Minorities and Democratization
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran
Columbia UniversityBahar Leventoglu
SUNY – Stonybrook
Project Background Interested in Racial Gerrymandering in the US
In the 1990’s, saw many Republican-Black Democrat coalitions in redistricting
Makes sense electorally: concentrating black voters in a few districts helps elect Republicans elsewhere
But not for policy – one side has to do better
So do this with numbers Estimate plans that maximize substantive represen-
tation, and those that maximize descriptive rep. Are they the same, or is there a tradeoff?
Findings In the 1970’s & 1980’s, maximize substantive
representation by electing blacks to office But starting in 1990’s, do better by creating
districts of no more than 45% black At that point, good chance of electing minority
rep. But don’t lose too much influence elsewhere
On the other hand, maximize # of minorities elected by concentrating up to 75% BVAP Not the same as maximizing substantive rep. So a Pareto Frontier has emerged over time
Lessons: AP Version Districting can give minority voters:
A lot of influence in a few districts, or Less influence in more districts
At times one strategy is best, at times the other may be superior
In the US, the answer changed due to: Decreased polarization in the electorate Increased polarization in Congress
Lessons: CP Version In a majoritarian system, minorities
must form coalitions to influence policy There are two ways to do this:
In elections, via encompassing parties, or In the legislature, via vote trading
Political institutions can favor one of these alternatives over the other This holds true for all types of minorities
Segue into this paper… So, within majoritarian systems:
institutions coalitions min. influence But of course, many systems are not
majoritarian This is itself an object of choice and change Minorities don’t always do better
w/democracy Voting to Violence
Important issue now in many places
Questions – Reciprocal Effects How does the presence of ethnic
factionalization affect democratization? Does it make it easier or harder to
transition to democracy? Does it matter if the ruling party is from
the majority or minority group? How does democratization affect
minorities? More discrimination, or less?
Model – Acemoglu & Robinson
• Society with two classes: upper (U) and lower (L)
• Group i is proportion i of the population, with L>U
• Total wealth x in society, U starts with x, U
U
L
Model – Acemoglu & Robinson
U
L
L
• Only issue is degree of redistributive taxes ()• U, of course, wants L would tax rich & transfer
• At first, only U members can vote, but can democratize
Game TreeU: Democratize?
Y N
L: Set L U: Set U
L: Revolt?
Y N
U
Nature
U
Success Not
R
Note: For A&R,revolutionaryoutcome destroysproportion of economy, and Ugets 0 utility.
For us, lose as before, but then move to democracy.
“RevolutionaryOutcome”
Model – ELO
U
L
1 2
• To A&R model, we add a second ethnic group
• Assume L>U, and 1>2 (so L1 is largest group)
• Groups decide independently whether to uprise.
Revised Game Tree
Model – ELO• So now, two taxes are possible: economic and ethnic
• Ethnic tax 2 yields “discrimination rents” to majority
U
L
1 2
e
2
Note: 1 is always 0 in equilibrium.
Model – ELO
U
L
1 2
• In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {e, 2}
• If L1 has a majority, proposal passes
• Otherwise, form coalition:
Model – ELO
U
L
1 2
• In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {e, 2}
• If L1 has a majority, proposal passes
• Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic)
Model – ELO
U
L
1 2
• In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {e, 2}
• If L1 has a majority, proposal passes
• Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic) or L1-L2 (class)
Note: Reversionpolicy in case of disagreement is e=2=0.
Equilibrium In autocracy, U1 sets {e=0, 2=1} No way to credibly commit to any
e>0 other than democratization Check equilibrium under democracy
and see which U1 prefers If L1 > 50% of the population, then
it sets {e=1, 2=1} So focus on L1 < 50% case
Implications Less peaceful democratization the
larger is 2, the size of the minority Peaceful democratization occurs at
intermediate levels of uprising cost
Either both L1 and L2 revolt together, or L2 alone revolts
Probability of transition independent of size of the economy (x)
Extensions Power Sharing in Autocracy
U1 can attract L1 or U2 as coalition partner
Democracy can be worse for minorities U2 starts off in power
Makes peaceful transitions less likely Two-period model with class mobility
Induces upper-lower class sympathy Increases likelihood of transitions with
anti-minority coalition in democracy
Conclusions Ethnic diversity reduces the
probability of peaceful democratic transitions Upper class loses discrimination rents
Lower class does well in: Autocracy violence potential Democracy numbers
Addresses question of when politics revolves around an ethnic dimension