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The term is used to refer to the acts punished under Presidential Decree No. 1829(Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders). Full texthere.
What is the stated purpose of PD 1829?
As stated in the law, its purpose is to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension
and prosecution of criminal offenders.
What is the penalty for Obstruction of Justice?
The penalty is imprisonment, fine or both. Imprisonment ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years (prision
correccionalin its maximum period). The fine ranges from P1,000 P6,000.
Who may be charged under PD 1829?
Any person whether private or public who commits the acts enumerated below may be charged with violating PD 1829. In
case a public officer is found guilty, he shall also suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
What are the acts punishable under this law?
The law covers the following acts of any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension
of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases:
a. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of
any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats.
b. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to
be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases.
c. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
d. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or
concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes.
e. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the
fiscals offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts.
f. Making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the
course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases.
g. Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discontinuing, or impeding the
prosecution of a criminal offender.
h. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any
immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in
the investigation of or in official proceedings in criminal cases.
i. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender orfrom protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating
authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the
investigator or the court.
What are some of the instances when questions against charges under PD 1829 reached the Supreme Court?
In Posadas vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 131492, 29 September 2000), certain officials of the University of the Philippines (UP) were
charged for violating PD 1829 (paragraph c above). The UP officers objected to the warrantless arrest of certain students by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the Supreme Court, the police had no ground for the warrantless arrest. The
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UP Officers, therefore, had a right to prevent the arrest of the students at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. The
need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights.
In another case, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile was charged under PD 1829, for allegedly accommodating Col. Gregorio Honasan by giving
him food and comfort on 1 December 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile
allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. The Supreme Court ruled that Sen. Enrile could not be
separately charged under PD 1829, as this is absorbed in the charge of rebellion already filed against Sen. Enrile.
TO STRICTLY PENALIZE OFFENSES
AGAINST THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE:A CRITIQUE OFPRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
by
Allan Verman Y. Ong
The things that will destroy us are: politics without principle; pleasure withoutconscience; wealth without work; knowledge without character; business withoutmorality; science without humanity; and worship without sacrifice.[1]
- Mahatma Gandhi
Introduction: Tracing the Roots of the Crime of Obstructionof Justice
At an early date, the punishment of acts of obstructing the due administration of justice was
recognized as absolutely essential to the existence of courts and their efficiency in performing
the functions for which they were created. The great object for the existence of courts is the
ascertainment of truth, and this can only be done fairly and impartially when all persons having
knowledge of the transactions at issue are allowed to come before the courts for examination
without hindrance from anyone. Thus, under American penal law, the obstruction of the
administration of justice is an indictable offense under the common law, and by statute in most
states.[2]
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official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted. A call to another
requesting that he give false information to the police is not constitutionally-protected speech,
and is punishable as obstruction of justice. Allegations that the defendant, intending to obstruct
justice, unlawfully sought to induce others, in connection with an investigation, to mislead the
investigation and not tell the investigators the true and complete facts support a conviction for
obstruction of justice.[9]
PD 1829 provides that if any of the acts mentioned in the law is penalized by any other
law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.[10]
But this act does not seem to
be penalized under Philippine penal law. The act of giving false testimony is penalized under the
Revised Penal Code[11]
as well as the act of refusing to answer.[12]
But there is no other law
which penalizes this same act.
(b) alter ing, destroying, suppressing or conceali ng any paper, record, document, or
object, with intent to impair i ts ver ity, authenticity, legibil ity, avail abil ity, or admissibi li ty as
evidence in any investigation of or of f icial proceedings in , criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or of fi cial proceedings in , cr iminal cases;[13]
Under American jurisprudence, one who knowingly and willfully impedes a lawfully
conducted police investigation of a crime by secreting, suppressing, or destroying evidence,
knowing that it is being sought by investigating officers, may be prosecuted for the crime of
obstruction of justice. Some states specifically make it a crime to destroy evidence with the
intent to impair its availability as evidence in an investigation or official proceeding. Tampering
with evidence pertains to the destruction or concealment of any book, paper, record, instrument
of writing, or other matter or thing about to be produced in evidence and is not limited to written
evidence but can extend to the destruction of contraband narcotics, as the term object
encompasses an unending variety of physical objects.[14]
(c) harboring or concealing, or facili tating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arr est prosecution and convicti on;[15]
The Revised Penal Code penalizes, as accessories, those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part, subsequent to its commission, by three acts: 1) profiting or to assisting
the offender to profit by the effects of the crime, 2) concealing or destroying the body of the
crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery and 3) harboring,
concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
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with abuse of his public functions, or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.[16]
The third type of accessory is central to the analysis presented in this paper. Under the
Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of accessories contemplated under the third type of
accessory:1. Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of
the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his
public functions; and
2. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape ofthe author of the crimeguilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to
be habitually guilty of some other crime.[17]
Thus, the Revised Penal Code does not penalize a person who harbors, conceals or assists
in the escape of an author of a crime other than those specifically enumerated therein treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt on the life of the President. Various crimes such as kidnap for
ransom, destructive arson, qualified rape, and crimes related to prohibited drugs, are of the same
gravity[18]
with the crimes listed under Art. 19 of the Code. But the Code does not penalize
private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of crimes such as kidnap
for ransom.
However, PD 1829 penalizes under the present subsection penalizes the act of harboring
or concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person he knows or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his
arrest, prosecution and conviction. Here, there is no specification of the crime to be committed
by the offender for criminal liability to be incurred for harboring, concealing, or facilitating the
escape of the offender, and the offender need not be the principal unlike paragraph 3, Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, although the subject acts may not bring about criminal
liability under the Revised Penal Code, it may still be punishable under this particular subsection
of PD 1829. Such an offender if violating Presidential Decree No. 1829 is no longer an
accessory. He is simply an offender without regard to the crime committed by the person
assisted to escape, and he is penalized as a principal. So in the problem, the standard of the
Revised Penal Code, the person who helps the criminal escape is not criminally liable because
crime is kidnapping, but under Presidential Decree No. 1829, the person who gives such aid is
criminally liable.
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Under paragraph 3, Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, in the case of a civilian who
harbors, conceals, or assists the escape of the principal, the RPC requires that the principal be
found guilty of certain specified crimes. The paragraph uses the particular word guilty. So
this means that before the civilian can be held liable as an accessory, the principal must first be
found guilty of the crime charged, either treason, parricide, murder, or attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive. If the principal is acquitted, the civilian who harbored, concealed or
assisted in the escape did not violate Art. 19 of the RPC. That is as far as the Revised Penal
Code is concerned. But not Presidential Decree No. 1829. This special law does not require that
there be prior conviction. It is a malum prohibitum, so there is no need for guilt, or knowledge of
the crime.
It is interesting to note that this particular act does not seem to be penalized under
American jurisprudence on obstructing justice.
(d) publi cly using a f icti tious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading
prosecution or the executi on of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal
cir cumstances for the same purpose or purposes;[19]
This particular act seems to be penalized also under the Revised Penal Code. Art. 178
penalizes the act of using fictitious names for purposes of concealing a crime, evading the
execution of a judgment or causing damages. The same articles also penalizes any person who
conceals his true name and other personal circumstances. The illegal use of a fictitious name
under this article must be for the three said reasons, otherwise, if the damage concerns private
interest, the offense may be punishable as estafa through the use of a fictitious name.[20]
However, PD 1829 applies only where the person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution
of criminal cases by committing any of the mentioned acts. Art. 178 which penalizes the use of
fictitious name and the concealment of true name of a person to allow himself, not another
person as provided in PD 1829, to conceal a crime, to evade the execution of a judgment or to
cause damage. So PD 1829 and Art. 178 of the RPC do not seem to penalize the same
offense. However, the wording of this particular subsection seems to imply that the acts must be
done to evade a sentence on oneself. There is yet no case of the Supreme Court which clarifies
this apparent duplicity.
However, it is interesting to note that the penalty provided for in PD 1829 isprision
correccionalin its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both. In
turn, the penalty provided for in Art. 178 is arresto mayorand a fine not to exceed 500 pesos. It
thus appears that the penalty is more stringent in PD 1829. So should a person be penalized
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under this subsection rather than Art. 178, the convicted person can be made to suffer a greater
penalty.
(e) delaying the prosecuti on of criminal cases by obstructi ng the service of process or
court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the
courts;[21]
American law on obstructing justice makes it a crime to obstruct the exercise of rights or
performance of duties under federal court orders. Although certain acts that violate the statute
may also constitute criminal contempt, the statute is designed to reach the actions of non-parties
who are beyond the traditional reach of the contempt sanction. To support a conviction, there
must be proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the court order and intentionally
obstructed justice. It is to be noted that a state court has noted that a person who obstructs an
officer that is attempting to carry out a court decree may be convicted of obstructing the duecourse of justice, and not just of obstructing an officer in the execution of process, since the
officer is acting in this situation as part of the judicial machinery.[22]
The same observations
apply to Philippine penal law.
(f ) making, presenti ng or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge
of i ts falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or off icial
proceedings in, criminal cases;[23]
Furnishing false information includes withholding information or providing information
that intentionally misleads. A misrepresentation statute applies to the concealment of true facts
as well as to the assertion of what is false.[24]
A suspect who gives a false identification to a
police officer impedes the course of an investigation, and violates a statute dealing with
obstruction of an officer in the discharge of his duty.[25]
Under American jurisprudence,
falsification of evidence with corrupt intent is an endeavor to obstruct justice. A state statute
dealing with presentation of false documents for the purpose of misleading a public servant deals
only with the use of false documents in court, not with the use of a genuine document as part of
the support of a false alibi.[26]
A false information statute may require that the information be given with the intent toprevent the prosecution and with knowledge that the information was untrue. This intent need
not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Three
elements are required to convict one under a false reporting statute. There must be a false
statement to a peace officer, it must be given with the intent to impede an investigation, and the
investigation must be of an actual criminal matter.[27]
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(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefi t in consideration of abstain ing
from, discounti ng, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal off ender;[28]
This act seems to fall under the definition since the offense can only be committed by one
who is responsible for the prosecution of a criminal offender, and on account of a benefit,
abstains from, discounts or impedes the prosecution thereof. To wit, direct bribery is committed
by any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with
the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another.[29]
This particular
subsection of PD 1829 is similar to paragraph three of Art. 210 on Direct Bribery, which
penalizes the public officer when the act of bribery constitutes the act of refraining from doing
something which it was his official duty to do. The penalty to be imposed upon the public
officer shall beprision correctionalin its maximum period toprision mayorin its minimumperiod and a fine not less than three times the value of such gift.
[30] In addition to this, Art. 210
imposes the penalty of special temporary disqualification. The provision shall apply to
assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other person performing
public duties.[31]
Given that the act penalized in this subsection is similar to paragraph three of Art. 210,
what shall be the penalty imposed? PD 1829 imposes the general penalty ofprision
correccionalin its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both. This
penalty is lighter than that given under Art. 210 on bribery. Therefore, the accused shall beimposed the penalty provided for under Art. 210, whether he is prosecuted under Art. 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under PD 1829.
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infl iction of any wrong upon his
person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of h is fami ly i n order
to prevent such person fr om appeari ng in the investigation of , or off icial proceedings in ,
criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or un lawful , in order to prevent a
person from appeari ng in the investigation of or in off icial proceedings in , cr iminal cases;[32]
Under American jurisprudence, it is made an offense by federal statute for one toinfluence, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede, by means of threats
of force or by any threatening letter or communication, the due and proper administration of the
law under which any pending proceeding is being had before a federal department or
agency.[33]
Under PD 1829, the acts are punishable are likewise not limited to criminal
investigations.
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It has been indicated that the act must be calculated to obstruct the administration of the
law to constitute a violation of the statute. However, the obstructionneed not be successfulas
one who endeavors to obstruct a proceeding may be convicted. There is also no requirement that
the means used to obstruct justice beper se illegal.[34]
This appears to be applicable as well under
PD 1829, since this subsection does not require that the wrong inflicted on the person to prevent
such person from appearing in an investigation or proceeding must constitute a crime. American
jurisprudence likewise provides that although most instances when there was obstruction of
justice have been based on acts of bribery, subornation of perjury, falsification of documents,
threats, and the like, a corrupt attempt to influence a pending administrative proceeding may also
include the use of legitimate arguments for concealed or falsified ends, such as asking an
investigator for a favor that would benefit the target of an investigation, without disclosing that
the request was made in return for a cash payment by the target.[35]
This act is not punishable elsewhere in Philippine penal law and it is only PD 1829 whichpenalizes the said act. Art. 143 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the commission of acts
tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies, but the criminal act contemplated
in this subsection pertains to those participants who were supposed to aid in the investigation,
and not the members of Congress themselves.
(i) giving of false or fabr icated in formation to mislead or prevent the law enforcement
agencies fr om apprehending the offender or f rom protecting the li fe or property of the victim;
or fabricating in formation f rom the data gathered in conf idence by investigating authori ties
for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or
disseminati ng the same to mislead the investigator or to the cour t.[36]
The acts penalized under this subsection seems to be similar to those penalized under
subsection (c) of the same PD 1829, since that subsection penalizes harboring or concealing, or
facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect,
has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution
and conviction.[37]
Under American law on obstruction of justice, these such acts are penalized
under other acts that constitute obstruction of justice. These include unlawfully obtaining and
using unreleased grand jury transcripts and attempts to transmit or sell transcripts of secret grand
jury testimony to persons under investigation, an agreement between co-defendants that one co-
defendant would absent himself as to cause a mistrial, persuading a co-defendant to absent
himself from trial in order to improperly secure its postponement and such acts constitute the
crime of obstruction of justice.[38]
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However, it is not a crime under American jurisprudence to advice the recipient of a letter
from a prosecutor not to comply with the prosecutors request to come to court and enter a plea,
since the obstruction of justice statute should not be used to give to the attorneys notes or verbal
requests the quality of process. And associating with a person whose conditions of probation
forbid such association does not come within the meaning of the federal obstruction of justice
statute.[39]
II. Jurisprudential Pronouncements on PD 1829: A Dearth ofPronouncements
Despite the admirable purpose of the statute and its interstitial nature which is to bridge
certain gaps in the law, there has hardly been PD 1829 which have reached the Supreme
Court. There are four cases reported where the accused was charged of PD 1829. These cases
are as follows.
A. Enri le v. Am in
In the case ofJuan Ponce Enrile v. Hon. Omar U. Amin,[40]
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was
charged with rebellion complexed with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
activities connected with the December 1989 coup d etat, and he was charged to be a co -
conspirator of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio Gringo Honasan. Government prosecutors filed another
information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. The information charged Enrile for willfully and knowingly obstructing,
impeding, frustrating or delaying the apprehension of Honasan by harboring or concealing him in
his house.
Petitioner Enrile claimed that the pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and
frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis
of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 precluded the prosecution of the Senator for
harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829. Both the RTC and
the CA denied him relief on this ground and he filed a petition forcertiorari with the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court invoked its ruling in the case ofPeople v. Hernandez[41]
where the
Court laid down the doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. The Court observed:
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This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be
charged with the complete crime of rebellion for the greaterpenalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two
(2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component
element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
x x x x x x x x x
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitionerentertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food
and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly
did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. Andbecause of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's
arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x [T]he factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge
constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to thecharge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under
the Department of Justice resolution there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murderbut there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
"harboring and concealing ' Honasan and 100 other armed rebels
under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily
apparent.[42]
Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and quashed the information. The Court
held that since petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.
Gringo Honasan, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioner's alleged act of harboring or
concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting
a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of
rebellion.
The crime of rebellion consists of many actsit is described as a vast movement of men
and a complex net of intrigues and plots and jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single
crime of rebellion. In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
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The Court noted the prosecutions theory that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in rebellion cases. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on
his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of
rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
B. People v. El ias Lov edioro
In the case of People v. Elias Lovedioro,[43]
an off-duty policeman was walking when a man
suddenly walked beside him fired a gun at the policeman's right ear and killed the policeman.
The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen
policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled. A witness identified the man who fired at the deceased
as Elias Lovedioro y Castro. Elias Lovedioro y Castro was charged and convicted in the
Regional Trial Court for the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in holding him liable for murder and notrebellion. He claims that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New
People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends," should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion
under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the
fatal shot but merely acted as look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have
been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph
2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the
penalty of prision mayor by the lower court.
The Solicitor General in turn avers that the crime committed by appellant may be
considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or
intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."
The Supreme Court held that the gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public
uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
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multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its
pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.
This peculiarity was underscored in the case ofPeople v. Hernandez,[44]
thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed againstthe political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is theintent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islandsor any part thereof, then it becomes stripped of its "common"
complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary
act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed inthe crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the
crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion,not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end.
The political motive of the act should be conclusivelydemonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive
falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which theaccused, better than any individual, knows.
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common
crime-alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from the
law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. The Court said that the ruling in Enrile
v. Amin[45]
was instructive in this regard. The Supreme Court observed and ruled:
x x x This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that
rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 could be tried separately 14
(on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Codewhile P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator
was being charged, though punishable under a special law, wasabsorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related
to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R.Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in
favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for
violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separateprosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact
decided, the Court said:
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The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion casesmust not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses
under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.
[I]intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce
Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed
Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and formerassociate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the
act is committed with political or social motives, that is in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of
the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive
relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of
rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice. The burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the
information. It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
C. People v. Medina and Carlo s
PD 1829 was applied only tangentially in the case of People v. Medina and Carlos.[46] In this
case, Jaime B. Medina and accused Virgilio Carlos were apprehended by members of the
Narcotics Intelligence and Suppression Unit (NISU) under the Philippine National Police
Narcotics Command (PNP-NARCOM) for selling Methamphetamine hydrochloride without
authority of law. The two were brought before Assistant City Prosecutor Lillian H. Ramiro for
inquest. Carlos denied any involvement in the transaction by claiming that he merely
accompanied appellant to the place of the sale, while Medina stated that he was only supposed to
buy the regulated drug at the agreed price of P250,000.00 when the policemen arrived and
arrested them. Appellant added that, at his request, Carlos merely drove the car used by them.They were however charged in an Information where they were alleged to have conspired
and confederated together and mutually helped each other, not having been authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully sell or offer for sale 306.71 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.
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The court below rendered judgment holding that appellant conspired with accused Carlos
in the illegal sale of 306.71 grams of shabu. As the trial court appreciated the presence of craft,
fraud or disguise as aggravating circumstances against herein appellant, he was sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of death. In the same decision, an alias warrant of arrest was issued
by the court for the arrest of accused Virgilio Carlos.
Medina sought the reversal of the ruling, saying that the lower court erred in finding a conspiracy
between him and Virgilio Carlos.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court. It held that in the case at bar,
appellant was not merely present in a passive manner at the scene of the crime as he contends.
He definitely took an active participation in the sale of the shabu. He was positively identified as
the driver of the car carrying accused Carlos and the regulated drugs. When the duo arrived at the
agreed place, appellant went down to check if the buyer brought the money while Carlos waited
inside the car. Then, upon learning that the poseur-buyer had the money, appellant signaled to hiscompanion indicating such fact.
No other conclusion could follow from appellant's actions except that he had a prior
understanding and community of interest with Carlos. His preceding inquiry about the money
and the succeeding signal to communicate its availability reveal a standing agreement between
appellant and his co-accused under which it was the role of appellant to verify such fact from the
supposed buyer before Carlos would hand over the shabu. Without such participation of
appellant, the sale could not have gone through as Carlos could have withdrawn from the deal
had he not received that signal from appellant. It is undeniable, therefore, that appellant and hisco-accused acted in unison and, moreover, that appellant knew the true purpose of Carlos in
going to the restaurant.
But the lower court considered the ruling sentencing the appellant to death due to its
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud or disguise. The Supreme Court
found that a comprehensive search in the records of this case do not reveal these circumstances:The reason for this can be found in the very rationale
adopted by the lower court in appreciating the said circumstances
against appellant in the dispositive portion of its decision. The
court stated that craft, fraud or disguise led to the escape and non-
arrest of Virgilio Carlos, hence it apparently imputes the same toappellant.
While we share the trial court's disgust over the still
unexplained escape of accused Carlos, we cannot approve its
attribution to herein appellant as the author of such craft, fraud or
disguise or even that the same should aggravate his liability in thepresent case. For, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that appellant
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had a part in the release of Carlos, it is obvious that the aggravating
circumstances involved do not pertain to the offense charged in the
information and are completely unrelated to the crime of illegalsale of shabu.
The court a quo should have borne in mind that the chargeagainst appellant is for illegal sale of shabu and not forobstructing the apprehension and prosecution of a criminal
offender or, for that matter, perjury. In fact, if such circumstances
in themselves constitute punishable crimes, or are included by thelaw in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor, they
cannot be considered as aggravating circumstances.
To be considered as an aggravating circumstance andthereby resultantly increase the criminal liability of an offender,
the same must accompany and be an integral part or concomitant
of the commission of the crime specified in the information; andalthough it is not necessarily an element thereof, it must not be
factually and legally discrete therefrom. Besides, it is highly
problematical whether the Spanish legal concept of astucia, fraude
and disfraz, adopted in our Revised Penal Code, can findapplication at all to the dismissal of the case against Carlos.
[47]
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in
considering against herein appellant the supposed aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud or
disguise. The violation of Section 15 subject of the amended indictment was consequently
committed without any aggravating circumstance.The Supreme Court here verified that acts punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1829
cannot be construed or constituted as mere aggravating circumstances, if indeed they were
present in the case. They are penalized under the law as liable under PD 1829 and they must be
made liable as such.
D. Soller v. Sandig anbayan
The most recent case applying PD 1829 isPrudente D. Soller v. Sandiganbayan andPeople.
[48] This was a case forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamusraising the issue of the
propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina
Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction
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of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D.
No. 1829.
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was
shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a
motorcycle together with petitioner Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a
medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and
his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. An autopsy was conducted on
the same night on the cadaver by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner
Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
A complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with
the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the
fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by:
(a) altering his wound ;(b) concealing his brain;
(c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he
had only one; and
(d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound
when in truth there was.
Petitioners Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and
claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it
was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente
Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the
Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing
which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabaels consent was obtained before the
autopsy.
But two Information were indeed filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the petitioners
for criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of Jerry Macabael
with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of
criminal case for murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to
Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one of
the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that
official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused.
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The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The court held that the rule is that in
order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be
inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law
or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of
the action.
The Court found:
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations
on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense ofObstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b
of P.D.1829.
x x x x x x x x x
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positionscorresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in theproper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, amended.
The Supreme Court observed that the bone of contention here is whether the offenses
charged may be considered as committed in relation to their office as this phrase is employed
in Section 4 of PD 1892.
As early asMontilla vs. Hilario,[49]
the Supreme Court interpreted the requirement that an
offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that the offense cannot exist without the
office or that the office must be a constituent element of the crime.[50]
People vs.
Montejo[51]
enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office
of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of
his official functions.
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted
earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their
offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection
between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the
offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders was
committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is
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included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners
were described as being all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health
Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, there was no allegation that the offense
of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity,
authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder
(Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report
and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the
offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function. Indeed
the offenses defined in P.D. 1892 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a
private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police
and autopsy report would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein
petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller. Thus there is a categorical indication that thepetitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would have
committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal
Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately
connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses
charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan. So the petition was granted and the orders were set aside for
being void for lack of jurisdiction.
III. Analyzing the Seeming Non-Use of the Law
PD 1829s purposes are admirable and the acts they penalize should truly be proscribed in order
for the efforts of law enforcers to bear fruit. Persons who obstruct the acts of administration of
justice do not harm society as much as the acts of the criminal who is sought to be brought to
justice. Nevertheless, it is necessary for there to be a meaningful exercise of law enforcement,
for citizens not to hamper the acts of law enforcers.The provision of PD 1829 which has been used in the cases has been that in subsection
(c) of Section 1 of the law which penalizes the act of harboring, concealing, or facilitating the
escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed
any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and
conviction. But the cases surveyed reveal that there has hardly been any conviction even under
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this act of obstructing justice, even as it appears to be the most commonly committed
ground. There can be two reasons for the seeming non-use of this provision of the law. The first
is that the criminals who are themselves in conspiracy with each other do not obtain aid from
those who are not in conspiracy with them. Thus, they do not need third persons who have not
participated in the crime to aid them in their escape. The second is that the cultural norms that
move Philippine society has made it common, or even accepted, that relatives will harbor,
conceal or facilitate the escape of other relatives who have committed crimes, regardless of the
criminal nature of the act, because of the strong filial bonds that exist among families. Because
perhaps of this ground, law enforcement agencies hardly use this ground to penalize those who
help out other relatives, since such persons would merely be doing what is natural for them
under the given circumstances.
But this is dangerous, because law enforcement agencies have no choice as to the law
which they are to enforce, or even the fact of whether or not to enforce a particular piece oflegislation. The act of drafting legislation is in the realm of another political body and the
Executive is mandated to apply the law, as it is found. The fact that PD 1829 has not been
prosecuted may reveal the reasons why the high rates of criminality have not been abated,
despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies.
The other acts penalized under PD 1829 which would preventing witnesses from
testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the
identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or
threats;
[52]
or altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, orobject, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as
evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases.[53]
Such acts are logically those which
are performed in the course of the prosecution of a criminal. It would be inconceivable that these
acts have never been performed in the course of criminal trials in the Philippines. But the fact
still remains that hardly has any case been tried and reviewed in the Supreme Court regarding PD
1829, the law which penalizes such acts which constitute the obstruction of justice. Does this
mean that litigation has descended to such a level that these acts which should actually constitute
obstruction of justice are no longer prosecuted, because both sidesthe prosecution and defense
routinely resort to them anyway, and anyone who complains of such acts by the other party
would be asking for relief from the court with unclean hands?
Conclusion: A Law Whose Time Has Come
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PD 1829 is essential to the effective functioning of the courts and the effective action of law
enforcement agencies. If the pillars of the criminal justice system are to attain the ends by which
they were created for, it is necessary that society does not thwart the efforts of the criminal
justice system in providing a solution for crimes.
The law on obstruction of justice is a law which is actively used in American courts to
prosecute those individuals who impede the administration of justice by the performance of
certain acts. It is inconceivable that these same acts are not performed in the Philippines. But
despite of this inconceivability, there are hardly any cases elevated up to the Supreme Court
which charges persons for violations of PD 1829. The law that prohibits obstruction of justice is
good law even up to the present time as the government intensifies its campaign against
crime. In order to do so, private citizens and other third parties must not deter in the arrest,
prosecution and trial of these persons who are charged with crimes. This is no recommendation
that the government do everything in order to convict. Rather, this is merely a call on citizensnot to impede in the just prosecution of criminal cases. PD 1829 seeks to penalize such behavior
that constitutes the obstruction of justice when private citizens are remiss in this duty which they
owe to other members of society.
But the good aims of the law cannot be met when there has been an observed non-use of
the law. Has this arisen out of the reluctant of public officers to involve themselves in charging
other with crimes which they find that they themselves could have committed in the first
place? This cannot be the case because justice should be blind, in order for it to be fair. And to
be fair, law enforcement agencies have to be hard hearted in order to bring about the ends that iscontemplated by all criminal laws, that of bring order to society, for the betterment of all that
belong to that society.
[1]Mahatma Gandhi, Seven Blunders of the World That Lead to Violence,available athttp://www.quincy.edu/~
hardeja/flag.html (last accessed Aug. 27, 2003).[2]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 1.[3]PD 1829, Whereas Clauses 1.[4]Id. 2.[5]Id.[6]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 2 (citing People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich 291, 17 NW2d 187; People v. Somma,
123 Mich App 658, 333 NW2d 117, Shackelford v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky 51, 214 SW 788).[7]PD 1829, Sec. 2.[8]Id. Sec. 1 (a).[9]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 34.[10]PD 1829, Sec. 1 2.
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[11]Revised Penal Code, Art. 180 penalizes false testimony against a defendant, Art. 181 penalizes giving of false
testimony favorable to the defendant, Art. 182 penalizes the giving of false testimony in civil cases, Art. 183
penalizes the giving of false testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation, and Art. 184 penalizes the
offering of false testimony in evidence.[12]Florenz Regalado, Criminal Law Compendium 387-88 (2003).[13]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (b).[14]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 43.[15]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (c).[16]Revised Penal Code, Art. 19.[17]Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 558-59 (14d ed. 1998).[18]Republic Act 7659, An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for That
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, imposes the
penalty of death on all these crimes, to wit, treason, parricide, murder, kidnap for ransom, destructive arson,
qualified rape, and crimes related to prohibited drugs.[19]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (d).[20]Regalado, supra note x, at 379.[21]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (e).[22]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 26.[23]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (f).[24]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 40.[25]Id. (citing State v. Latimer, 9 Kan App 2d 728, 687 P2d 648.[26]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 24.[27]Id. 41.[28]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (g).[29]Revised Penal code, Art. 210 1.[30]Id. 3.[31]Id. 4.[32]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (h).[33]58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 43.[34]Id. (citing US v. Vixie 532 F2d 1277).[35]Id. (citing US v. Mitchell 372 F Supp 1239).[36]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (i).[37]Id. Sec. 1 (c).[38]
58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice 27.[39]Id.[40]G.R. No. 93335, Sept. 13, 1990.[41]99 Phil. 515 (1956).[42]Enrile v. Amin,supra.[43]G.R. No. 112235, Nov. 29, 1995.[44]99 Phil. 515, 535-536 (1956).[45]189 SCRA 573 (1990).[46]GR 127157, July 13, 1998.[47]Id.[48]G.R. No. 144261-62, May 9, 2001.[49]90 Phil. 49.[50]As defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code, (referring to the crimes
committed by the public officers).[51]108 Phil. 613.[52]PD 1829, Sec. 1 (a).[53]Id. Sec. 1 (b).
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