ODUM, INNOCENT CHIKE
PG/M.Sc./08/49483
POLITICS OF FOOD AID AND FOOD CRISES IN
AFRICA: THE ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,, FACULTY
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
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Digitally Signed by Webmaster‘s Name
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ii
POLITICS OF FOOD AID AND FOOD CRISES IN AFRICA: THE
ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE
BY
ODUM, INNOCENT CHIKE
PG/M.Sc./08/49483
PRESENTED TO
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
PROF. MIRIAM IKEJIANI-CLARK
FEBRUARY, 2010
iii
POLITICS OF FOOD AID AND FOOD CRISES IN AFRICA: THE
ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE
PROJECT REPORT PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTERS OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (M.Sc.)
BY
ODUM, INNOCENT CHIKE.
PG/M.SC./08/49483
FEBRUARY, 2010
iv
APPROVAL PAGE
This Project report has been approved for the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria,
Nsukka.
By
…………………………………… …………………………………… PROF. MIRIAM IKEJIANI-CLARK PROF. E. O. EZEANI
PROJECT SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
………………………….. EXTERNAL EXAMINER
v
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to Robert Mugabe, the True African patriot who corrected a
historical imbalance through the land reform which led Zimbabwe to gain its rightful
heritage against colonial power acting on the behalf of the white community to
protect their interest.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The Journey was not a smooth sail. However tortuous the journey may have been, I am immeasurably
thankful to God Almighty with whose guidance and protection I was able to attain this academic height.
I,m sincerely grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Miriam Ikejiani-Clerk for her motherly advice and
encouragement. Without her critical supervision and painstaking reading, the material contained in this
work could not have been well utilised. I am indeed very grateful to her.
Credit also goes to the Head of Department of Political Science, Prof. Emmanuel Onyebuchi
Ezeani and all my wonderful, able and resourceful lecturers. I‘m profoundly grateful to all who helped
in seeing this research work through; my loving parents Chief and Mrs. Damien Odum (Ichie Chibueze)
my brothers and sisters and my friends. I thank most especially, Mr. Ohiaegbu P.C, for his astute
devotion to the success of this research work. I appreciate the friendship and encouragement of some of
my colleagues in this Master of Science (M.Sc.) programme and my friends who have created a
conducive environment for me in the course of this work, some of whom are; Ogbogho Blessing, Okeke
Nonso, Ilozue Cosmas, Ikeanyi Joseph, Anyanwu Placid, Obieze Uchenna, Obinna, and Arinze. Finally,
my utmost thanks go to God Almighty for His gift of life, good health, encouragement and bountiful
blessings. As always, may all the glory remain his.
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TABLE OFCONTENTS
Title page…………………………………………………………………………………………ii
Approval page …………………………………………………………………………………...iii
Dedication ……………………………………………………………………………………….iv
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………v
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………...vi
List of Abbreviations ……. …………………………………………………………………………….viii
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………...viii
List of Figure……………………………………………………………………………………x
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………..xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study………………………………………………………………….1
1.2 Statement of Problem……………………………………………………………………..3
1.3 Objective of the Study……………………………………………………………………6
1.4 Significance of the Study…………………………………………………………………6
1.5 Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………7
1.6 Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………………………..38
1.7 Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….43
1.8 Scope of the Study……………………………………………………………………….44
1.9 Method of data collection………………………………………………………………..44
1.10 Operataionalization of Concepts…………………………………………………………47
CHAPTER TWO: CONTRADICTIONS OF POLITICAL GOVERNANCE AND THE
ZIMBABWEAN FOOD CRISES
2.1 Leadership Crisis and National Development Crisis in Zimbabwe ……………………………..48
2.2 Militarization of Politics and Governance in Zimbabwe…………………………………...……55
2.3 The Politicization of the Military……………………………………………………………...…58
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CHAPTER THREE: HUNGER AND POLITICS, ECONOMIC REFORM,
ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIVAL PROGRAMME
AND CRISIS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE
3.1 Zimbabwe‘s Inheritance: Hunger and Politics…………………………………………...………67
3.2 The Politicisation of Land, and Land Reform in Zimbabwe, and Root Cause of Hunger ………69
3.3 National Economic Reform Programme, and the Zimbabwean Crisis…………………………..73
3.4 The Economic Sanctions On Zimbabwe‘s Economy, and Its Contribution to the Food Crisis …78
3.5 The First Millennium Development Goal and Food Security in Zimbabwe ……………………89
CHAPTER FOUR: CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD AID, AND EFFORTS OF
GOVERNMENTS. TOWARDS FOOD CRISIS
4.1 Characteristics of Food Aid and Its Implication for Recipient Nations …………………………87
4.2 Food Crisis and Social Unrest in Developing Countries…………………………………….…..92
4.3 Actions by governments Toward the Global Food Crisis………………………………………..99
4.4 The internal/External Dimension of the national Food Crisis in Africa……………………..…100
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………..107
5.2 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….107
5.3 findings of study………………………………………………………………………………109
5.4 Recommendation ……………………………………………………………………………..110
Bibliography
ix
List of Abbreviations
AIPPA Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
AU African Union
BSA Broadcasting Services Act,
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Development
FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FIVIMS Food Security and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System
HFSC High Food Sufficient Countries
IAASTD International Assessment on Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for
Development
ICTSD International Center for Technology and Sustainable Development
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IOM International Organisation for Migration
LFDCS Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
NAGG National Alliance for Good Governance
NAMA Non-Agricultural Market Access
NCA National Constitutional Assembly
POSA Public Order and Security Act
PUMA Patriotic Union of MaNdebeleland
SEED Sustainable Energy and Environmental Division
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WFP World Food Programme
WFS World Food Summit
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIDERA Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIMRIGHTS Zimbabwe Human Rights Association
ZNLWVA Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans‘ Association (the War Vets)
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List of Tables
Table 1.1 Decision Table……………………………………………………………………………..47
Table 2.1 The Economist Intelligence Unit‘s Index of Democracy 2008………………………….53
Appendix I List of political parties – in Zimbabwe………………………………………………..120
Appendix II Government Domestic Debt, 5 November 1999 to 31 January 2003: Z$‘m…………...121
Appendix III Retail Fuel Prices, January 1997 to April 2003………………………………………...122
Appendix IV Electrical energy produced and distributed………………………………………….....123
Appendix V Manufacturing: All Groups Annual Indices……………………………………………124
Appendix VI Manufacturing: 2001 and 2002 compared (Percentage Change)……………………....125
Appendix VII Metal and mineral production: 2001 and 2002…………………………………………126
xi
List of Figure
Fig 1.1 The Mechanism of Food Aid Recycling…………………………………………………41
xii
Abstract
The study sets itself the task of examining politics of food aid and food crises in Africa focusing on the
Zimbabwean experience. In Addition to problematizing the economic and political imperatives of food
aid for the developing nations, the study, also explain how the character of political leadership have
contributed to the national development crisis in Zimbabwe, and; explore the organic interconnections
between the character of the governance of the global food system, the flow of food aid , and food
insecurity in Zimbabwe; and, based on the findings, proffer policy solutions to the identified problems.
To explore root causes of the global food crisis, and the Zimbabwean food crisis in particular the
following questions will be addressed in the present study: Has the character of political leadership
contributed to the national development crisis in Zimbabwe?; and, Is there an organic interconnection
between food insecurity in Zimbabwe and food aid, and as well as the character of the governance of the
global food system?. The study was undertaken within the theoretical assumption of the Marxists
political economy paradigm, which was developed, by Karl Marx, Fredrick Engel‘s, and V.I Lenin as a
critique of capitalism which is a radical critique of the humanitarian strategy adopted by the developed
nations in their relations with the developing countries. The theory was adapted to the objective nature
and character of the governance of the global food system, the flow of food aid, and political leadership,
as well as food insecurity in Zimbabwe. The above theoretical insight provides both conceptual and
analytical framework through which the paradox ,and political economy of foreign food aid can be
understood, in such a way that the reader sees both food not only as an economic tool but also a more
fundamental tool of foreign policy, and economic diplomacy. Our method of data collection was
through the secondary source of data collection. Frequency tables, and charts, were used to organize the
quantitative information gathered in concise and ordered form to clarify the relationship between the
character of the character of political leadership in Zimbabwe, the character of the governance of the
global food system, food aid and food insecurity in Zimbabwe. The findings of the study confirmed the
two hypotheses. Against the above background, the study concludes that the political and economic
crisis in Zimbabwe is a mixture of contradictions in both the domestic and international political system,
both of which does not encourage achievement of the objective of the First Millennium Development
Goal of eradicating extreme hunger and poverty. Finally, against the background of the productivist
agricultural policy driven by the logic of commodity production and exchange, the study recommends a
shift back the traditional concept of self-sufficiency through sustainable agriculture. However, this is
dependent on the political situation of ensuring peace and security.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
The humanitarian strategy adopted by the developed nations in their relations with the
developing countries, is such that the former exploits the later, through foreign aid, especially, when the
terms of the aid are set by the donor nations or group of nations, in a manner that is entirely
disadvantageous to one nation.(Alasina et al. 2002:37). Understood this way, food aid is an intersection
of foreign policy, government power and business deals, not only because, of its centrality to national
power, but also, because, states that do not have food sovereignty depend on other nations, not just for
food, but also for other agricultural inputs.
The correlates that have pushed up food shortage are a mixture of factors: climatic, economic
and/or political. For Zimbabwe, specifically, there are at least three deeply-rooted interrelated long-term
factors and one additional proximate which converge to explain the socio-political-cum food crisis.
These three interrelated long-term factors have both internal-structural dimension (Zimbabwe‘s
incendiary combination of economic decline, social dislocation, and, most importantly, a politicized
military), and external institutional dimension. These have converged in causing the looming socio-
political-cum food crisis. Put differently, one way of understanding the political and economic trends
that has characterized the state of the Zimbabwean nation without an inevitable sense of detraction from
its political economy, is by focusing the analysis on both the character and the contradictions in both the
domestic and international political system, and on the place which Zimbabwean nation occupy in the
international division of labour, production and exchange.
In the domestic context, the vertical division of labour among the white and black Zimbabwean
farmers, and the land reform had a two way effect. First, about 4,000 commercial farmers mostly white
were displaced. Second, an estimated 350,000 black farm workers and their families were disgorged,
both of which led to a 50 percent reduction in overall agricultural output, and chronic shortages in key
staples, such as maize (Julian 2008:17). The implication of this abound: lost of productive capacity
which directly contributed to the Zimbabwean macroeconomic decline. Also, Zimbabwe, which was a
major exporter of commercial crops, and self-sufficient in food production, today has only managed to
produce 500 000 tones of maize against a requirement of 2.4 million tones, a sign that the country would
import grain through emergency food aid.(Ndlovu, 2007:5 in Global Politician Magazine).
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While the above exposition foregrounds the internal and structural dimension of the socio-economic
cum political crisis in Zimbabwe, yet there are external and structural dimension from which, it can be
argued that, the on-going political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe are linked to rising pressures from
the international financial institutions ( IFIs ) the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank
which forced the Zimbabwean government down the road of structural adjustment programmes.The
imposed structural adjustment programme in Zimbabwe known as the ESAP, was part of the problem,
as several historically strong sectors in Zimbabwe could not compete in the liberalized trade
environment prescribed by the IFIs and donors, who had to, out of necessity bail them out of the
economic quagmire. To this must, also be added, Mugabenomics: the unprecedented collapse and
3,700% inflation (Ndlovu, 2007:7).
After seven years of experimentation, and eight years of recession, Zimbabwe‘s economy shrunk
by more than one third since 1999.More recently, GDP declines have still average d a staggering 6
percent per year between 2002-2006, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, this ―slower‖ pace
results only from the fact that the economy is running out of ways to contract. Zimbabwe's annual
inflation further increased to 1513.7 percentage points from 2200.2 percent in March to 3713.9 percent.
This is the highest in the world, in a country where the majority lives below $1 a day. On a month on
month basis CSO said that prices had risen by 100.7 percent last month (February) after a 50.5 percent
rise in March.
Apart from policy-induced problems, there are also misgovernance (political) cause of Zimbabwe‘s
economic shrunk, and food crisis is the long term dissatisfaction among military and proto-military
elements in society (Kriger,2003:9),and lack of accountability that characterized the ZANU regime
from its inception. Beginning in 1980, when ZANU won the vast majority of contested seats in
Zimbabwe‘s first-ever democratic elections, the party under the leadership of prime minister, later
president, Mugabe became increasingly dominant. After 1987, Zimbabwe had established a de facto
one-party state, and maintained its hierarchical structure, with power concentrated in the president and a
handful of executive-level and party institutions, such as the politburo, Central Committee and, perhaps
a distant third, the cabinet (Bauer and Taylor, 2005 :2).
It has become convenient, if not fashionable, among many observers to locate much of the
responsibility for Zimbabwe‘s democratic decline in the person of President Mugabe. From this follows
somewhat facile assertions that competitive multiparty politics, or even civilian order, will be restored
upon his demise. However, the environment of politicized military and militarized politics has
xv
succeeded in making Robert Mugabe essential to Zimbabwe‘s stability in the medium term. Over the
longer term, the keys to a political, and economic, ―soft landing‖ in Zimbabwe lie, not in the country‘s
fractured civilian opposition groups, but in the most unlikely quarter, that is, cronies of the ZANU-PF
regime, a group that now prominently includes the military apparatus itself and its representatives. All
these have combined in making the political, economic and social infrastructures of Zimbabwe, as the
world‘s fastest-shrinking economy with GDP declining on an average of 6 percent per year between
2002-2006 (the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008).
Once the crisis has involved balance of payments (BOP) deficit, as Zimbabwe is in arrears with
its repayment commitments to the IMF and World Bank, and dependent on international food markets
for the suppliers of a variety of essential imports, it is only a moot point, if Zimbabwe‘s food
dependence would not be politicized for various political reasons, leading to contracting further foreign
aid.
1.2 Statement of Problem
The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is a mixture of three interrelated long-term
factors that have both internal-structural dimension (Zimbabwe‘s incendiary combination of economic
decline, social dislocation, and, a politicized military), and external institutional dimension. These
factors have converged in contributing to the current looming socio-political-cum food crisis in
Zimbabwe. For instance, in 1997, the Zimbabwean government faced rising pressures from the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to reduce government spending, accelerate privatization, and
renew the economic structural adjustment program (ESAP), and the International monetary fund (IMF)
specifically withheld an essential balance of payments facility (Ndlovu,2007:2). Thus, the political and
economic environment in the country was particularly fragile.
Faced with this problems, the destruction of Zimbabwe‘s once impressive urban-industrial
infrastructure and industries in the 1960s and seventies, was indisputably damaged by the effects of
economic structural adjustment in the 1990s (Bond, 2002:17).This collapse is not simply of physical
infrastructure, as institutional and organizational networks have also suffered, and trust has dwindled.
Formal economic activity became nearly impossible amidst Zimbabwe‘s capricious policy environment.
This lead to mass exodus of skilled labour, managers and capital, and rampant inflation, which some
estimates suggest a staggering 100,000 percent annually. The economic disintegration and deterioration
of political life and the steady erosion of remaining democratic practices lead to population
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displacement, cross bother migration leading to ―Brain Drain‖, since, more than 30 percent of the
population, by some estimates currently live outside their home country- Zimbabwe(HRW, 2005a:11).
Among these exiles who now make their home in the U.K, the US, South Africa, Botswana and
elsewhere, are many of the country‘s best and brightest, including healthcare professionals, educators,
business owners and managers, farmers, and a significant portion of Zimbabwe‘s laborers, both skilled
and unskilled.
Many of these people left within the past decade, fleeing catastrophic economic decline and
political harassment (Bond & Manyanya, 2003:45; Raftopoulos, 2004:4). In other words, the majority of
Zimbabweans settling in African countries are economic refugees while, on a percentage basis, a larger
number of political refugees have settled in the UK: London is the home of 40,000, while Luton is
hosting 20,000, Slough 10,000, Leeds 20,000, Manchester 10,000, Birmingham 10,000, Glasgow 5,000,
Edinburgh 1,000, Coventry 3,000, Leicester 5,000, Sheffield 10,000, Milton Keynes 10,000, and
Wolverhampton 5000 (Bloch 2005:6). Between 1990 and 2005, 395,800 Zimbabweans entered the UK
,according to the London office of International Organisation for Migration (IOM).In percentage terms,
the largest proportion (36.8%) went to the United Kingdom (UK), while 34.5% went to Botswana, 6.9%
to the United States, 4.6% to South Africa%(1.2 million ), 3.4% to Canada and the remainder to various
countries around the world .What is even more worrisome is that , ninety percent (90%) of the subjects
in their survey lived below the official poverty line and many of those interviewed expressed that they
were experiencing critical levels of need(Sara, B. and Lloyd, S.,2006:9).
For those who could not go on exile, unemployment ranged from 75 to 85 percent, and poverty is
estimated as high as 90 percent (ICG, 2007:56).Cholera and other preventable diseases are becoming
commonplace as water treatment facilities, not to mention the country‘s once laudable health care
system, has collapsed. Average life expectancy has plummeted, down to 37 for men and just 34 for
women, the lowest in the world.
There was also a sudden acceleration in the decline of the Zimbabwe dollar parallel market
exchange rate in the last quarter of 2002, which saw the dollar drop from Z$730 to one US dollar to
Z$1,500, and then to Z$1,800 in the first week of November, 2002. The exchange rate movements
caused a month-on-month rates of increase in prices at an average of 14,3% a month from August to
December 2002. The year-on-year inflation recorded was 175,5%. This rose to 198,9% in December, to
208,1% in January 2003, to 220,9% in February and to 228% in March. As a result, payments arrears of
almost one billion US dollars had been accumulated in 2001 and rose to US$1, 3 billion by November
xvii
2002. As a result, Zimbabwe now appears to be a good investment option only to the most opportunistic
of speculators, who will concentrate on quick commercial returns and completely ignore productive
investment opportunities.
The expectation was that Zimbabwean government would adopt acceptable policies favourable
to the international donors who may bail them out on the principle of ―business as usual‖, since; it has
very few options on what to do. However, as Zimbabwe became one of the 22 countries, of which 16 are
in Africa, in which the undernourishment prevalence rate is over 35%, with up to a third of the
population in need of food aid since 2001, the Zimbabwean Government decided to nationalize nearly
all of the country‘s commercial farms.
Apart from the reasons which the government adduced for the land reform, some critics are of
the opinion that President Robert Mugabe used the nationalization of the Zimbabwean commercial
farms policy for political reasons against his two opposition candidates: Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC
candidate and former ZANU-PF minister Simba Makoni, who contested the presidential poll on March
29, 2008. For instance, with President Robert Mugabe‘s defeat of its constitutional referendum, in
February 2000, like all dictators with their ―fascist and authoritarian style of governance, the incumbent,
President Robert Mugabe through populist policy of land reform established a dictatorial position in
Zimbabwe boasting that no Zimbabwean can rule ―until I (am)he is a century old‖ ( Moore, 2006:9).
As a result, the MDC was unable to secure electoral victory in the 2000, 2002, and 2005, or in 2008.
By implication, the nationalization of the Zimbabwean commercial farms, affected productivity
negatively, and export earnings from food production declined. This led to devaluation of the
Zimbabwean currency by the Zimbabwean government, a reason for which the Zimbabwean Reserve
Bank paid Z$800 for every US dollar it receives, each US dollar exchanged for Z$848 Zimbabwean
dollar. This led to a loss of Z$745 it will incur on every dollar taken by the government. This translated
to a total loss of US$10 million every month, or Z$7, 45 billion a month. It has affected productivity.
Provisional figures for the final quarter of 2002 show that manufacturing output for the whole year
declined by 16,4% compared to the volume produced in 2001.On April 16 2003, fuel prices were
increased again, this time by much bigger margins:210% for leaded petrol and 67,5% for diesel. In
February, 2003, the petrol price had been increased by 95% and the diesel price by 80%, but these
adjustments fell a long way short of the amounts needed to close the gap (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:5).
Finally, all these made Zimbabwe a typical international pariah, at least vis-à-vis the OECD
countries and a serious threat to the stability of the whole Southern African region with an estimated
xviii
poverty rate of 80 percent (the IMF 2005:407).Seeing that the European Union has switched its food aid
policies toward cash for local purchases in developing countries in the mid-1990s, a policy also adopted
by Canada and Australia; the US, maintaining its policy of tying 100% of its food aid to purchases of US
products, seeing the inevitable of food aid for Zimbabwe, it is only a moot point whether, the terms food
aid would not be set by foreign donors in a manner that would be entirely disadvantageous, and
detrimental to Zimbabwe.
The broad question still remains what are the root causes of the Zimbabwean food crisis? To
explain the long-term factors and proximate factors that have influenced Zimbabwe‘s socio-political-
economic cum food crisis, the following questions will be addressed in the present study:
I. Has the character of political leadership contributed to the national development crisis in
Zimbabwe?
II. Is there an organic interconnection between food insecurity, food aid, and the character of the
governance in Zimbabwe?
1.3 Objective of the Study
The general and specific objectives of this study are essentially but not exclusive of the following:
The general objective of the present study is to determine the main cause of the developing
countries' precarious food crisis using Zimbabwe as a case study with a view to problematize the
economic and political imperatives of food aid for the developing nations.
In terms of the specific objectives, the study intends to:
I. To explain how the character of political leadership have contributed to the national
development crisis in Zimbabwe, and ;
II. To explore the organic interconnections between the flow of food aid , food insecurity and the
character of the governance in Zimbabwe; and,
III. Based on the findings, proffer policy solutions to the identified problems.
1.4 Significance of the Study
The usefulness of any study is measured by how much it will contribute to the already
existing body of knowledge. Over the years, there have been various symposia conferences and foreign
policy Summit and Round tables convened to address the issue under investigation. Ontologically, the
phenomenon has been presented, and treated as a mere humanitarian emergency, which made analysts to
believe that foreign aid is given to states for humanitarian or economic development intentions. Contrary
xix
to the above consensus, the study will problematize and seeks to explain how the donor‘s interest, rather
than needs of the recipient determines whom to give aid as well as how the monopolization, and control
over food supply and food distribution by multinational corporations creates national food crisis. It
therefore, advances the intellectual position of scholars on the debate of shift in food policies of
developing countries, from insistence on national self-sufficiency to market-based food security.
Using the Kantian Inside-Outside conceptual framework in theorization to the analysis, the study
will help ,the reader to see the international system and the domestic system as both dependent and
independent variables respectively as it uses both national food and global food crisis as constitutive
and generative variables (the explanatory factor), and ( national food security/insecurity) as what is
explained. Therefore, the study ostensibly, provides a critique of the implicit sharp distinction between
domestic food crisis and international food crisis. Thus, the theoretical significance of the study lies
essentially in the fact that it will provide a fair illumination of the concept of political economy of
foreign aid.
Added to this, the study becomes timely, as food aid and its pattern of administration has become a
heated political issue on the international stage in recent years, sparking debates over the economic and
political imperatives of food aid for the developing nations in terms of the question of whether the tying
of food aid to commodity purchases in the donor country (in-kind food aid) is the best way to deliver
food aid.
Finally, not only will the study be beneficial to policy makers and society for a more profound and
deeper appreciation of the linkages between ―Developments‖ of a nation (including its food security) has
become dependent on the market based policies, trade liberalization, and privatization of national farm
lands. The study will also serve as a convenient springboard for further inquiry in the area of ―soft
power diplomacy in international relations. If the study succeeds in clarifying issues, enhancing
understanding and is able to elicit and stimulate enlightening intellectual discourse, we believe, it will
have adequately served its purpose.
1.5 Literature Review
Literature in this study will be reviewed under the following sub-headings or sub-themes:
I. Character of Political Leadership and Development Crises in Zimbabwe
II. National Development Crisis in Zimbabwe
xx
III. Food Insecurity in Zimbabwe
IV. Governance of Global Food System
Character of Political Leadership and Development Crises in Zimbabwe
The contradictions of governance, and crisis of leadership, or the character of politics in
Zimbabwe is a major contributory factor to the national development crisis in Zimbabwe. It has become
convenient, if not fashionable, among many observers to locate much of the responsibility for
Zimbabwe‘s democratic decline in the person of President Mugabe. From this follows somewhat facile
assertions that competitive multiparty politics, or even civilian order, will be restored upon his demise.
However, the environment of politicized military and militarized politics has succeeded in making
Robert Mugabe essential to Zimbabwe‘s stability in the medium term. Over the longer term, the keys to
a political, and economic, ―soft landing‖ in Zimbabwe lie not in the country‘s fractured civilian
opposition groups, but in the most unlikely quarter – cronies of the ZANU-PF regime, a group that now
prominently includes the military apparatus itself and its representatives.
Kriger, (2003:5), noted that the origins of Zimbabwe‘s recent chaos are well known. The
underlying/long-term factors are deeply-rooted and stem from at least three interrelated long-term
factors and one additional proximate cause. The first centers on unresolved disparities over economy
and land. This ―incomplete liberation‖ meant that there was a reservoir of populist resentment, which,
though long dormant, could be tapped and mobilized by opportunistic politicians and other actors.
Indeed, this contributed to long term dissatisfaction among military and proto-military elements in the
society. Lack of accountability is also a key variable that characterized the ZANU regime from its
inception (see Kriger, 2003).
Bauer and Taylor, (2005:144) argues that beginning in 1980, when ZANU won the vast majority
of contested seats in Zimbabwe‘s first-ever democratic elections, the party under the leadership of prime
minister, later president, Mugabe became increasingly dominant. After 1987, Zimbabwe had established
a de facto one-party state. It maintained its hierarchical structure, with power concentrated in the
president and a handful of executive-level and party institutions, such as the politburo, Central
Committee and, perhaps a distant third, the cabinet. Sylvester, (1995:6) makes a case for the
incorporation of ZANU‘s rival and leading opposition party, ZAPU, through a merger in 1987 which
essentially foreclosed the prospect of any potent political competition in the country for the next dozen
years .By definition, power is not diffused in a single-party predominant system. This type of governing
xxi
structure renders the Zimbabwean state particularly susceptible to militarization. Although the ZANU-
led state displayed flashes of democratic governance in its first two decades; a closer inspection reveals
an astounding willingness by the regime to use various tools of repression to maintain its authority.
Indeed, ZANU had a history of using violence for political ends. The most severe example of this was
the infamous Gukurahundi campaign between 1982 and 1986, in which some 20,000 Zimbabweans,
mainly from Matabeleland, died at the hands of the regime. (Sylvester, 1995).
For instance, Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since its independence from settler rule in
1980 till date. Although never a fully fledged democracy, in most conceptions of the term, during that
period, Zimbabwe has gone from multiparty state in the 1980s, to dominant one party state in the 1990s
to autocracy in the 2000s. Both scholarship and popular writing on democracy, and more specifically on
Zimbabwe, have accurately mapped Zimbabwe‘s descent into authoritarianism (The Economist,
2008:22).
In fact, not long after he began his fourth presidential term in 2002 – when the first serious
discussions of succession and ―will he/won‘t he‖ speculation began about the prospects of Mugabe
standing again in 2008 – the country has been sliding inexorably toward militarism. Research on African
regimes suggests that states displaying Zimbabwe‘s incendiary combination of economic decline, social
dislocation, and, most importantly, a politicized military, have experienced coups d‘état, and indeed,
Zimbabwe appears ripe for a coup, but one has not occurred.
According to Tawanda,(2009:45),the US introduced economic sanctions on Zimbabwe through
the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001 (ZIDERA) According to him, through
this enactment Zimbabwe‘s access to finance and credit facilities was effectively incinerated, and
ZIDERA empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence (as the main donor) in multilateral
lending agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank, and the African Development Bank to veto any
applications by Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling, and international debt
cancellation. The US cites Zimbabwe‘s human rights record, political intolerance and absence of rule of
law as the main reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The ZIDERA also suggests that if Zimbabwe
acts to correct these ills, then the sanctions will be removed and economic support measures are
suggested. Simply put, owing to the size of the US vote and influence in these institutions, neither the
IMF, World Bank nor the African Development Bank will lend to Zimbabwe, or offer it credit facilities.
Therefore, needless to say, as a direct result of the US 2001 Act, Zimbabwe‘s relationship with these
multilateral lending agencies was immediately and severely affected.
xxii
The political economy of land provided the central ideological theme for ZANU-PF which
employed to garner support and gain legitimacy from the rural populace, as evident in the ZANU PF‘s
campaign slogan ‗LAND IS THE ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMY IS LAND‖ during the whole
constitutional debate and thereafter the General elections held in June 2000 .The struggle for land
became the Third Chimurenga (The Third Revolution) in government circle
( http://www.afrika.no/noop/). Hence anyone who opposed the governments‘ view on the land issue was
viewed as an enemy and against nationalistic aspirations. As articulated by the ruling party newspaper:
their ties with ex-Rhodesians and Western powers who have been
working against the realization of our people‘s aspirations and
goals such as land reform is clear testimony that they are enemies
of our revolution. To be more precise, they are puppets of these
imperialists who want to re-colonize Zimbabweans
( http://www.afrika.no/noop/)
In view of the above, critics of government land reform argues that Zimbabwe‘s land reform was
market-oriented from the beginning. Land reform in post-independent in Zimbabwe can be separated
into three main periods: the early 1980s saw the government purchasing land on a ―willing buyer,
willing seller‖ basis with co-financing from the British government. Between 1980-1998, approximately
3.5 million hectares were redistributed in this manner. The government put a lot of effort in land
settlement, with the creation of the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement. The mid-1980s to mid-1990s,
land reform took a back seat due to government‘s preoccupation with economic revival under the
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the mid-1990s and onwards saw the politicization of
land reform (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
According to Robert Mugabe, the government was justified because it was correcting historical
imbalances through the land reform as it was ―a struggle by Zimbabwe to gain its rightful heritage
against colonial power acting on behalf of the white community to protect their interest‖. He blamed the
whites for their refusal to cooperate with the government and attacked them for their ―entrenched
colonial attitudes‖ and their ―vestigial attitudes from the Rhodesian yesteryears- attitudes of master race,
master colour, master owner and master employer‖ (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). Firmed in the
above believe, the international community, led by the United Kingdom and Britain‘s intransigence and
overt intervention in Zimbabwe‘s affairs did not change Mugabe‘s behaviour, but made him even more
xxiii
critical of external intervention and gave him the opportunity to dismiss and attack his critics as agents
of imperialism.
Tawanda, H.,( 2009:48) in his own contribution while noting that Mugabe‘s political
intolerance, electoral fraud and gross human rights abuses have contributed to the country‘s economic
malaise, argues that though, it was true that each one of these often cited factors has contributed, or
provides an explanation to Zimbabwe‘s current economic problems, however, western countries and
media almost collectively ignore one other significant factor responsible for the country‘s economic
collapse: economic sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and Australia against Zimbabwe. He noted
further that, Zimbabwe‘s economic woes are the direct result of a concerted and systematic campaign to
effect regime change through an economic implosion. Hence, in his words, Zimbabwe‘s inability to
obtain finance or credit facilities from international lenders to inject into the economy is a direct
consequence of a sanctions regime imposed against the Zimbabwe by particularly the US, and the EU.
Similarly, according to ZimEye (2009:2), the suggestion that Zimbabwe‘s economy is what it is because
of mismanagement is partly true but misleading. He noted that what Mugabe has done is to mismanage
the endemic crisis caused by the country‘s inability to access capital, which in turn are the result of a raft
of economic sanctions in place against the country. There are no doubt other reasons why Zimbabwe‘s
economy is in the doldrums; chief of which are myopic, ill-advised ZANU PF government policies and
corruption. But one cannot ignore the damaging effect the sanctions have had on the economy and how
the country and its economy are being slowly asphyxiated by the blockade on access to international
capital markets.
In fact, according to (ICG, 2007:144), economic disintegration is inextricably tied to the
deterioration of political life and the steady erosion of remaining democratic practices. Notwithstanding
various qualifications about Zimbabwe‘s democracy in previous decades, the country once enjoyed
vibrant institutions of political and civil society, a surprisingly autonomous judiciary, a briefly ascendant
political opposition. These institutions have been severely undermined, aided by draconian legislation –
among them Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), LOMA, and Public Order
and Security Act (POSA) – limiting or preventing assembly, protest and grassroots organizing. The IMF
has estimated poverty at 80 percent (IMF, 2005:405), but the point is clear. The independent media has
been banned, proscribed and even bombed into submission – and sometimes all three – so that
opposition voices are either not heard, or are audible to such a small percentage of the populace that they
are deemed inconsequential. Electoral institutions have been wholly penetrated by ruling party and
xxiv
military officials. Perhaps not surprisingly, the prevailing economic and political conditions have
contributed directly to an estimated 3.4m Zimbabweans now living abroad. This number could be as
high as 4 million exiles – or more than 30 percent of the population, by some estimates.
In 2007, several amendments were made to the POSA, AIPPA and the Broadcasting Services
Act (BSA), but these have been deemed ―piecemeal reforms‖ and unlikely to affect the climate of
repression (ICG, 2008:3). Certainly, President Robert Mugabe poised to begin his 29th year in office –
bears considerable blame for the myriad problems facing his country. Yet it is equally apparent that the
complexity of those problems means that they cannot simply be fixed with the demise of the 84-year old
head of state. Even under the best case scenario, the damage to population, economy, and infrastructure
will require decades to rectify. Mugabe‘s death, or departure from office by other means, is a necessary,
but hardly sufficient step to precipitate positive change in Zimbabwe.
Clapham,(1985:18) argues that the military as the ―armed wing of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is
another faction of the ruling elite, which seeks to protect its own interests (When these interests are
materially threatened, the military has a clear incentive for intervention in politics via a coup d‘état.
Moore, (2006:5) noted that, in Zimbabwe today, military interests are so diversified and so bound up
with factors completely outside the ordinary military sphere, that the armed forces would appear to have
ample incentive to intervene to protect those interest, and that ,on the surface, it appears that these
interests are seriously threatened in Zimbabwe, commensurate with the collapse of the economy,
political uncertainty and infighting, a restive political opposition, and the occasional pledge of President
Mugabe to remain in office, in his words, ―until I am a century old‖ (Moore, 2006:6). Indeed, according
to Maroleng, (2005:52), over the long term, militarized politics itself contains the seeds for an economic
and political revitalization in the country.
In addition, Zimbabwe‘s 1998-2004 misadventure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
certainly fits the model, described by Belkin and Schofer (2005:2), of giving your troops something else
to shoot at it provided rich patronage opportunities especially for the officer ranks. Moreover, arguably,
the regular army was so broken upon its return that coup risk was doubly diminished. Although it seems
unlikely that this was the leading cause of Zimbabwe‘s Congo intervention, it was, for the regime, a
positive spin off. [The DRC conflict thus served multiple functions: distract and possibly divide the rank
and file and enrich the brass]. Although other factors are also relevant; Mugabe and his party have
certainly put many of the above coup-proofing strategies into practice. For example, the creation of
parallel forces and the proliferation of militias have characterized the Zimbabwean polity for most of
xxv
this decade. (Belkin and Schofer, 2005:2). Further, although ethnic balancing was always imperfect in
Zimbabwe, the promotion of the president‘s co-ethnics from the Zezuru sub-group of the Shona, has
become the modus operandi particularly in regard to military and military-connected positions.
In terms of outright repression, Mugabe and ZANU-PF have effectively imposed legislation that
includes various restrictions on civil society and political opposition. Coupled with a disastrous
economic regime, this political repression has contributed to the emigration of millions of
Zimbabweans; many of those now abroad make up Zimbabwe‘s intelligentsia, and, as such include the
likely architects of a civilian effort to wrest power from ZANU-PF.
Furthermore, Belkin and Schofer (2005:8), added that, at least two indicators suggested currently
shows, a weakened civil society and regime that is increasingly considered illegitimate (only the absence
of a history of coups plays in Zimbabwe‘s favour). Using the second edition of the Economist
Intelligence Unit‘s democracy index, which used 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral
process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political
culture on a 0 to 10 scale, we can demonstrate that the character of governance and leadership influences
the stability of a state. For instance, Zimbabwe scored 149,2.53;0.83;4.29,1.67 4.38,and 1.47 as overall
score on electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government, political participation ,political
culture, and civil liberties respectively.
Ralph, R., (2007:1), in his article captioned, ―How Mugabe is Destroying The Zimbabwean
Economy " provided a perfect illustration of how the "fatal conceit" of government can turn a difficulty
into a catastrophe and shows how "Robert G. Mugabe has ruled over this battered nation, his every wish
endorsed by Parliament and enforced by the police and soldiers, for more than 27 years. It appears,
however, that not even an unchallenged autocrat can repeal the laws of supply and demand. With prices
doubling weekly, Mugabe's attempt to revoke the laws of economics came via an anti-inflationary order,
"Operation Slash Prices," on June 25, ordering merchants to cut their prices by 50 percent. One month
after Mr. Mugabe decreed just that, commanding merchants nationwide to counter 10,000-percent-a-
year hyperinflation by slashing prices in half and more, Zimbabwe's economy is at a halt. Wines in
(Ralph, 2007:4).
Ostensibly, the Gukurahundi was directed at renegade members of ZANU‘s former rival army
ZIPRA, under the pretext that they were seeking to overthrow the ZANU-led government. Vast numbers
of non-combatants, mainly of the Ndebele minority, were also killed in the campaign. Somewhat
paradoxically, the mid-late 1990s were also a time of modest political opening in Zimbabwe. Labor
xxvi
leaders, represented in the umbrella body ZCTU, were increasingly emboldened. Organizations of civil
society, including various campaigns such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) and
the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) were increasingly vibrant; opposition parties, though small
and fragmented, were quite outspoken. Indeed, although such groups and their predecessors had scant
impact on the results of the elections in 1995 and 1996 for parliament and the presidency, respectively,
opposition voices were represented quite forcefully. This revealed growing credibility problems for the
ruling party, particularly in the urban centers. Nonetheless, as a formidable actor, the ZANU-PF
government was able to effectively parry the demands and pressures from each of these groups (Ralph,
2007).
Yet another entity whose organizational and political strength grew immensely during this period
of relative social opening was the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans‘ Association
(ZNLWVA). When they marched in mid-1997 demanding that they receive pensions, land and health
care for their sacrifices to the nation years earlier, President Mugabe capitulated, granting lump-sum
payments and guaranteeing lifetime pensions costing the treasury Z$4.5 billion (then about $440 mm
US). At the same time, incendiary rhetoric about seizures of white-owned land and land reform – long a
regular feature of Zimbabwean election cycles, but prior to 2000 without any foundation or follow-up –
formed an expedient corollary to the regime‘s new found commitment to its War Veterans (Ralph,
2007:7).
According to Sylvester,(1995:3), each time a modest move toward greater political liberalism
occurred in Zimbabwe, it appears to suffer a severe authoritarian backlash. Thereafter, a backlash was
seen in 1997, in which fears of ZCTU-War Vets collaboration led to anti-white an anti-democratic
reaction, and in 2000, which marked the most competitive election in Zimbabwean history. This bodes
poorly for 2008, and suggests that any relaxation that results in an advance by ―pro-democracy‖ forces
will be met with a similarly authoritarian response from ZANU-PF and its military allies. The
ZNLWVA was itself notoriously corrupt, and numerous recipients of the payouts were not actual
veterans. Timothy Scarnecchia (2006:8) has called this ―fascist cycle‖, and Masipula Sithole‘s
Authoritarianism,‖ (Journal of Democracy, 1997:442).
Clapham, (1985:7) has focused on the politicization of the Zimbabwe‘s military. In other words,
politicization of the military is the expansion of the corporate identity of the military to include explicit
class interests that the military, as a class, is then inclined to protect (Clapham, 1985:3); as well as the
explicit assignment of political relevance to military officers, retired military personnel with links to the
xxvii
armed forces, and the military as an institution. This ultimately makes the military to become a key
power broker, often at the behest of civilian politicians, and may act as a final arbiter of political
outcomes. For instance, veterans of Zimbabwe‘s liberation war have always held prominent positions in
the ZANU-led government, the institutional military structure – formed from the merging of the two
liberation armies, Zanla and Zipra, with some elements from the Rhodesian army. Arguably, the
inclusion of so many former Liberation War Veterans in ZANU-PF politics from 1980 might be
characterized as politicizing the military. One could also argue that politicization began with General
Walls in 1980, when he considered an anti-ZANU coup. Another possible example is the Gukuruhundi
campaign, which called on the military, specifically the notorious Fifth Brigade, to play a substantial
political role by attacking and repressing non-combatants as much as Ndebele/Zipra-fringe militias
(Clapham, 1985:).
According to the Global Witness magazine, (2003:87), the War Vets empowered and politicized
important elements of the ―military grassroots.‖ The key turning point in the process of politicization
actually occurred in 1998, principally through the Zimbabwe army‘s intervention in the war in the DRC.
As a result of its deployment in the Congo, Zimbabwe‘s military hierarchy began to see itself in terms of
its collective interests as an economic class. Zimbabwe‘s intercession on behalf of the beleaguered
Kabila government generated key lucrative contracts – for materiel, supplies, transport, mining rights,
and so on – many of which were given to companies controlled by senior military officers, as well as the
military itself, such as OSLEG, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), and others (Nest; Weinstein; UN
Sec Council, 2003; Global Witness, 2003).This well documented appropriation of Congolese resources
was not, foremost, part of a strategy of collective security to rescue/aid an embattled SADC member, as
the Zimbabwe government claimed, but driven by domestic Zimbabwean politics. For the brass, the
Congo provided a treasure trove of patronage; the senior military elite drew vast amounts of capital from
their mining ventures in the DRC.
For the rank and file, their deployment to DRC literally and figuratively removed a potential
source of threat to the ruling ZANU-PF. Thus, there was an implicit recognition of the power of the
military as a corporate entity and the risk un-deployed [and underpaid?] soldiers posed as long as they
remained in their Zimbabwe barracks. By giving military elites new economic power directly, and
indirectly granting them political power, ZANU-PF gave them a stake in the outcome, both in DRC and
in Zimbabwe. Other forms of economic patronage have been heaped upon members of the military
establishment:
xxviii
Mugabe‘s beleaguered government has awarded huge pay raises to the army
ahead of critical elections [in March 2008] in a bid to calm the restless military‖
intelligence agents received increases as well; the military budget, the bulk of
which goes to salaries and personnel costs, has been spared many of the severe
cuts seen by other branches of government. In fact, ―taken as a whole, the
combined budget line for defence and security expenditure in Zimbabwe has been
‗second to none‘ since 1980; expenditure and regular increases on the police,
militia, war veterans and armed forces has been unequalled compared to civil
service and other productive sectors….Significantly, salary benefits and awards
for the security sector escalated by more than 100% in the run up to the much
contested March [2008] presidential elections. This was against much lower
percentages accorded to other groups in the country; apparently cautious about
leaving out any member of the increasingly extensive security apparatus, in early
2007 the government also increased pensions for War Vets from $103,000 to
$500,000 a month; In addition to salary increases, various gratuities have also
been made available. In mid-2007, for example, the government was reported to
have ―spent thousands of United States dollars acquiring luxurious Mazda 3
vehicles for army and police chiefs, at a time when the country has no foreign
currency for essentials such as drugs.‖ Each Mazda cost US $16,607, plus a
Zimbabwe dollar top-up of $200 million. The army chiefs fared even better,
receiving Toyota Prados or Mercedes Benzes depending on their rank, and the
government reportedly has acquired hundreds of Toyota Yaris for the Central
Intelligence Organization; Of course, senior military officials were also among
the leading beneficiaries of land seizures. The state has given them access to
credit to support their various business interests, however they were acquired. ―A
special Reserve Bank fund gives cheap unsecured loans to top officers, politburo
and central committee and central committee members, cabinet ministers, judges
and parliamentarians to finance farming and business activities‖ ;―some military
and political leaders are raking in small fortunes, particularly through the army‘s
foray into the DRC.‖ (Mawadza, Aquilina, in Institute for Security Studies
Accessed 11/29/2007 from: http://www.issafrica.org/static/templates/tmpl_html;
BBC Monitering International Reports of February 27, 2008 as cited in an article
in Business Day, Scott Baldauf, in The Christian Science Monitor of April 25,
2007 ; ( Nkatazo, Lebo 2007 ).
All these were efforts to ensure loyalty to the Zimbabwean state. Hence this placed the
Zimbabwean military unequivocally in the role of power broker. According to General Vitalis
Zvinavashe-Commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces who posed a thinly-veiled threat to
MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai:
The security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders
that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for thousands of
lives lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard-won independence‖..."[The president]
is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will
therefore not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different
xxix
agenda.(Peta Thornycroft and Tim Butcher, ―Military will not accept a Mugabe
Defeat‖ Telegraph, January 10, 2002).
Peta Thornycroft, however, reported in 2002 that the military was even given an explicit role in the
administration of elections. Zimbabwe Defense forces ―ran the nerve center of [2002‘s] disputed
presidential election, in violation of the constitution. This is evident in an exchange of letters in 2002
between the head of the Zimbabwe National Army and the head of the Zimbabwe Defense forces asking
General Vitalis Zvinavashe for permission for assignment of three officers to control the national
command center in Harare, during and after the [2002] presidential election. Thus, the national
command center was the headquarters for election logistics, providing ballot boxes, working with party
representatives, providing information for the media and reporting results. (Peta, T. VOA Feb 5, 2003,)
Matikinye, (2007:64) noted that Robert Mugabe (the government) has in February 2007, gazetted
the Defence (War Veterans Reserve) Regulations through Statutory Instrument to set up a War Veterans
Reserve. The new law incorporates former combatants into the Zimbabwe National Army as a Reserve
Force, thereby formalizing the position of the president‘s most vociferous military supporters. In a
similar vein, ―the reported deployment of units of the Presidential Guard in army barracks around the
country suggests that the government no longer trusts that the army will remain loyal under the present
conditions. Yet, increasingly, even the watchers need watching. Thus President Mugabe is also
recruiting people whose loyalty can be trusted in order to fill vacancies among service personnel created,
in part, by desertions including the replacement, ironically enough, of his own Presidential Guard with
members of his secret police and filing Army ranks with his party‘s youth militia and aging veterans of
the liberation struggle from the 1970s. (Scott, B. in the Christian Science Monitor. April 25, 2007.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007).
Sarah, B. (2005:5) states that Governance in Zimbabwe increasingly resembles a military
apparatus – the ―slow motion emergence of a junta‖ ―Autocratic Militarism,‖– wherein primary
responsibility for economic policy making now lies in the aptly named Zimbabwe National Security
Council (ZNSC), chaired by President Mugabe. This narrow body has marginalized Zimbabwe‘s
longstanding and more inclusive political institutions, such as the Politburo, the cabinet and the central
committee of the party itself. The worldview is decidedly defensive, and increasingly militaristic. In
addition, at least since 2007, the state and ZANU-PF were instrumental in the creation of the
paramilitary groups. For example, when Morgan Tsvangirai and other MDC members were arrested and
severely beaten in March 2007 after an intra-party meeting was disbanded, the calls grew louder (reports
xxx
of the abuses were widely circulated internationally). Tsvangirai, who had sustained head injuries and
had to be hospitalized, declared that this was the straw that broke the camel‘s back and that
Zimbabweans would finally rise up to overthrow the Mugabe regime. Although this sense was echoed
by observers such as US Ambassador Michael Dell and reporter Craig Timberg of The Washington Post,
such claims appear to have been wildly exaggerated.
Eric, B. (2006:13) noted that the ZNSC had taken over the operations of the Zimbabwe Revenue
Authority (ZIMRA). In addition, Oxford Research of April 20, 2006 reported that the national
railways, national parks, and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NocZim) are all run by former
security men, whereas the now pervasive militias often play a more sinister role. Freedom House
(2007:95), reported that war veterans and ZANU-PF militants operate as de facto enforcers of
government policies – including land redistribution – and have committed human rights abuses such as
assault, torture, rape, extralegal evictions, and extralegal executions without fear of punishment
(Freedom in the World: 2007 :97).
Chris, M. (2005: 7) reported that President Mugabe appears to be increasingly reliant upon
members of his own Zezuru sub-group. This ―Zezuru sum game‖ can be seen as a move by Mugabe and
his close associates within this faction to address their security dilemma by gaining total dominance.
Placing trusted faction members in strategic positions would provide protection from political rivals and
from threat of prosecution in future. In fact, Mugabe has assigned key posts to members or allies of the
Zezuru-led faction of powerful former army general Solomon Mujuru, and placed members of the
security establishment in strategic civil service positions. A glaring example of this is the fact that
Mugabe has given [Didymus] Mutasa (Minister for State Security) the responsibility to manage a new
government taskforce that oversees the import and distribution of food in the country.
Gregory. (2008:45) in a study of governmental responses to food crisis in Zimbabwe, Kenya,
and Botswana, with comments on Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya‘s Turkana District, argues that in a
political systems that have clientelist tendencies, governmental response to food crisis is similarly
clientelistic. In addition, he added that food scarcity provides governments with an opportunity to
instrumentalize the crisis as a patronage tool for political survival, which according to him necessitates
government to monopolize control over the food supply and food distribution for the purpose of
increasing the political power of food and therefore the power of its political-discriminatory distribution.
William and Haggard (1994:1) focused on the role of political leadership and government
officials in creating the desired environment for the implementation of economic reforms. Graw and
xxxi
McPherson (1999:17) shared a similar view .Rodstick (1994:5), and Ka and Van de Walle (1994:9) have
furthered the argument on the role of political leadership in implementing economic reforms. Focusing
on the impact of reliance on foreign experts in the design of reform programmes, some scholars contend
that such practices provides the ideal means by which large number of donor reform relations thereby
maintaining the status quo in post reform environment. Stressing the argument further, Healy and
Robison (1992:75) and Grindle and Thomas (1991:12), argues that the policy processes especially the
formulation state is dominated by state elite, sometimes in a single outcast and in others a small
oligarchy. Hence the dependence on foreign expends have led to a situation on the one hand, where:
The African post-colonial state has sought to determine the
utilization of its peoples economic resources, in many instances
become a rubber stamp for decisions made by others, usually non-
African in nationality. And the decision-making powers of aid
agencies in Africa have expanded as a result of the default of those
who mar the political kingdoms‖ hence an implicit loss of
sovereignty desirable in some instances, in view of the misuse of it
by those in power is taking place (Mkandawire 1995:24)
They further argued that the importance of broad political support depends on the form of
government in the short term. However, they are of the opinion that authoritarian regime may be able to
force the population to accept policies or to shape public opinion through the control of the media.
Drawing example from Latin America, East Asia, in sub-Sahara Africa‘ Zambia 1992, Zaire/Congo in
1997 and Nigeria in 1985-6, they concluded that most cases successful reform efforts were launched and
implemented under authoritarian regimes, and once these reforms are in place they are not reversed by
subsequent democratic regime.
Within these groups of scholars, some have focused on the role legislators, foreign experts in
reform policy design. These scholars have argued that because much of the resistance to market oriented
reforms may come from government official whose jobs salaries, prestige, and often opportunities for
graft are endangered, that in addition to leadership, successful reform requires adequate support from
legislators and or/ administration to ensure its effective implementation. Hence the recent adoption by
the World Bank of comprehensive development framework (CDF) and by the IMF of the poverty
Reduction and Growth strategy (PRGS) reflects condemnation of their close-door approach.
Thus, it is from the above observation, that the role of the world bank and the international Monetary
Fund (IMF) unprecedented control over the economic policies and institutions in most African since the
1980s which the implications of not only loss in policy autonomy but also undermining of existing
xxxii
capacity in the policy institutions can be understood. Some scholars have focused on liberalization and
how economic reforms are sequenced. Mcculloch and McPherson (2001:11) divided the liberalization
process into four components
The design of a policy package.
Its acceptance and endorsement by top policy makers and later by the public.
Its implementation in specific policy measures and their administration and
The economy‘s response to change incentives.
Also, Sachs and Warner (1995a:7) who adopted composite binary measure of openness, classifies a
country as a closed if even one of several criteria of significant insulation from global market forces
apply. According to the view of the Sachs – Warner Scheme, the removal of trade barriers is insufficient
to qualify as opening up if the real exchange rate remains overvalues as to prevent development of
export activities along lines of comparative advantage. In other words, devaluation of an overvalued
currency is a major characteristic of trade liberalizations. And thus helping one understood why Nigeria
and most Africa countries have devalued their currency.
Milner and Kubota (2005:6) have found that among developing countries, democracies are more
likely than authoritarian regimes, particularly military regimes and personalist dictatorships, to liberalize
trade. Barro (1997:14) finds an ―upside-down U-shaped‖ relationship between ―level of democracy‖ and
growth, and, echoing the concerns of classical liberals such as Lord Acton about universal suffrage,
infers that overly inclusive political systems can be bogged down with redistributive interest-group
politics. This is true of the Zimbabwean case.
Remmer, (2004:45) argues that, countries dependent on publicly owned natural resources or
foreign aid tend to suffer from dysfunctional government because such governments do not rely on
productive investment for tax revenue .Therefore, these governments pay little cost when politicians use
the manufacturing, agricultural, and service sectors as sinecures for themselves and their cronies, setting
up state-guaranteed monopolies and monopsonies (Bates, 1981:281). The productive sectors of the
economy may suffer, but the resource revenues and aid funds keep flowing into the public coffers. In
these countries, some sort of total collapse or revolutionary upheaval might be necessary to create the
sort of institutions that could constrain future governments.
Barro, R. (1997:64) finds that high government consumption also reduces growth rates. Cross-
national studies of FDI inflows specifically have found similar results: countries that are open to trade
and have low inflation, budget deficits, and corruption attract more FDI. Moreover, democratic countries
xxxiii
attract more FDI than authoritarian ones, while IMF agreements cause a decline in FDI inflows (Jensen,
2003; Jensen, 2004).Having the right policies is important for development, but what makes it more
likely that a country will have the right policies in the first place? Presumably, growth-killing policies
benefit the politicians who implement and maintain them; otherwise, they would not exist.
The burden of reform is not solely on developing country governments, nor is the blame for
persistent global poverty solely theirs. Rather than providing publicly financed aid, governments of the
developed countries should eliminate their own agricultural subsidies and tariffs, which have distorted
world markets so much that many African countries actually import food from Europe! These policies
also encourage unproductive and ecologically destructive land use in the northern hemisphere.
The recent support of Oxfam and other humanitarian NGOs for liberalized trade between North
and South is an encouraging sign. Unfortunately, the U.S. government has not been a leader in this area.
In fact, U.S. recalcitrance on farm subsidies may have doomed the Doha Round negotiations in the
World Trade Organization. Western governments also need to ease their demands on less developed
countries to adopt strict, Western-style intellectual property laws (Saches and Andrew, 1995:21).
Intellectual property laws are a creature of the state, and while they can play a role in promoting
creativity, they can also inhibit creativity and protect monopoly power. They need to be designed
flexibly to match the pace of technical change in different markets and industries. If the West is serious
about reducing global poverty, they need to follow up their rhetoric of freer markets with action.
National Development Crisis in Zimbabwe
Economic reforms as a major component of the globalization process (Onyeonoru (2003:10,
Olukoshi (1998:9) Bangura (1991:2), Obi (1991:8), and as such, an ideologically imposed project by the
IFIs (Ibeanu (2004:17) Agbakoba (2005:5) Teriba, (2005:15); Amadi (2005:45) has been linked to
national development crisis in the developing nations. This entails the introduction of rapid structural
changes (reforms) in the economy in favour of market relations which the Western nations determine its
terms. Sawyess (1998:67) who links economic reforms to globalization argues that the current wave of
economic reforms is desperately led by international capitalism to recover lost grounds due to
ideological shifts towards alternative paradigms which African countries adopted since independence,
especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unchallenged hegemony of capitalist and neo-
liberal ideology. A view which, Mccullocah, R. and Makolin, M. (2001:28) reinforced by arguing that
the economic reforms has been facilitated by the debt crises experienced by African countries. Since the
xxxiv
1980‘s hijacked by the Euro-Americanism mentored institution – the Bretton woods institutions,
especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to facilitate their globalization of
neo-liberalism.
The cost of economic reforms is socialized where as its gain are privatized. Private sector led
growth reduces the role of the state in an economy and leads to opening up the economy for foreign
capitalist who expects the market, therefore leads in turn to economic dependence, and
underdevelopment. Contrasting the sequencing of economic reforms of countries in the east Asian and
Latin America, with those of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) McPherson (1995:3) argued that in East Asian
and Latin America, measure to facilitate growth were often enacted in advance of comprehensive trade
reforms, where as in Africa, especially in Nigeria everything is seem to have been done in a haste, as all
policies relevant to liberalization of trade tend to have been changed at once.
Some scholars in addition have analyzed those who benefit and those who loose from economic
reforms. Collier (1994:98), Rodstick (1994:4), the IMF (1998:85) and Bienen (1991:76-7), all agreed
that there is a wealth of information to contrast the anticipated gains of adjusting with the equally real
and devastating costs affects, those already living on the economic margin as such are those already
poor (IMF 1998:85) moreover ,it further argues that, past efforts by Sub-Saharan African countries to
provide safety nets have been targeted primarily at politically powerful groups such as civil servants
rather than the very poor (IMF 1998:85).
Furthermore, Bienen (1991:76-77) observes that it is public officials, not necessarily the
organized interests groups, that are the major beneficiaries of protection and therefore the most
important force against reforms. He reinforced the above opinion when he contends that:
Trade liberalization policies are often hard to formulate and implement
in Africa precisely because it is powerful officials (civilians and
military) who benefit from the controls that have been established over
imports and exports. It is government official who rations and distributes
scarce imports, including foreign exchange. They realize the rents which
accrue from the systems they construct and control. Of course, officials
have allies-import-substituting manufacturers and urban workers
employed by state enterprise who are interested in subsidized urban
consumer goods (Bienen 1991:76-77).
Onumode (1987:72) and Olukoshi (1998:7,1990:15) argues that while globalization gave birth to
structural adjustment as the countries involved responded to the global economic crises, the adoption of
IMF/World Bank reform measures has in turn widened and deepened the thrust towards global
xxxv
integration. Contrary to the claims in World Bank quarters, especially of industrialization, Streeten
(1997:89) and Sawyer (1998:72) argues that the structural economic transformation of modern capitalist
relation in Africa, foisted on the content by the Breton words institutions, have been associated with a
process of industrialization. Thus, the reform programmes have not been successful, instead they have
adversely affected the industrial and economic performance of the economics. Pleskovic and Stigletz
(1997:7) observe that rather than acknowledge this failure as a mark of the inadequacy of its
globalization project, the world Bank takes the escapist route by attributing such factors as poor
governance, step-go implementation syndrome, as well as political and bureaucratic corruption.
Aina (1999:68) remarked that a major problem with globalization process in Africa is that many
of the programmes being implemented derive from the agenda of the voluntary policies of the adjusting
countries whose interests the programmes do not reflect. He add also that the expression of globalization
in terms of deregulation and liberalization of African economics has been achieved not through the
powers and compulsion and pressure available to international creditors and financial institutions. He
concluded that the economic restructuring project was therefore, a major component of the globalization
process introduced to Africa in the form of structural economic reform programmes or structural
adjustment programme all of which are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
In addition, Tawanda, (2009:65), stated that, the US introduced economic sanctions on
Zimbabwe through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001. (ZIDERA) Through
this enactment Zimbabwe‘s access to finance and credit facilities was effectively incinerated. ZIDERA
empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence (as the main donor) in multilateral lending
agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank, and the African Development Bank to veto any applications by
Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling, and international debt cancellation. The US
cites Zimbabwe‘s human rights record, political intolerance and absence of rule of law as the main
reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The ZIDERA also suggests that if Zimbabwe acts to correct
these ills, then the sanctions will be removed and economic support measures suggested.
Simply put, owing to the size of the US vote and influence in these institutions, neither the IMF,
World Bank nor the African Development Bank will lend to Zimbabwe, or offer it credit facilities.
Therefore, needless to say, as a direct result of the US 2001 Act, Zimbabwe‘s relationship with these
multilateral lending agencies was immediately and severely affected. In addition, Zimbabwe‘s ability to
reschedule its loan payments and to apply for debt cancellations in times of severe financial crisis was
severely affected (Tawanda, 2009:72). And once the IMF and World Bank stopped doing business with
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Zimbabwe, this had an immediate and adverse impact on Zimbabwe‘s credit and investment rating. And
with a drop in investment rating went the dream of low cost capital on the international markets.
ZIDERA was a masterstroke. At the stroke of a pen, Zimbabwe‘s access to international credit markets
was blocked. And relying purely on barter trade, and trade, mining, agricultural concessions, and on
exports-generated foreign currency, Zimbabwe‘s economy has been slowly but surely asphyxiated.
And the consequent foreign currency crisis has resulted in the continued devaluation of the
domestic currency, rapid inflation, and all else that has manifested itself in the current Zimbabwe
economic crisis. In addition, (Tawanda, 2009) maintained that both the US and the EU have frozen
financial and other assets of persons, or companies linked to ZANU PF. It is alleged that such
companies sustain the ZANU PF government. There may be a grain of truth in that observation.
However, what is often ignored in the race to rid Zimbabwe of Mugabe is that companies operating in
Zimbabwe provide a livelihood to thousands of families, and contribute to the development of the
country.
Australia is reported to have denied Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe officials‘ business visas to travel
to Australia. And the US is putting in place a raft of measures aimed at specified ZANU PF linked
individuals, their families, and companies. It is apparent therefore some of the most powerful countries
in the world have put in place measures to bring about the downfall of Mr. Mugabe by orchestrating the
economic collapse of Zimbabwe (Wertimer, 2008:12-19). It is wrong to conflate Zimbabwe with the
personality of Mugabe. They are two distinct entities. It cannot be right to say that economic support
will be provided to the country once its leader is out of power. As Zimbabwe, all too dearly knows
following the Lancester House Agreement of 1979 on the land question, such promises are impossible to
enforce.
No matter how evil a dictator Mugabe is, it cannot be right to force his downfall by killing off
the country‘s fledgling economy, by erasing the gains made after 1980, and worsening the AIDS, and
unemployment crisis. Those championing the imposition of the economic sanctions often retort that
Zimbabwe‘s ability to borrow from the IMF and World Bank was restricted in any event because it had
fallen foul of its agreements with the IMF. This argument is however disingenuous. It ignores the other
more vicious consequences of ZIDERA on the Zimbabwean economy.
In addition, according to Wertimer (2008:15), the suggestion that what is in existence is a regime
of symbolic travel bans and some asset freezes is far from the truth. It is correct that Zimbabwe must be
xxxvii
made to pay its debts, including money that it owes the IMF. However, in the circumstances of
Zimbabwe, going through a financial crisis, it is immoral for the IMF to insist on the payment of over
US$175 million on pain of expulsion from the institution for non payment. Zimbabwe recently managed
to stave its expulsion from the IMF by reportedly paying £150 million towards its debt obligations to the
institution. It was all too obvious however that Zimbabwe paid the money out of desperation. The
country cannot afford the payment it made. Zimbabwe paid the money because, owing to US influence
among others, it was unable to formally reschedule its IMF loan payments. Amidst all this, it is reported
that the country has critical foreign currency shortages, has run dry of fuel and other essentials, has
record high unemployment levels, and now has crippling inflation rates. In addition, the UN suggests
Zimbabwe is suffering from famine. Wertimer further stated that the IMF has made it patently clear that
the institution will only provide policy advice and technical support, actions which are inadequate for
Zimbabwe‘s revival. The IMF has pointed out that for a nascent recovery and balance of payment
support to be forthcoming, the Zimbabwean government must show a sustained track record of sound
policies and repay its arrears. Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Elton Mangoma
provided a clear position in that, Zimbabwe has no capacity to repay external debt including outstanding
arrears (IMF, 2006:299).
The IMF‘s declarative position means that Zimbabwe cannot negotiate any debt rescheduling
simply because it has no basis upon which to base those negotiations. According to Business Monitor
International report, the installment of Jacob Zuma as President of South Africa will not solve
Zimbabwe‘s domestic problems, but is likely to be supportive of the country‘s peace process over the
longer term. Writers contend that only until economic output recovers and collection mechanisms are
improved, taxation will remain inadequate to fund current expenditure. At the political level, Central
Bank Governor Gideon Gono and Biti remain locked in a power struggle over control of the nation‘s
financial policies, which is jeopardizing a holistic approach to economic management (Business
Monitor International, June 2009:13).
Gono retains the backing of President Mugabe, but donors would strongly prefer a change at the
top echelons of the RBZ. It remains to be seen as to how patient Zuma will be with Zimbabwe. South
Africa has a track record of maintaining policy consistency at both national and external levels.
Zimbabwe and South Africa will soon sign Bilateral Trade and Investment Protection Agreements
(BIPAs) that should calculatedly facilitate more trade between both nations.
Under the arrangement South African businesses in Zimbabwe shall be accorded national or
xxxviii
preferential treatment just like home industries within Zimbabwe. On the one hand, this move will
stimulate economic growth through increased competition at local levels and consequent lower prices to
the benefit of consumers. On the other hand, such an arrangement will be very detrimental to local
industries as foreign companies will be heavily capitalized and can push out local products and local
industries (http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/). A violation of the BIPAs will indeed stretch
South Africa‘s patience with Zimbabwe‘s challenges. A close reference to the fragility of the GPA that
is in place should provide a tentative glimpse as to the future of such BIPAs.
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth stands at 3.7% as at 2009. This is probably as a
result of increased industrial capacity utilization and increased revenue inflows into the country.
However investors are still concerned with the volatility of the political environment.
Revenue inflows amounted to U.S$970 Million. A lot still needs to be done at fiscal level due to
major inconsistencies; inconsistencies which exist because of the lack of a complementary monetary
policy. For instance, revenue expressed as a percentage of GDP currently stands at a staggering 28%
while expenditures are at 38.9%. Resultantly, such a scenario in the inclusive government‘s balance
sheet will not lead to the widely reported economic growth in the short term. More is being spent than
is being earned. The nation is still at a crossroads after the widespread economic carnage witnessed in
the preceding years. Yet the bone of contention is all about the resolving of subtle political
polarization which is having a direct effect on the functionality of the country‘s economy. (ZimEye,
Zimbabwe in http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/).
Food Insecurity in Zimbabwe
Maxwell (1998:33) in a view argues that concerns on food security have progressed over the last
50 years or so from purely physical availability at the global level to the provisions of food to
individuals and the role of poverty in ensuring year round access to food. Maxwell (1998) however,
distinguished five (5) phases in the history of food security since 1974 as follows; 1) 1974-1980: global
food security - the world food crisis was evident from famines in Africa, doubling of international grain
prices and large grain imports by the Soviet Union. FAO set up a committee on World Food Security
and a World Food Council was established to monitor world food availability; 2)1981-1985: food
entitlement and structural adjustment - questions of poverty and access featured since it was clear that
production on its own did not assure consumption, and people needed access to food. This era coincided
xxxix
with structural adjustment activities where poverty reduction and basic needs were subordinate to debt
management, macro-economic stability, etc; 3)1986-1990: the golden age - the 1984/5 African famine
and the drawbacks of the social costs of structural adjustment changed the perceptions of food security
which rose up in the international agenda; 4)1990-1996: poverty, not food security - poverty reduction
was brought back to the front of the development stage and displaced food security; many donors
abandoned or downgraded food security. Famines were seen to be far more associated with war and with
drought (eg Southern Africa in 1992) which appeared to be managed reasonably efficiently. Thus the
problem was not seen as a food security issue per se but rather one of managing food supplies in
complex political emergencies characterized by social and policy breakdown, and 5 ) 1996 and beyond
which saw rise in food prices and renewed concern about the ability of the world to feed itself. Will the
agenda shift back to Malthusian concerns of the 1970s with a focus on food production, often in high
potential areas or will the concern with consumption and access be sustained? Maxwell concluded by
noting that there has been a significant change in the food security agenda since the mid-1970s. Instead
of a discussion largely concerned with national food supply and price, there is a discussion concerned
with the complexities of livelihood strategies in difficult and uncertain environments; and with
understanding how people themselves respond to perceived risks and uncertainties.
Similarly, Swaminathan (1998:97) divides the history of food security in the post-war era into
four (4) phases : a) 1940/60s - food security was only considered in physical availability terms ;b) 1970s
- economic access to food was considered equally important; c) 1980s - food security must be
considered at the level of the individual and not merely of the household (since within a household
women and girl children tend to be undernourished) ,and ,d) 1990s - recognition that micronutrients in
addition to environmental hygiene and safe drinking water are important He concluded that today we
have to view food security from the viewpoints of physical, social, economic and environmental access.
Governance of Global Food System
One of the earliest studies on foreign aid was conducted by Morgenthau (1962:301). He
classified foreign aid into mainly six categories and argued that only humanitarian aid is non-political.
Other five categories of foreign aid are subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige
foreign aid and aid for economic development. Subsistence foreign aid is given to states where the
probability of regime change is high. The reason is that the donor wants political stability in terms of
leadership turnover and disintegration of an organized society which could lead to the change of status
xl
quo. Another interesting category of foreign aid is bribe. Morgenthau (1962, 302) argues that bribes
were used before the beginning of nineteenth century to get a political advantage. In those days it was
officially acknowledged by states. But in recent years, bribes changed forms and are given as economic
development assistances. The aim of these categories of foreign aid is close to the goal of foreign aid.
The difference, however, lies on the notion that foreign aid can take several forms but the intention is
only one. For example, the US can give to its trading or alliance partner an economic assistance,
subsistence aid or aid to improve human rights. But the goal of these aids is to maintain partner‘s
domestic status quo.
Baldwin (1966:72) argues that Morgenthau‘s (1962) classification of foreign aid is confusing.
The actual and intended functions of foreign aid are used without clear categorization. For example,
humanitarian aid is mostly given in the cases of natural disaster. But sometimes, churches and rich
foundations give aid too and these aids are not necessarily humanitarian in nature. Military aid
sometimes can be also prestige aid and. Baldwin (1966:73) argues that foreign aid categorization of
Morgenthau (1962) violates the idea of basic classification that ―parallel categories should be mutually
exclusive.‖ In Morgenthau‘s classification, foreign aid may have been given to promote economic
development, to strengthen military ability of a recipient state or to increase the prestige of the donor at
the same time. There is no clear classification and therefore it is difficult to study foreign aid using
Morgenthau‘s categories of foreign aid.
Lebovic (1988:114) argues that interest of donor is more important than interest of recipient
states in foreign aid allocation. He starts his study by trying to find an answer to question: Is foreign aid
designed to lessen sufferings and to improve economic development in recipient nations or ―is it
intended to serve the interests of the donor?‖ (Lebovic, 1988:115). After examining Carter and Reagan
administration‘s foreign aid allocations, he concludes that foreign aid is given to states in order to
promote donor‘s interests.
Another study that defines foreign aid as a policy tool to promote donor‘s interest is conducted
by Griffin and Enos (1970:310-31). They posit that how much a state gives foreign aid is not based on
how much the recipient state needs, but by how much the donor benefits in terms of political support
(Griffin and Enos 1970:315). Economic aid, to them, is just another tool of foreign policy. It can
substitute other instruments like diplomacy, military intervention, war or technical assistance (316). For
example, H.B. Chenery, who was one of the officials of the Agency for International Development,
stated that ―the main objective of foreign assistance, as of many other tools of foreign policy, is to
xli
produce the kind of political and economic environment in the world in which the United States can best
pursue its own social goals‖ (Griffin and Enos 1970: 316).Other studies also support the idea that
donor‘s interest, rather than needs of the recipient, determines whom to give aid (Maizels and Nissanke
,1984).
McKinlay and Little (1977:405, 1978a:106, 1978b:512, 1979:83) examine how donor‘s interest
shapes foreign aid allocation. They measure donor‘s interest using importance of a recipient state to the
donor in terms of military and former colony. Recipient‘s needs are measured using indicators such as
income per capita and quantifiable variables of quality of life. They found that Britain and France, which
previously had colonies, gives foreign aid to former colonies. The United States mostly gives to those
states where it has military and strategic interests.
Boone (1995:17) examines why foreign aid do not alleviate poverty and improve economic
development of recipient states and argue that poverty is not caused by the shortage of capital. Rather,
bad public policy and poor economic conditions (Boone 1995, 28). Therefore, when donor states give
foreign aid to poor states, bad public policy of ruling elites do not allow economic conditions to develop.
Instead of using foreign aid as an investment, ―elitist‖ governments usually maximize the welfare of
ruling coalition (Boone 1995, 3). In other words, aid is distributed among the ruling elites and does not
go to other citizens of the nation. Boone‘s findings and argument is consistent with the main theory of
this study. Political leaders in nations with small winning coalition rely on the support of small number
of elites in order to survive in political arena. This leads to bad public policies since citizens of a nation
does not affect political survival of the governing elites.
Webster‘s (1992:130) study of the US foreign aid allocations to Latin American countries also
shows that foreign aid is given to states for political purposes rather than humanitarian or economic
development intentions. He hypothesizes that the US gives aid to Latin American states in order to get
their support in the United Nations. Looking at voting in the UN, Webster (1992, 131) finds support for
his arguments and concludes that the US purposely distributes foreign aid to achieve its foreign policy
goals.
Svensson (1999: 275) argues that recipient state‘s political and civil liberties determine whether
aid positively affects growth and alleviates poverty. When there is an institutionalized check on the
government, like in democratic states, foreign aid contributes to the economic growth. But if political
and civil liberties are limited, foreign aid goes to the personal consumption of the ruling elites. Regan
(1995:3) also do not find statistically significant relationship between foreign aid and human rights.
xlii
In general, these studies show that wealthy states do not necessarily give foreign aid to promote
political liberties, increase economic development or fight the poverty. Instead, foreign aid serves as a
tool to promote donor‘s interests in recipient states. There could be many kinds of interests of the United
States, including strengthening a state against the communist regimes, policy concessions in favor of the
US, lowering leadership turnover in those states where the US has trade and alliance relationships.
Svensson (1999:277) further argues that both humanitarian aid and multilateral structural
adjustment and development assistance through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
have actually been designed to fail in their ostensible aims: if they were to be reformed along the lines
Easterly suggests, they would lose their political raison d‘être. While publicly funded development aid
has largely failed in its stated objectives, there is substantial evidence supporting the benefits of private
foreign direct investment (FDI) and micro lending (Easterly, 2006:212).
Milanovic (2006:76) posits that publicly funded foreign aid is offered in two forms: direct
grants-in-aid and loans, and that loans through the IMF and World Bank should not be considered "aid"
since they have to be repaid, but this argument ignores the fact that these loans are offered at interest
rates substantially below market--otherwise, governments would have no reason to accept them, given
the policy strings attached (known as "conditionality").Grants-in-aid are largely conducted bilaterally,
government-to-government, or through United Nations agencies. Grants typically address imminent
humanitarian needs such as famine and disaster relief, public health, and housing. The IMF and World
Bank, which are principally funded by the G-7 developed countries, theoretically have different
functions--promoting international financial stability and economic development projects, respectively--
but since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods international monetary system in 1973, the IMF has
broadened its mandate to cover any kind of assistance for governments trying to reform their economies
(what the IMF calls "structural adjustment").
De Waal, (1993:87), argues that, "most food aid is donated on condition that it be purchased and
processed in, and shipped from, donor countries, even when adequate supplies are available in the region
where it is needed." The United States government, for instance, requires that all food aid be
transported on U.S.-flagged ships. Additionally, food aid can sometimes harm those it is intended to
help, as when UN food giveaways in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 went chiefly to the warlords and
harmed the destitute and persecuted Rahanweyn farmers, who then could not sell their own produce (De
Waal, 1993:89).
xliii
The evidence that foreign aid generally has not enhanced economic growth is well-known. In
The Elusive Quest for Growth, Easterly (2001:203) shows that in the vast majority of countries,
development aid has not increased investment share of gross domestic product (GDP), and growth in
investment share of GDP has not caused subsequent increases in GDP per capita. Defenders of aid, such
as Jeffrey Sachs and Steve Radelet (2006:105-37), point to specific successful projects in which aid was
a component. However, it is impossible to draw any general conclusions from these experiences, for two
main reasons: 1) in case studies, it is impossible to control other factors that may have been responsible
for the success of the project, rather than aid: the counterfactual--how would the project have fared
without aid--is unavailable; 2) even when an aid-funded project meets its own targets, we do not observe
the opportunity costs of the project, all the other worthy endeavors foregone because taxpayer resources
went elsewhere. The minimum acceptable effect of foreign aid on growth and other desiderata is
therefore greater than zero.
Up-to-date, peer-reviewed, global studies of the effects of foreign aid on growth usually find
either no general relationship or even a slight negative relationship. One of the main problems with aid
is that a number of developing country governments have diverted aid to the private bank accounts of
government officials. For instance, Alesina and Weder (2002:54) find that more corrupt governments
receive just as much foreign aid as less corrupt governments, that the United States government even
gives more aid to more corrupt governments, and that the level of aid a country receives tends to
increase corruption in the future. Boone (1996:4) also finds that aid goes mostly toward wasteful public
consumption. Svensson (2000:19) finds that aid actually inhibits beneficial policy reforms, and Remmer
(2004:5) finds that foreign aid not only increases government spending, but it also reduces revenues,
presumably because aid-dependent governments feel less need to promote the kinds of economic growth
that generate tax revenue. Burnside and Dollar (2000:455-72) find that aid has a slight positive effect on
economic growth when the recipient country has good policies, but since the evidence suggests that aid
undermines good policies, their finding does not have clear policy implications.
The evidence on the IMF is equally disheartening. Vreeland (2003a:563) has corrected that, for
the fact that market-friendly governments tend to be the ones who seek IMF loans (and therefore would
grow faster than other governments without IMF loans); once this correction is performed, he finds that
IMF programs actually reduce economic growth by one and a half percentage points for each year the
country remains under an IMF agreement. Vreeland also finds that IMF programs redistribute income
from labor to capital and therefore increase income inequality.
xliv
Thus, foreign aid usually causes more harm than good. Although there might be specific
instances in which aid programs have worked, it would be a mistake to draw general inferences for
policy from the exceptions rather than from the rule. Critics of foreign aid programs do not necessarily
argue that every single aid program ever conceived has failed, but that, since aid usually fails,
maintaining current aid programs or creating new ones is probably a bad idea.
Many scholars have studied the relationship between foreign aid and change in the level of
economic and political development, human rights and economic growth. They find no statistically
significant relationship between these variables. Mosley et al. (1987:9) studies how foreign aid affects
economic growth and find no relationship. Burnside and Dollar (1997:432) examine policy change and
aid flows conclude that aid flows does not result in better public policies. Alesina and Dollar (2000:56)
find that foreign aid is given to states without considering economic policies a recipient state has.
Instead, aid is driven by the strategic interests of the donor. Alesina and Weder (2002:87) examine
whether less corrupt governments get more aid, but do not find any significant relationship.
One of the recent studies conducted by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2004:5, 2006:1-10) argue
that foreign aid is given to states in order to have policies that favor donor states. In nations with small
winning coalition, policy concession in exchange to aid is easier since aid serves as a resource to
redistribute to the members of the winning coalition. Particularly, aid is exchanged to favorable policy in
those states where resources to respond to the demands of the winning coalition is scarce. By contrast,
foreign aid does not transfer to policy concession very easily in states with the large winning coalition
because aid, when distributed to the members of winning coalition, becomes too small and the leader
can not reimburse supporters for policy concession. In this sense, donors do not aim to reduce poverty or
to increase economic development of recipient state, but rather a rational allocation of resources by
donors and recipients (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2006, 3). This allocation is in the interest of both
donor and recipient states‘ leaders. On one hand, leader of a recipient state gets aid and uses some part
of it to respond to the demands of his/her winning coalition. On the other hand, leader of donor state gets
more favorable policies.
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2006:6) use two different dependent variables. One is the amount
of aid which is used in models 1 to 3 and the other is the probability of getting any aid which was the
dependent variable of models 4 to 6. In models 1 to 3, they found that the larger the size of winning
coalition the more aid a state gets. This result supports arguments derived from the theory of political
survival. There are many members in the large winning coalition and their total demand is very huge.
xlv
Donor states which want policy concession from these states have to give a large amount of aid so that
leader of recipient state would satisfy demands of his/her winning coalition and reimburse policy
concessions
Hammond, (2008:5-14) in his study of five SSA countries selected through stratified random
using data obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization for the period 1970-2000 investigates
the relationship between United States food aid flow and food needs of recipient countries; measured by
domestic food production, commercial imports and exports of food, food stock and level of financial
indebtedness. He found out that food aid does not necessarily go to food-deficit countries; the issue of
whether food needs of recipient countries is a predictor of food aid flow has not been systematically
examined .The study also revealed, contrarily to expectation, that food aid distribution does not favour
countries with relatively severe financial problems; indicated by level of financial indebtedness. The
findings are consistent with previous studies, which showed that food aid is not allocated in relative
proportion to food needs of countries.
Christopher (2007:36) demonstrates how either normative interests or real politick interests
better explain foreign policy goals, using the US as his case study. According to him, the relationships
which exist between the provision of US food aid and the humanitarian, strategic economic and strategic
security interests of the US are the primary factors that inform these policy makers. Both theoretical
concepts for humanitarian and strategic interests are determined to influence policy makers during either
the selection stage where states are chosen, during the allocation stage where food is distributed or
during both stages. The presence of US imposed sanctions also helps to inform policy makers of both
US strategic interests and the need for humanitarian assistance. Overall, the analysis indicates that many
interests inform foreign policy decision makers, while imposed sanctions and human rights specific
sanctions both greatly impact how much food aid the US allocates to a recipient country during the
allocation stage
Meernik,(2008:9-18), analyses the relationships that exist between the provision of US food aid
and need based goals, as well as strategic objectives, on the one hand, and explain how US decision
makers might be influenced by the international environment as a whole when rendering their aid
allocation decisions. He concluded that food aid is a foreign policy tool utilized by many states. Jenkins,
J. Craig., Scanlan, Stephen and Peterson, Lindsey (2008:54) argues that that world hunger is
fundamentally a political problem that should best be addressed by protecting basic political rights,
xlvi
reducing violent conflict and improving the status of women. While there is some ―trickle down‖ from
economic growth, he did not find any effects of total international food aid and emergency relief aid.
Clapp, J. (2006:98) studied the various players and positions involved in the debate over food aid
reform as part of the WTO Doha talks. He argues that the academic literature is more or less in
consensus that in-kind food aid is highly problematic, and in need, of reform. Part of the problem is that
some players such as the European Union, favours primarily a cash-based food aid system on the
grounds that the US in-kind food aid programs are trade distorting. However, he noted that a powerful
set of actors have argued vocally to maintain the in-kind food aid system in the US because the US is
the largest donor of food aid by far, and developments in that country will have global ramifications for
the governance of food aid.
Nielsen, R. (2008:340) in his study of Donor Politics and the Composition of Foreign Aid, noted
that there is significant variance in the types of aid that donors give. In particular, donor countries place
varying emphasis on aid to certain sectors (i.e. infrastructure, health, education) and donors differ in the
degree to which they ―tie‖ aid by requiring recipient countries to use aid funds to purchase goods and
services from the donor‘s firms. According to him these variations in the composition of aid have
redistributive effects within the donor economy which create domestic winners and losers from aid
policy. He further demonstrated that those domestic political actors play a significant role in shaping aid
composition, and that from 1981 to 2001, there has been an increased political strength of the heavy
industry sector in OECD donors which lead to distortions in aid composition which favoured heavy
industry. Finally, from his survey data, it was found that individuals in the European donor countries
which stand to gain economically from aid are more supportive of aid increases. Taken together; these
results provide a novel political economy explanation for the composition of foreign aid.
Fuchs, D. and Clapp, J. (2007:66) studies the role of transnational corporations in global food
governance, he noted there has to date been very little written specifically on the role of transnational
corporations in global food governance. This lack of work on broader issues of global food governance
is surprising given the key role these actors play in the setting of global norms, institutions and rules that
govern global food and agriculture.
The scholars noted that the production, trade and marketing of food and agricultural products
have achieved a truly global scope in the past half century. However, that while the globalization of the
food and agricultural systems has produced some benefits, such as increased varieties of foods available
to consumers and new markets for producers, there are also concerns about the impacts of this food
xlvii
globalization, including the effects that it has on local farmer livelihoods, the environment, food safety,
and consumer sovereignty
Bermeo, S. (2008:9) examines foreign aid allocation of OECD countries in the new millennium.
According to the study, during the Cold War, aid was often ineffective at promoting development
because it was not given for development purposes, and that donor‘s condition aid on the quality of
governance in recipient countries. This implies that donors respond to governance as a signal of
recipient capacity to use aid effectively. Thus, poorly governed countries receive significantly less aid
for sectors where recipient government involvement is likely to be high. However, donors also recognize
the increased need experienced by citizens in countries where the quality of governance is low.
In a similar but, a different work, Bermeo, S. (2008:76) examines whether bilateral donors
consider the needs and capabilities of recipients when making aid allocation decisions. He argues that
donors use sector allocation as a tool to differentiate among recipients. He found out that countries with
poor policies receive a larger proportion of aid for emergency assistance and social sector programs,
while in countries with good policies donors allocate a larger proportion of aid to economic
infrastructure and production sectors. Donors give aid aimed at sectors likely to promote growth - such
as economic infrastructure and production - to countries with a policy environment conducive to growth,
while focusing on immediate needs and providing social services in other recipients. These patterns
suggest that donors pursue a strategy of poverty reduction and providing for the immediate needs of the
poor when allocating aid dollars. This is significantly different from previous studies on aid allocation,
which have concluded that aid is used to promote other donor objectives with little emphasis on poverty
concerns. These findings also have implications for the debate regarding the role of policies in
determining the ability of aid to foster growth, since donors consider policy when deciding whether or
not to target growth.
Wertimer, S. (2008:80) examine and analyze the various alliances, as well as, innovative
approaches to improving food security and an assessment of the structural forces that create and
perpetuate extreme inequality is paramount to understanding the undercurrents of hunger problems. He
argues that though the largest number of hungry people live in developing countries (Africa, South Asia;
Latin America and the Caribbean basin), some of the hungry also live in developed countries. In other
words, chronic food insecurity is not just peculiar to the developing countries alone.
Foreign aid generally does not promote economic development, Burnside (1997:256) for three
main reasons. First, governments in developing countries have become dependent on aid, diverting it to
xlviii
government consumption while reducing their efforts at market reforms that would boost productivity
and tax revenue in the rest of the economy. Second, donor countries have tied foreign aid to domestic
interest group objectives and to international power politics; they have little interest in holding recipient
countries accountable for achieving anything productive with aid. Finally, the driver of long-term
economic growth is not more dams and factories and schools, the objects of most development
assistance, but adoption of new technologies, broadly understood to include new ideas about how to
organize workforces and production processes (Burnside, 1997).
Rather than doling out aid, countries in the West can alleviate global poverty by ending their
hypocrisy on free trade and opening their own economies to imports from less developed countries. This
particular solution is not at all unthinkable; it is quite possible that Western governments will ultimately
face a crisis of conscience on this issue and give in. Unfortunately, the debate around the UN's
Millennium Development Goals has centered chiefly on the issues of debt forgiveness and massive new
aid, actions that will probably have little positive effect.
Even if we grant to aid proponents that there have been some aid successes, the evidence shows
that IMF structural adjustment loans and foreign aid more generally, tend to cause more harm than good
(Svensson, J. 1999:98). If a policy is likely to fail, then it should be abandoned. Apart perhaps from
emergency assistance and certain kinds of military aid, foreign aid should not be publicly funded. The
political temptations to misuse aid--on the part of both donor and recipient countries--are strong enough
to resist any real reform attempts. Foreign aid is not the primary solution to global poverty--few, if any,
scholars would dispute that--and it is probably a hindrance to the real solutions (Barro, R. 1997:6).
Donors, if want foreign aid to be effective, have to look at the institutionalization of a recipient
state. If institutes, such as elections and checks and control on governmental actions, are relatively
consolidated, then donors can be sure that the aid will increase development in economy and other
fields. In these recipient states, aid is invested in reforms and good public policies. But if a recipient
state is not institutionalized, it is obvious that aid will be distributed among elites and no reform will
occur. Elites of these states can not commit credibly to use aid in reforms. So, we should see aid flows
going to more institutionalized states. But this is not a case according to many studies. There is no
relationship between the level of institutionalization, political and civil liberties in one state, and the
likelihood of receiving foreign aid.
Thus, foreign aid is not necessarily given as a humanitarian or economic assistance. Rather, it is
used as one of the foreign policy tools to achieve strategic goals of donors (Burnside and dollar,
xlix
2000:455). Interests of donor are more important than the needs of potential recipient states. This study
contributes to this argument. Particularly, results show that autocratic states which have trade or alliance
relationship with the United States receive aid in order to survive politically and protect the status quo
against rivals. This conclusion is important since previous studies showed that the size of winning
coalition and selectorate are main determinants of the likelihood of receiving foreign aid. However, as a
results the, likelihood of receiving aid depends on trade or alliance relationship (Burnside, 1997:259)..
When autocracies have this relationship with the United States, only then they receive significant
amount of aid and stay in power until the winning coalition continue to support.
In the past, food security focused mainly on helping countries increase food availability but now
the emphasis is more on household food security issues. The present programme promotes increases in
agricultural production with enhanced food security at household, national and regional level combined
with improved welfare (especially rural) by promoting increases in broad-based employment and
income generation. There is an increasing urbanization along with manufacturing and services so that
causes of food insecurity are likely to shift from drought to unemployment and old age. This implies that
poverty alleviation, urban as well as rural, is now the prime food security concern
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/).
Food production requires adequate funding for agricultural R&D which must be kept at an
adequate level by both public and private funding and must be complementary. The continuing long-
term decline in grain prices should not preclude R&D funding which is required to ensure productivity
increases and lower prices. Both of these trends benefit all developing countries; only those with weak
external trading positions may not be able to take full advantage of world markets and prices. It is these
weaker developing countries where research and policy on poverty alleviation must be enhanced in
order to promote food security(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/).
Three approaches to food security are identified were: i) National self-sufficiency by increasing
food production through hybrid maize production and intensification. ii) Market liberalization with price
incentives to encourage diversification into high value and export crops; iii) Targeted safety nets or
research transfer for the poor (malnutrition and child mortality are very high)
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/).
Summary of Literature Review and identification of Gaps
l
The studies reviewed, no doubt have helped in clarifying issues, enhancing understanding and
capably eliciting, stimulating and enlightening intellectual discourse on the debate. However, most
studies reviewed presented the phenomenon, and treated it as a mere humanitarian emergency, and, the
reader is often given the impression that foreign aid is given to states for humanitarian or economic
development intentions.
After synthesizing the literature reviewed, one major observation that emerges is that foreign aid
generally does not promote economic development because foreign aid is given to recipient states in
order to promote donor‘s interests. Specifically, most food aid was donated on condition that it be
purchased and processed in, and shipped from, donor countries, even when adequate supplies were
available in the region where it is needed.
Also studies on governmental responses to food crisis showed that food scarcity provides
governments with an opportunity to instrumentalize the crisis and monopolize control over food supply
and food distribution, and use it as not only an instrument of control, but also, as patronage too for
support. As such, in political systems that have clientelist tendencies governmental response to food
crisis are similarly clientelistic. While this is a good observation, the studies above limited the
―clientelist/ clientelistic tendencies‖ to the domestic environment which reflects poor understanding of
the patron – client relationship between the major food exporting countries from the developed nations:
United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina which provide about 80 percent of cereal exports on the
world market, and the 95% Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LFDCS) which import more food than
they produce, nor does it show a clear understanding of both the logic and dynamics of the
politicization of food security and manipulation of international food markets for various political
reasons based on the neo-liberal productivist agricultural policy and management of global food system,
all of which are driven by the logic of commodity production and exchange.
A major gap in the literature is the low level of stimulating and enlightening intellectual
discourse on how the activities of the multinational corporations have helped in compounding the global
food crisis. Another gap identified is that most studies reviewed presented the phenomenon, and treated
it as a mere humanitarian emergency, and, the reader is often given the impression that foreign aid is
given to states for humanitarian or economic development intentions.
Similarly, some studies concluded that humanitarian aid is non-political (Morgenthau 1961, 301)
based on certain classification (subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid
and aid for economic development) is confusing because such foreign aid categorization violates the
li
idea of basic classification that parallel categories should be mutually exclusive.. For instance, foreign
aid may have been given to promote economic development, to strengthen military ability of a recipient
state or to increase the prestige of the donor at the same time. There is no clear classification and
therefore it is difficult to study foreign aid using the above classification
As such, the studies have paid very little attention to the politicization, internationalization, and
institutionalization of the management of the global food system and the resultant monopolization of
food aid by a cluster of developed nations (the High Food Sufficient Countries -HFSC) as instrument of
foreign policy in their interference in domestic affairs of developing countries. These are essentially, but
not exclusive of the gaps, the present study intends to fill by exploring the organic interconnections
between the governance of the global food system, the international division of labour, the flow of food
aid, and how these have contributed to food insecurity in the developing nations.
1.6 Theoretical Framework
The study is undertaken within the theoretical assumption of the Marxists political economy
paradigm, which was developed, by Karl Marx, Fredrick Engel‘s, and V.I Lenin as a critique of
capitalism. It is adapted to the objective nature and character of global food crisis, its
internationalization, and institutionalization of its management as strategy and tactics employed by the
High Food Sufficient Countries (HFSC) in their trade relations with between Low-Income Food-Deficit
Countries (LFDCS) in such a way that the former determines the economic positions of the later.
The basic assumption of the above neo-liberal approach is there is no ―Free Lunch ―a
commodified food system, and that Green revolution and globalization of agriculture are seen as the
fundamental threat to food security of developing countries. The theory assume that famine and hunger
problems in the third world were not caused by overpopulation and scarcity as proposed by neo-
Malthusian thesis ( Ehrlich (1968:8), or social structural causes (Sen 1981:7; Lappé et al. 1998:90) but
due to globalization of agriculture.
While there may be proximate causes of food crisis across nations, the theory sees the root cause
as international vertical division of labour, and asymmetrical trade relations among states. Hence, the
conceptual focus of the theory is international exploitation and inequalities in food- resource due. The
theory recognizes the fact that the internationalization, and institutionalization of the management global
food system monopolized by the High Food Sufficient Countries (HFSC) leads to sort of patron –
lii
client relationship between Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LFDCS),and major food exporting
countries from the developed nations. The theory defines nations in terms of, food sovereignty, that is,
whether nations are dependent on other nations, not just for their food, but also for their agricultural
inputs.
The theory recognizes the polar economic strength and asymmetrical relationship and benefits
between the High Food Sufficient Countries and Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries. For instance,
while the four leading food exporters—the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina—provide
about 80 percent of cereal exports on the world market, more than 95 countries in the world import more
food than they produce, as well as the politicization of food security and manipulation of international
food markets for various political reasons by the major food exporting countries led by the US.
The theory, therefore, conceptualizes politicization of food in terms of the capability of an actor
to forge or construct an exclusive regime or platform through which national agricultural processes can
be controlled .Food is used to further national objectives, and therefore, perceived as a tool of
diplomacy .Power is exercised in terms of the manipulation of food supplies by interests within certain
countries, and outside them , especially, through tying of food aid to commodity purchases in the donor
country (in-kind food aid. In other words, Thus, food is seen as a viable instrument of foreign policy
which certain privileged and powerful groups may restrict food supplies (directly or indirectly by
controlling distribution systems, etc) to segments of the population that are out of favours.
Under these circumstances, the question of food—who has food and who can produce it—
becomes an effective weapon in the relations between nation-states. The theory is a radical critique of
the humanitarian strategy adopted by the developed nations in their relations with the developing
countries. The theory sees Nutritionalization (the scientization of food in the Third World), and (bio)
fortification (the process of adding micronutrients to food products during the manufacturing process) as
additional advantage to the High Food Sufficient exporting Countries (HFSC) over their Low-Income
Food-Deficit importing countries (LFDCS), as it results to major change from the previously prevalent
food policy that was centered around more productivist policies. The productivist agricultural policy is
driven by the logic of commodity production and exchange and seeds the Low-Income Food-Deficit
importing countries (LFDICS) as a huge market.Hence, a number of working groups and donor agencies
spearheaded fortification in developing countries (Darnton-Hill and Nalubola 2002:45).The solution to
the food problem of the LFDICS is considered to lie in what is called Green Revolution technologies,
and food aid.
liii
Finally, the analysts sees this neo-liberal development approach to global food management as
both a cause and consequence of nutritionalization, as it encourages nutritionalization as a cost-
efficient, market-friendly path to development and food security , but at the same time, by shifting
resources from other food policy, nutritionalization reinforces neoliberal development practices.
Adaptation of the theory to the Subject Matter.
The global society is seen as one huge market, in which the logic of commodity production and
exchange derive at the economic level (globalization, liberalization, deregulation) economic reforms
derives both at the political and ideological level (democracy and governance) .Two classes of nations
are discernable in such society: the High Food Sufficient exporting Countries (HFSC) ,and the Low-
Income Food-Deficit importing countries (LFDCS).Agro-industrialization became the dominant policy
framework in which the newly-independent states sought to become self-sufficient in food supply for its
own population, restructuring the rural landscape through modernization and intensification. As Agro
industrialization required much state involvement in food production, the government had to subsidize
necessary synthetic inputs and large-scale irrigation (McMichael 2000a:57) in the, Green Revolution
programmes and projects in the post-independence Third World nations.
The gap in the needed resources implies that the developing nations will have to borrow from
the international capital market .Hence the Bretton-Woods institutions in collaboration with world food
exporters notably ,the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina which supply about 80 percent
of cereal exports on the world market, designed lending policies to promote neo-liberal policies in
developing countries.
With this market-opening policies on ground, production and supply became ―internationalized‖
(Raynolds et al. 1993:2).This forced the governments to restructure their food supply policies towards
global market, departing from self-sufficiency oriented approaches, the governments now consider food
security to be achieved by relying on world trade, emphasizing strategies to secure procurement sources
rather than self-sufficiency (Thompson and Cowan 2000:24). Emphasis on export-oriented agriculture
for the supermarkets in the North meant that production is not necessarily based on the domestic food
needs.
The explosion of debt in the 1980s, and the Structural Adjustment Program were partially
responsible, pressuring many developing countries to seek foreign currency as depicted in Fig.1.1
below:
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Fig1. 1: THE MECHANISM OF FOOD AID RECYCLING
UNDP
Source: Conceptual Depiction of the Global Food Aid Industrial Complex of the World
Food Programme http://www.allacademic.com
These liquidity regulation institutions are of three main types:
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), which help domestic companies trade by lending them money;
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) which, broadly, lend companies money to buy
factories and facilities abroad, most often in the context of Southern countries; and then jointly
held
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which are majority owned by a collection of rich
states.
Beyond the delivery of aid resources, organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, International
Development Agency, Paris Club, EU serve as the tributaries and arteries of Agro multinational firms,
governments, and banks which ,in turn act as gatekeepers of food aid export or ‗financial capital‘ for the
Low-Income Food-Deficit importing countries (LFDCS).
EIB
DG ID
EDFI
WEDFI
IDA
IMF
IFAD
FAO
The Low-Income Food-Deficit
importing countries (LFDCS)
contract Aid
The Low-Income Food-
Deficit importing
countries (LFDCS)
supplying Agro –raw
materials to (HFSC)
The High Food Sufficient exporting
Countries (HFSC) buys, or exchange
Agro –raw materials with their value
added capital goods produced from the
initial transaction
‘Core’ (HFSC) states
(OECD) underwrite
liquidity for Food Aid
export: Central banks
underwrite liability
(SDRs held for IFIs
High Food Sufficient
exporting Countries
(HFSC) pumps
CGIAR- the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research
International Food Policy
Research Institute, the Gates
Foundation, the World Bank,
USAID, DANIDA, and ADB.
lv
Starting with the establishment of the World Food Program which was established in 1963 with
the goal to coordinate a part of global food aid, a Global Food Aid Industrial Complex started
emerging. Hence, institutionalized food aid such as PL 480 in the U.S, which made it possible for the
US to maintain its policy of tying 100% of its food aid to purchases of US grown, packaged, and
shipped.
The above set up which sustains the business practices of multinational corporations is a form of
neocolonialism. The multinational corporations have the financial resources available to buy up the
agricultural resources of impoverished nations, particularly in the tropics. They also have the political
clout to convert these resources to the exclusive production of cash crops for sale to industrialized
nations outside of the tropics, and in the process to squeeze the poor off of their more productive lands.
It encourages "import dumping"- low-cost subsidized food from industrialized nations into developing
countries" domestic market. This creates a cycle of food safety dependence.
For instance, between 1996 and 2002, EU frozen chicken exports to West Africa rose eight fold, due
mainly to import liberalization. In Ghana, for instance, the half million chicken farmers have suffered
from this situation. In 1992, domestic farmers supplied 95% of Ghana‘s market, but this share fell to
11% in 2001, as imported poultry sells cheaper.
Once production and supply became ―internationalized‖, it becomes possible for, countries
which cannot become NACs like Singapore to focus on agrotechnology parks and relocated food
production elsewhere since the mid-1980s (Ufkes 1995:2).
Land where indigenous farmer would have is now being acquired by foreign agrofirms. In
Ghana, the Norwegian firm Biofuel Africa secured 38,000 hectares for 'the largest jatropha plantation in
the world'; European companies have grabbed over 600,000 hectares of land for the cultivation of
agrofuels crops; In Mozambique too Sun Biofuels has acquired 11 million hectares - more than one-
seventh of the country's total area - for growing energy plants; In Swaziland the British multinational
D1 Oils have acquired over 3,000 hectares in various parts of the country in addition to over 1,000
hectares at D1 Oils-operated farms. This internationalization, and acquisition rather than nationalization
of national arable land by Agro multinational corporations does not only deepen the dependence of the
Low-Income Food-Deficit importing countries (LFDCS) ,but also leads to their exploitation, and food
shortage because, what is produced from the land is neither for human consumption, nor for the
domestic market.
lvi
Under this view subsistence farmers in the Low-Income Food-Deficit importing countries
(LFDCS) are left to cultivate only lands that are so marginal in terms of productivity as to be of no
interest to the multinational corporations
For instance, Zimbabwe which was a major exporter of commercial crops, and self-sufficient in
food production, today agricultural production is down precipitously and the people have recurrent need
of emergency food aid. Since many of the once highly productive, mechanized and irrigated large-scale
properties are now idle or operating at a fraction of their capacity – many as so-called ―trophy farms‖
now owned by elites who are not commercial farmers by vocation – the result is a 50 percent reduction
in overall agricultural output, and chronic shortages in key staples, such as maize..
It is the light of the above land grabbing exercise and in a bid to maintain a permanent control of
power, that we can understand the Zimbabwean Government‘s decision to nationalise nearly all of the
country‘s commercial farms. Hence this has led to a sharp decline in export earnings as well as food
production in the short run, as well as the reason why the IMF and World Bank disapprove of balance of
payments support for Zimbabwe. Hence foreign banks withdrew credit lines and most aid donors to
suspend their Zimbabwe operations.
To get further assistance, Zimbabwe was asked or advised to (1) dismantle marketing boards and
guaranteed prices for farmers‘ products; (2) phase out or eliminate subsidies and support such as
fertilizer, machines, and agricultural infrastructure; (3) reduce tariffs of food products to low levels by
their donors.
The above theoretical insight underlies the dialectical and the organic interconnections between
the governance of the global food system, the international division of labour, the flow of food aid, and
food insecurity in the developing nations. It therefore provides both conceptual and analytical
framework through which the paradox ,and political economy of foreign food aid can be understood, in
such a way that the reader sees both food not only as an economic tool but also a more fundamental tool
of foreign policy, and economic diplomacy.
1.7 HYPOTHESES
In an attempt to answer the questions raised, following hypotheses will guide this study:
I. The character of political leadership contributed to the national development crisis and food
insecurity in Zimbabwe.
lvii
II. There is no organic interconnection between food insecurity, food aid, as well as the character of
governance in Zimbabwe.
1.8 Scope of the Study
This study is confined to the analysis of the political, economic, socio-political-cum food crisis
with a view to critically appraising its causes, and possibly proffers policy options with which to
mitigate the identified problems. However, to contextualize, the intricacies and dynamics of the reality
of socio-political-cum food crisis, reference shall be made to other nations to foreground the political
economy of foreign aid in the relations between the High Food Sufficient exporting Countries (HFSEC)
and Low-Income Food-Deficit importing countries (LFDICS),
This study was confronted with unavoidable limitations such as the extent to which accurate data
is available and the conceptual clarification of ―food crisis‖. Also, foreign policy is an area where
secrecy seems to be the norm .What people see are usually the action of the state but the motivations and
the real intentions of the actors are usually hidden. The net effect of this is that, the analyst has to rely on
mere conjectures a times in trying to figure out why particular state give assistance to another state,
while denying another. This creates a problem of information and data for the analyst especially in Third
World countries where trade and official data between nations are not accessible.
Another limitation is that foreign policy analysis has a lot of competing ontology ,as each
theoretical framework claim to have more explanatory power than others, not only do differences exist
among them but also even within them. This multiplicity of theoretical frameworks poses a problem for
trade and economic analysis ,in the sense that, the framework adopted affects not only the focus of the
study, but also the questions to be asked and conclusions that would be reached. With different
conclusions, it becomes really very difficult to determine which is accurate and which is not. Hence the
analytical quarrel among scholars about the most appropriate framework of analysis. In spite of these
constraints, the objectives set out in the study were achieved.
1.9 Methods of data collection
In this section an attempt is made to explain how the study was carried out, and what was used in
carrying it out. This involves showing /demonstrating how the researcher intends to go about solving the
already identified research problems (Legee, C. and Wayne, F., 1974:66; Obikeze, 1990:13).Indeed,
what is common to all research is the conceptual framework and analytical approach, which the
lviii
researcher brings to the entity or phenomenon being studied and into which in a sense, he/she constraints
it as a basis for the investigation of it (Warmington, Lupton and Gribbin, 1977:78).
In terms, of method of data collection, we used extraction (abstraction) from secondary data,
that is, from existing records and documents, and this entails teasing the research data from other forms
of recorded and stored information (Obikeze, 1990:18).Thus, the researcher relies mainly on secondary
sources of information, especially by eminent scholars, many of these studies appear in textbooks,
journals conference papers, newspapers and other research work on similar topic. This necessitated
using data from textbooks, journals of foreign policy and diplomacy.
As a result, we used descriptive and historical analysis which seeks for an in-depth and insightful
understanding of the subjects or the social phenomenon being studied. This is with a view to
discovering the underlying meanings and patterns of relationship as well as provides insights into subtle
nuances that quantitative approaches might miss.
This enabled us to place the subject matter in its historical perspective with a view to producing
an accurate reconstruction of the past history of the subject matter by identifying and analyzing social
forces and processes that brought it into being, and shaped or directed its subsequent development and
evolution to the present time. Therefore, given the ex post facto nature of this study, we adopted the
One-Shot Case Study designated as XO
. A study using the One-Shot Case Study [X O
] design involves a
careful examination of only one group, event or phenomenon at a single point in time after a presumed
causal event has occurred. Thus, an event is observed and linked to a probable cause (Legee, C. and
Wayne, L., 1974:70).The question arising from the use of the above design is how much of the observed
variance of O (the dependent variable can be attributed to the experimental treatment X (the independent
variable), and how much can be attributed to other substantive variables (extrinsic effects) and the
research design itself (intrinsic effects).
In terms of model,our design is an ex post facto descriptive research because we are more
concerned with examining how the commodification, and globalization of food system, creates
conditions that leads to internationalization of the Zimbabwean food ,and socioeconomic crisis.
The following conventional notation system is used:
X=The experimental treatment (Independent variable)
0=An observation on the dependent variable
O1,2,...=The time order of observation
R=The assignment to groups by randomization
lix
- = Nonrandom group assignment
* Dependent variable, here is a variable whose value is determined in the model.Hence the independent
variable explains the behaviour of the dependent variable.
In the present study, the following notations are used:
X=the tying of food aid to commodity purchases in the donor country (in-kind food aid),i.e, of the
Patron – client relationship between Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LFDCS), and major
food exporting countries from the developed nations, including market-based food policies, and
liberalization of the Zimbabwean economy
0= the deterioration of, economic, social infrastructures of Zimbabwe which made up to a third of the
populace to be in need of food aid, and the steady erosion of remaining democratic practices.
O1,2…= The on-going political and economic crisis in Zimbabwean dates back to 1997, a time the
international financial organizations (IFIs ),especially, the IMF and World bank
specifically withheld an essential balance of payments facility with a view to reducing
government spending, , which in turn, will force the government accelerate
privatization, and renew the structural adjustment program.
R=the assignment to groups by randomization (the Zimbabwean nation),
--- = Nonrandom group assignment (the Zimbabwean poor small peasant farmers),
In order to analyze the data collected, we used the content analysis approach which involves a
systematic transformation of quantitative data to qualitative data with a view to situate patterns of events
in their historical context and establish their subsequent development. Accordingly, documents on the
state of the Zimbabwean nation, and economy, and other relevant materials were subjected to textual
analysis, which according to Babbie`s The Practice of Social Research is ―the study of recorded human
communication involving six processes: objectivity, intersubjectivity apriori design, reliability, validity,
generalizability, replicability and hypothesis testing), the study of texts as to authorship, authenticity or
meaning (Neuendorf, 2002:27). The hypotheses raised will be tested, and based on the weight of the
evidence after analysis; each hypothesis will be validated (rejected or accepted) based on our decision
rule:
lx
Table: 1.1 Decision Table
Decision Rule: Decisions:
State of nature
Reject Do not Reject Null
Hypothesis Null Hypothesis
Null Hypothesis
Is true
Type I Error
P=ø
Correct Decision
Null Hypothesis
Is true
Correct Type II Error
Is false
1.10 Operationalization of Concepts.
Food security-access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. This
implies individual access in all seasons and all years not just for survival but for active
participation in society
Food insecurity - the physical unavailability of food, and lack of social or economic access to
adequate food, and/or inadequate food utilization,or a condition in which people lack basic food
intake to provide them with the energy and nutrients for fully productive lives.
Food-insecure people- those individuals whose food intake falls below their minimum calorie
(energy) requirements, as well as those who exhibit physical symptoms caused by energy and
nutrient deficiencies resulting from an inadequate or unbalanced diet or from the body's inability
to use food effectively because of infection or disease.
lxi
CHAPTER TWO: CONTRADICTIONS OF POLITICAL GOVERNANCE AND THE
ZIMBABWEAN FOOD CRISES
2.1 Leadership Crisis and National Development Crisis in Zimbabwe
As pointed out in our background of study earlier, a mixture of factors has conspired to challenge
the Zimbabwe‘s food security. Atleast three deeply-rooted interrelated long-term factors and one
additional proximate converge to cause the socio-political-economic cum food crisis in Zimbabwe.
These three interrelated long-term factors have both internal-structural dimension (Zimbabwe‘s
incendiary combination of economic decline, social dislocation, and, most importantly, a politicized
military), and external institutional dimension (Kriger, 2003:8). Thus, one way of understanding the
political and economic trends that has characterized the state of the Zimbabwean nation without
undermining, or glossing over the political economy of the Zimbabwean crisis, is by focusing the
analysis on both the character and the contradictions in both the domestic and international political
system, and on the place which Zimbabwe occupies in the international division of labour and
production.
Put differently, the contradictions of governance, and crisis of leadership, or the character of
politics in Zimbabwe is a major contributory factor to the national development crisis in Zimbabwe. For
instance, Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since its independence from settler rule in 1980 till date.
Although never a fully fledged democracy, in most conceptions of the term, during that period,
Zimbabwe has gone from multiparty state in the 1980s, to dominant one party state in the 1990s to
autocracy in the 2000s. Both scholarship and popular writing on democracy, and more specifically on
Zimbabwe, have accurately mapped Zimbabwe‘s descent into authoritarianism (Kriger, 2003:8).
In fact, not long after he began his fourth presidential term in 2002 – when the first serious
discussions of succession and ―will he/won‘t he‖ speculation began about the prospects of Mugabe
lxii
standing again in 2008 – the country has been sliding inexorably toward militarism. Research on African
regimes (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main) suggests that states displaying Zimbabwe‘s incendiary
combination of economic decline, social dislocation, and, most importantly, a politicized military, have
experienced coups d‘état, and indeed, Zimbabwe appears ripe for a coup, but one has not occurred.
It has become convenient, if not fashionable, among many observers to locate much of the
responsibility for Zimbabwe‘s democratic decline in the person of President Mugabe. From this follows
the assertions that competitive multiparty politics, or even civilian order, will be restored upon his
demise. However, the environment of politicized military and militarized politics has succeeded in
making Robert Mugabe essential to Zimbabwe‘s stability in the medium term. Over the longer term, the
keys to a political, and economic, ―soft landing‖ in Zimbabwe lie not in the country‘s fractured civilian
opposition groups, but in the most unlikely quarter – cronies of the ZANU-PF regime, a group that now
prominently includes the military apparatus itself and its representatives.
The political, economic and social infrastructures of Zimbabwe, described as the world‘s fastest-
shrinking economy, have been decimated in a remarkably short span of time. Having experienced eight
years of recession, Zimbabwe‘s economy has shrunk by more than one third since 1999
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main). More recently, GDP declines have still averaged a staggering
6 percent per year between 2002-2006, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, and this ―slower‖
pace results only from the fact that the economy is running out of ways to contract. The proximate cause
of the economic collapse was the invasions of mainly white and opposition-owned commercial farms,
which began in February 2000, and which, in turn, led to the destruction of agricultural sector. Some
4,000 mostly white commercial farmers have been displaced, as lands were seized and reapportioned to
cronies of the regime. In addition, an estimated 350,000 black farm workers and their families also were
disgorged (Julian, 2008:15).Whereas Zimbabwe was a major exporter of commercial crops, and self-
sufficient in food production, today agricultural production is down precipitously and the people have
recurrent need of emergency food aid. Since many of the once highly productive, mechanized and
irrigated large-scale properties are now idle or operating at a fraction of their capacity – many as so-
called ―trophy farms‖ now owned by elites who are not commercial farmers by vocation – the result is a
50 percent reduction in overall agricultural output, and chronic shortages in key staples, such as maize.
Indeed, Zimbabwe has experienced serious food shortages each year since 2001, with up to a third of the
populace in need of food aid. Once among largest sources of formal sector jobs, unemployment in the
commercial farming sector is now extreme, (John, 2003:9) as it is nationally.
lxiii
The destruction of Zimbabwe‘s once impressive urban-industrial infrastructure is perhaps more
striking. Zimbabwe‘s industry, built around policies of import substitution in the 1960s and seventies,
was indisputably damaged by the effects of economic structural adjustment in the 1990s (Bond,
Manyanya and Carmody: 2001:17). Yet productivity has virtually ground to a halt under conditions that
are fundamentally inhospitable to business and commerce. Moreover, the collapse is not simply of
physical infrastructure, as institutional and organizational networks have also suffered, and trust has
dwindled. Formal economic activity becomes nearly impossible amidst Zimbabwe‘s capricious policy
environment; its mass exodus of skilled labor, managers and capital, and rampant inflation, which some
estimates suggest is a staggering 100,000 percent annually. Not surprisingly, unemployment estimates
range from 75 to 85 percent, and poverty is estimated as high as 90 percent (ICG, 2007:2). Cholera and
other preventable diseases are becoming commonplace as water treatment facilities, not to mention the
country‘s once laudable health care system, has collapsed. Average life expectancy has plummeted,
down to 37 for men and just 34 for women, the lowest in the world.
This economic disintegration is inextricably tied to the deterioration of political life and the
steady erosion of remaining democratic practices. Notwithstanding various qualifications about
Zimbabwe‘s democracy in previous decades, the country once enjoyed vibrant institutions of political
and civil society, a surprisingly autonomous judiciary, a briefly ascendant political opposition. These
institutions have been severely undermined, aided by draconian legislation – among them, the
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), LOMA, and Public Order and Security Act
(POSA), (ICG, 2007:5),which limited or prevented assembly, protest and grassroots organizing.
The IMF has estimated poverty at 80 percent (the IMF, 2005:460), but the point is clear. The
independent media has been banned, proscribed and even bombed into submission – and sometimes all
three – so that opposition voices are either not heard, or are audible to such a small percentage of the
populace that they are deemed inconsequential. Electoral institutions have been wholly penetrated by
ruling party and military officials. Perhaps not surprisingly; the prevailing economic and political
conditions have contributed directly to an estimated 3.4mm Zimbabweans now living abroad. This
number could be as high as 4 million exiles – or more than 30 percent of the population, by some
estimates (the IMF, 2005:460).
Although their remittances literally have enabled many of those remaining in Zimbabwe to
survive, these earnings have come at enormous cost. Indeed, among Zimbabwe‘s exiles who now make
their home in the U.K, the US, South Africa, Botswana and elsewhere, are many of the country‘s best
lxiv
and brightest, including healthcare professionals, educators, business owners and managers, farmers, and
a significant portion of Zimbabwe‘s laborers, both skilled and unskilled. At the same time, famously
labeled an ―outpost of tyranny‖ by US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, Zimbabwe has become an
international pariah, at least vis-à-vis the OECD countries. Tourism, once a pillar of the economy, has
plummeted, as travelers have diverted their holidays – and their hard currency – elsewhere. Leading
politicians associated with Zimbabwe‘s ruling party, ZANU-PF, and their families, face sanctions on
travel and investment in a number of northern countries, including the United States, the EU and Japan.
Moreover, Zimbabwe has withdrawn from the Commonwealth and finds itself at odds with many of its
regional neighbours, despite increased dependence on them for electrical power and other essential
imports, and, of course, financial credit (the IMF, 2005:462).
In 2007, several amendments were made to the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Broadcasting Services Act, but
these have been deemed ―piecemeal reforms‖ and unlikely to affect the climate of repression (ICG,
2008:3). Certainly, President Robert Mugabe poised to begin his 29th year in office – bears considerable
blame for the myriad problems facing his country. Yet it is equally apparent that the complexity of those
problems means that they cannot simply be fixed with the demise of the 84-year old head of state. Even
under the best case scenario, the damage to population, economy, and infrastructure will require decades
to rectify. Mugabe‘s death, or departure from office by other means, is a necessary, but hardly sufficient
step to precipitate positive change in Zimbabwe. Moreover, March 29, 2008 marked the almost
inevitable reelection of the still vigorous Mugabe and, in all likelihood, an ironclad majority in a newly
expanded legislature (ICG, 2008:5). In addition to Mugabe, two opposition candidates contested the
presidential poll on March 29, 2008. Because a victory by MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai is all but
impossible, and a win by independent and former ZANU-PF minister Simba Makoni (which is a more
credible prospect, although still unlikely) would unleash a lethal contest for power, Mugabe remains the
most stable alternative despite pressure from middle class elements and restive military elites. In other
words, rather than undergoing some progression toward transition, however teleological, Zimbabwe is
actually ―stuck in reverse.‖ Yet while this reversal aptly captures the erosion of democracy, it does not
mean that Zimbabwe is intrinsically unstable (ICG, 2008:5).
As suggested by the coup literature, states displaying Zimbabwe‘s combination of economic
decline, social dislocation, and, importantly, politicized military, have experienced coups (Brian,
2001:40). Why not Zimbabwe? To a measurable degree, conditions appear far more ―ripe‖ for a coup
lxv
d‘état than they do for a post-Mugabe democratic transition. The military as the ―armed wing of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie as another faction of the ruling elite, seeks to protect its own interests
(Clapham,1985, in Third World Politics, 143, cited in Thomson, 2002:136). When these interests are
materially threatened, the military has a clear incentive for intervention in politics via a coup d‘etat. On
the surface, it appears that these interests are seriously threatened in Zimbabwe, commensurate with the
collapse of the economy, political uncertainty and infighting, a restive political opposition, and the
occasional pledge of President Mugabe to remain in office, in his words, ―until I am a century old‖ (
Moore, 2006:9). Indeed, in Zimbabwe today, military interests are so diversified and so bound up with
factors completely outside the ordinary military sphere that the armed forces would appear to have
ample incentive to intervene to protect those interests. This is even more likely because over the long
term, militarized politics itself contains the seeds for an economic and political revitalization in the
country (Maroleng, 2005:16).
Although other factors are also relevant, Mugabe and his party have certainly put many of the
above coup-proofing strategies into practice. For example, the creation of parallel forces and the
proliferation of militias have characterized the Zimbabwean polity for most of this decade. Further,
although ethnic balancing was always imperfect in Zimbabwe, the promotion of the president‘s co-
ethnics from the Zezuru sub-group of the Shona, has become the modus operandi particularly in regard
to military and military-connected positions. In addition, Zimbabwe‘s 1998-2004 misadventure in the
DRC certainly fits the model, described by Belkin and Schofer,2005:7, of giving your troops something
else to shoot at (it also provided rich patronage opportunities for the officer ranks, especially).
Moreover, arguably, the regular army was so broken upon that coup risk was doubly diminished.
Although it seems unlikely that this was the leading cause of Zimbabwe‘s Congo intervention, it was,
for the regime, a positive spin off. [The DRC conflict thus served multiple functions: distract and
possibly divide the rank and file and enrich the brass].
However, in terms of outright repression, Mugabe and ZANU-PF have effectively imposed
legislation that includes various restrictions on civil society and political opposition. Coupled with a
disastrous economic regime, this political repression has contributed to the emigration of millions of
Zimbabweans; many of those now abroad make up Zimbabwe‘s intelligentsia (Maroleng, 2005:16), and,
as such include the likely architects of a civilian effort to wrest power from ZANU-PF.
In Zimbabwe, in addition to its politicized military, at least two indicators suggested by Belkin
and Schofer (2003:45) currently obtain, namely, a weakened civil society and regime that is increasingly
lxvi
considered illegitimate (only the absence of a history of coups plays in Zimbabwe‘s 10 favour). Using
the second edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit‘s democracy index, which used 60 indicators
grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of
government; political participation; and political culture on a 0 to 10 scale, we can demonstrate that the
character of governance and leadership is influences the stability of a state. For instance, Zimbabwe
scored 149, 2.53; 0.83; 4.29, 1.67 4.38 and 1.47 respectively on rank, overall score, electoral process and
pluralism; functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties (Belkin
and Schofer, 2003:45). Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to
one decimal point.
Table : 2.1:The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008.
lxvii
KEY:
1. Full democracies —scores of 8-10; 2. Flawed democracies—score of 6 to 7.9;
3. Hybrid regimes—scores of 4 to 5.9; 4 Authoritarian regimes—scores below 4 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Zimbabwe. March 2007
IFAD, UN sets up food crisis task force, http://www.ifad.org/media/press, April 29th, 2008.
lxviii
In their articles, captioned, ―How Mugabe is Destroying the Zimbabwean Economy‖ by Ralph R.
Reiland (August 17, 2007:14), and "Caps on Prices Only Deepen Zimbabweans' Misery" by Michael
Wines (2008:4), a perfect illustration of how the "fatal conceit" of government can turn a difficulty into
a catastrophe was provided.‖Robert G. Mugabe has ruled over this battered nation, his every wish
endorsed by Parliament and enforced by the police and soldiers, for more than 27 years," explained
Wines (2008:4). It appears, however, that not even an unchallenged autocrat can repeal the laws of
supply and demand. With prices doubling weekly, Mugabe's attempt to revoke the laws of economics
came via an anti-inflationary order, "Operation Slash Prices," on June 25, ordering merchants to cut their
prices by 50 percent. One month after Mr. Mugabe decreed just that, commanding merchants nationwide
to counter 10,000-percent-a-year hyperinflation by slashing prices in half and more, Zimbabwe's
economy is at a halt, reported Wines (2008:6). Most students with a passing grade in Economics 101
could have predicted that Mugabe's decree would produce shortages. Cut the price of gasoline by law to
a dollar per gallon, and there'll be less supply and more demand -- the formula for a shortage. Cut the
price to 50 cents and we'll be walking.
It's the same with supply in the labor market. Cap the salaries of brain surgeons at $100,000 and
there'll be a shortage of brain surgeons. Predictably, the results of Mugabe's decree were catastrophic.
Bread, sugar and cornmeal, staples of every Zimbabwean's diet, have vanished, seized by mobs who
denuded stores like locusts in wheat fields (Wines, 2008:9). Meat is virtually nonexistent, even for
members of the middle class who have money to buy it on the black market. Gasoline is nearly
unobtainable. Hospital patients are dying for lack of basic medical supplies. Power blackouts and water
cutoffs are endemic. Similarly, the impact on manufacturing and jobs was ruinous. Manufacturing has
slowed to a crawl because few businesses can produce goods for less than the government-imposed sale
prices. Raw materials are drying up because suppliers are being forced to sell to factories at a loss.
Businesses are laying off workers or reducing their hours (Wines, 2008:9).
With three-fourths of Zimbabwe's labor force already jobless prior to Mugabe's decree, the
government's prescription for bringing down inflation only worsened the nation's poverty crisis. To keep
critics in line, a new law gives Zimbabwe's security forces the right to observe as many e-mails and tap
as many phones as they see fit. For noncompliance with Mugabe's edict, business owners are threatened
with jail and the nationalization of their companies. "We are at war," explained one of Mugabe's vice
presidents, Joseph Msika. "We will not allow shelves to be empty." (Ralph and Reiland August 17,
2007:14).
lxix
Wines (2008:12) further reported that, if supplies won't come forth voluntarily via the market,
the government will force the production. Thus as many as 4,000 businesspeople have been arrested,
fined or jailed. While the state-run newspapers publish lists of telephone numbers on their front pages
daily, exhorting citizens to report merchants whose prices exceed the dictates. In the Soviet Union, to
keep things moving according to plan, the government eventually killed 55 million of its own citizens
and in China, 36 million. To kill in those numbers required the obedience of many. According to
Clifford (2008),"There is one thing more wicked in the world than the desire to command, and that is the
will to obey." (Ralph and Reiland August 17, 2007:18).
2.2 Militarization of Politics and Governance in Zimbabwe
The origins of Zimbabwe‘s recent chaos are well known (Kriger, 2003:5). The underlying/long-
term factors are deeply-rooted and stem from at least three interrelated long-term factors and one
additional proximate cause. The first centers, around unresolved disparities over economy and land. This
―incomplete liberation‖ meant that there was a reservoir of populist resentment, which, though long
dormant, could be tapped and mobilized by opportunistic politicians and other actors. Indeed, this
contributed to long term dissatisfaction among military and proto-military elements in society (see
Kriger, 2003). White Zimbabweans are often portrayed as victims of brutality and appropriation by a
deranged regime. After all, it was predominantly white commercial farmers who were displaced by the
land invasions from 2000-2004 and whose lost productive capacity directly contributed to the country‘s
macroeconomic decline. Yet these Zimbabweans, whose population numbered around 70,000 as
recently as the mid-1990s, were essentially enablers of the government‘s/political elites‘ failures to
achieve liberation.
This is not a case of blaming the victims; rather, Zimbabwe‘s whites were at best only
intermittently pressured by the state to share land, resources, wealth, capital or even managerial
positions/affirmative action with blacks for nearly a generation following independence. Faced with
such laissez faireism from the state, the so-called settler class responded in kind with complacency of its
own (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:98). As subsequent events would reveal, however, the state was later able
to manipulate to its advantage the image of a white populace enjoying the perquisites of a colonial
lifestyle as a pretext for racism and the confiscation of white owned commercial farms. A second key
variable is the lack of accountability that characterized the ZANU regime from its inception. Beginning
in 1980, when ZANU won the vast majority of contested seats in Zimbabwe‘s first-ever democratic
lxx
elections, the party under the leadership of prime minister, later president, Mugabe became increasingly
dominant. After 1987, Zimbabwe had established a de facto one-party state. It maintained its
hierarchical structure, with power concentrated in the president and a handful of executive-level and
party institutions, such as the politburo, Central Committee and, perhaps a distant third, the cabinet (See
Bauer and Taylor, 2005). The incorporation of ZANU‘s rival and leading opposition party, ZAPU,
through a merger in 1987 essentially foreclosed the prospect of any potent political competition in the
country for the next dozen years (Sylvester, 1995:6). By definition, power is not diffused in a single-
party predominant system. This type of governing structure renders the Zimbabwean state particularly
susceptible to militarization (Sylvester, 1995:6).
Third, although the ZANU-led state displayed flashes of democratic governance in its first two
decades, a closer inspection reveals an astounding willingness by the regime to use various tools of
repression to maintain its authority. Indeed, ZANU had a history of using violence for political ends.
The most severe example of this was the infamous Gukurahundi campaign between 1982 and 1986, in
which some 20,000 Zimbabweans, mainly from Matabeleland, died at the hands of the regime (See
Bauer and Taylor, 2005).
The immediate catalyst for Zimbabwe‘s collapse is more recent and dates to just 1997, a time in
which the political and economic environment in the country was particularly fragile. After seven years
of experimentation with economic liberalization, known in Zimbabwe as ESAP, several historically
strong sectors were under threat. Largely as the result of trade liberalization, footwear, clothing and
textiles, metals and manufacturers found they could not compete in the liberalized trade environment
prescribed by the IFIs and donors (See Bauer and Taylor, 2005:103). Moreover, although commercial
agriculture sector was, by and large, performing well in the 1990s, farmers at the smaller end of the
scale had been buffeted by the effects of two major droughts in 1992 and again in 1995, and the rising
cost of finance and inputs and were therefore on the verge of bankruptcy (especially black large-scale
farmers). Formal sector employment was also under threat, and wages had become stagnant, leading to
increased union activism, really for the first time in independent Zimbabwe‘s history (Carmody and
Taylor, 2002:342; Bond and Manyanya, 2002:221). At the same time, the government faced rising
pressures from the IFIs to reduce government spending, accelerate privatization, and renew the
structural adjustment program, ESAP, and the IMF specifically withheld an essential balance of
payments facility.
Ostensibly, the Gukurahundi was directed at renegade members of ZANU‘s former rival army
lxxi
ZIPRA, under the pretext that they were seeking to overthrow the ZANU-led government. Vast numbers
of non-combatants, mainly of the Ndebele minority, were also killed in the campaign. Somewhat
paradoxically, the mid-late 1990s were also a time of modest political opening in Zimbabwe. Labor
leaders, represented in the umbrella body ZCTU, were increasingly emboldened. Organizations of civil
society, including various campaigns such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) and
the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) were increasingly vibrant; opposition parties, though small
and fragmented, were quite outspoken (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:224).. Indeed, although such groups
and their predecessors had scant impact on the results of the elections in 1995 and 1996 for parliament
and the presidency, respectively, opposition voices were represented quite forcefully. This revealed
growing credibility problems for the ruling party, particularly in the urban centers. Nonetheless, as a
formidable actor, the ZANU-PF government was able to effectively parry the demands and pressures
from each of these groups (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:224).
Yet another entity whose organizational and political strength grew immensely during this period
of relative social opening was the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans‘ Association (the ―War
Vets‖). When they marched in mid-1997 demanding that they receive pensions, land and health care for
their sacrifices to the nation years earlier, President Mugabe capitulated, granting lump-sum payments
and guaranteeing lifetime pensions costing the treasury Z$4.5 billion (then about $440 mm US). At the
same time, incendiary rhetoric about seizures of white-owned land and land reform – long a regular
feature of Zimbabwean election cycles, but prior to 2000 without any foundation or follow-up – formed
an expedient corollary to the regime‘s new found commitment to its War Veterans (Bond and
Manyanya, 2002:230).
Each time even a modest move toward greater political liberalism has occurred in Zimbabwe, it
appears to suffer a severe authoritarian backlash. Christine Sylvester (1995:6) demonstrates this
phenomenon in elections through 1995. Thereafter, a backlash was seen in 1997, in which fears of a
ZCTU-War Vets collaboration led to anti-white and anti-democratic reaction, and in 2000, which
marked the most competitive election in Zimbabwean history (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:230) This
bodes poorly for 2008, and suggests that any relaxation that results in an advance by pro-democracy
forces will be met with a similarly authoritarian response from ZANU-PF and its military allies.
The ZNLWVA was itself notoriously corrupt, and numerous recipients of the payouts were not
actual veterans (see Bond and Manyanya, 2002). More than any single event up to that time, Mugabe‘s
concessions to the ZNLWVA had an impact on Zimbabwe‘s political economy that was both immediate
lxxii
and severe. In fact, despite the political logic of placating a critical constituency (railing against white
farmers also arguably aided the fading liberation credentials, on which the aging ZANU-PF elites relied
for much of their legitimacy), this extra-budgetary largesse undermined Zimbabwe‘s fragile
international and domestic economic relations and threatened to bankrupt the treasury. The Zimbabwe
dollar plummeted 75 percent in one day against hard currencies and the economy, for all intents and
purposes, never recovered. IMF withheld its disbursement and the donor community soon followed suit.
By September 1999, the country was in severe economic difficulty and both local and
international investors were alarmed about the threat to property rights embedded in the anticipated land
acquisition program. Domestically, the vulnerability of the regime emboldened emergent political actors
such as the ZCTU, and this climate of relative political freedom and economic contraction, fostered the
emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999. It was joined by
whites, long supporters of the regime, who were now fearful enough of Mugabe that they needed to
break their tacit alliance, and sufficiently overconfident in Zimbabwe‘s democratic legitimacy that they
could make a difference, not least financially, to the new party‘s success (Bond and Manyanya,
2002:235). The fundamental error made by opponents of ZANU-PF was in overestimating plasticity of
Zimbabwe‘s partial democracy. Hence, the emergence of a bona fide opposition party in MDC was a
tipping point, leading not to greater democracy, but to a descent into militarism.
MDC, therefore, was unable to secure electoral victory in 2000 or 2002 or 2005; in 2008, victory
.Consider Masipula Sithole‘s ill-timed and unfortunately titled ―Zimbabwe‘s Eroding Authoritarianism,‖
which appeared in the Journal of Democracy in 1997.It is clear in retrospect that as of February 2000,
fresh from the defeat of its constitutional referendum, that Mugabe and ZANU-PF were faced with a
critical choice upon which rested not only the credibility of putative multiparty democracy/politics in
Zimbabwe, but the very foundations of civilian rule. The choices were to submit to democracy, and most
likely lose, or to seek to retain power at all costs by entering what Timothy Scarnecchia (2006:4) has
called the ―fascist cycle.‖ Yielding to democracy would have almost certainly ensured a parliamentary
victory by the MDC in June 2000 and very likely in the presidential elections that followed two years
later. Thus, Mugabe through populist policy of land reform established a dictatorial position in
Zimbabwe.
2.3 The Politicization of the Military
It is worth noting that what differentiates Zimbabwe‘s experience from that of other authoritarian
incumbents facing serious electoral competition like Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia in 1991, Kenya in
lxxiii
2002; Ghana in 2000; Malawi in 1993, and elsewhere is that ZANU-PF was able to engage in a dry run
in which it discovered its electoral vulnerability months before it actually counted. Although sponsored
by ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe‘s first-ever popular referendum in February 2000 on the subject of a new
constitution was resoundingly defeated 55% to 45%. The results surprised Mugabe and ZANU-PF, yet
they could not otherwise have known the depths of their unpopularity in Zimbabwe, particularly in the
cities, absent this test (Meredith, 2007:7). This, in short, was Zimbabwe‘s ―Algeria moment.‖ And like
Algeria‘s preempted election in 1992, ZANU-PF rejected democracy in favor of militarism. The 2000
election, hijacked by ZANU-PF, was a Zimbabwean veto coup, albeit one executed by a nominally
civilian government, which moved quickly to shore up its military credentials (see Meredith, 2007).
Since early 2000, two features have come to characterize Zimbabwe‘s political economy. The
first dimension is the politicization of the military. In other words, politicization of the military is the
expansion of the corporate identity of the military to include explicit class interests that the military, as a
class, is then inclined to protect (Clapham, 1985:4); as well as the explicit assignment of political
relevance to military officers, retired military personnel with links to the armed forces, and the military
as an institution. This ultimately makes the military to become a key power broker, often at the behest of
civilian politicians, and may act as a final arbiter of political outcomes.
A second feature of contemporary Zimbabwe is the militarization of politics. This
dimension attempts to capture the degree to which the political sphere itself has been penetrated by
militarist logic (Clapham, 1985:5). It suggests that military rhetoric and behavior permeates the
nominally civilian regime, and paramilitary organizations – militias, youth wings, and the like –
proliferate; the police abandon a law enforcement function, ostensibly geared toward protecting citizens,
and instead perform a regime enforcement function designed to preserve regime power through threats,
intimidation and terrorism against the populace, especially key civic groups. Necessarily authoritarian,
violence becomes the currency of a militarized regime.
Although veterans of Zimbabwe‘s liberation war have always held prominent positions in the
ZANU-led government, the institutional military structure – formed from the merging of the two
liberation armies, Zanla and Zipra, with some elements from the Rhodesian army – has always
traditionally remained outside of politics (Clapham, 1985:5). The early years of independence perhaps
revealed some ambiguity about the military‘s role, and it has been more visible in the party structures,
however, I would argue that there has been a clear institutional division since 1980 between ―military‖
and ―civilian leadership‖. Arguably, the inclusion of so many former Liberation War Veterans in
lxxiv
ZANU-PF politics from 1980 might be characterized as politicizing the military – or at least, those of a
military background. One could also argue that politicization began with General Walls in 1980, when
he considered an anti-ZANU coup. Another possible example is the Gukuruhundi campaign, which
called on the military, specifically the notorious Fifth Brigade, to play a substantially political role by
attacking and repressing non-combatants as much as Ndebele/Zipra-fringe militias. (see Clapham, 1985)
Certainly, for years following the Gukurahundi, neither the military nor paramilitary
agents/actors had any domestic or political role whatsoever. This has contributed to Zimbabwe‘s
character historically as a fundamentally civilian-ruled state. In fact, Zimbabwe is one of few countries
in Africa that has avoided a coup; although the severity of at least two rumored attempts has never been
firmly established (Clapham, 1985). Ceteris paribus, the politicization of the military threatens this
record. Individually and institutionally, military actors are now seen as bona-fide political players in
their own right. The mobilization of the War Vets in 1997 and Mugabe‘s capitulation was a precursor,
but it is important to note that their campaign was largely organic in origin; in that period of relative
political pluralism, they were another interest group, albeit an extraordinary one. The War Vets
empowered and politicized important elements of the ―military grassroots.‖ The key turning point in the
process of politicization actually occurred in 1998, principally through the Zimbabwe army‘s
intervention in the war in the DRC. As a result of its deployment in the Congo, Zimbabwe‘s military
hierarchy began to see itself in terms of its collective interests as an (economic) class (Meredith 2007:7).
Zimbabwe‘s intercession on behalf of the beleaguered Kabila government generated key
lucrative contracts – for materiel, supplies, transport, mining rights, and so on – many of which were
given to companies controlled by senior military officers, as well as the military itself, such as OSLEG,
Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), and others (Weinstein, in UN Sec Council, 2003:232; Global
Witness Magazine, 2003:97).This well documented appropriation of Congolese resources was not,
foremost, part of a strategy of collective security to rescue/aid an embattled SADC member, as the
Zimbabwe government claimed, but driven by domestic Zimbabwean politics. For the brass, the Congo
provided a treasure trove of patronage; the senior military elite drew vast amounts of capital from their
mining ventures in the DRC.14 For the rank and file, their deployment to DRC literally and figuratively
removed a potential source of threat to the ruling ZANU-PF.
Thus, there was an implicit recognition of the power of the military as a corporate entity and the
risk un-deployed [and underpaid?] soldiers posed as long as they remained in their Zimbabwe barracks.
By giving military elites new economic power directly, and indirectly granting them political power,
lxxv
ZANU-PF gave them a stake in the outcome, both in DRC and in Zimbabwe. Other forms of economic
patronage have been heaped upon members of the military establishment. Given the not outlandish fears
that Zimbabwe‘s deteriorating economic conditions since at least 2000 ―could erode the loyalty of the
security forces to the ZANU-PF regime… the loyalty of senior army officials has been reinforced by
them being provided generous salaries and other benefits such as luxury cars to shield them from
economic conditions.‖(Mawadza, Aquilina, in Institute for Security Studies Accessed 11/29/2007 from:
http://www.issafrica.org/static/templates/tmpl_html.)
According to BBC Monitering International Reports of February 27, 2008 as cited in an article
in Business Day, captioned ―Zimbabwe: Mugabe Gives Army, Teachers ‗Huge; Pay Raises Ahead of
March Poll,‖ in the current environment of runaway inflation, ―Mugabe‘s beleaguered government has
awarded huge pay raises to the army ahead of critical elections [in March 2008] in a bid to calm the
restless military‖ intelligence agents received increases as well. Thus, in an effort ―to ensure loyalty,
Mugabe gives priority to the military at the expense of other ministries. Scott Baldauf, ( 2007:15), noted
that, the military budget, the bulk of which goes to salaries and personnel costs, has been spared many of
the severe cuts seen by other branches of government. In fact, ―taken as a whole, the combined budget
line for defence and security expenditure in Zimbabwe has been ‗second to none‘ since 1980.Martin
R.(2008:45) in, ―Civil Military Relations in Zimbabwe: Is there a Threat?‖ noted that expenditure and
regular increases on the police, militia, war veterans and armed forces has been unequalled compared to
civil service and other productive sectors. Significantly, salary benefits and awards for the security
sector escalated by more than 100% in the run up to the much contested March [2008] presidential
elections. This was against much lower percentages accorded to other groups in the country, according
to Martin Rupiya(2008). Apparently cautious about leaving out any member of the increasingly
extensive security apparatus, in early 2007 the government also increased pensions for War Vets from
$103,000 to $500,000 a month.
In addition to salary increases, various gratuities have also been made available. In mid-2007, for
example, the government was reported to have spent thousands of United States dollars acquiring
luxurious Mazda 3 vehicles for army and police chiefs, at a time when the country has no foreign
currency for essentials such as drugs. Each Mazda cost US $16,607, plus a Zimbabwe dollar top-up of
$200 million. The army chiefs fared even better, receiving Toyota Prados or Mercedes Benzes
depending on their rank, and the government reportedly has acquired hundreds of Toyota Yaris, for the
Central Intelligence Organization (Nkatazo, 2007:5). Of course, senior military officials were also
lxxvi
among the leading beneficiaries of land seizures. The state has given them access to credit to support
their various business interests, however they were acquired. A special Reserve Bank fund gives cheap
unsecured loans to top officers, politburo and central committee and central committee members,
cabinet ministers, judges and parliamentarians to finance farming and business activities. McGreal (2007
) reports that ―some military and political leaders are raking in small fortunes, particularly through the
army‘s foray into the DRC.‖ He explains that ―this is no mere looting spree‖ as the Zimbabwean defence
force has created ―joint-venture and front companies to cream off some of Congo‘s richest mines.‖
All these placed the Zimbabwean military unequivocally in the role of power broker. According
to General Vitalis Zvinavashe-Commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces who posed a thinly-veiled
threat to MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai:
The security organisations will only stand in support of those political
leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs
for thousands of lives lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard-won
independence‖..."[The president] is expected to observe the
objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let
alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda.‖(Peta
Thornycroft and Tim Butcher, 2002:45).
Moreover, the military was even given an explicit role in the administration of elections. Journalist Peta
Thornycroft reported that an exchange of letters in 2002 between the head of the Zimbabwe National
Army and the head of the Zimbabwe Defense forces revealed ―that the country's army ran the nerve
center of [2002‘s] disputed presidential election, in violation of the constitution. The letter from General
Constantine Chiwenga dated March 4th, 2002, five days before Zimbabweans went to the polls to the
head of the defense force, General Vitalis Zvinavashe asking for permission for assignment of three
officers to control the national command center in Harare, before, during and after the [2002]
presidential election. In his reply, the leader of the defense force gives his permission, and says the
arrangement should be speedily concluded (Peta Thornycroft, VOA Feb 5, 2003,)
. The national command center was the headquarters for election logistics, providing ballot boxes,
working with party representatives, providing information for the media and reporting results.It is
normally run by the Election Supervisory Commission, and the Zimbabwe constitution specifically
forbids military personnel from any involvement, except to provide security (Peta Thornycroft, VOA
Feb 5, 2003).
Although, the secondment of military personnel in electoral institutions is expected to be
discontinued for the 2008 polls (ICG, 2008:16), the military‘s broader role as guarantor of election
lxxvii
victories by ZANU-PF and President Mugabe remains intact. In the run up to the March 2008 elections,
which harmonizes presidential and parliamentary elections for the first time, Commissioner of Prisons
Paradzai Zimondi, a retired army major-general, offered similar sentiments. Effectively channeling
Zvinavashe‘s 2002 pronouncement, Zimondi addressed a function marking the promotion by President
Mugabe of 14 senior prison officers by saying
If the opposition wins the [2008] election, I will be the first one to resign
from my job and go back to defend my piece of land. I will not let it go.
We are going to the elections and you should vote for President
Mugabe… I am giving you an order to vote for the president. Do not be
distracted. The challenges we are facing are just a passing phase…I will
only support the leadership of President Mugabe. I will not salute them
[Makoni and Tsvangirai] (Quoted in ―Partisan Statements Erode Public
Trust, Zimbabwe Independent. 07 March 2008).
Peter,K. and Patrick M. (2008), noted that Like Zimondi and others, Army Commander, General
Constantine Chiwenga has warned that he will overturn the constitutional order if President Mugabe
loses, noting in an interview with The Zimbabwe Standard that ‗The army will not support or salute sell-
outs and agents of the West before, during and after the presidential elections.Matikinye, Ray in ―War
Vets Form Army Reserve.” cited in Zimbabwe Independent, March 31, 2007 noted that Robert Mugabe
(the government) has in February 2007, gazetted the Defence (War Veterans Reserve) Regulations
through Statutory Instrument 64/2007 to set up a War Veterans Reserve. The new law incorporates
former combatants into the Zimbabwe National Army as a Reserve Force, thereby formalizing the
position of the president‘s most vociferous military supporters. In a similar vein, the reported
deployment of units of the Presidential Guard in army barracks around the country and suggests that the
government no longer trusts that the army will remain loyal under the present conditions. Yet,
increasingly, even the watchers need watching. Thus President Mugabe is also recruiting people whose
loyalty can be trusted in order to fill vacancies among service personnel created, in part, by desertions
includes the replacement, ironically enough, of his own Presidential Guard with members of his secret
police and filing Army ranks with his party‘s youth militia and aging veterans of the liberation struggle
from the 1970s. (Scott, B, accessed in, The Christian Science Monitor, April 25, 2007.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007).Again, however, the use of counter-balancing signals to both
supporters and would-be opponents alike that they matter politically.
Lastly, the politicization of the military is also evidenced in the range of duties now assigned to
the military. These new obligations now far exceed those ordinarily associated with the armed forces.
lxxviii
For example, among the growing responsibilities Mugabe has given the army includes, the expectation
that it will clean up ‗mistakes‘ by civilians. Among these are, Operation Maguta, which sought to revive
the agricultural sector in the wake of its collapse following land reform, and Operation Garikai, which
charged the military with building housing. This of course followed the widely condemned Operation
Murambatsvina, launched in May 2005, which literally bulldozed thousands of urban residences and
businesses deemed illegal by the state, and in which the military also played a role( OxResearch: April
20, 2006:1)
In sum, from explicit patronage opportunities, to expanded roles in non-traditional functions,
including elections and quasi-ministerial duties typically associated with civilian individuals and
institutions, to, most damningly, explicit declarations of intent to serve the party and the president and
not the state, the military in Zimbabwe has been highly politicized. Governance in Zimbabwe
increasingly resembles a military apparatus – the ―slow motion emergence of a junta‖ ―Autocratic
Militarism,‖(Sarah B.2005:8) – wherein primary responsibility for economic policy making now lies in
the aptly named Zimbabwe National Security Council (ZNSC), chaired by President Mugabe. This
narrow body has marginalized Zimbabwe‘s longstanding and more inclusive political institutions, such
as the Politburo, the cabinet and the central committee of the party itself. The worldview is decidedly
defensive, and increasingly militaristic. In addition, at least since 2007, all key decisions are now made
either by the president or through the Zimbabwe National Security Council (ZNSC), whose membership
includes many current and former senior military officers who will not question his inflexible, hardline
policies(Sarah B.2005:8). Hence Military backgrounds are increasingly seen as a prerequisite to access
the president‘s inner circle.
The state and ZANU-PF were instrumental in the creation of the paramilitary groups. For
example, when Morgan Tsvangirai and other MDC members were arrested and severely beaten in
March 2007 after an intra-party meeting was disbanded, the calls grew louder (reports of the abuses
were widely circulated internationally). Tsvangirai, who had sustained head injuries and had to be
hospitalized, declared that this was the straw that broke the camel‘s back and that Zimbabweans would
finally rise up to overthrow the Mugabe regime. Although this sense was echoed by observers such as
US Ambassador Michael Dell and reporter Craig Timberg of The Washington Post, such claims appear
to have been wildly exaggerated (ICG, March 2008:17).
In fact, the militarization of politics has severely undermined the capacity of MDC and other
potential centers of opposition in Zimbabwe to challenge the hegemony of the ZANU-PF regime.
lxxix
Notwithstanding its claims to unity, the MDC remains significantly divided; the party split over whether
or not to boycott elections for the newly established 66 member senate in 2005, and has remained
divided into two factions ever since, one led by Arthur Mutambara, the other by Tsvangirai. Running as
an independent, Simba Makoni faces similar obstacles, as discussed earlier (see ICG, March 2008). Civil
Society, once vibrant, is substantially cowed, and closely monitored.
Leading activists have been silenced, through arrest, intimidation or de facto exile. Indeed,
MDC‘s main supporters in civil society from the ZCTU, the NCA, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Committee,
the remaining independent media (namely the Zimbabwe Independent and The Standard newspapers),
ZimRights, and many others, are continually threatened with harassment and intimidation, or in some
cases, possible takeover by the state. At the same time, the vast majority of the population is focused,
quite understandably, on subsistence. More than 700,000 Zimbabweans was dispossessed by 2005‘s
Operation Murambatsvina (see ICG, March 2008).
Eric Bloch (2006:5) noted that the ZNSC had taken over the operations of the Zimbabwe
Revenue Authority (ZIMRA). In addition, Oxford Research of April 20, 2006 reported that ―the
national railways, national parks, and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NocZim) are all run by
former security men,‖ whereas the now pervasive militias often play a more sinister role. Freedom
House reports ―war veterans and ZANU-PF militants operate as de facto enforcers of government
policies – including land redistribution – and have committed human rights abuses such as assault,
torture, rape, extralegal evictions, and extralegal executions without fear of punishment (Freedom
Watch: 2007:18).
Maroleng (2005:7) reported that President Mugabe appears to be increasingly reliant upon
members of his own Zezuru sub-group. This Zezuru sum game can be seen as a move by Mugabe and
his close associates within this faction to address their security dilemma by gaining total dominance.
Placing trusted faction members in strategic positions would provide protection from political rivals and
from threat of prosecution in the future. In fact, Mugabe has assigned key posts to members or allies of
the Zezuru-led faction of powerful former army general Solomon Mujuru, and placed members of the
security establishment in strategic civil service positions. A glaring example of this is the fact that
Mugabe has given [Didymus] Mutasa (Minister for State Security) the responsibility to manage a new
government taskforce that oversees the import and distribution of food in the country (Maroleng
2005:7).
According to International Crisis Group, cited in Africa Report No. 132, 18 September 2007: 6,
lxxx
at a lower level, youth militias are another avenue for the militarization of the state. ZANU-PF has
deployed some 10,000 youth militia and war veterans in rural areas to deny the opposition access to a
significant part of the electorate. This is particularly problematic in advance of the March 2008
elections. Yet it is likely that the war veterans and their allies will continue to play a role in prolonging
Mugabe‘s rule (Africa Report, 2007: 6). Since the beginning of 2007, war veterans, who campaign for
Mugabe in the party and the countryside at election time, have been formally constituted as a reserve
force under defence ministry control, with a monthly wage. Their loyalty and that of the military make it
difficult for ZANU-PF dissidents to stage a successful coup against Mugabe. Despite sharply
diminishing patronage resources, ZANU has attempted to service these core constituencies. For
example, Brian (2007:6) reported that, Zimbabwe‘s central bank has doubled salaries for youth militia
squads employed to monitor prices in shops to Z$1.2 million per month, a figure more than ten times the
monthly salaries of teachers and doctors.
However the salaries of national service youths are more than 20 times what trained junior
members of the uniformed forces who pay tax are being given per month. There have been reports that
these youths have unleashed a reign of terror around the country as they beat up and harassed
businessmen and informal traders whom they accused of inflating prices in a bid to sabotage the
government (Chihuri, 2006:19). Additionally, Project Sunrise has seen the introduction of nation-wide
roadblocks and stricter border patrols involving ZIMRA, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and ―The
Youth‖ to investigate the illegal export and import of local currency. $10 trillion (US $40 million) – 22
per cent of the money in circulation [is] unaccounted for,( Maroleng, C. cited in African Security
Review, 2007:Vol. 15 No 4).
Based on the evidence from the foregoing analysis, we accept and validated our earlier working
hypothesis and restate to read that the Zimbabwean socio-politico cum economic, and food crisis has a
relationship with the character of the governance, military, and politics.
lxxxi
CHAPTER THREE: HUNGER AND POLITICS, ECONOMIC REFORM,
ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIVAL PROGRAMME, AND
CRISIS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE
3.1 Zimbabwe’s Inheritance: Hunger and Politics.
The correlation between hunger and politics is increasingly becoming more manifest, especially
in Africa and the Third World. On the political front, factors which have exacerbated the famine
situation in Africa include armed conflict, corruption and the mismanagement of the economy. There are
also arguments that global trade policies are playing an increasingly leading role in causing hunger in
Africa. Food security is threatened by GATT and its protectionist policies. Serious inequalities in world
agriculture trade and Western policies have had a devastating impact on agriculture producers in the
South.
Hunger in Zimbabwe cannot be understood outside colonialism. Colonialism produced a racially
skewed land ownership structure where 50% of the best land was owned by the minority white while
Africans were expelled from their choice of land and through systematic land segregation policies, were
squashed in reserves, most of them with poor soil quality or located far away from water and the major
lines of communication. Major laws relating to land were passed to legalize the racial character of the
colonial state (John, R. 2003:13).
In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act was passed and divided the land into racial blocks, giving
Whites the better half of the land. In 1951, the Land Husbandry Act was passed whose intention was to
lxxxii
divide the African population into farmers and non-farmers and those blacks temporary working in the
cities or on European farms were deprived of their land rights. The Land Husbandry Act greatly
undermined the African economic security in rural areas without creating any alternative means of
livelihood. In 1969, the white government passed the Land Tenure Act which increased the proportion
of land reserved for white occupation (Maroleng, C. 2005:45). Thousands of Africans continued to be
evicted from white farming areas. In short, all the land laws converted black farmers from successful
and enterprising people growing a surplus of food into impoverished subsistence farmers in
overcrowded reserves, practicing inefficient agricultural techniques. It is against this background that
Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980.
Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 after 15 years of internal civil war(John, R. 2003:13).
Zimbabwe‘s political independence was a result of the Lancaster House Constitution signed in London
on 17 December 1979. With the signing of the Lancaster House Constitution, a new democratic and
multi-racial society emerged in Zimbabwe. A Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary were included
in the new constitution. Despite all these changes, continuity with the past was still evident mainly
through the disproportionate number of reserved white seats and land compensation clause. The
constitution established an unfeasible system of market transfer and did not resolve the nature of
colonial responsibility ( http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
This prevented the government from enacting any law that would revoke Section 16 of the
Constitution, which deals with protection from deprivation of property within the first 10 years of
independence. This meant that for 10 years the government could only purchase land against the
owner‘s wishes if it was underutilized or required for a public purpose. Indeed, the new constitution was
seen as a liability by the ZANU leader Robert Mugabe as seen in these remarks:
Yes, even as I signed the document…I was not a happy
man at all.I felt we had been cheated to some
extent…that we had agreed to a deal which would to
some extent rob us of the victory we had hoped to have
achieved in the field( http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
Thus Zimbabwe‘s independence was obtained as a consequence of a negotiated settlement rather than
a final takeover of power. This fact has influenced the political and economic outcome of Zimbabwe.
The introduction of the multiple currency system has had major repercussions on many sectors of
Zimbabwe‘s economy. The United States dollar, commonly referred to as Obamas, is the most used
currency as the rand and other currencies are hard or impossible to come by now
lxxxiii
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). It is an incontestable verity that politics and business are inseparable.
The Global Political Agreement, through the Short Term Economic Recovery Program (STERP), which
informs the very basis of Zimbabwe‘s economic revival efforts is presently susceptible to
violation.Thus,the ideology behind the neo-liberal economic reform is a structured ideological response
of an organized corporate and technocratic class whose interests are well served by the asymmetrical
opportunities and outcomes of global capitalism, and a set of policy preference based on a normative
and prescriptive view of social reality (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). the imposition of new policies
and institution occurs because international technocrats invade domestic policy making area as, directly
or through domestic acolytes who share their world view and language and introduce powerful
ideologies and conditionalties in support of change ( Amadi, 2005: 8-18).
3.2 The Politicization of Land, and Land Reform in Zimbabwe, and Root Cause of Hunger.
Land in the Post-Colonial State.
Zimbabwe‘s land reform was market-oriented from the beginning. Land reform in post-
independent Zimbabwe can be separated into three main periods: the early 1980s saw the government
purchasing land on a ―willing buyer, willing seller‖ basis with co-financing from the British
government. Between 1980-1998, approximately 3.5 million hectares were redistributed in this manner.
The government put a lot of effort in land settlement, with the creation of the Ministry of Lands and
Resettlement. The mid-1980s to mid-1990s, land reform took a back seat due to government‘s
preoccupation with economic revival under the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the mid-
1990s and onwards saw the politicisation of land reform (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). Land
increasingly became a major political issue tied to the constitutional reform campaigns and the General
election (Maroleng, C. 2005:45).
In the early 1990s, an alliance of the labour and students began to openly question the hegemonic one
party state advocated by ZANU-PF. Two political parties were formed in this period – ZUM in 1989 and
the Forum Party of Zimbabwe (FORUM) in 1993 (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
lxxxiv
However, this did not pose a threat to the government as they lost momentum a few years after
formation. They were not in existence by the time the 1995 General Elections were held (Maroleng, C.
2005:47).However, it was the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998 that
changed the political face of Zimbabwe and made government become even more antagonistic. The
NCA was a grouping of a number of civic groups which included human rights organisations, churches,
women‘s groups, opposition parties, media and labour. Its main objective was to lobby the government
and the general public for a broader popular process of constitutional reform.
The formation of the NCA saw civil society begin to occupy a meaningful space in the national
discourse and public sphere. Apart from demanding for a new Constitution, the NCA began to question
the government‘s very legitimacy in the face of increasing economic decline
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). The NCA in collaboration with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU) among other alternative groupings propelled the formation of a new political
movement, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999. The leadership of the
new party represented a combination of trade unionist and leaders from the NCA. In late 1999, the MDC
began to make inroads into rural areas through trade union and NCA structures
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). This meant that the rural people, traditional support base of ZANU-PF,
began to receive alternative political messages.
Faced with a mounting political challenge, the government responded in many ways. As a result
of the successful NCA constitutional process, President Mugabe was forced to set up his own
constitutional commission on 29 April 1999. After the formation of the MDC, the government launched
a deluge of abuse on the opposition, calling them puppets controlled by whites and the western world. It
was also at this time that the discourse of land resurfaced in the public sphere. ZANU PF‘s campaign
slogan during the whole constitutional debate and thereafter the General elections held in June 2000 was
―LAND IS THE ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMY IS LAND.‖ It was thus land that provided the
central ideological theme for ZANU-PF and this was employed to garner support and gain legitimacy
from the rural populace (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). The government termed the struggle for land
as the Third Chimurenga (The Third Revolution). Anyone who opposed the governments‘ view of the
land issue was viewed as an enemy and against nationalistic aspirations. The MDC was the target of this
diatribe as articulated by the ruling party newspaper:
lxxxv
That their ties with ex-Rhodesians and Western powers who
have been working against the realisation of our people‘s
aspirations and goals such as land reform is clear testimony
that they are enemies of our revolution. To be more precise,
they are puppets of these imperialists who want to re-colonise
Zimbabwes( http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
Land Invasions
The political face of Zimbabwe changed dramatically in February 2000 when Zimbabweans
went to vote in a referendum for a new constitution. This was the first referendum to be held in
independent Zimbabwe. 53% of the population voted ―NO‖ to the government-sponsored constitution.
The government blamed the referendum defeat on the minority white community and the Western
world. Robert Mugabe said a few weeks after the referendum-―Their mobilizing, actually coercing their
labour force on the farms to support the one position opposed to government, has exposed them as not
our friends, but enemies…we are full of anger. Our entire community is angry and that is why we now
have the war veterans seizing land‖ ( http://www.afrika.no/noop/file)
On 26 February 2000, a combination of war veterans, unemployed ZANU-PF youths and other
members of the party began a series of violent land occupations throughout the country. Government
and army trucks were used to transport these people to the farms. The farm invasions had a devastating
effect on the white commercial sector, the main producer of food in the country. The farm invasions
increased as the country was nearing the crucial General Elections in June 2000
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). Initially, the government told the international world that the land
invasions were as a result of land-hungry peasants denied access to land by the white commercial
farmers. However, it became quite obvious that the government was using land as its last trump card to
win the hearts and minds of voters for the elections. The Police Commissioner, Augustine Chihuri
unknowingly confirmed that the land invasions were used for political legitimacy when asked to stop the
violent land invasions, he said ―It is a political issue…what do you expect the police to do?...Talk to the
politicians about it‖ (in http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
The land discourse increasingly became racialised. The land invasions led to deaths of many
supporters of the MDC and some white farmers. The first farmer to be killed was David Stevens, who
was also an MDC organizer in Macheke, a small farming community in Mashonaland East. His death
was followed by the killing before the General Elections of 35 MDC supporters, including 5 white
lxxxvi
commercial farmers, human rights violations of approximately18, 000 people. The violations included
assaults, property damage, detention, abduction, death threats and displacement from home areas.
There is no issue in Africa today that has divided the African progressives as much as the
Zimbabwean crisis. While the international community, led by the United Kingdom condemned the
violent land invasions, Robert Mugabe justified it by saying that he was correcting historical imbalances.
He depicted the crisis as a struggle by Zimbabwe to gain its rightful heritage against colonial power
acting on the behalf of the white community to protect their interest. He blamed the whites for their
refusal to cooperate with the government and attacked them for their entrenched colonial attitudes and
their vestigial attitudes from the Rhodesian yesteryears- attitudes of master race, master colour, master
owner and master employer ( http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
Britain‘s intransigence and overt intervention in Zimbabwe‘s affairs did not change Mugabe‘s
behaviour, but made him even more critical of external intervention and gave him the opportunity to
dismiss and attack his critics as agents of imperialism. His arguments somehow struck a positive cord in
many hearts of African people. They praised him for standing up to the former colonial masters and
giving back land to the black people. The ―new nationalism‖ espoused by Mugabe was reinforced by the
support he got from other African Heads of government and some African-Americans and given
immense publicity by such magazines as the New African which is widely distributed all over Africa
and the world. Mugabe strengthened his support in southern African region by articulating the land
question in Zimbabwe as part of a broader regional and continental struggle against a colonial legacy
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
There is no doubt that Zimbabwe has had diplomatic successes in propagating land and
Zimbabwe relations with the former colonial power Britain as the core of the crisis. Mugabe‘s
attendance at the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in September 2002 and his
famous speech on 2nd
September showed that a dangerous form of pan-africanism and solidarity was
emerging on the continent. Dangerous because in Zimbabwe gross human rights abuses have been
committed in the name of land reform and many of those killed and tortured were supporters of the
opposition. The violence was enacted in the name of anti-colonial land reclamation. Dangerous again
because the ―pan-africanism‖ espoused by the ruling party in Zimbabwe is radically racist, reminiscent
of the liberation war rhetoric (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
Accesses to food and basis social security are basic human rights regardless of political
affiliation, race, gender and ethnicity (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). However, in Zimbabwe in the
lxxxvii
past year, the land reform programme, coupled with economic mismanagement and poor governance
have exacerbated the current hunger caused to some extent by the regional drought. This has jeopardized
Zimbabwe‘s food security. The government seizure of almost all productive farms formerly owned by
white commercial farmers has significantly reduced food production in the country.
To make matters worse, government is using food as a political weapon
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). Food is being used to buy support. And maize meal and other staple
food, is often distributed only to those with membership cards of the ruling party. The denial of food to
opposition strongholds has in some cases replaced overt violence as the government‘s principle tool of
repression. Grain is now milled almost exclusively by ruling party members and shipped to shop owners
who are known as party faithful. Government has declared a monopoly on food importation, making it
difficult for business, church groups and civil society organizations to distribute food freely and openly.
Seizures of food by para-state groups, particularly in politically volatile areas, have been widespread
(http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
In short, politics in Zimbabwe, via the chaotic land reform, has worsened the hunger situation in
the country. The political drama of Zimbabwe was played prominently on the international media scene.
The international media depicted the growing crisis in Zimbabwe as solely a land issue. They depicted
the land issue in racial terms and in most cases failed to articulate the Zimbabwean crisis not only as a
land issue, but as a crisis of legitimacy and governance. The most vulnerable group in the whole land
reform process has been the 1.5 million black farm workers who have been displaced. However, the
international media, especially in the UK, concentrated on the plight of hundreds of white farmers
forced off their land. The twin issues of race and property rights in Zimbabwe were brought into sharp
focus by the international media at the expense of the gross human rights violations suffered by the
majority black people (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file). At the centre of the land reform programme in
Zimbabwe has been a struggle by a political party to retain power at any cost.
The effect of all this is that some sections of the international media have played right into the
hands of the government by giving the government the excuse that opposition to the land reform is tied
to Western interests. Mugabe has successfully portrayed within the region the perception that the
opposition MDC, civil society organizations in Zimbabwe and the international media are fronts for
championing white minority colonial interests in Zimbabwe. Many people asked why the international
media and the Western governments had remained quite and unconcerned when the Mugabe regime
killed approximately 10,000 black people and tortured thousands more during the Matebeleland Crisis
lxxxviii
in the early 1980s and yet the deaths of 5 white farmers in 2000 made headline news and changed the
course of international policy towards Zimbabwe (http://www.afrika.no/noop/file).
3.3 National Economic Reform Programme and the Zimbabwean Crisis.
Many in the world place the blame of the collapse of Zimbabwe‘s once stable economy on
Robert Mugabe. Among the issues usually cited are Mugabe‘s land policies, endemic corruption,
Zimbabwe‘s involvement in the DRC war, absence of the rule of law, and other ill-conceived economic
policies. It is also argued that Mugabe‘s political intolerance, electoral fraud and gross human rights
abuses have contributed to the country‘s economic malaise. Indeed, it is true that each one of these
often cited factors has contributed, or provides an explanation to Zimbabwe‘s current economic
problems (Tawanda, H. 2009:78). However, western countries and media almost collectively ignore one
other significant factor responsible for the country‘s economic collapse, that is, economic sanctions
imposed by the US, the EU, and Australia against Zimbabwe (Tawanda, H. 2009:78). Given that
Mugabe‘s often cited and main transgression, which has given rise to the country‘s international
isolation, was his forcible expropriation of farmland owned by the country‘s white farmers, and the
implications of his actions for the respect of private property rights and investments in the region, this
collective amnesia is hardly surprising. It is often argued that the sanctions in place against Zimbabwe
are not economic in nature; rather, the argument goes, there is in existence a regime of smart sanctions,
which targets specific ZANU PF loyalists (Ndlovu, 2007:8).
This is not true. Zimbabwe‘s economic woes are the direct result of a concerted and systematic
campaign to effect regime change through an economic implosion. Zimbabwe has a critical shortage of
foreign currency. However for the past four years or so, Zimbabwe has been unable to obtain finance or
credit facilities from international lenders to inject into the economy. And this is a direct consequence of
a sanctions regime imposed against the Zimbabwe by particularly the US, and the EU. That Mugabe is
an evil, brutal; dictator that needs to be removed from office is not in doubt. It is however immoral to
cause the removal of Mugabe from office by precipitating the collapse of a developing, only recently
independent, now famine-ravished African country through an economic sanctions regime (Tawanda H.
2009:78).
The on-going political and economic crisis in Zimbabwean dates back to 1997, a time the
international financial institutions (IFIs ),especially, the IMF and World bank specifically withheld an
essential balance of payments facility with a view to reducing government spending, which in turn, will
lxxxix
force the government to accelerate privatization, and renew the structural adjustment program (Ndlovu,
2007:8).
For Zimbabwe specifically, it seems all these have converged in causing the looming socio-
political-cum food crisis. However, there are at least three deeply-rooted interrelated long-term factors
and one additional proximate which converge to explain the paths the political and economic trends
socio-political-cum food crisis. These three interrelated long-term factors have both internal-structural
dimension (Zimbabwe‘s incendiary combination of economic decline, social dislocation, and, most
importantly, a politicized military), and external institutional dimension. Thus, one way of
understanding the political and economic trends that has characterized the state of the Zimbabwean
nation without an inevitable sense of detraction from the political economy of the Zimbabwean crisis, is
by focusing the analysis on both the character and the contradictions in both the domestic and
international political system, and on the place which nations occupy in the international division of
labour and production (Kriger, 2003:46).
The first centers on unresolved disparities over economy and land. This ―incomplete liberation‖
meant that there was a reservoir of populist resentment, which, though long dormant, could be tapped
and mobilized by opportunistic politicians and other actors. Indeed, this contributed to long term
dissatisfaction among military and proto-military elements in society (Kriger, 2003:50). A second key
variable is the lack of accountability that characterized the ZANU regime from its inception. Beginning
in 1980, when ZANU won the vast majority of contested seats in Zimbabwe‘s first-ever democratic
elections, the party under the leadership of prime minister, later president, Mugabe became increasingly
dominant. After 1987, Zimbabwe had established a de facto one-party state. It maintained its
hierarchical structure, with power concentrated in the president and a handful of executive-level and
party institutions, such as the politburo, Central Committee and, perhaps a distant third, the cabinet (
Bauer and Taylor, 2005:105). The incorporation of ZANU‘s rival and leading opposition party, ZAPU,
through a merger in 1987 essentially foreclosed the prospect of any potent political competition in the
country for the next dozen years (Sylvester, 1995:5). By definition, power is not diffused in a single-
party predominant system. This type of governing structure has the tendency of rendering the
Zimbabwean state particularly susceptible to militarization.
The proximate cause of the economic collapse was the invasions of mainly white and opposition-
owned commercial farms, which began in February 2000, and which, in turn, led to the destruction of
agricultural sector. Some 4,000 mostly white commercial farmers have been displaced, as lands were
xc
seized and reapportioned to cronies of the regime. In addition, an estimated 350,000 black farm workers
and their families also were disgorged (Sylvester, 1995:7), and inflation accelerating at a very rapid rate,
the commercial sector and service industries are feeling the effects of sharp declines in domestic
purchasing power.
Zimbabwe which was a major exporter of commercial crops, and self-sufficient in food
production, today agricultural production is down precipitously and the people have recurrent need of
emergency food aid. Since many of the once highly productive, mechanized and irrigated large-scale
properties are now idle or operating at a fraction of their capacity, many of the so-called ―trophy farms‖
are now owned by elites who are not commercial farmers by vocation (Sylvester, 1995:8). The result is a
50 percent reduction in overall agricultural output, and chronic shortages in key staples, such as maize.
Faced with such laissez faireism from the state, the so-called settler class responded in kind with
complacency of its own. As subsequent events would reveal, however, the state was later able to
manipulate to its advantage the image of a white populace enjoying the perquisites of a colonial lifestyle
as a pretext for racism and the confiscation of white owned commercial farms. White Zimbabweans are
often portrayed as victims of brutality and appropriation by a deranged regime (Ndlovu, 2007:8).
. White commercial farmers who were displaced by the land invasions from 2000-2004 and
whose lost productive capacity directly contributed to the country‘s macroeconomic decline.
The above exposition foregrounds the internal and structural dimension of the socio-economic
cum political crisis in Zimbabwe (Ndlovu, 2007:8).
. Yet there are external and structural dimension from which, the analyst can argue that, the on-
going political and economic crisis in Zimbabwean contributed to the current and future development
needs which dates back to 1997, a time in which the government faced rising pressures from the IFIs to
reduce government spending, accelerate privatization, and renew the structural adjustment program,
ESAP, and the IMF specifically withheld an essential balance of payments facility.Thus,the political and
economic environment in the country was particularly fragile.
Once the Zimbabwean economy was driven down the road of economic liberalization, known in
Zimbabwe as ESAP, after seven years of experimentation, several historically strong sectors were under
threat as Zimbabwean manufacturers found out that they could not compete in the liberalized trade
environment prescribed by the IFIs and donors, who had to, out of necessity bail them out of the
economic quagmire (The Economist, 2007:56). Having experienced eight years of recession,
xci
Zimbabwe‘s economy shrunk by more than one third since 1999. More recently, GDP declines have still
averaged a staggering 6 percent per year between 2002-2006, and this ―slower‖ pace results only from
the fact that the economy is running out of ways to contract (The Economist, 2007:56).
Apart from man-made policy-induced problems, farmers at the smaller end of the scale were
buffeted by the effects of two major droughts in 1992 and again in 1995, in addition to a rising cost of
finance and inputs. Given the vertical division of labour among the white and black Zimbabwean
farmers, the black large-scale farmers were, therefore, on the verge of bankruptcy. This brought about a
downward trend in the formal sector employment, hence wages became stagnant, leading to an increased
union activism for the first time in independent Zimbabwe‘s history (Carmody and Taylor, 2002:45;
Bond and Manyanya, 2002:87).
Government‘s decision to nationalise nearly all of the country‘s commercial farms has led to a
sharp decline in export earnings as well as food production. The need to pay for substantial food imports
has intensified the impact of reduced foreign earnings, while the policy choices in general have
prompted foreign banks to withdraw credit lines and most aid donors to suspend their Zimbabwe
operations (Carmody and Taylor, 2002:45).
Balance of payments support is not available because the IMF and World Bank disapprove of the
government‘s policies and because Zimbabwe is in arrears with its repayment commitments to these
bodies. The country is also in arrears in its payments to the suppliers of a variety of essential imports,
among which the fuel and electricity suppliers are the more obvious. As these and other cuts have bitten
deeper into business efficiency, creditors in other economic fields have felt the need to further reduce
their exposure. Thousands of exporting companies also face uncertainties, partly because their foreign
customers are concerned about continuity of supply. Producers requiring allocations of foreign exchange
for the imports needed to produce the exports await evidence that the Reserve Bank‘s share-out of scarce
foreign currency earnings will be fair and sustainable (Carmody and Taylor, 2002:48).
This has forced the Zimbabwean government to devalue its currency, though the government has
been able to avoid the use of the word ‗devaluation‘. Thus, the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank now pays
Z$800 for every US dollar it receives, no explanation is offered by the Reserve Bank on how it will
provide for the loss of Z$745 it will incur on every dollar taken by the government. This translated to a
total loss of US$10 million every month, or Z$7,45 billion a month (Carmody and Taylor, 2002:45). It
has affected productivity. Provisional figures for the final quarter of 2002 show that manufacturing
output for the whole year declined by 16,4% compared to the volume produced in 2001. Manufacturing
xcii
output has fallen every year since government announced its intention to nationalise commercial
farming land in 1997.On April 16 2003, fuel prices were increased again, this time by much bigger
margins. In February, the petrol price had been increased by 95% and the diesel price by 80%, but these
adjustments fell a long way short of the amounts needed to close the gap. In April, the increases were
210% for leaded petrol and 67,5% for diesel (IMF, 2005:305).
The introduction of price controls in November and the imposition of a price freeze in December
have brought the supply of a wide range of finished goods to local stores almost to a stop. Exchange rate
is in disarray as each importer is now required to apply for a foreign exchange allocation which is far-
from-adequate current earnings, from which 50% has already been captured by government for its own
use. The balance has to be shared between private sector companies and most of the parastatal
organizations, all of which are paying Z$848 for each US dollar‘s worth of hard currency (IMF,
2005:314).
With an estimated poverty rate of at 80 percent by the IMF has (2005 Statistical Appendix),
Zimbabwe has become an international pariah, at least vis-à-vis the OECD countries. All these are
happening after Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since its independence from settler rule in 1980 till
date. Although never a fully fledged democracy, in most conceptions of the term, during that period,
Zimbabwe has gone from multiparty state in the 1980s, to dominant one party state in the 1990s to
autocracy in the 2000s (IMF, 2005:308).
Finally, it appears Zimbabwe is becoming a serious threat to the stability of the whole Southern
African region. As such changes to the current policy mix are essential which will include a return to the
rule of law based upon acceptable property rights, and a reversal of provisions in the land reform
programme that made land free and distributable by political patronage. It is, however, only a moot
point whether politically, the ruling party could meet these demands.
To address these issues, government published its National Economic Revival Programme in
March. This document is the result of discussions that were triggered by the threats posed to the business
sector by the changes announced in the 14 November 2002 budget. Government rejected the initial
submissions by business organisations, which had concentrated mainly on the inflexibility of the
exchange rate policy statement in the budget, but this response did prompt wider-ranging discussions
between government, the business organisations and labour movements (IMF, 2005). In the three
months that followed, the Minister‘s budget speech, resulted in the National Economic Revival
Programme.This incorporated the changed exchange rate policy already described.
xciii
3.4 The Economic Sanctions and Food Crisis in Zimbabwe.
Given the role of the close link between agriculture, increased production, employment, feeding
and health, national growth and economic development, foreign food aid is a key issue among states,
and probably the most politicized realm of international relations (Ndlovu, 2007:17). With reference to
the developing nations, common means by which one-nation exploits, and one that is relevant to
Zimbabwe, and other food –insecure nations, is exploitation through foreign food aid, especially, when
the terms aid are set by one nation or group of nations, in a manner that is entirely advantageous to one
nation, and detrimental to the other, or others.
Another way in which food can be linked to security is when it is used as a "weapon" or even a
tool for gaining political leverage of some sort. In some cases, governments will use food as a weapon—
by restricting its access, for instance—against segments of its own population, such as political
opposition groups (FAO. 2007:56). In Sri Lanka, for example, several hundred Tamils recently
demonstrated in the northern Vanni region against what they alleged to be an official government policy
of restricting food supplies to the region. In contrast, some governments may assure access to food in
exchange for promises of political support (FAO. 2007:56). In Indonesia, for instance, the ruling Golkar
Party has reportedly engaged in "food politicking" by handing out bags of rice and money in exchange
for political support. (Ndlovu, 2007:15). For instance, in the case of North Korea, the current North
Korean regime has sought to consolidate its power by restricting food aid to its population out of
concern that such aid might result in some degree of "foreign penetration" of the country which could
somehow threaten the regime‘s absolute hold over the country (Ndlovu, 2007:17).
The above background explains how food aid has increasingly become a major if not the most
important tool in the dynamics of international power and diplomacy as it is being used to/or in
furtherance of wider national objectives. Under these circumstances, the question of food—who has it
and who can produce it—can become a legitimate strategic consideration because food can be an
effective weapon in the relations between nation-states (IMF, 2005:113). For example, food may
become a subject for international economic sanctions; when a nation that is a major food producer
refuse to sell grain to another country in order to assert its own power and perhaps even influence the
policies of other countries. Similarly, a food exporting country might use its abundant food resources as
a means of tempering relations with a foreign power that might otherwise be acrimonious (IMF, 2005).
Some have argued that the former Soviet Union‘s reliance on American food imports during the Cold
xciv
War helped strengthen relations between the two adversaries—despite their obvious and extensive
political differences.
Clearly, a mixture of climatic, economic or political factors have conspired to challenge
Zimbabwe as well as Africa‘s food security. For instance, increased farming for use in biofuels,global
population growth change, loss of agricultural land to residential and industrial development, and
growing consumer demand in China and India (FAO, 2008:322), among other variables are the
correlates that have pushed up the price of food.Hence,food riots have recently taken place in many
countries across the world.
3.5 The First Millennium Development Goal and Food Security in Zimbabwe.
The First Millennium Development Goal objective is to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty,
and agricultural productivity is likely to play a key role if it is to be reached on time. The MDG (1) call
for about 50 percent reduction of hunger and poverty by 2015 in relation to 1990, is a collective
approach based on agriculture to achieve food security.
The World Food Summit was held in Rome in 1996, with the aim of renewing global
commitment to the fight against hunger. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) called the summit in response to widespread under-nutrition and growing concern about the
capacity of agriculture to meet future food needs. The conference produced two key documents, the
Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action. The Rome
Declaration calls for the members of the United Nations to work to halve the number of chronically
undernourished people on the Earth by the year 2015 (FAO, 2003:144). The Plan of Action sets a
number of targets for government and non-governmental organizations for achieving food security, at
the individual, household, national, regional and global levels.
Globally enough food is produced to feed the entire world population at a level adequate to
ensure that everyone can be free of hunger and fear of starvation. That no one should live without
enough food because of economic constraints or social inequalities is the basic goal. This approach is
often referred to as food justice and views food security as a basic human right (FAO, 2003:146). It
advocates fairer distribution of food, particularly grain crops, as a means of ending chronic hunger and
malnutrition .The core of the Food Justice movement is the belief that what is lacking is not food, but
the political will to fairly distribute food regardless of the recipient‘s ability to pay (FAO, 2003:146).
Eradicating hunger and poverty requires an understanding of the ways in which these two
injustices interconnect, that is, the agriculture-hunger-poverty nexus. Hunger, and malnourishment that
xcv
accompanies it, prevents poor people from escaping poverty because it diminishes their ability to learn,
work, and care for themselves and their family members. Food insecurity exists when people are
undernourished as a result of the physical unavailability of food, their lack of social or economic access
to adequate food, and/or inadequate food utilization. Food-insecure people are those individuals whose
food intake falls below their minimum calorie (energy) requirements, as well as those who exhibit
physical symptoms caused by energy and nutrient deficiencies resulting from an inadequate or
unbalanced diet or from the body's inability to use food effectively because of infection or disease
(FAO, 2003:148). An alternative view would define the concept of food insecurity as referring only to
the consequence of inadequate consumption of nutritious food, considering the physiological utilization
of food by the body as being within the domain of nutrition and health. Malnourishment also leads to
poor health (FAO, 2003) hence individuals fail to provide for their families. If left unaddressed, hunger
sets in motion an array of outcomes that perpetuate malnutrition, reduce the ability of adults to work and
to give birth to healthy children, and erode children's ability to learn and lead productive, healthy, and
happy lives. This truncation of human development undermines a country's potential for economic
development – for generations to come.
There are strong, direct relationships between agricultural productivity, hunger, and poverty
(FAO, 2003:144). Three-quarters of the world's poor live in rural areas and make their living from
agriculture. Hunger and child malnutrition are greater in these areas than in urban areas. Moreover, the
higher the proportion of the rural population that obtains its income solely from subsistence farming
(without the benefit of pro-poor technologies and access to markets), the higher the incidence of
malnutrition. Therefore, improvements in agricultural productivity aimed at small-scale farmers will
benefit the rural poor first. Increased agricultural productivity enables farmers to grow more food, which
translates into better diets and, under market conditions that offer a level playing field, into higher farm
incomes (FAO, 2003:144). With more money, farmers are more likely to diversify production and grow
higher-value crops, benefiting not only themselves but the economy as a whole.
Yet despite the World Food Summit of 1996 held in Rome and both the Rome Declaration on
World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action, the attainment of the declared First
Millennium Development Goal objective of eradicating extreme hunger and poverty, food insecurity is
still the norm ,rather than the exception in the developing nations (FAO, 2003).
As a result, World-wide around 852 million men, women and children are chronically hungry
due to extreme poverty, while up to 2 billion people lack food security intermittently due to varying
xcvi
degrees of poverty (source: FAO, 2003). More than half of the planet's population, numbering
approximately 3.3 billion people, lives in urban areas as of November 2007. Any disruption to farm
supplies may precipitate a food crisis in a relatively short time. The ongoing global financial meltdown
has affected farm credits, in spite of the irony of booming commodity prices. The crisis-ridden global
financial structure will only exacerbate multiple foreclosures, credit defaults and, ultimately, incidences
of poverty. A direct relationship exists between food consumption levels and poverty.
According to FAO (2008:14-27) the number of people without enough food to eat on a regular
basis remains stubbornly high. Over 840 million people (15% of population) are undernourished. By
2010, this will only reduce to 680 million (10% of world population). This translates to the fact that 18%
of the population in the most vulnerable countries where 3 billion people would live (out of a world
population of about 6.8 billion in 2010) will be vulnerable. The implication is that: a third of children
(nearly 180 million) are malnourished and this may only drop to a quarter worldwide by 2020 and
remain at 40% in South Asia; a third of the people in Sub-Saharan Africa will be food insecure by 2010
while the population may have doubled from today. Data at the country or local level will most likely
show even greater disparities (FAO (2008:20).
While this may be a general problem for the Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LFDCS),the
proportion of people who are hungry, however, is greater in Africa (33%) than Asia (16%),this is
evident in the latest FAO figures indicating that there are 22 countries, 16 of which are in Africa, in
which the undernourishment prevalence rate is over 35% ( FAO (2008:17).
Thirty five years ago about half the population (1 billion people) of developing countries was
undernourished - today it is under 20% (about 800 million people). During this period cereal yields, total
cereal production and total food production in developing countries more than doubled while the
population increased by 75%. As a result average daily calorie supply increased by a quarter from under
2,000 calories per person per day in the early 1960s to almost 2,500 calories in the mid 1980s, of which
1,500 calories was provided by cereals (Conway, 1997:47). This trend has continued into the mid 1990s
so that the last 30 year period has seen a worldwide 19% per capita increase in food for direct human
consumption with a 32% increase for developing countries as a whole. Today only 10% of the world
population lives in countries with very low per capita food supplies (under 2200 calories) down from
56% in 1969/71 (de Haen, 1998:8).
However, these impressive gains have bypassed a large number of countries and population
groups so that Sub-Saharan Africa is no better and often worse off today than 20 years ago and South
xcvii
Asia is still in a mid- low position as regards per capita food supplies. Nevertheless, considering India
alone we see tremendous advances over the last 50 years - food grain production has increased four fold
(50 to 200 Mt) while population has increased three fold (330 to 960 million) (FAO, 2008:27). These
successes of the Green Revolution should be widely acknowledged but the shortcomings also need to be
recognized. The resource-poor farmers and landless and especially those in marginal areas have not
benefited significantly. The inability of such groups to improve their food security, in spite of substantial
food production gains, is now recognized as a general failure to alleviate poverty within the context of
enhancing agricultural resources so that employment and incomes may increase (Conway, 1997:47).
There are also gender-related causes of food crisis (IFPRI, 1997:90-94). Thus, an aspect of
agriculture which is often ignored is that 60-80% of the staple food production in developing countries is
produced to a large extent by women. Unfortunately, in the past the role of women in local food
production did not receive a sufficiently broad-based recognition so that their inputs were not targeted
by yield-enhancing techniques. Now however, this is changing, albeit slowly (IFPRI, 1997:90) recently
projected food production and consumption to 2020 using their updated IMPACT. They concluded that
there are signs of progress toward a food secure world but prospects are bleak if a business-as-usual
scenario is used - there will be food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. Nevertheless,
worldwide per capita availability of food is projected to increase around 7%. Not a dramatic percentage
increase but certainly significant quantitatively as the population is also predicted to increase to about
7.6 billion (WFP, 2002:405).
The rate of increase in the world's population has declined from 2.0% p.a. prior to 1970 to about
1.4% today. In 1997 the population was estimated at about 5.8 billion and growing by about 80 million a
year (or 1 billion in 12 years) (UNFPA, 1998:44). The 2020 population is predicted to be about 7.6
billion with 90% of the increase occurring in developing countries whose share of the global population
will be 84% (compared to 79% today). The estimates of future population have been declining over the
last decade as population growth rates decline. Lutz et al (1997:1) make a persuasive case that global
population growth is slowing down and that there is a probability of two-thirds that the world's
population will not double into the 21st century. They conclude that the fertility transition is well
advanced in most developing countries and has even started in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1960 woman
gave birth to more than 5 children on average and today only 3. In order to stabilize world population
while maintaining low death rates, births will need to average about 2 children per woman. Attaining
this level will almost certainly take decades. Lutz et.all, median path projection is for 10 billion people
xcviii
in 2050 with a major concern (for them) of a doubling of the world's elderly people (>60 years) (Lutz,
1997:1).
The significant increase in cereal (and some other crop) yields since the 1960s has been analysed
in many publications (see for example Alexandratos, 1995:47; Dyson, 1996:5; Conway, 1997:47).
Doubling and trebling of yields of rice, wheat and maize in both developing and developed countries is
well documented. The so-called Green Revolution where breeding and agronomic practices were
successfully combined undoubtedly improved the standard of living of billions of people. The question
being posed now is whether the yield growth rates of cereals can continue to keep up with population
growth since globally they appear to have lowed down since the mid 1980s - declining from 2.3% p.a. to
about 1.5% p.a. today and possibly only 1% p.a. over the next 25 years. However, the analysis is
complex since developed countries have been decreasing productive capacity due to macroeconomic
policies while in many developing countries where agriculture is of major importance to their economy
they have maintained growth rates of all agricultural produce combined, besides cereals (Conway,
1997:47).
The question of China's food security (where rice yields have increased 2 fold from 1961 to 5t/ha
today) and their possible import requirements received much publicity in 1996 when wheat and maize
prices peaked in May 1996 after China became a substantial net importer in 1995. However, it should be
realized that this peak (in the wheat price at $260/t) was only a third in real terms of the peak price in
1974. The 1996 price move was due to a combination of circumstances and prices have declined by over
half since then (early 1998). An analysis by International Food Policy Research Institute (1997:2) points
out that predictions vary from China being a major cereal exporter to becoming the world‘s largest
importer. IFPRI concludes that china is already a significant player on world food markets and is likely
to become increasingly important. However, it does not represent a major threat to world food markets.
Global projections by IFPRI (1997:48), using a market-driven model indicate that developing
countries as a whole will double their net imports of cereals up to 2020 reaching about 230Mt/p.a. Latin
America will most likely not increase imports but Asia could quadruple imports due to rapid income
growth while Sub-Saharan Africa will increase imports by 150% due to poor food production. This
situation is not thought to be satisfactory by Conway (1997:47) for a number of reasons. Firstly, the
number of undernourished people is unlikely to decrease unless something new is done to increase food
production locally. Many developing countries could not afford to be so dependent on food imports.
Secondly, the model predictions depend on a significant rate of economic growth in developing
xcix
countries highly dependent on the effectiveness of current economic reforms. However, the lack of
infrastructure and institutional obstacles to reform are formidable. Thirdly, continuing increases in crop
yields and production following recent trends are assumed, whereas these have in fact shown a degree of
stagnation possibly due in part to environmental degradation caused by agriculture itself (Conway,
1997:48).
The December 1997 Food Policy Report on the World Food Situation: Recent Developments,
Emerging Issues and Long Term Prospects described the results of their analysis and modeling
projections to 2020 (Andersen, 1997:9). It is concluded that in many developing countries food
production is unlikely to keep pace with increases in demand for food. The food gap could more than,
double in the next 25 years. An increasing share of food demand in developing countries (especially
cereals and meat) will have to be met by imports from developed countries. This will be different for
many low-income countries including most of those in Sub-Saharan Africa which will not be able to
generate the necessary foreign exchange to purchase food on the world market. Many poor people
within these countries will not be able to afford sufficient food (Andersen, 1997:9). The poor could
become more vulnerable to hunger if there is increasing volatility in the world food situation. This could
also be aggravated by the halving of food aid over the last 5 years. Support for agriculture has also
decreased significantly over the last decade. It is predicted that the long-term trend for world cereal and
meat prices will continue downward in real terms. But unless the poor in rural (and urban) areas can
generate the necessary purchasing power they will not benefit from lower prices (Andersen, 1997:12).
Policies and investments in rural areas to improve agricultural productivities and generate income are
essential if food security is to be improved. The focus on agricultural research and policy should be on
low-income developing countries, and particularly small-scale farmers in those countries (Andersen,
1997).
Governments should direct resources toward rural facilities which accelerate broad-based growth
within and outside agriculture. Often agriculture extension and research is inadequately supported and is
not directed to marginal areas where food security problems are prevalent.
About 30 million people are facing hunger in Africa alone. The United Nations, African
governments and relief organizations put the number at about 15 million in the Horn of Africa and over
14 in southern Africa and the rest in the Sahel region of West Africa. (ICG, 2007:13). It is known and
accepted that hunger and famine are mainly caused by drought- this is an indisputable fact.
c
Of the 22 countries, of which 16 are in Africa, in which the undernourishment prevalence rate is
over 35%, Zimbabwe is a peculiar case (ICG, 2007:13). Zimbabwe has experienced serious food
shortages each year since 2001, with up to a third of the populace in need of food aid. Once among
largest sources of formal sector jobs, unemployment in the commercial farming sector is now extreme,
as it is nationally. The destruction of Zimbabwe‘s once impressive urban-industrial infrastructure is
perhaps more striking. Zimbabwe‘s industry, built around policies of import substitution in the 1960s
and seventies, was indisputably damaged by the effects of economic structural adjustment in the 1990s
(Bond Manyanya Carmody, 2002:28).
Furthermore, productivity has virtually ground to a halt under conditions that are fundamentally
inhospitable to business and commerce. Moreover, the collapse is not simply of physical infrastructure,
as institutional and organizational networks have also suffered, and trust has dwindled. Formal
economic activity becomes nearly impossible amidst Zimbabwe‘s capricious policy environment; its
mass exodus of skilled labor, managers and capital, and rampant inflation, which some estimates suggest
is a staggering 100,000 percent annually (ICG, 2007:13).
Not surprisingly, unemployment estimates range from 75 to 85 percent, and poverty is estimated
as high as 90 percent (ICG, 2007:14). Cholera and other preventable diseases are becoming
commonplace as water treatment facilities, not to mention the country‘s once laudable health care
system, has collapsed. Average life expectancy has plummeted, down to 37 for men and just 34 for
women, the lowest in the world (ICG, 2007:13).
Zimbabwe is now facing an unprecedented hunger crisis since independence. The country which
has normally been a food surplus country has seen a sharp deterioration of its food security. Zimbabwe
was a net exporter of maize mainly to neighbouring countries, especially during the drought of 1984,
1992 and 1993.The present hunger crisis in Zimbabwe is due to a combination of factors: erratic
rainfalls, a rapidly declining economy and the negative impact of the government‘s land reform
programme. As a result, today 7,2 million of the 14 million of Zimbabweans do not have enough food.
Of this figure, approximately, 5.5 million are facing starvation.
(http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41502).
In Zimbabwe, the issue of hunger cannot be understood outside the land question. The land
question has proved to be thorny in Zimbabwe and indeed in other settler-dominated colonies such as
Namibia and South Africa. It is a topic of considerable political and moral debate and contention in the
region. Land reform is a central issue in the wider regional political economy and has had a direct effect
ci
on addressing poverty, hunger and underdevelopment. In Zimbabwe the issue of land however has been
linked to the struggle for democracy and good governance. ZANU-PF‘s increasingly eroding legitimacy
in the 1990s gave the ruling party a political space to launch a renewed nationalist ideological assault
around redistributive demands relating to the land question.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD AID, AND EFFORTS OF
GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS FOOD CRISIS.
4.1 Characteristics of Food Aid and Its Implication for Recipient Nations
Food crisis has been greatly exacerbated by the character of food aid, and a series of political
factors. There are Some special characteristics of food aid and their particular implications for food
deficit dependent nation‘s .For instance, first, a number of regulations for the disposal of food aid imply
that it has repercussions on the commercial food and nonfood trade of the recipient countries. Second, a
considerable share of food aid is not provided on a grant basis but rather as long-term soft loans with
related long-term foreign exchange and fiscal implications. Third, concern about the developmental
impact of food aid supplies seems to be increasing. Fourth, food aid is an unstable and insecure source
of supply (IFAD, 2008:95). Food aid tends to have an opportunity cost to the donor countries not only in
the sense that it results from misallocated agricultural resources but also in the sense that it partly
replaces capital aid, which maybe used more effectively in development.
Thus, because of the above outlined character of food aid, recipient countries are continually
facing policy dilemmas as to how to optimize the use of available food aid in both the short and the long
run and how to adjust domestic price policies, given their economic, and possibly political, costs. This
discussion is largely based on the current food aid disposal policies of donor countries. We do not imply
that suppliers should not explore policy improvements. Numerous efforts have been made to persuade
donor countries to adjust food aid supplies to enhance the potential growth, employment, and nutritional
effects in recipient countries. These adjustments include policies to assure a continuous flow of food aid,
viewed as a resource transfer under multi-year commitments, and to provide food aid to stabilize
domestic food availability in less developed countries with short domestic production and depleted
foreign exchange reserves (IFAD, 2008). However, various exogenous factors, such as protection of
agriculture in the United States and Europe and fluctuating international price levels, continue to
determine the availability of food aid to low-income countries.
Food aid distorts incentives to increase agricultural production. An analysis of sixteen
developing countries: Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Ghana, Iran, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philip pines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and Tunisia that achieved
ciii
particularly high growth rates in food production of 3.9 percent during 1961-76 shows that they also
received about 80percent more food aid per capita than the average food aid recipient country (IFAD,
2008). Six of these countries: Brazil, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia received high
amount of food aid over an extended period (IFAD, 2008:97).
Overemphasis on the disincentive effect of food aid can be attributed to simplistic theoretical
reasoning, for example, neglect of the dual structure of markets in most recipient countries. Von Plocki's
in-depth analysis of the Indian case (1979:4) shows the shortcomings of much of the earlier work. He
concluded that an additional 100tons of food aid to India reduced domestic production by only 15 tons.
Food aid in the Brazilian case had a positive effect on government-administered wheat support prices
and production. According to Hall (1978:7), this effect was mostly due to the use of government
revenues from wheat imports to support prices to wheat producers. A similar conclusion was reached by
Stevens (1978) for Tunisia. For Egypt, Braun (1982:5) estimated that food aid (wheat) reduced domestic
wheat production by an amount equivalent to 4 to 9 percent of total food aid. In this case, the change in
wheat production was not equal to reduced farm output because the decrease in production was mainly
from changes in acreage allocation toward other competing crops. In Bangladesh, preliminary results of
a normative model by Norton and Hazell (1984:16) yielded a price elasticity of staple food with respect
to food aid of only —0.013. This result indicates that food aid had relatively little effect on domestic
prices.
Maxwell and Singer (1979:34), in their survey of nine non-India studies of food aid, cite two
countries in which a significant disincentive effect can be identified (Colombia and Pakistan). However,
these countries achieved particularly rapid growth in food production during the 1960s and 1970s
(Pakistan, 4.7 percent; Colombia, 4.2 percent).This is supported by the fact that a number of countries
which had absorbed large amounts of food aid during rapid growth in food production received
significantly less food aid in the 1980s. These included Taiwan, Korea, India, Paraguay, Colombia, and
Brazil. Such cases demonstrate that food aid need not lead to long-term dependence. Taiwan is a
particularly interesting case in terms of the relationship between the disincentive effect of food aid for a
single crop and overall agricultural growth (Lu, 1973:2). The country received high amounts of food aid
(wheat) during the 1950s and 1960s, and agricultural output grew at the exceptional rates of4.6 and 5.9
percent per annum, respectively, in the two decades. However, wheat production increased rapidly
during the 1950s but fell back to its earlier levels during the 1960s, when more profitable winter crops
replaced wheat.
civ
Food aid's disincentive effect may be only part of the reason why wheat lost its comparative
advantage. Furthermore, the cheap import supply of wheat (food aid) contributed to high growth in rice
exports. Consequently, the country and the agricultural sector obtained substantial benefits from food
aid through the resource transfer and reallocation of domestic agricultural resources. The lesson is that
"disincentive effects" must not be assessed through a single crop perspective (Huddleston, 1984:9).
Production and trade effects for competing crops must be assessed as well. The effects of food aid on
demand for foreign exchange and the exchange rate must also be kept in perspective, given the direct
effects of exchange rate changes for the structure of incentives (Huddleston, 1984).
Food aid is characterized by short-term relief and long-term burden of food aid/concessional
imports. The "market" in which food aid transactions are negotiated is highly regulated and segregated.
Complex bargaining among suppliers as well as between demanders and suppliers finally determines the
quantity flowing to a particular country in a particular year. It also should be pointed out that political
considerations of costs and benefits continue to play a major role in equating supply and demand of food
aid (Hopkins 19804). There are two types of food aid: project aid provided by donors on a grant basis, a
large share of which is tunneled through the World Food Programme, and program aid on a grant basis
or funded by long-term soft loans for which no specific project use is identified. The economic value
and costs of the two types to recipient countries are quite different.
A particular problem arises from the long-term repayment schedules of food aid provided on a
soft-loan basis, which usually starts with a ten-year grace period. It seems fair to assume that a period of
ten years is far beyond the food supply planning horizons of most governments in low-income, food-
deficit countries. Nor is it likely that import planners use a social discounting rate, however constructed,
in formulating the demand for concessional imports. In the case of a continuous inflow of this type of
food aid, the repayment burden grows exponentially after the grace period is over (Srivastava, 1975:34).
Egypt, for example, is currently shifting into this phase, since it has been receiving food aid under P.L.
480Title I continuously since the early 1970s.A common agreement on food aid supplied under U.S.
P.L. 480 Title I during the 1970s and 1980s has the following terms: initial payment of some percent;
installments of equal annual amounts; ten-year grace period; initial interest rate of 2 percent; continuing
interest rate of 3 percent (Srivastava, 1975). A shrinking value of the domestic currency compared to
the dollar may further reduce the ex-post perceived benefit of food aid received a decade before if
repayments are due in hard currency. This is increasingly the case. Consequently, debate on
rescheduling "food aid debts‖ became an issue in a number of recipient countries in the 1990s
cv
(Srivastava, 1975).
Since the per capita income of food-deficit countries is used by the World Bank to determine
eligibility for IDA assistance, it means that Low-income, food-deficit countries (LFDCS) have received
about 7.6 million tons of food aid in recent years. This was about 15 to 17 percent of total cereal
imports. During 1976-78, food aid exceeded 20percent of total grain imports in one-half of the LFDCS
receiving food aid and in one-third of all recipient countries. Although food aid was not very important
in some developing countries, it certainly mattered to a number of the poorest. During 1976-78, food aid
covered between 6 and 16 percent of total grain consumption in nine low-income countries. It was even
more important for the poor in some of these countries because their special food subsidy schemes
depended on food aid (IFPRI, 1997:46).
In addition, research at IFPRI has shown that, in the aggregate, food aid supplies are not very
responsive to short-term fluctuations in LDCS" import requirements. However, if allocated
appropriately over time and countries, the same quantities could significantly contribute to increased
food security (Huddleston 1981:9). Except for 1974, the year of the grain price crisis, total annual food
aid ranged between about 7 and 12 million tons of grain (most of which was wheat) during 1970-83.
However, the drop from 10.1 to 5.7 million tons in 1973-74 suggests that food aid can hardly be relied
upon to provide food security in severe crisis situations. As long as the food aid commitments of major
donors are made largely in terms of fiscal allocations rather than actual quantities, prices will
significantly influence food aid supplies (Huddleston 1981).
The instability of food aid becomes even more evident in a country-by-country analysis. During
1962-78, the average coefficient of variation of food aid was 1.25 in LFDCS in which food aid averaged
more than 10 percent of grain imports. Clearly, that means that the quantities of food aid received
fluctuated substantially from year to year over the time period. Frequently, countries that have been
important recipients for some time suddenly face a "blackout" of food aid. Twenty-seven countries con-
fronted this situation between 1965 and 1978. . Food aid, which had exceeded 15percent of imports over
three years, dropped below 3 percent in the next year in these cases (IFPRI, 1997:46).
Frequently, domestic and foreign policy events cause the interruptions of the food aid inflow.
The time series on food aid shows no diminishing trend in these "blackouts." Food aid remains an
insecure and risky source of supply. During 1964-78 only one-half to two-thirds of all countries facing a
cut-back in food aid fully replaced the aid with commercial imports in the short run. The difference was
particularly wide when cuts in food aid coincided with high world prices and related foreign exchange
cvi
constraints that prevented imports from staying at normal levels. Increases in domestic supplies, which
are not accounted for in the data, were insufficient to compensate fully for the incomplete substitution of
commercial imports for food aid. The incomplete substitution between trade and aid is further indicated
by a reduction of food aid by one ton from trend levels increases commercial imports by 0.8 tons in
these countries. Obviously, the response is not uniform. Given the simplistic approach, the parameters
should not be interpreted with too much emphasis on numerical results. Of course, this is not a
monocausal relationship. Commercial grain imports in the medium run are determined by import prices,
foreign exchange availability, domestic supplies, stocks, etc., which are not taken into account
sufficiently by a trend variable (IFPRI, 1997:49).
The estimation results suggest that substitution occurs to a certain extent but that food aid cannot
be viewed as either a simple balance of payments support, which would be the case if it substituted
completely for commercial imports, or as fully additional. This has direct implications for the price
effects of food aid in recipient countries. Among factors which determine the incomplete substitution
between trade and aid, the following seem important. First, it is clear that food aid represents a resource
transfer which may allow further expansion of demand for food and other goods and services. To the
extent that food aid is channeled into employment- and demand-creating programs, the additional
demand requires continuation of at least a fraction of earlier commercial imports to avoid domestic food
price inflation. Secondly, and probably more important, donors regulate provision of food aid so as to
avoid reducing commercial imports by food aid. The usual marketing requirements regulation (UMR) in
the food aid convention is intended to serve this purpose (IFPRI, 1997:49). Although not always
enforced, this regulation has at least some relevance for major food aid recipients who also are major
commercial importers and reduces the ability of food aid to contribute to balance of payments support.
Thirdly, when food aid is used to build up domestic stocks and therefore is received only erratically, its
relation to normal imports should be small, and its price effects largely depend upon releases of grain
from stocks (IFPRI, 1997).
Because of the instability of food aid and the numerous forms of its regulation, trade and price
policy must be extremely flexible to avoid its undesirable side effects or even to use it as an incentive.
The domestic price effects of food aid depend to a large extent on the degree to which it substitutes for,
or is in addition to, trade. An improvement in capacity of recipient country institutions, including
physical facilities (ports, storage, transportation, etc.) and less rigid food aid disposal rules such as
UMRS, would certainly increase the ability of such countries to use food aid as a source of foreign
cvii
exchange savings and fiscal support with no disincentive effects on domestic production. However,
using food aid just as a general resource transfer conflicts with the concern for its equity effects through
raising food consumption levels of the poor (Mellor 1980:2). As a means of achieving the latter
objectives, food aid must be at least partly additive to normal supplies, as is generally the case. The
general problem of food aid for price policy stems from attempts to achieve these conflicting objectives
simultaneously with the same instrument. The compromise appropriate for a specific country depends on
its ability to channel additional food to the poor and at the same time generates demand-creating
employment.
Food aid appears to be inherently unstable and insufficiently tuned to meet shortfalls in domestic
food production or to supplement foreign exchange needs. The general instability of food aid matters
very much to countries confronted with high levels of instability in food production and severe short-
term constraints in foreign exchange reserves and storage capacities. This situation is familiar in many
sub-Saharan African countries. To provide effective food security to such countries, it is necessary to
eliminate the insecurity associated with the supply of food aid. Donor coordination and improved
planning and managerial capacities in recipient countries are required for this purpose. The potential of
the IMF cereal import financing scheme can be exploited fully if some of its regulations can be reformed
further to provide easier access to low-income countries with emergency need for food supply
(IMF1981:314).
4.2 Food Crisis and Social Unrest in Developing Countries
Food security and political stability are often linked, although the relationship is complicated
and not necessarily direct or causal. The manipulation of food supplies by interests within certain
countries, and outside, or privileged and powerful groups' restriction of food supplies to segments of the
population that are out of favours with the powers that be may lead to social instability. In recent times,
this has been the case as there has been panic, and social unrest in developing countries resulting to
"Food riots following the UN (FAO) projection of a 49 percent increase in African cereal prices, and 53
percent in European prices, in December 2007 through July 2008 (FAO, 2008:187).
The unavailability of basic food staples due to price rises in parts of Asia and Africa, particularly
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal, Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt and Morocco experienced protests
and food riots in late 2007 and early 2008 .Similarly, other countries that have seen food riots or are
facing related unrest were: Mexico, Bolivia, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
cviii
South Africa. For instance, in Bangladesh 10,000 workers rioted close to the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka,
smashing cars and buses and vandalising factories in anger at high food prices and low wages. Dozens
of people, including at least 20 police officials, were injured in the violence. Ironically, the country
achieved food self-sufficiency in 2002, but food prices increased drastically due to the reliance of
agriculture on oil and fossil fuels (FAO, 2008:187).
Economists estimate 30 million of the country's 150 million people could go hungry. In April
2008, the Brazilian government announced a temporary ban on the export of rice. The ban is intended to
protect domestic consumers. One of the earlier food riots took place in Burkina Faso, on February 22,
when rioting broke in the country's second and third largest cities over soaring food prices (up to 65
percent increase), sparing however the capital, Ouagadougou, where soldiers were mobilized throughout
strategic points. The government promised to lower taxes on food and to release food stocks. Over 100
people were arrested in one of the towns (FAO, 2008).
Cameroon, the world's fourth largest cocoa producer, saw large scale rioting in late February
2008, in protest against inflating food and fuel prices, as well as the attempt by President Paul Biya to
extend his 25-year rule. At least seven people were killed in the worst unrest seen in the country in over
fifteen years. This figure was later increased to 24. Part of the government response to the protests was a
reduction in import taxes on foods including rice, flour, and fish. The government reached an agreement
with retailers by which prices would be lowered in exchange for the reduced import taxes. As of late
April 2008, however, reports suggested that prices had not eased and in some cases had even increased
(see FAO, 2008:187-95).
On April 24, 2008, the government of Cameroon announced a two-year emergency program
designed to double Cameroon's food production and achieve food self-sufficiency.Similarly,on March
31, Côte d'Ivoire's capital Abidjan saw police use tear gas and a dozen protesters injured following food
riots that gripped the city. The riots followed dramatic hikes in the price of food and fuel, with the price
of beef rising from $1.68 to $2.16 per kilogram, and the price of gasoline rising from $1.44 to $2.04 per
liter, in only three days. In Egypt, a boy was killed from a gunshot to the head after Egyptian police
intervened in violent demonstrations over rising food prices that gripped the industrial city of Mahalla
on April 8. Large swathes of the population have been hit as food prices, and particularly the price of
bread, have doubled over the last several months as a result of producers exploiting a shortage which has
existed since 2006 (FAO, 2008:187).
cix
On April 12, 2008, the Haitian Senate voted to dismiss Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis
after violent food riots hit the country. The food riots caused the death of 5 people. Prices for food items
such as rice, beans, fruit and condensed milk have gone up 50 percent in Haiti since late 2007 while the
price of fuel has tripled in only two months. Riots broke out in April due to the high prices, and the
government is attempting to restore order by subsidizing a 15 percent reduction in the price of rice. Food
riots were reported in the Indian state of West Bengal in 2007 over shortages of food. India has banned
the export of rice except for Basmati types of rice which attract a premium price. Street protests over the
price of food took place in Indonesia where food staples and gasoline have nearly doubled in price since
January 2008. (FAO, 2008:189).
In April 2008, the Latin American members of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) met in Brasília in order to confront the issues of high food prices, scarcities and
violence that are affecting the region. The President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón, with industry
representatives and members of the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (Concamin), agreed to freeze
prices of more than 150 consumer staples, such as coffee, sardines, tuna, oil, soup or tea, among others,
until the end of December 2008. The measure was carried out in an attempt to control inflation, which
stood at an annual rate of 4.95%, the highest increase since December 2004. Mexican baking company
Grupo Bimbo agreed to maintain stable prices of their products, despite of the 20% raise of the
production costs. Daniel Servitje, CEO of this company, announced in the 19th Plenary Meeting of the
Mexico-China Business Committee (FAO, 2008).
In mid February, rioting that started in the Mozambican rural town of Chokwe and then spread to
the capital, Maputo, has resulted in at least four deaths. The riots were reported in the media to have
been, at least in part, over food prices and were termed "food riots." (FAO,2008). A biofuel advocacy
publication, however, claimed that these were, in fact, "fuel riots", limited to the rise in the cost of
diesel, and argued that the "food riot" characterization worked to fan "anti-biofuels sentiment."The
Pakistan Army has been deployed to avoid the seizure of food from fields and warehouses. This hasn't
stopped the food prices from increasing. The new government has been blamed for not managing the
countries food stockpiles properly.
Once the world's top rice producer, Myanmar has produced enough rice to feed itself until now.
Rice exports dropped over four decades from nearly 4 million tons to only about 40,000 tons last year,
mostly due to neglect by Myanmar's ruling generals of infrastructure, including irrigation and
cx
warehousing. On 3 May 2008 Cyclone Nargis stripped Myanmar's rice-growing districts, ruining large
areas with salt water. U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimate that these areas produce 65
percent of the Southeast Asian country's rice. Worries of long-term food shortages and rationing are rife.
The military regime says nothing about the rice crisis, but continues to export rice at the same rate.
According to Turnell (2008:76), at least the next two harvests are going to be greatly affected and
there‘ll be virtually no output from those areas during that time. So we‘re likely to see considerable food
and rice shortages for the next couple of years. The damage to the economy is going to be profound.
In Panama, in response to higher rice prices the government began buying rice at the high market
price and selling rice to the public at a lower subsidized price at food kiosks. In the Philippines, the
Arroyo government insisted on April 13 that there would be no food riots in the country and that there
could be no comparison with Haiti's situation. Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, Sergio Apostol stated
that: "Haiti is not trying to solve the problem, while we are doing something to address the issue. We
don't have a food shortage. So, no comparison..." (Apostol in FAO, 2008:92). Comments by the Justice
Secretary, Raul Gonzalez, the following day, that food riots are not far fetched, were quickly rebuked by
the rest of the government. On April 15, the Philippines, the world's largest rice importer, urged China,
Japan, and other key Asian nations, to convene an emergency meeting, especially taking issue with those
countries' rice export bans. "Free trade should be flowing," Philippine Agriculture Secretary Arthur Yap
stated. In late April 2008, the Philippines government requested that the World Bank exert pressure on
rice exporting countries to end export restrictions (FAO, 2008).
Apart from the analysis of the above wider cases, the African cases deserves special attention,
especially, the Southern African experience and specifically, the experience of the crisis in Zimbabwe.
Of the six countries primarily affected, Lesotho and Swaziland (along with Botswana and Namibia) are
traditionally food deficit countries that require imports from South Africa to make up the shortfall.
While the shortfall is larger this year, the problem is manageable. About 20% of the population in each
of Lesotho and Swaziland is estimated to be in need of food aid (445,000 and 231,000 respectively).The
impact of the Zimbabwe crisis lies not only in the sudden absence of the food that the country is
traditionally able to export to its neighbours. The political and economic consequences are equally
important. Inflation exported from Zimbabwe has put food prices out of the reach of poor people in
Malawi and parts of Zambia, as well as within the country itself. This famine, like most, is primarily a
problem of access to food rather than availability (FAO, 2008). Inevitably it is the poor who are hit
hardest.
cxi
The crisis in Zimbabwe is of a quite different quality and magnitude from that in the other
affected countries. After South Africa, Zimbabwe has the second largest and most diverse economy in
the sub-region. The seizure of commercial farm land has had a direct impact on the nation‘s capacity to
produce enough food. But of equal significance has been the disruption of other forms of agriculture,
such as tobacco production and horticulture for export, which has severely hit foreign exchange
earnings. Industrial production has equally been hit, with an overall shrinkage of 12% in the economy
this year. Half of those affected by food shortages are in this, the most fertile and, until recently, the
most productive agricultural economy in the region (FAO, 2008). It is this that transforms serious
shortages caused by climatic factors into a potential disaster.
Six million Zimbabweans, according to an Oxfam International survey of the Crisis in Southern
Africa on 26 June 2002, of which nearly half the population and about half the number affected
regionally, are in need of food aid. Normally self-sufficient in maize, in the last growing season
Zimbabwe produced only 480,000 tonnes of maize – a quarter of its needs. It needs to import 1.7 million
tonnes of maize to meet the shortfall.The first manifestations of the food crisis in Zimbabwe had nothing
to do with the weather and everything to do with the disruption of agriculture caused by land
occupations (FAO,2008). The first signs came during 2001 when there were shortages of vegetables
supplied from commercial farms. Then the disruption of planting of wheat (a winter crop) in the same
year led to shortages of bread. However, wheat is a staple only for a small proportion of the urban
population (and a reserve staple for others). It was the collapse of the maize crop that caused disaster.
The argument advanced by the government and its supporters is that communal farmers have
been extremely efficient maize producers since independence. An expansion of the small-scale black
farming sector is vital to long-term food security, according to this argument. It is a view that has some
substance, but one that leaves two important factors out of account (FAO, 2008). First, the dramatic
increase in communal maize production since independence has been based upon the availability of
efficient extension services and farming inputs. The resettlement of 2001-2002, by contrast, has been
chaotic and virtually without any infrastructural support for resettled farmers. In addition, many of those
resettled have not been landless peasants, but ruling party and government loyalists rewarded for their
support. The second important factor is that commercial maize production, unlike that in the communal
areas, is irrigation-fed. This makes it less vulnerable to short-term fluctuations in rainfall and avoids the
situation – which has been prevalent this year – when people are short of food, ostensibly as a result of
drought, while the country‘s dams are full (FAO,2008:190).
cxii
The impact of Zimbabwe‘s land resettlement on the food situation goes far beyond the fall in
crops planted. One of the most devastating effects of the land occupations, was the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of workers employed on the commercial farms, along with their families.
Deprived of homes and income, these are the most vulnerable to food shortages. Equally, the overall
effect of land occupations, political violence and disruption over the past two years has been shrinkage
of the economy and a loss of foreign exchange earnings. In the past year GDP has contracted by 12%
and inflation is running at more than 120%. This has generated greater poverty at a local level, as well as
reducing the country‘s capacity to import food (FAO, 2008).
Finally, the crisis has been exacerbated by serious mismanagement of food relief on the part of
the government and its agencies. The government has insisted on channeling food imports through the
parastatal Grain Marketing Board, an inefficient mechanism, but one that allows the government to
control distribution of grain on party political grounds. The same applies to food-for-work schemes. The
third channel for distribution of food aid is through donor-funded schemes. In most instances external
donors have monitored distribution to make sure that opposition supporters are not denied support. Yet
there have been instances where this has happened. Human rights groups accuse the government of
deliberately inflicting starvation on its political opponents (FAO, 2008).
To be added to the discussion is the fact that the crisis has implications for and/or, on
population movements .To some extent present food shortages result from and are bound up with
displacement of people that has already occurred. This is most evident in Zimbabwe. It is also apparent
that people who have already been displaced will be less able to resort to traditional coping strategies
than if they had remained in their previous homes. This applies particularly to farm workers who would
have maintained a small garden to supplement their food needs. The loss of these small plots is both a
cause of the crisis and an obstacle in the way of farm workers and their families adopting their usual
strategies in periods of hunger. Survival or coping strategies were adopted, though it varied throughout
the region: Reduction of food consumption; eating bush foods, sharing with family and neighbours,
selling assets, and working for cash, etc.
The crisis in Zimbabwe has had its own inflationary impact, which affects not only the 12-13
million Zimbabweans, half of whom will be among the seriously hungry, but also many people in
adjacent areas. The other reason waged employment has been undermined as a survival strategy is the
impact of AIDS, with many households not having an active adult who can go and find a job. One of
these strategies – working for cash – clearly entails migration for most southern Africans (WFP,
cxiii
2002:116), often over great distances. The major population displacement caused by food shortages will
be of individual family members trying to find work, rather than a mass flight of the starving. The
migratory patterns of this crisis will be influenced in part by its very regional character. Many of the
farm workers displaced in Zimbabwe are of Malawian, Zambian or Mozambican origin – especially the
first of these. Yet the severity of the food shortages in Malawi make it unlikely that the feared mass
return of Zimbabweans of Malawian origin will in fact take place (WFP, 2002). In the two worst
affected countries, Zimbabwe and Malawi, traditional coping strategies have largely failed for differing
reasons.
It seems likely that this will be a significant ―push‖ factor (WFP, 2002:116). In Zimbabwe, entire
families have already been deliberately uprooted. In Malawi, it is more likely families will divide, in the
hope that a breadwinner, usually male, can earn a cash income elsewhere in the region. Historically,
southern African economies have been structured around the labour needs of mines, industry and large-
scale agriculture in South Africa (and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe and Zambia). Four of the countries
affected by the current food shortages – Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland – have
historically functioned as labour reserves, with extensive male migration on either a seasonal or long-
term basis. In the case of Lesotho and Swaziland, this has been because they are simply not viable as
national economies. In the case of Malawi, even as South Africa‘s need for migrant labour was
declining, the local economy was becoming more dependent upon remittances. The extensive alienation
of communal land and development of estate agriculture in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s
undermined the viability of subsistence agriculture in Malawi even in good years. Hence individual
households are permanently dependent on labour migration and cash earnings, whether on agricultural
estates in Malawi itself, or from elsewhere in the region (WFP, 2002:118).
In the past two decades, South Africa‘s labour needs have changed and the pattern of migration
with it. The system of labour migration overseen by the apartheid administration and the big mining
houses has been replaced by a much more varied pattern of seasonal and often informal migration. Some
countries, such as Mozambique, have continued to maintain their share of jobs in traditional sectors,
such as mining, even as the total number of such jobs available has declined. Other nationalities have
also tended to be concentrated in particular sectors, such as Zimbabweans in the construction industry.
Also, not surprisingly, there are geographical factors at work. So, for example, many Zimbabweans
work seasonally in farms in South Africa‘s Limpopo Province, which borders Zimbabwe (WFP,
2002:118).
cxiv
With further development in the Zimbabwe crisis, the assumption on the part of the South
African authorities has been that mass refugee flows are likely. They have established holding camps
near the Messina-Beitbridge border crossing to allow for the reception of asylum seekers. The reaction
to the growing food shortages north of their border has been the same. Yet this refugee flow has never
materialized. It is unlikely that it ever will in the form that is currently anticipated. Of course it is
impossible to quantify informal or illegal immigration from Zimbabwe into South Africa. Some
estimates in early 2002 put the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa at 2 million – probably an
exaggeration, but possibly indicative of a rough order of magnitude. A clearer indication of the increase
in the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa, if not the overall numbers present, comes from statistics
for deportations. In May 2002, the Zimbabwean press reported that the South African authorities had
deported 11,181 Zimbabweans since the beginning of the year (WFP, 2002:116). This was a significant
increase on the 8,603 deported in the whole of 2001.
. The Zimbabwean crisis is a highly complex one. The government‘s obstruction of food aid to
presumed opposition supporters lends substance to the accusation that the ruling party is engaged in a
campaign to exterminate the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Whilst history
suggests that starving people are unlikely to rise up in arms, it is not inconceivable in the coming months
that sections of opposition supporters might abandon the MDC‘s policy of non-violent resistance. If this
happens, which is most likely in the urban areas, and then there may be refugee flows similar to those in
the 1980s, when the army was engaged in its counter-insurgency campaign in Matabeleland
(WFP,2002:116). Botswana, along with South Africa, would seem the most likely destination for such
flows, especially if they emanated mainly from Matabeleland again.
4.3 Actions by Governments Toward the Global Food Crisis
To address the crisis discussed above, governments, and international institutions and
organizations are building up a synergy to resolve the problem. It was for this reason that on 28 April,
2008, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established a Task Force on the Global Food
Security Crisis under his chairmanship and composed of the heads of the United Nations specialized
agencies, funds and programmes, Bretton Woods institutions and relevant parts of the UN Secretariat to
co-ordinate efforts to alleviate the crisis (UNO,2008:113).The Russian government pressured retailers to
freeze food prices before key elections for fear of a public backlash against the rising cost of food in
October 2007.The freeze ended on May 1, 2008.On 31 March 2008, Senegal saw riots in response to the
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rise in the price of food and fuel. Twenty four people were arrested and detained in a response which
one local human rights group claimed included torture and other unspeakable acts on the part of the
security forces (UNO,2008). Further protests took place in Dakar on 26 April 2008.Witnesses and
officials in Somalia said thousands of angry Somalis rioted on May 5, 2008 over rising food prices and
the collapse of the nation's currency, culminating in clashes with government troops and armed
shopkeepers that killed at least five protesters. The protests occurred amid a serious humanitarian
emergency due to the Ethiopian war in Somalia (UNO,2008).
The Christian Science Monitor, (Neweurasia, 2009:5) and other media observers are predicting
that a nascent hunger crisis will erupt into a full famine as a consequence of the energy shortages. UN
experts announced on 10 October that almost one-third of Tajikistan‘s 6.7 million inhabitants may not
have enough to eat for the winter of 2008-09.Food riots in southern Yemen that began in late March and
continued through early April, saw police stations torched, and roadblocks were set up by armed
protesters. The army has deployed tanks and other military vehicles. Although the riots involved
thousands of demonstrators over several days and over 100 arrests, officials claimed no fatalities;
residents, however, claimed that at least one of the fourteen wounded people has died (see Neweurasia,
2009).
IFAD is making up to US$200 million available to support poor farmers boost food production
in face of the global food crisis (UNO,2008: 115). On May 2, 2008 U.S. President George W. Bush said
he was asking Congress to approve an extra $770 million funding for international food aid. On October
16, 2008, former US president Bill Clinton scolded the bipartisan coalition in Congress that killed the
idea of making some aid donations in cash rather than in food. The release of Japan's rice reserves onto
the market may bring the rice price down significantly. As of May 16, anticipation of the move had
already lowered prices by 14% in a single week. On April 30, 2008 Thailand announced the creation of
the Organization of Rice Exporting Countries (OREC) with the potential to develop a price-fixing cartel
for rice. This is seen by some as an action to capitalise on the crisis to rip off the Low-Income Food-
Deficit importing Countries ( LFDICs ) .In June 2008 the Food and Agriculture Organization hosted a
High-Level Conference on World Food Security, in which $1.2 billion in food aid was committed for
the 75 million people in 60 countries hardest hit by rising food prices. however, a sustained commitment
from the G8 was called for by some humanitarian organizations. On October 23, 2008, Associated Press
reported the following:
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Former President Clinton told a U.N. gathering Thursday [Oct 16, 2008] that the
global food crisis shows "we all blew it, including me," by treating food crops
"like color TVs" instead of as a vital commodity for the world's poor.... Clinton
criticized decades of policymaking by the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and others, encouraged by the U.S., that pressured Africans in
particular into dropping government subsidies for fertilizer, improved seed and
other farm inputs as a requirement to get aid. Africa's food self-sufficiency
declined and food imports rose. Now skyrocketing prices in the international
grain trade — on average more than doubling between 2006 and early 2008 —
have pushed many in poor countries deeper into poverty (UNO,2008:115).
In line with the above scenario, Former US President Bill Clinton, in Speech at United Nations
World Food Day, on October 16, 2008, noted that ―food is not a commodity like others. We should go
back to a policy in which food self-sufficiency is maximized. It is crazy for us to think we can develop
countries around the world without increasing their ability to feed themselves‖ (UNO,2008).
4.4 The Internal/External Dimension of the National Food Crisis in Africa.
The manipulation of food is a form of violence, particularly in a country where staples have
become scarce and food imports essential. Yet Government is abusing the Grain Marketing Board
monopoly over grain and cereals to whip vulnerable people into their direction. The UN estimates that
Africa has at least 500 million hectares; 150 million hectares by the Democratic Republic of Congo, of
marginal, unused and underused land and that will be used by energy-hungry and importing countries of
the North and their agribusiness partners to save the world from an energy crunch is corporate plunder
of Africa in the rush for African land (FAO, 2008:305).
Given the growing need for energy sources in Africa, there is the need to seek viable and
sustainable alternatives. Though the countries in Africa have oriented towards local production and
consumption rather than international markets. Some of these countries believed that they could meet
their energy needs through agrofuels (FAO, 2008:305) and still have more than enough to export.
Thus,the the imperative for alternative source of energy has made some to embarked on the production
of agrofuels,which is among the factors that has intensified food crisis as land is cultivated no longer
for human consumption. Nevertheless, this sets the rush for African lands.
Analysts have shown that there is simply not enough agricultural land on earth to grow agrofuels
crops to meet the huge energy needs driven by our current ways of living. Jumping into the agrofuels
boat thus has special implications for Africa. These crops, apart from gobbling up the land in order to
feed machines, also require a lot of water and falling water tables can trigger off famines. The fact that
cxvii
agrofuels have triggered a new scramble for Africa is no longer news. Millions of hectares are being
grabbed with little concern for the poor who are bound to face displacement and for the impact that this
will have on family farms and other small-scale farms and food production on the continent (FAO,
2008).
Julian Borger, (2002:2) noted that, in Madagascar a South Korean firm Daewoo Logistics plans
to buy a 99-year lease on over a million hectares for the production of 5m tonnes of corn a year by 2023,
and to use another 120,000 hectares for the production of palm oil. This deal, according to Billy Head, is
estimated to cost the company about $6bn over 25 years, is acclaimed as the biggest of its kind in the
world. The land to be parceled off to Daewoo Logistics covers arable land about half the size of
Belgium. For a mostly arid country with three food crisis situations in five years, this is a huge challenge
indeed (Billy Head, The Guardian, London, Saturday November 22, 2008).
The firm in the words of Julian Borger claims that thousands of jobs will be created and that it
will use a mainly South African workforce, but the produce will be mainly earmarked for South Korea.
In other words, that chunk of Africa would simply be a South Korean farm for South Korea. Although
the crops are said to be for food, the lesson for land and land rights is the same for agrofuels. The
London Guardian (2002:6), in its Madagascar land deal story presents us with additional reasons to
worry. We are told that in Sudan there are efforts by the state to attract investors for almost 900,000
hectares of its land, while the Ethiopian Prime Minister is reported to have been courting would-be
Saudi investors. Commentators believe that these negotiations are lopsided and may weigh against
Africa. A number of factors impact the quality and amount of arable lands available in many African
countries. In the case of Ethiopia, the pressure on natural resources has led to the burning of animal dung
for fuel instead of utilizing it as a resource for soil quality improvement. Over 600,000 tonnes are said to
be lost in crop production annually due to these pressures on the land. This loss amounts to double the
amount of yearly food aid requests from the country (Araya and Edwards 2006:5-6 ).The additional
pressures that use of land for agrofuels would bring to bear on food deficits in countries in similar
conditions are easy to imagine.
The FAO, in its Review of biofuel policies and subsidies, it noted that a further downside is that
small farmers without official land title are already on the losing end. Add to this is the fact that details
of these land deals are hard to come by. With a lack of transparency there is no assurance of safeguards
for the poor or even the overall long-term interest of the continent. The UN's Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) advocates an urgent review of agrofuels policies and subsidies in order to preserve
cxviii
the goal of world food security, protect poor farmers, promote broad-based rural development and
ensure environmental sustainability. Its head, Jacques Diouf, has clearly warned that the controversial
rise in land deals could create a form of 'neo-colonialism', with poor states producing food for the rich
(and their machines) at the expense of their own hungry people
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/).
The craze for agrofuels has been largely driven in Africa by the global North, to purportedly
address three main issues: climate-change mitigation, energy security and agricultural development. An
issue that we must repeatedly state is the wrong-headedness of seeing the market as the only route to
progress and development. The current economic spirals have eliminated any need for further debate on
this. It is also instructive to see that the global commodity market is not concerned with the overall good
of humanity but rather with profit maximisation.The importance of food security was underlined by no
less than then US President George Bush in 2001, when he said:
‗Can you imagine a country that was unable to grow enough food
to feed its people? It would be a nation that would be subject to
international pressure. It would be a nation at risk. And so when
we're talking about American agriculture, we're really talking
about a national security issue' (Quoted by Eduardo Galeano in
'The Eighth Commandment - Lies', New Internationalist, Issue NI
414, August 2008).
If the cheapest commodities are agrofuels crops - like oil palm, cassava, maize, groundnuts, etc -
cultivated on cheap African lands, what this means, according to George Monbiot, (2007:159) is that
we are not only stoking the fires of humanitarian disaster, but also building an environmental
disaster.
Benin decided to go into agrofuels production to solve the problems associated with climate
change and very high prices for petroleum products. Burkina Faso is currently at experimental stages of
production of agrofuels from cottonseeds and jatropha. Eighty per cent of the population of Burkina
Faso work in the agricultural sector, contributing about 32% to her income. The country reportedly pays
the highest for petroleum products and is said to pay the highest electricity charges in the whole world.
For some years now jatropha has been used in Mali as a source of fuel oil for cooking and lighting.
Senegal's effort to escape the clutches of a disconcerting energy crisis, including electricity cuts and fuel
price hikes, bore fruit in the 1980s when the country decided to go into agrofuels production
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/).
cxix
This is an assault on the staples. While the case of Togo, Senegal and Mali are different in the
sense that, the production of agrofuels is aimed at local consumption and not for export, and food crops
are not targeted in these countries, it is a different ball game in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania
and other countries, where staple food crops such as cassava, corn, groundnuts, sorghum, sweet
potatoes, etc, are being used or are being proposed to be used to produce bio-ethanol
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/). Nigeria provides a good example of a country where
staples are under assault for the sake of agrofuels production. Research and monitoring carried out by
Friends of the Earth (FoE) African group‘s show that cassava and other staples across the continent are
under severe attack by agrofuels giants and their biotech partners. In a newspaper interview, Dr.
Akinwumi, the Vice President of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), in The
Guardian, Sunday, August 10, 2008 declared that Nigeria should 'turn cassava into a money-making
business' by processing the staple into 'ethanol, livestock feed, pellets and so on‘. However, he says he
feels sad that we (Nigerians) are unable to feed ourselves (The Guardian, 2008:17).
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its foreign partners have acquired
large chunks of land, in almost all the 36 states of the country, for the production of ethanol. The crops
of choice include staples like cassava, sorghum and sugarcane. Some of the agrofuels plantations and
production plants are already sited in communities with water shortages, leaving the community with an
acute water scarcity. Researchers from Friends of the Earth Nigeria on a field visit found that the local
people neither had an idea of the actual land uptake nor were they consulted by the state government
before community lands were appropriated (The Guardian, 2008).
Also the Friends of the Earth Sierra Leone field report, 2008, noted that Chinese companies
operating in Sierra Leone have acquired large parcels of land in the country to produce ethanol using
sweet potatoes, corn, cassava and fig-nut. Villagers interviewed complained that there was very little
land available for them to farm and they could thus barely sustain their families. They also complained
that they were being coerced into planting corn not for their local consumption but to sell to the Chinese
merchants. All the local people hold on to are promises that they would buy their produce at a good
price. It is obvious that where local farmers are made to use their lands to cultivate crops for export,
there is a serious threat to food sovereignty. Considering the fact that Sierra Leone is a country just
recovering from war and still struggling to produce food to satisfy the needs of her people, this thinly
veiled land grab will aggravate the food crisis in the country (The Guardian, 2008:17).
In Ghana, the Norwegian firm Biofuel Africa secured 38,000 hectares for 'the largest jatropha
cxx
plantation in the world' and began clear-cutting the land in preparation for cultivation. The major plank
on which jatropha is being pushed across the continent is that it does well on marginal lands. In this case
the so-called marginal land is a forest. The Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency eventually
halted the clear-cutting after 2,600 hectares of forest had been destroyed. The story is one of glittering
promises of jobs, rapid deforestation, and use of neo-colonial methods. The chief who signed the so-
called contract documents could neither read nor write (Horand K. in BusinessWeek, 8 September,
2008). According to RAINS/ABN, cited by GAIA Foundation in The Myth of Marginal Lands,
Agrofuels companies take land from rural communities with much ease (www.gaiafoundation.org).
Field reports on Cameroon by Centre for Environment and Development/Friends of the Earth
Cameroon (CED/FoE C), reveal that some of the projects are concentrated in the heart of the forest of
the Congo Basin. Large tracts have been deforested. Complaints abound from the people that wildlife
and the source of livelihood of the locals are threatened. European companies are in the top league of
those who have grabbed over 600,000 hectares of land for the cultivation of agrofuels crops (The
Business Week, 2008:6).
Aggressive agrofuels push by foreign multinational companies is a contributory factor. British
firm Sun Biofuels is at work in Ethiopia, where the government has reportedly set aside 24 million
hectares for the production of fuel crops. Other companies are known to try to secure century-long
farming rights for nothing but a promise to invest in local roads and schools. An Ethiopian minister
claims that such land is otherwise unusable, and officials in Tanzania claim that it's just marginal land.
'The whole thing is nothing but positive,' says the administrator of Tanzania's Kisarawe district, who is
responsible for the Sun Biofuels project in the district. 'We have convinced the people (Horand Knaup,
in Business Week, 8 September, 2008).While government officials gush over agrofuels and claim that
the lands being sought by agrofuels promoters are marginal lands, others perceive that 'the land grabs
and forced relocations are stirring ugly memories of colonialist exploitation.
In Mozambique too Sun Biofuels has acquired a large parcel of land from the people. Foreign
investors have their eye on 11 million hectares - more than one-seventh of the country's total area - for
growing energy plants. In April 2006, Sun Biofuels claimed that it had received formal approval for
cultivation from 10 of 11 villages whose lands had been allocated to it in Tanzania. At the time they
made this claim most of the villages were not even aware of any move to give their lands to Sun
Biofuels. According to reports, one village head sent a letter to the district administration complaining
that Sun Biofuels had cleared and marked off land without even contacting the village elders (The
cxxi
Guardian, 2008).
Land rights issues in Tanzania also extend to actions in the mining sector. For example, the
mining policy states that the Land Act (1999) and the Village Land Act (1999) provide a legal basis on
ownership and compensation on land matters (The Guardian, 2008:17). These laws are not evenly
applied and multinational mining companies take advantage of the locals who are not aware of
compensation processes, their rights and the fact that the new landowners have a duty to compensate
them where the lands are transferred legally. It is said that 'sometimes the companies use administrative
and other corrupt measures to avoid making payments‘. In Swaziland the aggressive agrofuels push has
come from the British multinational D1 Oils. The company engaged about 2,000 outgrowers to plant
jatropha on over 3,000 hectares in various parts of the country in addition to over 1,000 hectares at D1
Oils-operated farms. Following mounting pressure from civil society groups, D1 Oils Swaziland has
been ordered to suspend any new planting of jatropha by the Swaziland Environment Authority (SEA),
who has also ordered D1 Oils to conduct a strategic environmental assessment
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/).
Ethanol production also affects food prices: Any spike in food prices must worry Africa, as the
impacts are grave (http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/). Two years ago, the International Food
Policy Research Institute published sobering estimates of the potential global impact of rising demand
for agrofuels. They predicted that given continued high oil prices, the rapid increase in global agrofuels
production would push global corn prices up by 20% by 2010 and 41% by 2020. The prices of oilseeds,
including soybeans, rapeseeds, and sunflower seeds, are also projected to jump by 26% by 2010 and
76% by 2020 while wheat prices were expected to rise by 11% by 2010 and 30% by 2020. In parts of
sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, where cassava is a staple, its price is expected to increase
by 33% by 2010 and a startling 135% by 2020. The number of people suffering from undernourishment
globally could increase by 16 million for each percentage point increase in the real price of staple food
crops. This could mean that 1.2 billion people would be suffering from hunger by 2025
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/).
A statement by an American commentator provides a good lesson for Africa. He wrote, 'The
only economical way to make ethanol right now is with corn, which means the burgeoning industry is
literally eating America's lunch, not to mention its breakfast and dinner.', according to Crenson (2006:6).
The obvious downside of the investment in large-scale/commercial production of agrofuels has been
cxxii
variously documented. Shifting from fossil fuels to agrofuels following the same market paradigm will
not increase the poor's access to energy but would aggravate existing problems such as land grabs and
create particular challenges to food supplies due to a shift from food cropping to fuel cropping.
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Summary
The humanitarian strategy adopted by the developed nations in their relations with the
developing countries, is such that the former exploits the later, through foreign aid, especially, when the
terms of the aid are set by the donor nations or group of nations, in a manner that is entirely
disadvantageous to one nation. Understood this way, food aid is an intersection of foreign policy,
government power and business deals, not only because, of its centrality to national power, but also,
because, states that do not have food sovereignty depend on other nations, not just for food, but also
for other agricultural inputs.
cxxiii
The origins of Zimbabwe‘s recent chaos are deeply-rooted and stem from at least three
interrelated long-term factors and one additional proximate cause: climatic, economic, and political. All
these have converged in causing the looming socio-political-cum food crisis in Zimbabwean. Thus, one
way of understanding the political and economic trends that has characterized the state of the
Zimbabwean nation without an inevitable sense of detraction from the political economy of the
Zimbabwean crisis, is by focusing the analysis on both the character and the contradictions in both the
domestic and international political system, and on the place which Zimbabwe the nation occupy in the
international division of labour, production and exchange.
To recapitulate, the character of political leadership contributed to the national development
crisis in Zimbabwe, and there is an organic interconnection between food insecurity in Zimbabwe and
food aid, and as well as the character of the governance of the global food system. The implication of
contradictions in both the domestic and international /global governance of the food system does not
encourage the achievement of the objective of the First Millennium Development Goal of eradicating
extreme hunger and poverty.
5.2 Conclusion
The simple existence of plentiful food either in a particular country or throughout the world does not
guarantee in any way that people will have access to adequate food supplies. Availability of adequate
food is one matter; access to that food is quite another. This is where social, economic, and political
factors play a major role in determining who has and who does not have food. In other words, there is no
such thing as an apolitical food problem. While drought and other naturally occurring events may trigger
famine conditions, it is government action or inaction that determines its severity, and often even
whether or not a famine will occur. The 20th century is full of examples of governments undermining
the food security of their own nations – sometimes intentionally. The controversy over the economic and
political imperatives of food aid for the developing nations is the question of whether the tying of food
aid to commodity purchases in the donor country (in-kind food aid) is the best way to deliver food aid.
More worrisome is even the politicization of food security, and manipulation of international food
markets for various political reasons. As a result, many countries do not "trust" international markets
because of the propensity of the High Food Sufficient Countries(HFSC) led by the United States and
other countries to apply economic embargoes against Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LFDCS )for
various political reasons. The distribution of food within a country is a political issue: food supplies are
cxxiv
manipulated as certain privileged and powerful groups restrict food supplies (directly or indirectly by
controlling distribution systems, etc) to segments of the population that are out of their favour.
At a higher strategic level, the politicization of food security, and manipulation of international food
markets for various political reasons could be achieved through international economic sanctions (or
embargoes), as in the case of Zimbabwe. Nations whose food security is jeopardized by such
international economic sanctions or embargoes tend to insist on pursuing ―self-sufficiency" policies
even when they lack of comparative advantage. The indispensability of food to human sustenance is
such that, food security is seen as national interest, hence, lack of food leads often to "food riots", often
instigated by urban residents; poorer rural residents rarely have a political voice. Similarly, the lack of
food security resulting from a sudden jolt (i.e. international embargo, poor climate) can lead to political
instability. "Food riots", when they occur, are often instigated by urban residents; poorer rural residents
rarely have a political voice. Thus, food security and political stability are often linked, although the
relationship is complicated and not necessarily direct or causal, and because of this, ―necessarily direct
or causal relationship‖ "Individuals without property are susceptible to starvation, and, according to
William Bernstein (1983), in his book The Birth of Plenty, it is much easier to bend the fearful and
hungry to the will of the state.
Food crisis has been greatly exacerbated by the character of food aid, and a series of political
factors. For instance, a number of regulations for the disposal of food aid imply that it has repercussions
on the commercial food and nonfood trade of the recipient countries. Also, a considerable share of food
aid is not provided on a grant basis but rather as long-term soft loans with related long-term foreign
exchange and fiscal implications. Food aid is an unstable and insecure source of supply. Food aid tends
to have an opportunity cost to the donor countries not only in the sense that it results from misallocated
agricultural resources but also in the sense that it partly replaces capital aid, which maybe used more
effectively in development. As result, recipient countries are continually facing policy dilemmas as to
how to optimize the use of available food aid in both the short and the long run and how to adjust
domestic price policies, given their economic, and possibly political, costs.
Nevertheless, food aid cannot be condemned in its entirety since despite its numerous
drawbacks; it still has some potential roles development: First, food aid can play a crucial role in
supporting increased employment in the early stages of growth. Food aid can supply a basic wage good
needed to back a rapid growth in employment when agricultural growth initially lags and foreign
exchange is too scarce to maintain a labor-intensive growth strategy. Food aid may also play a
cxxv
favourable role in maintaining basic food consumption in the wake of policy reforms for restructuring
the economy, which may require drastic measures be taken to cope with debt servicing and foreign
exchange problems.
In terms of nexus between food and politics, the land reform in Zimbabwe has provided the best
example of the relationship between hunger and politics. The land reform in Zimbabwe was in the main
used for political expediency and it is obvious that it was not properly thought out and planned.
Government‘s often negative economic policies and bad governance have also exacerbated the food
insecurity being faced by the country. In an attempt to win the support of the urban voters, government
has introduced price controls which have worsened rather than improve the situation.
The situation in Zimbabwe should be taken seriously because it may have a boomerang effect on
the region as has already been witnessed. It appears Zimbabwe is becoming a serious threat to the
stability of the whole Southern African region. As such changes to the current policy mix are essential
which will include a return to the rule of law based upon acceptable property rights, and a reversal of
provisions in the land reform programme that made land free and distributable by political patronage. It
is, however, only a moot point whether politically; the ruling party could meet these demands. Finally,
to achieve the First Millennium Development Goal objective of eradicating extreme hunger and poverty
requires an understanding of the ways in which these two injustices interconnect.
Findings of the Study.
Arising from the literature review and the analysis in the testing of the hypotheses, the following
findings are evident:
I. The character of political leadership contributed to and national development crisis, and food
insecurity in Zimbabwe;
II. The incorporation and institutionalization of the military in Zimbabwe; has led to the expansion
of the corporate identity of the military as an explicit class ;
III. There is a relationship between the character of the governance of the global food system, and
food insecurity in the developing in general, and Zimbabwe in , particular ;
IV. The conditionality of contracting foreign aid has deepened the crisis of national development in
Zimbabwe, and predisposed the Zimbabwean government to implement economic, and land
reforms;
V. Food aid is characterized by short-term relief and long-term burden of food aid/confessional
imports;
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VI. Developed nations are contracting large arable land in developing nations for the production of
Agro-fuel. The opportunity cost of this is that agricultural commodities that would have been
used for human consumption id now being used for ―feeding of machines‖
VII. Food aid is not provided on a grant basis but rather as long-term soft loans with related long-term
foreign exchange and fiscal implications, and food aid, is an unstable and insecure source of
supply which tends to have an opportunity cost to the donor countries not only in the sense that it
results from misallocated agricultural resources but also in the sense, that it, partly replaces
capital aid, which may be used more effectively for development.
VIII. The usurpation of land by Agro-multinational corporations in Zimbabwe, for the production of
agrofuels has intensified food crisis as land is cultivated no longer for human consumption
IX. Food insecurity exists when people are undernourished as a result of the physical unavailability
of food, their lack of social or economic access to adequate food, and/or inadequate food
utilization, and depend on others for sustenance.
5.3 Recommendations
In the light of the findings, the following suggestions are made:
I. Against the prevailing character of political leadership that contributed to national development
crisis, and food insecurity in Zimbabwe; efforts must be made to restore and consolidate democracy
in Zimbabwe. The imperative for this is inherent in the fact that democracy represents a fulcrum in
the accepted values of contemporary international system. This will involve demilitarizing
Zimbabwean politics;
II. Instead of the productivist commodity production and exchange which make most developing
nations to relying on imports, there is need to shift emphasis back to the traditional concept of
greater self-sufficiency through increased local food production in developing countries, instead of
relying on (international markets )the High Food Sufficient Countries(HFSC) led by the United
States and other countries;
III. In view of the implications of the above observation, African states should adopt measures of
synergy, in the form of intra-industry trading so as to enable Africa to extract more trade returns
from her industrial raw materials. This is critical because instead of relying on commodity markets,
Africa (primary commodity producer) should support the initiative by some international
organizations (NGOs) aimed at developing alternatives to forge direct links with the consumers
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under''fair" trade arrangements, that can enable African countries of primary commodity producers
enjoy returns of about 200% above the same time, have a stake in the companies that process the
African raw materials into finished goods. In order to reduce developing nation‘s extremely
externally dependent food aid, the African government in particular and the developing countries
should, establish institutions and create mechanism for mobilizing and collocating development
funds from their nationals in Diaspora .This could be induced and facilitated by granting of dual
citizenship to persons who are citizens of Africa by birth but have become citizens of the developed
countries through other ways. The ability to harness any such potential in the case of Zimbabwe is
critical because nearly one-third of the Zimbabwean population is now estimated to be living
elsewhere the majority of these people driven out by the on-going political and economic crisis in
Zimbabwe;
IV. To enhance sustainable food production for food security, more sustainable agriculture is required
for long term food security and, an agricultural ecosystem approach (agro ecology), rather than
narrow production/yield objectives, is critical for resource-poor farmers ,local and regional rural
development goals must be linked with sustainable agriculture ,urban agriculture should be
encouraged to help the urban food-insecure needs
V. Food production should be increased at a greater rate than in recent years so as to provide enough
food for everyone,
VI. The agriculture policy paradigm in developing countries must be allowed to change. Countries
should have the policy space to expand public expenditure on agriculture. The imperative for this is
inherent in the fact that The economic and trade policies followed by many developing countries,
often at the advice of international financial institutions, or as part of multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements, have contributed to the stunting of the agriculture sector in developing countries. The
developing countries must be allowed to provide adequate support to their agriculture sector and to
have a realistic tariff policy to advance their agriculture, especially since developed countries‘
subsidies are continuing at a high level;
VII. The developed countries should quickly reduce their actual levels of subsidy. The actual levels (and
not just the bound levels) of agricultural domestic subsidies in developed countries should be
effectively and substantially reduced. There should also be new and effective disciplines on the
Green Box subsidies to ensure that this category does not remain an ―escape clause‖ that allows
distorting subsidies that are detrimental to developing countries.
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VIII. The developing countries like Zimbabwe should be allowed to calibrate their agricultural tariffs in
such a way as to ensure that the local products can be competitive and the farmers‘ livelihoods and
incomes are sustained, and national food security is assured;
IX. To improve the incentive effects of food aid, recipient countries should focus on efficient systems of
dual markets, while donors should emphasize more stable flows of food aid under long-term
commitments which do not preclude an effective variable emergency component.
X. Against the background of cultivating land for the production of agrofuels, land should be cultivated
for human consumption. Shifting from fossil fuels to agrofuels following the same market paradigm
will not increase the poor's access to energy but would aggravate existing problems such as land
grabs and create particular challenges to food supplies due to a shift from food cropping to fuel
cropping.
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APPENDIX
Appendix I :List Of Political Parties – in Zimbabwe
Major parties
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T)
Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara (MDC-M)
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) - Revived
Minor parties
International Socialist Organisation
Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara
National Alliance for Good Governance
Patriotic Union of MaNdebeleland
United People's Party
Zimbabwe African National Union - Ndonga
Zimbabwe African People's Union - Federal Party
Zimbabwe People's Democratic Party
Zimbabwe Youth in Alliance
Defunct parties
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Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe - At one time the former governing party, the Rhodesian Front
Forum Party
Patriotic Front
United Party
Rhodesian Action Party
Rhodesian Front Party
United African National Council
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Source: The Global Politician Magazine, May 6
Appendix II: Government Domestic Debt, 5 November 1999 to 31 January 2003: Z$’m
Governing parties Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) - Movement
for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) - Movement for Democratic
Change – Mutambara (MDC-M)
Minor parties Zimbabwe African National Union - Ndonga (ZANU-Ndonga) - National
Alliance for Good Governance (NAGG)- Zimbabwe People's Democratic
Party - Zimbabwe Youth in Alliance (ZYA)- International Socialist
Organisation (ISO) - United People's Party (UPP) - Patriotic Union of
MaNdebeleland (PUMA) - Zimbabwe African People's Union - Federal Party
(ZAPU-FP) - Zimbabwe Development Party (ZDP)
Defunct Parties Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) - Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU) - Rhodesian Front (RF) - Responsible Government
Association (RGA)
President Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF)
Prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T)
Key People Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU, ZANU - Ndonga) - Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) -
Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M) - Ian Smith (RF)
Armed Factions ZANLA (ZANU, ZANU-PF) - ZIPRA (ZAPU)
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Source: Robertson Economic Information Services Apr 16 2003.
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Appendix I1I:Retail Fuel Prices, January 1997 to April 2003
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services Apr 16 2003
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Appendix IV: Electrical energy produced and distributed
Key: 2001 based on 1st 10 months Source: Robertson Economic Information Services Apr 16 2003
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Appendix V: Manufacturing: All Groups Annual Indices
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services Apr 16 2003.
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Appendix VI: Manufacturing: 2001 and 2002 compared(Percentage Change)
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Source: Robertson Economic Information Services Apr 16 2003.
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Appendix VII: Metal and mineral production: 2001 and 2002 2001 2002 % Change
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services Apr 16 2003.
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