Memory Forensics and Incident Response
Robert Reed
Frequently when we think ofCyberCrime external intrusionsimmediately comes to mind, but weshould remember that “insiders”represent a significant threat toorganizations. Between 46 and 58percent of the incidents resulting in thelargest losses to organizations were“inside jobs.” This is particularlytroubling because in these incidents thelikely hood of identification of offendersand potential recovery of assets shouldbe easier.
Intrusions
Insiders
Outsiders
Global Economic Crime Survey 2011, PriceWaterhouse Cooper.
42%
40%
39%
12%
8%
6%
5%
4%
11%
20%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Damage levelinsufficient
Could not identify theindividual
Lack of evidence
negative publicity
Concerns about liability
competitors use foradvantage
Prior negativeresponse law…
Unaware crime wasreportable
Other
Don't know
Reason not Prosecuted
Damage level insufficient
Could not identify theindividual
Lack of evidence
negative publicity
Concerns about liability
competitors use foradvantage
Prior negative responselaw enforcement
Unaware crime wasreportable
Other
In “insider” incidents, 40 percent of the time those responsible are never identified, or insufficient evidence was obtained for prosecution. This is particularly troubling because in these incidents the likely hood of identification of offenders and potential recovery of assets should be easier
2011 CyberSecuirtyWatch Survey, CSO Magazine, U.S. Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Deloitte, January 2011.
Why are so many incidents not producing sufficient informationfor prosecutions? To some degree this makes sense when we digdeeper into the numbers, 61 percent businesses suffering fromCyberCrime indicated that “they don’t have, or are not aware ofhaving, access to forensic technology investigators.”
61
60
46
0 20 40 60 80
Not Aware of access toforensic investigators
No in-house forensics
No forensic IRproceedures
Business Forensic capabilities
Forensic Capabilities
Global Economic Crime Survey 2011, PriceWaterhouse Cooper
Objectives of incident response:• Collect as much evidence as possible• Minimize or eliminate changes made to
evidentiary information• Maintain the integrity of the investigation• Minimize the disruption to business processes • Obtain a successful outcome
Striking a balance
• Do we need to do a forensic examination?– Is there a statutory requirement to report?– Is there potential liability for not investigating?– Is there a broader objective in the investigation?– Is it fiscally responsible?
Typical Incident life cycle• Identify incident• Establish approach• Collect evidence• Analyze evidence• Document and report• Assess and follow-up
Traditional Computer Forensic Response
• Secure location• Document the scene• Pull the plug• Collect evidence• Image the media• Analysis• Reporting
Pro’s of the Approach
• Acceptable for most of the cases LE is presented with
• Easy to validate the information for court purposes
• Easy to establish and validate SOP’s
Con’s to Traditional Approach• Increasing drive capacities• Increased security
awareness– Encryption– Passwords– “Personal Privacy” Software
• Business Continuity • Misses /Destroys vital
information in RAM
Better Approach• Secure location• Photograph and document scene• Collect volatile data• Isolate from network??• Bring the machine down or live image??• Bit stream image• Analysis• Reporting
Order of volatility1. CPU cache and Register2. ARP cache, Routing and Process tables3. RAM4. Temp file systems, Swap and page files5. Fixed and removable media attached 6. Remotely logged data7. Archives
Collection of volatile data
Tool/s
Utilities
OSHardware
Results
Concerns• Reliability of local tools• Root kits• Integrity of evidence– Authenticity– Integrity
• Chains of custody• Security
Collection of Volatile data• cmd• tasklist• netstat• arp• Route• Net commands• etc
* The problem with using native commands is that we can not trust their results*
Collection of volatile data
Tool/s
Utilities
OSHardware
Results
Collection of volatile data
Tool/s
Utilities
OSHardware
Results
Kernel Space
Use
r Sp
ace
External tools• cmd ?? *are you bringing your own command console?*
• Sysinternals: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/default
• Nirsoft: http://www.nirsoft.net/
• Foundstone: http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/index.aspx
• WFT: http://www.foolmoon.net/security/wft/
• Tons of others out there
Collection of volatile data
Tool/s
Utilities
OSHardware
Results
Kernel Space
Use
r Sp
ace
API
Collection of volatile data
Tool/s
Utilities
OSHardware
Results
Kernel Space
Use
r Sp
ace
RAM / Image Analysis
tool
OS utilities
OSHardware
Results ?
Kernel Space
Use
r Sp
ace
Tool
Imaging and Analysis Tools
• Win32/64 dd• Dumpit• Man dd• FTK Imager• Belkasoft• Volatility
• Memoryze• Redline• HBGary
Responder• Encase• Etc….
Imaging and Analysis Tools
• Challenges– Varied Implementations– Anti-Forensics programs and
techniques
Direct Memory Access
tool
OS utilities
OSHardware
Results ?
Kernel Space
Use
r Sp
ace
Tool
http://www.breaknenter.org/projects/inception/
“Inception is a FireWire physical memory manipulation and hacking tool exploiting IEEE 1394 SBP-2 DMA. The tool can unlock (any password accepted) and escalate privileges to Administrator/root on almost* any powered on machine you have physical access to. The tool can attack over FireWire, Thunderbolt, ExpressCard, PC Card and any other PCI/PCIe interfaces.”
“Goldfish was a project by AfrahAlmansoori, Pavel Gladyshev, and Joshua James aimed at the extraction of user password and fragments of AIM instant messenger conversations directly from RAM of Apple Mac computers. Goldfish software can be used against 32 bit versions of Mac OS X up to and including Mac OS X (10.5) Leopard.”
http://digitalfire.ucd.ie/?page_id=430
Direct Memory Access
• Advantages– Bypass passwords to gain access– Recover passwords (keyboard buffers)– Evade current anti-forensics techniques
Direct Memory Access
• Challenges– Hardware dependent!– Physical access!– Disabled drivers?– 4GB of accessible space! 0>ffffffff
Direct Memory Access
• Mitigation– Windows
• Block SBP-2 drivers: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2516445
• Remove FireWire and thunderbolt drivers
Direct Memory Access
• Mitigation– Macs
• Filevault2 (OS X Lion) and screen locked• Firmware password
Direct Memory Access
• Mitigation– Linux
• Disable DMA• Remove FireWire drivers
Questions ??