source: Author
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Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix for the Variables
DV IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
Presidential Semi-
Presidential
DV
1.00 -0.19*** 0.07** 0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.18***
IV1
1.00 0.02 -0.46*** -0.24*** -0.07*** 0.81***
IV2
1.00 -0.06** -0.02 0.02 -0.03
IV3
1.00 0.53*** -0.26*** -0.46
IV4
Presidential 1.00 -0.43*** -0.30***
Semi- Presidential
1.00 -0.09**
IV5
1.00
Pearsons correlation coefficient. Significance levels: *p<=0,05; **p<= 0,01; ***p<= 0,001, insignificant correlation coefficients in grey. Source: Author (Data: see Table 1)
Appendix 6: Group Differences in the Frequency of Re-Autocratizations
Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Type of Government
Parliamentary
Systems Semi-Presidential
Systems Presidential
Systems Total
n=536 n=317 n=326 N=1382
no Re-Autocratization (AV=0)
533 98.89 %
304 95.90 %
513 97.54 %
1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (AV=1)
6 1.11 %
13 4.10 %
13 2.46 %
32 2.32 %
Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage. Source: Author
Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Region
Africa Asia
Latin America Caribbean
Eastern Europe
W. Europe N. America
Total
n=157 n=224 n=319 n=279 n=403 N=1382
no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)
151 96.18 %
209 93.30 %
314 98.43 %
273 97.84 %
403 100.00 %
1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (DV=1)
6 3.82 %
15 6.70 %
5 1.57 %
6 2.15 %
0 0.00 %
32 2.32 %
Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage. Source: Author
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Point of Time of First Democratization
Before 1974 After 1974 Total
n=582 n=800 N=1382
no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)
579 99.48 %
771 96.36 %
1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (DV=1)
3 0.51 %
29 3,63 %
32 2.32 %
Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage. Source: Author
Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Grouped Income Diffusion
high
diffusion n=346
medium diffusion
n=346
medium concentration
n=344
High concentration
n=346
total
N=1 382
no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)
342 98.84 %
340 98.26 %
330 95.38 %
338 97.69 %
1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (DV=1)
4 1.16 %
6 1.73 %
14 4.05 %
8 2.31 %
32 2.32 %
The grouping is conducted on the basis of the quartiles: 1st quartile 31.67, median 37.00, 3rd quartile 47.17. Depicted are the country years per category and column percentage. Source: Author
Appendix 7: Residuals and Leverage for Outlier Cases
Case
nu
mb
er
Resi
du
als
Leve
rag
e
Country
Year
Re-Autocratization
Growthi Perceived Governance Performance
High Residuals
1.256 16.18 0.00 Thailand 2005 Yes -1.83 0.43
38 8.63 0.00 Armenia 2003 Yes -4.48 -0.26
1060 7.58 0.00 Philippines 2007 Yes 25.84 0.08
743 7.54 0.00 Lesotho 1998 Yes -29.02 -0.13
High Leverage
1304 -0.59 0.12 Ukraine 2008 No 245,22 -0.71
1188 -0.43 0.09 Serbia 2005 No 251.19 -0.31
1303 -0.49 0.08 Ukraine 2007 No 223.03 -0.67
718 -1.19 0.07 Liberia 2000 No 105.96 -1.84
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Case
nu
mb
er
Resi
du
als
Leve
rag
e
Country
Year
Re-Autocratization
Growthi Perceived Governance Performance
Influential Cases
471 7.26 0,01 Georgia 2008 Yes 167.33 0,30
139 2.42 0,03 Bosnia and Herzegovina
1999 Yes 173.91 -0.93
1.358 1.03 0.12 Venezuela 2008 Yes 204.61 -1.11
719 1.17 0.16 Liberia 2001 Yes 60.47 -1.68
i In this table the centered growth rates are depicted. The signs are included for reference. Source: Author
Appendix 8: Annual Distribution of the Country Centered Growth Rates
Source: Author.
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 31 (October 2016)
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