Accordan international review of peace initiatives
Logo using multiply onlayers
Logo drawn as seperate elementswith overlaps coloured seperately
Local engagement with armed groupsIn the midst of violence
INSI
GH
T 2A
ccord INSIG
HT 2â
2015Local engagem
ent with arm
ed groups:âinâtheâmidstâofâviolence
EditorsSophie Haspeslagh and Zahbia Yousuf 2015
Accordan international review of peace initiatives
Accord Insightâ //â www.c-r.org PublishedâbyâConciliationâResources,âtoâinformâandâstrengthenâpeaceâprocessesâworldwideâbyâdocumentingâandâanalysingâtheâlessonsâofâpeacebuilding
Local engagement with armed groups In the midst of violence
Accord Insight presents cutting-edge analysis and contemporary peacebuilding innovation by re-examining key challenges and practical lessons from Conciliation Resourcesâ Accord publication series
INSI
GH
T 2
May 2015 // Editors Sophie Haspeslagh and Zahbia Yousuf
Published by Conciliation Resources Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road, London NW5 1AL www.c-r.org
Telephoneâ +44â(0)â207â359â7728ââFaxâ +44â(0)â207â359â4081âEmailâ [email protected]
UK charity registration number 1055436
EditorsâSophieâHaspeslaghâandâZahbiaâYousuf
Executive Director AndyâCarl
Director of Policy and Practice EleanorâOâGorman
Head of Accord AlexanderâRamsbotham
Peacebuilding Editor and Analyst ZahbiaâYousuf
Head of Policy and Learning TeresaâDumasy
Policy Analyst SanneâTielemans
Programme Officer FelixâColchester
Copyedited by Aaron Griffiths
Designed and typeset by Soapbox www.soapbox.co.uk
©âConciliationâResourcesâ2015âPermissionâisâgrantedâforâreproductionâandâuseâofâtheâmaterialsâforâeducationalâpurposes.âPleaseâacknowledgeâyourâsourceâwhenâusingâtheâmaterialsâandânotifyâConciliationâResources.
Coverâphoto:âHenrietteâUseniâKabake,âgovernmentâadministratorâofâLulingu,âSouthâKivuâProvince,âDemocraticâRepublicâofâCongo,âhostsâaâtownâmeetingâalongsideâtraditionalâleadersâandâleadersâfromâtheâRaiaâMutombiokiâarmedâgroupâ©âDianaâZeynebâAlhindawiâ2014.
ISBN:â978-1-905805-21-1
ISSN:â1365-0742
Acknowledgements
Accordâsâstrengthâandâvalueâreliesâonâtheâexpertise,âexperienceâandâperspectivesâofâaârangeâofâpeopleâwhoâcontributeâtoâAccordâInsightâprojectsâinâaâvarietyâofâways.â
Weâwouldâlikeâtoâgiveâspecialâthanksâto: AdenâAbdi,âDianaâFrancis,âDoreenâKhoury,âElizabethâPicard,âEmmaâLeslie,âFredâLubang,âGinnyâBouvier,âJasonâMacLeod,âKennedyâTumutegyereize,âKristianâHerbolzheimer,âMareikeâSchomerus,âNereaâBilbatua,âNorbertâRopers,âSolâSantos,âTeresaâWhitfield,âVeroniqueâDudouetâandâZannahâMustapha.
WeâalsoâextendâgratefulâthanksâtoâtheâmanyâotherâexpertâcontributorsâtoâthisâAccordâInsightâpublication:âAminaâHassanâAhmed,âAnne-KristinâTreiber,âBasselâSalloukh,âChrisâRush,âClaireâSneed,âDavidâNewton,âEdâGarcia,âEleanorâJohnson,âErshadâMahmud,âGavinâSullivan,âMichaelâSemple,âNoelâLarge,âOmarâAshour,âPeterâBowling,âSantaâOkot,âSusanneâGentz,âTomâCrick,âUrkoâAiartza,âVaradaâKumarâandâYaserâAlashqar.
Opinionsâexpressedâbyâauthorsâareâtheirâown.
ConciliationâResourcesâisâveryâgratefulâtoâtheâMinistryâforâForeignâAffairsâofâFinlandâandâtheâNorwegianâPeacebuildingâResourceâCentreâ(NOREF)âforâtheirâfinancialâsupportâforâthisâAccordâInsightâprojectâandâpublication.âTheâcontentsâofâthisâpublicationâareâtheâsoleâresponsibilityâofâConciliationâResourcesâandâdoânotânecessarilyâreflectâtheâpositionâofâtheâMinistryâforâForeignâAffairsâofâFinlandâorâNOREF.
â
â
ConciliationâResourcesâwouldâalsoâlikeâtoâthankâtheâUKâGovernment,âtheâSwedishâInternationalâDevelopmentâCooperationâAgency,âtheâNorwegianâMinistryâofâForeignâAffairs,âandâtheâSwissâFederalâDepartmentâofâForeignâAffairsâforâtheirâsupport.
ContentsAcronyms 4
Foreword 5
AccordInsight 6
Inthemidstofviolence:localengagementwitharmedgroups
Expertanalysis 10
Betweenfightingandtalking
Casestudies
NorthernUganda 15
Colombia 21
NorthernIreland 27
Syria 30
Keytexts 35
Furtherreading 35
Keywebsites 37
TheAccordseries 38
4 // Accord // Insight 2
AcronymsARLPI ââAcholiâReligiousâLeadersââPeaceâInitiativeAUC ââUnitedâSelf-DefenceâForcesâofâColombiaBCB ââCentralâBolivarâBlockCAR ââCentralâAfricanâRepublicâCINEP ââCenterâforâResearchâandâPopularâEducationCPA ââComprehensiveâPeaceâAgreementDRC ââDemocraticâRepublicâofâCongoELN ââNationalâLiberationâArmyâFARC ââRevolutionaryâArmedâForcesâofâColombiaFSA ââFreeâSyrianâArmyGoSS ââGovernmentâofâSouthernâSudanHSM ââHolyâSpiritâMovementIRA ââIrishâRepublicanâArmyIS ââIslamicâStateJN ââJabhatâal-Nusra
LAC ââLocalâAdministrativeâCouncilLCC ââLocalâCoordinationâCommitteeLRA ââLordâsâResistanceâArmyNGO ââNon-governmentalâorganisationNIACRO ââNorthernâIrelandâAssociationâforâtheâCareâandâResettlementâofâOffendersâNRA ââNationalâResistanceâArmyPDPMM ââPeaceâandâDevelopmentâProgrammeâofâMagdalenaâMedioPSNI ââPoliceâServiceâofâNorthernâIrelandRUC ââRoyalâUlsterâConstabularyâUNSC ââUnitedâNationsâSecurityâCouncilUPDF ââUgandaâPeopleâsâDefenceâForceUPDM/A ââUgandaâPeopleâsâDemocraticâMovement/Army
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 5
ForewordMichael SempleâisâvisitingâprofessorâatâtheâInstituteâforâtheâStudyâofâConflictâTransformationâandâSocialâJustice,âQueenâsâUniversityâBelfast.âHeâspecialisesâinâresearch,âpolicyâandâpracticeâofâhumanitarianâassistanceâandâconflictâresolutionâinâAfghanistanâandâPakistan.âHeâworkedâinâtheâregionâfromâ1988â2008âandâwasâaâmemberâofâtheâUnitedâNationsâpoliticalâ
teamâthatâhelpedâimplementâtheâ2001âBonnâAgreement.âFromâ2004â08âheâwasâDeputyâtoâtheâEuropeanâUnionâSpecialâRepresentativeâforâAfghanistan.âMichaelâisâaârecognisedâanalystâofâtheâAfghanâTalibanâMovementâandâhisâcurrentâresearchâlooksâatâchallengesâfacingâmilitantâjihadiâgroupsâevolvingâaâpoliticalârole.
Pioneersâofâpeaceâtalksâwithâarmedâgroupsâareâoftenâfiguresâfromâcommunitiesâaffectedâbyâviolence.âThisâAccordâInsight,âexploringâlocalâengagementâinitiatives,âisâaâtimelyâreminderâthatâconflictâtransformationâoftenâproceedsâwithoutâaâpresidentialâmandateâorâmediationâbyâaâretiredâinternationalâdiplomat.âNationalâlevelâandâformalâprocessesâhaveâmuchâtoâlearnâfromâtheâexperiencesâofâtribalâelders,âclericsâorâcivilâsocietyâactivistsâwhoâhaveâsatâdownâtoâtalkâwithâtheirâlocalâarmedâgroups.â
Inâmyâexperience,âmediaâcoverageâofâconflictsâoftenâpresentsâcivilianâpopulationsâasâdisempoweredâandâatâtheâmercyâofâarmedâgroups.âInâPakistan,âestimatesâofâtheânumberâofâtribalâeldersâassassinatedâbyâTalibanâandâal-Qaedaâaffiliatesâareâcitedâtoâshowâhowâmilitantsâhaveâsubvertedâtraditionalâauthorityâstructuresâsuchâasâjirgas.âButâmyâunderstandingâofâbothâPakistanâandâAfghanistanâisâthatâthereâisâintenseâinteractionâbetweenâarmedâgroupsâandâcommunityâfigures,âinâpartâdrivenâbyâmilitantsâârecognitionâthatâtheirâsurvivalâdependsâonâmaintainingâaâdegreeâofâpopularâconsent.
Communitiesâengageâwithâarmedâgroupsâonâaârangeâofâissues:âfromâhostageânegotiation,âtoâcriminalâjustice,âdisputeâadjudicationâandâlocalâceasefires.âTheâdegreeâofâagencyâshownâbyâcivilianâinterlocutorsâalsoâvaries.âRepresentativesâmayâarticulateâcommunityâdemandsâtoâarmedâgroups.âInâPakistanâandâAfghanistanâthereâareâaâwealthâofâinformalâactors,âincludingâclericsâandâelders,âreadyâtoâactâasâintermediariesâforâtheârecoveryâofâhostagesâorâtoâagreeâtruces.âInâareasâwhereâanâarmedâgroupâisâtheâdeâfactoâauthority,âmuchâofâtheâengagementâconsistsâofâpetitioningâââciviliansâapproachâtheâarmedâgroupâsâcommanderâbecauseâtheâgovernment-sanctionedâassistantâcommissionerâisânoâlongerâableâtoâdeliver.
TheâimportanceâattachedâtoâcivilianâengagementâbyâtheâTalibanâisâillustratedâinâcadreâtrainingâprogrammes,âwhichâinârecentâ
yearsâhaveâincreasinglyâemphasisedâtheâneedâforâcourteousâandânon-coerciveârelationsâwithâcivilians.âTheâactualâbehaviourâofâcadresâmayâdiffer,âbutâtheâTalibanâsâintentionâisâclearâenoughââârecognisingâthatâtheâabilityâtoâoperateâsafelyâinâruralâareasâdependsâuponâmaintainingâaâmodicumâofâcommunityâconsent.âConversely,âtheâAfghanâTalibanâperceiveâarbakaiâ(government-backedâcommunityâmilitias)âasâtheâgreatestâthreatâtoâtheirâinfluence,âwhichâareâformedâwhenâtheâTalibanâfailâtoâsecureâconsentâtoâtheirâpresence.âArmedâgroupsâknowâthatâlosingâtheâargumentâwithâcommunitiesâmayâmeanâlosingâtheâwar.
Sinceâ2010âthereâhaveâbeenâperiodicâattemptsâtoâorchestrateâofficialâpeaceâtalksâwithâtheâAfghanâTaliban.âEarlyâ2015âsawâtheâmostâconcertedâattemptâyet,âasâPresidentâAshrafâGhaniâmadeâaâstrategicâcalculationâthatâtop-levelârapprochementâwithâPakistan,âcomplementedâbyâChineseâmediation,âcouldâbringâtheâTalibanâleadershipâtoâtheâtable.âTheâinitiativeâstartedâoutâasâaâclassicâexampleâofâtop-downâpeacemaking,ârelyingâonâtheâpersuasiveâpowerâofâstateâactorsâtoâengageâwithâtheâleadership.â
ThisâAccordâInsightâpointsâtoâalternativeâapproaches,âwhereâcommunitiesâengageâwithâandâinfluenceâarmedâactorsâinâtheirâoperationalâarea.âByâconsideringâgrassrootsâengagementâinâaârangeâofâcontextsâtheâAccordâInsightâusefullyâdrawsâattentionâtoâtheârichnessâofâexperienceâinâdealingâwithâarmedâgroups.â
Theânewâdataâwillâhopefullyâhelpâaddressâtheâtop-downâbiasâinâofficialâpeacemaking,âandâcreateâspaceâforâcomplementaryâapproachesâatâmultipleâlevels.âTheâexperiencesâdocumentedâareârelevantâinternationallyâtoâanyoneâdevelopingâaâstrategyâtoâbringâarmedâgroupsâintoâaâpeaceâprocess.âAfghanâpeacemakersâmayâyetâembraceâtheâbottom-upâapproachâifâtheyâfindâthatâhigh-levelâtalksâdoânotâdeliverâtheâkindâofâprogressâtheyâhaveâbeenâhopingâfor.
6 // Accord // Insight 2
AccordInsightIn the midst of violence: local engagement with armed groupsZahbiaYousufZahbiaâYousufâjoinedâConciliationâResourcesâasâPeacebuildingâEditorâandâAnalystâinâMayâ2012.âBeforeâthisâsheâwasâaâTeachingâFellowâinâViolence,âConflictâandâDevelopmentâatâSOASâUniversityâandâKingsâCollegeâLondon.âSheâhasâalsoâbeenâaâResearchâAssociateâatâINCOREâatâtheâUniversityâofâUlster,â
andâtheâGermanâInstituteâforâEconomicâResearchâ(DIW),âBerlin.âSheâcompletedâaâPhDâinâComparativeâPeaceâProcessesâinâ2010,âlookingâatâNorthernâIreland,âIsrael/PalestineâandâKashmir,âandâholdsâaâMastersâDegreeâinâInternationalâPeaceâandâSecurityâfromâtheâDepartmentâofâWarâStudies,âKingsâCollegeâLondon.
ThisâsecondâInsightâpublicationâinâConciliationâResourcesââAccordâseriesâlooksâbeyondâstate-centredâandâinternationalâdebatesâoverâwhetherâorânotâtoâengageâinâdialogueâwithâanâarmedâgroup.âInsteadâitâexploresâtheâspacesâinâwhichâarmedâgroupsâoperateâandâtheirârelationshipsâwithâtheâpeopleâwhoâliveâthere.â
Localâpopulationsâareânotâjustâpassiveâactorsâinâconflictâzones,âsimplyâcoercedâbyâarmedâactors.âEqually,âarmedâgroupsâdoânotâmerelyâexploitâorâabuseâcommunitiesâinâareasâinâwhichâtheyâoperate.âThreeâin-depthâcaseâstudiesâfromâColombia,ânorthernâUgandaâandâSyria,âasâwellâasâaâshorterâreflectionâfromâNorthernâIreland,âillustrateâhowâcommunitiesâhaveâtriedâtoâinfluenceâtheâbehaviourâofâarmedâgroupsâawayâfromâviolence,âandâtheâfactorsâthatâhaveâaffectedâtheirâinteractionsâââmostâofâwhichâtookâplaceâinâadvanceâofâmoreâformalânegotiationsâandâoftenâinâsituationsâofâintenseâviolenceâandâembeddedâconflict.
Theseâlocalââspacesâinâbetweenââfightingâandâtalkingâshedâlightâonâtheâpossibilitiesâforâmoreâupstreamâengagementâwithâarmedâgroupsâandâtheâvarietyâofâpeaceâeffortsâinvolvedâinâshapingâtheirâdecisions.âTheâcaseâstudiesâillustrateâthatâreachingâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâdoesânotâhaveâtoâlegitimateâtheirâtacticsâorâevenâambitions.âTheyâalsoâshowâhowâactiveâcommunityâengagementâwithâarmedâgroupsâcanâmakeâanâimportantâcontributionâtoâlocalâhumanâsecurityâandâpeacebuilding.â
Theâexperiencesâdocumentedâconfirmâthatâlocalâpeaceâactorsâfaceâhugeâsecurityârisksâââunprotectedâbyâdiplomaticâimmunityâorâtheâsecurityâofâtheâstate.âArmedâgroupsâoftenâhaveâaâblatantâdisregardâforâcivilianâsecurity,âorâworse,âpurposefullyâtargetâpopulations.âLocalâpopulationsâalsoâfaceâsecurityâthreatsâfromâtheâstate,âwhichâoftenâviewsâcommunitiesâcloseâtoâarmedâgroupsâasâcomplicit.âActiveâcontactâbyâaâcommunityâwithâanâarmedâgroupârisksâexacerbatingâperceptionsâofâassociation.
Duringâintenseâfighting,âlocalâeffortsâtoâreduceâviolenceâandâpromoteâdialogueâmayâalsoâbeâseenâasâcontraryâtoâconflictâpartiesââeffortsâtoâgainâmilitaryâadvantage.âLocalâactorsâexpendâconsiderableâeffortâtoâremainâbothâimpartialâandâsafe.âMaintainingâthisâspaceâisâimportantâsoâthatâthoseâwhoâcanâandâdoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâinâorderâtoâcounterâviolenceâareâprotected.
Theâcaseâstudiesâpresentedâhereâareâonlyâaâsnapshotâofâtheâcomplexâandâatâtimesâambiguousârelationsâbetweenâlocalâpopulationsâandâarmedâgroupsâââcommunitiesâcanâbeâvictims,âallies,âfamilyâmembers,âprotesters,âorâchannelsâofâdialogueâtoâarmedâactors.âHoweverâitâisâhopedâthatâtheseâcaseâstudiesâcanâcontributeâtoâdiscussionâandâinquiryâintoâaâbroaderârangeâofâconstructiveâoptionsâtoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâtoâpromoteâpeace,âasâwellâasâhighlightâtheâexperiencesâofâpeopleâwhoâfaceâtheâdailyâchallengeâandâriskâofâlivingâalongsideâarmedâgroupsâandâwhoâdecideâtoâconfrontâtheirâuseâofâviolence.
Local populations are not just passive actors in conflict zones, simply coerced by armed actors. Equally, armed groups do not merely exploit or abuse communities in areas in which they operateâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 7
Community engagement with armed groups can open entry points for peacebuilding when more conventional paths are blockedInâtheâcaseâstudiesâpresentedâinâthisâpublicationâtheâmainâimperativeâforâlocalâpopulationsâtoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâactorsâwasâsecurityâââtoâprotectâthemselvesâfromâattack.âOtherâimmediateâreasonsâincludedâsecuringâaccessâtoâroads,âwaterâandâotherâhumanitarianâresources.âInâMicoahumadoâinâColombia,âcommunitiesâwereâatâriskâfromâcrossfireâbetweenâtheâNationalâLiberationâArmyâ(ELN)âandâparamilitaryâforces.âLocalâpopulationsâcaughtâupâinâintenseâandâchaoticâwarfareâinâSyriaâsoughtâtoâendâregime-imposedâsieges.âInânorthernâUganda,âcommunitiesâfacedâtheâthreatâofâextremeâviolenceâasâwellâasâtheâabductionâandâforcedârecruitmentâofâtheirâchildrenâintoâtheâLordâsâResistanceâArmyâ(LRA).
AsâtheâSyrianâcaseâstudyâillustrates,âarmedâgroups,âparticularlyâthoseâwithoutâpre-existingâlinksâtoâlocalâpopulations,âmayâbeâdifficultâtoâinfluenceâinâtheâshortâterm,âasâviolentâtacticsâandâstrategicâprioritiesâoverwhelmâandâsilenceâvoicesâforâpeace.âYet,âmanyâinitiativesâdocumentedâinâthisâAccordâInsightâstartedâasâeffortsâtoâenhanceâlocalâhumanâsecurityâandâsubsequentlyâdevelopedâbroaderâambitions.âInânorthernâUgandaâthereâwasâexplicitârecognitionâbyâcommunityâactorsâthatâprotectingâlocalâpopulationsâfromâviolenceârequiredâlongerâtermâpeaceâeffortsâââforâtheâLRAâtoâtalkâtoâtheâgovernment.âInâotherâcasesâtheâtransitionâtoâpeacebuildingâwasâlessâdeliberateâandâdevelopedâasâaâresultâofâtheâspecificâapproachesâtaken.
Maintaining and sustaining contact with armed groups when no one else willLocalâactorsâcanâprovideâcrucialâinsightsâintoâandâlinksâwithâarmedâgroupsâwhenâconflictâpartiesâareâunwillingâtoânegotiateâ
andâwhenâthereâareânoâdiscernableâentryâpointsâforâmoreâformalâmediation.âThroughâdirectâcontact,âlocalâactorsâinâeachâofâtheâcaseâstudyâcontextsâgainedâunderstandingâofâtheâstructureâandâprioritiesâofâtheârespectiveâarmedâgroups.âTheyâcanâactâasâbarometersâforâwhenâgroupsâmightâbeââripeââforâformalâtalksâââandâunderstandâtheâbarriers.
Localâactorsâareâalsoâlikelyâtoâhaveâaâlong-termâviewâofâengagement.âThisâcanâcontrastâwithâinternationalâinvolvement,âwhichâtendsâtoâprioritiseâdeliveringâdemonstrableâresultsâinâspecificâtimeframes.âWhenâviolenceâexplodes,âlocalâactorsâmayâtemporarilyâretreatâfromâdirectâengagementâwithâanâarmedâgroup,âbutâtheyâcanâmaintainâreducedâcontact,âreadyâtoâreachâoutâagainâwhenâcircumstancesâallow.âInânorthernâUganda,âcustomaryâleadersâcontinuedâtoâtransmitâmessagesâtoâtheâLRAâduringâperiodsâofâheavyâfightingâbetweenâtheâLRAâandâtheâUgandaâPeopleâsâDefenceâForceâ(UPDF)âwhenâcivilianâattacksâwereâparticularlyâintense.
Practical support for an armed groupâs transition from violence to non-violenceThereâareârealâandâpracticalâchallengesâforâarmedâgroupsâtoâceaseâviolenceâandâenterânegotiations.âCommunity-basedâgroupsâcanâprovideâaâtrustedâspaceâforâarmedâgroupsâtoâtestânewâideasâorâchallengeâexistingâones.âTheyâcanâalsoâhelpâcreateâconditionsâconduciveâtoâencouragingâpeacefulâchangeâwithinâanâarmedâgroup,âandâsupportâandâfacilitateâaâgroupâsâtransitionâfromâviolenceâtoânon-violence.â
InâNorthernâIreland,âdiscussionsâbetweenâtheâIrishâRepublicanâArmyâ(IRA)âandâlocalâcivilâsocietyâonârestorativeâjusticeâtookâplaceâalongsideâformalâpeaceâtalks.âTheâIRAâhadâcomeâtoârealiseâthatâitsâpunishmentâactivitiesâââbeatingsâandâshootingsâtoâenforceâorderâamongâcommunitiesâââwereâatâoddsâwithâitsâpoliticalâambitionsâandâcommitmentâtoâaâceasefire.âRecognitionâofâthisâtensionâincentivisedâIRAâinterestâinâalternatives.âConversationsâwithâcivilâsocietyâprovidedâconceptualâframeworks,âpracticalâadviceâandâtrainingâonâdifferentâapproaches.âThisâalsoâopenedâupâspaceâforâtheârepublicanâmovementâtoârethinkâcommunityâsecurityâandâtheâroleâofâstateâpoliceâservices,âandâaddressâtheâkeyâissueâofâpoliceâreformâinâemergingâpeaceâtalks.
InânorthernâUganda,âcommunityâengagementâwithâtheâLRAâidentifiedâconcernsâregardingâreintegration.âTheâpeaceâworkâofâtheâAcholiâReligiousâLeadersâPeaceâInitiativeâ(ARLPI)âfosteredâcommunityâunderstandingâthatâmanyâLRAâmembersâwereâvictimsâofâabductionâbyâtheâarmedâgroup,âoftenâwhenâtheyâwereâchildren.âCommunitiesâwereâsensitisedâtoâtheâpotentialâreturnâofâLRAâfighters,âwhichâopenedâupâaâpossibleâdemobilisationâroute.âTheâARLPIâsâcommunityâworkâprovidedâincentivesâforâcombatantsâtoâreturnâtoâtheirâcommunitiesâwithoutâfearâofârejection,âandâpromotedâLRAâreintegration.â
Embedding engagement with armed groups in broader peace efforts to promote societal change Localâactorsâhaveâaâfundamentalâstakeâinâtheâoutcomeâofâengagementâwithâarmedâgroups,âwhichâoftenâreflectâaâcommunityâsâambitionsâforâbroaderâsocietalâchange.âInâbothânorthernâUgandaâandâMicoahumado,âcommunityâactivistsâobservedâthatâpeaceâmobilisationâandâorganisationâprovidedâstrengthâto,âandâpromotedâtheâagencyâof,âfearfulâcommunitiesâfacingâsevereâviolenceâandâinsecurity,âencouragingâthemâ
Peacebuildinginsightsfromlocalengagementwitharmedgroups
Community engagement with armed groups can open entry points for peacebuilding when more conventional paths are blocked, through:
âąâ maintainingâandâsustainingâcontactâwithâarmedâgroupsâwhenânoâoneâelseâwill
âąâ providingâpracticalâsupportâforâanâarmedâgroupâsâtransitionâfromâviolenceâtoânon-violence
âąâ embeddingâengagementâwithâarmedâgroupsâinâbroaderâpeaceâeffortsâtoâpromoteâsocietalâchange
Community strategies to reach out to armed groups use existing local institutions and systems, including:
âąâ buildingâonâpre-existingâlinksâwithâarmedâgroupsâsuchâasâkinshipâandâsharedâideology
âąâ developingâandâstrengtheningâstructuresâforânon-violentâcommunityâmobilisationâandâorganisation
âąâ framingâdiscussionsâinâlocalâculturalâandâsocialânormsâ
Local actors face considerable risks when talking to armed groups and develop techniques to reduce these, including through:
âąâ linkingâwithâexternalânetworksâandâsupportâstructuresâąâ assertingâtheirâimpartiality
8 // Accord // Insight 2
toâbelieveâinâtheâpossibilityâofâpeaceâandâworkâtowardsâit.âInâSyriaâthisâhasâprovedâimportantâasâconflictâdynamicsâhaveâoverwhelmedâtheâpossibilityâofâformalâpeaceânegotiations.
TheâAccordâInsightâcaseâstudiesâshowâlocalâactorsâwereâinvolvedâinâaârangeâofâactivitiesâthatâcontributedâtoâtheâpossibilityâofâsustainableâpeace,âincluding:âtheâreturnâandâreintegrationâofâcombatants;âcommunityâsecurityâandâde-mining;âaddressingâtheâeffectsâofâviolenceâinâsociety;âpeaceâadvocacyâtoânationalâandâinternationalâactors;âandâeffortsâtoâsocialiseâarmedâgroupsâtoâbeâmindfulâofâconstituencyâpriorities.âInânorthernâUgandaâtheâARLPIâconductsâtrauma-healingâtherapyâforâthoseâaffectedâbyâviolence,âandâhasâmediatedâlocalisedâconflictsâsuchâasâlandâdisputes.â
InâColombia,âthoseâinvolvedâinâtheâMicoahumadoâde-miningâinitiativeâhaveâsharedâlessonsâwithâotherâcommunitiesâandânationalâNGOs,âleadingâtoânationalâlearningâandâmobilisationâonâtheâissue.âDe-miningâhasâalsoâbecomeâaâkeyânegotiatingâtopicâinâtalksâbetweenâtheâgovernmentâandâtheâRevolutionaryâArmedâForcesâofâColombiaâ(FARC),âandâisâlikelyâtoâfeatureâinâtalksâwithâtheâELN.
Community strategies to reach out to armed groups use existing local institutions and systemsConflictâdisruptsâtheâsocialâfabric.âForâexample,âasâtheâSyriaâcaseâidentifies,âtheâtakingâupâofâarmsâcanâgiveâthoseâwhoâhaveâfeltâmarginalisedâinâsocietyâanâopportunityâtoâexerciseâpowerâandâdefyâsocialâandâculturalâexpectationsâandâstructures.âInâeachâofâtheâcaseâstudiesâdiscussedâinâthisâpublication,âhighâlevelsâofâviolenceâ(bothâstateâandânon-state)âreshapedâsocialâlife,âculturalâpractices,âroutineâactivities,âandâpublicâandâpersonalâspace.â
Engagementâwithâarmedâgroupsâthereforeâimpliesâdifferentâchallengesâforâlocalâcommunitiesâwhoâareâpartâofâtheâconflictâcontextâthanâforâexternalâactors.âAccessâtoâandârelationshipsâwithâarmedâgroups,âincludingâatâleadershipâlevel,âmayâalreadyâexist.âButâtheâabilityâtoâinfluenceârequiresâmuchâmoreâactiveâagency,âincludingâadaptationâofâexistingânetworksâandâdevelopmentâofâinnovativeâwaysâtoâswayâarmedâactors.
Building on pre-existing links with armed groups such as kinship and shared ideologyInâMicoahumadoâandâinâcertainâareasâofâSyria,âcommunitiesâreliedâonâpre-existingârelationshipsâââkinshipâandâfamilyâtiesâââtoâengageâarmedâgroupsâinâdialogue.âSomeâreligiousâleadersâinâtheâARLPIâdidânotâhaveâethnicâlinksâwithâtheâLRA,âbutâinitialâcontactsâwereâoftenâmadeâthroughâcustomaryâleadersâwithâmoreâhistoricalâconnectionsâtoâLRAâmembers.
Manyâarmedâgroups,âatâleastâinitially,âalsoâhadâcommunityâsupportâforâtheirâobjectives,âforâexampleâinâtheirâoppositionâtoâtheâstate.âInâSyria,âself-defenceâforcesâoftenâemergedâinâareasâofâmassâpopularâuprisingâagainstâtheâAssadâregime.âInâearlierâphasesâofâtheâconflict,âtheârelationshipâbetweenâarmedâandâunarmedâelementsâwasâakinâtoâaâdivisionâofâlabourâaroundâsharedârevolutionaryâprinciples.
Identifyingâwithâandâunderstandingâtheâambitionsâofâanâarmedâgroupâisâkeyâtoâlocalâactorsââabilityâtoâinfluenceâit:âtoâestablishâtrust,âtoâbeâableâtoâsayâthingsâthatâothersâcannot,âandâtoâbeâ
listenedâto.âItâwasâeasierâtoâreachâaâde-miningâagreementâwithâtheâELNâthanâwithâparamilitaryâgroupsâinâMicoahumadoâââandâitâwasâmoreâlikelyâthatâtheâdealâwouldâstickâââbecauseâofâtheâELNâsârootsâinâtheâcommunity.âInâNorthernâIreland,âlocalâconnectionsâbetweenâtheâIRAâandâcommunitiesâwereâlessâevident,âbutâtheârestorativeâjusticeâinitiativeâreliedâonâex-prisonersâformerlyâassociatedâwithâtheâIRAâtoâdevelopâconvincingâcontactsâwithâit.â
Developing and strengthening structures for non-violent community mobilisation and organisation Communityâmobilisation,âorganisationâandâstrategyâwereâkeyâfeaturesâinâallâofâtheâcaseâstudies.âInâbothâMicoahumadoâandânorthernâUganda,âcommunitiesâassembledâtoâdiscussâhowâtoâaddressâtheâviolenceâthatâwasâaffectingâthem.âTheâconvenersâofâtheseâlocalâpeaceâconferencesâwentâonâtoârepresentâcommunitiesâinâtalksâwithâtheâarmedâgroups.âTheâfactâthatâconsultationsâwereâcommunity-wideâgaveâweightâandâcredibilityâtoâtheâindividualsâwhoâledâtheâengagement.
Theâpresenceâofâpre-conflictânetworksâandâinformalâorâformalâinstitutionsâwasâalsoâsignificant.âLocalârepresentativesâbroughtâwithâthemâexistingâsourcesâofâstatusâorâauthority,âfromâbothâinsideâandâoutsideâtheâcommunity.âTheâARLPI,âasâreligiousâleadersâwithâinfluentialânetworksânationallyâandâinternationally,âhadâaccessâtoâtheâUgandanâgovernmentâandâtheâinternationalâcommunityâthatâtraditionalâleadersâdidânot,âandâsoâcould,âforâexample,âpromoteâanâAmnestyâLaw,âandâadvocateâforâpeace.âInâSyria,âcivilianâadministrationsâinâregime-freeâareasâwereâmoreâeffectiveâwhereâthereâwasâaâpreviousâhistoryâofâcivilâsocietyâactivityâorâtraditionalâstructures.
Aârelianceâonâpre-existingâcommunityânetworksâandâstructuresâcanâreinforceâembeddedâsocial,âculturalâandâpoliticalâpowerâactorsâandâinstitutions.âInâtheâcaseâstudyâcontexts,âitâwasâlargelyâtraditionalâ(male)âeldersâandâreligiousâactorsâwhoâengagedâinâdirectânegotiationsâwithâtheâarmedâgroupsâandâgovernments,âandâchurchânetworksâthatâprovidedâprotection.â
However,âtheâcapacityâofâconflictâtoâdisruptâtheâsocialâfabricâcanâallowâforânewâorâpreviouslyâmutedâsocial,âculturalâandâpoliticalâsourcesâofâagencyâtoâcomeâtoâtheâfore.âInâMicoahumado,âlocalâleadersâwereâforcedâtoâflee,âleavingâbehindâaânewâcohortâofâcommunityâactivists;âsubsequently,âtheâpeaceâcommissionsâincludedâequalârepresentationâofâwomen.âInânorthernâUganda,âanâAcholiâmothersâânetworkâwasâinstrumentalâinâgalvanisingâsupportâforâtalksâwithâtheâLRAâandâcommunityâacceptanceâofâtheâreturnâofâabductees.âAcholiâwomenâhaveâalsoâbeenâatâtheâforefrontâofâreintegrationâactivities,âsupportingâtheâparticularâneedsâofâfemaleâreturnees.
Identifying with and understanding the ambitions of an armed group is key to local actorsâ ability to influence it: to establish trust, to be able to say things that others cannot, and to be listened toâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 9
Framing discussions in local cultural and social norms AsâSimonâMasonâidentifiesâinâthisâpublicationâ[see Box 1],âlocalâactorsâworkâthroughâdifferentânormativeâframeworksâthanâtheirâexternalâcounterparts,âwhichâcanâallowâforâaâbroaderâsetâofârulesâforâengagement.âTheseâincludeâmoreâflexibleâculturalâandâinformalâunderstandingsâââoftenâsharedâwithâarmedâgroupsâââofâissuesâsuchâasâjustice.
InâNorthernâIrelandâandânorthernâUganda,âlegalâandâjusticeâframeworksâgroundedâinâlocalâsocialâandâculturalânormsâplayedâimportantâroles,âatâtimesâcomplementedâbyâinternationalâstandards.âPeaceâinitiativesâappliedâlessonsâfromâtransitionalâjusticeâsuchâasâconditionalâamnesty,âreconciliationâandârestorativeâjustice,âwhichâintegratedâtraditionalâcustomsâandâunderstandings.
TheâARLPIâadvocatedâforâanâAmnestyâActâthatâallowedâforâtheâreturnâofâcombatants,âoftenâabductees,âtoâtheirâcommunitiesâwithoutâfearâofâprosecution,âwhichâappliedâprinciplesâofâforgivenessârootedâinâAcholiâculture.âRestorativeâjusticeâapproachesâusedâinâNorthernâIrelandâwereâgroundedâinâinternationalâhumanârightsâandâlegalâprinciplesâofâruleâofâlaw,âbutâwereâdevelopedâaccordingâtoâlocalâconsiderationsâofâlegitimacyâandâreputation.â
Local actors face considerable risks when talking to armed groups and develop techniques to reduce theseCommunitiesâsufferâviolenceâandâhumanârightsâabusesâbyânon-stateâandâstateâarmedâforcesâalike.âBeforeâtheâARLPIâwentâintoâtheâbushâtoâspeakâtoâtheâLRA,âthreeâtraditionalâleadersâhadâbeenâkilledâwhileâattemptingâtoâdialogueâwithâtheâgroup.âInâallâcasesâpresentedâinâthisâpublication,âcontactâwithâarmedâgroupsâwasâcriminalised,âandâinâMicoahumado,âaâpreviousâgenerationâofâcommunityâleadersâhadâbeenâforcedâtoâleaveâtheâareaâafterâstateâsecurityâforcesâaccusedâthemâofâsidingâwithâtheâELN.
Evenâwhereâanâarmedâgroupâisâpreparedâtoâacceptâsomeâreductionâinâviolence,âstrategicâmilitaryâimperativesâmayâsubsequentlyâundermineâsuchâcommitments.âTheâELNâprotestedâthatâde-miningâreducedâitsâmilitaryâadvantage.âGovernmentârestrictions,âincludingâproscriptionâregimesâandâcounter-insurgencyâtactics,âhaveâatâtimesâbeenâmoreâdisruptiveâtoâlocalâactorsâthanâtheâbehaviourâofâarmedâgroups.âInâMicoahumadoâandâinâAcholiland,ânorthernâUganda,âeffortsâbyâcommunityâpeaceâcommitteesâwereârepeatedlyâheldâupâorâthreatenedâbyâescalationsâinâviolence.
Linking with external networks and support structuresLocalâinitiativesâhaveâcooperatedâwithâexternalânetworksâandâsupportâstructuresâtoâmaintainâaâsecureâspaceâinâwhichâtoâoperate,âandâalsoâtoâgainâleverage.âInânorthernâUgandaâandâMicoahumado,âlocalâactorsâlookedâtoânationalâreligiousânetworksâthatâhadâpowerfulâcurrencyâwithinâsociety,âandâhenceâwithâtheâgovernment,âtoâprovideâumbrellaâprotectionâ
toâinitiatives.âInternationalâhumanârightsâandâhumanitarianâorganisationsâthatâwereâableâtoâmobiliseâinternationalâawarenessâandâinfluenceâalsoâplayedâaâbeneficialârole.â
InânorthernâUganda,âtheâARLPIâwasâatâtheâforefrontâofâinteractionsâwithâtheâLRA,âevenâthoughâsomeâARLPIâmembers,âincludingâaâSpanishâpriest,âdidânotâshareâAcholiâethnicityâwithâtheâLRA.âVariousâreligiousâestablishmentsâinâUgandaâprovidedâaâformâofâprotectionâagainstâgovernmentâaccusationsâofâcollusionâwithâtheârebels.âInâMicoahumadoâtheâcoverâofââpastoralâdialoguesââwasâanâinnovativeâwayâforâcommunitiesâtoâbypassâtheâissueâofâcriminalisationâofâcontact.
Externalâactorsâalsoâplayedâcomplementaryârolesâthroughâsharingâexperiencesâfromâotherâcontexts.âHowever,âAccordâInsight authorsâfromânorthernâUgandaâandâColombiaâassertâthatâtheâmostâwelcomeâandâeffectiveâexternalâinterventionsâwereâthoseâinâwhichâideasâandânormsâchimedâwithâlocalâprioritiesâandâapproaches.
Asserting impartialityImpartialityâisâimportantâforâpeopleâworkingâinâareasâcontrolledâbyâarmedâgroups.âWhileâcommunityâpeaceâactorsâfeaturedâinâthisâpublicationâwereânotânecessarilyâneutral,âasâtheyâwereâpartâofâtheâconflictâcontextâandâmayâhaveâhadâlinksâwithâanâarmedâgroup,âtheyâstrivedâtoâactâimpartiallyâsoâthatâtheyâcouldâoperateâasâeffectiveâbrokersâbetweenâtwoâsidesâandâavoidâperceptionsâofâcollusion.
Theâneedâtoâmaintainâimpartialityâsometimesârequiredâtheârenegotiationâofâpre-existingârelationships.âInâMicoahumado,âtheâcommunityârejectedâeitherâjoiningâoneâorâotherâofâtheâarmedâactors,âorâopposingâbothâofâthem,âasâeachâofâtheseâoptionsâriskedâprovokingâtheirâownâdisplacement.âInsteadâtheyâchoseâaââthirdâwayââofâcivilâdisobedience,âwhichâmeantârefusingâtoâsupportâanyâofâtheâarmedâactorsâandâmaintainingâaâclearâstanceâofânonviolence.â
TheâARLPI,âinâitsâroleâasâconduitâbetweenâtheâLRAâandâtheâgovernment,âreducedâtheâriskâofâaccusationsâofâeitherâspyingâforâtheâgovernmentâorâcolludingâwithâtheâLRAâbyâinsistingâthatâtheâpartiesâsignedârespectiveâmessagesâbeforeâsharingâthemâwithâtheâopposingâside.â
10 // Accord // Insight 2
ExpertanalysisBetween fighting and talking SophieHaspeslaghSophieâHaspeslaghâisâaâdoctoralâcandidateâatâtheâInternationalâRelationsâDepartmentâofâtheâLondonâSchoolâofâEconomicsâandâPoliticalâScienceâwhereâsheâisâresearchingâtheâengagementâofâarmedâgroupsâandâtheâeffectsâofâproscriptionâonâpeaceâprocesses.âUntilâ2012âsheâwasâHeadâofâPolicyâatâ
ConciliationâResources.âSheâpreviouslyâmanagedâtheâadvocacyâplatform,âABColombia.âSheâhasâalsoâworkedâforâtheâUnitedâNationsâDevelopmentâProgrammeâinâAlgeria,âtheâWorldâFoodâProgrammeâinâRome,âandâInternationalâCrisisâGroupâinâColombiaâandâBrussels.
Internationalâpolicyâisâambiguousâonâwhetherâorânotâtoâtalkâtoânon-stateâarmedâgroupsâ(referredâtoâasââarmedâgroupsââinâthisâpublication).âWhileâthereâisâaâgeneralâtendencyâtoâavoidâpoliticalâengagement,âexperiencesâfromâNorthernâIrelandâwithâtheâIrishâRepublicanâArmyâ(IRA)âandâfromâColombiaâwithâtheâRevolutionaryâArmedâForcesâofâColombiaâ(FARC)âshowâthatâthereâareâexceptions.â
Governmentsâandâtheâinternationalâcommunityâtendâtoâlabelâarmedâgroupsâthatâattackâciviliansâorâstateâinfrastructureâasâcriminal,âextremistâorâterroristâââandâcorrespondinglyâpreferâmilitaryâandâsecurityâoptionsâtoâotherâtypesâofâresponse.âRecentâdiscussionsâonâgroupsâsuchâasâtheâIslamicâStateâ(IS)âandâBokoâHaramâpointâtoâtheirâamorphousânature,âuncertaintyâoverâtheirâstructure,âorâtheirâlackâofâaâcoherentâpoliticalâagendaâasâmajorâbarriersâtoâengagingâwithâthem.
Whereâstateâactorsâhaveâembarkedâonâpoliticalâtalksâwithâarmedâgroupsâtheâcriteriaâforâdoingâsoâareâunclear.âWhileâconcreteâchangesâinâaâgroupâsâbehaviourâmayâencourageâdialogue,âmoreâoftenâtheâstrategicâinterestsâofâaâstateâatâaâparticularâtimeâorâtacticalâcalculationsâdictatedâbyâtheâbattlefieldâareâparamount.âYet,âwhileâstatesâareâweighingâupâwhetherâorâhowâtoâengage,âpopulationsâlivingâalongsideâarmedâgroupsâmayâalreadyâbeâinâcontact.
ThisâsecondâAccordâInsightâpublicationâinâConciliationâResourcesââAccordâseriesâlooksâatâhowâlocalâactorsâorganiseâ
toâenterâintoâdialogueâwithâarmedâgroupsâandâchallengeâtheirâuseâofâviolence.âTheâpublicationâbuildsâonâAccordâ16â(2005),âChoosing to engage: armed groups and peace processes.âItâhasâbeenâinformedâbyâaâjointâanalysisâworkshopâheldâinâNovemberâ2013,âwhichâbroughtâtogetherâoverâ30âexpertsâwithâaârangeâofâexperience,âincludingâinternationalâmediatorsâandâhumanitarians,âasâwellâasâlocalâcivilâsocietyâactors,âex-combatantsâandâothersâthatâidentifyâwithâarmedâgroups.â
CaseâstudiesâfromâSyria,âColombiaâandânorthernâUganda,âasâwellâasâaâshorterâreflectionâfromâNorthernâIreland,âexploreâinâdepthâwhyâandâhowâcommunityâinitiativesâtoâengageâarmedâgroupsâarise:âwhoâareâtheâactorsâinvolvedâandâwhatâareâtheâchallengesâtheyâface?âItâisâhopedâthatâtheâlocalâandânationalâpeacebuildingâbenefitsâofâtheseâinitiativesâwillâhelpâtoâinformâpracticalâandâconstructiveâoptionsâforâpolicymakersâandâpractitionersâtoârespondâtoâarmedâgroupsâââandâthatâlocalâactorsâthemselvesâcanâlearnâfromâtheâexperiencesâofâothersâwhoâhaveâreachedâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâandâinfluencedâtheirâuseâofâviolence,âinâtheâshort,âmediumâandâlongâterm.
Engaging armed groups and building peaceAccordâ16,âpublishedâfourâyearsâafterâ9/11,âmadeâaâstrongâcaseâforâcontactâwithâarmedâgroupsâtoâbecomeâtheâpolicyânormâinâeffortsâtoâendâarmedâconflicts.âTenâyearsâon,âgovernmentsâareâstillâreluctantâtoâallowâspaceâforâengagement,âandâdiscussionâofâhowâtoâreachâandâinfluenceâarmedâgroupsâconstructivelyâhasâbeenâlimited.
TheâreasonsâidentifiedâinâAccordâ16âforâsuchâreticenceâstillâapplyâââfearâofâlegitimisingâviolenceâorâgivingâcredibilityâtoâunreasonableâorânon-negotiableâdemands.âFramingânon-stateâarmedâactionâasâterroristâandâcriminalâremainsâtheânorm,âwhileâtheânumberâofâarmedâgroupsâprohibitedâthroughâinternationalâterroristâlistingsâhasâincreased:âMariekeâdeâGoedeâestimatedâinâ2011âthatâthereâwereâ214âproscribedâarmedâgroupsâworldwide.
While states are weighing up whether or how to engage, populations living alongside armed groups may already be in contactâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 11
Theâspaceâforânon-governmentalâorganisationsâ(NGOsâââlocal,ânationalâandâinternational)âtoâcontactâarmedâgroupsâforâconflictâresolutionâorâhumanitarianâpurposesâhasâalsoâshrunk.âTheâUSâSupremeâCourtârulingâofâ2010,âHolder vs Humanitarian Law Project,âmadeâitâillegalâtoâprovideââexpertâadviceâ,ââservicesââorââtrainingâinâhumanârightsâenforcementâorâpeacefulâconflictâresolutionââtoâarmedâgroupsâthatâareâlistedâasâforeignâterroristâorganisations.âAsâtheâUSâlawâisâextra-territorialâitâalsoâappliesâtoânon-Americans.âThisârulingâhasâproducedâaââchillâfactorââinternationally,âdiscouragingâunofficialâcontactâwithâlistedâarmedâgroups.âEvenâhumanitarianâorganisations,âwhichâareâusuallyâaffordedâgreaterâoperationalâspace,âfindâtheirâroomâforâmanoeuvreârestrained.â
Atâtheâsameâtime,âgroupsâpreviouslyâconsideredââbeyondâtheâpaleâ,âsuchâasâtheâAfghanâTalibanâandâtheâFARC,âareâtodayâacceptedâasâparticipantsâinâpoliticalâdialogue.âTheâlistingâofâtheâTalibanâalongsideâal-QaedaâunderâUNSCâResolutionâ1267âinâ1999âwasâoneâofâmanyâsecurityâandâmilitaryâtoolsâusedâbyâtheâinternationalâcommunityâtoâtryâtoâdisruptâandâdefeatâtheâgroup.âYet,âasâtheâlimitsâofâmilitaryâinterventionâinâAfghanistanâhaveâbecomeâincreasinglyâapparent,ârecognitionâofâtheâneedâtoâtalkâtoâtheâTalibanâhasâgainedâground.âTheâUNSCâResolutionâwasâamendedâinâJuneâ2011âtoâseparateâtheâTalibanâandâal-Qaedaâlistsâandâfacilitateâdialogue.âHowever,âtheâinternationalâcommunityâhasânoâclearâcriteriaâtoâindicateâunderâwhatâconditionsâanâarmedâgroupâwillâbeâacceptableâforâpoliticalâdialogue.â
Accordâ16âofferedâconcreteâindicatorsâforâwhetherâpoliticalâengagementâwithâanâarmedâgroupâisâfeasible,âincludingâwhetherâitâholdsâterritory,âhasâpoliticalâinstitutionsâorâagendas,âorâderivesâprofitâfromâtheâwarâeconomy.âItâfurtherâhighlightedâtheâneedâtoâthinkâcreativelyâabout,âandâdevelopâaâmoreâsophisticatedâunderstandingâof,âengagementâoptions.âTalkingâtoâandânegotiatingâwithâanâarmedâgroupâareânotâtheâsameâthing.âTalkingâcanâsimplyâmeanâestablishingâcontactâandâcanâbeâaâmeansâtoâunderstandâanâarmedâgroup,âincludingâitsâdynamicsâandâmotivations.âItâcanâinvolveâanâexchangeâofâconcernsâandâpositionsâandâcanâhelpâtoâjudgeâwhetherâotherâformsâofâengagementâareâwarranted.âNegotiatingâassumesâandârequiresâmutualâcommitmentâtoâreachingâanâagreementâthroughâdialogueâandâbargaining.
Thereâareâmanyâoptionsâalongâtheâspectrumâbetweenâtalkingâandânegotiating.âWhileâAccordâ16âreflectedâonâhowâhumanitarianâdialogue,âforâexample,âcanâfacilitateâbroaderâcontact,âthereâhasâbeenâlittleâin-depthâexplorationâofâhowâarmedâgroupsâareânudgedâintoâsustainedâandâseriousâpoliticalâengagement.âThisâAccordâInsightâhopesâtoâshedâlightâonâtheâlocalâinteractionsâwithâarmedâgroupsâthatâoftenâtakeâplaceâbeforeâformalâtalksâareâconsidered.â
What do we mean by âlocalâ and âarmed groupâ?âLocalââcanâbeâaâfluidâterm.âItâcanâbeâusedâby peopleâoutsideâaâspecificâcontextâtoâdescribeâthoseâlivingâinsideâit.âSomeâpeopleâmightâbeâdefinedâasââlocalââbecauseâofâethno-culturalâtiesâtoâaâterritory,âorâbecauseâtheyâhaveâbeenâdirectlyâaffectedâbyâcontextualâviolence;âothersâbecauseâtheyâliveâinâtheâareaâinâwhichâanâarmedâgroupâoperates,âregardlessâofâanyâhistoricâorâethnicâlinks.â
Inâthisâcomplexâpicture,âthisâAccordâInsightâunderstandsââlocalââasâreferringâtoâpeopleâlivingâinâgeographicâproximityâtoâaâconflict.âThisâdefinitionâhelpsâtoâdelineateâtheâanalysis.âTheâpublicationâdoesânot,âforâexample,âdelveâintoâtheâroleâofâdiasporas,âbutâmayâincludeâcivilâsocietyâactorsâwhoâhaveâplayedâaâkeyâroleâinâreachingâoutâtoâarmedâgroups,âevenâifâtheyâareânotâoriginallyâfromâtheâareaâââsuchâasâaâSpanishâmissionaryâbasedâinâGulu,ânorthernâUganda.âTheâdefinitionâallowsâusâtoâmapâhowâpeopleâimmediatelyâandâregularlyâaffectedâbyâtheâactionsâofâanâarmedâgroupâreact.âItâalsoâhelpsâusâtoâgoâbeyondâtheâinsider-outsiderâdichotomyâtoâlookâatâsynergiesâbetweenâtheâtwo,âsuchâasâhowâlocalâinitiativesâhaveâtappedâintoâcomplementaryânationalâandâinternationalânetworks.
Armedâgroupsâareâdiverse.âAsâPaulâStanilandâarguedâinâ2014,âthereâcanâbeâdramaticâdifferencesâbetweenâarmedâgroups,âevenâamongâthoseâfightingâtheâsameâgovernment,âwithâregardâtoâtheirâstrategies,âcapabilitiesâandâsocialâbases.âAccordâ16âdescribedâarmedâgroupsâasâactorsâwho:â1)âchallengeâtheâstateâsâmonopolyâonâcoerciveâforce;â2)âoperateâoutsideâeffectiveâstateâcontrol;âorâ3)âareâcapableâofâenablingâorâblockingâandâendangeringâhumanitarianâactionâorâpeaceâinitiatives.âButâgroupsâlikeâAlâShabaabâandâIS,âwhichâhaveâaspirationsâandânetworksâthatâareâsimultaneouslyâlocalâandâtransnational,âchallengeâtheseâdefinitions.
Theâcaseâstudiesâpresentedâhereâembraceâaâmoreâfluidâandâcomplexâunderstandingâofâarmedâgroups.âTheyâincludeâgroupsâwithâstrongâlinksâtoâlocalâcommunities,âlikeâtheâNationalâLiberationâArmyâ(ELN)âinâMicoahumadoâinâColombia;âgroupsâthatâuseâextremeâviolenceâandâhaveâtransnationalâagendas,âlikeâISâinâSyria;âandâgroupsâthatâhaveâunclearâpoliticalâambitionsâandâperpetrateâhighâlevelsâofâindiscriminateâviolenceâagainstâcivilianâpopulations,âlikeâtheâLordâsâResistanceâArmyâ(LRA)âinânorthernâUganda.
Theâcasesâexploreâhowâtheârelationshipâbetweenâtheâlocalâcommunityâandâtheâarmedâgroupâisâaffectedâby:âtheânatureâofâtheâconflict,âtheâresponseâofâtheâstate,âtheâtypeâandâcharacterâofâtheâarmedâgroup,âandâtheâabilityâofâtheâcommunityâtoâmobilise.âTheyâaskâwhetherâparticularâarmedâgroupsâareâmoreâresponsiveâtoâlocalâinitiatives,âandâifâsoâwhy?âTheyâalsoâaskâhowâtheâcriminalisationâandâbrandingâofâanâarmedâgroupâasââterroristââaffectsâtheâspaceâforâlocalâactorsâtoâmakeâcontactâwithâit.
Communities and armed groupsAnâarmedâgroupâsârelationshipâwithâtheâlocalâpopulationâisâoftenâportrayedâasâeitherâpredatoryâââtheâarmedâgroupâinflictingâhumanârightsâabuses,âlootingâandâdestroyingâproperty,âandâtheâlocalâpopulationâdevelopingâcopingâmechanismsâandâsurvivalâtechniques;âorâsymbioticâââlocalâpopulationsâenablingâarmedâgroupâviolenceâandâhamperingâcounter-insurgencyâefforts.âButâtheârealityâisâmuchâmoreânuancedâandâcomplex.
Talking to and negotiating with an armed group are not the same thing. Talking can simply mean establishing contact and can be a means to understand an armed group, including its dynamics and motivationsâ
â
12 // Accord // Insight 2
Accordâ16ânotedâthatâtheâattitudesâofâcommunitiesâorâconstituenciesâwithâcloseâtiesâtoâanâarmedâgroupâcanâsignificantlyâinfluenceâit,âespeciallyâwhereâtheyâshareâfamily,âclan,âtribalâorâclassâconnections.âInsiderâmediatorsâ[see Box 1]âcanâbenefitâfromâârelationalâpartialityââwithâanâarmedâgroupâââcloserâlinksâtoâaâparticularâgroupâbasedâonâpersonal,âpoliticalâorâeconomicâties.âAlthoughâthereâisâstillâlittleâpreciseâunderstandingâofâtheâvalueâofâpartialityâtoâeffectiveâpeacebuilding.
Armedâgroupsâalsoâplayâimportantâsecurityâandâdevelopmentâroles,âforâexampleâdeliveringâeverydayâservices.âZachariahâMampillyâsâworkâ(2011)âonâdeâfactoâgovernanceâbyâarmedâactorsâhighlightedâhowâHezbollahâinâLebanonâandâtheâTamilâTigersâinâSriâLankaâranâschoolsâandâhospitalsâandâcollectedârubbish.âInâtheâColombiaâcaseâstudyâinâthisâpublication,âtheâELN,âinâtheâabsenceâofâtheâstate,âprovidedâsecurityâandâlocalâgovernanceâfunctions.âAâcentralâmotivationâtoâprovideâservicesâisâtoâsecureâtheâacquiescenceâorâconsentâofâtheâlocalâpopulation,âifânotâitsâfullâsupport.â
ThisâAccordâInsightâlooksâatâproactiveâactionsâbyâlocalâcommunitiesâtoâprocureâdeliveryâofâservicesâfromâanâarmedâgroup,âbutâalsoâtoâshapeâandâinfluenceâitsâtacticalâandâstrategicâdecision-making.âTheseâtypesâofâinitiativeâmayâbeâtheâexceptionâratherâthanâtheârule,âbutâtheyâraiseâimportantâquestions:âwhyâdoâcertainâcommunityâmembersâchooseâtoâchallengeâtheâactionâofâarmedâgroups?âHowâdoâsuchâinitiativesâstartâandâdevelop,âandâwhatâimpactâdoâtheyâhave?âHowâdoâsomeâpeopleâchallengeâarmedâauthorityâdespiteâsubstantialâpersonalârisk?â
InâtheâjointâanalysisâworkshopâforâAccordâ16,âparticipantsâwithâlinksâtoâarmedâgroupsâpointedâoutâthatâaâgroupâsâdecisionâtoâenterâintoâpoliticalâdialogueâisâoftenâportrayedâasâanâoptionâpresentedâfromâoutside.âInâfact,âarmedâgroups,âlikeâotherâarmedâactors,âoftenâhaveâtwo-trackâmilitaryâandâpoliticalâstrategies.âFindingsâfromâtheâBerghofâFoundationâsâTransitionâSeriesâchallengesâassumptionsâaboutâwhyâarmedâgroupsâenterâintoânegotiations,âidentifyingâmoreâpositiveâandâdynamicâmotivationsâthanâsimplyâtheârealisationâofâtheâlimitsâofâarmedâstruggle.â
Community-basedâactorsâmustâestablishâtrustâwithâanâarmedâgroup,âaârequirementâoftenâpoorlyâunderstoodâorâlargelyâignoredâbyâbothânationalâandâexternalâactors.âTheâthreeâcasesâinâthisâAccordâInsightâshowâhowâlocalâinitiativesâsucceededâinâdevelopingâandâmaintainingâtrust.âInâSyria,âlocalâcitizensâinâBarzehâwereâableâtoâinfluenceâtheâarmedâgroupâsâconductâthroughâestablishingâneighbourhoodâcommittees;âinâColombia,â
theâlocalâpopulationâofâMicoahumadoâconnectedâwithâtheâELNâbyâbuildingâonâdeepâhistoricalâandâclassâties;âandâinânorthernâUganda,âAcholiâcommunitiesâusedâethnicâlinksâtoâinfluenceâtheâLRA.
Mobilising for peaceAccordâ16âpointedâoutâthatâlocalâcommunitiesâcanâoftenâofferâtheâmostânuanced,âmultifacetedâandâcontextualisedâunderstandingâofâarmedâgroups.âDrawingâonâexamplesâfromâtheâDemocraticâRepublicâofâCongoâandâSierraâLeone,âitâshowedâthatâunofficialâengagementâcanâbuildâarmedâgroupsââwillingnessâandâcapacityâtoâparticipateâinâaâpeaceâprocess.
Theâdiscussionâonâtheârolesâofâinsiderâmediatorsâbelowâhighlightsâtheâcomplementarityâofâeffortsâbyâinternationalâandâlocalâmediators,âinâparticularâexploringâhowâactorsâatâtheânationalâlevelâ(non-governmentalâorganisations,âreligiousâorganisationsâorâconflictâresolutionâprofessionals)âhaveâbeenâableâtoâfacilitateâmediationâwithâanâarmedâgroup.â
Howâcommunitiesâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâforâhumanitarianâorâdevelopmentâpurposesâhasâalsoâbeenâaâcommonâareaâofâresearch.âTheâGenevaâAcademyâsâ2011âreport,âRules of Engagement,âreflectedâonâaidâagenciesâârelianceâonâeldersâandâcommunityâmembersâtoânegotiateâaccessâtoâarmedâgroupsâtoâpromoteâcivilianâprotectionâandâtheâsafeâdeliveryâofâhumanitarianâassistance.â
Studiesâinâ2007âandâ2012âbyâChrisâMitchellâandâLandonâHancockâonâcivilianâresistanceâtoâmilitarism,âincludingâstateâandânon-stateâgroupsââbearingâarmsâ,âlookâatâcommunityâeffortsâtoâestablishââzonesâofâpeaceâ.âTheyâexploreâhowâlocalâactorsâhaveâbeenâableâtoâdevelopâinnovativeâprotectionâmechanismsâandâinâeffectâoptâoutâofâaâconflictâthroughânegotiationsâwithâarmedâgroups.â
Thereâhasâbeenâmuchâlessâanalysis,âhowever,âofâhowâlocalâcommunitiesââinteractionsâwithâarmedâgroupsâââwithâwhomâtheyâmayââliveâtogetherâandâevenâsometimesâeatâtogetherââââcanâhelpâtoâbuildâpeace.âTheâcaseâstudiesâinâthisâAccordâInsightâshowâthatâwhileâlocalâactorsâmayânotâimmediatelyâidentifyâaâpeacebuildingâfunctionâinâtheirâcontactâwithâarmedâgroups,âcommunityâmobilisationâcanâhelpâtoâreduceâviolenceâorâincentiviseâarmedâgroupsââengagementâinâpoliticalâdialogue.âInânorthernâUganda,âtheâAcholiâReligiousâLeadersââPeaceâInitiativeâ(ARLPI)âtriedâtoâestablishâcontactâwithâtheâLRAâtoâhelpâprotectâtheâlocalâpopulation;âtheyâeventuallyâbecameâaâbridgeâtoâtheâUgandanâgovernmentâandâaâsignificantâstimulusâforâtheâJubaâpeaceânegotiationsâinâ2006.
Structure of the publicationInâtheâfirstâcaseâstudyâinâthisâpublication,âRt.âBishopâMacleodâBakerâOcholaâandâJamesâO.âLatigoâreviewâtheâeffortsâofâtheâARLPIâtoâreachâoutâtoâtheâLRA.âTheseâledâtoâmediatedâdialogueâbetweenâtheâLRAâandâtheâUgandanâgovernment.âTheâarticleâidentifiesâtheâkeyâpointsâofâinfluenceâtheâARLPIâwasâableâtoâleverageâwithâbothâtheâLRAâandâwithânationalâpoliticalâactors,âandâexploresâhowâtheâLRAârespondedâtoâtheâinitiativeâââfromâreducingâitsâuseâofâviolence,âtoâagreeingâtoâtakeâpartâinâpeaceâtalks.âItâalsoâhighlightsâtheâchallengesâofâengagementâwhenâthereâareâhighâlevelsâofâstateâandânon-stateâviolence,âandâtheâapproachesâthatâwereâdevelopedâtoâminimiseârisks.âTheâarticleâisâaccompaniedâbyâanâinterviewâwithâformerâLRAâ
While local actors may not immediately identify a peacebuilding function in their contact with armed groups, community mobilisation can help to reduce violence or incentivise armed groupsâ engagement in political dialogueâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 13
CommanderâCaptainâRayâApire,âwhoâreflectsâonâhowâtheâLRAâviewedâtheâARLPI.
Second,âMauricioâGarcĂa-DurĂĄnâandâFernandoâSarmientoâSantanderâexploreâanâinitiativeâbyâtheâpopulationâofâMicoahumadoâinâsouthernâBolivar,âoneâofâtheâmostâdisputedâzonesâinâtheâColombianâconflict.âTheâarticleâidentifiesâhowâtheâcommunityâwasâableâtoâconvinceâtheâELNâtoâunilaterallyâde-mineâtheâmainâarteriesâconnectingâtheâvillageâofâMicoahumadoâinâaâterritoryâunderâdeâfactoâELNâcontrol.âTheâcaseâstudyâlooksâatâhowâlocalâactorsâcircumventedâaâbanâonâtalkingâtoâtheâELN,âwhichâwasâproscribedâasâaâterroristâgroup.â
Theâthirdâcaseâstudyâexaminesâtheâeffectivenessâofâcommunity-basedâinitiativesâtoâengageâinâdialogueâwithâarmedâgroupsâinârebel-controlledâSyria,âaâfluidâenvironmentâwithâhighâlevelsâofâinsecurityâandâviolence.âWisamâElhamouiâandâSinanâal-Hawatâdescribeâhowâaânumberâofâcommunitiesâlivingâinâtheseâareasâhaveâorganisedâinformallyâtoâfacilitateâreliefâoperationsâandâbroaderâsocialâwelfare.âSomeâcommunitiesâhaveâsoughtâtoâengageâdirectlyâwithâarmedâgroupsâtoâreduceâviolenceâorâcoordinateâresponses.âTheâarticleâlooksâatâtheâextentâofâengagementâthatâmayâbeâpossible,âasâwellâasâtheâkeyâfactorsâinvolvedâinâexertingâinfluenceâoverâarmedâgroups.â
BrianâGormallyâreflectsâonâeffortsâofâcivilâsocietyâactivistsâinâNorthernâIrelandâtoâpromoteâalternativeâapproachesâtoâpunishmentâviolenceâwithinâtheâIRA.âTheâinitiativeâââwhichâbecameâknownâasâcommunityârestorativeâjusticeâââalsoâprovidedâspaceâforâtheârepublicanâmovementâtoâopenâupâdiscussionâonâcommunityâsecurityâandâjusticeâandâtheâroleâofâformalâpolicingâasâofficialâpeaceânegotiationsâemerged.â
AnâInsightâarticleâdistilsâlessonsâfromâtheâcasesâforâpeacebuildingâpolicyâandâpractice.âItâsuggestsâtheâimportanceâofâaâsecurityâimperativeâââtoâprotectâpopulationsâfromâattackâââasâaâprimaryâmotivationâforâlocalâcommunitiesâtoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroups.âItâreflectsâonâhowâlocalâinitiativesâtoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâoftenâplayâaâcrucialâroleâinâpromotingâlocalâhumanâsecurityâandâpeacebuilding,âandâinâsomeâcasesâcanâsupportâbroaderâtransformationâofâthoseâgroups.âItâdetailsâtheârealârisksâlocalâactorsâface,âandâhighlightsâtheâimportanceâofâpre-existingâlinksâwithâarmedâgroups,âofânetworksâthatâpredateâtheâconflict,âofâinformalâorâformalâinstitutions,âandâofâtheâroleâofâexternalârelationsâandâsupportâtoâgainâleverageâandâmaintainâspace.
BOX1
LocalmediatorsSimonâJâAâMasonâisâaâseniorâresearcherâandâheadâofâtheâMediationâSupportâTeamâatâtheâCenterâforâSecurityâStudiesâ(CSS),âZurich.âAsâpartâofâtheâMediationâSupportâProjectâ(aâjointâprojectâofâtheâCSSâandâSwisspeace,âfundedâbyâtheâSwissâFederalâ
DepartmentâofâForeignâAffairs)âheâfocusesâonâmediationâresearch,âtrainingâandâprocessâsupport.âHeâisâoneâofâtheâcoordinatorsâofâtheâMediationâSupportâNetwork.
Thereâisâincreasingâinternationalâawarenessâofâtheâimportanceâofâlocalâmediators.âInâ2012,âUNâSecretaryâGeneralâBanâKiâMoonânoted:ââThereâisâgrowingârecognitionâthatâmediationâisânotâtheâexclusiveâpurviewâofâexternalâmediationâactors.âLocalâmediatorsâwhoâcomeâfromâtheâconflictâcountryâcanâusefullyâleadâlocalâmediationâeffortsâorâcomplementâregionalâorâinternationalâinitiativesââ(ReportâofâtheâSecretary-General A/66/811â25âJuneâ2012).â
Whoarelocalmediators?Mediationâcanâbeâunderstoodâasâaâstructuredâprocessâofânegotiationâandâconflictâresolutionâsupportedâbyâanâacceptable,âimpartialâthirdâparty.âLocalâmediatorsâââsometimesâreferredâtoâasâinsiderâmediatorsâââhelpâactorsâfromâwithinâtheirâownâcontextsâtoâdevelopâmutuallyâacceptableâagreements.âLocalâmediatorsâhaveâcredibilityâwithâtheâpartiesâtoâtheâconflictâandâinfluenceâinâtheirâcommunity,âandâcanâincludeâtraditionalâelders,âreligiousâleaders,âleadersâofâwomenâsâgroups,âstateâofficials,âsecurityâsectorâactors,âandâbusinessâpeople.âTheâtermââlocalââisârelative,âasâtheâdelimitationâofâtheâcontextâcanâbeâvillage,âsub-regionalâorâcountryâlevel.
Atwhatlevelsdotheywork?Typically,âlocalâmediatorsâareâinvolvedâinâinformalâpeaceâefforts,âwhereâtheirâmandateâisâlessâprescribedâandâtrustâisâbuiltâthroughârelationshipsâratherâthanâthroughâformalâinstitutions.âWhileâtheyâusuallyâfocusâonâtheâsub-nationalâlevel,âthereâareâcasesâwhereâlocalâmediatorsâhaveâalsoâtakenâonâaâfacilitatingâroleâatâtheânationalâlevel.
Duringâtheâ2007â08âelectionâcrisis,âaâgroupâofâeminentâKenyansâcreatedâaâConcernedâCitizensâforâPeaceâinitiativeâinâresponseâtoâelectionâviolence.âThisâbroughtâtogetherâKenyanâpeaceâmediatorsâandâmembersâofâcivilâsocietyâtoâprovideâinputâintoâtheâformalâmediationâprocessâledâbyâKofiâAnnan,âandâhelpâlinkârelevantâofficialâandâunofficialâactorsâatâtheânationalâandâsub-nationalâlevels.âInâNepal,âtheâmainâpartiesâtoâtheânegotiationsâleadingâtoâtheâ2006âComprehensiveâPeaceâAgreementâdidânotâacceptâaâformalâoutsideâmediator.âInstead,âlocalâandâinternationalâactorsâhelpedâtoâpassâmessagesâbetweenâtheâpartiesâandâsupportâtheânegotiationâprocessâinâaâmuchâlessâstructuredâandâdirectiveâway.â
14 // Accord // Insight 2
Howdotheywork?Theâtypesâofâactivityâundertakenâbyâlocalâandânon-localâmediatorsâmayânotâdifferâfundamentally,âbutâtheânormativeâframeworkâinâwhichâtheyâworkâisâdifferent,âinfluencedâtoâvaryingâdegreesâbyâlocalâlegalâframeworks:âmodernâ(formal,âdomestic);âcustomaryâ(egâregardingâcollectiveâlandâuse);âorâreligiousâ(egâregardingâcompensationâforâdamageâaccordingâtoâlocallyâprevailingâreligiousâstandards).â
Inâsomeâcases,âthereâmayâbeâtensionsâbetweenâmodernâformalâlaw,âbasedâonâindividualârights,âandâcustomaryâlaw,âwhereâcollectiveâpunishmentâmayâpresentâaâpragmaticâoption,âforâexampleâtoâminimiseâtheâuseâofâviolenceâinâinter-communityâdisputes,âsuchâasâregardingâcattleârustling.âLocalâmediatorsâareâwellâsuitedâtoâdealingâwithâsuchâtensionsâasâtheyâhaveâin-depthâknowledgeâofârelevantâculturalânorms.âCulturalâconsiderationsâalsoâshapeâmethodsâofârelationshipâbuilding,âcommunicationâstyleâandâperceptionsâofâwhatâconstitutesâaâfairâprocess.âLocalâmediatorsâinânorth-eastâKenya,âforâinstance,âtendâtoâbeâinfluencedâbyâSomaliâcultureâthatâemphasisesâpoetryâandâstorytellingâasâcommunicationâtools.â
StrengthsoflocalmediatorsTheâmainâstrengthsâofâlocalâmediatorsâareâtheâdepthâofâtheirâcontextualâknowledgeâandâtheâextentâofâtheirâlocalânetworks.âTheseâareâbuiltâonâtrustâandâmayâderiveâfromâholdingâaâparticularâpositionâandâlevelâofâauthorityâwithinâtheirâcommunities.âAsâlocalâmediatorsâareâgeographicallyâandâculturallyâcloseâtoâaâspecificâcontext,âtheyâmayâbeâmoreâattunedâtoâaâconflictâsâpotentialâforâescalation,âandâsoâareâwellâplacedâtoâstepâinâtoâpreventâviolenceâbeforeâitâbreaksâout.â
Localâmediatorsâcanâhelpâsecureâpausesâinâfighting,âlongerâtermâceasefires,âorâaâcompleteâresolutionâofâaâconflictâthroughâmutualâagreement,âwhichâmayâforâexampleâincludeâcompensationâorâjusticeâmechanisms.âEffectiveâinterventionâtypicallyârequiresâstrongârelationshipsâwithâconflictâparties,âstateâandânon-state,âasâwellâasâcommunityâleaders.âLocalâmediatorsâalsoâoftenâworkâonâconflictsâlongâbeforeâtheâinternationalâcommunityâmobilisesâandâareâthereâlongâafterâitâdisengages.âTheyâmay,âtherefore,âenjoyâsignificantâlocalâlegitimacyâlinkedâtoâtheirâcommitmentâandârelationships,âwhichâcanâhelpâtoâmaintainâtheâsocialâfabricâinâtimesâofâcrisis.
Localmediationandnon-statearmedgroupsLocalâmediatorsâareâoftenâinâcontactâwithânon-stateâarmedâactors,âespeciallyâinâareasâwhereâthereâisâaâweakâorâpredatoryâstateâpresence.âLocalâmediationâprocessesâhaveâsometimesâledâtoâtheâestablishmentâofââzonesâofâpeaceâârelatedâtoâspecificâterritories.âLocalâdealsâdoânotâautomaticallyâleadâtoâaânationwideâpeaceâagreement,âasâtheyâmayâlackâauthorityâbeyondâtheirâimmediateâcontext.âButâtheyâmayâprovideâusefulâlessonsâandâfacilitateâaâmoreâconduciveâenvironmentâforâformalâpoliticalâprocesses.â
ChallengesandresponsesLocalâmediatorsâfaceâchallengesâincludingâthreatsâtoâtheirâpersonalâsecurity,âandâlackâofâtechnicalâexpertiseâââforâexampleârelatingâtoâceasefireâagreementsâorâinstitutionalâoptionsâforâpowerâsharing,âsuchâasâmodelsâofâfederalismâorâdevolution.âTheyâcanâfaceâaccusationsâofâbias,âasâconflictâpartiesâfromâoneâlocationâorâcommunityâmayâmistrustâmediatorsâassociatedâwithâanother.âAânumberâofâapproachesâtoâbroadenâlocalâmediationâthroughâinternalâandâexternalâcooperationâhaveâhelpedâtoârespondâtoâtheseâchallengesâandâmaximiseâlocalâmediatorsââstrengths.âTheseâinclude:â
âąâ Co-mediation:âlocalâmediatorsâcanâworkâinâteamsâassembledâfromâacrossâconflictâlinesâtoâsoftenâperceptionsâofâpartiality.
âąâ Peace committees:âlocalâmediatorsâcanâbecomeâpartâofâaâbroaderââinfrastructureâforâpeaceââorââpeaceâarchitectureââââaâsystemâforâcoordinatingâandâsupportingâpeaceâprocesses.âThisâcanâincludeâanâestablishedânetworkâofâlocalâmediatorsâinâtheâformâofâpeaceâcommitteesâthatâmeetâregularlyâ(egâonceâaâmonth)âandâcanâreactârapidlyâasâtensionsâarise.âTheâworkâofâpeaceâcommitteesâusuallyâgoesâbeyondâmediationâtoâincludeâpeaceâeducationâorâpolicyâwork.âThisâhelpsâtoâaddressâtheâstructuralâcausesâofâviolence,âratherâthanâonlyâtheâimmediateâconflict.â
âąâ Regional and international networks: externalâsupportâcanâhelpâmitigateâsecurityârisks,âperceptionsâofâpartialityâorâlackâofâtechnicalâknowledge.âRegionalâandâinternationalâactorsâcanâalsoâprovideâdiplomaticâorâpoliticalâcontactsâthatâlocalâmediatorsâmayânotâhave,âprovideâaâdifferentâtypeâofâlegitimacy,âandâbringâcomparativeâlessonsâfromâotherâcontexts.â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 15
NorthernUgandaThe Acholi Religious Leadersâ Peace Initiative: local mediation with the Lordâs Resistance ArmyJamesO.LatigoandRt.BishopMacleodBakerOcholaOjeraâJamesâLatigoâisâProgramâDirectorâofâUgandaâHistoricalâMemoryâandâReconciliationâCouncil,âandâResearchâFellowâandâAcademicâCoordinatorâatâtheâMarcusâGarveyâPan-AfrikanâInstitute.âHeâisâalsoâaâconsultantâforâConciliationâResourcesââEastâandâCentralâAfricaâProgramme.
Rt.âBishopâOcholaâwasâformerlyâAnglicanâBishopâofâKitgumâDiocese.âHeâisâaâBoardâmemberâandâAmbassadorâforâPeaceâatâARLPI,âandâtheâfounderâandâChairâofâtheâAcholiâEducationâInitiative.âHeâremainsâaâcommittedâpeaceâactivist.
Forâtwoâdecades,ânorthernâUgandaâwasâravagedâbyâwarâbetweenâtheâGovernmentâofâUgandaâandâtheâLordâsâResistanceâArmyâ(LRA).âTheâAcholiâReligiousâLeadersââPeaceâInitiativeâ(ARLPI)âââanâinter-denominationalâreligiousânetworkâââevolvedâtoâsupportâcommunityâpeaceâmobilisation.âThisâarticleâtracesâtheâdevelopmentâofâtheâARLPIâfromâitsâgrassrootsâbeginningsâtoâitsâroleâasâaâcredibleâintermediaryâbetweenâLRAâcommandersâinâtheâbushâandâtheâgovernment.âInâtheâabsenceâofâsustainedâformalâpeaceâefforts,âtheâlackâofâcredibleâintermediariesâandâtheâfrenziedâviolenceâperpetratedâbyâtheâLRAâandâstateâarmedâforces,âtheâgroupâbecameâanâimportantâvoiceâforâpeace.
TheâLRAâemergedâinâtheâyearsâafterâtheâoverthrowâofâtheâmilitaryâjuntaâinâUgandaâinâ1986âbyâYoweriâMuseveniâsâNationalâResistanceâArmyâ(NRA).âInâAcholiland,ânorthernâUganda,âaânumberâofâarmedâgroupsâformedâtoâresistâtheânewâregime,âincludingâtheâUgandanâPeopleâsâDemocraticâMovement/Armyâ(UPDM/A),âandâtheâHolyâSpiritâMovementâ(HSM)âledâbyâtheâcharismaticâAliceâAuma.âTheâHSMâsufferedâaâmajorâdefeatâinâ1987âandâtheâUPDM/Aâeventuallyâconcludedâaâsettlementâwithâtheâgovernment,âbutâdisaffectedâremnantsâofâbothâgroupsâcameâtogetherâfromâ1987âinâwhatâwouldâlaterâbecomeâknownâasâtheâLRA,âledâbyâJosephâKony.âTheâLRAâclaimedâitâwasâfightingâagainstâeconomicâmismanagementâandâundemocraticâgovernanceâbyâtheânewâgovernment,âandâtheâwidespreadâhumanârightsâviolationsâcommittedâbyâtheâarmyâinâAcholiland.âThisâwasâaccompaniedâbyâspiritualâbelief:âLRAâfightersâsawâtheirâstruggleâasâaâdivineâcauseâguidedâbyâGodâthroughâhisâprophetâKony.â
InitialâresistanceâtoâtheâNRAâwasâwidelyâsupportedâbyâtheâAcholiâpopulation.âAsâconflictâescalatedâbetweenâtheâUgandanâArmyâ(theâUgandaâPeopleâsâDefenceâForceâââUPDF)âandâtheâLRA,âbothâdirectedâtheirâoperationsâasâmuchâagainstâlocalâ
populationsâasâeachâother,âexposingâciviliansâtoâbrutalâviolenceâandâfracturingâAcholiâsociety;âthousandsâwereâmutilated,ârapedâandâkilled.
Inâ1991,âtheâgovernmentâinitiatedâaâpolicyâofâforcedâdisplacementâofâtheâpopulationâintoââprotectedâcampsââasâpartâofâitsâOperationâNorthâcounter-insurgencyâcampaign.âThisâeffectivelyâsealedâoffâmuchâofâtheânorthâfromâtheârestâofâtheâcountryâââalthoughâtheâcampsâhadâinâfactâbeenâestablishedâunofficiallyâsinceâ1986.âTheâLRAâbecameâincreasinglyâreliantâonâtheâSudaneseâgovernmentâinâKhartoum,âwhichâusedâitâasâaâmeansâtoâdestabiliseâsouthernâSudan.âKonyâresortedâtoâtheâforcedârecruitmentâofâchildren,âbothâgirlsâandâboys,âfromâAcholiâpopulations,âabductingâanâestimatedâ30,000âminorsâbyâ2006.
The formation of the ARLPIEarlyâpeaceâeffortsâwereâunsuccessful.âTheâmostâsignificantâinitiativeâcameâinâ1994,âwhenâtheâStateâMinisterâforâNorthernâUganda,âBettyâBigombeâ(anâAcholi),âembarkedâonânegotiationsâwithâtheâLRAâonâbehalfâofâtheâgovernment.âHowever,âtalksâcollapsedâwhenâPresidentâMuseveniâassertedâthatâtheâLRAâwasâusingâthemâasâcoverâtoâre-armâinâSudanâandâissuedâanâultimatumâforâtheârebelsâtoââsurrenderâorâbeâcrushedâ.â
Inâ1997,âaânumberâofâreligiousâleaders,âmanyâofâwhomâhadâbeenâpersonallyâaffectedâbyâtheâconflict,âcameâtogetherâtoâspeakâoutâagainstâtheâviolence.âTheyâincludedâtheâthenâAnglicanâBishopâofâKitgumâDiocese,âMacleodâBakerâOcholaâII;âtheâCatholicâArchbishopâofâGulu,âArchdioceseâofâNorthernâUganda,âJohnâBaptistâOdama;âtheâEpiscopalâVicarâofâtheâCatholicâChurch,âMonsignorâMatthewâOjara;âFr.âCarlosâLudigrie;âandâFr.âJosephâGenna.âTheâARLPI,âanâinter-denominationalâbody,âbroughtâtogetherâCatholics,âAnglicans,âMuslims,âOrthodoxâChristians,âSeventh-dayâAdventistsâandâBorn-AgainâFaithâFederationâworshippersâunderâoneâumbrella.â
16 // Accord // Insight 2
Inâ1998,âtheâARLPIâheldâitsâfirstâofficialâpublicâevent.âBedo Piny pi Kucâ(sittingâdownâforâpeace)âdrewâoverâ150âAcholis,âincludingâparentsâofâabductedâchildren,âtraditionalâchiefsâandâcommunityâelders,âlocalâcouncilâleaders,âteachersâandâcommunityâworkers,âtoâdiscussâtheâeffectsâofâtheâconflictâonâtheâcommunityâandâstrategiesâtoâovercomeâit.âTheirâmainâconcernsâincludedâtheâinabilityâofâgovernmentâforcesâtoâprotectâthem,âforcedâdisplacement,âLRAâandâUPDFâatrocitiesâandâlooting,âandâtheâreturnâofâabductedâchildren.
ThereâwasâaâgeneralâsenseâofâangerâthatâtheâgovernmentâhadâunderminedâBettyâBigombeâsâpeaceâefforts.âDespiteâaâdeclineâinâsupportâforâtheâLRA,âparticipantsâwereâfrustratedâthatâtheâgovernmentâwasânotâaddressingâtheâpoliticalâissuesâraisedâbyâtheârebels.âTheâhumanitarianâcrisisâalsoârequiredâurgentâattention.âConcernedâmothersâinâparticularâmadeâanâemotiveâpleaâtoâbeâgivenâtheâopportunityâtoâtalkâtoârebelâleaders.âAâconsensusâemergedâthatâtheâwarâcouldânotâbeâwonâthroughâmilitaryâaction,âthatâtheâcommunityâshouldâdemandâaâpeacefulâresolutionâtoâtheâconflict,âandâthatâtheâconflictâpartiesâshouldâbeâbroughtâtogetherâinâmediatedâdialogue.â
TheseâdecisionsâwereâinfluencedâbyâtheâtraditionalâvaluesâandânormsâofâtheâAcholiâpeople,âwhichâemphasisedâreconciliationâandârestorativeâapproachesâratherâthanâactsâofârevenge.âTheâARLPIâstressedâtheâimportanceâofânon-violenceâandâalleviatingâtheâsufferingâofâtheâpeople,âandâarguedâthatâmostâofâtheârebelâfightersâdidânotâgoâtoâtheâbushâofâtheirâownâvolitionâandâthatâthereâwasâthereforeâaâmoralâimperativeâtoâsafeguardâtheâlivesâofâtheseâabductedâgirlsâandâboys.âTheâARLPIâsâworkâwasâkeyâtoâchangingâtheâwayâtheâcommunityâspokeâaboutâtheâLRA:âratherâthanâsimplyâbeingâperpetratorsâofâviolence,âsomeâwereâseenâasâtheâvictimsâofâabductionâwhomâtheâgovernmentâhadâfailedâtoâprotect.
TheâARLPIâandâotherâcommunityâleadersâbeganâtoâorganiseâpeaceâralliesâandâprayers.âTheseâprovidedâaâsourceâofâsupportâforâcommunitiesâaffectedâbyâviolence,âbutâwereâalsoâintendedâtoâdemonstrateâcommunitiesââneedâandâdesireâforâpeaceâtoâtheâgovernmentâandâtheâLRA.âVariousâattemptsâwereâalsoâmadeâtoâbuildâlinksâwithâLRAâfightersâinâtheâbush,âincludingâbyâputtingâpeaceâmessagesâinânewspapersâandâonâpostersâinâmarketsâthatâLRAâmembersâwereâknownâtoâfrequent.âProgrammesâonâtheâstate-runâRadioâFreedom,âandâlaterâMegaâFM,âprovidedâaâforumâforâpeopleâtoâvoiceâtheirâviewsâandâraiseâissuesâdirectlyâwithâbothâtheâLRAâ(whoseâmembersâwereâknownâtoâtuneâin)âandâstateâsecurityâforces.
TheâARLPIâalsoâwroteâpastoralâlettersâââopenâlettersâinâtheâpressâââtoâtheâLRAâandâtheâgovernment.âTheâlettersâhighlightedâ
theâurgentâneedâforâaâpeacefulâresolutionâofâtheâconflictâandâspokeâoutâstronglyâagainstâforcedâdisplacementâandâtheâpoorâconditionsâwithinâdisplacementâcamps.âTheâmessagesâalsoâencouragedâtheâLRAâtoâcomeâtoâchurchâonâholyâdays,âwhereâitâwasâhopedâtheyâcouldâbeâencouragedâtoâreturnâtoâtheirâcommunities.â
Reaching out to the LRAManyâARLPIâfiguresâwereâknownâtoâtheâLRAâandâmanyâtraditionalâleadersâmaintainedâinformalâcontactsâwithâLRAâcadres,âinâparticularâabducteesâwithâkinshipâtiesâtoâcommunities.âKonyâhimselfâhadâbeenâaâchoirboyâandâhadârespectâandâaffinityâforâCatholicâPriests.âYet,âdirectâcontactâwithâtheâLRAâhighâcommandâwasâdifficult,âespeciallyâafterâtheâmainâleadershipâshiftedâtoâsouthernâSudan.âItâwasâalsoâdangerous:âtheâLRAâhadâkilledâthreeâtraditionalâleadersâwho,âpriorâtoâBigombeâsâefforts,âhadâsoughtâtoâconvinceâitâtoâengageâinâpeaceâtalks.â
Theâenactmentâofâtheâ1999âAmnestyâLaw,âandâtheâsubsequentâestablishmentâofâanâAmnestyâCommission,âstrengthenedâtheâARLPIâsâposition.âItâgaveâthemâtheâlegalâandâpoliticalâspaceâtoâpursueâdialogueâandâreinforcedâtheâmoralâimperativeâofâforgivenessâtoâthoseâwhoâhadâbeenâabducted.âMembersâofâtheâdiasporaâwereâintegralâtoâprovidingâanâinternationalâspotlightâonâtheâamnestyâissueâinâorderâtoâconvinceâtheâUgandanâgovernment.âAcholiâparliamentariansâwereâalsoâinstrumentalâinâensuringâtheâActâwasâpushedâthroughâtheâlegislatureâdespiteâreluctanceâfromâtheâgovernment,âwhileâbroadâpopularâsupportâwithinâtheâAcholiâpopulationâfurtherâfacilitatedâtheâprocess.
TheâARLPIâtriedâtoâconnectâtoâtheâLRAâthroughâtraditionalâleadersâinâUgandaâandâcertainâindividualsâinâNairobiâwhoâclaimedâtoâhaveâaccessâtoâKony.âAâbreakthroughâcameâinâOctoberâ1999âwhenâaâmessageâwasâdeliveredâtoâtheâthenâAnglicanâBishop,âNelsonâOnono-Onweng,âthroughâYusufâAdek,âaâcloseâadviserâtoâKony.âTheâbishopâwasâtakenâaloneâtoâanâunknownâlocationâtoâmeetâwithâLRAâcommanders.âSubsequentâharassmentâandâsurveillanceâbyâtheâUPDFâdelayedâfurtherâcontact.âEventually,âinâAprilâ2001,âotherâreligiousâandâtraditionalâleadersâwereâableâtoâmeetâface-to-faceâwithâhigh-levelâLRAâofficers.âTheâmainâfocusâofâtalksâwasâtheâimplementationâofâtheâ1999âAmnestyâLaw,âwhichâallowedâcombatantsâtoâreportâtoâreligiousâleaders.
However,âaâmassiveâmilitaryâoffensiveâlaunchedâbyâtheâgovernmentâinâMarchâ2002,âOperationâIronâFist,âpushedâtheâLRAâbackâintoânorthernâUganda.âAbductionsâandâattacksâonâciviliansâintensifiedâasâtheâLRAâextendedâitsâreachâbeyondâAcholilandâintoâtheâLangoâandâTesoâsub-regions.âCommunities,âunconvincedâbyâARLPIâcallsâforânegotiations,âralliedâintoâself-defenceâgroupsâcalledâArrowâBrigades,âtoâjoinâwithâtheâUPDFâinâfightingâtheâLRA.âThisâtrendâwasâcompoundedâbyâethnicâtensionsâasâLangiâpopulationsâattributedâatrocitiesâtoâtheââAcholiââLRA.â
Yet,âopportunitiesâforâdialogueâstillâemergedâamidâtheâviolenceâandâdiscord.âArchbishopâOdamaâreceivedâaâdirectâcallâfromâtheâLRAâsâsecondâinâcommand,âVincentâOtti,âwhoâaskedâreligiousâleadersâtoâmediateâbetweenâtheâgovernmentâandâtheâLRA.âARLPIâleadersâtookâadvantageâofâthisâshowâofâtrustâtoâbeginâdialogue.âSelectedâARLPIâmembersâandâtraditionalâleadersâtrekkedâunescortedâintoâtheâbushâandâmetâwithâtheâ
The ARLPIâs work was key to changing the way the community spoke about the LRA: rather than simply being perpetrators of violence, some were seen as the victims of abduction whom the government had failed to protectâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 17
LRAâforâthreeâdays.âDiscussionsâtookâplaceâwithâhigh-levelâcommandersâbutânotâwithâKony:âtheâemissariesâthoughtâitâwouldâbeâdifficultâtoâextractâclearâcommitmentsâfromâtheâunpredictableâleader,âandâthatâitâwouldâbeâmoreâproductiveâtoâspeakâwithâsecond-rankâpersonnel.
InitialâmeetingsâwereâdependentâonâLRAâcommunication.âTheâLRAâwouldâcontactâaâparticularâpersonâthroughâaâletterâorâpersonalâmessageâââoftenâtraditionalâleaderâRwotâOywakâofâPaderâDistrictâorâFr.âCarlosâRodriguezâââwhoâinâturnâwouldâinformâtheâotherâreligiousâandâtraditionalâleaders.âTheâLRAâwouldâchooseâtheâtime,âplaceâandâtheâpersonsâwhoâshouldâattend.âArchbishopâJohnâBaptistâOdama,âSheikâMusaâKhalil,âBishopâOcholaâII,âandâFr.âCarlosâRodriguezâwereâthoseâmostâfrequentlyâcalledâuponâtoâmeetâwithâseniorâLRAâcommanders.â
Atâeachâmeeting,âtheâcommunityâleadersâappealedâtoâtheâLRAânotâtoâkillâcivilians,âtoâallowâtheâreturnâofâabducteesâandâtoâpursueâpeaceâandâreconciliation.âTheâLRAârepresentativesâadamantlyârefused,âarguingâthatâtheyâwereâdefendingâthemselvesâagainstâUPDFâattacksâandâshouldânotâbeâcondemned.âItâwasâdifficultâtoâunderstandâthisâargumentâsinceâtheyâwereâkillingâinnocentâpeopleâinâvillages,âinsteadâofâattackingâtheâmilitaryâbarracksâinâtheâAcholiâsub-region.â
Maintaining impartiality despite insecurityTheâsituationâwasâpervadedâbyâmistrust.âTheâpopulationâasâaâwholeâfacedâsuspicionâfromâbothâsides:âtheâgovernmentâaccusedâciviliansâofâbeingâârebelâcollaboratorsâ,âwhileâtheâLRAâaccusedâtheâsameâciviliansâofâdivulgingâinformationâtoâgovernmentâforcesâaboutâtheirâpositionsâandâfoodâsupply.âJosephâKonyâviewedâtheâcommunityâasâârebelliousââforârefusingâtoâsupportâhim.âTheâreligiousâleadersâthemselvesâwereâmistrustedâbyâtheâLRA,âwhichâaccusedâthemâofâusingâtheâLRAâtoâsolicitâfundingâfromâtheâinternationalâcommunityâforâtheirâownâpersonalâbenefit.âTheâLRAâtestedâtheâARLPIâbyâallowingâtheâreturnâofâgirlâabducteesâwhoâhadâborneâchildrenâinâtheâbush.âTheâreligiousâleadersâreinforcedâtheirâcredibilityâbyâtakingâcareâofâallâthoseâreleasedâandâtheirâchildren.â
Theâreligiousâleadersâalsoâcameâunderâpressureâfromâgovernmentâforcesâtoâacceptââescortâandâprotectionâ,âbutâtheâLRAâdrewâaâlineâonâtheâmapâbeyondâwhichâgovernmentâforcesâwereânotâallowedâtoâproceed.âAsâaâresult,âtheâgovernmentâaccusedâtheâreligiousâleadersâofâbeingâârebelâcollaboratorsâ.âInâMarchâ2002,âUgandaâpassedâanâAnti-TerrorismâActâmakingâ
membershipâofâtheâLRAâaâcriminalâoffence,âaâyearâafterâtheâUSâStateâDepartmentâhadâputâtheâLRAâonâitsââB-listââofââotherâterroristâorganisationsâ.âThisâexposedâtheâARLPIâtoâchargesâofâtreason.
TheâstatusâofâARLPIâfoundersâasâreligiousâleadersâandâtheirâlinksâtoâchurchânetworksâhaveâbeenâcrucial.âChristianâchurchesâinâparticularâareâformidableâinstitutionsâinâUgandaâandâcanâtranscendâethnic,âgeographicâandâpoliticalâdivisions.âBecauseâofâtheirâpowerâbase,âitâbecameâhardâforâtheâgovernmentâtoâeitherâignoreâtheâreligiousâleadersâorâthrowâthemâinâjail.â
ArchbishopâOdamaâandâBishopâOcholaâIIâmetâwithâPresidentâMuseveniâinâAprilâ2002âtoâobtainâofficialâpermissionâforâreligiousâandâtraditionalâleadersâtoâtalkâtoâtheâLRA.âThisâwasâgrantedâonâconditionâthatâtheâbishopsâwouldâreportâtoâgovernmentâsecurityâoperativesâafterâeachâmeetingâwithâtheâLRA.â
TheâARLPIâsoughtâtoâhighlightâitsâimpartialityâasâaââbridgeâforâpeaceââbetweenâtheâLRAâandâtheâgovernment.âInâmeetingsâwithâtheâLRAâitâaskedâthatâallâdemandsâandâcommitmentsâbeâwrittenâdownâandâsignedâtoâavoidâaccusationsâofâinventingâorâchangingâtheâpositionsâofâtheâLRAâorâtheâgovernment.âTheâARLPIâhadâmoreâthanâ24âmeetingsâwithâtheâLRA,âwithâminutesâofâallâmeetingsârecordedâandâhardâcopiesâgivenâtoâbothâtheâUgandanâPresidentâandâtheâLRAâforâtransparencyâandâconsistency.
However,âfromâtheâoutset,âmeetingsâbetweenâcommunityâleadersâandâtheâLRAâcameâunderâattackâfromâgovernmentâforces.âTheâsecondâmeetingâinâAprilâ2001,ânearâPajule,âwasâviolentlyâinterruptedâbyâtheâUPDF,âandâaâculturalâleaderâwasâinjured.âTheâfifthâroundâofâmeetingsâinâPajuleâinâAprilâ2003âwasâabruptlyâhaltedâasâaâresultâofâdirectâandâheavyâbombardmentâbyâUPDFâtroopsâlastingâthreeâdays.âAfterâtheâbombingâstopped,âtheâthreeâpriestsâpresentâwereâarrestedâandâbrieflyâheld.âTheâarmyâcontendedâthatâitsâfieldâoperationsâforceâhadânotâbeenâinformedâofâtheâmeeting,âevenâthoughâtheâarmyâseniorâcommandâhadâbeenâkeptâappraisedâofâongoingâdialogueâattempts.
TheâLRAâinâturnâaccusedâtheâARLPIâofâactingâasâbaitâforâtheâgovernment.âKonyâorderedâhisâcommandersâtoâkillâanyâreligiousâleadersâwhoâattemptedâtoâcontactâtheâLRAâagain.âAmidâincreasingâviolence,âtheâARLPIâsoughtâtoâclarifyâitsâposition,âarguingâthatâitâcouldânotâhaveâbeenâcomplicit,âsinceâitsâownâleadersâwereâinâtheâbushâtoâmediateâandâwouldânotâsacrificeâtheirâfellowâreligiousâleaders,âletâaloneâcondoneâanyâactâofâviolence.â
The status of ARLPI founders as religious leaders and their links to church networks have been crucial. Christian churches in particular are formidable institutions in Uganda and can transcend ethnic, geographic and political divisionsâ
â
In meetings with the LRA [the ARLPI] asked that all demands and commitments be written down and signed to avoid accusations of inventing or changing the positions of the LRA or the governmentâ
â
18 // Accord // Insight 2
The road to JubaAsâfightingâcontinued,âformalâattemptsâtoâfacilitateâtalksâbetweenâtheâPresidentialâPeaceâTeamsâandâtheâLRAâfalteredâinâ2003,âwithâtheâLRAârefusingâcallsâtoâassembleâinââsafeâzonesââwithoutâwiderâsafeguards.âButâtheâARLPIâwasâableâtoâresumeâitsâdialogueârole,âdeliveringâlettersâofâexchangeâandâliaisingâwithâtheâgovernmentâthroughâkeyâAcholiâmembersâofâparliamentâandâreligiousânetworks.âTheâLRAâbeganâtoârespondâtoâdemandsâtoâreleaseâcaptives,âalthoughâatrocitiesâagainstâciviliansâwereâstillâbeingâcommitted.âTheâreleaseâofâabducteesâoneâdayâmightâbeâfollowedâbyâtheâcaptureâofâanotherâgroupâofâchildrenâtheânext.
TheâARLPIâhelpedâtoâbringânationalâandâinternationalâattentionâtoâtheâconflict,âinâoppositionâtoâUgandanâgovernmentâattemptsâtoâcontainâtheâsituationâbyâpresentingâitâasâaâdomesticâproblemârequiringâanâexclusivelyâdomesticâsolution.âInâlateâ2003,âARLPIâChairâArchbishopâOdamaâledâaâten-personâteamâonâanâadvocacyâtourâofâtheâUnitedâStates,âCanadaâandâEurope,âpromotingâaâresearchâreportâbyâtheâAfrikaâStudyâCentreâandâHumanâRightsâandâPeaceâCentre,âMakerereâUniversity, The Hidden War, the Forgotten People: War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda.â
TheâARLPIâalsoâbenefitedâfromâinternationalâstateâandânon-stateâsupportâandâadvocacy,âwhichâplayedâanâimportantâroleâ
inâhighlightingâtheâissueâinternationallyâandâputtingâpressureâonâtheâUgandanâgovernment.
Forâyears,âyoungâchildrenâinânorthernâUgandaâtrekkedâlongâdistancesâtoâtownâcentresâandâspentâtheânightâinâtheâstreetsâforâfearâofâabduction.âTheyâbecameâderogativelyâcalledâânightâcommutersâ.âInâ2003âreligiousâleadersâledâbyâArchbishopâOdamaâcommunedâwithâtheâchildrenâandâspentâfourânightsâsleepingâwithâthemâinâtheâbusâparkâinâGulu.âThisâattractedâmassânationalâandâinternationalâmediaâattentionâandâspurredâmanyâhumanitarianâagenciesâandâgovernmentsâtoârespondâandâprovideâsupportâtoâeaseâtheâplightâofâtheâsufferingâchildren.
Theâgovernmentâeventuallyâcalledâaâseven-dayâceasefireâinâlateâ2004âtoâenableâBettyâBigombeâtoâpursueâtalksâwithâsupportâfromâtheâUS,âtheâUKâandâtheâNetherlands,âbutâhostilitiesâcontinued.â
AsâtheâGovernmentâofâSudanâandâtheâSudanâPeopleâsâLiberationâMovement/ArmyâedgedâtowardsâsigningâaâComprehensiveâPeaceâAgreementâ(CPA),âtheâLRAâsâpositionâinâSudanâwasâbecomingâmoreâvulnerable.âTheâCPA,âsignedâinâ2005,âgaveâsouthernâSudanâsemi-autonomousâstatusâunderâtheâGovernmentâofâSouthernâSudanâ(GoSS).âTheâNetherlands-basedâNGOâIKVâPaxâChristiâfacilitatedâcontactâwithâtheâVice-PresidentâofâGoSS,âDr.âRiekâMachar,âwhoâwasâableâtoâundertakeâaâmediatoryâroleâbetweenâ
S e s e I s .
KENYA
Kampala
DEMOCRATICREPUBLICOF CONGO
UGANDA
Garamba National
Park
Lira
Yambio
Juba
SOUTH SUDANSOUTH SUDANWhite Nile
KitgumKitgum
PaderPader
GuluGulu
Victoria Nile
Lake Victoria
Lake KyogaLake Albert
Lake George
Lac Ădouard
Arua
Mbale
Kampala
LiraAcholiland
Yambio
Kitgum
Arua
Mbale
Juba
PajuleGulu
Bunia
Mahagi
Butembo
Mbarara
Masaka
Dungu
0 75 Miles
0 50
50
7525
25
100 Kilometres
International boundary
National capital
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 19
BOX2
ConversationwithformerLRACommanderCaptainRayApireCaptainâRayâApireâwasâabductedâbyâtheâLordâsâResistanceâArmyâ(LRA)âinâ1993âfromâhisâhomeâvillageâofâLamolaâinâKitgumâdistrict,ânorthernâUganda.âHeâservedâasâtheâLRAâsâChiefâCatechistâ(faithâteacher)âuntilâheâsurrenderedâtoâtheâUgandaâPeopleâsâDefenceâForceâ(UPDF)âinâ2004.âSinceâthenâheâhasâcounselledânewâLRAâreturneesâatâtheâUPDFâChildâProtectionâUnitâinâGulu.â
Inâthisâinterview,âCaptainâApireâreflectsâonâhowâtheâAcholiâReligiousâLeadersââPeaceâInitiativeâ(ARLPI)âwasâperceivedâbyâtheâLRA.âTheâinterviewâwasâconductedâbyâJamesâLatigoâinâAcholiâandâtranslatedâintoâEnglish.â
WhydoyouthinktheLRAwaswillingtotalktoARLPIrepresentatives?TheâLRAâdoesânotâtrustâanybody.âThatâisâwhyâitâhasâsurvivedâforâsoâlong.âWhenâIâsayâLRA,âIâmeanâJosephâKony.âHeâgaveâtheâordersâandâdecidedâforâus,âalthoughâheâwouldâoftenâsayâitâisâtheââspiritââinâhimâtalking.âForâexample,âwhenâheâdecidedâtoâconveneâaâgeneralâparadeâheâwouldâtellâusâthatâtheâspiritâhadâdirectedâhimâtoâdoâso.
WeâdidânotâknowâtheâARLPIâasâanâorganisation.âButâweâknewâcertainâmembersâwhoâwereâprominentâreligiousâleaders.âKonyâwasâanâaltarâboyâhimselfâwhenâheâwasâyounger.âHeâhadâaârespectâforâreligiousâpriests,âespeciallyâCatholicâones.âWhenâoperationsâandâambushesâtookâplaceâheâorderedâfightersâtoâavoidâdisturbingâtheâpriests.
theâUgandanâgovernmentâandâLRA.âNumerousâtripsâwereâmadeâbyâdelegations,âincludingâtheâARLPI,âtoâKonyâsânewâbasesâinâtheâGarambaâforestâinâtheâDemocraticâRepublicâofâCongoâ(DRC),âtoâcommunicateâmutualâconcernsâandâpositions.âTheseâwereâviewedâasâinstrumentalâinâpersuadingâtheâLRAâleadershipâtoâpursueâtheâpeaceâtalksâthatâbeganâinâJuba,âsouthernâSudan,âinâ2006âandâwhichâwouldâlastâforânearlyâtwoâyears.â
ARLPIâmembersâwereâinvitedâtoâtheâJubaâtalksâasâobservers.âOnâseveralâoccasionsâduringâtheânegotiations,âbothâtheâLRAâandâgovernmentânegotiationâteamârevertedâtoâARLPIâmembersâtoâclarifyâcertainâissuesâpertainingâtoâtheânegotiatingâagenda.âTheâARLPIâalsoâplayedâaâkeyâroleâinâkeepingâcommunitiesâinformed,âtherebyâencouragingâpublicâsupportâforâtheâpeaceâprocess.
FiveâagreementsâwereâsignedâinâJubaâcoveringâjusticeâandâaccountabilityâandâdemobilisation,âdisarmamentâandâreintegration.âButâKonyâfailedâtoâshowâupâtwiceâtoâsignâtheâFinalâPeaceâAgreement,âcitingâdissatisfactionâwithâtheâhandlingâofâreintegrationâandâtheâwelfareâofâhisâtroops,âandâtheârefusalâofâtheâInternationalâCriminalâCourtâ(ICC)âtoâwithdrawâarrestâwarrants.âTheâUPDFâandâUSâmilitaryâconcludedâthatâtheâLRAâhadâbeenâusingâtheâperiodâofâtalksâtoâregroup,âandâinâDecemberâ2008âOperationâLighteningâThunderâwasâlaunchedâagainstâLRAâbasesâinâGarambaâforest,âdashingâfurtherâhopesâforâaâpeacefulâresolution.
SinceâJuba,âtheâARLPIâhasâremainedâaâviableâchannelâforâcommunicationâwithâtheâLRA.âInâanâenvironmentâwhereâconflictâpartiesâhaveâfavouredâmilitaryâoptions,âandâregionalâandâinternationalâinfluenceâhaveâbeenâweighty,âtheâARLPIâsâabilityâtoâmoveâbetweenâarmedâgroups,âcommunitiesâandânationalâandâinternationalâactorsâhasâbeenâimportant.â
Sinceâ2008âthereâhaveâbeenâthreeâcallsâfromâpurportedâLRAârepresentativesâseekingâtoârevitaliseâtalks,âbutâthereâhasâremainedâaâpersistentâlackâofâcredibleâcontact.âLRAâoperationsâ
andâbasesâareânowâscatteredâbetweenâWesternâEquatoriaâinâSouthâSudan,âtheâDRC,âtheâCentralâAfricanâRepublicâ(CAR)âandâtheâvolatileâDarfurâregionâofâSudan.âTheâpossibilityâthatâtheâUgandanâgovernmentâhasâmodernâmonitoringâtechnologyâsuppliedâbyâUSâadvisersâhasâprobablyâmadeâtheâgroupâwaryâofâusingâcommunicationsâdevices.
TheâARLPI,âtogetherâwithâsisterâchurchesâandâtraditionalâorganisationsâinâUganda,âSouthâSudan,âDRCâandâCAR,âhaveâformedâaâRegionalâTaskforceâonâtheâLRA,âsupportedâbyâinternationalâNGOsâ[see Regionalâcommunityâpeacebuilding:âaâconversationâwithâJohnâBaptistâOdama, inâAccordâ22,â2011].âThisâmeetsâregularlyâtoâreviewâtheâLRAâsituationâandâcontinuesâtoâseekâcontactâandâtheâpossibleâresumptionâofâpeaceâtalks.â
ConclusionTheâARLPIâhasâfacedâmanyâchallengesâinâitsâattemptsâtoâdialogueâwithâtheâLRAâandâpromoteâpeaceâwithinâtheâcommunityâandâmoreâbroadly.âItâhasâencounteredâsuspicionâfromâopposingâsidesâandâoperatedâinâoftenâvolatileâconditions.âCommunitiesâareâdividedâandâsometimesâresistantâtoâtheâpeaceâefforts.
AâlargeâpartâofâtheâARLPIâsâworkâhasâinvolvedâsupportingâtraditionalâAcholiâreconciliationâprocessesâ(Mato Oput),âpreparingâtheâcommunityâtoâreceiveâformerâcombatants,âandâpromotingâtheâAmnestyâLawâthroughâtranslatingâandâdistributingâLuoâversions.âThisâhasâinvolvedâovercomingâdifferencesâinâopinionâandâdenominationâwithinâtheâARLPI,âandâin-depthâandâheatedâdiscussionâonâissuesâofâaccountability,âincludingâtheâroleâofâtheâICCâandâofâtraditionalâjusticeâmechanismsâsuchâasâtruth-tellingâprocessesâandâreparations.âWhileâoutreachâtoâtheâLRAâhasâhadâvariedâresults,âperhapsâtheâmostâsignificantâpartâofâARLPIâsâworkâhasâbeenâinâstrengtheningâcommunityâresilienceâandâunityâinâtheâfaceâofâextremeâviolence,âandâbuildingâpeopleâsâconfidenceâandâwillingnessâtoâsupportâpeacebuildingâactivities.
20 // Accord // Insight 2
Whywasthat?Weâheardâthatâheâwantedâtoâbecomeâaâpriestâhimself.âIâthinkâthatâisâwhyâheâallowedâVincentâOtti,âhisâsecondâinâcommand,âtoâcallâArchbishopâOdamaâ[aâmemberâofâARLPI].âKonyâisâaâveryâintelligentâman.âHeâwouldâsayâthatâtheâspiritâforbidsâhimâtoâtalk,âandâheâwouldâgetâhisâseniorâcommandersâlikeâOttiâandâlaterâSamâKoloâtoâspeakâonâhisâbehalf.âWhenâKonyâdoesâdecideâtoâspeak,âheâtalksâlikeâaâmachineâgunâââtatatatataâââwithoutâbeingâinterrupted.â
SowhathappenedafterthecallbyVincentOttitoArchbishopOdama?Iâwasânotâveryâinvolvedâinâoperations,âbutâIâoverheardâaâconversationâaboutâdroppingâaâletterâtoâtheâArchbishopâsâresidence.âThatâwasâhowâtheyâgaveâdirectionsâandâinstructionsâ[toâtheâARLPI]âonâwhereâtoâmeet.âBecauseâofâaâlackâofâtrust,âKonyâdidânotâwantâtheâreligiousâleadersâtoâbeâaccompaniedâbyâtheâarmy.âTheyâkeptâchangingâtheâlocationâtoâconfuseâtheâarmy.
Hisârepresentativesâsecretlyâmetâwithâtheâreligiousâleaders.âIâdonâtâknowâwhoâwasâthereâ[fromâtheâLRA]âapartâfromâOtti,âbutâtheyâsaidâthatâaâmessageâshouldâbeâsentâtoâtheâgovernmentâthatâtheyâwantedâgenuineâtalks.âNumerousâsecretâcommunicationsâcontinuedâinâthisâway.âTheârank-and-fileâmembersâofâtheâLRAâwereânotâinformedâofâthisâââIâthinkâtoâkeepâthemâloyal.âKonyâinstilledâaâlotâofâfearâinâthoseâwhoâwereâcaptured.âHeâalsoâmadeâpeopleâbelieveâitâwasâtheâspiritâguidingâhisâthinkingâandâplanning.
Insubsequentmeetings,thereligiousleadersdidnotgoalonebutwereaccompaniedbyothercommunitymembers.DidtheLRAtrustthecommunityleaders?Notâatâall.âKonyâusedâtoâsayâtheâAcholiâcommunityâisâlikeâdogiryoâââaâtwo-headedâsnakeâthatâchangesâdirectionâatâitsâconvenience.âTheyâwillâspeakâtoâyouânicelyâandâthenâsayâsomethingâdifferentâtoâtheâgovernment.âOutâofârespectâforâtheâreligiousâleaders,âthoseâwhoâaccompaniedâthemâwereâtolerated.âInâ1996,âtwoâcommunityâelders,âSamsonâOkot-OgoniâandâchiefâOlanya-Lagonyâ[whoâtriedâtoâbrokerâpeaceâbetweenâtheâLRAâandâtheâgovernment],âwereâkilled.âTheâLRAâfeltâthatâeveryoneâdislikedâthemâsoâitâbecameâveryâdifficultâtoâtrustâanybody.
Inits riyo tal [mediation]role,theARLPIcommunicatedthecommunityâsconcernstotheLRAâthatitshouldstopabductinginnocentchildrenandendtheconflictthatwascausingalotofsufferingtothepeople.HowdidtheLRAreacttothis?WhenâthatârequestâwasârelayedâtoâKonyâheâconsultedâhisâcloseâcommanders.âKonyâconsultsâaâlotâbutâmakesâhisâownâdecisions.âHeâclaimsâthatâheâisâbeingâguidedâbyâtheââspiritââsoânoâoneâcanâquestionâit.âKonyâcalledâMegaâFMâ[aâradioâstationâbasedâinâGulu,âwhichâbroadcastsâaânumberâofâpeaceâprogrammes]âtoâdiscussâtheâabductionâofâchildrenâandâtheâsufferingâofâtheâpeople.âHeâsaidâthatâpeopleâwereâawareâofâtheâongoingâwarâbetweenâtheâLRAâandâGovernmentâofâUganda,âandâifâtheyâputâthemselvesâinâharmâsâwayâtheâLRAâwasânotâresponsible.âHeâsaidâthatâgovernmentâsoldiersâwereâdoingâmostâofâtheâkillingâandâthenâblamingâtheâLRA.âOnâtheâquestionâofâabduction,âheâsaidâthatâtheâAcholiâpeopleâwereâinfectedâwithâevilâandâitâwasâhisâresponsibilityâtoâstartâaânew,âcleanâtribe.
DidtheLRAagreeitshouldtalktothegovernment?Howwasitconvinced?TheâLRAâhadâallâalongâwantedâtoâtalkâpeaceâwithâtheâgovernment.âEvenâwhenâitâwasâfighting,âitâsaidâitâwasâfightingâforâpeace.âTheâLRAâsâargumentâwasâthatâtheâgovernmentâdidânotâwantâpeace.
DidyounoticeanychangeintheLRAâsbehaviouroractivitiesafteritsinteractionswithARLPI?Theâpossibilityâofâtalkingâpeaceâraisedâmoraleâinâtheâcamps.âIâthinkâmanyâofâthemâ[LRAâcombatants]âwereâbecomingâtiredâofâfighting,âandâincreasinglyâunconvincedâbyâtheâpromiseâthatâtheâgovernmentâwouldâbeâoverthrown.âButâtheyâwereâafraidâtoâexpressâtheirâtrueâwishes;âtheyâfearedâthatâKonyâhadâtheâpowerâtoâknowâwhenâheâwasâbeingâdiscussed.âItâwasâseriousâpsychologicalâtortureâonâtheâcombatants.
DidtheARLPIinitiativehaveanybearingontheJubapeacetalks?Jubaâwasâanotherâmatter.âAfterâtheâUPDFâOperationâIronâFistâ[2002â05]âKonyâseizedâonâanâopportunityâforâRiekâMacharâ[aâSudaneseâpolitician]âtoâcontactâtheâGovernmentâofâUgandaâandâmediateânegotiationsâwithâtheâLRA.âTheâARLPIâhadâsowedâtheâseedsâforâpeaceâtalksâandâtheâLRAâbuiltâonâthis.âJubaâwasâaâveryâintricateââfootballâmatchâ.âThereâwereâaâlotâofâorganisationsâaroundâJubaâatâthatâtimeâandâIâcannotâsayâmuchâaboutâtheâroleâofâARLPIâinâtheâactualâtalks.
DidtheLRAleadershipwanttocontinuedialogueafterthebreakdownoftheJubatalks?TheâbombingâofâtheâLRAâsâmainâbaseâinâGarambaâforestâconvincedâthem,âinâmyâopinion,âthatâtheâgovernmentâwasânotâsincereâaboutâtalks.âThatâisâwhyâthereâisâcompleteâsilenceânow.âYouâneedâtoâtalkâfromâaâpositionâofâstrength.âIâthinkâtheâLRAâisânotâasâstrongâasâitâwasâduringâtheâJubaâtalks.âPerhapsâinâtheâfuture,âifâitâgainsâstrength,âitâwillâwantâtoâtalkâagain.âManyâotherâpeopleâhaveâenteredâtheâconflictâinâGarambaâââtheâAmericans,âtheâarmiesâofâtheâDemocraticâRepublicâofâCongoâandâSouthâSudan.âIâamâtoldâthatâtheâAfricanâUnionâhasâalsoâjoinedâandâthatâtheâUPDFâisâstillâchasingâtheâLRA.âWhichâsideâshouldâbeâinvolvedâinâtalksâwithâtheâLRA,âorâwillâtheyâallâbeâbroughtâtogether?
Finally,doyouthinktheARLPIcanstillplayaroleintermsofdialoguewiththeLRA?Personally,âIâthinkâpeaceâtalksâcanâstillâwork.âItâwouldâbeâgoodâifâsomeoneâcouldâfindâaâwayâtoâcontactâtheâLRAâtopâleadership.âButâitâisâveryâdifficultâtoâknowâwhatâisâhappeningânowâinâtheâorganisationâofâtheâLRA.âIfâtheyâareâinâdisarrayâasâreported,âthenâitâwillâbeâdifficultâtoâorganiseâtalksâagain.â
TheâreasonsâKonyâgaveâforânotâsigningâtheâJubaâAgreementâneedâtoâbeâconsideredâasâwell.âThisâ[lackâofâtrust]âwasâmadeâworseâbyâOperationâLightningâThunderâ[2008â09].âWhoâcanâheâtrust,âespeciallyâwithâsoâmanyâforcesâafterâhimânow?âItâmayâbeâaâgoodâideaâifâtheâARLPIâcanâfindâaâwayâtoâreachâhim.âPerhapsâheâwillâstillâtrustâthemâlikeâheâdidâinâtheâbeginning.âButâasâIâsaid,âitâisâveryâdifficultâtoâknowâwhatâisâreallyâgoingâonâwithinâtheâLRA.
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 21
ColombiaDe-mining in Micoahumado: from civil resistance to local negotiation with the ELN MauricioGarcĂa-DurĂĄnandFernandoSarmientoSantanderMauricioâGarcĂa-DurĂĄnâisâaâJesuitâpriestâandâcurrentlyâExecutiveâDirectorâofâJesuitâRefugeeâServiceâ(JRS),âColombia.âHeâhasâspentâtheâlastâ25âyearsâresearchingâpeaceâprocessesâandâsocialâmobilisationâforâpeaceâinâColombia.âInâaddition,âheâhasâworkedâwithâdisplacedâpopulationsâforâtheâCenterâforâResearchâandâPopularâEducationâ(CINEP),âwhereâheâwasâExecutiveâDirectorâbetweenâ2007âandâ2012.âHeâwasâissueâeditorâofâAccordâ14:âAlternatives to War â Colombiaâs peace processesâ(2004).
FernandoâSarmientoâSantanderâisâaâresearcherâonâpeaceâinitiativesâatâCINEP,âwhereâheâisâcurrentlyâtheâcoordinatorâforâtheâCitizenship,âDevelopmentâandâPeaceâTeam.âSinceâ1997âheâhasâfocusedâonâpeaceâmobilisationâinâColombia,âspecialisingâinâsocialâmanagement,âpoliticalâparticipation,âconflictâresolutionâandâinternationalâhumanitarianâlaw.âHeâalsoâhasâexperienceâinâstrengtheningâlocalâpeacebuildingâinitiatives.
Onâ2âFebruaryâ2005,âtheâinhabitantsâofâMicoahumadoâvillageâorganisedâaâtraditionalâcabalgata celebrationâââaâmarchâwithâhorses.âItâwasâattendedâbyâcommunityâandâstateârepresentatives,âasâwellâasâmembersâofâtheâmedia,âtheâCatholicâChurch,âregionalânon-governmentalâorganisationsâ(NGOs),âandâtheâinternationalâNGOâGenevaâCall.âTheâeventâcelebratedâtheâcompletionâofââtheâprocessâofâsocialâandâcommunityâde-miningââofâtheâmainâroad,âtheâsecondaryâroadsâandâaccessâroutesâleadingâtoâMicoahumado,âbyâtheâNationalâLiberationâArmyâ(ELN).âTheâvillageâisâanâadministrativeâsubdivisionâ(corregimiento)âofâMoralesâmunicipalityâinâtheâdepartmentâofâBolivar,ânorth-centralâColombiaâ[see map].âItâisâalsoâpartâofâtheâgeographicâregionâofâMagdalenaâMedio,âwhichâstretchesâacrossâaânumberâofâdepartments,âandâencompassesâtheâMagdalenaâRiver,âtheâbiggestâinâColombia.
Theâprocessâââalsoâknownâasâhumanitarianâde-miningâââbeganâafterâaârequestâbyâtheâcommunityâtoâtheâELNâtoâde-mineâtheâarea,âandânearlyâtwoâyearsâofânegotiations.âItâinvolvedâmultipleâinteractionsâbetweenâtheâcommunity,ânationalâandâinternationalâNGOs,âarmedâactors,âandâtheâgovernment.âWithâtheâsupportâofâexternalâactors,âtheâcommunityâorganisedâtoâconfrontâandânegotiateâwithâdifferentâarmedâactors,âincludingâparamilitaryâandâguerrillaâgroups.â
ThisâarticleâisâbasedâonâresearchâcarriedâoutâbyâtheâauthorsâasâpartâofâCINEPâsâeffortsâtoâdocumentâtheâMicoahumadoâexperience.âTheâresearch,âconductedâbetweenâ2010âandâ2015,âincludedâseveralâinterviews,âtwoâworkshopsâandâvariousâpeaceâeventsâinvolvingâcommunityâleadersâandâmembersâofâsupportingâorganisations.â
The ELN and Micoahumado ContemporaryâarmedâconflictâinâColombiaâbeganâinâtheâ1960sâwithâtheâemergenceâofâtwoâmajorâguerrillaâgroupsâââtheâELNâandâtheâFARCâ(RevolutionaryâArmedâForcesâofâColombia).âTheâotherâmainâconflictâpartiesâincludeâtheâColombianâArmyâandâpoliceâforces,âandâparamilitaryâgroupsâunderâtheâumbrellaâofâtheâUnitedâSelf-DefenceâForcesâofâColombiaâ(AUC).âAfterâtwoâdecadesâofâlowâintensityâconflict,âtheâviolenceâescalatedâinâtheâ1980sâandâreachedâitsâpeakâinâtheâlateâ1990s.
AsâaâMarxistâpro-Cubanâgroup,âtheâELNâwasâinspiredâbyâtacticsâusedâbyâguerrillasâledâbyâFidelâCastroâinâtheâ1950sâinâtheâSierraâMaestraâmountainârangeâofâCuba.âItâhadâideologicalâtiesâwithâCuba,âasâwellâasâChristianârootsâinspiredâbyâliberationâtheologyâandânotionsâofâsocialâjustice.âTheâgroupâhasâincludedâseveralâpriestsâandâreligiousâactors,âsuchâasâGeneralâCommanderâManuelâPĂ©rezâ(alsoâknownâasâEl Cura PĂ©rezââââPĂ©rezâtheâPriestâ),âandâCamiloâTorres,âwhoâparticipatedâinâsocialistâmovementsâbeforeâjoiningâtheâELNâinâ1965.âTheâELNâhadâanâestimatedâ3,000âtoâ5,000âmembersâatâtheâheightâofâtheâmovementâinâtheâ1990s;âinâ2015âitâisâestimatedâtoâhaveâ1,500âtoâ2,000âmembers.â
TheâgreatestâescalationâofâviolenceâinâColombiaâcoincidedâwithânegotiationsâbetweenâtheâgovernmentâandâtheâFARCâfromâ1999â2002.âWhileâpeaceâtalksâdevelopedâinâaâdemilitarisedâzoneâinâElâCaguĂĄnâinâtheâsouthâofâtheâcountry,âarmedâconflictâintensifiedâinâtheânorth.âDuringâthisâtimeâtheâparamilitaryâAUCâconcentratedâitsâeffortsâonâattackingâareasâcontrolledâbyâtheâELNâinâtheâMagdalenaâMedioâregion,âincludingâvillagesâlikeâMicoahumado,âlocatedâinâtheâSerranĂaâdeâSanâLucasâmountainârange.
22 // Accord // Insight 2
Givenâitsâcentralâlocationâandâwealthâofânaturalâresources,âtheâSerranĂaâdeâSanâLucasâbecameâoneâofâtheâcountryâsâmostâdisputedâregions,âmoreâsoâafterâtheâimprovementâofâtheâMagdalenaâMedioâHighwayâduringâtheâ1980s,âwhichâconnectedânorthernâandâcentralâpartsâofâtheâcountry.â
Theâstateâhasâhistoricallyâbeenâabsentâfromâtheâregion,âwithâlittleâinstitutionalâprovisionâofâwater,âeducationâorâhealthâcare.âTheâELN,âinâmanyâcasesâwithâsupportâfromâtheâpopulation,âmaintainedâsocialâandâmilitaryâcontrolâofâvariousâmunicipalitiesâandâsubdivisionsâofâSerranĂaâdeâSanâLucasâandâMagdalenaâMedio.âCommunitiesâandâarmedâgroupsâdevelopedâstrongârelationships,âandâindividualâguerrillasâhadâpersonalâlinksâtoâinhabitantsâasâfamily,âfriendsâandâneighbours.âDirectâcommunicationâbetweenâtheâcommunityâandâtheâELNâwasâthereforeânormallyâpossible,âalthoughâtheâcommunityâwouldâlookâtoâtheâChurchâtoâhelpâresolveâdisputes.â
Theâregionâalsoâhasâparticularâpolitical,âmilitaryâandâhistoricâsignificanceâforâtheâELNâasâoneâofâtheâmainâareasâwhereâtheâgroupârebuiltâitselfâinâtheâ1980sâafterâitâwasâmilitarilyâdevastatedâinâtheâ1970s.âTheâgroupâthenâexpandedâitsâuseâofâanti-personnelâminesâasâaâwayâofâdefendingâterritory.
âTheâelenosâ(ELN)âhaveâplayedâaâcentralâroleâinâeverydayâlifeâinâtheâregion.âTheyâhelpedâtoâbuildâtheâpathsâandâtheâroads,âasâwellâasâtheâsoccerâfield,âtheâhealthâcentreâandâschools,âwithâtheirâownâmachinery.âTheyâalsoâdefendedâtheâlocalâpopulationâfromâtheâparamilitaryâonslaught,âwhichâwouldâhaveâbeenâworseâwithoutâtheirâprotectionâInterview with a community leader, 2010
Escalation of violence in MicoahumadoThereâwereâtwoâcyclesâofâheightenedâarmedâconflictâinâMicoahumado.âFromâ1985â95âtheâarmyâconductedâsporadicâcounter-insurgencyâoperationsâinâtheâvillage.âTheâpopulationâwasâstigmatisedâasâsupportersâofâtheâguerrillasâandâexperiencedâaâvarietyâofârepressiveâmeasures.âThen,âbetweenâ1998âandâ2003,âthereâwasâaâterritorialâdisputeâbetweenâtheâparamilitaryâAUCâsâCentralâBolivarâBlockâ(BCB)âandâtheâELNâsâJosĂ©âSolanoâSepĂșlvedaâFront.âAsâpartâofâtheirâbroadâstrategyâtoâgainâterritorialâcontrolâinâsouthernâBolivar,âtheâparamilitariesâlaunchedâaâseriesâofâraidsâtoâestablishâoperationalâbasesâinâaânumberâofâtheâregionâsâmunicipalitiesâandâtowns.
Betweenâ1998âandâ2002,âMicoahumadoâwasâsubjectâtoâaâseriesâofâattacksâbyâparamilitariesâinâanâattemptâtoâtakeâcontrolâofâtheâzoneâfromâtheâELN.âAtâtheâpeakâofâtheâfightingâinâ2001â02,âtheâlocalâcommunityâstartedâtoâorganiseâinâresponseâtoâtheâbrutalityâofâparamilitaryâviolence.âTheâBCBâattackedâtheâcivilianâpopulationâinâorderâtoâreachâtheâguerrillas,âoftenâwithâtheâtacitâconsentâofâtheâarmy.âManyâfamiliesâandâmostâcommunityâleadersâhadâtoâabandonâtheirâhomesâforâfearâofâbeingâchargedâasâaccomplicesâofâtheâguerrillas.â
Onâ2âDecemberâ2002,âtheâBCBâlaunchedâitsâmostâsevereâattack.âTheâpopulationâwasâcaughtâinâtheâcrossfireâbetweenâtheâparamilitariesâandâtheâELN.âRoadblocksâlimitedâaccessâtoâfood,âmedicalâaidâandâdrinkingâwaterâasâbothâsidesâsoughtâtoâentrenchâthemselvesâinâtheâvillage.âParamilitariesâestablishedâthemselvesâinâtheâschool,âtheâsportsâarenas,âandâotherâpublicâplaces,âasâwellâasâpeopleâsâhomes.âTheâELNâminedâwaterâ
supplyâroutesâtoâforceâtheâpopulationâtoâleaveâsoâtheyâcouldâconfrontâtheâparamilitariesâdirectly.
The community dialogue commissionAdversityâandâviolenceâinâMicoahumadoâultimatelyâledâtoâcommunityâorganisation.âTheâcommunityâfacedâanâapparentâdilemma:âeitherâtoâjoinâoneâorâotherâofâtheâgroups,âinvitingâdirectâinvolvementâinâtheâconfrontation;âorâtoâopposeâboth,âalmostâcertainlyâprovokingâtheirâownâdisplacement.âInstead,âtheyâoptedâforâaâthirdâalternative:âtoâdeclareâtheirââcivilâdisobedienceâââârefusingâtoâsupportâanyâofâtheâarmedâactors,âassumingâaânonviolentâstance,âandâdefendingâaâproposalâforâpeace,âcoexistenceâandâsecurity.â
Onâ14âDecemberâ2002,âtheâinhabitantsâofâMicoahumadoâandârepresentativesâofâtheâlocalâCatholicâChurchâheldâaâmeetingâonâtheâvillageâsoccerâfield.âTheânewâpriestâofâtheâDioceseâofâMaganguĂ©,âFr.âJoaquinâMayorga,âandâtheâDirectorâofâtheâPeaceâandâDevelopmentâProgrammeâofâMagdalenaâMedioâ(PDPMM),âFr.âFranciscoâDeâRoux,âwhoâhadâbegunâtoâprovideâsupportâtoâMicoahumado,âalsoâattended.
Theâparticipantsâvotedâtoâremainâinâtheâvillageâratherâthanâabandonâit,âasâhadâhappenedâpreviously.âTheâassemblyâelectedâaâdialogueâcommissionâmadeâupâofâeightâtoâtenâpeople,âwithâequalârepresentationâofâmenâandâwomen.âTheirâmissionâwasâtoâtalkâtoâtheâparamilitariesâandâguerrillasâtoâresolveâissuesâsuchâasâdrugâtraffickingâandâde-mining.âBecauseâmanyâpreviousâcommunityâleadersâhadâbeenâaccusedâofâcollaborationâwithâtheâELNâandâforcedâtoâleave,âitâwasâvitalâthatâtheânewâcommissionâremainâanonymous.âAtâtheâsameâtimeâeachâcommissionerâalsoâhadâtoâbeâanâactiveâmemberâofâtheâcommunityâââanâevangelicalâpastorâorâteacher,âforâexample.â
Theâfirstâroundâofânegotiationsâbeganâinâtheâmiddleâofâarmedâconfrontation.âTheâcommissionâinitiatedâcontactâwithâtheâELNâthroughâtheâmilicianosâ(militias)âpresentâinâtheâvillageâandâconvenedâaâmeetingâwithâguerrillaâcommandersâpositionedâinâtheâmountains.â
Theâparamilitariesâmovedâawayâfromâtheâcentreâofâtheâvillageâtoâtheâneighbouringâhills.âHowever,âaccordingâtoâaâcommunityâleader,âthisâwasââwhenâtheâworstâfighting startedâ.â
IntenseâviolenceâcontinuedâthroughâChristmasâ2002âandâtheâNewâYear,ââwhichâkeptâusâboardedâupâinâourâhousesâfromâ24âtoâ31âDecember.âWeâcouldnâtâevenâpokeâourâheadsâout.ââAfterâthis,âtheâcommissionânegotiatedâwithâtheâparamilitariesâtoâwithdrawâfromâMicoahumadoâandâcontinuedâdialogueâ
The community faced an apparent dilemma: either to join one or other of the groups, inviting direct involvement in the confrontation; or to oppose both, almost certainly provoking their own displacement. Instead, they opted for a third alternativeâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 23
withâtheâELNâtoâprotectâtheâpopulationâfromâcrossfire.ââOnâ17âJanuaryâ[2003],âtheâparamilitariesâleftâwithâjustâ150âmen,âafterâtheyâhadâarrivedâwithâ600â[âŠ]âAfterâthat,âtheyâneverâcameâbackââ(interview with community leader, 2010).âTheâELNâthenâreturnedâtoâMicoahumadoâinâorderâtoâmaintainâcontrolâofâtheâarea.â
Communityâleadersââaccountsârevealâtheârisksâinvolvedâinâengagingâwithâallâsidesâinâtheâmiddleâofâarmedâconfrontation.âTheyâhadâtoâbeâdirectâandâclearâwithâeachâpartyâandâemphasiseâtheâunityâandâresolveâofâtheâcommunity.âAlthoughâbothâtheâELNâandâtheâparamilitariesâbroadlyâacceptedâtheâcommunityâsâproposalâtoâavoidâinvolvingâtheâpopulationâinâtheâconfrontation,âadherenceâtoâthisâwasânotâconstant,âandâwasâdependentâonâtheâarmedâactorsââstrategicâinterestsâvis-Ă -visâtheirâadversaryâaâparticularâmoments.
Withâtheâwithdrawalâofâtheâparamilitaries,âhowever,âtheâarmyâintensifiedâaggressionâagainstâtheâpopulation.âTheâcommunityâinsistedâtheâguerrillasâabideâbyâpreviousâagreementsâandânotâinvolveâtheâcommunityâinâtheâconfrontation.âTheâELNâacceptedâthisâandâdecreasedâtheirâpresence.âEncouragedâbyâthisâprogress,âonâ14âMarchâ2003,âtheâcommunityâcreatedâtheâPopularâConstituentâAssemblyâofâMicoahumadoâasâaâhumanitarianâspaceâforââlifeâandâpeaceâ.âTheâAssemblyâwasârepresentativeâofâtheâwholeâterritoryâââinâtheâprecedingâweeksâ100âdelegatesâdrawnâfromâeveryâvillageâinâtheâadministrativeâsubdivisionâhadâbeenâselectedâtoâsitâonâit.
TheâAssemblyâbecameâtheâcommunityâsâmainâorganisationalâstructure,âresponsibleâforâallâmajorâdecisions.âItâratifiedâtheâdialogueâcommissionâandâcreatedâfurtherâcommissionsâtoâdealâwithâotherâcommunityâissues.âTheâAssemblyâmetâtoâprepareâforâtheâdialoguesâwithâtheâarmedâgroups,âdefiningâtheâmainâtopicsâtoâbeâaddressedâbyâtheâcommissionâandâtoâestablishâcriteriaâforâtheâcommissionâtoâtakeâdecisionsâautonomouslyâduringâtheâtalks.âAfterâeachâround,âtheâresultsâofâtheâdialoguesâwereâdiscussedâandâratifiedâbyâtheâAssembly.â
TheâAssemblyâworkedâcollectively,âandânoâoneâpersonâexercisedâmoreâpowerâthanâanother.âAâreligiousâdimensionâwasâalwaysâpresent:âmeetingsâstartedâwithâaâBibleâreadingâandâecumenicalâprayer.âBothâtheâAssemblyâandâtheâcommissionâwereâdrivenâbyâtheâslogan:ââInâdefenceâofâaâterritoryâforâlife,âwithoutâcoca,âwithoutâmilitaryâoperations,âwithoutâcamps,âwithoutâmines,âwithâautonomyâandâfreedomâ.âTheâissueâofâde-miningâwasâcentralâtoâtheirâdialoguesâwithâtheâELN.
Community leadersâ accounts reveal the risks involved in engaging with all sides in the middle of armed confrontation. They had to be direct and clear with each party and emphasise the unity and resolve of the communityâ
â
An ELN guerrilla de-mining in Micoahumado in January 2005 // © Peace and Development Program in Magdalena Medio
24 // Accord // Insight 2
De-mining beginsAâsecondâroundâofânegotiationsâbetweenâtheâcommunitiesâandâtheâelenosâfocusedâonâde-miningâandâtookâplaceâthroughoutâ2003â04,âatâspecificâtimesâandâunderâspecificâconditions.âAâguerrillaâenvoyâwouldâannounceâwhenâtheâdialogueâcommissionâcouldâgoâupâtheâmountainâtoâtalk,âandâtheâcommunityâwouldâimmediatelyâtellâFrs.âdeâRouxâandâMayorga,âwhoâwouldâaccompanyâtheâcommission.â
Communityâleadersâattestâthatâtheâguerrillasâatâfirstâmaintainedâtheirâpositionâonâlandmines:ââtheyâareâwhatâprotectsâus,âsoâweâcannotâremoveâthemâ.âTheâcommunityâleadersâinsistedâthatâtheyâhadâlearnedâfromâtheâELNâhowâtoâmakeâdemandsâfromâtheâstate,âandânowâtheyâhadâtoâmakeâdemandsâofâtheâELN.â
Onâ28âDecemberâ2004,âafterâtwoâyearsâofâprotractedâeffortsâandânegotiationsâwithâtheâdialogueâcommission,âtheâCentralâCommitteeâofâtheâELNâannouncedâthroughâtheâLuisâSolanoâSepĂșlvedaâFrontâitsâdecisionâtoâunilaterallyâde-mineâsomeâkeyâroads:âfromâtheâurbanâcentreâofâtheâMunicipalityâofâMoralesâtoâtheâadministrativeâsubdivisionâofâMicoahumado,âandâfromâthereâtoâtheâvillagesâofâLaâCaobaâandâLaâGuĂĄcima,âasâwellâasâsomeâsecondaryâroadsâandâpaths.âTheâELNâalsoâagreed:
1.â notâtoâenterâtheâvillageâinâuniformâandâwithâweaponsâ2.â toâreturnâgoodsâtakenâfromâtheâcommunityâasâpunishment:â
land,âcattleâandâworkingâtoolsâ3.â toâceaseâkidnappingsâandâretentions4.â notâtoâre-mineâtheâterritory.
Byâ20âJanuaryâ2005,âtheâterritoryâwasâheldâtoâbeâsafeâforâtransit.âThisâeventâwasâaâhistoricalâmilestoneâforâMicoahumado.âAâlargeâpartâofâtheâcommunityâwasâinvolvedâinâverifyingâtheâde-miningâprocess,âgivenâthatâthereâwasânoâtechnicalâverificationâeitherâbyâtheâgovernmentâorâbyânationalâorâinternationalâNGOs.â
TheâMicoahumadoâcommunityâsâcommitmentâtoâimpartialityâvis-Ă -visâtheâdifferentâarmedâactorsâandâitsârefusalâtoâcollaborateâwithâanyâofâtheâgroupsâwasâkeyâtoâtheâELNâsâwillingnessâtoâacceptâandâcomplyâwithâtheâde-miningârequest.âTheâELNârecognisedâthatâitsâownâsecurityâwasâinâlargeâpartâdueâtoâtheâpopulationâsâdecisionâtoâneitherâdenounceâtheâgroupânorâsupportâotherâarmedâactors.
National and international supportSinceâtheâescalationâofâconflictâinâ1998,âdialogueâwithâspecificâarmedâgroups,âincludingâtheâELNâandâFARC,âwithoutâtheâauthorisationâofâtheâstateâhasâbeenâillegalâunderâColombianâlaw.âHowever,âtheâstateâacceptedââpastoralâdialoguesââwherebyâmembersâofâtheâCatholicâChurchâ(bishopsâandâpriests)âreachedâoutâtoâguerrillaâandâparamilitaryâgroupsâtoâensureâminimalâsecurityâforâcommunitiesâorâtoâmediateâtheâreleaseâofâkidnapâvictims.âTheâpastoralâdialogues,âwhichâwereâdevelopedâbyâtheâChurchâacrossâtheâcountry,âofferedâaâbackâchannelâforâengagementâandâwereâinfluentialâwithâallâgroups.
WhenâmembersâofâtheâMicoahumadoâdialogueâcommissionâinitiatedâtalksâwithâtheâELN,âtheyâwouldâaskâaâpriestâtoâaccompanyâthemâsoâtheyâcouldâbeââcoveredââbyâtheâpastoralâdialogueâprovision.âTheâpresenceâofâreligiousâleadersâduringâmomentsâofâfierceâconfrontationâbetweenâtheâELNâandâAUCâalsoâprovidedâimmediateâsecurityâtoâcommissionâmembersâ
fromâtheâarmedâactors.âFr.âdeâRouxâandâtheâDiocesesâplayedâaâcriticalâandâcoordinatedâmediationâroleâinâtheâadvancementâofâdialogueâwithâtheâELNâandâhelpedâtoâpresentâtheâcommunityâsâdemandsâclearlyâtoâtheâguerrillas.âTheyâalsoâcoordinatedâpeaceâmissionsâtoâMicoahumadoâinâFebruaryâ2003âtoâtrainâandâstrengthenâtheâassemblyâandâdialogueâcommissions,âandâwereâsupportedâbyâREDEPAZâ(theâNationalâNetworkâforâPeace).â
Nationalâorganisationsâwereâalsoâimportantâinâsupportingâandâdrawingâattentionâtoâtheâdialogueâinitiative.âTheseâincludedânationalâchurchânetworks;âhumanârightsâandâhumanitarianâgroupsâsuchâasâtheâRegionalâCorporationâforâtheâDefenceâofâHumanâRightsâ(CREDHOS),âtheâColombianâCampaignâagainstâMines,âandâtheâPopularâWomenâsâOrganisationâ(OFP);âasâwellâregionalâstateâbodiesâsuchâasâtheâOmbudsmanâOfficeâinâMagdalenaâMedio,âtheâlocalâadministrationâofâMoralesâandâtheâregionalâadministrationâofâBolivar.â
Internationalâorganisationsâprovidedâsimilarâsupportâbyâhighlightingâtheâissueâandâendorsingâtheâinitiative,âincludingâtheâInternationalâCommitteeâofâtheâRedâCrossâandâtheâUNâRefugeeâAgency.âGenevaâCall,âwhichâisâcommittedâtoâengagingânon-stateâarmedâactorsâtoâimproveâcivilianâprotectionâinâarmedâconflicts,âplayedâaâsecondaryâbutâimportantârole,âofferingâtechnicalâadviceâandâencouragingâtheâgovernmentâtoâallowâtheâprocess.âItâproposedâjointâde-miningâbyâtheâguerrillasâandâtheâarmedâforces,âwhichâtheâlatterârejected.
âAfterâaâtwo-dayâjourneyâweâmetâwithâtheâguerrillasâonâ17âDecemberâofâ2002,âunbeknownstâtoâtheâparamilitaries.âInâLaâGuĂĄsimaâtheyâsaidâtoâus:âweâwillâclearâtheâwaterâsupplyâofâmines,âweâllâletâfoodâcomeâin,âbutâwithâtheâconditionâthatâtheââparasââ[paramilitaries]âleaveâtheâcentreâofâtheâvillage.âThenâtheâsameâcommissionâdecidedâtoâtalkâtoâtheâparas.âTheâparasâdecidedâtoâacceptâInterview with a community leader, 2010
The lack of state recognitionOneâofâtheâmostâdifficultâaspectsâofâtheâde-miningâprocessâwasâtheârelationshipâbetweenâtheâleadersâofâMicoahumadoâandâtheâColombianâState.âTowardsâtheâendâofâ2003,âtheâdialogueâcommissionâtravelledâtoâBogotĂĄâtoâinformâtheâVice-PresidentâandâPeaceâCommissioner,âLuisâCarlosâRestrepo,âofâtheâharassmentâtheyâfacedâfromâtheâarmy.âTheâgovernmentârefusedâtheâcommunityâsârequestâforâofficialâsupportâbecause,âasâtheâPeaceâCommissionerâpointedâout,âtheâELNâcontinuedâtoâplantâlandminesâinâotherâareasâofâtheâcountry.
Faced with high levels of violence and insecurity, the [de-mining] process in Micoahumado was not only empowering for the population but also showed a way to build peace from below with wider social participationâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 25
TheâarmyâalsoâquestionedâtheâELNâsâcommitmentâtoâde-miningâandâraisedâdoubtsâaboutâtheâcommunityâsâimpartiality.âItâcontinuedâtoâharassâtheâpopulation.âNevertheless,âspecificâunitsâofâtheâarmyâinâtheâareaâallowedâELNâde-miningâactivitiesâasâlongâasâtheyâdidânotâundermineâmilitaryâoperations.â
Theâdirectorâofâtheânationalâlandmineâobservatoryâacknowledgedâtheâimportanceâofâtheâprocessâandâtheâneedâtoâprovideâtechnicalâsupportâforâverification,âbutâcouldânotâactâagainstâgovernmentâdecisions.âTheâstateâsâsolutionâwasâtoâprovideâunofficialâsupportâwithoutâgrantingâadministrativeâ
certificationâforâde-miningâactivities;âthisâmadeâtheâprocessâmoreâcomplexâandâdifficult,âalthoughâparadoxicallyâmoreâautonomousâandâsustainableâinâtheâlongâterm.â
Theâgovernmentâsâreactionâsuggestsâthat,âatâtheânationalâlevel,âtheâlogicâofâarmedâconflictâdeterminedâinstitutionalâdecisionsâandâunderminedâtheâabilityâofâlocalâactorsâtoâpromoteâsecurityâandâpeaceâwithinâtheirâcommunities.âTheâpotentialâroleâofâtheâstateâwasâalsoâlimitedâbyâtheâELNâsâmistrustâofâofficialâparticipationâinâtheâprocess.âTheâgroupâinsistedâonâcarryingâoutâ
NorthPacificOcean
Caribbean Sea
COLOMBIACOLOMBIA
ECUADOR
PANAMA
PERU
BRAZIL
VENEZUELA
Caracas
BogotĂĄ
Barranquilla
MedellinMedellinMedellin
Mountains of San Lucas
Magdalena Medio
Highway
CESARDEPARTMENT
SANTANDERDEPARTMENT
BOLIVAR DEPARTMENT BarrancabermejaBarrancabermeja
BarrancabermejaBarrancabermejaBarrancabermeja
BucaramangaBucaramangaBucaramanga
MoralesMoralesCESAR
DEPARTMENT
MORALES M
UN
ICIPALITY
Micoahumado
Morales Municipality
Morales MunicipalityR
io M
agda
lena
International boundary
National capital
100 200 Miles0
0 100 200 Kilometres
Magdalena Medio region
Magdalena Medio region
26 // Accord // Insight 2
theâde-miningâprocessâitselfâandâwouldânotâallowâtheâarmedâforcesâaccessâtoâtheâzone.â
Facedâwithâtheseâtensions,âtheâlocalâpopulationâinsistedâonâdescribingâtheirâinteractionsâwithâtheâELNâasââsocialâandâpastoralâdialoguesâ,âhighlightingâthatâtheirâactionsâwereâindependentâofâanyâarmedâgroupâandâsupportedâbyâtheâChurch.âInâorderâtoâavoidâofficialâandâinternationalâlanguage,âtheâcommunityâcalledâtheâprocessââsocialâandâcommunityâde-miningââinsteadâofââhumanitarianâde-miningâ.âTheirâobjectiveâwasâtoâemphasiseâaâbottom-upâprocessâthatâhadâbeenâcarriedâoutâafterâtheârefusalâofâofficialâsupport.â
Sustained impact of the Micoahumado modelInâtheâfaceâofâhighâlevelsâofâviolenceâandâinsecurity,âtheâprocessâinâMicoahumadoâwasâempoweringâforâtheâpopulationâandâdemonstratedâaâbottom-upâapproachâtoâbuildingâpeaceâwithâbroadâsocialâparticipation.âTheâcommunityâsâsocialâorganisationâ(theâPopularâConstituentâAssembly)âdevelopedâasâanâeffectiveâconflictâresolutionâmechanism.âSomeâpeaceâactivistsâhaveâcalledâtheâMicoahumadoâexperienceâaâde-miningâprocessâforââlifeâandâdevelopmentâ.âItâallowed,âforâexample,âcommunicationâandâtransportationâbetweenâdifferentâpartsâofâtheâmunicipality,âandâtheâresumptionâofâeconomicâactivityâincludingâcultivationâ
ofâagricultureâandâitsâexportâoutâofâtheâregion.âSinceâ2005âthereâhaveânotâbeenâanyâarmedâconfrontationsâinâtheâvillage.
TheâMicoahumadoâexperienceâheldâsymbolicâmeaningâforâotherâpeaceâinitiatives.âForâexample,âmembersâofâtheâMicoahumadoâcommunityâsharedâexperiencesâwithâcounterpartsâinâSamaniegoâ(inâtheâdepartmentâofâNariño),âandâsubsequently,ârepresentativesâofâSamaniegoâtravelledâtoâHavana,âCuba,âduringâexploratoryâtalksâbetweenâtheâELNâandâtheâColombianâgovernmentâtoâdiscussâtheâde-miningâofâtheirâterritories.
Keyâfactorsâinâtheâdevelopmentâandâsustenanceâofâtheâinitiativeâincludedâtheâabilityâtoâmaintainâmomentumâinâtheâmidstâofâcontinuingâarmedâconflictâandâaârefusalâtoâcompromiseâwithâarmedâactors.âTheâcommunityâalsoâlearnedâtheâimportanceâofâexternalâsupportâasâgovernmentâpolicyâprioritisedânationalâstrategicâobjectivesâoverâlocalâneeds.âTheâcommunityârequiredâtheâbackingâofâregional,ânationalâandâinternationalâorganisationsâtoâstrengthenâitsâabilityâtoânegotiateâwithâbothâgovernmentâandââillegalââarmedâgroups.âAboveâall,âitâwasâessentialâforâtheâcommunityâtoâbeâconsistentâinâitsâinteractionsâwithâdifferentâactorsâinâorderâtoâmaintainâtrustâandâlegitimacyâinâtheirâdialogues.
De-miningâisâaâkeyâissueâinâformalânegotiationâdiscussionsâinâtheâcountry.âItâhasâbeenâmadeâoneâofâtheâmainâtopicsâinâtalksâinâHavanaâbetweenâtheâFARCâandâColombianâgovernmentâasâaâwayâtoâde-escalateâtheâarmedâconfrontation.âItâisâlikelyâtoâfeatureâprominentlyâinâanyâtalksâbetweenâtheâELNâandâtheâgovernment.âColombianâcivilâsocietyâhasâbeenâvocalâinâensuringâtheâissueâisâonâtheâtableâandâhasâbeenâpushingâtoâbeâinvolvedâinâanyâde-miningâprocessâthatâtakesâplace.âWhileâde-miningâcanâactâasâaâconfidence-buildingâmeasureâbetweenâconflictâparties,âde-miningâasâaâprocessâalsoârecognisesâtheâeffectsâofâviolenceâonâtheâpopulationâandâitsâroleâinâovercomingâconflict.âTheâparticipationâofâlocalâcommunitiesâwillâbeâcrucialâtoâensureâaâpeaceâagreementâhasâbroadâsocietalâsupportâandâcanâbeâimplementedâinâpractice,âasâwellâasâtoâensureâthatâanyâpost-conflictâpeacebuildingâstrategyâisâfeasible.
The local population insisted on describing their interactions with the ELN as âsocial and pastoral dialoguesâ, highlighting that their actions were independent of any armed group and supported by the Churchâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 27
NorthernIrelandBackgroundWhenâIrelandâwasâpartitionedâinâ1921,âNorthernâIrelandâremainedâpartâofâtheâUK.âTheâProtestantâmajorityâlivingâthereâlargelyâsupportedâremainingâwithinâtheâUKâ(unionists),âwhileâtheâCatholicâminorityâlargelyâconsideredâitselfâIrish,âwithâmanyâdesiringâaâunitedâIrelandâ(nationalists).âTheâNorthernâIrelandâstateâwasâcharacterisedâbyâstructuralâsectarianâdiscriminationâandâpoliticalâmanipulationâofâelectoralâboundariesâtoâminimiseâtheânationalistâvote,âasâwellâasâdraconianââSpecialâPowersââthatâwereâusedâalmostâexclusivelyâonâtheâminorityâpopulation.
Inâtheâlateâ1960sâaâpeacefulâcivilârightsâmovementâinvolvingâbothâunionistsâandânationalistsâwasâmetâwithâviolenceâfromâpolice,âandâinâAugustâ1969âBritishâtroopsâwereâdeployedâtoâtryâtoâmaintainâcontrol.âThereâwasâalsoâaârapidâgrowthâofâparamilitaryâactivity,âincludingâtheânationalistâIrishâRepublicanâArmyâ(IRA)âandâtheâunionistâUlsterâVolunteerâForceâ(UVF)âââreferredâtoâasâârepublicanââandââloyalistâârespectivelyâtoâdistinguishâthemâfromâtheânon-violentânationalistâandâunionistâmovementsâââandâoverâtheânextâ30âyearsâNorthernâIrelandâwasâmarkedâbyârepression,âsectarianâhostilityâandâviolence.âArmedâgroupsâcommittedâappallingâviolenceâagainstâciviliansâandâtheâstateâusedâimprisonmentâwithoutâtrial,âorganisedâandâsanctionedâtortureâandâextrajudicialâexecutions.â
Loyalistâandârepublicanâparamilitaryâgroupsâannouncedâaâcessationâofâhostilitiesâinâ1994,âandâalthoughâtheâIRAâceasefireâcollapsedâinâ1996,âitâwasâreinstitutedâinâ1997.âMulti-partyâtalksâbeganâtheâsameâyear,âandâincludedâtheâpoliticalâwingâofâtheârepublicanâ
movement,âSinnâFĂ©in,âandârepresentativesâofâloyalistâarmedâgroups.âTheânegotiationsâledâtoâtheâBelfastâAgreement,âorâGoodâFridayâAgreementâasâitâisâalsoâknown,âinâ1998.âTheâagreementâdevolvedâreformâofâtheâRoyalâUlsterâConstabularyâ(RUC)âtoâanâindependentâcommission,âwhichâledâtoâhugeâchangesâinâtheâcompositionâandâoversightâofâtheânewâpoliceâbody,âtheâPoliceâServiceâofâNorthernâIrelandâ(PSNI).â
DuringâtheâconflictâtheâRUCâwasâwidelyâmistrustedâbyâbothâloyalistâandârepublicanâcommunities,âonlyâenteringârepublicanâareasâforâconflict-relatedâoperations.âBothâcommunitiesâinsteadâlookedâtoââcommunityâpolicingââbyâarmedâgroups,âwhichâreliedâheavilyâonâpunishmentâviolenceâtoâsupressâwhatâtheyâregardedâasâanti-socialâbehaviour.
Theâarticleâbelowâoffersâfirst-handâreflectionâonâcivilâsocietyâactivistsââeffortsâinâtheâ1990sâtoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâinâorderâtoâpromoteâalternativeâapproachesâtoâpunishmentâviolenceâââwhichâbecameâknownâasâcommunityârestorativeâjustice.âInitiallyâthisâwasâthroughâaâlocalânon-governmentalâorganisation,âtheâNorthernâIrelandâAssociationâforâtheâCareâandâResettlementâofâOffendersâ(NIACRO).âHowever,âwhileâloyalistsâwereâbroadlyâamenableâtoâtheâintervention,ârepublicansâwereâatâfirstâveryâreluctant.âAâcivilâsocietyâactivistâinvolvedâinâthisâprocessâexploresâhowâtheârepublicanâmovementâbecameâopenâtoârestorativeâjusticeâapproaches,âandâreflectsâonâtheâbroaderâimpactâofâtheâinitiative.
28 // Accord // Insight 2
From punishment violence to restorative justice in Northern IrelandBrian GormallyBrianâGormallyâisâdirectorâofâtheâCommitteeâonâtheâAdministrationâofâJustice,âaâhumanârightsâNGOâinâNorthernâIreland.âBeforeâthatâheâwasâDeputyâDirectorâofâtheâNorthernâIrelandâAssociationâforâtheâCareâandâResettlementâofâOffendersâ(NIACRO)âforâ25âyearsâandâanâindependentâ
consultantâworkingâmainlyâinâtheâcommunityâandâvoluntaryâsector,âspecialisingâinâjustice,âcommunityâpolicingâandâhumanârights.âHeâhasâalsoâbeenâinvolvedâinâinternationalâpeace-relatedâworkâinâSouthâAfrica,âIsrael/Palestine,âtheâBasqueâCountryâandâColombia.â
Restorative justice â a civil society perspectiveInâtheâmid-1990sâthereâwasâwidespreadââpunishmentâviolenceââinâbothârepublicanâandâloyalistâcommunitiesâinâNorthernâIreland,âevenâafterâtheâ1994âceasefires.âThisâwasâdueâto:âaâperceivedâpolicingâgap,âparticularlyâinârepublicanâcommunities;âaâdesireâbyâarmedâgroupsâtoâserveâtheâcommunityâtoâfillâthisâgap;âpressureâfromâcommunitiesâtoâdealâwithâanti-socialâbehaviourâandâmoreâseriousâcrimes;âandâaâperceptionâthatâyoungâcriminalsâwereâusedâasâinformersâbyâstateâforces,âandâthatâstateâforcesâwereâalsoâencouragingâdrugâtakingâandâdrugâdealingâasâaâcounter-insurgencyâmeasureâdesignedâtoâdestroyâcommunities.
Punishmentâviolenceârangedâfromâpublicâhumiliationâ(tarringâandâfeathering),âtoâmaimingâ(âknee-cappingââââoftenâofâmultipleâlimbs)âandâexecution.âHowever,âduringâtheâ1990s,âbothâbeforeâandâafterâtheâceasefires,âarmedâgroupsâsoughtâtoâreduceâtheirâinvolvementâinâsuchâactivities.âThisâwasâdueâtoâtheânegativeâpoliticalâimpactâofâtheâpracticeâinâspiteâofâlocalâpopularity,âtheâexposureâofâmembersâtoâpossibleâidentificationâandâarrest,âandâdistasteâwithinâtheâbroaderâranksâââincludingâtheâunitsâtaskedâwithâcarryingâoutâpunishments.
TheâNorthernâIrelandâAssociationâforâtheâCareâandâResettlementâofâOffendersâ(NIACRO),âaâmajorânon-governmentalâorganisationâsetâupâinâ1968âtoââworkâforâtheâwelfareâofâtheâoffenderââandâprovideâservicesâtoâhelpâpreventâcrimeâandârehabilitateânon-politicalâoffenders, feltâthereâwasâanâopportunityâtoâproposeâpeacefulâalternativesâtoâpunishmentâviolenceâthroughâmediationâandârestorativeâjustice.âRestorativeâjusticeârefersâtoâcommunity-basedâmeasuresâdesignedâtoâhealâtheâharmâdoneâbyâcrimeâthroughâtheâoffenderâtakingâresponsibility,âmakingâreparationâandâbeingâreintegratedâintoâtheâcommunity.âItâmustâbeâexclusivelyâpeacefulâandâvoluntary.â
Asâwellâasâreceivingâstateâmoneyâandâhavingâaâgoodâworkingârelationshipâwithâstatutoryâagencies,âNIACROâhadâaâwell-establishedâpresenceâinâmanyâlocalâcommunities,âworkingâwithâyoungâpeopleâandâarmedâgroups.âItâwasâalsoâworkingâwithâtheâfamiliesâofâimprisonedâmembersâofâpoliticalâarmedâgroupsâandâsomeâofâthoseâreleasedâonâconditionalâlicence.â
Reaching out to armed groupsOneâofâNIACROâsâprojectsâthatâbeganâinâtheâearlyâ1990s,âBaseâ2,âhelpsâthoseâunderâthreatâofâviolenceâfromâarmedâgroupsâandâmaintainsâcontactâwithâtheâgroupsâtoâestablishâtheâactualâlevelâofâthreatâtoâindividuals.âTheâprojectâoffersâaâverificationâandâmediationâserviceâtoâhelpâindividualsâremainâwithinâtheirâhomes,âorâgivesâpracticalâsupportâforâsafeârelocationâoutâofâtheâarea.âTheâassociationâthereforeâhadâaâreasonableâlevelâofâcredibilityâwithâarmedâgroupsâbyâtheâmid-1990s,âyetâalsoâhadâpositiveâlinksâwithâgovernmentâagenciesâandâofficialsâwhoâhadâaccepted,âforâexample,âthatâBaseâ2âhadâtoânegotiateâconfidentiallyâwithâarmedâgroupsâinâorderâtoâminimiseâviolence.â
Inâ1996,âasâaâwayâtoâreachâoutâtoâloyalistâgroups,âNIACROârecruitedâanâex-lifeâsentenceâprisonerâtoâconsultâwithâcommunityâactivistsâandâarmedâgroupsâinâloyalistâareasâonâanâacceptableâcommunityâalternativeâtoâpunishmentâviolence.âThereâwasânoâdirectâengagementâbetweenâNIACROâstaffâandâtheâarmedâgroups.âAâreportâoutliningâtheâoutcomeâofâtheâconsultationsâproposedâallâtheârelevantâelementsâofârestorativeâjustice,âevenâthoughâtheâtermâwasânotâinâwideâuseâinâNorthernâIrelandâatâthatâtime.âThisâprocessâeventuallyâledâtoâtheâestablishmentâofâaârestorativeâjusticeâmovementâcalledââAlternativesââinâcommunitiesâaffectedâbyâloyalistâparamilitaryâviolence.
Engagementâwithâtheârepublicanâmovementâwasâmoreâchallenging.âAnâinitialâattemptâinâ1996âcameâtoânothingâââpossiblyâbecauseâtheârepublicanâmovementâwasâunwillingâtoâcooperateâonâaâsensitiveâissueâwithâanâinitiativeâthatâhadânotâoriginatedâwithinâitsâownâranks.âHowever,âshortlyâafterâthis,âmembersâofâtheârepublicanâmovementâinitiatedâcontactâwithâindividualâNIACROâstaffâmembersâthroughâaâtrustedâintermediaryâââanâemployeeâofâNIACROâwhoâwasâanâex-combatantâandâstateâtortureâvictim.âThisâresultedâinâdirectâdialogueâbetweenâcivilâsocietyâactivistsâandârepublicansâinvolvedâinââpolicingââandâpunishmentâviolence;âseniorâmembersâofâtheâmovementâwereâkeptâinformed.â
NIACRO recruited an ex-life sentence prisoner to consult with community activists and armed groups in loyalist areas on an acceptable community alternative to punishment violenceâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 29
Thisâdialogueâinvolvedâdiscussionâonâtheââspectrumâofâlegitimacyââ(theâextentâtoâwhichâelementsâofâdueâprocessâandâproportionalityâaffectedâtheâlegitimacyâofâinformalâpunishment)âandâtrainingâinâhumanârightsâandâtheâprinciplesâofârestorativeâjustice.âItâalsoâsharedâcomparativeâlessonsâfromâotherâcontextsâââaboriginalâpopulationsâinâAustraliaâandâtheâtransitionalâprocessâinâSouthâAfrica.
TheâengagementâwithâtheârepublicanâmovementâwasâseenâtoâbeâmoreâpoliticallyâsensitiveâandâwasânotâanâofficialâNIACROâproject.âItâinvolvedâfourâcivilâsocietyâactivistsâwhoâhadâallâbeenâemployedâbyâNIACRO,âbutâatâthisâstageâoneâwasâanâacademicâandâoneâworkedâforâaâhumanârightsâNGO.âThereâwasânoâformalânegotiationâwithâtheârepublicanâmovementâaboutâwhoâshouldâbeâinvolved,âbutâthoseâwhoâdecidedâtoâparticipateâwereâknownâandâtrustedâbyâtheârepublicanâcommunitiesâfromâtheirâpreviousâwork.
Acceptabilityâdidânotâmeanâsympathyâwithâtheâaimsâorâtacticsâofâtheâmovement,âbutâthatâtheâmovementâhadâreasonableâconfidenceâthatâinformationâfromâtheâmeetingsâwouldânotâbeâpassedâtoâtheâauthoritiesâandâthatâtheâencountersâwouldânotâbeâusedâinâaâpoliticallyânegativeâway.âSectarianâidentityâwasânotânecessarilyâanâissue,âandâtheâworkâhistoriesâofâtheâindividualsâinvolvedâovercameâanyâhostility.âAlthoughâtheâindividualsâbenefittedâfromâtheârespectâNIACROâhadâbuiltâupâwithâtheârepublicanâmovement,âparticularlyâfromâtheâBaseâ2âproject,âinâtheâendâitâwasâindividualâtrustâthatâcounted.â
Aâseriesâofâweeklyâmeetingsâtookâplaceâinâareasâandâpremisesâwhereârepublicanâactivistsâfeltâsafeâandâonâhomeâground;âthisâculminatedâinâaâweekendâresidential.âAfterâaâsix-monthâsilence,âaâreportâdetailingâtheâdiscussionsâandâaâframeworkâforâfutureâworkâwasâacceptedâbyâtheârepublicanâmovementâandâpublished.âPracticalâworkâtoâestablishâanâorganisationâthatâcouldâdeliverârestorativeâpracticesâbegan,âbutâwasâfiercelyâopposedâbyâtheâgovernmentâandâtheâleadershipâofâtheâthenâRUC,âalthoughâitâwasâsupportedâbyâmid-levelâpoliceâofficersâonâtheâground.
Validating vigilantism or promoting community justice?Someâsawâtheârestorativeâjusticeâprojectâasâsanctioningâterroristsâundertakingâvigilanteâjustice;âcivilâsocietyâmembersâinvolvedâsawâitâasâlocalâcommunitiesâpractisingâpeacefulâjusticeâandâbuildingâaâpotentialâfutureâbridgeâbetweenâcommunitiesâandâtheâpolice.
Communitiesâwereâatâfirstâbemusedâbyâtheâabandonmentâofâpunitiveâresponsesâtoâcrimeâbutâquicklyâcameâtoâacceptâtheâconceptsâofârestorativeâjustice,âandâthereâwasâaâhighâlevelâofâvoluntaryâparticipation.âRepublicanâpunishmentâviolenceâdidânotâdisappearâimmediately,âalthoughâitâdidâreduceâconsiderably,âbutâitâwasâaâconditionâofâtheâcivilâsocietyâactivistsââparticipationâthatâneitherârestorativeâjusticeâmechanismsânorâanyâofâtheâpeopleâinvolvedâhadâanyâconnectionâwithâtheâviolence.
Theâprojectâbeganâtoâcooperateâwithâtheâpoliceâinâcertainâways,âespeciallyâafterâtheâ1998âagreement.âThisâhelpedâtoâdispelâsuspicionâonâbothâsidesâandâdemonstratedâtheâpracticalâbenefitsâofâcooperation,âandâthusâhelpedâpaveâtheâwayâforârepublicansâtoâformallyâsupportâtheâtheâPoliceâServiceâofâNorthernâIrelandâ(PSNI).âEventually,âtheâstateâacceptedâtheâlegitimacyâofâtheâprojects,âandâinâ2007âitâagreedâtoâcertificationâbyâtheâCriminalâJusticeâInspectionâââoneâofâtheânewâ
independentâoversightâmechanismsâestablishedâbyâtheâBelfastâAgreement.âTheârepublicansâagreedâtoâtheâdevolutionâofâpolicingâandâjusticeâpowersâtoâtheâNorthernâIrelandâAssembly.âForâbothâloyalistsâandârepublicans,âtheâprojectsâareâtodayâtheâmostâeffectiveâmethodâofâcommunicationâandâcooperationâbetweenâcommunitiesâandâpoliceâââandâtheâpoliceâareâtheirâmostâvociferousâchampions.
Broader impact and conditions for successInâtheâlongâterm,âtheâmainlyâinformalâengagementâbetweenâtheârestorativeâjusticeâprojectâandâtheâpoliceâundoubtedlyâcontributedâtoâSinnâFĂ©inâsâeventualâsupportâforâtheâPSNI.âDuringâtheâBelfastâAgreementânegotiations,âitâwasâclearâthatâpunishmentâviolenceâcouldânotâcontinueâonâaâlargeâscaleâwhileârepublicanârepresentativesâwereâclaimingâtoâbeâpursuingâaâpeacefulâwayâforward.âForâpoliticalâreasons,âtheâmovementâhadâtoâendâorâalmostâendâtheâviolence,âwhileâmaintainingâtheâclearâpublicâsupportâforâtheirâpolicingârole.
Aânumberâofâconditionsâcontributedâtoâtheâsuccessâofâtheâinitiativeâwithâtheârepublicanâmovement.âFirst,âcivilâsocietyâparticipants,âwhetherâorganisedâinâaâgroupâorânot,âbenefittedâfromâaâhistoryâofârelevantâworkâ(inâtheâcaseâofâtheâauthorâandâhisâcolleagues,âworkâwithâprisonersââfamiliesâandâex-prisoners),âaâlackâofâovertâpoliticalâinvolvementâorâperceivedâbias,âasâwellâasâlinksâtoâandâcredibilityâwithâbothâbroaderâcivilâsocietyâandâtheâstate.âTheâpeopleâinvolvedâinâtheâinitiativeâalsoâhadâsomethingâtoâofferâtheâarmedâgroup,ânamelyâaânewâperspective,âknowledge,âcontactsâandâtraining:âtheyâunderstoodâandâwereâsensitiveâtoâtheâarmedâgroupsââandâalsoâtheâstateâsâpositionsâasâcombatantsâinâaâconflict,âandâsoâcouldââtranslateââbetweenâthem.
Second,âitâhelpedâthatâtheâtrustedâintermediary,âwhoâplayedâaâkeyâroleâinâinitiatingâandâmaintainingâdialogueâbetweenâtheâarmedâgroupâandâcivilâsociety,âhadânothingâtoâproveâtoâtheâarmedâgroupâ(inâthisâcaseâbeingâanâex-prisonerâandâex-combatant),âandâhadânoâcurrentâinvolvementâinâconflictâââieâwasânotâunderâtheâdisciplineâofâtheâarmedâgroupâandâhadâdemonstratedâcredibilityâtoâtheâcivilâsocietyâorganisation.
Third,âitâisâunusualâforâsuchâengagementsâtoâbeâsuccessfulâunlessâtheâbroaderâconditionsâforâaâpeaceâprocessâareâbeginningâtoâemerge.âTheseâincluded,âinâthisâcase,âtheârecognitionâonâallâsidesâthatâmilitaryâvictoryâwasâunlikelyâifânotâimpossible,âtheâmoveâtowardsâceasefiresâbyâarmedâgroups,âsomeâprospectâforâpoliticalâparticipationâbyâex-combatants,âandâsomeâpossibilityâofâstateâreformâincludingâreformâofâpoliticalâandâsecurityâinstitutions.
Some saw the restorative justice project as sanctioning terrorists undertaking vigilante justice; civil society people involved saw it as local communities practising peaceful justice and building a potential future bridge between communities and the policeâ
â
30 // Accord // Insight 2
SyriaCivilian interaction with armed groups in the Syrian conflictWisamElhamouiandSinanal-HawatWisamâElhamouiâisâaâSyrianâcivilâsocietyâactivistâfocusingâonâemergencyâpracticeâandâconflictâtransformation.âHeâisâcurrentlyâworkingâinâGaziantep,âTurkey,âonâaâprojectâtoâempowerâlocalâemergingâgovernanceâstructuresâinânon-regimeâheldâareasâofâSyria.âHeâholdsâanâMAâinâDevelopmentâandâEmergencyâPractice.âHeâhasâwrittenâandâcontributedâtoâresearchâonâtheâSyrianâcrisis,âwithâaâfocusâonâceasefiresâandâconflictâprevention.
Sinanâal-HawatâisâaâLondon-basedâresearcherâspecialisingâinâcomplexâemergenciesâandâhumanitarianâaid.âHeâholdsâanâMScâinâDevelopmentâManagementâfromâtheâLondonâSchoolâofâEconomicsâandâPoliticalâScience,âasâwellâasâaâpostgraduateâdegreeâinâIslamicâStudiesâandâHumanitiesâfromâtheâInstituteâofâIsmailiâStudies,âLondon.â
ConflictâhasâravagedâSyriaâsinceâ2011,âwhenâPresidentâBasharâal-Assadâsâregimeârespondedâseverelyâtoânationwideâpro-democracyâdemonstrations.âSomeâprotestorsâbeganâtoâtakeâupâarmsâtoâdefendâthemselvesâand,âasâfightingâescalated,âtheâcountryâdescendedâintoâcivilâwar.âTheâpeacefulâprotestâmovementâwasâoverwhelmedâbyâviolentâencountersâbetweenâtheâSyrianâregimeâandâitsâloyalâmilitias,âandâforcesâopposedâtoâAssadâsârule.âCiviliansâandâcivilâsocietyâgroupsâhaveâsinceâstruggledâtoârepresentâtheirâviewsâandâinterestsâinâtheâfaceâofâmultipleâarmedâfactions.
Theâarmedârebellionâhasâevolvedâsignificantlyâsinceâlateâ2011.âInitially,âtheâFreeâSyrianâArmyâ(FSA),âaâlooseâcoalitionâofâarmedâanti-regimeâgroups,âplayedâaâprominentâroleâinâmilitaryâoperations.âToday,âaâproliferationâofâindependentâarmedâgroupsâwithâdistinctâmodesâofâorganisationâandâstatedâgoalsâareâfightingâinâSyria,âestimatedâatâupâtoâ1,000,âincludingâlocalâremnantsâofâtheâFSA,âumbrellaâgroupsâsuchâasâtheâIslamicâFrontâandâtheâSyrianâIslamicâLiberationâFront,ââjihadistââgroupsâincludingâIslamicâStateâ(IS)âandâJabhatâal-Nusraâ(JN),âasâwellâasâKurdishâmilitaryâfactions.âAllâshareâtheâgoalâofâremovingâAssad,âbutâalsoârepresentâaâdiversityâofâotherâobjectivesâandâmotivations.
TheâconflictâhasâfurtherâacquiredâsectarianâdimensionsâbetweenâMuslimâSunniâandâShia/Alawiteâsects.âSunniâjihadistâgroups,âISâinâparticular,âhaveâprovedâformidableâinâtheirâabilityâtoâmobiliseâresourcesâandâcontrolâhugeâswathesâofâterritory,âalbeitâthroughâtheâuseâofâbrutalâtactics.âTheâSyrianâObservatoryâforâHumanâRightsâhasâestimatedâthatâoverâ200,000âpeopleâhaveâdiedâinâtheâwarâasâofâDecemberâ2014,âwithâmoreâthenâthreeâmillionârefugeesâfloodingâtheâregionâandâoverâsevenâmillionâpeopleâinternallyâdisplaced.
Oneâofâtheâmostâsignificantâdevelopmentsâofâtheâconflictâhasâbeenâtheâemergenceâofâareasâthatâlieâoutsideâregimeâcontrolâââoftenâreferredâtoâasâliberatedâareas.âInâtheâabsenceâofâtheâstate,âdifferentâactors,âarmedâandâunarmed,âliveâinâtheâsameâspace;âtheyâcooperate,âcoexistâorâcompeteâtoâfillâtheâvacuum.
Thisâarticleâlooksâatâhowâciviliansâinteractâwithâarmedâgroups,âincludingâthroughâinformalâchannelsâandâmoreâorganisedâcivilâsocietyâgroups,âandâtheâfactorsâthatâaffectâthisâinteraction.âItâfocusesâonâareasâwhereâtheâabsenceâofâtheâregimeâhasâallowedâparticularâarmedâgroupsâtoâemergeâasâtheâsoleâmilitaryâpower.âItâexcludesâareasâcontrolledâbyâKurdishâmilitaryâfactions,âwhichâareâbeyondâtheâlimitsâofâthisâarticle.âNorâdoesâtheâarticleâcoverâregime-heldâareas,âwhereâtheâstate,âalthoughâweakenedâandâchallengedâbyâautonomousâlocalâdefenceâgroups,âisâstillâableâtoâcontrolâcivilianâlifeâtoâaâlargeâextentâusingâpoliceâforcesâandâmilitiasâfundedâbyâandâloyalâtoâtheâregime.
TheâcaseâstudyâincludesâinformationâfromâinterviewsâwithâactivistsâinâSyriaâââinâtheâcitiesâofâDaraaâandâHoms,âandâtheâDamascusâdistrictsâofâYarmoukâcampâandâBarzehâââandâresearchersâoutsideâSyria,âasâwellâasâtheâauthorsââownâexperienceâofâworkingâonâhumanitarianâandâpeacebuildingâresponsesâtoâtheâSyriaâconflict.
Theâcompositionâofâtheâarticleâdistinguishesâfourâareasâofârelationshipâbetweenâarmedâgroupsâandâcommunities.âTheseâhelpâtoâidentifyâgeneralâobservableâtrendsâbasedâonâavailableâdata,âalthoughâinârealityâofâcourseâtheyâinter-connectâandâoverlap.âTheâarticleâlooksâfirstâatâhowâstructuredâcivilianâorganisation,âincludingâadministrativeâcouncilsâinâliberatedâareas,âhaveâinâsomeâinstancesâdevelopedârelationsâwithâarmedâgroups.âSecond,âitâexploresâcontextsâinâwhichâcivilianâ
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 31
organisationâhasâbeenâlessâestablished,âyetâmodesâofâinformalâorganisationâhaveâdevelopedâtoâpressureâarmedâgroups.âThird,âitâidentifiesâsomeâspecificâfactorsâthatâinfluenceâinteractionâbetweenâciviliansâandâarmedâgroups,âsuchâasâpersonalâlinks.âFourth,âitâreflectsâonâtheâimpactâofâtheâchangingânatureâofâtheâconflictâandâshiftsâinâtheâtypologyâofâtheâarmedâgroups.
Armed groups, civilian organisation and local legitimacyAfterâdecadesâofâoppression,âcivilâactivismâemergedâinâtheâpublicâspaceâinâSyriaâinâ2011.âAtâtheâstartâofâtheâuprising,âactivistâgroupsâdevelopedâintoâLocalâCoordinationâCommitteesâ(LCCs)âasâplatformsâforâmobilisingâandâcoordinatingâprotestsâandâcampaigning.âAsâareasâwereâliberatedâfromâregimeâcontrolâtheâsubsequentâgovernanceâvacuumâwasâfilledâbyâaâmultitudeâofâactors,âbothâarmedâandâcivilian.âArmedâgroupsâcontinuedâtoâfightâtheâregimeâandâholdâterritory,âandâprovideâsecurityâandâprotectionâtoâtheâpopulation.âCivilianâactors,âincludingâLCCsâwhereâpresent,âtookâonâresponsibilityâforâdeliveringâservices,âandâprovidingâaidâandâadministration.â
Theâintensificationâofâtheâarmedâconflictâsawâmanyâcivilianâstructuresâdismantled;âsomeâwereârestructuredâandâonlyâaâfewâsurvived.âSyrianâcivilâsocietyâhasâbeenâthroughâmanyâchangesâandâfacedâmanyâconstraints,âasâRanaâKhalafâdocumentedâinâ2014.âAndâasâDoreenâKhouryâ(Accordâ25,â2014)âhasâmappedâout,ânewâcivilâsocietyâgroupsâemergedâinânon-regimeâcontrolledâareas,âmostânotablyâLocalâAdministrativeâCouncilsâ(LACs)âthatâprovidedâgovernanceâfunctionsâinâruralâregions.â
ResearchâbyâtheâCentreâforâHumanitarianâDialogueâpublishedâinâ2014âshowedâhowâmostâSyrianâanti-regimeâarmedâfactionsâacknowledgeâtheâneedâtoâmaintainâpopularâsupportâforâtheâuprising.âTheyâcooperateâwithâlocalâcouncilsâandâencourageâtheirâcreation,âandâalsoâmaintainâvestedâinterestsâinâtheirâstructure,âespeciallyâtheirâwelfareâfunction.âLACsâwereâofficiallyâacknowledgedâbyâtheâNationalâCoalitionâforâSyrianâRevolutionaryâandâOppositionâForces,âaâcoalitionâofâoppositionâgroupsâcreatedâinâNovemberâ2012.âInâ2014,âtheâoppositionâgovernmentâestimatedâthereâwereâoverâ750âLACsâinâliberatedâareas.
Manyâcivilâsocietyâgroupsâuseâtheâlegitimacyâgainedâfromâtheirâadministrative,âgovernanceâandâserviceâdeliveryâfunctionâtoâengageâarmedâgroups.âForâexample,âactivistâgroupsâinâYarmouk,âDamascus,âhaveâsinceâtheâarrivalâinâtheirâneighbourhoodâofâarmedâgroupsâinâsummerâ2012âââtheâFSAâandâtheâDemocraticâLiberationâFrontâofâPalestineâ(DFLP)âââusedâtheirâactivistâheritageâtoâbecomeâaâreferenceâpointâforâciviliansâtoâcontactâlocalâarmedâgroups.âSimilarly,âinâAleppo,âsomeâcivilâactivistsâexplainâtheirâgoodârelationshipâwithâcertainâarmedâgroupsâbyâtheâcamaraderieâthatâhadâbroughtâthemâtogetherâpriorâtoâemergenceâofâtheâarmedârebellion,âatâtheâtimeâwhenâtheâregimeâwasâsystematicallyârepressingâhumanârightsâactivists.
LACsâhaveâderivedâlegitimacyâfromâbasicâdemocraticâtoolsâsuchâasâpublicâreasoningâandâelectionsâasâwellâasâthroughâconsensusâamongstâinfluentialâcommunityâactors.âFundingâfromâforeignâdonorsâforâLACsâthatâdeliverâservicesâandâhumanitarianâaidâinâtheirâlocalâareasâisâoftenâconditionalâonâtheirâindependenceâfromâanyâarmedâgroups.âOneâofâourâintervieweesâdescribesâhow:ââarmedâgroupsâunderstandâthis;âandâtheyâknowâthatâtheyâwillâfaceâoppositionâfromâtheâlocalâpopulationâifâtheyâinterfereâinâtheâworkâofâLACsâ.âCivilâsocietyâgroupsâthatâdoânotâdeliverâservicesâareâmoreâvulnerableâtoâarmedâgroupâinterference.
InâBarzeh,ârelationshipsâthatâwereâchannelledâthroughâtheâneighbourhoodâcommitteeâwereâmoreâeffectiveâthanâdirectâinteractionâbetweenâciviliansâandâlocalâFSAâbrigades.âThisâisâbecauseâtheâneighbourhoodâcommitteeâwasâformedâthroughâanâagreementâbetweenâlocalâarmedâgroupsâandâlocalâcivilians.âItâwasâheadedâbyârepresentativesâofâlocalâkatibasâ
Many civil society groups use the legitimacy gained from their administrative, governance and service delivery function to engage armed groupsâ
â
Members of the Free Syrian Army join demonstrators during a protest against Syriaâs President Bashar al-Assad in Maraa, near Aleppo, 21 September 2012 // © REUTERS/Shaam News Network/Handout
32 // Accord // Insight 2
(fightingâunits)âandâciviliansâ(suchâasâdoctorsâandâlawyers),âandâwasâconsequentlyâgivenâexecutiveâpowersâthatâallâpartiesâcommittedâtoârespect.âAsâTurkmaniâetâalâ(2014)âdescribe,âtheâReconciliationâCommitteeâplayedâanâimportantâroleâinârepresentingâlocalâarmedâgroupsâandâactivistsâinâBarzehâinânegotiatingâaâceasefireâwithâtheâregimeâinâearlyâJanuaryâ2014.
InâSaraqeb,âaâpredominantlyâSunniâpopulatedâcityâofâ30,000âinâIdlibâGovernorate,ârevolutionaryâactivistsâandâarmedâgroupsâcooperatedâtoâformâlegislativeâandâadministrativeâbodies.âAnâexampleâisâtheâRevolutionaryâFront,âanâallianceâformedâinâDecemberâ2013âbyâFSAâbrigadesâandânowâoneâofâtheâstrongestâlocalâarmedâgroupsâinâSaraqeb,âwhichâhasâworkedâwithâactivistâgroupsâandâtheâLACâtoâsetâupâanâindependentâcivilâjudiciaryâbody.âThisâwasâaâsharedâeffortâtoâlimitâviolationsâbyâsecurityâbrigadesâoperatingâinâtheâarea.â
Informal civilian interaction with armed groupsInâmanyâinstances,âcooperationâisânotâfeasibleâandârelationsâbetweenâciviliansâandâarmedâgroupsâareâmoreâconfrontational.âSinceâMarchâ2014,âtheâIslamicâCouncilâforâtheâAdministrationâofâLiberatedâAreas,âbackedâbyâJNâandâtheâIslamicâFront,âhasâendeavouredâtoâestablishâlocalâIslamicâcouncilsâinâorderâtoâchallengeâtheâroleâofâindependentâLACs.â
InâareasâunderâISârule,âcivilianâlifeâ(relief,âeducation,âjustice,âandâbehaviourâinâpublicâspaces)âisâunderâstrictâcontrol.âDespiteâlimitedâvenuesâforâexpression,âlackâofâprotectionâandâfearâofâretribution,âciviliansâactivelyâengageâinâcampaigningâandâmobilisationâtoâcounterâtheâcontrolâofâarmedâgroupsâandâtoâvoiceâtheirâconcerns.âThereâareânumerousâexamplesâofâciviliansâandâactivistsâreplicatingâtheâsameânon-violentâtechniquesâinânon-regime-controlledâareasâthatâhadâpreviouslyâbeenâusedâagainstâtheâregime,âincludingâprotests,âleaflets,âgraffitiâorâdisobedience.
InâtheâbesiegedâgovernorateâofâRifâDimashq,âcommunitiesâhaveâbecomeâfrustratedâwithâtheâconductâofâJayshâal-Islam,âtheâdominantâlocalâarmedâgroup.âTheâgroup,âwhichâisâpartâofâtheâIslamicâFrontâandâisâmadeâupâofâlocalâfighters,âemergedâinâ2011âandâbecameâanâumbrellaâforâaânumberâofâfactionsâinâtheâarea.âCommunities,âprotestingâagainstâtheâstockpilingâofâfoodâreservesâwhileâpeopleâstarved,âbrokeâintoâfoodâstores.âInâMaaretâal-Numanâ(IdlibâGovernorate),âciviliansâprotestedâagainstâJNâinterferenceâinâtheirâdailyâlives,âsuchâasâimposingâdressâcodesâforâwomenâandâschoolgirls.âJNârespondedâbyâlooseningârestrictions.âInâanotherâcaseâinâAleppo,âaâhighâprofileâactivistâwasâarrestedâafterârefusingâtoâwearâhijabâasârequestedâbyâaâlocalâarmedâgroup.âAânetworkâofâactivistsâreachedâoutâtoâpoliticalâbodiesâandâdonorsâsupportingâandâfundingâtheâgroup.â
Theâactivistâwasâreleasedâafterâtheâgroupâwasâwarnedâitâwouldâloseâitsâfunding.â
However,âdespiteâtheâabundanceâofâcasesâofâextremeâviolenceâagainstâciviliansâbyâarmedâgroups,âandâtheâeffortsâthatâcivilâactivistsâinvestâinâhighlightingâtheirâcause,âtheseâstoriesârarelyâgainâinterestâorâsupportâfromâinternationalâactivists,âinternationalânon-governmentalâorganisations,âdonorsâorâpoliticians.âAnâexceptionâisâtheâcaseâofâRazanâZaytouneh,âco-founderâofâtheâLCCs,âwhichâhasâgeneratedâwiderâattention.âRazanâandâthreeâotherâcivilâactivistsâwereâabductedâinâDoumaâ(anâeasternâsuburbâofâDamascus)âinâDecemberâ2013âbyâmembersâofâaâlocalâIslamistâmilitia,âandâremainâinâcaptivity.
Personal relationsPersonalâlinks,âsuchâasâthoseâderivingâfromâkinship,âtribalâaffiliationâandâsolidarityâbetweenâfriendsâandâneighbours,âplayâaâkeyâroleâinâhowâcommunitiesâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroups.âWhetherâarmedâgroupsâandâciviliansâareâfromâtheâsameâlocalityâisâofâparticularâââoftenâparamountâââimportanceâinârelationâtoâtheirâinteraction,âbuildingâonâexistingâsocialâcapitalâandâencouragingâtheâdevelopmentâofânetworksâforâciviliansâandâarmedâgroupsâtoâtrustâeachâotherâandâworkâtogether.
Thisâisâespeciallyâtheâcaseâinâurbanâcentres.âTheâBarzehâdistrictâofâDamascus,âwithâaâpopulationâofâ50,000,âhasâbeenâunderâaâregimeâblockadeâsinceâspringâ2013.âTheâFSAâunitâcontrollingâtheâareaâisâmadeâupâofâfightersâfromâtheâneighbourhoodâandâitâhasâpositiveârelationsâwithâlocalâciviliansâthatâareâmoreâsignificantâthanâbloodâties;âtheâFSAâhasâbeenâresponsiveâtoâcivilianâinfluenceâandâinterests.âPressureâfromâmembersâofâtheâBarzehâpopulationâwhoâhadâbeenâdisplacedâtoâtheârestâofâDamascusâandâwantedâtoâreturnâhomeâwasâaâkeyâreasonâwhyâFSAâfightersâstruckâaâceasefireâdealâwithâtheâSyrianâarmyâinâJanuaryâ2014.âTheâinfluxâofâreturneesâmadeâtheâceasefireâirreversibleâââanyâmilitaryâactionâwouldâcauseâlargeânumberâofâcasualtiesâandâaânewâdisplacementâcrisisâforâBarzehâlocals.â
Solidarityâfromâsharedâexperiencesâduringâinitialâphasesâofâtheâuprisingâfurtherâstrengthensâlinksâbasedâonâlocality.âInâAleppo,âcivilâactivistsâexplainâthatâtheirâgoodârelationsâwithâarmedâgroupsâdevelopedâfromâsolidarityâpriorâtoâtheâarmedârebellion,âwhenâtheâregimeâhadâsystematicallyârepressedâhumanârightsâactivists.â
Tribes,âandâlargeâfamilyânetworksâinâruralâareasâincludingâruralâAleppoâandâIdlib,âassertâaâhierarchicalâstructure,âwhichâemphasiseâtheâimportanceâof,âandârespectâfor,ânotablesâandâsocialâleaders.âTheyâalsoâpromoteâsolidarityâandâcohesionâasâessentialâforâtheirâsurvival.âTribalâconnectionsâextendâtoâcities.â
Despite limited venues for expression, lack of protection and fear of retribution, civilians actively engage in campaigning and mobilisation to counter the control of armed groups and to voice their concernsâ
â
In Aleppo, civil activists explain that their good relations with armed groups developed from solidarity prior to the armed rebellion, when the regime had systematically repressed human rights activistsâ
â
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 33
InâHoms,âoneâintervieweeâexplainedâthatâinâareasâunderâFSAâcontrolâciviliansâhaveâtriedâtoâinfluenceâtheâextentâofâfightingâinâtheirâlocality,âandâinâsomeâcasesâhaveâpreventedâfamilyâmembersâfromâfightingâinâtheirâareas.â
ForâLACs,âtribalâandâfamilialârelationsâhaveâbeenârelevantâwhereâsuchârelationshipsâareâhighlyâvaluedâandârespected,âsuchâasâruralâandâtribalâcommunities.âMembershipâofâlocalâleadersâinâtheâLACâplaysâanâimportantâroleâinâaffectingâand,âifâneeded,âpressuringâlocalâarmedâgroups.âInâruralâDaraa,âforâexample,âtheâtribalâaffiliationsâofâmembersâofâLACsâandâShuraâ(consultative)âcouncilsâareâusedâtoâinfluenceâlocalâarmedâgroups.âThisâroleâisânotâlimitedâtoâLACs,âbutâtoâanyâcivilâbodyâthatâincludesâcommunityâleaders,âsuchâasâtheâCouncilâofâWiseâMenâinâruralâIdlib.â
Theânegativeâsideâofâsuchâorganicâsolidarityâisâthatâlocalâcommunitiesâpayâaâhighâpriceâforâsupportingâtheirâlocalâarmedâgroup.âAfterâtwoâyearsâofâanâintensiveâarmyâsiegeâofâHoms,âtheâcityâcentreâwasâcompletelyâdestroyedâandâmoreâthanâ2,200â
citizensâlostâtheirâlives.âWhenâdefeatedâFSAâfightersâandâIslamicâbrigadesâagreedâtoâleaveâtheâBabââAmrâdistrictâofâHomsâinâJuneâ2014,âmostâciviliansâfledâtheâcityâinâfearâofâarmyâreprisals.â
Personalâandâcompetitiveâagendasâcanâalsoâemergeâinâconflictâcontexts,âwhichâcanâundermineâsocialâandâculturalâstructuresâthatâsupportâcommunityâcohesion.âInâBarzeh,âanâintervieweeâexplainedâhowâilliterateâfightersâfindâinâwarâanâopportunityâtoâgainâinfluenceâandârespect,âasâwellâasâearnâaâliving.âTheâpossessionâofâarmsâprovidesâthemâwithâpowerâthatâmightânotâbeâaccessibleâtoâthemâotherwise.âThisâweakensâtheâinfluenceâofâpersonalârelationshipsâandâkinships.âInâManbij,âAleppoâGovernorate,âarmedâfactionsâfromâoutsideâtheâregionâaccusedâtheâlocalâcouncilâofâsupportingâtheâregime,âcausingâitâtoâloseâlegitimacy,âandâafterwardsâtookâtheâopportunityâtoâreplaceâitâwithâaâsubmissiveâSharia (Islamicâlaws)âcommitteeâinâNovemberâ2013.â
JORDAN
LEBANON
ISRAEL
SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA
AleppoAleppo
DamascusDamascus
Homs
Yarmouk Refugee Camp
DaraaDaraa
Amman
Antioch
LatakiaAr-Raqqah
HomsGovernorate
Rif DimashqGovernorate
As-SuwaydaGovernorate
DaraaGovernorate
QuneitraGovernorate
TartusGovernorate
Al-HasakahGovernorateAl-HasakahGovernorate
LatakiaGovernorate
Hama Governorate
AleppoGovernorate
Ar-RaqqahGovernorate
Deir ez-ZorGovernorateDeir ez-ZorGovernorate
IdlibGovern-orate
QabunBarzehBarzeh
Jobar ZamalkaZamalka
IrbinIrbin
OldCityOldCity
QazzazQazzaz
TadamonYarmoukCamp
TadamonYarmoukCamp
Nahr Aisha
Kfar SousaKfar SousaMidanMidan
University
City
University
City
DAMASCUS
JORDAN
IRAQ
TURKEYTURKEY
SAUDI ARABIA
WestBankWestBank
BeirutLEBANON
ISRAEL
Amman
Tigris
EuphratesAdana
Gaziantep
Diyarbakir
SinjarMosul
Hadithah
Palmyra
0 100 Miles
0
50
50 100 Kilometres
International boundary
National capital
34 // Accord // Insight 2
Theâstrategicâconflictâprioritiesâofâarmedâgroupsâcanâalsoâreduceâtheâinfluenceâofâpersonalârelations.âWhereâmilitantsâpossessâtheâupperâhandâmilitarily,âpersonalâlinksâareâsupersededâinâfavourâofâmilitaryânecessity.âInâtheâlongâterm,âthisâdamagesâtheâsocialâbondsâthatâpreviouslyâallowedâciviliansâtoâresistâorâsupportâoppositionâgroups.âSeveralâintervieweesâexplainedâhowâduringâtruceâperiods,âcivilianâneighbourhoodâcommitteesâconsistingâofârespectedâneighbourhoodâindividualsâhaveâbeenâableâtoâinfluenceâmilitiaâdecisionsâthroughâtraditionalâleadershipâorâadâhocâelectedâauthority.âHowever,âduringâperiodsâofâintenseâfightingâwar,âarmedâgroupâactionsâareâdeterminedâbyâconflictâpriorities.
Civilian interaction and the changing nature of Syrian armed groups TheâarmedâmovementâinâSyriaâstartedâwithâsmall,âlocalâandâlooselyâorganisedâgroupsâthatâwereâlargelyâcomposedâofâlocalâfightersâandâdependentâonâtheâsupportâofâtheirâcommunities.âTheâintensificationâofâfightingâandâtheâneedâofâarmedâgroupsâtoâincreaseâtheirâcapabilitiesâinâorderâtoâsustainâresistanceâtoâtheâregimeâandâgainâorâmaintainâterritoryâcreatedâdemandâforâlargerâandâmoreâorganisedâfightingâformations.âTheâavailabilityâofâresources,âaccessâtoâfundingâandâweapons,âandâclarityâofâorganisationâandâchainâofâcommand,âallâplayedâessentialârolesâinâcreatingâtheâlargerâarmedâgroupsâprevalentâtoday.
Clarityâofâmilitaryâgoals,âpoliticalâvision,âorââideologyâ,âaffectâarmedâgroupsââcoherenceâandâorganisation,âtheirâabilityâtoâmobiliseâandârecruitâlike-mindedâindividuals,âandâtheirâlegitimacyâamongâpopulationsâinâterritoriesâtheyâmeanâtoâliberateâfromâregimeârule.âGroupsâthatâdidânotâadoptâaâpoliticalâprogrammeâfailedâtoâattractâforeignâfundingâearmarkedârespectivelyâforâeitherââdemocraticââ(pro-Western)âorââIslamistââgroups,âandâconsequentlyâlackedâtheâresourcesâtoâachieveâmilitaryâprogress.âTheâdiscourseâofâdemocracy,âcitizenshipâandâtheâruleâofâlawâheldâbyâsomeâarmedâgroupsâlinkedâtoâtheâFSAâinâtheâinitialâstagesâofâtheâSyrianâuprisingâwasâsoonâweakenedâbyâtheâparalysisâofâWesternâpowersâandâinterferenceâfromâregionalâstatesâwithâtheirâownâgeo-politicalâinterests.â
Inâ2015,ââIslamistââideologyâisâtheâmostâprominentâdogmaâamongstâarmedâgroupsâinâSyria.âTheâlargestâanti-regimeâarmedâgroupsâandâformationsâcurrentlyâinâSyriaâincludeâJN,âJayshâal-Islam,âal-Jabhaâal-Shamia,âJayshâal-MujahideenâandâIS.âTheseâgroupsâclaimâtoâbeâgovernedâbyâspecificâvariationsâofâ(Sunni)âIslam.âTheyâoftenâtryâtoâimposeâtheirâconvictionsâonâcommunitiesâaroundâthem,âincludingâbyâsettingâupâreligiousâcourtsâandâcommittees.âCivilianâreactionâtoâthisâvariesâdependingâonâtheâcontext,âbutâcommunitiesâthatâtryâtoâinfluenceâarmedâgroupsâwillâmakeâreferenceâtoâtheâsameâreligiousâcorpusâtoâcounterâorârejectâaârulingâofâaâcourtâorâcommittee.âForâexample,âaâcommunityâinâruralâIdlib,âoutragedâbyâJNâsâstoningâofâaâwomanâaccusedâofâcommittingâadulteryâinâlateâ2014,âusedâreligiousâsourcesâtoâprovideââevidenceââthatâtheâstoningâwasââun-Islamicâ.âOneâinterviewee,âwhoâopposesâJNâsâviews,âcommentedâthat,ââweâhaveâtoâuseâtheâsameâlanguageâtheyâ[JN]âuseâ.â
Manyâpeopleâbelieveâitâisânotâpossibleâtoâdefyâideologiesâoutsideâofâthisâframework.âGroupsâlikeâISâandâJNâimposeâaâradicalâandâexclusiveâimplementationâofâShariaâinâregionsâandâcitiesâtheyâruleâover,âsuchâasâAr-RaqqahâandâDeirâez-ZorâGovernorate.âEvenâsomeâhumanârightsâactivistsâorâsecularistsâhaveâresortedâtoâargumentsâfromâtheâsameâideology,âalthoughâthisâcanâbeâ
problematicâasâitâlimitsâtheirâcapacityâtoâcontradictâorâcondemnâviolationsâandâimpositionsâperpetratedâbyâarmedâgroups.â
Inevitably,âarmedâgroupsâthatâhaveâadoptedâanâIslamistâideologyâareâlessâaccountableâtoâtheâcommunity.âAnâactivistâfromâYarmoukâquotedâaâresponseâheâwasâofferedâfromâaâlocalâarmedâgroup:ââOurâroleâisâtoâraiseâtheâwordâofâGod.âThisâisâmoreâimportantâthanâhumanâlife.ââTheâactivistâsubsequentlyâhadâtoâleaveâYarmoukâtoâevadeâpersecution.
Theâmajorityâofânon-SunniâcommunitiesâlivingâinâareasâunderâtheâcontrolâofâIslamistâgroupsâhaveâfacedâsevereâtreatment.âForâexample,âinâJanuaryâ2015,âreligiousâminorityâDruzeâcommunitiesâfromâ14âvillagesâaroundâIdlibâwereâforcedâbyâaâJNâEmirâtoâdemolishâtheirâshrinesâandârenounceâtheirâfaith.âCiviliansâfromâtheseâcommunitiesâusuallyâlackâtheâcapacityâtoâengageâwithâIslamistâarmedâgroups,âwhichâoftenâleadsâtoâtheirâdisplacementâorâphysicalâharm.âSimilarly,âactivistsâthatâdoânotâconformâtoâtheâviewsâofâIslamistâarmedâgroups,âsuchâasâthoseâwhoâareâopenlyâsecularist,âpro-freedomâorâpro-democracy,âhaveâalsoâbeenâforcedâtoâflee.
ConclusionAsâtheâconflictâmapâinâSyriaâgrowsâincreasinglyâcomplex,âitâwouldâbeâwrongâtoâassumeâthatâciviliansâareâalwaysâcapableâofâengagingâarmedâgroupsâinâdialogueâorâresistingâtheirâdemands.âInâtheâfaceâofâextremeâandâsustainedâviolence,âSyrianâpopulationsâhaveâundoubtedlyâstruggledâtoâassertâtheirâpeacebuildingâagencyâtoâinfluenceâconflictâdynamicsâandâtheâbehaviourâofâarmedâactors.â
Theâmostâsignificantâchannelsâremainâkinship,âlocalâandâsocialârelations.âCivilâsocietyâactivistsâhaveâalsoâdevelopedâinfluentialârelationshipsâwithâarmedâgroupsâhavingâpreviouslyâorganisedâandâparticipatedâinâanti-regimeâprotestsâtogether.âThisâhelpsâthemâtoâmediateâbetweenâciviliansâandâarmedâgroups.âAtâtheâpoliticalâlevel,âactivistsâhaveâalsoâbeenâinvolvedâinâseveralâlocalâceasefireâagreementsâconcludedâbetweenâanti-regimeâgroupsâandâregimeâforces.
Theâtacticsâofânon-violentâresistanceâusedâagainstâtheâregime,âincludingâorganisingâprotests,âcampaigns,âandâgeneralâcivilâdisobedience,âhaveâbeenâadaptedâtoâengageâwithâarmedâgroupsâwithâvaryingâsuccess.âRelationshipsâbetweenâcommunitiesâandâIslamistâarmedâgroupsâareâparticularlyâcomplicated.âInâmostâcases,âciviliansâdoânotâhaveâstrongâcounter-argumentsâtoâSharia-basedârulingsâtoânegotiateâtheirâpositions.âItâisâalsoâimportantâtoâassistâciviliansââpeaceâeffortsâbyâpressuringâstatesâandâdonorsâthatâsupportâSyrianâarmedâgroupsâtoâinâturnâcompelâgroupsâtoâstopâencroachingâonâcivilianâspace.â
AsâtheâSyrianâconflictâentersâitsâfifthâyear,âitâisâimportantânotâtoâloseâsightâofâtheâsignificantârolesâplayedâbyâunarmed,ânon-stateâactorsâtoâdevelopâstructuresâforâpromotingâlocalâsecurityâandâpeace,âandâtoâadaptâtoâtheâconstantlyâchangingâdemandsâofâtheâconflict.âHugeâeffortsâhaveâbeenâinvestedâinâmaintainingâaâcivilianâvoiceâbyâactivistsâandâlocals.âTheyâhaveâshownâcourageâandâresilienceâandâanâincredibleâcapacityâtoâsustainâtheirâeffortsâandâaspirationsâdespiteâhugeâchallengesâandâlackâofâsupport.
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 35
KeytextsGeneral
15âOctoberâ1999.âUNSCRâ1267âestablishingâaâsanctionsâregimeâtoâcoverâindividualsâandâentitiesâassociatedâwithâAl-Qaida,âOsamaâbinâLadenâand/orâtheâTalibanâwhereverâlocatedâwww.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1267(1999)
21âJuneâ2010.âTheâUSâSupremeâCourtârulingâofâHolderâvâHumanitarianâLawâProjectâwww.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf
25âJuneâ2012.âUNâSecretary-GeneralâsâReportâA/66/811,âStrengtheningâtheâroleâofâmediationâinâtheâpeacefulâsettlementâofâdisputes,âconflictâpreventionâandâresolutionâwww.goo.gl/1oTqKj
Northern Ireland
7âAprilâ1922.âCivilâAuthoritiesâ(SpecialâPowers)âActâ(NorthernâIreland)â1922âwww.goo.gl/JHeDwA
10âAprilâ1998.âTheâBelfastâAgreementâwww.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement
Northern Uganda
17âJanuaryâ2000.âGovernmentâofâUganda,âTheâAmnestyâAct,â2000âwww.goo.gl/PSens6
2006-2008.âAgendaâitemsâofâtheâJubaâtalksâbetweenâtheâGovernmentâofâUgandaâ(GoU)âandâtheâLordâsâResistanceâArmyâ(LRA)âwww.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements.php
5âNovemberâ2008.âDeclarationâofâtheâStakeholdersââConsultationâonâtheâJubaâPeaceâProcess,âMunyonyo,âKampalaâwww.goo.gl/Icrb6m
26âMarchâ2015â(updated).âCaseâinformationâsheetâforâICC-02/04-01/05:âTheâProsecutorâv.âJosephâKony,âVincentâOttiâandâOkotâOdhiamboâwww.goo.gl/zs9OOk
Furtherreading General
Arjona,âAna.âCivilianâresistanceâtoârebelâgovernance.âHouseholdsâinâConflictâNetworkâWorkingâPaperâ170,âFebruaryâ2014
BerghofâPeaceâSupportâandâConciliationâResources.âMediatingâpeaceâwithâproscribedâarmedâgroups:âPolicyâworkshopâreportâonâtheâimplicationsâofâEuropeanâUnionâ(EU)âcounter-terrorismâlegislationâforâmediationâandâsupportâforâpeaceâprocesses,â2011
ConciliationâResources.âAccord 25: Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consentâ(London:âConciliationâResources,â2014)
ConciliationâResources.âAccord 22:âPaixâsansâfrontiĂšres:âbuilding peace across bordersâ(London:âConciliationâResources,â2011)
ConciliationâResources.âAccordâInsightâII:âLocalâcivilâsocietyâengagementâofânon-stateâarmedâgroups.âJointâanalysisâworkshopâreport,âLondon,âNovemberâ2013
ConciliationâResources.âAccord 16: Choosing to engage: Armed groups and peace processes.â(London:âConciliationâResources,â2005)
ConciliationâResources.âEngagingâarmedâgroupsâinâpeaceâprocesses.âJointâanalysisâworkshopâreport,âLondon,âJulyâ2004
DCAFâ&âGenevaâCall.âArmedânon-stateâactors:âCurrentâtrendsâ&âfutureâchallenges.âDCAFâHorizonâ2015âWorkingâPaperâNo.â5,â2011
deâGoede,âMereike.ââBlacklistingâandâtheâban:âContestingâtargetedâsanctionsâinâEuropeâ,âSecurity DialogueâVol.â42,â2011:â499
Dudouet,âVĂ©ronique,âHansâJ.âGiessmannâandâKatrinâPlanta.âFromâcombatantsâtoâpeacebuilders:âAâcaseâforâinclusive,âparticipatoryâandâholisticâsecurityâtransitions.âPolicyâReport,âBerghofâFoundation,â2012
Dudouet,âVĂ©ronique.âFrom war to politics: Resistance/liberation movements in transition (Berlin:âBerghofâFoundation,â2009)
36 // Accord // Insight 2
Forced Migration ReviewâNo.â37:âArmedânon-stateâactorsâandâdisplacement,âMarchâ2011
GenevaâAcademyâofâInternationalâHumanitarianâLawâandâHumanâRights.âRules of engagement: Protecting civilians through dialogue with non-state actors (Geneva:âGenevaâAcademyâofâInternationalâHumanitarianâLawâandâHumanâRights,â2011)
Hancock,âLandonâE.âandâChristopherâR.âMitchellâ(eds).âZones of peaceâ(Bloomfield:âKumarianâPress,â2007)
Hofmann,âClaudiaâandâUlrichâSchneckener.ââEngagingânon-stateâarmedâactorsâinâstate-âandâpeace-building:âoptionsâandâstrategiesâ,âInternational Review of the Red CrossâVol.â93âNo.â883,âSeptemberâ2011
Jackson,âAshleyâandâAntonioâGiustozzi.âTalkingâtoâtheâotherâside:âHumanitarianâengagementâwithâtheâTalibanâinâAfghanistan.âHPGâWorkingâPaper,âDecemberâ2012
Mampilly,âZachariahâCherian.âRebel rulers: Insurgent governance and civilian life during warâ(IthacaâandâLondon:âCornellâUniversityâPress,â2011)
Manningham-Buller,âEliza.âTheâReithâLecturesâ(BBC,â2011)
Mason,âSimon.âInsider mediators: Exploring their key role in informal peace processes (BerghofâFoundationâforâPeaceâSupport,â2009)
Mitchell,âChristopherâR.âandâLandonâE.âHancockâ(eds).âLocal peacebuilding and national peace: Interaction between grassroots and elite processesâ(LondonâandâNewâYork:âContinuum,â2012)
Powell,âJonathan.âTalking to terrorists: How to end armed conflictsâ(London:âTheâBodleyâHead,â2014)
SolimanâM.âSantos,âJr.âandâPazâVerdadesâM.âSantos.âPrimed and purposeful: Armed groups and human security efforts in the Philippines (SmallâArmsâSurvey,â2010)
Staniland,âPaul.âNetworks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapseâ(IthacaâandâLondon:âCornellâUniversityâPress,â2014)
Whitfield,âTeresa.âEndgame for ETA: Elusive peace in the Basque Countryâ(London:âHurst,â2014)
Whitfield,âTeresa.âEngagingâwithâarmedâgroups:âDilemmasâ&âoptionsâforâmediators.âMediationâPracticeâSeries,âHumanitarianâDialogue,âOctoberâ2010
Zartman,âI.âWilliamâandâGuyâOlivierâFaureâ(eds).âEngaging extremists: Trade-offs, timing and diplomacyâ(Washington:âUnitedâStatesâInstituteâofâPeace,â2011)
Colombia
CaraballoâAcña,âVladimir.ââDesminadoâsocialâyâcomunitarioâdeâMicoahumado.âSoberanĂasâenâviloâyârelacionesâpreviasâaâlaânegociaciĂłnâ,âinâSarmientoâSantanderâF.,â(ed)âLecciones
para la paz negociada: Retrospectiva historica en Colombiaâ(Colombia:âCINEP/PPP,â2011)â209â223
ConciliationâResources.âAccord 14: Alternatives to war: Colombiaâs peace processesâ(London:âConciliationâResources,â2004)
GenevaâCall.ââCasoâdeâMicoahumadoââinâExperienciasâdeâDesminadoâyâLimpiezaâdeâTerritoriosâenâColombia,â2011:â3â9,âatâwww.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2013/12/experencias.pdf
HernĂĄndezâDelgado,âEsperanza.ââExperienciaâdeâlaâAsambleaâPopularâConstituyenteâdeâMicoahumadoââinâEsperanzaâHernĂĄndezâDelgado,âIntervenir antes que anochezca: Mediaciones, intermediaciones y diplomacias noviolentas de base social en el conflicto armado colombianoâ(Bucaramanga:âUniversidadâAutĂłnoma,â2012)
Mitchell,âChristopherâandâSaraâRamĂrez.ââLocalâpeaceâcommunitiesâinâColombia:âAnâinitialâcomparisonâofâthreeâcasesâ,âinâVirginiaâM.âBouvierâ(ed),âColombia: Building peace in time of war,âWashington,âDC:âUnitedâStatesâInstituteâofâPeace,â2009:â245â270
Reusse-Decrey,âElisabeth.ââTheâstruggleâagainstâlandminesâanâopeningâforâpeaceâtalksâinâColombiaâ,âinâConciliationâResources,âAccord 16: Choosing to engage: Armed groups and peace processesâ(London:âConciliationâResources,â2005)
Sjöberg,âAnn-Kristin.âDealingâwithâtheâDevil?âHumanitarianâengagementâwithâarmedânon-stateâactors:âTheâcaseâofâtheâNationalâLiberationâArmy.âPaperâpreparedâforâtheâAnnualâConventionâofâtheâInternationalâStudiesâAssociationâSanâFrancisco,â26â29âMarchâ2008,âGraduateâInstituteâofâInternationalâandâDevelopmentâStudiesâ(HEID)âGeneva,âSwitzerland
Valencia,âLeĂłn.ââTheâELNâsâhaltingâmovesâtowardsâpeaceâ,âinâVirginiaâM.âBouvierâ(ed),âColombia: Building peace in time of war.âWashington,âDC:âUnitedâStatesâInstituteâofâPeace,â2009:â95â110
LRA
Afako,âBarney.âPursuingâpeaceâinânorthernâUganda:âLessonsâfromâpeaceâinitiatives.âCommissionedâbyâCivilâSocietyâOrganizationsâforâPeaceâinâNorthernâUganda,â2003
Allen,âTimâandâKoenâVlassenrootâ(eds).âThe Lordâs Resistance Army: Myth and realityâ(London:âZedâPress,â2010)
Baines,âErinâandâEmilyâPaddon.ââThisâisâhowâweâsurvived:âCivilianâagencyâandâhumanitarianâprotectionâ,âSecurity Dialogue 43,â2012:â231
ConciliationâResources.âAccord 11: Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda.â(London:âConciliationâResources,â2002)
ConciliationâResources.ââRegionalâcommunityâpeacebuildingâandâtheâLRAâconflict:âAâconversationâwithâJohnâBaptistâOdama,âArchbishopâofâGulu,âUgandaâ,âinâAccord 22: Paix sans
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 37
frontiĂ©res: building peace across bordersâ(London:âConciliationâResources,â2011)
ConciliationâResources.âAccord 11 (update): Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda: 2002-09 and the Juba peace process,â(London:âConciliationâResources,â2010)
HumanâRightsâandâPeaceâCentreâ(HURIPEC)âandâLiuâInstituteâforâGlobalâStudies,âTheâHiddenâWar,âtheâForgottenâPeople:âWarâinâAcholilandâandâitsâRamificationsâforâPeaceâandâSecurityâinâUganda.â2003
Ibrahim,âMaggie.ââRebelâvoicesâandâradioâactors:âinâpursuitâofâdialogueâandâdebateâinânorthernâUgandaâ,âDevelopment in PracticeâVol.â19,âNo.â4â5,â2009
RodriguezâSoto,âCarlos.âTall grass: Stories of suffering and peace in Northern Uganda (FountainâPublishers,â2009)
Royo,âJosepâMaria.âWarâandâpeaceâscenariosâinânorthernâUganda,âEscolaâdeâCulturaâdeâPau,âJulyâ2008
Schomerus,âMareikeâandâKennedyâTumutegyereize.âAfterâOperationâLightningâThunder:âProtectingâcommunitiesâandâbuildingâpeace.â(London:âConciliationâResources,â2009)
Syria
IntegrityâResearchâandâConsultancy.âLocalâtrucesâinâSyria.âJuneâ2014
Khalaf,âRana,âOulaâRamadanâandâFriederikeâStolleis.âActivismâinâdifficultâtimes:âCivilâsocietyâgroupsâinâSyriaâ2011â2014.âBadaelâProjectâandâFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,â2014
Khoury,âDoreen.ââSyria:âOrganisingâforâtheâfuture:âgrassrootsâgovernanceâandânationalâpeaceâ,âinâConciliationâResources,âAccord 25:âLegitimacy and peace processesâ(London:âConciliationâResources,â2014)
MinistryâofâForeignâAffairsâofâDenmark.âLocal administration structures in opposition-held areas in Syria,âGeneva:âCentreâforâHumanitarianâdialogue,âAprilâ2014.â
Turkmani,âRim,âMaryâKaldor,âWisamâElhamwi,âJoanâAyoâandâNaelâHariri. Hungry for peace: Positives and pitfalls of local ceasefires in Syria.âLondon:âMadaniâandâLondonâSchoolâofâEconomics,â2014
KeywebsitesAcholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative www.arlpi.org
Beyond Juba www.beyondjuba.org
Berghof Transitions Series www.berghof-foundation.org/publications/transitions-series
CINEPâwww.cinep2015.org/Old/2014_V1â
Committee on the Administration of Justice www.caj.org.uk
Geneva Call www.genevacall.org/country-page/colombiaâ
NIACROâwww.niacro.co.ukâ
Northern Ireland Alternatives www.alternativesrj.orgâ
Security in Transitionâwww.securityintransition.org
38 // Accord // Insight 2
INSIGHT ISSUE 1 (2013)
Women building peace
Most peace agreements do not address the
specific concerns of women, and women are
still excluded from political processes. The
first Accord Insight presents nine articles and
new analysis drawn from the Accord series
from 1998 to 2010, which examine the roles
women have played in addressing violence and
building peace â from Bougainville and Sierra
Leone to Aceh and Northern Ireland.
ISSUE 25 (2014)
Legitimacy and peace processes: from
coercion to consent
Accord 25 focuses on the practical ways
that legitimacy can contribute to building
more sustainable peace: national dialogue;
constitutional reform; local governance; and
transforming coercive actors. It looks at 15
country case studies, including the Philippines,
Syria, Afghanistan, the Basque Country,
Somaliland, Yemen and Burma.
ISSUE 24 (2012)
Reconciliation, reform and resilience:
positive peace for Lebanon
Accord 24 includes more than 30 articles
and interviews on peacebuilding in Lebanon:
from diverse perspectives and from inside and
outside the country. Together they show that the
Lebanese are not passive victims of a violent fate
determined beyond their countryâs borders. Many
are actively pursuing opportunities for change.
ISSUE 23 (2012)
Consolidating peace: Liberia and Sierra Leone
A decade after the official end of wars in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, Accord 23 draws
on respective societiesâ experiences and
insights to ask what headway has been made to
consolidate peace, what challenges lie ahead
and what lessons can be learnt. It argues that
policy needs to focus on people, on repairing
relationships and promoting inclusion, and that
traditional mechanisms can play a crucial role.
ISSUE 22 (2011)
Paix sans frontiĂšres: building peace
across borders
War does not respect political or territorial
boundaries. This twenty-second Accord
publication, edited by Alexander Ramsbotham
and I William Zartman, looks at how
peacebuilding strategies and capacity can âthink
outside the stateâ: beyond it, through regional
engagement, and below it, through cross-
border community or trade networks.
ISSUE 21 (2010)
Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali
and international peacemaking
Edited by Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy Accord
21 contains over 30 articles including interviews
with Somali elders and senior diplomats
with the African Union, the UN and IGAD, and
contributions from Somali and international
peacemaking practitioners, academics, involved
parties, civil society and womenâs organisations.
ISSUE 20 (2008)
Reconfiguring politics: the Indonesia-Aceh
peace process
In 2005, the Indonesian government and the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed a settlement
ending 30 years of armed conflict. Accord 20
explores how that agreement was reached and
subsequent challenges to its implementation.
TheAccordseries
Local engagement with armed groups: in the midst of violence // 39
ISSUE 19 (2008)
Powers of persuasion: incentives, sanctions
and conditionality in peacemaking
International policymakers frequently use
incentives, sanctions and conditionality as tools
to influence intra-state conflicts. Using a range
of case studies, Accord 19 asks whether and how
these tools can constructively influence conflict
partiesâ engagement in peacemaking initiatives.
ISSUE 18 (2006)
Peace by piece: addressing Sudanâs conflicts
This Accord publication reviews the peace
process that led to the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in Sudan. It also explores
questions that remain to be tackled, arguing
that future Sudanese initiatives must be more
inclusive and better coordinated.
ISSUE 17 (2005)
The limits of leadership elites and societies
in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process
Since the 1994 ceasefire, the conflict between
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorny
Karabakh has remained deadlocked. Accord
17 explores the dynamics of polarisation,
the obstacles to a sustainable agreement
and the challenge of overcoming resistance
to compromise.
ISSUE 16 (2005)
Choosing to engage: armed groups
and peace processes
Non-state armed groups, key actors
in many internal armed conflicts, have
participated in peace processes across the
world. Accord 16 draws on these experiences
to explore the case for engaging with armed
groups, and the different options, roles and
challenges for such engagement.
ISSUE 15 (2004)
From military peace to social justice?
The Angolan peace process
The Luena Memorandum of 2002 brought
an end to Angolaâs 27-year civil war. Accord 15
reviews the history of peacemaking efforts in
Angola, and analyses challenges that remain
if the absence of violence is to develop into
a sustainable and just peace.
ISSUE 14 (2004)
Alternatives to war: Colombiaâs peace
processes
This Accord publication provides an overview
of more than 25 years of peace initiatives with
Colombiaâs guerrilla and paramilitary groups.
It includes analysis of civil society efforts at
local, regional and national levels and identifies
the necessary elements of a new model of
conflict resolution.
ISSUE 13 (2002)
Owning the process: public participation
in peacemaking
This first thematic Accord publication
documents mechanisms for public participation
in peacemaking. It features extended studies
looking at how people were empowered to
participate in political processes in Guatemala,
Mali and South Africa. It also contains shorter
pieces from Colombia, Northern Ireland and
the Philippines.
ISSUE 12 (2002)
Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea â
Bougainville peace process
This Accord publication documents efforts
leading to the Bougainville Peace Agreement
of 2001. It describes an indigenous process
that drew on the strengths of Melanesian
traditions, as well as innovative roles played
by international third parties.
ISSUE 11 (2002)
Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives
to end the violence in northern Uganda
While a meaningful peace process in northern
Uganda remains elusive, Accord 11 documents
significant peacemaking initiatives undertaken
by internal and external actors and analyses
their impact on the dynamics of the conflict.
ISSUE 10 (2001)
Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan
peace process
This publication describes the aspirations
of the parties to the conflict in Tajikistan. It
documents the negotiation process leading to
the General Agreement of June 1997, looking at
the role of the international community, led by
the UN, and of local civil society.
40 // Accord // Insight 2
ISSUE 9 (2000)
Paying the price: the Sierra Leone
peace process
The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999
sought to bring an end to armed conflict in
Sierra Leone: one of the most brutal civil wars
of recent times. Accord 9 explores the Lomé
process and earlier attempts to resolve the
conflict, and draws lessons for Sierra Leoneâs
transition.
ISSUE 8 (1999)
Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland
peace process
This publication examines the factors that
led to the negotiations resulting in the 1998
Belfast Agreement. It describes the complex
underlying forces and the development of
an environment for peace. (2003: Supplement
Issue â see online index)
ISSUE 7 (1999)
A question of sovereignty: the Georgia-
Abkhazia peace process
This publication explores the background and
issues at the heart of the Georgia-Abkhazia
conflict, providing a unique insight into
a political stalemate and pointing towards
possible avenues out of deadlock.
ISSUE 6 (1999)
Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao
in transition
The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was
a milestone, as all previous peacemaking
attempts over 24 years had failed. Accord 6
analyses elements of peacemaking in Mindanao
and examines the challenges of implementation.
(2003: Supplement Issue â see online index)
ISSUE 5 (1998)
Safeguarding peace: Cambodiaâs
constitutional challenge
This publication documents issues around
the signing of the 1991 Paris agreements that
officially ended Cambodiaâs long war, and the
subsequent violent collapse of the countryâs
governing coalition in July 1997.
ISSUE 4 (1998)
Demanding sacrifice: war and negotiation
in Sri Lanka
This publication documents the cycles of ethnic/
national conflict that have blighted Sri Lanka
since 1983. It analyses negotiations and other
peace initiatives, and outlines fundamental
concerns that need to be confronted in future
peacemaking efforts
ISSUE 3 (1998)
The Mozambican peace process in perspective
This publication documents the diverse
initiatives that drove the parties to a negotiated
settlement of the conflict in Mozambique. It
further illustrates the impact on the country
of changing regional and international
political dynamics.
ISSUE 2 (1997)
Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process
The signing of the peace agreement in
1996 brought an end to 36 years of civil war
in Guatemala. Accord 2 analyses issues
of impunity, indigenous rights, political
participation and land reform.
ISSUE 1 (1996)
The Liberian peace process 1990â1996
This first Accord publication documents the
lengthy and fractious Liberian peace process
and provides insight into why thirteen individual
peace accords collapsed in half as many years.
Conciliation Resources is an independent organisation working with people in conflict to prevent violence and build peace. Weâre there for as long as weâre needed to provide advice, support and practical resources. We take what we learn to government decision-makers and others working to end conflict, to improve peacebuilding policies and practice worldwide.
We work mainly in the East and Central Africa on the Lordâs Resistance Army conflict, the South Caucasus, the Philippines, Kashmir, Fiji, Colombia and West Africa, in partnership with local and international civil society organisations and governments. We also publish Accord: an international review of peace initiatives. Our funding is through grants from governments, independent trusts and foundations.
We aim to:
» Promote understanding of peaceful ways to resolve conflicts
» Create opportunities for dialogue between divided communities
» Strengthen peacebuilding policies and practice » Support people to build peace
Please visit our website or contact us for more information about what we do and how you can support this work:
Conciliation Resources Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road London NW5 1AL United Kingdom
Web www.c-r.org Twitter @CRbuildpeace Facebook Conciliation Resources
Email cr @c-r.org Tel +44 (0)20 7359 7728 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081
Charity registered in England and Wales (1055436)
Company limited by guarantee registered in England and Wales (03196482)
Internationalâpolicyâisâambiguousâonâwhetherâorânotâtoâtalkâtoânon-stateâarmedâgroups.âButâwhileâstatesâequivocate,âlocalâpopulationsâmayâalreadyâbeâinâcontact.
ThisâsecondâAccord Insightâlooksâatâhowâlocalâactorsâorganiseâtoâenterâintoâdialogueâwithâarmedâgroupsâandâchallengeâtheirâuseâofâviolence.âItâbuildsâonâAccordâ16â(2005),âChoosing to engage: armed groups and peace processes.âCaseâstudiesâfromâSyria,âColombia,ânorthernâUgandaâandâNorthernâIrelandâdocumentâtheâexperiencesâofâcommunitiesâwhoâchooseâtoâreachâoutâtoâarmedâgroupsâââoftenâinâadvanceâofâmoreâformalânegotiationsâandâinâsituationsâofâintenseâviolenceâandâembeddedâconflictâââexploringâwhyâandâhowâtheyâinteractâandâtheâchallengesâinvolved.
Theâcaseâstudiesâhighlightâtheârisksâcommunitiesâtake,âbutâalsoâtheâresilienceâandâinnovationâinvolvedâinâtryingâtoâinfluenceâarmedâgroupsâapparentlyâsetâonâviolence.âTheyâshowâhowâactiveâcommunityâengagementâmakesâimportantâcontributionsâtoâlocalâhumanâsecurityâandâpeacebuilding,âandâtoâarmedâgroupsââtransformation.
Conciliation Resources is an independent organisation working with people in conflict to prevent violence and build peace. CRâs Accord publication series informs and strengthens peace processes by documenting and analysing practical lessons and innovations of peacebuilding.
Accord Insight presents cutting-edge analysis and contemporary peacebuilding innovation by re-examining key challenges and practical lessons from our Accord publication series.
ConciliationâResourcesâBurghleyâYard,â106âBurghleyâRoadâLondonâNW5â1AL
www.c-r.org
Logo using multiply onlayers
Logo drawn as seperate elementswith overlaps coloured seperately
Accord IN
SIGH
T 2â2015
Local engagement w
ith armed groups:âinâtheâm
idstâofâviolence
9 781905 805211
ISBN 978-1-905805-21-1ISBNâ978-1-905805-21-1
9 781905 805211