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Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearchVol. LI1,No. 1, March 1992
The Self-Defeating CharacterofSkepticism
DOUGLASC. LONG
The University f NorthCarolina t ChapelHill
1. SKEPTICISM AND THE EPISTEMIC PRIORITY OFEXPERIENCE
An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external
world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive
without our realizing it. For all I know, my life could be only a coherent
dreamin which objects and otherpeople do not really exist. Such wholesale
questioningof the deliverancesof all forms of perceptionseems to leave us
no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an
objective world beyond our subjective experiences.
Not all epistemologists agree with that assessment. For instance,
"externalists" hold that our knowledge of the world is secure, provided
that certain conditions are in fact satisfied, such as the reliability of the
perceptual mechanisms giving rise to our perceptualbeliefs. They do not
believe it is necessary to know that our senses arereliable in orderto possess
knowledge about the world. This curt response to skepticism does not
satisfy "internalists" who seek a way, using epistemological resources
which are available to us, to justify the claim that we do in fact have reliable
perceptual access to objects. Such justification might be achieved by
producing a positive justification for a general "belief in objects."V
Alternatively we might try to show that there is something wrong with the
skeptical argumentand thatno such justification s necessary.
In what follows I pursue the latter strategy, arguing that there is a fatal
flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "externalworld." The feature of skepticism which I believe renders it vulnerable is
the assumptionthateach of us has a right to be certain of his own existence
as a subjectof conscious experienceeven in the face of comprehensivedoubt
about our empirical beliefs. From the time of Descartes's cogito argument,
philosophers have thought that the most extravagant doubts about our
cognitive faculties cannotassail our assuranceof ourown existence. For that
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assurance,it is said, we do not requireveridical sensory perception."Inner
perception"provides us with an indubitableself-awareness, if not directly,
at least by inference from the fact of one's experiences. Moreover, the
possibility of this inference accounts for our ability to refer to ourselves
independently of any knowledge of the external world. This alleged
capacity for self-reference under skeptical ground rules may be thin,
pointing to no more than "the thinking subject," yet it has seemed to
provide an adequatebasis for expressingskepticismin a self-conscious, first
person form: "I know thatI exist, along with my experiences and thoughts,
but I cannot claim to have knowledge of the world aroundme."
Contrary to this tradition, I question the coherence of self-conscious
skepticism on the grounds that our "introspective" self-knowledge
ultimately depends upon our capacities to perceive ourselves as individualagents from an objective point of view sharedby others. My thesis is that
philosophical doubt undercuts the perceptual access to oneself as an
individual subject of mental states that is required both to know of one's
existence as a subject and to be capable of self-reference. Hence, self-
conscious skepticism is internallyincoherent and self-defeating.
To defeat skepticism it is important to challenge the doctrine that
"direct" awareness of the mental or subjective character of experience has
what Barry Stroud calls epistemicc priority" over ordinary empiricalknowledge.' Unless this challenge is successful it is unlikely that we can
justify rejecting with confidence the thought that all our perceptionsmay be
delusive. For if we concede that the concept of "mere experience" is
available to the doubting ego, without any essential reference to objective
existence, this permits the speculation that all experiences purporting to
representwhat is outside theego's mind are non-veridical. It is the apparent
intelligibility of this speculation which renders the "loss of significant
contrast" argument offered by Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin ineffective
against traditional doubt.2 It may be that the concept of non-veridical
perception makes sense only to someone with the concept of veridical
perception, but the skeptic claims the ego has the relevant contrasting
concepts. The ego's problem is to determine which representational
experiences,if any, arein factveridical.
Both the importance of attacking the skeptic's subjective startingpoint
and the possibility of doing so are easily overlookedbecause we tend to as-
1 Barry Stroud correctly points to the "epistemic priority of ideas or appearancesor per-
ceptions over external physical objects" as the key to skepticism. However, he does not
think he can show this starting assumption to be incoherent. See The Significance of
Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 140 and also chap. vii.
Subsequentreferences to this book will be cited as (SPS) in my text.2 Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press; 1950), p. 95. Austin,
Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1962), 11.
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sume that philosophical skepticism arises within our ordinaryfirst person
point of view. We need to be reminded that a "purely subjective epistemol-
ogy," one that questions the deliverances of perception across the board, is
not the perspective of common sense. As Austin pointed out, ordinarily we
do not raise doubts about what we see and hear without some special reason
for doing so.3 We should not be surprised, therefore, to find thatgiving up
all perceptual judgments at once creates problems not only for our
knowledge of material objects in the world but knowledge of ourselves as
well, since we too are in the world. The crucial issue to consider then is
whether the resources for expressing skepticism are available within a
resolutely subjective epistemology.
2. SKEPTICISM AND THE MATERIAL SELF
The conception of "inner"knowledge that is at the heart of self-conscious
skepticism has no doubt derived some of its support from the traditional
dualistic bifurcation of humanbeings into bodies, whose existence may be
questioned, and immaterial minds known to their possessors either by
introspectionor by inference from what is introspected.Now that dualism
is in eclipse and the idea that human beings have a materialconstitutionis
ascendant, it might be thought that there is a quick way to show that the
self-awareness assumed by skepticism conflicts with general philosophicaldoubt. P. F. Strawson has remarked that "at its most general, the skeptical
point concerning the external world seems to be that subjective experience
could, logically, be just the way it is without its being the case that physical
or material things actually existed."4But if I believe that I am a material
being, it seems that the skeptic invites me to question my own existence
along with that of other material things. The invitation must, of course, be
refused, as it is incompatible with my belief that I exist to engage in the
inquiry.
However, the epistemological challenge of skepticism can be posed with-
out requiringacceptanceof a dualisticontology of persons. If I do not know
whether any material things exist, but I am certain of my own existence,
then I do not know that I am material. The question of my ontological
nature may be open in a way that my own existence is not. One's body need
not be conceived as being substantially distinct from an immaterialself in
the way envisaged by dualism to be part of the "external world." What'external' means here is that one's body or physical aspect is epistemically
beyond the grasp of introspective knowledge about oneself. This is
3 J. L. Austin, "OthcrMinds," in Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1961), 56, 81.4 P. F. Strawson, "Skepticism, Naturalism, and TranscendentalArguments," chapter 1 of
Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (New York: Columbia University Press,
1985), 5.
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compatible with being material;but it is not to deny that, were there no
material entities, and if I possessed indubitableself-awareness, this would
entail thatI exist as an immaterial ndividual.
Thereare,however, modem counterparts f the Cartesiandemonscenario
which appear to assume the material natureof the experiencing subject.An
example is the much-discussedhypothesisthat,withoutknowing it, one is a
brain floating in a vat of nourishingliquid. A streamof signals is fed into
the cerebrumby scientists who create a non-existent reality for the brain-
subject and "teach" t a languagewhich it uses to describeits experience of
"the world."5Closely related is Keith Lehrer's less invasive "braino cap,"6
which similarly feeds sensory signals into the skull of an intact human
being. Computercontrolled video goggles and datagloves alreadyare used
to create artificial walk-in environments within which a person canexperience a non-existent "virtual"reality.7Even without such technical
aids an individual might experience multi-sensory hallucinations or
continuous and coherent dreams for much of his life. We should note,
however, that none of these scenarios questions the subject's warrantfor
believing he exists; nor do they requirehim even to believe thathe may not
be material. At most what is threatened s his warrant or claiming to know
whatpropertieshe has and what situationhe is in. They invite him to wonder
whetherhe is in reality a brainthe size of a grapefruitor a being the size of aplanet. Thus, even in this ontologically less radical form, the success or
failure of self-conscious skepticism turns on whether or not perception of
ourselves is essential to (1) the justificationof beliefs about ourselves and
(2) the self-reference expressedin such beliefs.
3. KNOWLEDGE OF ONE'S OWN MENTAL AGENCY
The purely subjectiveepistemological startingpoint upon which skepticism
is based is dramatically described by Descartes at the end of the First
Meditationwhere he imagines that a malicious and powerful demon is pre-
senting him with a streamof data which project a nonexistent world outside
his mind. The only thing he is certain of is his own existence as a conscious
and thinking thing. Let us suppose for the moment that this skeptical hy-
pothesis is truein my case. Then the human protagonistof my delusion, this
person here (puttingmy hand on my chest) is merely part of the delusion.
5 See, for example, Ililary Putnam's much-criticized attempt to refute this skeptical hy-
pothesis in chapter 1 of Reason, Truthand History (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1981). John L. Pollock offers a particularly compelling "vat" story in
ContemporaryTheories of Knowledge (Totowa,N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 1-
3.
6 James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George S. Pappas, Philosophical Problems and
Arguments:AnIntroduction 3rd ed. rev.;New York: The MacmillanCompany,1982), 54.7 BennettDaviss, "illusions," Discover (June, 1990): 37-41.
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The subject who actually has my experiencescannot be "me,"if this pronoun
is meant to refer to my ordinaryempirical self, which does not exist. Or if
we thinkin terms of one of the science fiction scenarios, the brain in the vat
which I am supposed to be is not this (empirical) brain here (pointing into
my skull) but some other entity altogether.
To whom or to what, then, do "my" experiences belong? The pro forma
answer that they belong to me tells us nothing about what individualentity
is supposed to have those experiences. But if I am not in perceptual contact
with my real self, how is it possible for me to know that there is a suitable
entity to whom a mind or experiences can be legitimatelyascribed?We must
be on guard not to let our common sense capacity for routine self-reference
make it appearthat there is no problemhere.
In his Second Meditation Descartes noticed this consequence of hisradical doubt. "ButI was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world,
thattherewas no heaven,no earth,that therewere no minds,norany bodies:
was I not then likewise persuadedthatI did not exist?"8He realized, firstof
all, that a purely mentaland immaterialsubstance,as he conceived the mind
to be, is nota properobjectof perception.On the otherhand,if he cannotrely
cognitively on sight, touch, or kinesthetic feeling, he cannot claim to be
perceptually aware of any individual, including himself. Why then did he
and later philosophers not conclude that all-encompassing doubt aboutperception completely undermines first person claims to know of one's
existence?
The answer, of course, is that, with the notable exceptions of Hume and
Kant, philosophers have generally assumed with Descartes that one's exis-
tence as a subject is not in doubt because belief in one's existence can be
justified independentlyof perceptual knowledge.9 Such self-access has not
been regardedas being epistemically direct, because the soul or mind is not
itself an object of introspection.Descartes, for example, held that any sub-
stance is known by its attributes,which in the case of the mind are mind-de-
pendentmodes of thinkingor cogitationes.10 He canjustify belief in his own
existence as a mental substance throughhis immediateawareness of mental
actions, such as doubting,affirming,willing, all of which can occuronly in a
mind. He first identifies what is occurringas "mentalaction" (thinking)and
then employs the principle-call it Principle MA (for mental acts)-to
8 Meditations, HR II, 150.9 P. F. Strawson develops Kant's argument that self-awareness is not possible without
supposing that one is able to perceive an objective order, a world of objects of "outer
sense" in space-time in The Bounds of Sense (London:Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1966), 97-
110, 125-32. My simpler anti-skeptical argument focuses directly on skepticism's
troublesome implications for self-knowledge.10 Principles I, Iii (HR I, 240) and xi (HR I, 223).
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be an illusion, a possibility that should increase our appreciation of our
capacity to think for ourselves.
When focusing our attention on the more limited threat of general
sensory deception, skepticism takes illegitimate advantage of the fact that
we think of dreams and hallucinations as occurring to a person who
possesses a genuine core of active mentalcapacities. Against thisbackground
the skeptic invites us to imagine that our proprietary capacities are
artificially stimulated so as to create a "world" to which the victimized
mind is free to respond rationallywithin the delusion. If, however, we take
seriously the very powerful demon or brain-in-a-vat cenarios, there appears
to be no convincing way to justify one's belief that one is an active, creative
locus of mental agency, as opposed to an entirely passive arena of mere
happenings.Can the skeptic evade this objection by stipulating that the imagined
braino engineer has control only of the victim's peripheral sensory input,
leaving his central thought processes free to think his own thoughts? No,
since, by hypothesis, we cannotknow of such epistemologically convenient
but arbitrary estrictions.I cannot ascertainhow much I am contributingto
the origination and processing of what are supposed to be my ideas or
thoughts. In order to justify the belief that one is a "thinkingself' in the
sense of an individuallocus of originalmentalagency, one must know some-thing about his individual unity, identity through time, behavioral indepen-
dence, and self-control. The purelysubjectiveview at theheartof skepticism
affords none of this importantontological information about oneself as an
individual capable of action. For that we require ordinary observational
capacitieswhich the skeptic denies us.
4. INFERRING ONE'S OWN EXISTENCE
Doubts about our knowledge of our own mental agency may not appearto be
sufficient reason to give up the traditionaldogma that skepticism about the
material world leaves our awareness of ourselves relatively unscathed. It
might be thought that we can at least be certain that we exist as conscious,
experiencing subjects-whether we are active or only passive. It seems we
can infer by a Principle-call it ES this time-from the occurrence of
experiencesto theexistence of a conscious mindor subject thathas them.We
may know nothing of the metaphysical nature of that subject; but surely
theremustbe sucha thing.
There is, however, reasonto question the legitimacy of this inference be-
cause we cannotclaim to have therequiredpremise. Under the skeptic's rules
the humanbeing which common sense takes me to be is possibly partof a
delusion. Yet, I can claim no perceptual knowledge of an objective subject
who has the delusive experiencesin question.I have no knowledge of a being
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whose behavior would provide grounds for thinking that there are mental
processes occurring within or to a particular subject which would explain
that behavior, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions.This suggests that, if I
am initially in doubt about the objective existence of a subject, then my
regarding what occurs within my consciousness as "experiences" or as
"conscious states of a subject" is not justifiable. For all I can tell from
"inside" my consciousness, as it were, my experiences could be simply
happenings, completely independent of any subject, and having no
significance beyond themselves. If so, skepticism deprivesme of knowledge
of my own existence as a subject of experience by denying me the use of
Principle ES.
This argument echoes Hume's problem about knowledge of the "self,"
but it is muchmore radical.Hume noted that,since the perceivingself is notwithin its own ken, a personcan focus only upon the streamof "distinctper-
ceptions"which "have no need of any thing to supporttheirexistence."13 f
thereis no a priori or logical connectionbetween suchperceptionsanda sup-
porting self, thenone cannot infer that a substantialsubjectexists on the ba-
sis of thoseperceptions.
It is tempting to dismiss Hume's objection on the grounds that mental
phenomena, such as perceptions, thoughts, and pains, must be ascribed to a
mind, since the contents of consciousness are not, as Hume suggests, inde-pendent particulars,but are essentially dependentfor theirexistence upon a
mind or subject. This is not merely a point about language to the effect that
mental verbs must have a grammaticalsubject, as does 'hurts' in "It hurts."
It is ratherthatwe are entitled by the very meaning of these psychological
expressions to assert that if perceiving, thinking, or pain is occurring, then
thereis a perceiver,thinker,or pained subject.Mentalphenomenaare, to use
Strawson's phrase, "dependent particulars,"in the sense that they occur
only to a subjectwho is in the mental state or undergoesthe mentalprocess
in question.14This appears to vindicate Descartes's reasoning over Hume's
objection.
Nonetheless, this reply fails to meet my criticism of the subjective ac-
count of self-knowledge. My claim is that the inference from experiences to
a subject illegitimately assumes the desired conclusion by invoking in its
premise the idea of something mental or subjective, even though Principle
ES is appealed to in the firstplace precisely because the existence of a subject
is in question.If the data for the premises are described, not as experiences,
but neutrallyand nonsubjectivelyas being merely something "happening,"
then, as Hume noticed, the inference to a subject of awareness by Principle
13 Treatise, Book I, part iv, section 6. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford:ClarendonPress; 1951), 252
14 P. F. Strawson,Individuals(London:Methuenand Co. Ltd., 1959), 170.
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ES is not justified. On the other hand, the ego has no way to establish the
essentially subjectiveanddependentcharacterof experienceby introspection
alone. If the subject is not included within the contents of the experiences
themselves, then it and its relation to the experiences are not accessible to
the ego. There are no purely introspectable grounds for saying that a
phenomenonis "mental,"where this means it is happeningin a mind or that
it is an object of awareness.15The doubtingego has no right to suppose that
something appropriately called "thinking," "pain," "anger" or, more
generally, "experience" is occurring, where these terms by their very
meaning carry the implicationthat there is a mind or subject to which they
belong.'6 Ourmerely having experiences is not sufficient to account for our
right to regard them as such. That requires the external perspective on
ourselves as objective subjects which perceptionprovides. And so the egocannot legitimately claim that his initial data are subjective experiences if
he is reduced to using only the meager resources available on the purely
subjectiveview.
My claim that one would have no right on the subjective view to charac-
terize the data initially as "mental"or "subjective"may seem counter-intu-
itive. Surely I can identify my experiencesand ascribe them to myself with-
out "external" observation of my behavior. Descartes is not alone in
insisting that the mental character of cogitationes is manifestly evident tointrospection. Many will insist that it is not possible to have a thought
without being aware that it is a thought having a certain content. Its
intentionality surely evidences its relation to the awareness of a mind or
personalsubject.
I suggest, however, that this self-intimatingcharacterof experience is an
illusion that is fostered by the fact that, with common sense epistemology
as a background, we have learned to describe much of our mental life
without having to appealexplicitly to our behavior.Descartes assumed that
the mind is more easily known thanthebody; but the truth s that each of us
is a competentself-ascriberonly because we are aware of our own existence
as active, purposive humanbeings. We understandthat we are appropriate
subjects for the ascriptionof mentalpredicatesby both othersand ourselves.
And so we can refer to our thoughts and feelings in the context of the
independently warranted belief that we are individuals to whom such
15 In "A Neo-KantianRefutationof CartesianScepticism " SouthwestPhilosophy Review, 3
(1986): 146, Edward S. Shirley argues similarly thatthe mental characterof sense-datais
not a propertyof them and so they cannot be experiencedas mental.16 Strawson seems to hint at this point on p. 101 of Individuals, when he says that "...the
most I may be allowed to have noted is thatexperiences,all experiences, stand in a specialrelation to body M.... (This 'most' is perhaps too much-because of the presence of theword 'experiences'.)"
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mentalphenomena are justifiablyascribable.The alleged epistemic priority
of introspectiveawareness of the mind is a myth.
5. EXTERNAL VERSUS TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCE
I have argued that skepticism is much more troubling than has beentraditionally recognized, because it unwittingly undermines our self-
awareness. It might be suggested, however, that the fact that the ego's
beliefs abouthimselfcannotbejustifiedin the absence of perceptiondoes not
render completely unintelligible his speculation that a mind exists. This
suggestion is intended to parallelthe idea that someone who at least had the
concept of "an object" could engage in an intelligible speculation about
whether there are materialobjects, even if a belief in them was unwarranted.
It is controversial whether anyone could be said to "have" suchfundamental concepts as "object" or "mind" without having any
opportunity to apply them appropriately to objects and to intelligent
beings. But, leaving thataside, the fatal problemwith skepticismto which I
wish to call attention is that it undercuts the possibility of meaningful
reference to the particular ndividualthatis oneself. Self-reference requires
more than merely having a concept of "mind" or "person."One's words
must connect up with a particular ndividual,and one should have reason to
think there is that connection with oneself. But the ego can have no suchreason where skeptical doubts preclude its having warrantedbeliefs about
the existence of a particular individual from either external or internal
sources. The external world doubt implies that the ego has no right to
suppose thatthere is any humanbeing to which occurrences of the word 'I'
refer. And I claim that my argument against the identificationof a subject
purely by "internal experience" blocks the move that the first person
pronounrefers to whateverbeing it is that has (my) "experiences."There is
no possibility of legitimate reference to experiences. Given such deep
uncertaintiesabout self-reference from the ego's point of view, there is no
reason to think that it can be said to understandeven the bare speculation
that "I might exist." There is nothing within its ken to which it knows the
pronouncould refer.
The skeptic may attempt to meet this objection by citing a parallel with a
less controversialcase in which it seems thatI can refer to myself as a sub-
ject of experience even when I am not perceptuallyaware of myself. The ex-ample concerns the way my self-reference works in a dream when I say, "I
am only dreaming."It seems plausible to identify the protagonist who says
these words in the dream with the dreamer, i.e. the person who is really
asleep in bed. Yet, the sleeperis epistemically externalto the dreamer.Why,
asks the skeptic, should I not similarly identify myself with the possible
transcendent brain in the vat who is experiencing "my" biography in his
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delusion? The suggestion is that if I were a brainin a vat, the word 'I' used
by me within my delusion would not designate the nonexistent protagonist
in the world of my delusion, but would refer right throughmy delusion to
the brain-subject which I really would be. This is possible, just as in mydreams, despite the fact that my real nature would be unknown to me
because it transcends my perceptual grasp. On this view of pronominal
reference,if, in the vat, I entertained he thought"I am sitting at a computer
keyboard now," that thought would be false, because the "I" in question
would in reality be a small round spongy item, lacking appendages, and
floating in liquid. It is perhaps not out of the question, the scenario
continues, that I might some day "wake up" to that "higher" reality and
realize my truecondition.All this sounds superficially intelligible, and the intelligibility of self-
reference in the scenario is all that the skeptic claims at this point. He need
not convince us that the vat speculation is true or that it is even plausible.
Nevertheless, serious doubt can be cast upon this apparent ntelligibility by
questioning the force of the analogy with self-identification in ordinary
dream examples. It is certainly possible for me to dream that I am having
wild adventures,while someone else sees that I am actually lying in bed.
When I awaken, I myself take up the role of observer, perceiving my truesituation, and from thatwaking vantage point I am in a position to speak of
what I did in my dream. It is plausible to suggest that my waking
identificationof the dreamprotagonist as myself is what gives sense to the
claim that my use of the first person pronoun when asleep referred
"through" he dream,so to speak, to the real, material me and not merely to
the protagonist n the dream. Had I always been in a deep sleep therewould
be no reason to think thatwhatever understandingof self-reference I might
have could escape the confines of my dreams. What is crucial to thepossibility of genuine self-reference in a dream, then, is that the person is
capable of ordinary,waking reference to herself as a humanbeing and that
when she awakes she reports the dreamin the firstperson as something that
(seemed to) have happened to her. Of course, if one agrees with Anthony
Kenny that "one cannot make judgments during dreams" or "entertain
beliefs in sleep," then one will object that a dreamercannot, refer in her
thoughts "out" of the dream to herself or anythingelse. But then, so much
the worse for the skeptic's appealto this analogy.17
If we comparethis dreamexample to the allegedly parallelskeptical sce-
nario, we find that there is a significant difference. Suppose the common
sense notion of "a dream" is expanded by the reckless philosophical
imagination to encompassboth my dreamingand my presentwaking life, so
17 AnthonyKenny,Descartes (New York: RandomHouse, 1968), 30-31.
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that nothing within my experience is permitted to count as a genuine
perception of myself. My "real self" transcends my present sense
experience.But in this case no paradigmatic elf-referenceis availableto me
of the sort I have when awake to lend credibility to the suggestion thatI, inmy totaldelusion, may now be referring o my transcendent elf. There is no
provision in the skeptical scenario for validating my self-reference by my
actually perceiving and identifying myself from the alleged transcendent
view, as there is in the case of a dream. Hence, ordinarydreamexperience
cannot be used to render intelligible the idea of a merely speculative
referenceto something dentifiedas oneself in an unexperienced econd-order
reality.
6. OBSERVATION BY OTHERS
Nonetheless, the thought persists that it at least makes sense to speculate
that I might be totally unaware of my real nature and situation,because we
know that sometimes one person is in a position to observe that anotheris
deceived abouthimself. Canwe imaginean extremecase, a twinof mine who
has been completely deludedsince birth,but who is rationaland who thinks,
just as I do, thathe has always been in touch with reality?We think of him
as referringto himself within his delusion and falsely believing that he is
able to perceive himself froman external,objective point of view. He has no
idea that he is seen to be totally deluded from a perspective that is
epistemically inaccessible to what he thinks of as his perceptionof objects.
If his case is conceivable, how can I insist withjustificationthatI am now in
an epistemic position superior to his? How can I resist the suggestion thatI
might be in an analogouspositionrelative to anotherobserver?
My answer is that, unlike me, my twin is, by hypothesis, incapable of
perceiving either himself or his surroundings.On the basis of our common
sense epistemology, accordingto which the reliability of sense perceptionis
the default position, we are able to identify and refer to the twin, and
ascertain that his cognitive faculties are not functioning properly with
respect to what is true about himself or the world. We find that he is not
awareof himself in any richersense thanthathe has feelings and sensations
occasioned by his body. He does not understand any seemingly self-
referential expressions that escape his lips because he is unaware of theperson in the world (himself) to which such terms normallyrefer.
On the otherhand,my situation is very differentfrom his since I can and
do perceive myself in my surroundingsand can refer to myself. I cannot
make sense of the suggestion that I may unknowingly be in a similar state,
because that would require me to ignore what I believe to be true about
myself insofar as I understand references to me at all. My having the
capacity to conceive that a humanbeing might be totally out of perceptual
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contact with his environment does not entail that I also understand that I
could now be in that condition or that I might always have been in that
condition. The thought thatI am so cognitively incapacitatedwould cost me
the rightto believe I can entertain hatvery speculationaboutmyself.It is tempting to think that the hypothesis that I am now totally deluded
is intelligible to me because I can imagine anotherobserver,call her T, who
considers me to be out of touch with reality just as I think this of my twin.
The appealto a hypotheticalobjective observeris meantto convince me that
all of my beliefs may be false, even the ones regarding my own nature and
situation. What may slip by unnoticedis that T cannot be viewing me from
the ordinary external perspective which was the context of the twin
example and within which I believe I have perceptualaccess to myself, toother people, and to my surroundings.For if I were to institute a thorough
search of "my universe," I would not encounter T, just as I would not
discover the braino on my head, or my real self, for that matter. The
philosophical skeptic wants me to imagine my being viewed from a
perspective that stands "outside"the ordinary one, a transcendent point of
view from which I can be observed now to be a brain in a vat, despite my
perceptionsto the contrary.
This is the "higher-order"perspective of the Cartesian demon who is
able to perceive me at this moment and determine that, despite what I and
my friendsbelieve, my experiences are delusions and my ontological nature
(along with thatof my friends)is quite other thanI suppose it to be.
But this substitutionof what is in fact a transcendentperspective for the
external perceptual one we are all familiarwith and all normally share, is a
trick. There is no such perspective for T or anyone else to take up. The idea
that there is a level of Reality relative to which the world that we all live
in could turnout to be only someone's dream is nothing but a plausible bit
of nonsense. Such talkmay seem to be meaningfulat first because it appears
to appeal merely to an externalobserver,as in the twin case. However, if I
then fall in with the skeptical suggestion that ordinary seeing, hearing, and
touching provides merely subjectiveawareness of what is phenomenal, this,
in effect, places the observer of my conditionepistemically outside not only
me, but outside everything and everyone in my world. The perceptual
observation which is from a point within the world and external merely tomy introspection has become a "transcendent" observation which is
external even to perception.We have passed from ordinarydoubt about my
possible cognitive failings and delusions to a seemingly invincible
philosophical doubt that is based upon the allegedly subjective nature of
experience to which any observer is vulnerable.
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This skeptical move illustrates the classic shift, noted by Thompson
Clarke, from doubt stated in "plain" talk to a "philosophical" question.18
It also representsthe way that Stroud, in the words of Hans-JohannGlock,
"quietly turns reality into REALITY-a metaphysical ordo essendi whichcan always show everythingwe say or believe to be wrong."19Not even the
demon or T is in a position to claim more reliable knowledge aboutReality
than I, so they too must be worried about skepticism in their turn.20Stroud
sees nothing objectionable in this result that "we all might be in the same
boat" (SPS, 272), but it in fact reveals how far we have come from the twin
example in which we supposed that persons with unimpaired,unquestioned
cognitive faculties could judge another ndividual to be deluded.The skeptic,
by questioning all perceptions, implicitly appeals to a "higher reality"relative to which our waking is a dream. But the idea of a "transcendent"
reality offering such a critical view of our world is empty. Unlike the
distinctions between waking and sleeping or clear-headed perception and
delusion, the relevant external/transcendentdistinction has not been and
cannot be intelligibly introduced.2',
7. THE LIMITS OF DELUSION
The moral of my anti-skeptical argument is that only limited
epistemological dislocations, occasioned by the sorts of deceptions, dreams,
and hallucinations that are possible within the context of our ordinary
epistemology, are compatible with having beliefs about oneself. There must
be at least some body of experience available to me which I can regardas
affordingme a baseline perceptualcontact with myself as an individual, if I
am to understand he suggestion thatat times I have been or might in future
be out of contact with the world.
This is my response to Stroud's challenge to show "that some unprob-
lematic knowledge of facts of the world is presupposedor involved in any
genuine dream-possibility, or more generally, that the only possibilities
thatcan threatenour knowledge must be understood n a 'plain' or 'internal'
or 'empirical' way." As he himself remarks,"that would be to show that
the fully 'external' or 'philosophical' conception of our relation to the
world, when pressed,is an illusion, and not a way we can coherentlythinkof
ourselves at all" (SPS, 273-74). Substituting 'transcendent' for Stroud'sphrase"fully 'external',"I believe that this is exactly what I have shown.
18 ThompsonClarke,"The Legacy of Skepticism,"Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972): 758.19 Hans-Johann Glock, "Stroud's Defense of Cartesian Scepticism-A 'Linguistic
Response',"PhilosophicalInvestigations,13:1(Jan. 1990): 61.20 Clarkenotes the demon's plight in "The Legacy of Skepticism,"766.21 This supports Ludwig Wittgenstein's remark 19 in On Certainty (New York: Harperand
Row, 1969), that the Idealist's "furtherdoubtbehind practical doubt"is an illusion.
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For instance,I might be ill with fever andconvinced thatI am waking up
in my bedroomwhen I amactuallyin the hospital.Given my priorhistoryof
normalvisual, tactual,and somatic awarenessof myself, there would be no
reason to question my reference to myself, even when I am suffering thisrelatively serious confusion, for we are not yet imagining that I am totally
cut off from perceptualcontactwith myself. We can also imagine a device,
drug, or disease inducing delusions and dreamswhich might become more
and more extensive so that eventually I would know nothing of my
environment, my identity, or even myself. Only others would be in a
position to ascertainwho I reallyam or whatmy condition is. However, it is
my present capacity for empirical self-awareness which permits me to
consider even the possibility that such a thing could happento me. And on
the assumption of that same self-awareness it is also empirically evident
that it has not in fact happened o me.
The perceptual self-awareness which serves as a basis for my self-
referencerules out the possibility thatI am now andhave always been asleep
and dreaming. However, my so-called knowledge that I am awake and
conscious is not a bit of information hatI discover to be trueand for which
I have particularevidence. As Kenny points out, "There is no fact better
known to me than the fact that I am awake, thatI can offer as a reason for
saying thatI am awake. When I say 'I am awake,' I do so without grounds,
but not without justification."22Ordinarily we know that we are awake
without performinga specific test simply because we perceive ourselves to
be active in oursurroundings.
Stroudwould object thatmy use of 'perceive' begs the question against
the skeptic, since it could be "thatI am now dreaming" SPS, 27). Any test I
performto determinewhetheror not I am asleep could itself be carried out
in a dreamandso be worthless (SPS, 22). However,as we have seen, the sup-
position that all my observations and actions could be merely dreamed is
self-defeating. If we accept such skepticismas a serious possibility, we then
raise all the problems to which I have called attention concerning self-
awareness and self-reference. My philosophical "justification" for the
belief that I am now awake, therefore, consists in the anti-skeptical
arguments hatI have presented n this essay.
What implications does my argument have for the brain-in-a-vat
scenario? It may eventually be feasible to keep humanheads conscious on
life-support systems that are connected to natural or artificial sense and
speech "organs."Norman Malcolm has insisted that the idea that a brain
could have thoughts, illusions, or pains is senseless, on the Wittgensteinian
22 Kenny,Descartes,30.
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grounds that "a brain does not sufficiently resemble a human being."23
However, we may think of the individual, not as a merely immobile and
faceless organ,but as a personwho has lost all of his naturalbody except his
brain. He is maintained on life-supportwhich replaces the functions of hisother bodily organs. Since, on our ordinaryepistemology my existence as a
human being is intelligible to me, I can understandthe idea that I might
undergo this procedure and thereafter be both physically and
epistemologically at the mercy of the scientists in chargeof my input.They
might render me completely deluded, cutting me off from reality entirely.
Having conceded all this, however, it does not follow that I must also
concede thatI might already have suffered thatfate. The very perceptions
thatpermitme to know thatI exist as a conscious being who can understandand examine the skeptical hypothesis as it might apply to me, conflict
directly with any such thesis aboutmy situation.
Why then is it so tempting for us to believe that the skeptic's false hy-
potheses are not falsifiable? Why have philosophersso readily accepted the
doctrine of the epistemic priorityof experience? I suggest that this attitude
is to be explained in part because we are tempted to treat introspection and
perception as separableaspects of ourcommon sense epistemology when in
fact they cannot be understoodin isolation from one another. The purely
subjective view which nourishes skepticism highlights our introspective
capabilities, especially the ability to express our thoughts and to ascribe
them to ourselves without always engaging in the perceptualobservationof
us that others require. But emphasis on "inner perception"underplays the
fact that our self-knowledge and our capacity to make self-ascriptions
depends fundamentally on our perceptualawarenessof ourselves as proper
subjects of both behavioralandpsychological ascriptions.
On the other hand, the impossibly "transcendent"point of view, by
which skepticism appears to undermine our empirical beliefs, takes its
inspiration from our ordinary status as objects of "external"perception by
others. However, like the subjective notion, this idea of transcendencealso
leaves out of account our own capacity for self-perception from that same
ordinaryexternal view. Ignoringthe fact that self-awareness and perception
are inseparably inked for us in self-perception, skepticism creates mischief
by insulating my references to myself from the references to me by others.The artificial dissociation of these two elements of our common sense
epistemology, self-consciousness and perception, creates the Cartesian
fiction that we can know that we exist and have experiences but not know
what we really are like from the "outside." Such a view is fundamentally
23 NormanMalcolm,"ScientificMaterialism nd the IdentityTheory,"Dialogue, 3:2(1964):124-25.
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misguided, not merely because it leads to radical skepticismabout the world
and self, but because this separationof the "interior" rom the "exterior"
views we have of ourselves deprives us of a proper understandingof our
essentially unifiedsubjective/objectivenatureas persons.
8. CONCLUSION
It should be evident that I do not agree with those philosopherswho have re-
cently expressed either pessimism or resignation about meeting the
skeptical challenge. BarryStroud believes "theproblem has no solution; or
ratherthat the only answer to the questionas it is meant to be understood s
that we can know nothing about the world around us" (SPS, 1). He
concludes that none of the several major attempts to defeat traditionalskepticism which he examines is successful. They eitherdogmatically reject
the skeptical conclusion, or miss the skeptic's point altogether,or appeal to
a discreditedverifiability theoryof meaning.On the contrary,I have argued
without appealing to a verifiabilitytheory of meaning that, if perception is
generally questioned, self-knowledge and self-reference are jeopardized
along with knowledge of the world.
In contrastto Stroud, who arguesthat no one has yet defeated skepticism,
Thomas Nagel insists, in The Viewfrom Nowhere, thatno one can defeat it.
The theories of verifiability and reference that have been arrayed against
philosophical doubts are themselves refuted by the "evidentpossibility and
intelligibility of skepticism...."24 According to Nagel, skepticism is in-
evitable because it expresses something true of our epistemological
situationand is not something to be overcome or refuted,even though"our
natural realism makes it impossible for us to be content with a purely
subjective view."25
Although this attitude of resigned acceptance has romanticcharm, I do
not agree that skepticism is inevitable or that it expresses something true of
our epistemological situation. It is indisputable that the human situation is
subject to variouskinds-of troublingdoubt, but full-fledged skeptical theses
are either false or empty, depending on whether we highlight their conflict
with ordinary epistemological assumptionsor the attemptby the skeptic to
make illegitimate use of the correlative but inapplicable concepts of the
purely subjective and purely transcendent.It is not, as Nagel suggests, our"naturalrealism" which makes it impossible to be content with a "purely
subjective view." It simply is not a point of view we can adopt without
losing an epistemologicalgrip on ourselves.
24 Thomas Nagel, The View rom Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 73.2 T. Nagel, The View rom Nowhere, 74.
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Since I hold that self-conscious skepticism cannot be intelligibly ex-
pressed and so requires no refutation,I agree with Strawsonthat a "rational
justificationof the belief in external objects" is not the way to rebut skepti-
cism. However, I disagree when he adds that, because our beliefs represent"natural, nescapable commitments which we neither choose nor give up,"
skeptical arguments and counter-arguments are "equally idle-not
senseless" and the skeptical challenge should be ignored.26 have tried to
show on rational grounds appealing to the interrelations of fundamental
conceptionsof subjectivityand objectivitywhy "commonsense" is not open
to question in the way the skeptic suggests. Yet, the skeptical challenge
should not be ignored,because meetingit can teach us valuablelessons about
our epistemology. We learn in particular hat we must resist the temptationto think of our epistemic resourcesas reducedby doubts aboutperceptionto
mere "experiences," f we are to account for self-knowledge.27
26 "Skepticism,Naturalism,and TranscendentalArguments,"chapter 1 of Skepticismand
Naturalism:SomeVarieties,27.
27 I wish to express my appreciation o my colleague William G. Lycanfor his helpful com-
mentson earlierversions of thisessay.