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Political Republicanism and Perfectionist RepublicanismAuthor(s): Paul WeithmanReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), pp. 285-312Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics

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Political Republicanism andPerfectionist Republicanism

Paul Weithman

In recent years, a number of political thinkersin philosophy, political theoryand law have defended political theories which are deeply indebted to classical

republicanism. Like classical republicans, these thinkers have claimed that a

flourishingpolity dependsuponcitizens' exerciseof the civic virtues.Unlikeclassical

republicans,some of these thinkershave defended what might be called "political

republicanisms"-republicanismswhich are also indebted to the

methodologicalrestraintof Rawls'spoliticalliberalism.The articlearguesthatpolitical republicanismsuffers froma viabilityproblem.Its list of civic virtues s too short.Moreworrisome,the publicjustificationsthatwould be available to a political republicanregime are

not sufficient to motivate the developmentof the civic virtues.Therefore, f we are

to be republicans,we should be "perfectionist republicans" nstead.

Whenwe call some trait of character ike patriotisma civic vir-

tue, we typically mean that it suits its possessorto contribute o her

society's good. But when we shift our attention-and emphasis-to the claim that it is a civic virtue, what we mean is ambiguousbetween two possibilities. We might mean that someone must be

patriotic if she is to be a good human being. Or we might mean

simply that she must be patrioticif she is to be a good citizen.Someone who means the first thinks of the civic virtues as hu-

man excellences, as traits which make their possessor a good or anexcellent or a flourishingmemberof her kind. This contribution o

human flourishing, she thinks, is what makes patriotism a virtue.She also thinks that that excellence has salutarysocial consequences,at least in favorablecircumstances.A person possessed of it is dis-

posed somehow to contribute to the good of her society. She isthereforea good citizen. The proponentof this view does not typi-cally think the connection between the virtues, humanflourishing,and good citizenship is mere happenstance. Asserting a strongerconnection is partof what is meantby philosopherswho claim that

human beings are naturallypolitical: because human beings needto live politically, the qualities that make them good citizens andenable them to live political life well are partially constitutive ofhuman excellence.

This article was originally drafted for a symposium on neo-republicanismsponsoredby the EasternDivision of the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation. I am

grateful o Dan Brudney,FrankMichelman,PhilipPetit,Phil Quinn,David Solomon,MichaelThrushand audiencesat the Universityof ChicagoLaw School and the Notre

Dame Center for Ethics and Culturefor helpful comments on earlierversions.



Someone who means the second commits herself to a muchweaker thesis. Waryof the philosopher's ability to identify human

excellence, she does not commit herself to the claim that contribut-

ing to human excellence is what makesa trait a civic virtue.Rather,what makes a trait a virtue is ultimately its relation to somethingthe value of which is, she thinks, far less controversial.In the case

of civic virtues, what makes these traits virtues is that they are the

qualities a person must have if she is to satisfy the demands of a

certain civic role, that of the citizen. However the value of being a

good citizen in a decent society is cashed out -if it needs cashingout at all-it will not be by drawingon a robustconceptionof hu-

man flourishing of which good citizenship is a part. If someoneelse wants to make the further claim that these qualities or civic

virtues are genuine human excellences, the advocate of this latter

view may not protest.But she does not go so far herself.A number of contemporaryrepublicanshave allied themselves

with the second view. Mindful of republicanism'straditionalinvo-

cation of a virtuous citizenry, they have argued that republican

governmentdepends upon citizens' possession of certain civic vir-

tues.Mindful, oo, of moralpluralism,hey avoidbasingtheirpoliticaltheories on controversialpremises about the human good. Instead

they invoke what they think are less controversialpremises about

the public good. They thereforeomit some of the traditionalcivic

virtues from their lists. And they refrainfrom claiming that the vir-

tues they do include are genuine human excellences. Instead theyclaim only that these traits are derivativelyvaluable statesof charac-

ter, countingas virtuesbecausethey suit theirpossessorsto takepart

in republicangovernment.They decline to make the furtherclaimthat doing so is partof a good human life. For reasonsthatwill be-

come clear,I shall referto the version of republicanismdefendedbythese contemporary hinkersas "political republicanism."

I will suggest that the political republicanlist of civic virtues

should be longer. Furthermore, he reasons a political republican

regime would give us for thinking some trait worth having would

affect our motives to develop and act from it. The problem with

presentingthe civic virtues as virtues in the weaker sense is that itmakes our motive to cultivate and sustainthem too heavily depen-dent upon our identificationwith our citizenship.This is too frail a

reed to support republican government in contemporary liberal

democracies.It is also considerably railer a reed thanthat on which

1. The phrase"decentsociety"is taken fromthe title of AvashaiMargalit,The

Decent Society (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1996).

286 THEREVIEWOF POLITICS



PERFECTIONISTREPUBLICANISM 287

many classical republicansrested their hopes. If political republi-cans are correctin claiming that republicangovernmentreally does

dependupon citizens' possessing the civic virtues, then my claims

imply that political republicanismdoes not adequately secure theconditions of its own success. I shall suggest that if we are to be

republicansat all, we would do better to embracewhat I shall call

"perfectionist republicanism,"2This is a republicanism hat values

and promotesthe civic virtues as genuine excellences of character.I will not arguefor the superiority f republican oliticaltheoryto

alternativepolitical philosophies such as classical or contemporaryliberalism.My conclusioncan thereforebe cast as a conditional:f re-

publicanism s the best political philosophyavailable,then we shouldbe perfectionist ather hanneo-republicans. or will I lay out the per-fectionistargumenthat civic virtues contribute o humanflourishing.These argumentsare familiar enough from the tradition.I want to

establishthe need for such arguments,rather than to rehearsethem

here.Thusmy primaryaims are to identifyand settlea disputewithin

contemporary epublicanism.This is a significant enough enterprisein its own right. Republicanismhas provena very attractive ntellec-

tual paradigm n a numberof disciplines, providinga framework orefforts which are constructiveas well as historical.It is importantosee what formof republicanisms most defensible.

Currentinterest in republicanism reflects a broader trend. Inrecent years political thinkers have turnedincreasingly to the his-

tory of their disciplines in hopes of recovering political theorieswhich might-with suitable adaptations-be serviceable under

contemporaryconditions. This turn to history has resulted in the

serious discussion of views which are variously Aristotelian,Thomist, Hobbesian, Lockean, Rousseauian, Kantian, Millian,

Hegelian or republican.It is far from obvious, however, that politi-cal theories which were framed to addresspolitical circumstances

quite different from our own can be recoveredand refurbishedfor

contemporaryuse. The best way to assess these recovery efforts is

by fine-grained analyses of the views that result, analyses which

2. The word "perfectionist" s meant to recall both John Rawls's use of theterm and descriptions of Joseph Raz's view as "perfectionist liberalism." Noconnection with extremeor Nietzcheanforms of perfectionismare intended. Rawls

applies the adjective "perfectionist" o theories like Aristotle's accordingto whichthe state has an interestin promotinghumanexcellence; see JohnRawls, A Theoryof Justice (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1971), p. 25. Raz's liberalismis said to be perfectionistbecause he arguesthatautonomous hoice is choice amongoptionsthataregenuinelyworthy;see JosephRaz, TheMoralityof Freedom Oxford:Oxford

UniversityPress,

1986), p.417.



288 THEREVIEWOFPOLITICS

pay careful attention to the ways in which modifications have al-tered the original view. I attemptone such analysis here.

The critiqueof political republicanisms also significantbecause

it turns on the social and political conditions for developing thecivic virtues. Even political theories which do not claim to be re-

publican-deliberative democratic theories and some liberal

theories, for example-claim that citizens need some of the quali-ties of characterwhich politicalrepublicansdescribe as civic virtues.Yet many of them say little about how those virtues are to be ac-

quired.My critique of political republicanismlinks the conditionsfor developingthe civic virtues to what is publicly said about their

value. If these othertheories account for the value of the civic vir-tues in the same way thatpolitical republicanismdoes, by appealingonly to politicalvalues, then it is possible thatmy critiqueof politi-cal republicanismcan be extended to those theories as well. If itcan be, then this may show something important,not only about

political republicanism, ut about otherpolitical conceptionsas well.I shall not, however, attemptsuch an extension here.

Let me begin by saying somethingmore aboutrepublicanism nd

aboutthe conditions any form of contemporary epublicanismmustsatisfy.In sectionsII andIII, I shall elaborate he distinctionbetween

political and perfectionistrepublicanism. n section IV, I shall arguethatcitizensmusthave the virtue of temperancewith respectto mate-rialpossessions f politicalrepublicanisms to be viable.In sectionV, I

arguethat political republicanregimes would not have the intellec-tual resourcesneededto sustainthatvirtueamongcitizens. In section

VI, I considervariousdefensesof political republicanism.

I

What has come to be called the "republican evival"in Ameri-

can law, as well as in Americanhistory,politicaltheory,andpolitical

philosophy s in fact a family of reactionsagainstthe formsof liber-

alism which were seen to dominate each of these fields. Historiansof the American Founding and its intellectual antecedents, most

notably John Pocock,3BernardBailyn,4and GordonWood,5reactedagainst the claim that Lockean individualism provided the ideo-

3. J. G.A. Pocock,TheMachiavellianMoment: lorentinePoliticalThought nd the

AtlanticRepublicanTraditionPrinceton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1975).4. BernardBailyn,The deologicalOriginsof theAmericanRevolutionCambridge,

MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1992).5. GordonWood, The Creation of the AmericanRepublic (Chapel Hill, NC:

Universityof North CarolinaPress, 1998).



PERFECTIONISTREPUBLICANISM

logical underpinnings of the founding.6 In law, Frank Michelman,7Cass Sunstein,8 and Suzanna Sherry9 reacted against the classical

liberalism-the libertarianism-that others found in the Constitu-

tion and held up as a standard for constitutional and legal

interpretation.10 In political theory, and philosophy, Michael Sandel

reacted against the Kantian liberalism of Rawls.1" Philip Pettit re-

acted against the identification of political freedom with negative

liberty.12

In philosophy, law, and political theory, thinkers engaged in

the revival attempted to frame republican legal and political theo-

ries appropriate for contemporary societies like the United States.

These theories were to preserve liberal advances over classical re-

publicanism, like liberal commitments to human rights and political

inclusiveness, while avoiding the inadequacies of the liberal theo-

ries they were meant to supplant. This required supplementingclassical republicanism to address concerns-like the concern for

personal autonomy-that sparked the development of the liberal

tradition but were peripheral to the republican one. To answer the

objection that republicanism is a form of ethical life which is un-

available under modern conditions,13 it required imagininginstitutional forms through which republican government can now

be exercised. Most important for present purposes, the revival of

6. For an overview and critique of the uses to which republicanismwas putonce it gained currency among historians, see Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism:The Careerof a Concept,"TheJournalof AmericanHistory 11 (1992): 11-38;I am

grateful to John McGreevy for this reference. For a deep and interestingreply to

Rogers, see G. Edward White, "Reflections on the 'Republican Revival':InterdisciplinaryScholarship n the Legal Academy,"YaleJournal of Law and theHumanities (1994): 1-36.

7. FrankMichelman,"Law'sRepublic,"YaleLawJournal97 (1988): 1493-1538.8. Cass Sunstein,"Beyond he RepublicanRevival,"YaleLawJournal97 (1988):

1539-90.9. SuzannaSherry,"The IntellectualOrigins of the Constitution:A Lawyer's

Guide to Contemporary istoricalScholarship,"ConstitutionalCommentary (1988):323-48.

10. See LauraKalman,TheStrangeCareerof LegalLiberalismNew Haven:Yale

UniversityPress, 1996), pp. 132-66.11. Michael J. Sandel,Democracy sDiscontent:America sSearch or a Public

Philosophy (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1996).12.PhillipPettit,Republicanism: Theory fFreedomand GovernmentCambridge:

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997).13. For this objection see Jeremy Waldron,"Virtue en Masse," in Debating

Democracys Discontent, ed. Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan (Oxford:Oxford

UniversityPress, 1998), p. 32; also BernardWilliams,"Saint-Just'sllusion,"in his

MakingSense of Humanity Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1995),pp. 135-50.

289




republicanismrequiredabandoningelements found in classical re-

publican writers because they were at odds with what seemed to

be liberal insights. It is because of their self-conscious commitment

to framinga reconstructedrepublicanism hat these authors are of-ten referredto as neo-republicans.

Any neo-republican theory-whether political or perfection-ist-must satisfy three conditions. First, it must be intellectually

satisfactory.It mustgive intellectually atisfyingaccountsof the core

notions of political theory, includingthe notions of citizenship,free-

dom and the public good. It must also offer plausible answers to

problems like "How do we know when a given political outcome

promotesor is consistent with the public good?" and "Underwhatconditions is the state's exercise of power legitimate?"Second, it

must be politically adequate.It must be capableof servingas a self-

sustaining public philosophy for a pluralistic democracy. This

requires that it be capable of informing the habits of thought and

conduct that enable citizens and public officials to sustain the po-litical practices the theory identifies as republican, and to realize

freedom and the public good as neo-republicans conceive them.

Third,if the theoryis to be called "neo-republican,"t must be his-torically responsible. It must have sufficient affinities to the

republican tradition of political thought running from Cicero to

Madisonthat it is plausible to locate the theory within it.

The last condition, while hardlyvacuous, is ratherloose. Neo-

republicanstypically drawupon historical materialsthat belong to

the earlier republicantradition. Those materials were written in a

varietyof circumstances, ften by politicalactorswho were respond-

ing to the quite differentpolitical dangers each perceived as mostsalient in his own time. Some worked under the threat of despo-tism, othersunderthe threatof imperialdesigns like those of Julius

Caesar,still others under the shadow of political dominationby a

ruling family like the Medici or a regional power like the PapalStates. Thinkersin the traditionaccordingly gave emphasis to the

republican deas that seemed the most effective political and intel-

lectual responses to the threats they faced. The result is a set of

texts which show strong enough family resemblancesand lines ofdescent to distinguish them from other traditions of political

thought,but which are sufficiently different in tone, emphasis and

guiding ideas that they could never be mistaken for clones.

Faced with these diverse materials, neo-republican theorists

abstractand systematize their leading ideas in different ways and

establish different orders of intellectual priority.FrankMichelman

turns to the republicantraditionto solve a persistent puzzle about




citizen sovereignty.John Pocock, by contrast,suggests that the lo-cation of sovereignty was a problemof at most secondaryconcernto the republican thinkers about whom he writes.14Philip Pettit

makes freedom, understood as nondomination, the "supreme po-litical value" of his neo-republican theory.15Michael Sandel, Cass

Sunstein, and Frank Michelmanendorse a form of neo-republican-ism that accords pride of place to self-government-somethingPettit thinks has only instrumentalvalue because it promotes his

preferredform of freedom.16Both sorts of neo-republicanism re, I

believe, historically responsible.Here I shall be concernedwith the

immensely influential neo-republicanisms that are centrally com-

mitted to self-government and with the perfectionist and politicalforms this republicanismcan assume.17

14. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment,p. 316: "Humanistpolitical thoughtexcelled at this sort of analysis, and subordinated he considerationof power to it;

liberty,virtue and corruption,rather than the location of authority,were its primeconcerns."

15. Pettit,Republicanism, . 8.

16. Ibid.17. Pettit'sneo-republicanisms also extremely nterestingandworthyof criticalexamination in its own right. Here I simply want to point out that the republicantradition is more complex, and his appropriationof it more selective, than his

historiography occasionally suggests. As I noted, Pettit takes freedom asnondomination by others as the "supreme political value" of his theory. Theachievementof this sort of political freedomis so valuable,Pettitthinks,because it

brings the independentsocial status that Pettit says was the mark of citizenship inthe republican radition.There is ample support n Pocock's historical work for theclaim that Italian and English republicansvalued such independenceand thought

it a shortstep fromdependence o corruption.On the otherhand,I am not awareofanything in Cicero's writings that suggests he noticed the tension between hisembrace of republicanismand the Roman institution of patronageand clientage,under which some citizens were very much dependent upon others. For the

importance f clientage n Cicero'sRome,see ErichS. Gruen,The Last Generation ftheRomanRepublic Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1995),pp. 435, 446; on

pp. viii-ix, Gruenstresses that clients' dependenceon their patronswas social aswell as political.Furthermore,epublicancitizenshipwas not always valuedbecauseof the social or political status it conferred.Sometimes it was sought for the accessit

broughtto economic benefits. See A.N.

Sherwin-White,TheRoman

Citizenship(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1980 ), p. 135. Pettit arguesthat makingfreedom as he understands t the central political value of his neo-republicanismfits with the contrastbetweenfreedomand slaverythat is so prominenta feature of

republican writing. This is because slaves' lack of freedom,Pettit thinks, consists

precisely in the fact that they are legally and socially dominated even by masterswho let them do what they like. But this seizes on one feature of the slave's statusat the expense of others that are arguablyof equal importance.To mention two

others, slaves are not typically consulted about the ends or organization of the

enterprises in which they are employed, and they are typically exploited in the



292 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

II

Neo-republicans who give self-government a central place intheir theories typically think that citizens should govern themselves

by public deliberation. That is, they think citizens should decideissues and choose representatives after processes in which theydeliberate-in which they offer one another reasons or arguments,rather than threats or bargains. Participants in these processesshouldbe free and equal. Deliberationsshouldbe inclusive, so thatcitizens can participateregardlessof point of view or group mem-

bership. The reasons they offer one another should bepublic-regarding,rather than self-regarding. They should be pro-posals to advance the good of the public rather than that of an

individual, section or faction.If neo-republicantheories are to be politically adequate, they

must identify conditionsnecessary for citizens to advancethe pub-lic good through well-conducted deliberation, and for them tomaintain the practices of deliberation over time so that they gov-

ern themselveswell in the long run.'8Theymust also say somethingabout how those conditions are to be satisfied in the societies to

which they are addressed, societies like the contemporaryUnited

States. What are those conditions?For many writers in the classical republicantradition,the con-

ditions of effective, sustainable self-government prominentlyincluded moral conditions. Republican governmentthat attains the

public good, they thought, requires a virtuous citizenry. The con-

cepts they used to describe the virtues and their opposites were

crude sense that those enterprisesare not reciprocallybeneficial. Their efforts are

expendedfor the benefit of othersin non-consensualarrangements.We can imagine

republican theories which made much of the opposition between slavery and

freedom,but which seized on these other featuresof slavery instead. Thus in some

moods Cicero made much of the importanceof consultation.The contrastAquinasdrew between the rule over slaves and political rule turned on the fact that slaves

are used for another'sbenefit; see ThomasAquinas, SummaTheologiae 1.96.4. AThomistrepublicanism ould take this distinction as its point of departure; erhaps

JacquesMaritainheld such a view.18. The questionof how to maintainrepublicangovernmentagainstthe ravages

of fortuna and of changingcircumstancewas central to the republican raditionof

thought.This theme is brilliantlyexploredby Pocock in his MachiavellianMoment.

The questionas Pocock conceives it is especially well put by Michael P. Zuckert,Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1994), p. 161. For a similar concernamongRoman and earlyAmericanrepublicans,see Wood, Creation, p. 51.





thick ethicalconcepts:fortitude,rectitude, ntegrity,dependence,servility,corruption. t least some writers n the tradition tressedthatthe civic virtuesweregenuinehuman xcellencesbecausecon-

tributingo thepublicgoodis partof the human ood.19Thevirtuesrequiredby republicangovernmentwere therefore houghtto bevirtuesin the strongsense. Finally,the virtuesrequired or self-

governmentwerethought o be verydemanding.ndeed heywere

thoughtso demandinghatthey couldnot be developedand sus-tainedsimplyby engagingn thepractices f politics n whichtheywere exercised.They required ignificantextra-political upport.This supportwas to take the formsof prevalentways of life like

yeomanryor soldiering,20ndprevalenteligiousorquasi-religiousbeliefs,deemedconducive o the civic virtues.21

In sum,partsof the classicalrepublicanradition, t least,of-fered highly moralizedtheories of politics. This is true of the

republicanismf theAmerican ounders.22t is equally rueof that

partof the republicanradition hatarguablynfluencedheAmeri-canFoundersmostprofoundly,he Roman epublicanismf Ciceroand Sallust.23For my purposes,the most important eatureof these

views is theirclaim thateffectiveandlastingself-governmente-quirescitizensto developandexercise raitsof character hicharegenuinehuman xcellences.Viewswhichendorse his areversionsof whatI call "perfectionistepublicanism."

Like perfectionistrepublicanism,he neo-republican ositionin which I am interesteddentifiescertaincivic virtuesnecessaryfor republicanovernment. ome of the mostprominentxponentsof thisview are,however,ndebted o a formof liberalismhatre-

fuses to build on theoriesof human lourishingor on traditional

19. See CiceroDe RePublica6.xxiii-xxvi.20. The connectionJeffersonsaw betweenyeomanryandrepublicanisms well

known. Montesquieu, on the other hand, famously thought that commerce was

necessary for republicangovernment;see Pocock, MachiavellianMoment,p. 441.For thinkers who believed that a republicrequiredcitizen-soldiers, MachiavellianMoment,pp. 203, 243-44, 271, 413.

21. Religious belief was long thought necessary to sustain American

republicanism;see StephenMacedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in aMulticulturalDemocracy (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1999). By"quasi-religious beliefs" I mean the belief in personal immortality that is so

prominentn CiceroDe Re Publica 6.ixff.22. For the founderson civic virtuegenerally,see Wood,Creation,pp. 65ff.23. For Cicero,see the textjust cited at supranote 24; also his De Officiis.For

Sallust,see CatalinaeConiuratio.For the influence of Romanrepublicanism n theFounders,ee Wood,Creation, p.48-53;Bailyn,IdeologicalOrigins,p. 25; andStanleyElkins andEricMcKitrick,TheAge of Federalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,

1993),pp. 6, 48.




views of humanexcellence. The civic virtues on which they dwellare not the cardinal virtues that were traditionallyopposed to de-

pendency and personal corruption. Instead they are the traits

citizens need to talk with one anotheras equals in the public fora ofa contemporarypluralistic society. These neo-republicans tress thatcitizens must be willing to participatein politics,24that they mustoffer public-regardingustificationsfor the policies they favor,25hat

they should attempt to understandpoints of view different fromtheir own,26thatthey should be prepared o "reconsider their]endsand commitments."27 urthermore,n calling these virtues civic vir-

tues, these neo-republicansare making a claim about their value.

That claim is the weaker of the two I distinguished at the outset.Civic virtues are valuable traitsof characterbecausethey make their

possessors good citizens, equippingthem to contributeto the pub-lic good understood as the outcome of well-conducted publicdeliberation. There is not said to be any further connection with

genuine human excellence. As Cass Sunsteinsays of his own view:

Some of those who value civic virtue emphasize the improvement of

individual character-as in the classical formulation-while othersunderstand it as a precondition for the achievement of social justice. On

the second view, civic virtue is necessary for participation in publicdeliberation, and it is instrumental to a well-functioning deliberative

process. The second view is the principal object here.28

I suggested that the focus on the deliberative virtues and the

weak account of why those virtues are valuable pay the neo-

republican'sdebt to a form of liberalism.Some neo-republicansare

indebtedto this liberalismfor isolatingone of the requirementsheirviews must satisfy if they are to meet the political adequacy condi-

tion. The liberalism in question eschews theories of human

flourishingbecause the societies to which it is addressedare mor-

ally and religiously pluralistic.These societies are characterizedby

deep disagreement about the good life. No normative theory of

politics which requirescitizens to accept a view of human flourish-

ing can gain citizens'allegiance,hence none can be politicallyviable.

24. Michelman,"Law'sRepublic,"p. 1503.

25. Sunstein,"RepublicanRevival,"p. 1550.

26. Ibid.,p. 1555.27. Michelman,"Law'sRepublic,"p. 1528.

28. Sunstein,"RepublicanRevival,"p. 1541 note 8; also Michelman,"Law's

Republic,"pp. 1550-51; and QuentinSkinner,"The RepublicanIdeal of Political

Liberty,"n MachiavelliandRepublicanism,d. Bock, Skinnerand Viroli(Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990), pp. 297, 307-309.




Accepting this line of thought,some contemporary epublicansalsorefuseto build theirpoliticaltheories on theoriesof the humangood.They therefore distance themselves from what Sunstein calls the

"classical formulation"of the civic virtues-and the classical list-in order to satisfy the political adequacy requirement.These arethe thinkersI refer to as "political republicans."

I want to query whether this attemptto meet the political ad-

equacy requirementundermines the political republican's abilityto satisfy it. I suggest thatemphasison the deliberativevirtues leadsto the not so salutaryneglect of a civic virtue that was morepromi-nently discussed earlier in the republicantradition, at times when

political theory could be more overtly moralized without failing tobe politically adequate.I also suggest that the political republicanaccount of why that virtue would be valuable leaves citizens tooweak an incentiveto develop and act on it. When citizens of a plu-ralisticsociety like oursregardthe virtue as a virtue simply becauseof its connection to effective self-government, they may not havethe motivation they need to be civically virtuous. To ask whetherthis is so I shall focus, not on one of the obviously deliberativevir-

tues, but on the cardinal virtue of temperance. Before doing so,however, let me comment on my applicationof the label "politicalrepublican" o those who rely on a weak view of the civic virtues.

III

The term "politicalrepublicanism"s, of course, reminiscentofJohn Rawls's term "political liberalism." Rawls famously distin-

guishes political from comprehensive iberalismby three conditions.

Accordingto the first, the centralfocus of a political conceptionof

justice is society's basic institutions, the norms that apply to themand the ways "thosenorms are to be expressedin [citizens'] charac-ter and attitudes."These ways of expressing the norms include thevirtuescitizensmustnormallyhave if they are to do theirpartin themaintenanceof just institutions.Accordingto the second condition,political conceptions can be presented independentof comprehen-sive doctrines.Theythereforeaccount or the value of the civic virtueswithout appealingto claims abouthumanflourishingor aboutwhatmakes human life worth living. According to the third condition,political conceptions are worked out from fundamentalideas seenas implicit in the public political cultureof constitutionalregimes.

Nothing in Rawls's statementof the threeconditions mplies thatthe distinctionbetweenpolitical and comprehensiveconceptionscan

only be drawnamong liberal conceptions, as Rawls would readily

295



acknowledge.29It should therefore be possible to develop politicalversions of neo-republicanism or, what I call "politicalrepublicanisms." oliticalrepublicanisms re republican heories that

satisfy Rawls's three conditions. Like political liberalismsthey arerestrictedin scope and are capable of being presented independentof comprehensivedoctrines.They include accountsof the civic vir-

tues, but do not explain the value of the civic virtues by appeal to

comprehensivedoctrine.They are also workedup from fundamen-tal ideas implicit in the public political culture of constitutional

regimes like the United States and othernorthAtlanticdemocracies.

As I have stressed, he resurgenceof republicanismn the last de-

cadeanda half has been the resultof a self-conscious evival.It is theresultof attempts o revive a strainof politicalthoughtthat is a part,albeita previouslyneglectedpart,of the political radition f the United

States,England, he Netherlands, ndItaly.Muchof the workof those

contributing o the revival has been historical or has drawnon the

workof historians o show thatrepublicanisms partof that tradition.

Thisworkhasbeen doneto makeclaimsfor thejustifiability f repub-licanismat least initiallyplausible.For if a revived republicanisms

presentedas based on ideasto be foundin the NorthAtlantic raditionor on ideaspresent n the publiccultureof, say,the UnitedStates,citi-

zens may be more easily persuaded hat republicanism ohereswith

theirconsideredudgments.At least,theywill be moreeasilypersuadedif the republicanismn questionis a neo-republicanismwhich incor-

porates iberalcommitments o rights.Thuscontemporary roponentsof republicanism ave, in effect, triedto show thatrepublicanismat-

isfies the thirdof the threeconditionswhich definepoliticalconceptions.

The interest of the other two conditions on political concep-tions-and the distinction between political and comprehensive

republicanisms-has been more clearly recognized by some con-

temporary republicans than others. Because of Michael Sandel's

early criticisms of Rawls, we might expect to find the distinction

clearly drawnin his more recent defense of republicanism,thoughit seems to be thereonly implicitly.30 uzannaSherryseemsto grasp

29. JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalismNewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p. 374.

30. There s one passagein which he could be takento say thatrepublicansmaydivide between political and comprehensive republicanisms,though this readingstrains the text and Sandel does not say which republicanism he would prefer

DemocracysDiscontent,p. 338. The tenorof DemocracysDiscontent uggeststhat he

thinksof republicanismas a comprehensivedoctrine.Whenpressed laterby critics

to say whetherhe is a "strong"or a "weak"republican,Sandelrepliedin termsthat

suggest his republicanism s comprehensive,though his reply did not refer to the

distinctionbetweenpolitical and comprehensiveviews; Allen and Regan, Debating

DemocracysDiscontent, p. 324-27.

296 THE REVIEWOFPOLITICS




the distinction between perfectionist and political republicanism,and to defend the weak acocunt of the civic virtues characteristic

of political republicanism.31The distinctionbetween political and

comprehensive republicanisms seems to be drawn most explicitlyby RichardDagger in his discussion of Rawls's work.32Thereare

problems with the way Dagger distinguishes political from com-

prehensive views.33 Still, Dagger's remarksshow that he sees the

possibility of a political republicanism.The identificationand study of this possibility would be of in-

terest even if no working political theorist had clearly formulated

31. Sherry notes that the republicanismwhich was currentin the American

foundingperiod "stemmed from the classical traditionof political participationas

the highest humangood" (Suzanna Sherry,"WithoutVirtue There Would Be No

Liberty,"MinnesotaLaw Review 78 [1993]: 69). When Sherry lays out her own

proposalsfor education n the civic virtues, she conspicuouslystops short of claims

about the highest humangood; see "WithoutVirtue,"pp. 75ff. See also Suzanna

Sherry, "Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship," University of

ChicagoLaw Review62 (1995): 172. Herreticence,in conjunctionwith her remarks

about eighteenth-centuryAmericanrepublicanism, suggest that she favors a moremodest and perhapsa political republicanism,one that gives a weaker account of

the civic virtues. As if to confirmthis, Sherry says that the "moralcertitudeof the

earlierrepublicaneras has been irretrievably ost; we no longer have faith in God,natural law or even a humantelos that lent virtue its incontestabilityin the past"

(Sherry, "ResponsibleRepublicanism,"pp. 143-44).32. As Daggernotes nearthe end of his book Civic Virtues:Rights,Citizenship

and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Rawls

distinguishes classical republicanism from civic humanism. The former, Daggerwrites, is "themore modest view that citizens of a democraticsociety must exhibit

'to a sufficient degree' the political virtues, as Rawls has defined them, and 'be

willing to take partin political life."' By contrastcivic humanism,he continues,"is

a comprehensive doctrine, 'a form of Aristotelianism' in which 'taking part in

democraticpolitics is viewed as the privilegedlocus of the good life."' Both quotesare fromp. 186.According o Dagger,Rawls claims thatjustice as fairness s a form

of classical republicanism.Because justice as fairness is a political conception of

justice it follows that it is, on Dagger's reading,a political republicanism.33. In an attempt to show that Rawls's distinction between political and

comprehensiveviews is not clearly drawn,Dagger introducesa distinction between

views which are "implicitly" and "explicitly comprehensive." Implicitlycomprehensiveviews are those that rely on a conception of the nonpolitical goodbut do so implicitly rather than explicitly. Dagger then argues that Rawls's view,while ostensibly political must be implicitly comprehensive.It must, that is, relyimplicitly on a conception of the nonpolitical good. The crucial step in Dagger'sargument or this conclusionis the claim thatjustice as fairness is not neutral n itsforeseen but unintended affects. For this line of argument,see Civic Virtues,pp.188-91. I would argue that to make the distinction between political and

comprehensiveviews dependent upon the difference between neutralityand non-

neutralityof foreseen but unintended affects is mistaken, though I cannot pursue

the matter here.



and defendedpolitical republicanism.For if the distinction between

political conceptions of justice and comprehensivedoctrines is in-deed significant, then it is surely interestingto learn which views

in the history of political thoughtcan plausibly be reformulatedaspolitical conceptions and which cannot. This is especially true ofviews such as republicanism,which had so profoundan influenceon the development of Westernliberal democracies and which is

presentedas a rival to various forms of liberalism,including politi-cal liberalism. It would surely be interestingto learn whether thosethat cannot be reformulatedplausibly cannot be because they failto be intellectuallysatisfactory,politically adequateor because they

fail some othercondition.The studyof political republicanismmightalso show that the distinction between political and comprehen-sive republicanisms, though tenable, is not the most illuminatingdistinction to draw between republicanviews or not the most illu-

minating to draw for some purposes.34But as I have already suggested, political republicanism s not

a previouslyunidentifiedpossibility. This possibility has been seenmost clearly by Sunstein and Michelman, two thinkers whose re-

marks about the civic virtues suggest that they wish to accountfor the value of those virtues while eschewing comprehensivedoc-trine. They do not refer to their own views as "politicalrepublicanism," but they have most fully grasped the implica-tions of Rawls's political turnfor work in the republicantradition.Like other participants in the republican revival, they draw onhistorical work to show, in effect, that their republicanisms sat-

isfy Rawls's third condition. They also recognize that questions

about the civic virtues fall within the scope of their views, consis-tent with Rawls's statement of his first condition. But theyrecognize-at least implicitly-the importance of satisfyingRawls's second condition when they answer those questions. Bysatisfying the three conditions, they presumably hope to gain the

advantages that Rawls thinks his own view enjoys over compre-hensive liberalisms. They hope to frame views which are worked

up from ideas which are familiar because present in the shared

political culture of constitutional democracies. And they hopethose views will be widely acceptable because they avoid the

deeper controversies which divide the societies they address.

34. As Amy Gutmannseems to think that for purposesof justifying programsof democratic education, the distinction between political and comprehensiveliberalisms is less importantthan the distinction between liberalisms which are

"deeply partisan"and those which are not; see her "Civic Education and Social

Diversity,"Ethics 105 (1995):575.





The study of political republicanismmay suggest what strengthsand weaknesses to look for in other conceptions that are politicaland that share certain essential features with political republican-

ism, such as the emphasis on self-governance and the list of civicvirtues deemed necessary for self-government. Deliberative demo-cratic theories, for example, also emphasize self-government and,at least in some versions, claim that citizens must have certain de-

liberativevirtuesif they are to governthemselves.It is not surprisingthat Sunstein and Michelman are among the foremost proponentsof deliberative democracy.35Both move easily between republicanand deliberative views. In one recent work, Sunstein suggests that

for purposes of understandingAmerican constitutionalism, thereis not a significant difference between the two.36 Some deliberativedemocratic theories are also egalitarian,37as I shall claim politicalrepublicanism s. I would arguethat they thereforerequirecitizensto have the civic virtue of temperance,as I shall claim political re-

publicanism does. As we shall see, it is the conjunction of an

important feature of temperance which I shall call "broadbasedness" on the one hand, with political republicanism's com-

mitments to self-government and egalitarianismon the other, thatleaves it vulnerableto critique.This suggests thatpolitical versionsof deliberative democracy may be similarly vulnerable.

Of course only a careful examinationof deliberativedemocratictheories would settle the matter. The advantageof examining po-litical republicanisms thatviews aremost easily assessed in contrastwith their rivals. In the case of political republicanism,there is anatural rival readily available for comparison. The history of the

republicantradition itself provides that rival in the form of perfec-tionist republicanism.That history also shows that republicanismhas traditionallybeen thought to requirecertain moral conditions.

Teasing out why suggests criticisms that might be pressed againstpolitical versions of deliberative democracy.38

35. Forjust two of the many constructiveworks in which Sunstein defends it,see Cass Sunstein, ThePartial Constitution(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1993) and his One Case at a Time Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,

1999).36. He writes of "theway the Americanconstitutionunderstands the concept

of a republic], n terms of a deliberativeapproacho democracy";ee Cass Sunstein,Republic.Cor (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001), p. 37.

37. See JoshuaCohen,"TheEconomicBasis of DeliberativeDemocracy," ocial

Philosophy ndPolicy6 (1988):25-50.38. For a clear statementof such a theory,see JoshuaCohen,"Deliberation nd

DemocraticLegitimacy," n The Good Polity, ed. Hamlin and Pettit (Oxford:Basil

Blackwell, 1989),pp. 17-34.



Here, however, I am concerned with political republicanism.The question I now want to press is whetherthe views of politicalrepublicans,if implemented,could allow a political republicanre-

gime to encouragethe virtues they themselves think citizens needto sustain it.

IV

The achievement and maintenance of economic justiceshould be high on the agenda of any government. I assume

that taxation and redistribution of income and wealth areamong the means of achieving economic justice that have to be

considered and sometimes implemented. I also assume that

republicans are especially sympathetic to the egalitarian dis-

tribution of income and the dispersal of wealth. For inequalitiesof income and wealth may make some citizens financially de-

pendent upon others. This, in turn, may compromise the

political freedom and equality of the dependents. Moreover,

republicans may fear that concentrations of wealth will con-centrate political power because of the ability of the wealthy to

exercise unequal influence. And so I assume republicans will

insist that taxation, redistribution, restrictions on

intergenerationaltransfers, and restrictions on the use of moneyin politics, all receive very serious consideration.

Clearly if citizens are to consider and, when necessary,

implement such measures, they will have to be properly dis-

posed to income, wealth and possessions. The elements of therelevant dispositions are quite complex, and they are likely to

be quite demanding of those who are better off. Reaching and

abiding by just outcomes may well require those citizens to be

somewhat detached from material wealth and from the pres-

tige that wealth confers. Giving serious consideration to

egalitarian measures will require them to be ready to part with

some of what they have and to refrain from rationalizing their

possession of it in public deliberation. It will also require themto be reflective about the effects of their first order dispositionson their own capacities for judgment, hence to be self-effacingabout the personal and political consequences of being undulyattached to material possessions. In sum, governance which is

just by republican standards may well require citizens-espe-

cially the better off-to develop and exercise important forms

of temperance.

THEREVIEWOFPOLITICS00




This is especially so if the government s to be republican gov-ernment conducted by inclusive public deliberation. Some forms

of liberalism are consistent with a relatively passive citizenry.

They do not particularly value citizens' political participation.They do require that citizens be temperate enough to complywith just legislation but the sanctions which attend noncompli-ance provide strong incentives to obey. Republican government,however, is self-government. It requires temperate behavior forwhich citizens have no comparable incentives. Republican citi-zens are, for example, to cast public- rather than self-regardingvotes for candidates. This implies that they must be ready to

support candidates who, if elected, may ask them to make sacri-fices so that others can have more. Citizens are also to take partin public deliberation about issues, offering public-regardingarguments for the policies they regard as just. This implies that

they must be ready to argue for proposals which could imposesignificant costs on them. In neither of these cases is the readi-ness reinforced by the threat of legal sanction. Republicangovernment thus requires an especially high degree of volun-

tary, noncoerced temperance. It requires, as classical republicansrecognized, an especially virtuous (or perhaps an especially con-

tinent) citizenry.Political republicansmight well accept this point. Nothing they

say is inconsistent with it. If convinced that temperanceis neces-

sary for adequate self-government,they might agree that it shouldbe considered a civic virtue along with the more obviously delib-erative qualities they explicitly mention. It is interestingthat they

have said little about temperance and that their list of civic vir-tues would have to be expanded to include it. As I mentioned

earlier, I attributethis reticence to a reluctance to endorse the tra-ditional theories of human flourishing that accorded temperancean importantplace. But I do not want to make too much of this

suggestion. Instead I shall simply assume political republicanswould acknowledge that republican government requires a tem-

perate citizenry.

My own view is that some orientations toward wealth andconsumptionmake us worse as people. Among the many ways inwhich they do so is by dulling us to the claims of the spiritual,broadlyunderstoodas including the intellectual, the aesthetic, andthe religious, and by deafening us to the claims of others on ourresources. Temperanceis a corrective which orients us properlytoward wealth and consumption. When properly developed, it isa human excellence. There is no way of determining what the

301




proper or temperate orientation toward these things is without

principles of justice.39There is at least thatmuch truthto the claimthat the virtues are unified. Because temperancemust be informed

by justice, it is a civic virtue-in the strong sense.These views, the view that better people make better citizens

and the attractionsof self-government,all contributeto the appealof some version of perfectionist republicanism.One such versionwould be a republicanismthat is reconciled to big governmentasthe most effective counterweightto concentrationsof private eco-nomic power. Such a republicanism would also value

self-government, thinking that an informed, public-spirited, and

vigilant citizenry is necessary to forestall devolution into what deTocqueville famously referred o as "soft despotism"by an increas-

ingly powerful state.40 Like traditionalrepublicanism, t would be

39. Indeed Thomas Aquinas, who calls the proper orientation toward these

things "liberality," argues that that orientation is part of justice rather than

temperance;ee SummaTheologiae11-11,117,5d 2. Some will think thatAquinas scorrect.Temperance, hey may think, cannot be a civic virtue for it seems to be a

self-regardingvirtuehavingto do with the properregulationof one's own appetitesfor food, drink and sex. Note first, however, that even apparently self-regardingvirtuescan also be civic virtues,for actionsthatproceedfrom themcan havepoliticalconsequences.Aquinashimself recognizesthis at SummaTheologiae1-11,61,5wherehe grantsthat in one sense, all the naturalvirtues are political virtues.Furthermore,Thomas'sargument hat the virtue at issue is partof justice rather hantemperancedoes not turn, as the objection does, on a distinction between self-regardingand

civic virtues. Insteadit turns on one between appetitesand pleasures of the bodyon the one hand, and those of the soul ("concupiscentia .. et delectatio ... animalis")on the other.Temperance,he says, regulatesthe former;he numbersthe desire for

and delight in money and possessions among the latter.By classifying delight in

money and possessions among the pleasures of the soul, Aquinas draws attentionto a fact I would also stress.The undue attachmento wealth andpossessionshas a

significant intellectualcomponent.It often arises from reflection on the statuswe

think wealth and possessions confer. But the unqualifieddistinctionAquinasseems

to draw between pleasures and appetites of the body and those of the soul is

untenable. Bodily pleasures and appetites also have significant intellectual

components.This is clear from the role of fantasyin sexualdesire and from the factthat educated tastes can make the pleasures of food and drink more nuancedand

enjoyable.Once we recognize the untenabilityof Thomas'sdistinction,the way isclear to argue that the pleasures of possession are among those governed by

temperance.It seems to me that they are.The connectionsI have assertedamong status,reflection and the pleasuresof

possession seem to have been recognized by Cicero; see the counsel againstostentatiousdwellingsat De OfficiisI, 139-40. Theseparagraphsf De Officiisfall in

the section of the work devoted to temperance.Thus though it is not clear, Cicero

may side with me and against Aquinas on which virtue regulates our attachmentto wealth and possessions.

40. See CharlesTaylor,The Ethics of Authenticity Cambridge,MA: Harvard

UniversityPress, 1992), p. 9.




wary of political dependence, particularlythe interdependenceof

governing and economic elites. It would also be perfectionist in

that it would view the civic virtues requiredfor self-governmentas

genuine human excellences. I cannot develop and defend such aview here; indeed such a view may have serious problems of its

own. To indicate its advantagesover political republicanism, want

to examine the practical consequences of a political theory whichclaims that temperanceis a civic virtue only in the weak sense. I

want, that is, to query the practical consequences of claiming that

it is a qualityof characterwhich is valuable because it is necessaryfor self-government while remaining silent about whether it is a

genuine human excellence.

V

Let me begin by defusing an objection that might be thoughtfatal to the political republicanview. Temperancewith respect tomaterialpossessions, it might be thought, is broad-based.Temper-ance effects a certain orientationtoward materialpossessions. That

orientation manifests itself in characteristic actions and attitudeswhere materialpossessions are concerned. Public deliberation and

voting may be among the activities which engage temperance,but

they are not the only ones. A truly virtuous orientation owardpos-sessions also shows itself in activities that have nothing to do with

politics. It shows itself in many areas of private life as well. If itdoes not, then the person in question does not really have the vir-tue after all. Because a temperateorientation hows itself in so many

areas that have nothing to do with republicangovernment,the ob-jection concludes,it is a mistake to seize on the connectionbetween

temperanceand politics to explain why temperanceis a virtue.The political republicancould reject the claim about the broad-

basedness of temperance. She could appeal to the intuitivelyplausible claim that civically virtuouspeople betraywhat look likeinconsistent orientations toward material possession. They show

austerity in some areas and self-indulgence in others. So long as

someone's self-indulgence does not impede her ability to contrib-ute to and act on the outcomes of public deliberation, her

self-indulgence is not inconsistent with the ascriptionof civic vir-tue. To deny this and insist on broad-basedness is to impose too

demanding a standardof virtue-ascription.This reply to the objectionis suggested by a traditionalview of

the civic virtues.Accordingto that view, the civic virtue of temper-ance does not confer or requirean ideal orientation owardmaterial

possessions, nor does the virtue make its possessor ideally temper-

303



ate. It merely makes its possessor temperateenough to be a goodcitizen. That, it might be thought, is consistent with quite a bit of

laxity in private life. This "good enough"view of the civic virtues

might be very attractive to the political republican who endorsesthe weak view of what makes civic virtues.On the weak view, whatmakes a qualityof charactera virtue is that it suits its possessorfor

citizenship.It is naturalfor someone who accepts this to think thatall a qualityof charactermust do to qualify as a civic virtue is suit

its possessor for citizenship. It is natural,that is, for someone who

endorses the weak view of the civic virtues to endorse the "goodenough"view of the civic virtues as well.

I am inclined, however, to think that some version of broad-basedness is correct.As I have already suggested, the temperanceneeded for contributing o public deliberationabout tax policy, say,and for adhering readily to its verdicts manifests a deeper orienta-

tion toward our income, wealth, and consumption. It may be

consistent with a certain amount of self-indulgence. But there istruth to the remark that "where your treasure is, there also yourheart shall be."41 Recast in more prosaic and political terms: too

deep an attachment o our pocketbooksmakes us too readyto votethem. Too strongan attraction o our money and the things it buysmakes it too difficult for us to part with money when justice de-

mands it. The orientationtowardincome, wealth, and consumptionthat is necessary for someone to perceive and act on the demands

of justice, and sincerely to deliberateabout what she may have to

give up, needs reinforcement in private life. Even someone who

accepts the "good enough"view of the civic virtues should recog-

nize that.I therefore think the political republicanshould grant that the

civic virtue of temperancerequires a family of affective, intellec-

tive, and appetitive dispositions which are exercised in activities

seemingly unrelatedto citizenship. Consistentwith her theory, she

can stick to her claim that, appearances of incongruity notwith-

standing, the members of this family are valuable simply because

they equip their possessors for self-government.The pressing ques-

tion for the political republican s whetheraccountingfor the valueof temperancethis way diminishes the likelihood that citizens will

develop and act from it. It seems to me that it does, and thatrecog-

nizing the truthof some formof broad-basednessmakesthe problemeven more pressing.

Much of the time virtuous action takes place, if not automati-

cally, at least with little reflection on our motives, on the deeper

41. Luke 12:34.





dispositions to which those motives are connected, or on the valueof the dispositions and attitudes that comprise the virtue. There

are, however, occasions on which we do reflect about these mat-

ters. We may ask whether a virtue is worth acquiring or is worthtraining n a differentdirection,so that it motivatesa new family ofactions. Or we may ask whether the quality which the occasionseems to call on really is worthhaving or worthacting from. Someof these are occasionson which we are exhortedby others to be justor faithful or to show some self-restraint. Some are occasions onwhich we are tempted not to act from these virtues, or when wefind it difficult to do so. We may then remind ourselves of the kind

of personswe aspireto be and recall why we think certainqualitiesare worth acting from even under difficult circumstances.At timeslike these, what we believe about the value of the virtues matters.

If all that political republicans are preparedto say about thecivic virtues is that they are valuable because they make their pos-sessors good citizens, this will show itself in the public culture and

governmentaction of a political republicanregime. The weak viewof the civic virtueswill informpublic practicesof criticism and en-

couragement, and individual reflection on action with politicalconsequences. When young people are publicly educated in the

rightforms of temperance, hey will be told thattemperances worth

cultivatingbecause it will make them good citizens. When politicalleaders exhort constituents to relinquish earnings because tax rev-enues are needed to fund governmentprograms,they will say thatit is characteristic of the good citizen to defer gratification for

justice's sake. When citizens are tempted to do the intemperate

thing, what the political republicancounts on to check them is theknowledge that temperance s one of the virtues of a good citizen.Public morality in a political republican regime will therefore be

morality which stops with the invocation of political values. Edu-

cation, exhortation,self-examination,and self-restraintwill be quitedifferent in a perfectionist republicanregime. There public moral-

ity, public education,and political oratorycould trade on the claimsthat helping to govern one's society is partof a well-lived life and

that the temperance requiredfor doing so is a human excellence.The tendencies to be counteredby political republicaneduca-

tion, exhortation,and self-restraintare obviously very powerful. If

they are to be effective against these tendencies, people must care

very greatly about living up to the demands of citizenship. This isclear once we appreciatethe truth of broad-basedness.Accordingto broad-basedness, the temperance required for republican citi-

zenship is connected to dispositions which show themselves in

many other areas of life. Developing and exercising the former re-

305



quires developing and exercising the latter. If the only incentive

political republicanscan offer for developing the formeris the im-

portanceof living up to the demandsof citizenship,it is hard to see

that they could offer any other incentive for the latter either. Ourcitizenship would therefore have to regulate large stretches of our

lives, both public and private.Some thinkersin the republicantraditionthoughtthat it could,

at least with the right kind of education. American revolutionaryBenjaminRush famously gave extreme expression to this thought,saying that "[i]t is possible to convert men into republican ma-chines." In the ideal republican education, Rush continued, the

Americanwould "be taughtthat he does not belong to himself, butthat he is public property."42No political republican, however,would endorseso illiberal a goal of civic education.Yet withoutan

extremely heavy-handededucationalprogram,it is not at all clearthe membersof contemporarydemocracieswill value their citizen-

ship highly enough or identify with it to a sufficient degree to spurdevelopment of the republicanvirtues. It is certainly not obviousthat they care enough aboutbeing good citizens to let the demands

of citizenshipgovernas much of their lives as they would have to ifI am right about the broad-basednessof temperance.There is alsosome evidence-in the form of low rates of voter turnout and po-litical participationand the low level of effort people expend ontheir own political education-that Americans do not attach great

importanceto doing what a good republicancitizen would do.This empirical point serves a deeper aim. For many people in

large democratic republics, the identity of republican citizenship

is reflectively escapable. Their felt need to participatein self-gov-ernmentis not urgent. Reflecting on their lives, their many social

roles, and the demands on their time, they can distance them-selves from the role of self-governing citizen or reject it entirelywith relatively few perceptiblecosts. In this the identity of repub-lican citizen differs significantly from that of moral agent. Moral

agency is not reflectively inescapable. It is not logically impos-sible for someone to reject the view that she is a moral agent and

to reject the claims that that identity makes upon her. Moral skep-ticism is a coherent position. But the costs of this rejection tosomeone's self-esteem, and to her abilities to deliberateand choose,are incomparably higher.

This is because the categories and norms associated with ourmoral agency are much more deeply implicated in our practical

42. Citedat Wood, Creation,p. 427.





thinking than are those connected with republican citizenship. We

might be able to reason about whether to spend more or shelterincome while denying the relevance of asking what a good citizen

would do. It is much more difficult to do so while denying the rel-evance of questions about what it is good to do or right to do orwhat the good person would do. This is why the exhortationto bea good person can gain a greater purchase than the exhortationtobe good republicancitizen. This is also why it is much cheaperforsomeone to ask why she should do what the good republicanciti-zen would do than it is for her to ask why she should do what the

good personwould do. And this, in turn,is one of the reasonswhy

describingcivic virtues as moralexcellences can be much morecom-pelling than simply describing them as excellences of citizenship.The perfectionist republican is able to take advantage of this bylinking the two, and promoting good citizenshipas an element of a

good humanlife. The political republican,on the other hand, must

forego this advantage.

VI

What argumentscan political republicansoffer for valuing citi-

zenship more highly? What arguments can they offer that wouldshow the price of rejecting republicancitizenship to be dearer thanI have estimated?

Perhaps they will argue that living up to the demands of

citizenship is both attractive in its own right, because citizensare to be tolerant, open-minded and public-spirited, and neces-

sary for self-government. Perhaps they will argue thatself-government by public deliberation is both attractive in itsown right, because deliberation is to be empowering, inclusiveand public-regarding, and necessary for the achievement of cor-rect political outcomes. And perhaps they will argue that theachievement of correct outcomes is of paramount importancebecause outcomes determine the distribution of social benefitsand burdens. This distribution, in turn, conditions all citizens'

chances in life. These connections among the civic virtues, self-government, and justice make a strong moral case for valuingcitizenship quite apart from any further claims about theexcellences of the civic virtues. In fact, it might be said, the caseis so compelling that no real difference would be made by ap-pending claims of this kind to it. Anyone who would reject thecase would also reject the one that resulted from conjoining itwith stronger claims.

307



There are, however, some difficulties with this line of thought.First,politicalrepublicanismaces an assuranceproblem hatper-

fectionistrepublicanismdoes not. The arguments supposedto make

republican itizenshipattractive noughto each personthatshe caresaboutdeveloping he virtuesof the good republican itizen. It dependscruciallyuponconnectionsamongcivic virtue,well-conductedpublicdeliberation,andjust outcomes. This connectiononly holds when all

citizens, or when a suitably large number of them, possess and actfrom the civic virtues.A singleperson'spossessionand exercise of thevirtues is not enough. For the argument o make republicancitizen-

ship attractive o someone, she must therefore have some assurance

thatit also makescitizenshipattractive o others.She must have somereasonto believe thatthey will not engage in disingenuousargumen-tation,strategicvoting, and self-interestedagenda manipulation ndercover of public-regardingalk. It is far from obviouswhat assurance

mightbe forthcoming. ndeed, n a society of a quarter-billion eople,it is not clear thatassurance ould be had. Theperfectionist epublicanargumentor valuingthe virtues s much less vulnerableon this score.Excellences of the humancharacterrealize goods that can be made

attractivequite apart rom the prospect hatotherswill developthem.Indeed we sometimesfind them attractivebecause others have failedto developthem. This is reflectedin the fact that on comparingour-selves with others we can prideourselveson our virtues, sometimesto a fault.

Furthermore,f the political republicancase is as compelling asit purports o be, then it is hard to see what would be lost by claim-

ing that the virtues of republican citizenship are genuine human

excellences. Politics is an ineliminable component of human life.The achievement of just outcomes in politics is a very great moral

good. If the civic virtues, including temperance,are necessary for

bringing about this very great good in an area of life that is

ineliminable, why isn't someone who exercises the civic virtues amore excellent humanbeing in this respectthan someone who doesnot? The political republican who is persuadedthat political ad-

equacy requires silence about the human good will find it natural

to stop short of the strongerclaim. But political republicanismisaddressedto a society in which many people seem to believe thereare moral norms that do not owe their authorityto public delibera-tion and seem to want a deep justificationfor political arrangements.These people may find the argumentunsatisfying or oddly trun-

cated because it pulls back before reaching its logical conclusion.Who has the betterof the case dependsupon exactly why politicalrepublicansthink they should avoid claims about the humangood.





Politicalrepublicansmightthinkthat the politicaladequacyof their

theory depends upon avoiding claims which are unlikely to secure

agreement.In a pluralisticsociety, claims about the humangood are

unlikely to do so since they have normative mplicationsfor humanbehavior hatsome citizens will reject.But the political republicanistof civic virtues and the claim thatcitizens shouldcultivatethemmaybe no less controversial than strong claims about the humangood.The demands of republicancitizenship are very heavy. Even those

prepared o identify with their citizenship may not identify with re-

publicancitizenship.They might identifyinsteadwith a conceptionof

citizenshipthat demandsless political interestand involvement.The

claim that citizens shouldcultivatetemperancemay meet with espe-cially deep disagreement,particularly f temperance s broad-basedand must be exercised in areas of private life that are far removedfromrepublican olitics.If the reasonfor stayingwithinthe boundsofthe political is to avoid reliance on controversialpremises, then the

heavy demandsof republican itizenshipmake it questionablewhetherthis strategyhas the advantages t promised.

Alternatively, political republicans might think that political

adequacy requires avoiding claims which cannot secure reason-able agreement.They do not say much aboutreasonableagreementand disagreement,and so it may not be immediately obvious thattheir claims about the value of the civic virtues fall on the rightside of the divide. Perhaps,however, their weak view of the civicvirtues obviates the need to say much. The political republicanmay assert, as Sunstein does in the passage I quoted earlier, thatthe civic virtues are "instrumental o a well functioning delibera-

tive process," a process which the political republican thinksreaches just outcomes. The political republican may then say, inline with the weak view, that civic virtues are valuable simplybecause they stand in an instrumental relationship to those out-comes. The importance of reaching just outcomes would securereasonableagreementif anythingwould. The claim that some traitis a civic virtue is therefore an instrumental claim about what is

requiredto attain an object the value of which is beyond reason-

able disagreement. However standards of reasonable andunreasonable disagreement are to be spelled out, disagreementabout an instrumentalclaim of this kind is clearly not the sort ofreasonable disagreement political republicans are concerned toavoid. Disagreementwith more robust claims about the civic vir-tues is quite different.

But this replysets the bar for politicaladequacy oo high. Surelya theory could be politically adequate-could serve as the working

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public philosophy of a liberal democracy-even if premised onclaims with which some citizens could reasonably disagree. Indeedit might prove more workable than theories which provoke less

disagreement if adopting it as a public philosophy increases thelikelihood that a critical mass of citizens will develop the virtuesneeded for self-government.

Here it might be protestedthat perfectionist republicanobjec-tions underestimate he deliberative characterof republicanpolitics.Citizens are supposed to approach inclusive public deliberation

readyto rethinktheir political commitments n light of others' con-tributions.If the privilegedreally are readyto do this, if they really

are prepared to listen to the contributions of the poor and themarginalized,those contributions will persuadethem to favor justoutcomes. The temperance hat good citizenshiprequiresis implicitin the openness of virtuous citizens to the contributionsof others.

It is elicited and exercised in sincere responses to them. Citizens'

manifest willingness to contribute, to listen, and to change their

preferencesbuilds the mutual trust and confidence needed to over-

come the assurance problem. With assurances that others will

develop and exercise the civic virtues if we will, each can see andbe inspired by the attractions of becoming a virtuous republicancitizen. Each can see why republicancitizenship is something she

should try to live up to.This protest is either unduly sanguine or begs a crucial ques-

tion. There are a number of responses available to us when we are

faced with the just claims of others. One is defensive rationaliza-

tion. Another is the transientsentimentalitythat motivates isolated

episodes of generosity. The right response, however, comes froman enduring disposition to honor those claims, even at our own

expense in the face of strong temptationto the contrary.That dis-

position may be elicited and developed by political participation,but because it is broad-basedit must also be nurtured n areas of

life far removed from politics. Citizens must cultivate that orienta-

tion and affirm it as a deep-rootedelement of their character.The

presence of this disposition and its exercise in public deliberation

are what needs to be explained.To assume that the dispositionwillbe inducedsimplyby the claims of others is to put more faith in the

transformative character of deliberation than our knowledge of

humannaturewarrants.To assume that citizens who enter publicdeliberationin the right spirit implicitly have the temperancetheyneed is to assume away the problem on which the perfectionistrepublican seizes.




VII

The thoughts that republican citizenship can be attractive in-dependent of stronger claims about the human good and thatdeliberativepolitics is sufficient to elicit, develop, and sustain the

civic virtues, betray a deeper supposition at the heart of political

republican thought. That is the supposition that republicanism is

self-sustaining, intellectually and politically. More precisely, it is

the supposition that political republican theory does not need a

deeper ethical justification to be intellectually satisfactoryand po-

litically adequate.The supposition s a naturalone to make. Politicalliberals like Rawls have taughtcontemporarypolitical philosophersthat their theories should be capable of being presented as "free-

standing."43Yet the suppositionmarks a significant departure rom

the classical republican tradition. Thinkers in that tradition, as I

mentioned earlier,believed that republicanism requiredsignificantextrapolitical support.

Here the perfectionistrepublicansides with the tradition,fear-

ing that this supposition threatens republicanism's politicaladequacyby shearingoff some of its most powerful supports.These

supports include the widely shared beliefs that there are genuinehuman excellences and that the civic virtues are among them, the

public culturethat grows up around those widely held beliefs, theform of public education appropriatefor transmittingthat cultureand political oratoryat its best, which calls citizens to excellence attimes when it is most needed. They also include the practices and

secondaryassociationsof so-called private life which help to fosterthose beliefs and cultivate the virtues. There are dangersto relyingon the supportmechanisms used by classical republicans,as politi-cal republicans' trenchant critiques of the tradition make amplyclear. These mechanisms were too often militaristic, sexist, exclu-

sionary or, as in the case of the yeoman population favored byThomas Jefferson, unworkable under currentconditions. Second-

ary associationscan foster intransigentlyheld preferencesand serve

as a breeding ground of the factionalism so long anathemato therepublicantradition. One challenge facing perfectionistrepublicansis that of describing forms of civic and associational life that will

help us affirm our citizenship and support a strong view of the

republican virtues while avoiding the problems so clearly identi-fied by political republicans.

43. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10.

311




When those who prize self-government and the civic virtuesmake the supposition that republicanism is self-sustaining, theyalso forego their claim to a potentiallyvaluablepiece of conceptual

space. In Americanpolitics, it is conservatismthat is popularlyas-sociated with moral strength, while liberalism is often associatedwith laxity. The space available for a morally demandingpolitics ofthe left is sometimes thought to be unoccupied. The best politicalrepublican writing defends positions on the left of the American

political spectrum. Perfectionist republicans can do likewise. If Iam correct that republican government is morally demanding-that it demandsgenuine excellences of character-then perfectionist

republicanismholds out the promiseof claimingthat space for thosewhose political sympathies lie with the liberal tradition of Ameri-can politics.