Legal PhilosophyCase Studies
Functionalist PerspectiveModern Legal Realist PerspectiveCritical Legal Analysis Policy Science
Esplana, Maria CarlaOctaviano, ClarenceYu, Benjamin
3/1/2009
I. Functionalist Perspective
a. Teresita Arobang v. Mayor Vicente Bermejo
b. Hon. Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati v.
Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission of Audit
II. Modern Legal Realist Perspective
a. Alejandro Estrada v. Soledad Escritor
b. Ferdinand Marcos v. Hon. Raul Manglapus
III. Critical Legal Analysis
a. International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) v. Hon. Leonardo
A. Quisumbing
IV. Policy Science Perspective
a. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus: Laurente C. Ilagan
vs. Hon Juan Ponce Enrile
b. Florentino Joya and Juan Tahimic and Domingo Joya v. Pedro
Pareja
V. Scandinavian legal realism
a. Primitivo Ansay, et al v. The Board of Directors of the National
Development Company et al.
Cases for functional perspective
Arrobang v. Martinez
G.R. No. 153974 August 7, 2006
Austria- Martinez, J.
Before this Court is a petition for review questioning the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 20, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47052, as well the Resolution dated
June 11, 2002 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Facts:
Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about 20,424 square
meters, covered by Free Patent Nos. 7265, 7266, 7267, 7268, 7269, and 7270. On
November 8, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution
No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on April 14,
1997 by the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 18 of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6958.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but
only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners
voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed
beneficiaries of the land sought to be expropriated have not actually signed a petition
asking for the property but their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing
the same.
On July 31, 1997, the trial court denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and declared that
the expropriation in this case is for "public use" and the respondent has the lawful right to
take the property upon payment of just compensation. Petitioners filed an Answer on
August 12, 1997 reasserting the issues they raised in their Motion to Dismiss.
On October 1, 1997, the trial court issued an Order appointing three persons as
Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the property. Petitioners
filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners to
Determine Just Compensation and for Clarification of the Courts Order dated October 1,
1997" which was denied by the trial court on November 3, 1997. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied on December 9, 1997.
Petitioners then filed on March 2, 1998 a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming
that they were denied due process when the trial court declared that the taking was for
public purpose without receiving evidence on petitioners claim that the Mayor of Panay
was motivated by politics in expropriating their property and in denying their Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners; and that the trial
court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the affidavits of
persons denying that they signed a petition addressed to the municipal government of
Panay. On January 17, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Attached Memorandum
and the Memorandum itself where they argued that based on the Petition for Expropriation
filed by respondent, such expropriation was based only on a resolution and not on an
ordinance contrary to Sec. 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160; there was also no valid and
definite offer to buy the property as the price offered by respondent to the petitioners was
very low.
On March 20, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
Thus, the present petition claiming that:
Issue:
Petitioners were utterly denied procefural due process of law by the court, when it
PETITIONERS WERE UTTERLY DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE
COURT A QUO, WHEN IT SIMPLY DECLARED IN ITS ORDER DATED 31 JULY 1997 THAT
THE TAKING BY RESPONDENT OF PETITIONERS PROPERTIES IS PURPORTEDLY FOR
PUBLIC PURPOSE WITHOUT RECEIVING EVIDENCE ON THEIR ASSERTED CLAIM THAT
RESPONDENTS MUNICIPAL MAYOR WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED IN SEEKING THE
EXPROPRIATION OF THEIR PROPERTIES AND NOT FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.
Ruling:
Petitioners argue that: contrary to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160 of the Local Government
Code, which provides that a local government may exercise the power of eminent domain
only by "ordinance," respondents expropriation in this case is based merely on a
"resolution"; while objection on this ground was neither raised by petitioners in their
Motion to Dismiss nor in their Answer, such objection may still be considered by this Court
since the fact upon which it is based is apparent from the petition for expropriation itself; a
defense may be favorably considered even if not raised in an appropriate pleading so long
as the facts upon which it is based are undisputed; courts have also adopted a more
censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of local bodies of
the delegated power of expropriation, as compared to instances when it is directly
exercised by the national legislature; respondent failed to give, prior to the petition for
expropriation, a previous valid and definite offer to petitioners as the amount offered in
this case was only P10.00 per square meter, when the properties are residential in nature
and command a much higher price; the CA failed to discuss and rule upon the arguments
raised by petitioners in their Memorandum; attached to the Motion to Dismiss were
affidavits and death certificates showing that there were people whose names were in the
supposed petition asking respondent for land, but who did not actually sign the same, thus
showing that the present expropriation was not for a public purpose but was merely
politically motivated; considering the conflicting claims regarding the purpose for which
the properties are being expropriated and inasmuch as said issue may not be rightfully
ruled upon merely on the basis of petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Answer as well as
respondents Petition for Expropriation, what should have been done was for the RTC to
conduct hearing where each party is given ample opportunity to prove its claim.
Respondent for its part contends that its power to acquire private property for public
use upon payment of just compensation was correctly upheld by the trial court; that the CA
was correct in finding that the petitioners were not denied due process, even though no
hearing was conducted in the trial court, as petitioners were still able to adduce their
objections and defenses therein; and that petitioners arguments have been passed upon by
both the trial court and the CA and were all denied for lack of substantial merit.
Respondent filed a Memorandum quoting at length the decision of the CA to support its
position. Petitioners meanwhile opted to have the case resolved based on the pleadings
already filed. Petition is impressed with merit.
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private
property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the
legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs),
other public entities and public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated entities
is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the
delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and restraints
imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by
themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power
of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in
eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter
cannot go against the principals will or modify the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental right. It greatly affects a land owners right to private property which is a
constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of
personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Thus,
whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the
exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still
the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an
ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the
municipal council will not suffice.
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; and
the reason for this is settled:
x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by
a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such
expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy
promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of
its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such
power.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 47052 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Action No. V-6958 is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
Hon. Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati v.
Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission of Audit
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
Paras, J.
The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under
the general welfare clause.
Facts:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved
Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE
TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURY.
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of
Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a
month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the
amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for
the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program.
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its
expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA
disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the
implementation thereof.
Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners were denied by respondent in its
Decision No. 1159.
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.
Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari
praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of
Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of police power and
parens patriae.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere
tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI
of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such
power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise
from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers
within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give
effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the
enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called inferred police
powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in
express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of
the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully
accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs.
Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies,
must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their
governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus,
not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but
the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure
the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefore, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote
health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in
the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute
of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions.
(Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life
and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said
to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S.) However, it is not
confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must
follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or
relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988,
supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its
exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people
in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,
and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,
and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is
deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the
limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still
subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of
the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed
out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "The drift is towards social welfare legislation
geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the
general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for
human rights
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor
has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the
welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban
poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is
a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened
by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however
must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby
GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.
Functional Perspectives case analysis
The social interest therefore in the preservation of human personality and dignity
emphasizes personal security from abusive application of power by private individual or
groups of individual and from unreasonable application of authority by the government,
namely, police power, power of taxation, power of eminent domain. The essence of this
social interest is two-fold. The first is the right of the people without discrimination among
individuals, to have a voice and to participate in the formation of government policies and
functions. Of this right there is no doubt since the people are called upon to support these
policies morally, physically and financially. The second is the reasonable expectation of the
people that their optimum social requirements will be met.
The two cases above were historical expression of the social interest context in our
country that properly displays the functional perspective view of law. The court in ruling
these cases expressly applies the maxim of salus populi est suprema lex. It is thus based on
the title and concern of the entire social group against those forms and acts and practices
which adversely affect the stability of existence and happiness of the people. There is an
abundance of historical illustrations where national decay has been the result with the
wanting of the esteem fro personality and dignity. Paradoxically, the preservation of this
social interest is a continuous fight and endeavor.
Case for Modern Legal Realist Perspective
Alejandro Estrada v. Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4, 2003
Facts:
Soledad Escritor works as a Clerk of Court in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas. In
July 27, 2000, complainant Estrada, requested for an investigation in relation to rumors
that respondent was engaged in a relationship with a man who is not her husband.
Respondent testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow,
her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband
was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have
a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement
is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In
fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness.”
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have
been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world
except in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the
Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple
cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal
impediments. Only those couples which have been baptized and in good standing may
execute the Declaration. The declaration requires the approval of the elders of the
congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the declarations are
executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were executed in the usual and approved
form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where
the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the
couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their
union. In Escritor’s case, although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal
impediment to marry on her part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus,
their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and
Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in
asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct for which she should be held administratively liable.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be reprimanded for her alleged extra-marital
affairs.
Held:
No. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in
arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had
was “illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its
very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the Solicitor General
failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests
Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including
religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that
such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but
in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the interpretation of a document, such as the
Bill of Rights, designed to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which
perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history,
structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the clauses, all point toward this
perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a reading of the religion clauses which leaves
both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability
to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others, makes the most
sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities
and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy.
Case Analysis for Modern Legal Realist Perspective
Estrada v. Escritor
The Modern Legal Realist Perspective’s American Legal Realism states that “the law is
an instrument of social control entrusted to the Courts with regard to experience and
prevailing moral and political theories and policies”. Law is what the Court says it is. The
Courts are affected by certain Metalegal Factors. These are the elements which stimulate a
Judge either against or for a specific matter or controversy. The Metalegal Factor of the
Stimuli Set Up by the Judges’ Predilections and Preconceptions may be applied in the case
at bar. The leading case of Estrada v. Escritor was penned by Chief Justice Reynato Puno, a
known religious and virtuous man.
The Metalegal stimulus that is present in the case is the Judge’s or Justice’ Legal
Sympathies. Legal Sympathies arise from a judge’s community of experience, education,
interests, and even temperament. Chief Justice Puno’s disposition towards fairness and
equality are well known in the Philippines. It is an area in which he is forthright, clearly
reflecting his legal sympathies towards the protection of equal rights as well as religious
rights.
In the Estrada case, Chief Justice Puno of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
respondent. The Chief Justice, who penned the opinion, characterized the acts of the
respondent to be well in the realm of the free exercise of her religious beliefs. Furthermore,
it was held that there was no compelling state interest to warrant a punishment against the
respondent.
The mind of a Judge or Justice is a store of legal sympathies and legal antipathies which
is acquired in the process of maturing and education. The metalegal stimuli come into
operation only because certain issues strike familiar notes which may set a judicial tone.
Marcos vs. Manglapus,
GR no. 88211 September 15, 1989
August 2, 2008
Facts:
The petitioners are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul
Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request of
Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
president’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of discretion in
determining that return of former president Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
Case Analysis for Modern Legal Realist:
Marcos v. Manglapus
The Metalegal Factor of the Stimuli Set Up by Historical or Political Events and
Precedents may be applied in the case at bar. As was held in the case: “The duties of the
President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect
and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving
at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.”
The petitioners in the case at bar raise their inherent right as citizens of the Philippines
to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the
rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution. However, if the Marcoses were
allowed to return, it may provide a catalytic effect which, instead of erasing fears of
destabilization, might even cause the opposite.
The historic-political setting of the case shows that it was barely four years after the
dramatic EDSA Revolution and that strong political feelings were still at its height. The
Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners not because of existing prejudices against the
family, but because the Motion was filed during a time when emotions were still high and a
strong possibility of government destabilization was apparent.
Case for Critical Legal Studies
International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The school hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said
International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better treatment of their
colleagues who have been hired abroad. These foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not
accorded the local-hires which include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home
leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local-hires. Petitioner
claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the school is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent school constitutes racial
discrimination.
Held:
YES. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the
spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to
promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent school to justify
the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and
local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character"
notwithstanding. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by
logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not
for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That
would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it
is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
Case Analysis for Critical Legal Studies
Critical legal studies views the law as an instrument to redeem the people from social
divisions and hierarchies. It is an advocacy of the law as a neutral and objective means of
social control with emphasis on its liberating function. In the case cited, there exists a
duality which is often called by the realist theorists as paired opposite. This is the
classification made by the international school categorizing the members of the faculty of
the International School as foreign-hires and local-hires. Dualities, such as this one, are
being eradicated by the critical legal realism theorists to show how they create an ideology
that furthers the interest of the ruling class. They envisioned a future in which the
categories that currently divide and separate people—including sexual, racial, political, and
class categories—are broken down, allowing people to share more values and to create a
more harmonious society. It is only when the law is neutral and maintains its neutrality in
the inevitable conflict of claims, demands, and expectations can everyone in society accept
it as a means of social control and feel safe and secure from illegitimate divisions and
hierarchies.
Critical Legal Studies pushes the liberal premises about state and society, about
freedom from dependence and governance of social relations by the will, to the point at
which they merge into a larger ambition: the building of a social world less alien to a self
that can always violate the generative rules of its own mental or social constructs and put
other rules and other constructs in their place. It therefore seeks to reform the law and
society in such a way as to liberate and empower every individual.
Case for Policy Science
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus: Laurente C. Ilagan
v. Hon Juan Ponce Enrile
October 21, 1985
Facts:
A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Free
Legal Assistance Group on behalf of Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and
Marcos Risonar.
The three lawyers were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a
Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry
of National Defense. The petition for habeas corpus was then filed on the ground that the
arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, because arrests cannot be made on
the basis of Mission Orders and there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers
who are involved in national security cases.
The respondents contended that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree
issued by the President. Respondents further allege that the detained attorneys played
active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front.
The Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the
recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely retired Chief Justice
Concepcion and retires Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. However, despite the Order of the
Court, the detained attorneys were not released. Respondents field an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration stating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of
ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case.
Furthermore, the respondents alleged that an Information for Rebellion was filed
against the detained attorneys and thus making the petition for Habeas Corpus moot and
academic. Petitioners opined, saying that the detained attorneys were not given the benefit
of preliminary investigation, ant that they were denied their constitutional right to due
process.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of an Information is a bar to a petition for Habeas
Corpus.
Held:
Case was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners were detained
by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation
to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.
Case Analysis for Policy Science:
Ilagan v. Enrile
The concept of Habeas Corpus as presented in this case is the materialization of the
concept of “Liberty” as a social value. The social value of “liberty” moves towards the
ability of people to act or to do things which are crucial to his way of life.
In the famous case of Calalang v. Williams, the Supreme Court stated that liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy and neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
In the present case, the social value of “liberty” was apparent. Liberty means security
from restraint, it is deemed to embrace the right of a man to enjoy the faculties with which
he has been endowed by his creator subject only to restraints necessary for the public
welfare. The Social Value of “Liberty” may take an active or passive mode. In the case, it
took an active form. The active form of “liberty” is that which may be the basis of legal
claims or legal powers. The exercise of the right to Petition the Court for Habeas Corpus is
an example of an active form of “liberty” based on a legal claim.
But whether “liberty” is in its active or passive form, it is an area of human endeavor
which the government should not encroach upon or permit undue restriction to. In the
case at bar, a conflict arose between the claim of the government to national security and
individual rights. The government applied unrestricted and unreasonable interference
which may be detrimental to social values.
The social value of “Power” was also evident in the case at bar. The first aspect of
“Power” as a social value is the capacity to secure and maintain fundamental Human Rights.
These rights cannot exist under a benevolent despot. In Ilagan v. Enrile, the captives were
arrested under the authority of the then dictator Ferdinand Marcos. It can be gainsaid that
the arbitrary authority exercised over the lawyers were unnatural and undesirable.
Florentino Joya, Juan Tahimic and Domingo Joya v. Pedro Pareja
G.R. No. L-13258; November 28, 1959
Florentino Joya is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 11 hectares (lot No.
1171), situated in Sanja Mayor, Tanza, Cavite, which had been under lease to one Maximina
Bondad for 16 years. For the duration of said period, the land was tenanted and worked on
for the lessee by Pedro Pareja.
In April, 1954, upon termination of the lease agreement, the property was returned to
the landowner, with the lessee recommending that the same be leased to Pareja. The said
tenant and the landowner, however, failed to agree on the terms under which the former
could work on the lands, specifically on the matter of rental, as Joya demanded 120 cavanes
as annual rental therefore. Notwithstanding such lack of understanding between them,
Pareja continued on his cultivation of the property.
On May 24, 1954, the tenant filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (before the
creation of the Court of Agrarian Relations) Tenancy Case No. 5281-R against Florentino
Joya for the purpose of securing a reduction of the rental allegedly being imposed upon him
by the respondent. The landowner resisted the complaint disclaiming that Pareja had ever
his tenant.
Two days thereafter or on May 26, Florentino Joya leased the land to Domingo Joya at
an annual rent of 120 cavanes. As the aforesaid lessee found Pareja already working on the
land, the former agreed to allow him (Pareja) to continue with his cultivation on condition
that they would equally share its produce after deducting the rental for the land. In view of
this development, Pareja moved for the dismissal of his complaint against the landowner,
then pending in the Court of Industrial Relations, on the ground that the parties therein had
already reached an agreement on the matter in controversy.
One year later, or on April 10, 1055, Florentino Joya renewed the lease in favor of
Domingo Joya but included as co-lessee one Juan Tahimic. The rent was reduced to 105
cavanes a year. Pareja, with whom Domingo had worked during the previous year, refused
to surrender the land to Tahimic. Thereupon, Florentino filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court of Tanza, Cavite, a complaint for usurpation against Pareja who, consequently, was
arrested and stayed in jail for a week. When finally released on Bail, Pareja filed a counter-
charge with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, against Florentino Joya, Juan Tahimic, and
Domingo Joya, for alleged violation of Republic Act 1199.
However, threatened to be imprisoned again or fined in the usurpation case if he did
not desist and surrender the land, he withdrew his complaint manifesting that he was
surrendering the property to its owner but "leaving to the Court of Industrial Relations or
Agrarian Court the determination of whatever right he may have in the said land."
Thereafter, at the instance of Florentino Joya, the criminal case for usurpation was also
dismissed.
On January 31, 1956, Pareja filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations a complaint against
Florentino Joya and Juan Tahimic for alleged violation of Republic Act 1199 (Tenancy Case
No. CAR-6, Cavite), consisting of his allegedly unlawful ejectment from the land he was
working on for 16 years and the appointment by Florentino Joya of his co-defendant Juan
Tahimic as tenant in his (Pareja's) stead; of the landowner's filing a criminal action when
he refused to vacate the property and making it a condition for its dismissal his (Pareja's)
surrender of the same. And contending that he unwillingly vacated the land for fear of
being again indicted in court, Pareja prayed for his reinstatement to the landholding;
payment to him of his share of the crops for the agricultural year 1955-56 which he failed
to receive; for damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer with counterclaim, defendants Florentino and Juan denied the existence
of tenancy relationship between plaintiff and defendant Florentino; and claimed that the
complaint stated no cause of action and that the case had already been passed upon the
competent authorities (apparently referring to the dismissal by the Court of Industrial
Relations and the Provincial Fiscal's Office of the previous complaint of Pareja against the
same defendants.) Domingo Joya also filed an answer in intervention praying for the
recognition of his and Tahimic's superior right to work on and cultivate the land.
After due hearing, the Court rendered judgment holding that upon termination of the
civil lease in favor of Maximina Bondad, Pedro Pareja, the lessee's tenant, automatically
became the tenant of the landowner, pursuant to Section 264 of Act 4054; that said tenant,
on the other hand, in agreeing to share equally with Domingo Joya the produce of the land
for the agricultural year 1954-55 in effect waived his right over an undetermined 1/2 of
the landholding; that the subsequent contract of lease entered into between the landowner
and Domingo Joya and Juan Tahimic as lessees could not prejudice the right of Pareja to
work on the same land and, accordingly, was declared valid only insofar as that portion
given up by the latter in favor of Domingo Joya was concerned. Consequently, Pedro Pareja
was ordered reinstated to 1/2 of the 11 hectare landholding, while Domingo Joya and Juan
Tahimic were recognized as joint tenants over the other half. As the rental for the lease of
the land was fixed at 53.75 cavanes per agricultural year after taking into consideration its
nature and productivity, the court also directed Florentino Joya to return to plaintiff Pareja
and intervenor Domingo Joya 21.25 cavanes of palay or their value, which were overpaid to
him (the landowner) for the agricultural year 1954-55; and to Domingo Joya and Juan
Tahimic 55 cavanes or their corresponding value which were overpaid to him for the year
1955-56 and 1956-57. The court, however, finding that plaintiff's failure to continue on the
cultivation of the land its return to the owner could not be imputed to the latter,
exonerated Florentino Joya from the charge of violation of Republic Act 1199. Not satisfied
with this decision, therein defendants and intervenor filed this petition for review.
Admittedly, the respondent-tenant cultivated the land for the lessee for 16 years or for
the entire duration of the tenancy relationship existed between Maximina Bondad, the
lessee, and Pareja, the tenant. The question now interposed in this petition is whether the
tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite the termination of the lease,
or said in other words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him, upon the
expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor.
The question thus presented must be answered in the affirmative, not so must because
of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court, but pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act
1199, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act 2263, which reads in part:
SEC 9. Severance of Relations. The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the
voluntary surrender or abandonment of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the
tenant:
xxx xxx xxx
The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the sale,
alienation or transfer of legal possession of the land does not of itself extinguish the
relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and
obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the
landholder, his heir shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that tenancy relationship is not extinguished by (1) the
expiration of the contract(of tenancy); (2) sale; (3) alienation; or (4) transfer of legal
possession of the land.
In a contract of lease, the lessee, for the duration of the contract subject of the
agreement.1 The return by the lessee of the property to the lessor, upon expiration of the
lease contract, naturally involves again a transfer of possession from one lawful holder to
another. But it may be asked, is this transfer of possession included in or comprehended by
the aforequoted Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended?
Prior to the enactment of Republic Act 2263, amending Republic Act 1199, our tenancy
legislations, while providing for the tenant's right in case of sale or alienation of the
property, is silent where there is only a transfer of legal possession of the land. With
amendment of the Agriculture Tenancy Act (Rep. Act 1199) on June 19, 1959, the tenure
even in cases of transfer of legal possession. Petitioner-landowner, however, claims that to
hold that the lessee's tenant, with whom he had no dealing whatsoever, automatically
become his tenant upon the return of the property to him would constitute a restraint on
his right to enter into contract and deprive him of his liberty (to contract) and property
without due process of law.
This same contention was raised during the deliberations of the then Senate Bill No.
119, but Congress, decided to implement its policy and objective in adopting the
Agricultural Tenancy Law and passed the bill in its present form. The following is quoted
from the Congressional Record:
SENATOR PRIMICIAS. On the severance of relationship of tenant and landowner, it
seems that there is an intention on the part of Your Honor to amend Section 9 of the Act so
as to include the transfer of legal possession of land in one or two cases which do not
extinguish the relationship . . . .
SENATOR PELAEZ. I would say that this afternoon, in the committee on Revision of
Law, we were considering amendments to the effect that the present tenants must have the
priority right, and I think we should give priority to those tenants who are there and that
any transfer of lands should not affect them the least.
SENATOR PRIMICIAS . . . Does Your Honor think that the landowner is not entitled to
transfer the lease to another person even if the police offered is better?
SENADOR PELAEZ. Under the present law, he cannot do it.
SENATOR PRIMICIAS. Would that not constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
SENATOR PELAEZ. It is deprivation of property without due process of law. It is in the
present law. But we have to remember here social values and human values against
material values. Precisely, the agricultural tenancy act remedied an existing evil because
before the agricultural tenancy act provided for security of these poor tenants, they were
pushed out of the land by the landlords . . . (Senate Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 54,
April 21,1958, p. 905-906.)
It is our considered judgement, since the return by the lessee of the leased property to
the lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves also a transfer of legal possssion and
taking into account the manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to
provide the tenant with security of tenure in call case of transfer of legal possession, that
the instant case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act
1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263. The termination of the lease, therefore, did not
divest the tenant of the right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.
Furthermore, should any doubt exist as to the applicability of the aforementioned provision
of law to the case at bar, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the tenant.3
Petitioner landowner likewise assails the legality of the judgment of the court a quo
prescribing the rental that must be paid by the tenants, it being claimed that such question
was never raised in the pleadings filed in said court. This is not exactly the case, because it
must be remembered that the main reason for the refusal of the landowner to let petitioner
continue in the cultivation of the landholding in 1954 was precisely the question of the
rental to be paid, the tenant claiming that the 120 cavanes being asked by the landowner
was excessive. This therefore, is a matter of dispute between the parties and the action
taken by the Agrarian Court is sanctioned by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1267 which
provides:
SEC. 11. Character of Order or Decision. In issuing an order or decision, the Court shall
not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or determination which may
be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing
further disputes, provided that said matter for determination has been established by
competent evidence during the hearing.
Contrary to petitioners' contention that no proof was adduced during the trial to
support the lower court's finding that the entire landholding has an average annual yield of
215 cavanes, we have the testimony of Florentino Joya himself that "the land normally
produces more than 300 cavanes per year" (pp. 207 & 225, Records). There is also the
statement of Pareja that in 1954-55, he harvested 133 cavanes, in spite of poor crop. (p.45,
Record.) Hence, we find no reason to disturb the finding of fact of the lower court.
Petitioner also allege that the tenant voluntarily surrendered the property to the
landowner, as evidence by an affidavit executed by Pareja on July 16, 1955 and subscribed
before the Justice of the Peace of Tanza, Cavite, the translation of which reads:
I, PEDRO PAREJA, of legal age, and residing in the municipality of Tanza, Cavite, under
oath state the following:
That in accordance with what I have declared before the provincial Fiscal of Cavite
during the investigation (July 6, 1955), I will not interfere with or continue the cultivation
in the land of Mr. Florentino Joya in Balite, Tanza, Cavite, Lot No. 1171, and which I am
voluntarily returning to him, nevertheless I am leaving to the C.I.R. or Agrarian Court the
determination of whatever right I may have in said land.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign this document, in the Municipal building of
Tanza, Cavite, this 16th day of July, 1955.
(Sgd.) PEDRO PAREJA
This statement notwithstanding, the lower court found that "petitioner's fear after his
incarceration was ordered by the Justice of the Peace was such that his freedom of choice
was impaired, or at least restricted. Under such circumstances, he was not acting
voluntarily."
This conclusion is fully supported by the record of the case. The explanation of the
tenant is sufficiently borne out by the circumstances attending the execution of the
document. At the time he made the statement both in the office of the Provincial Fiscal and
the Justice of the Peace of Tanza (who ordered his previous arrest), petitioner Florentino
against him was then pending in the justice of the peace court. The facts that immediately
after the execution of the affidavit the landowner moved for the dismissal of the
aforementioned criminal case corroborates Pareja's testimony that he had to do as he did
out of fear of further harassment.
Significantly too, it may be observed from a reading of the document that the affiant did
not over the property to the owner unconditionally. On the contrary, he made a reservation
of his right to secure from the property court a judicial declaration of whatever interest he
may have in the land. This indeed contradicts the supposed "voluntaries" of the tenant's act
in giving up the land.
With respect to the charge that a portion of the land was utilized by the tenant as a
"tilapia" fish pond, we agree with the lower court that there is no evidence that it resulted
in material injury to the land (Sec. 51, Rep. Act 1199). The uncontradicted testimony is that
the fishpond was made on requirement of the Bureau of Agricultural Extension that every
farmer in the vicinity should have a small fishpond, and that this particular fishpond was
on the portion ("balot") not used for planting rice (pp. 81-82, Record.)
Wherefore, finding no reason to review the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Florentino Joya. So ordered.
Case Analysis for Policy Science
Joya v. Pareha
The policy science jurisprudence is an advocacy of the social value. In this advocacy,
the policy science school deplores the failure of the ontological schools, for all their legal
craftsmanship, in supplying the empirical basis for the legal ordering of the society,
especially in the solution of problems involving the relation of the individual to the state
and the conflict between individual rights and national security. In this advocacy, the policy
science school also underscores the thesis that if legal philosophy is to succeed in providing
norms for the criticism or evaluation of the rules of positive law, whether national or
international, it must take into account the social values. In the instant case, the enactment
of the Agricultural Tenancy Law upholds the social value and human value against material
value remedied an existing evil because before the agricultural tenancy act provided for
security of these poor tenants, they were pushed out of the land by the landlords.
Case for Scandinavian Legal Realism
Primitivo Ansay et al, v.
The Board of Directors of the Natioanal Development et al.
G.R. No. L-13667 April 29, 1960
Paras, C. J.:
On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The
court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued the following order:
Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning;
considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there
was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court waited for sometime for them;
considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the court will
consider together with the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked
and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering
that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus for
petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that the Court
does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:
(a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial
powers to command respondents to be liberal;
(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but
that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of
respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to
comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.
Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed
bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they
discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition
and meaning of natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil
obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being
based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to
enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof".
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable
by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but
only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary
performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine Education
Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48
Off. Gaz., 5278)
x x x x x x x x x
From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It
is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation.
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor Union,
et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:
Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or
compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on equitable
consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in succeeding two years
from low salaried employees due to salary increases.
still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence the
ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present action.
Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Case Analysis for Scandinavian Legal Realism
The Scandinavian legal realists believe that legal ideology has no place in the
conception of the law and its component jural relations. Characterizing statutes as just or
unjust whether the evaluation is in terms of the natural law or the will of the supreme
political superior is meaningless. The reason behind is that the interpreter is only
expressing a personal preference or statement that he or she likes or dislikes a particular
statute or rule without any conscious reference to any known quality of the statute or rule.
They believe that the legal ordering of society is based on the feeling for justice prevalent
and current within the society. It is this feeling for societal good that gives substance and
meaning to the legal ordering of society. To them, the law is the means of regulating human
behavior based on the feeling for what is best for the social welfare. Therefore, its binding
force is no longer on the illusory idea of the consent of the governed.
For the Scandinavian legal realist, the conventional concepts of “right” and
“obligation” are verbal magic. It is pointed out that this is word magic for there can be
rights and obligations even without legal rules and sanctions. In the case cited, the Board of
Directors of the National Development Company, in performing the obligation of paying the
Christmas bonus, feels that in good conscience should comply with the undertaking which
is based on moral grounds.