Learning Democracy?
Civic Education in South Africa’s First Post-Apartheid Generation
Robert Mattes
Department of Political Studies
Centre for Social Science Research
University of Cape Town
Cape Town, South Africa
David Denemark
Political Science and International Relations
University of Western Australia
Crawley, 6009
Western Australia
Richard G. Niemi
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester
Rochester, New York 14627
Abstract This paper uses an original 2012 survey of 2,518 11
th Grade students from 45 High
Schools in metropolitan Cape Town to examine the political values and activities of high
school students in South Africa‘s first post-Apartheid generation. We do so in order to
explore whether the socialization and education of Cape Town‘s young can impart a
critical, engaged democratic citizenship, even in the face of high levels of poverty,
unemployment, racial inequality and violence. We show that their levels of ―Demand for
Democracy‖ are not substantially higher than recent national or municipal samples of
adults. We then explore the relative explanatory power of a number of factors related to
political knowledge and efficacy, their understanding of the meaning of democracy, and
the role of various dimensions of their schooling as well as their family backgrounds,
race, gender, and economic circumstances. While previous research has found that South
Africans‘ level of education is not related to demand for democracy, we find that some
aspects of the educational process can be exploited to increase popular demand.
Students‘ knowledge of politics and their understanding of democratic processes,
procedures, and citizenship, as well as their educational expectations (which likely
reflects home factors) are all highly related to their views of democracy. While
economic insecurity reduces students‘ demand for democracy, race per se has no effect.
Prepared for presentation at the
7th
General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research
Bordeaux, France, September 7, 2012
1
Learning Democracy?
Civic Education in South Africa’s First Post-Apartheid Generation1
Introduction and Overview
According to political culture theory, instability and political change are the consequence
of incongruity between mass attitudes and values on one hand, and political institutions on the
other (Eckstein 1966). Viewed through this lens, the demise of dozens of totalitarian and
authoritarian regimes over the past four decades resulted from their failure to supply sufficient
economic and political goods to satisfy citizens, or more broadly, the mismatch between their
operating norms and those of their mass public. However, just because popular norms had
evolved beyond what could be contained by these old regimes does not mean that mass publics
in new democracies have developed the norms and predispositions necessary to make democracy
work.
South Africa provides a classic illustration of this problem. While the old apartheid
regime attempted to legitimate itself by claiming to allow African ethnic groups to govern
themselves and develop according to their own cultural norms, and simultaneously protect
traditional cultures from the polluting impact of modernity, these claims were constantly exposed
by the harshness of everyday life, whether in the urban townships, the farms of ―white‖ South
Africa, or in the Bantustan homelands, and by the near totalitarian reach of the apartheid regime
and its intrusion into the most intimate aspects of the lives of coloured, Indian and black South
Africans. Thus, in the language of political culture theory, apartheid ultimately fell because the
norms of racial separation, racial hierarchy and white superiority were rejected by the vast
majority of the South African populace.
Yet while popular rejection of its key norms may have led to the demise of apartheid, it
is by no means certain that South Africans sufficiently endorse the norms supportive of a liberal
democracy. South Africans—of all races—pay minimal lip service to the idea of democracy,
and significant minorities appear willing to countenance one party rule or strong man
dictatorship, especially if these regimes would promise economic development (or may simply
believe erringly that those regimes are consistent with democracy) (Mattes and Thiel 1998;
Mattes 2002; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and
Bratton 2007). South Africans also display high levels of intolerance of political difference
(Gibson and Gouws 2003) and the highest levels of xenophobia measured anywhere in the world
(Mattes et al 2000).
The question remains, then, how can we explain the failure of South Africa‘s new
democratic citizens to embrace democracy and both its explicit protections and freedoms, and the
implicit values of tolerance and respect for the equality of all before the law? And can the
educational system teach support for democratic values and a commitment to its procedures?
To answer this question, we use an original, 2012 survey of a representative sample of
2,518 high school students from 45 schools in metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa to measure
their levels of demand for democracy. We then attempt to explain demand for democracy with
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regard to a range of factors, such as students‘ knowledge of South African politics, their
understanding of the meaning of democracy, and the role of various dimensions of their
schooling, including the classroom environment and extracurricular activities designed to
promote critical thinking and active involvement in decision-making, as well as their family
backgrounds, race, gender, and economic circumstances. Overall, we sought to establish the
relative impact of socialization and education on young citizens‘ political values and activities,
and the extent to which schools can impart a critical, engaged democratic citizenship, despite the
ongoing vicissitudes of unemployment, political divisions and social uncertainty.
While previous research has found that South Africa is one of the few countries in the
world where demand for democracy does not increase with levels of education, we identify
various parts of the educational process that can indeed make students ―more democratic.‖ In
particular, students‘ knowledge of politics and their understanding of democratic processes,
procedures, and citizenship, as well their educational expectations are all highly related to their
views of democracy. Economic insecurity reduces demand, but suprisingly race has no effect.
These results may enable us to identify those things that South African teachers might profitably
pursue to increase future citizens‘ embrace of democracy, and thereby forge a viable path to
―learning democracy.‖
Setting the Stage: Education, Race and Politics in South Africa
One important underlying factor for understanding South African attitudes toward
democracy and democratic citizenship is the history and nature of education in the country.
James Gibson has observed that alongside the former Soviet Union, South Africa is the only
country for which we have data where higher levels of education do not translate into higher
levels of political tolerance (Gibson 2005). While increasing levels of education are routinely
found to be one of the most important predictors of support for democracy (e.g., Rose, Mishler,
and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Markowski 2005; Rose, Mishler, and Munro 2006), South Africa
is the only country in Africa in which education does not increase public demand for democracy
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes, forthcoming 2014).
At first glance, this would seem to reflect the legacies of apartheid education. For nearly
half a century, National Party governments focused national resources on the education of white
school children, and used school curricula to impart an Afrikaner version of the nation‘s history
(Lowry 1995: 1006, cited in Allais 2009: 258). Textbooks were dominated by themes of black-
white conflict and black barbarism (Du Preez 1983, cited in Finchilescu and Dawes 1998: 565).
National Party governments also devoted considerable attention to the education of black
children, though for very different reasons. With the introduction of ―grand apartheid‖ in the late
1950s, the fates of black children living in the nominally self-governing Bantustans were handed
over to the education ministries of those new governments. Within ―white South Africa,‖
however, the National Party government took direct control of black education. While it
massively increased the numbers of black children in school, the content of education was
limited to those skills that the government felt blacks needed as temporary workers in white
South Africa, Government mandated curricula in black schools stressed a range of values that
underpinned the government policy of separate development, such as ―obedience, communal
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loyalty, ethnic and national diversity, the acceptance of allocated social roles, piety, and
identification with rural culture‖ (Lodge 1983:116, cited in Allais 2009: 258).
Beginning with the 1976 Soweto student riots, black schools became one of the main
sites for popular resistance to apartheid. Black schools in the late 1970s and 1980s were
characterized by frequent disruptions and boycotts resulting in many months and years of missed
classes. Nonetheless, despite being a locus of critical political views, schools remained racially
separate, and wellsprings of racial suspicions and animosities. Like virtually all aspects of life
under apartheid, schools were rigidly segregated, limiting almost all opportunities for inter-racial
contact (Holtman, Louw, Tredoux, and Carney 2005). By the mid-1990s, studies demonstrated
that students of different race groups had developed strongly negative images of other groups
(Dawes and Finchilescu 1996 and 2002). Systematic analysis of student essays written by
regional samples of 14 and 17 year old high school students in the Western Cape and Durban in
1992 and 1996 showed that white children viewed blacks as ―inherently violent, stupid,
uncivilized and chaotic – incapable of ruling the country and liable to plunge it into economic
ruin.‖ Blacks, for their part, saw whites as ―immoral, greedy (who) want all the power and
privileges for themselves‖ (Dawes and Finchilescu 1996).
Upon taking office in 1994, the African National Congress realized that overhauling the
educational system was one of its main challenges and embarked on several important reforms.
First of all, the new unified South Africa meant ending the old apartheid system of 14 separate
bantustan and ―own affairs‖ education departments, and reorganizing them into one national
department and nine provincial departments. Second, access to schooling was expanded as
quickly and as widely as possible. Third, the education budget was radically redistributed to
ensure equal spending on children of different races. Fourth, changes to school admission
criteria enabled increasing numbers of black students to attend heretofore racially exclusive
schools and universities (Chisholm 2005b). Fifth, the governance of schools was democratized
by the introduction in schools of Representative Councils of Learners from Grade 8 and above,
and the inclusion of parents and students on School Governing Boards.
Last, and for our purposes most important, the new government embarked on an
ambitious plan of curriculum reform. Almost immediately, in 1995, the new Minister of
Education and his staff began to cleanse racist and sexist language out of official texts. And by
1998, the government introduced a radically new ―outcomes based education (OBE)‖ curriculum
in primary grades (and 1999 in senior grades) adding an additional grade each year. Branded as
Curriculum2005, its underlying OBE approach did away with disciplines and subjects and
reorganized the curriculum into a series of ―learning areas‖ where units of learning are described
through statements about the student is supposed to be able to accomplish when they exit the
program (Deacon and Parker, 1999: 61).
At least in theory, this new curriculum was meant not only to change South Africa
pedagogy, but also to begin to change the country‘s political culture. In its initial incarnation,
however, there were no specific courses or modules devoted specifically or explicitly to civic
education or democracy. Rather, the intention was that ―the values of democracy, non-racialism
and non-sexism‖ were to be ―suffused‖ across the eight learning areas (Chisholm 2003: 268).
Instead of defining specific subjects or values to be taught, the approach was to define a set of
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outcomes, derived from the new Constitution, that ―define the kind of citizen that the post-
apartheid society would like to see created‖ (Chisholm 2003: 270). For example, one of the key
―developmental outcomes‖ was to produce students who are able to ―Participate as responsible
citizens in the life of local, national and global communities‖ (Cited in Chisholm 2003).
Yet within two years of its introduction, the first internal government evaluations began
to find little evidence of progress in the relevant grades and government-sponsored studies began
to link the lack of performance to the new curriculum (Chisholm 2003: 275). Facing a hail of
controversy and criticism both within the educational sector, as well as within the broader
society, the second Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, commissioned a review of the new
system beginning in 2000.
Two potentially important reforms emerged from this review that at least held out the
prospect for a more explicit treatment of civic education. One was the (re)introduction of
History as a mandatory subject in Grades 4-9, and optional for 10-12. The addition of history
was seen as a way to develop, among other things, ―democratic values and principles‖
(Department of Education 2001: 15). As a result, primary school (Grade 7) students would be
given an explicit treatment of systems of democracy as one unit within the history curriculum
(Chisholm 2005a: 201).
The second potentially important reform was the introduction of a new course called Life
Orientation. In secondary school, from Grades 10 to 12, students get two hours of Life
Orientation classes each week, designed to teach a range of life skills. However, while Grade 11
LO is supposed to have a specific democracy element, it has not yet been implemented
(Chisholm 2011). Furthermore, LO is non-examinable, making it doubtful, argue some
analysts, that schools, teachers or students take it seriously.
With the first cohort to spend its educational career under OBE having only graduated in
2008, the impact of South Africa‘s considered attempt to impart support for democratic process
and values is still an open question. Though one previous study has found that civic education
can work in South Africa, it did not evaluate the current educational system. In a natural field
experiment, Finkel and Ernst (2005) compared students who had participated in USAID funded
Street Law ―Democracy for All‖ courses with matched control groups in the late 1990s and
found substantial effects. However, an analysis of the first cohort of South Africans who had
spent all or substantial portions of their schooling in the new system found no gains in support
for democracy among this cohort. In fact, once controls for race, social condition, and political
attitudes were applied, the so-called ―born frees‖ were significantly less democratic than their
parents‘ or grandparent‘ generations (Mattes 2012).
Our current research which, when completed, will include survey analysis of Cape Town
students, high school teachers and parents, is the first significant attempt to assess in detail the
impact of South Africa‘s reformed educational process and curriculum on students‘ social and
political attitudes and behaviour. Its larger analytic goal, as we detail below, is to see if there are
ways to promote the ―learning of democracy‖ in a society with little experience of liberal
democracy, and high rates of poverty, economic insecurity, racial inequality and crime.
5
What Makes People View Democracy Favorably?
Explanations for how people develop positive views of democracy and, in particular, how
it is possible to inculcate a deeper, more intrinsic sense of democratic commitment among
younger citizens has its roots in four related, but distinct sets of research. The first source
follows from a particular take on a long line of research on youth and political socialization. In
this paradigm people develop their fundamental beliefs during their youthful, impressionable
years. After becoming aware of the social and political world around ages 13-15 (Adelson and
O‘Neill 1966), and perhaps even drawing on experiences earlier in life (Greenstein 1965; Jahoda
1963), adolescents and young adults form strong views of their political world, including both
partisan and non-partisan interpretations of their surroundings. They then tend to retain these
attitudes as they age. Attitudes do change, especially in response to events, but the basic values
established early in life set the tone for understanding, interpreting, and evaluating situations,
issues and problems that individuals confront later in life (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991;
Niemi and Jennings, 1991; Kelly and DeGraaf 1997; Sears and Funk 1999; Zuckerman, Dasovic
and Fitzgerald 2007; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Kroh forthcoming).
Crucial to this perspective is where, or from whom, youths form their initial views of
society. The traditional view has these views coming first and foremost from parents and
schools, and secondarily from the peers and from the more amorphous ―context‖ of the time and
place one is growing up. In established societies, these forces often coalesce to reinforce
existing ideas; older generations, schools, and overall surroundings convey generally similar
messages—at least about the less partisan aspects of politics. Hence the criticism sometimes
levelled again socialization research that it has a built-in ―conservative‖ bias—that it sees new
generations as largely created in the image of older ones.
And yet, socialization researchers have long noted that reproduction of older views is not
preordained. Especially at times of crisis and fundamental change in the world, youths develop
views that differ from and often directly challenge those of their elders. Thus we speak of a
widespread Depression Generation that grew to adulthood in the 1930s, of a Protest Generation
that evolved in the U.S. and elsewhere in the 1960s, of Post-Materialist Generations in much of
the developed world in the second half of the 20th
century (Inglehart 1977), and of a more recent,
―elite-challenging‖ generation (Inglehart 1997: 307; Dalton 2009: ch. 4). In all these instances,
young people developed viewpoints that were distinctive and evidently derived more from their
surroundings than from the adult population.2 Thus, one might expect generations growing up
under newly democratic governments to embrace the freedoms and opportunities afforded
them—if not entirely, at least to a greater extent than those who lived for long periods of time
under more authoritarian regimes.
However, the evidence of change in Third and Fourth Wave democracies is not one of a
clear cut movement from authoritarian views in the older generation to support from democratic
government among the younger population. While Richard Gunther and his colleagues have
found substantial increases in Spaniards‘ support for democracy, particularly among the young,
in the years after that country‘s successful transition (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986; and
Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 2005), the rest of the literature has thus far produced very little
evidence of important generational differences in support for democracy (Rose, Mishler, and
6
Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Markowski 2005; Rose,
Mishler, and Munro 2006; Chu et al. 2008). Indeed, in a recent global analysis, Norris (2011:
174) found that democratic aspirations (measured as the extent to which people think it is
important to live in a democracy on a scale of 1 to 10) increase with age. At the same time, what
she calls the ―democratic deficit‖ (the perceived extent of democracy subtracted from democratic
aspirations, both measured on a 1 to 10 scale) is highest among the young. In South Africa, as
noted above, Mattes (2012) has found no evidence of increases in democratic support among the
first ―Born Free‖ generation of South Africans.
That young people in newly democratic nations do not automatically adopt anti-
authoritarian, pro-democratic views draws attention to a second set of research—namely, the
voluminous literature that has documented consistent linkages between education and political
attitudes and behavior. As early as the pioneering work of Almond and Verba (1963) and other
work of that era, it was widely recognized that there were major differences across educational
strata in their views and behavior regarding politics and government. Since then, education has
repeatedly been shown to be an important predictor of turnout in the United States (Verba and
Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Sondheimer and
Green 2010) as well as in many other Western countries (Lipset 1960; Norris 2002; Dalton
2008a).3 Education has also been confirmed as a strong predictor of other citizen qualities such
as interest in politics, newspaper readership, political knowledge, interpersonal trust, tolerance of
political opponents, and a wide range of forms of political participation such as contacting
elected leaders, joining community associations, attending community meetings, political
internet activism, and protest both in the United States (Hyman, Wright and Reed 1978; Hyman
and Wright 1979; Bobo and Licari 1989; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Putnam 1995;
Brady et al. 1996; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barrry 1996; and Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001)
and other democracies in Europe and Latin America (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Milner 2002;
Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos 2004; Magalhães 2008; Dalton 2008a). The impact of
education is so regularly found that Philip Converse (1972) once called it the ―universal solvent‖
of political participation (cited in Dee 2004: 1700). In a 1996 summary, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-
Barry concluded (1996: 2):
The notion that formal educational attainment is the primary mechanism behind
citizenship characteristics is basically uncontested …. Formal education is almost
without exception the strongest factor in explaining what citizens do in politics and
how they think about politics.
While it is more limited, the existing literature in developing societies also bears out the
importance of education. Education has been shown to increase voter turnout and civic
engagement in several different developing world contexts (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978;
Anderson and Dodd 2006; Lam and Kuan 2008). More importantly for present purposes,
education has proved to be a very strong predictor of popular support for democracy in places
like Korea, Chile, Eastern Europe, Russia, and sub-Saharan Africa (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer
1998; Shin 1999; Markowski 2005; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Rose, Mishler,
and Munro 2006; Mattes and Bratton 2007).
Beyond the general impact of education, a third body of research has focussed on the
special case of democracy education. In many if not most established democracies, the general
7
school curriculum (particularly in social studies) is designed to teach a broader set of values such
as individualism, tolerance, and mutual respect. But democracies often go further and require
students to take specific classes in civic education that inculcate students in the workings of
democracy and government, as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (Callan 1997;
Chesney and Feinstein 1997; Milner 2002; Torney-Purta, Schwille, and Amadeo 1999; Torney-
Purta et al. 2001; Norris 2011). Whether through direct instruction about democratic norms or
more indirectly through imparting political knowledge, or through the effects of open classrooms
(Torney-Purta 2002) and active learning strategies (Dassonneville et al. 2012), a goal of civic
education is to foster greater understanding of and appreciation for democratic government. Of
particular relevance here is South Africa‘s effort not only to increase equality of education but its
2002 introduction of History and Life Orientation classes aimed at influencing youths‘ attitudes
toward the social and political world.4
The final source of research that has stimulated our interest is the literature on public
opinion in post-World War II Western Europe and Japan. Various scholars found rapid and
significant increases in pro-democratic values and attitudes in West Germany (Baker et al. 1981),
Austria (Mueller 1984), Italy (Sani 1980), and Japan (Richardson 1974; Flanagan and
Richardson 1984; Ikeda and Kohno 2008). Scholars have tended to credit considered efforts in
the schools, but also in media and civil society, with educating a new generation of
democratically minded citizens. Dalton‘s (1994: 471-472) description of the Federal Republic of
Germany is illustrative.
Confronted by an uncertain public commitment to democracy, the government
undertook a massive programme to re-educate the public. The schools, the media
and political organizations were mobilized behind the effort. And the citizenry itself
was changing – older generations raised under authoritarian regimes were being
replaced by younger generations socialized during the postwar democratic era.
These efforts created a political culture congruent with the new institutions and
processes of the Federal Republic. The West German public also learned democratic
norms by continued exposure to the new political system. As a result, a popular
consensus slowly developed in support of the democratic political system.
As noted above, evidence of large-scale generational shifts has been scant elsewhere,
though scholars have traced important effects among students exposed to small-scale
experiments in school civic education programs in Poland and South Africa (Slomczynski and
Shabad 1998; Finkel and Ernst 2005) as well as among adults participating in donor-supported
adult civic education programs in the Dominican Republic, Poland, Senegal, and South Africa
(Finkel 2002, 2003; Kuenzi 2005).
These four strains of research thus point to the possibility, though not the inevitability, of
rapid change in attitudes about governmental forms and processes, especially among the
relatively well-educated portions of society and particularly if intense educational resources are
harnessed to encourage change. Our first task, therefore, is to document the knowledge of
adolescents in Cape Town schools about politics in their country, their attitudes about the
functioning of their now-democratic government, and their understanding of and attitudes about
democratic government generally. As a second step, we undertake to determine what lies behind
8
their evaluations of democracy as a form of government, with a special eye on the apparent
contribution of education to those views. In our third step, we introduce a model that assesses
the impact of students‘ perceptions of democratic values and responsibilities, and of their
involvement in civically-minded activities. In our fourth step, we explore both the effect of
confidence in South African political and economic institutions and also examine the impact of
students‘ economic and physical insecurity on their support for democracy. In our fifth and final
step, we introduce students‘ self-perceived educational skill and their anticipated final level of
educational attainment, as well as their race and familial household assets.
Study Design
We interviewed a representative sample of 2,518 Grade 11 students from 45 schools in
metropolitan Cape Town from August-September 2012.5 Beginning with a list of all public and
private schools in the Cape Town metropolitan authority, we stratified schools by their former
legal status under apartheid, as well as by their graduation rates. Schools were randomly
selected with probability proportionate to the size of its Grade 11 population. Within each
sampled school, we randomly selected one Life Orientation class and one History class (if the
school offered History). In each sampled classroom, we administered questionnaires to all
students during regular school class periods. The questionnaires were self-administered and
were available in English or Afrikaans, with the student choosing which version to use.6 Two
different versions of the questionnaire were randomly assigned the forms differed in one section,
allowing us to cover a more extensive set of material). Of those students present on the day of
the interview, 0.9 percent either refused to participate or had their consent denied by their
parents.
Results
Demand for Democracy
In this analysis, our dependent variable is a concept we call Demand for Democracy. It is
composed of two separate sub-concepts called Support for Democracy (Gunther, Montero, and
Torcal 2005) and Rejection of Authoritarian Alternatives (Rose et al. 1998). Support for
Democracy measures people‘s sense of whether ―democracy is always preferable to any other
kind of government.‖ Because this item uses the ―D-word,‖ its validity has often been
questioned, since different respondents and different populations might possess differing
understandings of what democracy actually is. Because of the possibility that people might say
they prefer democracy when in fact they are willing to live with various forms of
authoritarianism that parade as democracy, Richard Rose and his colleagues (1998) developed a
set of questions that asked people about democracy‘s opposites, such as presidential dictatorship,
the one party state, or military rule.
However, while the term ―democracy‖ does offer analytical challenges, we believe that it
is impossible to develop a valid measure of citizens‘ demand for a democratic regime without
using it. Indeed, in previous work, we have shown that it is possible to put these concepts and
items together in the same scale in a valid and reliable way (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi
2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007). In the present project, we ask students whether they believe
9
democracy is ―always preferable‖ and also whether they think it is important for them to live in a
democratic country. In addition, we ask them whether or not they would reject any attempts to
abandon a democratic regime in favor of the one party state, presidential dictatorship, military
rule, or a return to the apartheid regime.
[Table 1 About Here]
The results, presented in Table 1, indicate that the Cape Town students are most likely to
reject a return to apartheid (75 percent) and least likely to reject abandoning democracy for
military rule. Just 60 percent say that democracy is ―always preferable‖ and only 45 percent say
that it is important for them to ―live in a country that is governed democratically.‖
But an even more important point to take from Table 1 is the comparison with the results
from a national sample in the 2012 Afrobarometer South Africa survey, as well as a municipal
Cape Town sample of the 2012 Super-Diversity survey carried out by the University of Cape
Town and the Max Planck Institute. With one exception, the students consistently display lower
levels of demand for democracy than either adult Capetonians or adult South Africans, markedly
so in a few instances.
From the items displayed in Table 1, including the item on the importance of living in a
democracy, we created a valid and reliable composite index of Demand for Democracy.7
Having found that Cape Town students are less than fully supportive of democratic
processes, our next task is to uncover the kinds of characteristics associated with higher and
lower levels of support. We will do so by a series of models in which we regress our measure of
demand for democracy on students‘ knowledge and understanding of politics, their school
experiences, political interest and anticipated participation, their feelings of economic and
physical uncertainty, and ―background‖ measures including household assets, expected
educational achievement, and population group. As we proceed, we will retain in a subsequent
model the variables that achieved statistical significance in the previous model. As we will note
as we go along, variables that are deleted – especially the school and classroom measures, may
be intervening variables that help us understand the way in which ―later‖ characteristics
influence students‘ views.
Political Knowledge, Meanings of Democracy, and Cognitive Engagement
Our first broad area of enquiry is what students know about South African politics, and
what they understand by the word democracy. While factual survey questions have often been
criticized as ―game show‖ type trivialities, previous research has documented that the ability to
offer a definition of what democracy is strongly related to Democratic Demand (Bratton, Mattes
and Gyimah-Boadi 2005) as is the ability to answer questions about basic constitutional and
political facts (Mattes and Shenga 2013). The same is true for how one understands democracy.
In general, respondents who understand democracy as a set of institutional procedures are much
more likely to support democracy than those who see it as a set of substantive outcomes
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes et al. 2014
forthcoming).
10
Students who know more about politics, both theoretically and practically, are likely to
have read and heard more about democracy and about government in general, to have thought
more often about history and politics, and to have taken part in more discussions and debates
about the pros and cons of various ways in which governments are organized and run. This
greater ―interaction‖ with political ideas is likely, we believe, to result in more positive
judgments about democracy and, correspondingly, more negative views about autocratic forms
of governance. That such results are not guaranteed, however, comes from the observation noted
in the introduction that the ―born free‖ generation of South Africans, who grew up under
democracy and surely have read and heard more about it than their predecessors, do not judge it
more favorably
In the current surveys, students were asked nine items testing their knowledge of the
apartheid past, the purpose of democracy, the new Constitution and basic facts about the
political system. (see appendix). Large majorities knew which political party controlled the
national parliament (90 percent) and provincial assembly (80 percent). Only about one-half of
the sample could correctly identify the purpose of multi party democracy (52 percent), an
example of discrimination (51 percent), elements of the Bill of Rights (41 percent), which
political party created apartheid (36 percent) or an instance of non-democracy (33 percent).
Less than one-in-five (17 percent) could identify the role of the Constitutional Court.
Consistent with previous research on South African adults (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-
Boadi 2005), the students tended to see democracy in substantive terms. Almost nine-in-ten said
that the provision of ―basic necessities for all‖ (85 percent) was a ―very important‖ characteristic
of democracy. In contrast, little more than one-third said the same thing about a ―small income
gap between rich and poor‖ (38 percent). Echoing prior findings, the students do not rate
political procedures very highly. In Cape Town, in which national minorities such as Coloured
and White respondents form the majority, one-half see the ―protection of minorities‖ (49 percent)
as essential. But only four-in-ten see ―regular elections‖ (40 percent) as a ―very important‖
characteristic of democracy, and just one-quarter say the same thing about ―at least two parties
competing with each other‖ (26 percent), ―limits on government power‖ 26 percent), ―majority
rule‖ (25 percent), or ―freedom of expression‖ (25 percent).
[Table 2 about here]
The initial model, presented in Table 2, includes, most prominently, students‘ knowledge
of politics and of the political system of South Africa. Our expectation was that ―test scores‖
would be positively related to demand for democracy. However, even if there is a positive
relationship between knowledge and demand for democracy, it may be spurious. This, of course,
is the reason for including other variables in our models. Thus, in the first model, we also
include variables related to student‘s cognitive engagement in politics, and internal efficacy, as
well as items measuring students understanding of the meaning of democracy. It is likely that
students who are especially interested in politics and discuss politics frequently are more
knowledgeable than others – their greater interest and more frequently discussions
simultaneously prompting more democratic viewpoints. Controlling for this factor may thus
render knowledge itself an insignificant predictor of demand for democracy. Similarly, students
11
who are especially efficacious may support democracy, as they feel they in fact understand
government, while less efficacious students feel they are disadvantaged regardless of the
governmental structure. How students interpret the word democracy may also make a significant
difference in their support for it.
The results of our first model suggest that knowledge plays a vital role in promoting
students‘ demand for democracy. Political knowledge is clearly important, as judged by the
large beta coefficient or by the amount of change in democratic demand associated with changes
in objective knowledge. Moving up five points on the test score variable is associated with
nearly a one point rise in support for democracy (which would be equivalent to changing one‘s
answer on one of the component items from strongly approving of a non-democratic alternative
such as army rule to strongly disapproving of it).
Knowledge is important in another way as well. Students who understand democracy as
majority rule, regular elections, multi-party competition, protecting the rights of minorities,
freedom of speech and limited government are more likely to want more democracy. This is the
good news. The bad news, however, is that – as we have seen above – clear minorities of
students see these procedures as foundational to democracy. At the same time, imbuing
democracy with substantive meanings involving basic necessities or income (and even gender)
equality does nothing to enhance students‘ support for it. Those who see democracy in terms of
income quality, freedom from poverty and gender equality are neither more nor less likely to
want democracy. This supports Joseph Schumpeter‘s (1948) basic insight, made almost seventy
years ago: if democracy is defined as outcomes, citizens should support any regime that produces
those outcomes, whether or not it is elected or respects individual rights. This finding is also of
consequence in a country like South Africa, in which millions of its citizens continue to have
struggled to find economic security. Though, as we will see in later models, economic concerns
and views of the economic system‘s provision of opportunities for improvement are important
mediators of attitudes toward democracy, a minority of South Africa‘s young citizens appear
primarily to premise their support of democracy on its procedural qualities.
Finally, we note that knowledge is important even when one takes into account one‘s
interest in and discussion of politics, while cognitive engagement with political issues by itself is
unrelated to democratic demand in this multivariate equation. Interestingly, internal political
efficacy (the sense that one can understand government) does not make one more favorable
toward democracy. But neither does its inclusion in the model undercut the contribution factual
knowledge and a procedural understanding of the concept.
The Sources of Knowledge and the Classroom Environment
Our next step in identifying the sources of student views of democracy is to add to the
model two new sets of variables – the first assesses students‘ levels of news media use and the
second measures the characteristics of their classrooms and schools. The second model thus
incorporates students‘ efforts to gather information about current events, plus aspects of their
classes and schools that encourage or require them to take note of or be involved in civic and
political discussion and activities. As noted above, these items are added into a model that
includes those that were found in the first model to be statistically significant.
12
Our measure of news media use consists of student self-reports of how often they read
about ―what is happening in South Africa‖ and how often they watched or listened to the news
on television or radio. The second set asked how often they read about news and politics on the
Internet or on social media. Together these items indicate the extent to which students actively
seek out political news.
Compared to adult South Africans, students report far lower levels of news media use.
While one-half say they ―often‖ watch television news (51 percent), less than one-third
frequently listen to radio news (28 percent) or read newspapers (28 percent). While one might
see this as reflecting a generational shift away from conventional and toward new media, even
smaller proportions say that they ―often‖ get news from social media (19 percent) or internet (10
percent).
But students do not simply learn about politics and democracy on their own initiative.
They can learn either from formal lectures and textbooks, or classroom discussion. They can
also learn about democracy simply by the style by which teachers run their classrooms and the
extent to which critical engagement is supported in the learning process. Thus, we begin by
measuring the sheer amount of classroom time spent on relevant topics by asking : ―How often
do you talk about current events, politics and government‖ across in a range of different course
including History/Geography, Life Orientation, Business/Economics, and a catch-all ―other.‖ In
the survey, almost six-in-ten of those 11th
graders who are taking History (57%) say they ―often‖
―discuss political and social issues,‖8 compared to one-third of those in a Business or Economics
class (32 percent). In contrast, just one-fifth of students say they ―often‖ discuss these things in
Life Orientation class.
In addition to total classroom time, we inquired about what is frequently called classroom
climate (Torney-Purta 2002). The first such measure asked about the extent of critical discussion
and debate that took place in the classroom, including how much leeway students are given in
discussing political and social issues. The extent to which classes are ―open‖ with respect to
discussion and debate has often been found to be important to what students glean from civics
classes (Campbell 2008). We also inquired about the social environment of classes, inquiring
about tolerance and respect for divergent opinions on the part of both teachers and students.
More tolerance and respect for others might also indicate by practice what is expected of
students in a more open, democratic society.
Finally, we inquired about various specific activities, including participation in school
organizations, a number of extracurricular civic or history education courses, and civics oriented
field trips. Though results are inconsistent, such ―active learning‖ activities have sometimes
been found to influence students‘ knowledge and activity levels (e.g., Dassonneville et al. 2012;
Torney-Purta et al. 2001: 150). As they often relate in one way or another to ―government‖
(either through their own organizational structure or through the contacts they make), they may
also affect students‘ attitudes about forms of government in general (Torney-Purta et al. 1975).
The survey finds that one-quarter of students participated in ―Facing Ourselves‖ history
education courses (27 percent) run by the non-governmental organization Shikaya, and even
13
smaller proportions took part in civic education courses run by Street Law (9 percent) or CLASI
(6 percent). Larger proportions had participated in single day-long field trips to Robben Island
(45 percent) (where Nelson Mandela and other liberation leaders has been imprisoned), the
District Six Museum (39 percent) (which documents the history of the victims of forced
removals from the centre of Cape Town), Parliament (38 percent) or the Cape Town Holocaust
Museum (24 percent).
[Table 3 about here]
The results of our second model are shown in Table 3 (with the two significant variables
carried forward from Model One highlighted in shaded rows). Note first that students‘ political
knowledge and their understanding of democratic procedures retain nearly as strong impacts as
in Model 1. News media use, however, is unrelated to views of democracy. Paying attention to
the news might contribute indirectly to how students think about government,9 but beyond
possibly increasing their knowledge, it does not make students more sympathetic to democratic
ideas.
In contrast, various factors related to the classroom experience have significant effects on
attitudes about democracy, even with political knowledge and understanding in the model.
Importantly, however, it is not the total amount of classroom discussion that makes a difference
but the way in which the class is run. Moreover, of all the school variables, only critical
discussion and debate contributes significantly and positively to greater expression of democratic
viewpoints. When teachers allow students to bring up current events, present multiple sides of
and issue, make up their own minds, and even encourage them to disagree respectfully with the
teacher, students more often approve of democratic governmental structures and processes. As
Torney-Purta et al. (2001: 137) expressed it, ―the extent to which students experience their
classrooms as places to investigate issues and explore their opinions and those of their peers‖ is
―a vital part of civic education.‖
And in this sense, Cape Town teachers seem to be doing a good job promoting these
types of environment. Approximately one half of all students said that they felt they can,
respectfully, disagree with their teachers (54 percent), and that their teachers present several
sides of issues when explaining them (47 percent). Four-in-ten say their teachers encourage
them to make up their own minds (42 percent) when discussing political and social issues.
However, just one-quarter say that students often spontaneously bring up social or political
issues during classroom discussion (24 percent).
Surprisingly, other school variables, including even the measure of the social
environment of the classroom, seem to lessen students‘ commitment to democracy. Perhaps
most surprisingly, and in sharp contrast to Finkel and Ernst‘s (2005) earlier findings, the variable
with the greatest impact, suggests that participation in extra-curricular civic education courses
specifically designed to enhance their understanding of and appreciation for tolerance and the
rule of law actually reduces students levels of democratic commitment. This is a finding that
deserves greater attention in future work.
Overall, we are left with the conclusion that the openness of the classroom to debate and
14
respectful dissent provides one key to the successful inculcation of demand for democracy. The
ability of schools to impart a new sense of active democratic citizenship, these results
underscore, may well rest on their informal socio-political environment more than the formal
political knowledge they convey.
Citizenship, Democracy and Political Values
We saw in the first model, above, that students‘ understanding of procedural aspects of
democracy is a good predictor of their support for a democratic government. In our third model,
we delve more deeply into how students‘ understanding and expectations of citizenship
influences their views. In particular, we consider whether their views of what it means to be a
good citizen and their projected levels of political participation are related to demand for
democracy. While a favorable view of democracy in the abstract might shape their views of
good citizenship, we think it is more likely that how they view the role of ordinary citizens
provides a basis for their evaluation of a particular form of government. Specifically, those who
think of citizens as playing an active and critical role, and those who see themselves in a
participatory role, should be more likely to demand a form of government that values citizen
input.
Many scholars have expected to find that people in traditional settings or developing
societies are more likely to see themselves as ―subjects‖ (Almond and Verba 1963). In
particular, scholars of African politics have characterized people as ―subjects‖ rather than
―citizens‖ (Mamdani 1996; Etounga-Manguelle 2000), as ―voters but not yet citizens‖ (Bratton
and Logan 2013) or in specific settings as ―uncritical citizens‖ (Mattes and Shenga 2013). At the
same time, Africa‘s own process of democratization demonstrates that younger cohorts have, at
times, led struggles that overthrew dictatorship (Bratton and Van Der Walle 1998) or apartheid
in South Africa.
We measure views about citizenship and political action with four related indexes. The
first two juxtapose examines the degree to which Cape Town students see citizenship in active
(rather than passive) terms. The second assesses the degree to which they see citizenship as
entailing an uncritical, mobilized acquiescence to political organizations or government. Those
who believe that the good citizen is an active one, respond positively to the index‘s items about
voting, discussing politics, taking part in activities to benefit other people or the environment and
to protest peacefully against laws they feel are unjust. Many students seem to understand
citizenship in this way. Six-in-ten say that it is ―very important‖ that, ―as an adult‖ people
should participate in activities that protect the environment (64 percent), that they should obey
the law (61 percent), and that they should vote in every election (59 percent), but just a bare
majority say they should take part in activities that help the community (51 percent). Smaller
proportions say that it is ―very important‖ that adult citizens should peacefully protest against
unjust laws (37 percent), or take part in political discussion (19 percent).
Those who accept a subject role for the citizen agree with index‘s statements that s that
people should not criticize the government, that they should respect governmental
representatives, join a political party, or agree with the majority of people in your community.
The survey suggests that while Cape Town‘s schools may have done a good job inculcating a
15
spirit of criticalness, there are some significant legacies of conformism. Four-in-ten say that it is
―very important‖ that adults should ―show respect for government representatives,‖ and between
one-quarter and one-fifth say that citizens should join a political party (24 percent), not criticize
government (24 percent), or agree with the majority on political issues (20 percent).
We also asked about the likelihood that respondents would engage in a variety of social
and political activities. The first set of activities tapped more conventional, civically oriented
participation. These items asked respondents whether they were likely to volunteer time to help
people and to engage in various less time-consuming, more conventional modes or participation,
including writing a letter to the editor, calling in a radio, and contacting one‘s representative
about an issue, and, finally, to participate in a peaceful protest march or rally. Alternatively, we
asked whether respondents were likely to do two more violent forms of political activity:
blocking traffic and occupying buildings as a form of protest.
[Table 4 about here]
Adding these four indicators to the progressive regression model – while retaining all of
the previously significant factors – produces the results shown in Table 4. Once again, the
students‘ political knowledge and their understanding of democratic procedures remain
significant predictors, though the strength of the relationship is somewhat reduced. The fact that
students‘ thoughts about democratic procedures retain some of their predictive power in the face
of other attitudinal controls attests to the power of understanding democracy in creating support
for it. On the other hand, once the new variables are introduced, school and classroom variables
are uniformly rendered insignificant, almost certainly due to their indirect role in shaping
students‘ attitudes. Curiously, the one exception is students‘ participation in on-going
extracurricular civic education activities, which produces a significant, negative effect on their
support for democracy.
Three of the four new variables are powerful predictors of demand for democracy.
Importantly, contrasting views of the good citizen relate in opposite ways to support for
democratic government. Students who think of citizenship as active and participatory are
considerably more likely than others to prefer democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives.
Those who view citizenship as subservience and acquiescence are much less likely to be
supportive of democratic government. In the same vein, note that the item about the likelihood
of engaging in violent protest also has a negative relationship with support for democracy.
Students who say they are likely to engage in illegal protests are significantly less approving of
democracy. Clearly, students who regard non-conventional and violent forms of political
activity as potential avenues for their own political activity are significantly less likely both to
support democracy and to reject authoritarian forms of governance.
Several alternative interpretations of these results are possible. It may be that subject-
oriented respondents think in a principled way that democratic governments are too weak to
accomplish important goals. Alternatively, they may simply feel that democratic government
has let them down – that participation can have some beneficial effects, but not for them.
Likewise, those who are relatively supportive of violent protest may think that it takes disruptive
behavior to move any government, or they may feel let down by the present regime. In any
event, we see once again the powerful connection between how students understand the way in
16
which democracies operate – in this case, how democratic citizens act – and the extent to which
they demand democratic form of government. These disparate, positive and negative, effects
echo those in Model 2, in which critical and active challenging of ideas in the classroom
prompted support for democracy, while discussion of current events and government, and an
environment of tolerance in the classroom prompted lower levels of support for democracy.
Economic and Physical Insecurity; Confidence in Political and Economic Institutions
Having seen that those who see citizens as acquiescent subjects, along with those who
believe in violent protest, are relatively unsupportive of democracy, it is important to consider
whether this connection is largely a reflection of disdain for democracy in principle or from its
performance as a provider of economic and political security.
Democratic governments are charged by citizens to do more than adhere to lofty
principles and legal precepts. As arbiters of the public‘s tax revenue, protectors of citizen safety,
managers of the nation‘s economic growth, and providers of a variety of services, governments
are widely expected ―to deliver.‖ Norris (2011) in this sense has argued that at least part of the
current wave of disillusionment with governments in many democracies around the world
reflects citizens‘ growing unease with, especially, the current economic downturn. It is, she
contends, a reflection of disdain for the ―performance‖ of governmental institutions more than a
deep-seeded dismissal of democratic principles and regimes overall. Though her analysis
remains contentious, and citizen disdain can be shown across countries with varying economic
trends (Dalton 2004: 30-31), it points to an important dimension of support for democracy:
confidence in the nation‘s economic and political institutions and the degree to which
government can deliver security for its citizens.
In new democracies, citizens may well regard the building of democracy as a vehicle for
ridding the nation of corruption and a means for promoting economic stability and physical
security. This is a particular worry in South Africa. For years, the African National Congress
and its junior partners of the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African
Trade Unions have, to varying degrees, sold democracy to their followers in largely materialist,
if not Leninist terms. That is, democracy is where material inequalities are removed, helped
along by democratic centralism amongst the popular organs of the oppressed. South Africa‘s
high levels of poverty, joblessness and inequality have created a receptive climate for such a
depiction. At the same time, fledgling democracies may not succeed during their formative years
in effecting broad-based economic and security reforms, thereby prompting citizens to view
authoritarian politics as a more expedient way to ―get things done.‖ High school students might
be especially susceptible to this view, as they have had less time to absorb the idea of adhering to
principles in the face of (temporarily) negative outcomes. Thus, students‘ views on these issues
might have an important impact on their demand for democracy or, alternatively, authoritarian
politics. Indeed, prior research has demonstrated that South Africans‘ support for democracy,
both across the entire population but even within the youngest generations, has a strongly
―instrumentalist‖ nature to it, strongly linked to satisfaction with economic performance (Mattes
2001; Bratton and Mattes 2001; and Mattes 2012).
Our fourth model, in addition to the significant factors carried forward from Model 3,
17
introduces two indexes that measure students‘ perceived economic and physical security. The
former derives from three survey items tapping the frequency that respondents feared their
family would not have enough money, or that someone in their family might suffer a serious
illness, and the number of times they had gone without electricity in their homes. The index
measuring physical security measures the frequency that students felt unsafe in the street, in
school, and in their homes.
The fourth model also examines students‘ confidence in the country‘s economic and
political institutions. One index measures respondent confidence in national political
institutions: the President, the national government of South Africa, and the police. A second
index measures students‘ perceived confidence in local and regional political institutions: the
provincial government of the Western Cape, and the municipal government of Cape Town. An
additional index in Model 4 measures students‘ confidence in the South African political system:
its ability to be changed if citizens are unhappy with what it is doing, the extent of corruption;
and the degree to which crime can be expected to be punished under the law. The final index
measures students‘ confidence in the economic system: the perception that they will have better
opportunities than their parents; the feeling that people who work hard can get ahead; and the
extent to which they feel pride in what South Africa has achieved.
[Table 5 about here]
On the one hand, the results of Model 4 suggest a continuing ―instrumentalist‖ tinge to
how South Africans view democracy. Of the newly introduced items in Model 4, economic
insecurity promotes support for authoritarian politics, while confidence in South Africa‘s
economic system, to the contrary, is a strong predictor of demand for democracy. Clearly,
having confidence in being able to ―get ahead‖ economically in the nation is a vital component in
students‘ support for democratic politics, and likely can be seen as a vote of confidence in the
government‘s supportive role for the nation‘s economic fortunes. Students‘ physical safety,
however, is not an important arbiter of their attitudes toward democratic or authoritarian
governance. Nor are their levels of confidence in the nation‘s political institutions and processes,
or the provincial and municipal political institutions.
Economic concerns can be seen, then, as taking precedence in students‘ evaluations of
the desirability of democratic or non-democratic forms of political organization. In a nation that
still suffers from high levels of unemployment, gross inequality, and a raft of economic
uncertainties, these patterns serve as a reminder that citizens in new democracies have important
economic expectations that are likely to color their perceptions of the efficacy of the governance
systems that are instituted. For these people, democracy, to prosper, must ―deliver‖ in the
domain of economic provision if government is to realize the support of its citizens.
On the other hand, the results from Model 4‘s regression reflect the continued impact of
political knowledge and procedural understandings of democracy. Students who think of
citizenship in active, participatory ways also remains a significant predictor of demand for
democracy, while participation in extracurricular activities, a likelihood of engaging in protest or
violent activities, and viewing civic citizenship in a passive way continue to predict support for
authoritarian alternatives to democratic processes. That these variables remain important even
18
after controlling for economic considerations suggests a growing impact of ―intrinsic‖
considerations.
Educational Expectations, Perceived Educational Skill, Race, and Household Economics
The final model, in addition to eight significant factors carried forward from Model 4,
introduces several personal social and economic factors that can be expected to have an impact
on students‘ support for democracy. Because young citizens bring their familial and social
realities as well as their individual expectations with them to the classroom, these ―background‖
factors are likely to have an important impact on students‘ political attitudes. In a country like
South Africa, with a long history of legally enshrined distinctions on the basis of race, students
enter the high school each morning from a variety of socio-economic conditions which, despite
the demise of apartheid, continue to reflect those erstwhile distinctions.
Model 5 thus introduces factors that tap these perceptual and demographic forces. The
first of these is a variable that measures students‘ expected educational attainment. Because
students engage in the civics educational process with a variety of expectations of their ultimate
level of educational attainment, these self-perceptions are expected to affect their demand for
democracy. Similarly, we introduce a variable measuring the student‘s relative rating of their
educational skills compared to other students. We would expect students who feel they will do
well by the educational system, and who have high levels of skill to carry them forward, would
be attracted to democracy, with its emphasis on procedural fairness and meritocracy. Those who
feel they will not do well in the educational system, and do not have the skills to do so, might
well be less persuaded by democracy‘s ordered system of power and provision.
Model 5 also introduces a dummy variable for the student‘s race: Africans are
distinguished from Whites, Indians, Coloureds, and Others. As black Africans were historically
excluded from the regularized channels of advancement, and still disproportionately dominate
the ranks of the economically disadvantaged in South Africa, they might be less prone to support
democracy, given the likelihood of feelings that the country‘s new democratic system still does
not ―deliver‖ for Africans. Finally, this model also introduces an index measuring the household
assets of students, including such things as having a TV and a computer in the household, as well
as more basic things such as hot running water, a flush toilet, and an electric stove. Students
coming from families that do not have fundamental comforts of modern life might be expected to
regard democracy as a luxury, while viewing authoritarian alternatives that could command a
broader distribution of these sorts of assets as desirable.
[Table 6 about here]
The results from Model 5 show that each of the significant factors carried forward from
Model 4 remain significant, despite the introduction of the new factors in the Model. Students‘
political knowledge remains a highly significant predictor of demand for democracy, as does
regarding active involvement in civics activities. Viewing democracy in terms of procedural
mechanisms and the regularized control of political power also continues to predict support for
democracy. At the same time, as in Model 4, participating in school extracurricular activities,
perceiving the good citizen as passively conforming to the majority sensibility, feeling economic
19
insecurity, and viewing protest and violent activities as possible courses of action in the future,
are all negatively associated with support for democracy, and thus denoting a significant
likelihood of supporting authoritarian alternatives to democracy.
Of the new factors introduced in Model 5, it is only students‘ expected educational level
that has a significant effect on their attitudes toward democracy. Those who feel they will
achieve high levels of education are significantly more likely to demand democracy than those
who feel they will attain only a low level of education. Students‘ perceived relative educational
skill, on the other hand, has no effect on attitudes toward democracy.
Students‘ family assets, similarly, have no bearing on their demand for democracy.
School, in this sense, seems not to be unduly constrained by the household realities of students.
Perhaps most surprising is the lack of a direct impact of students‘ race. Africans were no more
or less likely to demand democracy than White, Coloured, and Indian students, and those from
―Other‖ racial groups. In this sense, South Africa has managed to divest itself of racially
distinctive attitudes toward governance, at least in terms of young citizens‘ views about the
desirability of democracy. However, racial differences may well be indirectly evident –
manifesting themselves in a variety of other sensibilities, including economic insecurity and
confidence in the nation‘s economic system. South Africa‘s endemic unemployment and
underemployment continue disproportionately to disadvantage black Africans.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to establish whether the socialization and education of Cape
Town‘s youths can impart a critical, engaged democratic citizenship, despite the ongoing
vicissitudes of unemployment, political divisions, and social uncertainty in South Africa. Given
the number of countries across the globe with no history of liberal democracy that are attempting
to democratize, this case study is highly relevant. In short, this paper, in the context of one of the
world‘s best known new democracies, asks whether democratic norms and values can be instilled
through the educational process, and thereby lend support to educational reform as an important
pathway to democracy.
The South African setting for this study was not very encouraging, as the evidence from
existing surveys had indicated that the first post-apartheid generation of South Africans – the
first cohort which has spent substantial portions of their schooling in the new system – was, if
anything, significantly less democratic than their parents‘ or grandparent‘ generations.
Nevertheless, because these students who are now finishing high school are among the first to
spend their educational career entirely under the outcomes based education known as
Curriculum2005, including a compulsory civics component called ―Life Orientation,‖ and some
taking new History courses, we have sought to take this opportunity to explore the likely
consequences of various aspects of South Africa‘s new education system on young citizens‘
political attitudes and behavior.
Our initial results, like those of a previous study, were dispiriting. Students‘ levels of
―Demand for Democracy‖ were below those of recent readings of adults from Cape Town or
amongst South Africans more generally. The items we used inquired not only whether
20
democracy is (in principle) preferable, but whether respondents disapproved of authoritarian
alternatives. While a high percentage of students did not favor a return to apartheid, surprisingly
large numbers were indifferent toward or actually approved of options such as doing away with
elections and Parliament or allowing the army to govern the country.
The results were mildly more encouraging when we examined the correlates and probable
causes of higher levels of support for democracy. While previous research found that South
Africans‘ level of education is not related to demand for democracy, we find that some aspects of
the educational process do matter. In particular, students‘ knowledge of politics and their
understanding of democratic processes, procedures, and citizens‘ roles, as well as their
anticipated future education (which likely reflects home as well as school factors) are all highly
related to their support for democracy.
Likewise, students‘ attitudes about citizenship were influential. Those who felt that
citizens should play an active, lawful role in the country‘s activities were considerably more
likely to have a democratic perspective. In contrast, those who spoke of citizenship only in
passive or subject terms, as well as those who could see themselves in the future taking violent
actions, were more likely to support authoritarian forms of governance. Moreover, these
relationships were particularly strong and survived multiple controls in our progressive
multivariate model.
However, the results were mixed with regard to specific classroom practices. Students in
classes that were ―open‖ to meaningful, respectful discussion and debate were more likely to
demand democracy. However, its impact on democratic demand is likely to be indirect since the
variable fell away once we controlled for citizenship values.
Our single anomalous and puzzling finding is that students who were more frequent
participants in school organizations more often endorsed authoritarian principles. More
disconcerting is that students who were a part of sustained, targeted civic education curricula –
Street Law and the like – were also more likely to be accepting of non-democratic arrangements.
This clearly demands a more focussed analysis than we have scope for in the present paper.
Importantly, economic security and confidence in the economic system were also
significantly related to democratic attitudes, suggesting the continued presence of instrumentalist
considerations of democracy. However, they did not overwhelm the informational and
attitudinal correlates, suggesting the growth of intrinsic support for democracy.. Of course, the
importance of economic confidence also creates a daunting hurdle for fledgling democracies like
South Africa‘s, as they are often beset with long-term economic problems, including significant
inequality, unemployment and uneven development. This effect suggests that school-based
curricula must be accompanied by sufficient economic growth and stability to legitimize the new
democratic regime and its ability to ―deliver.‖ Finally, despite the importance of perceptions of
the economic system more generally, personal economic circumstances, along with race, did not
ultimately influence students‘ views. This suggests that schools may well have the potential to
shape the demand for democracy of all types of students. This, the results underwrite, is
especially the case by schools promoting a classroom environment in which the fair and critical
consideration of issues – an essential element of democratic citizenship – is undertaken.
21
Thus, the jury is still out on the extent to which schools in South Africa can train people
into being democratically engaged and supportive citizens in a new democracy. Political
knowledge and a more sophisticated understanding of democratic governance – both of which
schools should be promoting – are an avenue to success. And yet, in an important sense, it may
be that people simply have to ―grow up democratic‖ in order fully to internalize democratic
values and norms. If ongoing corruption, economic problems and insecurity continue to burden
a new regime with uncertainties, cynicism, and problems that cannot quickly be resolved,
fledgling democrats may be susceptible to the lure of returning to authoritarian politics ―to get
things done.‖ In such a situation, schools, even with purposive-curricula, like ―Life
Orientations,‖ or civic-specific programs such as Street Law, may not be able to assuage the ill-
feelings of those who remain dispossessed in a democratic system that touts inclusion, stability
and equality before the law. Our results identify some of the ways schools can attempt to
overcome the obstacles they face in creating a demand for democracy. The question remains as
to how much they can in fact achieve amidst the myriad challenges that face young democracies.
22
Appendix
Variables in the Analysis:
Item Wording and Construct Statistics
This appendix lists all indicators used in this article, presented in the order of the regression
models examined.
Three types of indicator are employed.
Single items are used where a concept is measured with one survey question. We report
the verbatim wording of survey questions. The accuracy (validity and reliability) of
single item indicators is based on the correspondence of the item‘s wording with the
underlying concept (face validity), its association with other theoretically expected
correlates (construct validity) or, eventually, test-retest reliability through longitudinal
analysis.
We also use several two item constructs, the composition of which is reported here. In
this case, validity and reliability are established by the methods already mentioned, but
also by examining inter-item correlation (Pearson‘s r) and internal consistency
(Cronbach‘s Alpha).
Wherever possible, we use multi-item indices, again reporting how these are constructed.
These indices allow us to establish validity through factor analysis (which measures how
each observed item relates to a hypothesized latent construct) and reliability analysis
(Cronbach‘s Alpha).
There are many different combinations of factor analysis. To err on the side of caution, we apply
the most stringent methods, that is, maximum likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation,
guaranteeing that if a factor solution can be found, it will also be found via all other methods.
Test statistics from factor and reliability analyses were used to establish the accuracy of all
multi-item indices. However, we ultimately calculate simple average – and, in specified cases,
additive – index scores. Since the actual factor weightings of individual items may vary across
countries and social groups, it is safest to assume that all items contribute to each index equally.
All test statistics reported in the text are ultimately based on a full sample of 2,518 interviews.
Test statistics (correlations, factor loadings, reliability coefficients) are calculated on this
unweighted sample.
Unless otherwise noted, all descriptive and test statistics are calculated after omitting missing
data and either excluding don‘t know answers, or recoding them to theoretically defensible
positions on the response scale.
23
Variables in the Analysis
Dependent Variables
Item Wording
Construct
Loading
Missing
Data
(Percent)
Demand for Democracy: i_DEMAND
Index Additive scale of the following six items; divided by 6. Not Done Not Done
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the
following alternatives in South Africa?
(1) B7a_x: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.
4=strongly disapprove; 3=disapprove; 2=neither approve nor disapprove; 1=approve;
0=strongly approve. (B7a)
(2) B7b_x: Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide
everything. (coded as in item 1, above) (B7b)
(3) B7c_x: The army comes in to govern the country. (coded as in item 1, above) (B7c)
(4) B7d_x: If the country returned to the old system we had under Apartheid. (coded as
in item 1, above) (B7c)
(5) B5_c: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
democratically? 4= ―absolutely important;‖ and 0=‖not at all important.‖ (B5)
(6) B6_x: With which one of these statements are you most in agreement? Democracy is
preferable to any other kind of government; In some circumstances, a non-democratic
government can be preferable; For someone like me, it doesn‘t matter what kind of
government we have. 4=‖democracy is always preferable‖; 2=‖non-democratic
government may be preferable in some instances‖; 0=doesn‘t matter. (B6)
Note: Variable names in bold are those created through recoding or the creation of scales. Variable names not in bold, at the end of
each item‘s wording, are the original variable names from the Cape Area Survey Student data file, used for all statistical tests in this
paper.
24
Independent Variables Introduced in Model One: Cognitive Engagement and Political Knowledge
Item Wording Construct
Loading
Missing
Data
(Percent)
Political Knowledge
Political System and Politics
Knowledge: TESTSCORE
Index Additive scale of the following 9 items.
(1) A1correct: A woman who has a young child is interviewed for a job at a travel
agency. Which of the following is an example of discrimination? She does not get the
job because…a) she has no previous experience; b) she is a mother; c) she speaks only
one language; d) she demands a high salary; e) I don‘t know or don‘t have enough
information. (A1)
(2) A2correct: In democratic countries what is the primary function of having more
than one political party? a) to represent different opinions in the national legislature; b) to
limit political corruption; c) to prevent political demonstrations; d) to encourage
economic competition; e) I don‘t know or don‘t have enough information. (A2)
(3) A3correct: Who is ultimately responsible for deciding whether a law is permitted
under South Africa‘s Constitution? a) The President; b) Parliament; c) The courts; d)
Political parties; e) I don‘t know or don‘t have enough information. (A3)
(4) A4correct: The South African Constitution‘s Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of
expression. Which of these is NOT protected by this freedom? a) The right of a citizen
to criticize the President; b) The right of a newspaper to publish information about
corruption; c) The right of a citizen to call for violence; d) The right of a member of a
political party to criticize that party; 3) I don‘t know or don‘t have enough information.
(A4)
(5) A5correct: Which political party holds the most seats in South Africa‘s national
legislature? a) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); b) Democratic Alliance (DA); c) African
National Congress (ANC); d) Congress of the People (COPE); e) I don‘t know or don‘t
have enough information. (A5)
(6) A6correct: Which political party holds the most seats in the Western Cape provincial
legislature? a) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); b) Democratic Alliance (DA); c) African
National Congress (ANC); d) Congress of the People (COPE); e) I don‘t know or don‘t
have enough information. (A6)
(7) A7correct: Which of the following is most likely to mean that a country is no longer
a democracy? a) People are not allowed to criticize the government; b) There are high
25
levels of racism in society; c) People pay very high taxes; d) There is too much
unemployment; e) I don‘t know or don‘t have enough information. (A7)
(8) A8correct: Which of the following organizations created Apartheid? a) United
Democratic Front (UDF); b) Pan-African Congress (PAC); c) The National Party (NP);
d) The United Party (UP); e) I don‘t know or don‘t have enough information. (A8)
(9) A9correct: The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 occurred in response to what? a)
Protests against the ―pass laws‖; b) Protests against the destruction of District Six; c) An
attack by the Mozambican military; d) Conflict between black and white miners; e) I
don‘t know or don‘t have enough information. (A9)
Cognitive and Political Engagement
Cognitive Engagement i_COGENGAGE
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
B10: How interested are you in public affairs (politics and government)? 0) not at all
interested; 1=Not very interested; 2=Somewhat interested; 3=Very interested. (B10)
B13a: How often do you do the following things? a) Discuss politics or current events
with people your own age? (B13a). 0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often.
B13b: How often do you do the following things? b) Discuss politics or current events
with parents or other adult family members? (B13b). (coded as with item B13a above).
Internal Efficacy c_EFFINTERN
Contsruct Additive construct of the following two items, divided by 2.
B11a: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your own
understanding of politics? a) I am able to understand most political issues easily.
0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither Agree nor Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree
Strongly. (B11a)
B11b: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your own
understanding of politics? b) I would be good at explaining a political issue to someone
0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither Agree nor Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree
Strongly. (B11b)
26
Democratic Meaning:
Procedures i_DEMMEANSPROC
Index Additive scale of the following 6 items, divided by 6.
People associate democracy with many different meanings. What do you think? For a
country to be called democratic, how important are each of the following in your
opinion?
(1) B8a: Majority rule. 0=Not at all important; 1=Not very important; 2=Important;
3=Very important. (B8a)
(2) B8b: Complete freedom for anyone to criticize the government. (coded as with item
B8a, above). (B8b)
(3) B8c: Regular elections. (coded as with item B8a, above). (B8c)
(4) B8d: At least two political parties competing with each other. (coded as with item
B8a, above). (B8d)
(5) B8e: Limits on the power of the government. (coded as with item B8a, above). (B8e)
(6) B8f: Protections for the rights of minorities. (coded as with item B8a, above). (B8f)
Democratic Meanings:
Substantive i_DEMMEANSSUBST
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
People associate democracy with many different meanings. What do you think? For a
country to be called democratic, how important are each of the following in your
opinion?
(1) B8g: Equal rights of men and women. 0=Not at all important; 1=Not very important;
2=Important; 3=Very important. (B8g)
(2) B8h: Basic necessities like shelter, food and water for everyone. (coded as with item
B8g, above) (B8h).
(3) B8i: A small income gap between rich and poor. (coded as with item B8g, above).
(B8i)
27
Independent Variables Introduced in Model Two: Media Use and Classroom Environment
Item Wording Construct
Loading
Missing
Data
(Percent)
Use of the News Media
Followed News in Traditional
Media i_NEWSMEDIATRAD
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
How often do you do the following things?
(1) B13c: Read in the newspaper about what is happening in South Africa. 0=Never;
1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (B13c)
(2) B13d: Watch the news on television. 0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often.
(B13d)
(3) B13e: Listen to news on the radio. 0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often.
(B13e)
Followed News using New Media i_NEWSMEDIANEW
Index Additive scale of the following 2 items, divided by 2.
How often do you do the following things?
(1) B13f: Read on the internet about news and politics. 0=Never; 1=Rarely;
2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (B13f)
(2) B13g: Read about news or politics on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, MXit).
0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (B13g)
28
Classroom Environment
Classroom Discussion of Current
Events, Politics and Government
in High School subjects i_CLSRMDISCUSS
Index Additive scale of the following 4 items.
.
How often do you talk about current events, politics and government in courses in the
following subject areas? When discussing political and social issues during regular
lessons, how often do the following things happen?
(1) C5a_r: Life Orientation. 0=Not taking this subject or Never; 1=Rarely;
2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C5a)
(2) C5b_r: History/Geography. 0=Not taking this subject or Never; 1=Rarely;
2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C5b)
(3) C5c_r: Business/Economics. 0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C5c)
(4) C5d_r: Other subjects. 0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C5d)
Critical Discussion and Debate
Supported in Classroom i_CLSRMCRITICAL
Index Additive scale of the following 4 items, divided by 4.
When discussing political and social issues during regular lessons, how often do the
following things happen?
(1) C1a: Teachers encourage students to make up their own minds. 0=Never; 1=Rarely;
2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C1a)
(2) C1b: Students can disagree with teachers as long as they are respectful. 0=Never;
1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C1b)
(3) C1c: Teachers present several sides of the issues when explaining them. 0=Never;
1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C1c)
4) C1d: Students bring up current political events for discussion. 0=Never; 1=Rarely;
2=Sometimes; 3=Often. (C1d)
29
Classroom Environment
Social Environment of Tolerance
and Respect in Classroom i_CLSRMSOCIAL
Index Additive scale of the following 5 items, divided by 5.
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you and your
school? Think about life at your school in general, not any specific class.
(1) C2a: Most students seem to care about each other, even people they don‘t know at
all. 0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 3=Neither agree nor disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree
Strongly. (C2a)
(2) C2b: Teachers don‘t let students make fun of other students. (coded as with C2a,
above) . (C2b)
(3) C2c: Most of my teachers really listen to what I have to say. Teachers don‘t let
students make fun of other students. (coded as with C2a, above) . (C2c)
(4) C2d: Teachers give all students a fair chance. (coded as with C2a, above) . (C2d)
(5) C2e: Students have a role in making decisions in the school. (coded as with C2a,
above). (C2e)
Participation in Civic Oriented
Field Trips Activities
_ECURRONESHOT
Index Additive scale of the following 4 items.
Have you ever participated in the following activities?
(1) C6d_r: A visit to the Holocaust Centre in downtown Cape Town. 0=No, I have
never done this; 1=Yes, I have done this. (C6d)
(2) C6e_r: A visit to Robben Island. 0=No, I have never done this; 1=Yes, I have done
this. (C6e)
(3) C6f_r: A visit to Parliament. 0=No, I have never done this. 1=Yes, I have done this.
(C6f)
(4) C6g_r: A visit to the District Six Museum. 0=Never; 1=Rarely; 2=Sometimes;
3=Often. (C6g)
30
Classroom Environment
Participation in Extracurricular
Civic Education i_ECURRSUSTAINED
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items.
Have you ever participated in the following activities?.
(1) C6a_r: CLASI (Constitutional Literacy and Service Initiative) civic education.
0=No, I have never done this; 1=Yes, I have done this. (C6a)
(2) C6b_r: ―Street Law‖ civic education 0=No, I have never done this; 1=Yes, I have
done this. (C6b)
(3) C6c_r: ―Facing Our History and Ourselves‖ history education. 0=No, I have never
done this; 1=Yes, I have done this. (C6c)
Participation in School
Organizations i_ECURRSOCCAP
Index Additive scale of the following 7 items.
In the past year, have you participated in the following activities, and do you think you
were an inactive member, an active member, or a leader of the group?
(1) C7a_r: The Representative Council of Learners. 0=I am not involved in this;
1=Inactive member; 2=Active member; 3=Leader. (C7a)
(2) C7b_r: The School Governing Body. 0=I am not involved in this; 1=Inactive
member; 2=Active member; 3=Leader. (C7b)
(3) C7c_r: Any other school committee. 0=I am not involved in this; 1=Inactive
member; 2=Active member; 3=Leader. (C7c)
(4) C7d_r: A sports team. 0=I am not involved in this; 1=Inactive member; 2=Active
member; 3=Leader. (C7d)
(5) C7e_r: A school club or society. 0=I am not involved in this; 1=Inactive member;
2=Active member; 3=Leader. 0=I am not involved in this; 1=Inactive member;
2=Active member; 3=Leader. (C7e)
(6) C7f_r: A religious group. 0=I am not involved in this; 1=Inactive member; 2=Active
member; 3=Leader. (C7f)
(7) C7g_r: An arts project, club or society (for example, theatre, music). 0=I am not
involved in this; 1=Inactive member; 2=Active member; 3=Leader. (C7g)
31
Independent Variables Introduced in Model Three: Political and Social Values, Citizen Activism or Conformity
Item Wording Construct
Loading
Missing
Data
(Percent)
Good Citizen Activities
Active Citizenship
i_CITACTIVE
Index Additive scale of the following 6 items, divided by 6.
How important do you think the following behaviours will be for you to be a good citizen
as an adult?
(1) Bx14a: Voting in every election. 0=Not important at all; 1=Not very important;
2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14a)
(2) Bx14c: Participating in activities to benefit people in the local community. 0=Not
important at all; 1=Not very important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important.
(Bx14c)
(3) Bx14d: Taking part in activities to protect the environment. 0=Not important at all;
1=Not very important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14d)
(4) Bx14f: Engaging in political discussions. 0=Not important at all; 1=Not very
important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14f)
(5) Bx14h: Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust. 0=Not
important at all; 1=Not very important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important.
(Bx14h)
(6) Bx14j: Always obeying the law. 0=Not important at all; 1=Not very important;
2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14j)
32
Uncritical Citizenship i_CITSUBJECT
Index Additive scale of the following 4 items, divided by 4.
How important do you think the following behaviours will be for you to be a good citizen
as an adult?
(1) Bx14b: Joining a political party or youth league. 0=Not important at all; 1=Not very
important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14b)
(2) Bx14e: Showing respect for government representatives. 0=Not important at all;
1=Not very important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14e)
(3) Bx14g: Not criticizing the government. 0=Not important at all; 1=Not very
important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very important. (Bx14g)
(4) Bx14i: Agreeing with the majority of people in your community on political issues.
0=Not important at all; 1=Not very important; 2=Somewhat important; 3=Very
important. (Bx14i)
33
Potential Political Activities
Potential Participation in Protest
or Violent Activities
i_POTVIOLPROT
Index Additive scale of the following 2 items, divided by 2.
Listed below are several types of actions that you as a young person could take during the
next few years if you felt it was necessary to change something in your community. How
likely would you be to do each of these things?
(1) Bx15h: Block traffic as a form of protest. 0=I would definitely NOT do this; 1=I
would probably NOT do this; 2=I would probably do this; 3=I certainly would do this.
(Bx15h)
(2) Bx15i: Occupy public buildings as a form of protest. 0=I would definitely NOT do
this; 1=I would probably NOT do this; 2=I would probably do this; 3=I certainly would
do this. (C6b)
Potential Participation in Civic
Activities i_POTCIVPART
Index Additive scale of the following 7 items, divided by 7.
Listed below are several types of actions that you as a young person could take during the
next few years if you felt it was necessary to change something in your community. How
likely would you be to do each of these things?
(1) Bx15a: Volunteer time to help people in the community. 0=I would definitely NOT
do this; 1=I would probably NOT do this; 2=I would probably do this; 3=I certainly
would do this. (Bx15a)
(2) Bx15b: Vote in an election. (coded as with item Bx15a, above) (Bx15b)
(3) Bx15c: Work for a party during an election campaign. (coded as with item Bx15a,
above). (Bx15c)
(4) Bx15d: Contact an elected official to give them your opinion. (coded as with item
Bx15a, above) . (Bx15d)
(5) Bx15e: Join with others to raise awareness of an important issue. (coded as with item
Bx15a, above) (Bx15e)
(6) Bx15f: Write a letter to the editor or call in to a radio show about a public issue.
(coded as with item Bx15a, above). (Bx15f)
(7) Bx15g: Participate in a peaceful protest march or rally. (coded as with item Bx15a,
above) (Bx15g)
34
Independent Variables introduced in Model Four: Insecurity; Confidence in Political Institutions
Item Wording Construct
Loading
Missing
Data
(Percent)
Insecurity
Economic Insecurity:
i_INSECECON
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
Over the past year, how often have you…
(1) D12D: Worried that your family does not have enough money? 0=Never; 1=Just
once or twice; 2=Several times; 3=Many times; 4=Always. (D12d)
(2) D12e: Worried that your or someone in your family will suffer a serious illness?
0=Never; 1=Just once or twice; 2=Several times; 3=Many times; 4=Always. (D12e)
(3) D12f: Gone without electricity in your home (not including load-shedding)?
0=Never; 1=Just once or twice; 2=Several times; 3=Many times; 4=Always. (D12f)
Physical Insecurity i_INSECPHYS
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
Over the past year, how often have you…
(1) D12a: Felt unsafe in the street? 0=Never; 1=Just once or twice; 2=Several times;
3=Many times; 4=Always. (D12a)
(2) D12b: Felt unsafe in school? 0=Never; 1=Just once or twice; 2=Several times;
3=Many times; 4=Always. (D12b)
(3) D12c: Felt unsafe in your home? 0=Never; 1=Just once or twice; 2=Several times;
3=Many times; 4=Always. (D12c)
35
Confidence in Political Institutions
Confidence in National Political
Institutions i_CONFNATINSTS
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
How much confidence do you have in each of the following people or institutions?
(1) B3A: The President of South Africa. 0=No confidence; 1=A little; 2=Quite a lot;
3=Complete confidence. (B3a)
(2) B3b: The national government of South Africa. 0=No confidence; 1=A little;
2=Quite a lot; 3=Complete confidence. (B3b)
(3) B3e: The police. 0=No confidence; 1=A little; 2=Quite a lot; 3=Complete
confidence. (B3e)
Confidence in Local Political
Institutions i_CONFLOINSTS
Index Additive scale of the following 2 items, divided by 2.
How much confidence do you have in each of the following people or institutions?
(1) B3c: The provincial government of the Western Cape. 0=No confidence; 1=A little;
2=Quite a lot; 3=Complete confidence. (B3c)
(2) B3d: The municipal government of Cape Town. 0=No confidence; 1=A little;
2=Quite a lot; 3=Complete confidence. (B3d)
36
Confidence in Political System
Confidence in the Political
System i_SATPOLSYST
Index Additive scale of the following 3 items, divided by 3.
How do you see South Africa today? Please indicate wither you agree or disagree with
these statements, and how strongly.
(1) B1d: The people of South Africa have the ability to change the government if we
don‘t like what it is doing. 0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither agree nor
disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree strongly. (B1d)
(2) B1e: Corruption in South Africa‘s government is limited to a small number of
individuals. 0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither agree nor disagree; 3=Agree;
4=Agree strongly. (B1e)
(3) B1f: When a person commits a crime in South Africa, they are generally punished.
0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither agree nor disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree
strongly. (B1f)
Confidence in the Economic
System i_SATECONSYST
Index Additive scale of the following 2 items, divided by 2.
How do you see South Africa today? Please indicate wither you agree or disagree with
these statements, and how strongly.
(1) B1a: Compared to my parents, I think I will have better opportunities in life.
0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither agree nor disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree
strongly. (B1a)
(2) B1b: Anyone who works hard enough can get ahead in South Africa today.
0=Disagree strongly; 1=Disagree; 2=Neither agree nor disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree
strongly. (B1b)
(3) B1c: South Africa should be proud of what it has achieved. 0=Disagree strongly;
1=Disagree; 2=Neither agree nor disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Agree strongly. (B1c)
37
Independent Variables Introduced in Model Five: Personal Educational Skill, Race and Family Economics
Item Wording Construct
Loading
Missing
Data
(Percent)
Household Assets
Household assets i_HHASSETS
Index Additive scale of the following 14 items.
How important do you think the following behaviours will be for you to be a good citizen
as an adult?
(1) D13a: TV set. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13a)
(1) D13b: Car, bakkie, or passenger vehicle. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13b)
(1) D13c: M-Net/DStv subscription at home. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13c)
(1) D13d: Radio-Hi-fi/music centre. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13d)
(1) D13e: Computer. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13e)
(1) D13f: Dish washing machine. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13f)
(1) D13g: Washing machine. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13g)
(1) D13h: Electric stove. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13h)
(1) D13i: Fridge/freezer. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13i)
(1) D13j: Home security service (burglar alarm or armed response. 0=No; 1=Yes.
(1) D13k: Tap water in house/on plot. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13k)
(1) D13l: Hot running water. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13l)
(1) D13m: Flush toilet in/outside house. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D13m)
(1) D14a: Your own (personal) mobile phone. 0=No; 1=Yes. (D14a)
Personal Education and
Demographics
Expected Educational Level: D4
Perceived Educational Skill: D6
Population Group: RaceAfrican
D4: What is the highest education you intend to complete? 1=Grade 11; 2=Grade 12/
Matric; 3=Technical University/Technikon; 4=University. (D4)
D6: Compared to other learners your age, do you think you are academically: 0=A
weak student; 1=About average; 2=A strong student; 3=A very strong student. (D6)
RACEAFRICAN: What is your population group? 1=African; 0=Coloured;
Indian/Asian; White; Other. (D7)
38
Table 1. Support for Democracy and Opposition to Authoritarianism among
High School Students and the South African Population (2012)
Variables
Students
(Cape Town)
Adults
(Cape Town)
Adults
(National)
Democracy is always preferable.
60.2
65.2
71.9
How important is it for you to live in a
country that is governed democratically? (Absolutely Important)
44.5 NA NA
Only one political party is allowed to stand
for election and hold office.
(Disagree / Strongly Disagree)
65.9 64.5 68.0
Elections and Parliament are abolished so
that the president can decide everything. (Disagree / Strongly Disagree)
67.7 80.8 70.0
The army comes in to govern the country. (Disagree / Strongly Disagree)
56.8 81.9 68.7
If the country returned to the old system
we had under apartheid. (Disagree / Strongly Disagree)
75.3 NA 76.5
N 2,450+ 1,874 2,399
+ Due to non-responses the N for each cell varied from 2,438 to 2,460.
Source: Column One (Students): Cape Area Student Survey 2012.
Column Two (Adults): University of Cape Town-Max Planck Institute Super-Diversity Survey, 2012.
Column Three (Adults): Afrobarometer South Africa Survey (Round 5 2012).
39
Table 2. Model One: Demand for Democracy
Cognitive Engagement and Political Knowledge Items
OLS Regression _________________________________________________________________
b
Variables (std error) beta
_________________________________________________________________
Political System and Politics Knowledge TESTSCORE
.17***
(.09)
.41
Democratic Meaning: Procedures i_DEMMEANSPROC
.24***
(.03)
.16
Democratic Meaning: Substantive i_DEMMEANSSUBST
-.01
(.03)
-.01
Cognitive and Political Engagement i_COGENGAGE
-.00
(.03)
-.00
Internal Political Efficacy c_EFFINTERN
-.03
(.02)
-.04
Constant 1.77***
(.09)
N 2,108
Adj. R2 .23
__________________________________________________________________ Note: The dependent variable, demand for democracy, is an index of six items
and ranges from .67 to 4. For items and scoring, see the appendix.
*p < .05 **p <.01 ***p <.001
Source: Cape Area Student Survey 2012
40
Table 3. Model Two: Demand for Democracy Use of Various Media; and Classroom and Extracurricular Activities
OLS Regression
_________________________________________________________________
b
Variables (std error) beta
_________________________________________________________________
Political System and Politics Knowledge TESTSCORE
.16***
(.01)
.38
Democratic Meaning: Procedures i_DEMMEANSPROC
.22***
(.03)
.14
Followed News in Traditional Media i_NEWSMEDIATRAD
-.03
(.02)
-.03
Followed News using New Media i_NEWSMEDIANEW
-.02
(.02)
-.02
Classroom Discussion of Current Events,
Politics and Government in H.S. subjects i_CLSRMDISCUSS
-.01*
(.01)
-.04
Critical Discussion and Debate Supported in
Classroom i_CLSRMCRITICAL
.13***
(.03)
.10
Social Environment of Tolerance and Respect
in Classroom i_CLSRMSOCIAL
-.04*
(.02)
-.04
Participation in Civics Related Field Trips
i_ECURRONESHOT
.02
(.01)
.03
Participation in Extracurricular Civic
Education i_ECURRSUSTAINED
-.14***
(.02)
-.12
Participation in School Organization i_ECURRSOCCAP
-.01***
(.00)
-.07
Constant 1.85***
(.09)
N 2,046
Adj. R2 .27
__________________________________________________________________
*p < .05 **p <.01 ***p <.001
Source: Cape Area Student Survey 2012
41
Table 4. Model Three: Demand for Democracy
Good Citizen Activities; Potential Participation in Civic and Protest Activities
OLS Regression
_________________________________________________________________
b
Variables (std error) beta
_________________________________________________________________
Political System and Politics Knowledge TESTSCORE
.13***
(.01)
.31
Democratic Meaning: Procedures i_DEMMEANSPROC
.12*
(.05)
.07
Classroom Discussion of Current Events,
Politics and Government in H.S. subjects i_CLSRMDISCUSS
-.00
(.01)
-.01
Critical Discussion and Debate Supported in
Classroom i_CLSRMCRITICAL
.05
(.04)
.03
Social Environment of Tolerance and Respect
in Classroom i_CLSRMSOCIAL
.02
(.03)
.02
Participation in Ongoing School
Extracurricular Activities i_ECURRSUSTAINED
-.11***
(.03)
-.10
Participation in School Organizational
Activities i_ECURRSOCCAP
-.01
(.01)
-.03
Active Citizenship i_CITACTIVE
.38***
(.06)
.25
Uncritical Citizenship i_CITSUBJECT
-.26***
(.04)
-.22
Potential Participation in Civic Activities i_POTCIVPART
-.01
(.05)
-.00
Potential Participation in Protest or Violent
Activities i_POTVIOLPROT
-.19***
(.03)
-.20
Constant 1.79***
(.14)
N 963
Adj. R2 .36
__________________________________________________________________
*p < .05 **p <.01 ***p <.001
Source: Cape Area Student Survey 2012
42
Table 5. Model Four: Demand for Democracy
Economic and Physical Insecurity; and Confidence in National and Local Political Institutions
OLS Regression
_________________________________________________________________
b
Variables (std error) beta
_________________________________________________________________
Political System and Politics Knowledge TESTSCORE
.12***
(.01)
.30
Democratic Meaning: Procedures i_DEMMEANSPROC
.13*
(.05)
.08
Participation in Ongoing School
Extracurricular Activities i_ECURRSUSTAINED
-.11***
(.03)
-.10
Active Citizenship i_CITACTIVE
.39***
(.06)
.25
Uncritical Citizenship
i_CITSUBJECT
-.26***
(.04)
-.24
Potential Participation in Protest or Violent
Activities i_POTVIOLPROT
-.16***
(.03)
-.18
Economic Insecurity i_INSECECON
-.06*
(.02)
-.07
Physical Insecurity i_INSECPHYS
-.04
(.03)
-.05
Confidence in National Political Institutions i_CONFNATINSTS
-.04
(.04)
-.22
Confidence in Local Political Institutions i_CONFLOINSTS
.01
(.03)
.01
Confidence in the Political System i_SATPOLSYST
-.01
(.03)
-.01
Confidence in the Economic System i_SATECONSYST
.10**
(.03)
.10
Constant 1.80***
(.14)
N 839
Adj. R2 .37
__________________________________________________________________
*p < .05 **p <.01 ***p <.001
Source: Cape Area Student Survey 2012
43
Table 6. Model Five: Demand for Democracy
Expected Educational Level, Perceived Educational Skill, Race and Household Assets
OLS Regression
_________________________________________________________________
b
Variables (std error) beta
_________________________________________________________________
Political System and Politics Knowledge TESTSCORE
.12***
(.01)
.29
Democratic Meaning: Procedures i_DEMMEANSPROC
.12*
(.05)
.08
Participation in Ongoing School
Extracurricular Activities i_ECURRSUSTAINED
-.09**
(.04)
-.07
Active Citizenship i_CITACTIVE
.36***
(.06)
.23
Uncritical Citizenship i_CITSUBJECT
-.26***
(.04)
-.23
Potential Participation in Protest or Violent
Activities i_POTVIOLPROT
-.15***
(.03)
-.17
Economic Insecurity i_INSECECON
-.06*
(.02)
-.07
Confidence in the Economic System i_SATECONSYST
.11***
(.03)
-.11
Expected Educational Level D4
.08***
(.02)
.11
Perceived Educational Skill D6
-.05
(.03)
-.04
Population Group RaceAfrican
.00
(.05)
.00
Household assets i_HHASSETS
.01
(.01)
.05
Constant 1.43***
(.19)
N 783
Adj. R2 .38
__________________________________________________________________
*p < .05 **p <.01 ***p <.001
Source: Cape Area Student Survey 2012
44
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Endnotes
1 For their input to the overall conceptualization and design of the project, we wish to thank Cherrel Africa, Linda
Chisholm, Jonathan Clark, Ariane De Lannoy, Rajen Govender, Jeremy Seekings, Shirley Pendlebury, Helmien
Slabber, Rob Sieborger, Penny Vyngevold. We also want to thank Samantha Richmond and Kevin O‘Neil for
managing this project, as well as Jamy Felton, Idriss Kallon, Sohyeon Kim and Sihle Nontshokweni for data entry
and cleaning.
2 In these circumstances, socialization by parents is obviously less strong. Indeed, one might even expect influence
to move in the other direction, from youths to parents. Though direct evidence of such influence is rare, aggregate
evidence of rapid changes in views about topics such as gay rights (or women‘s rights in the 1970s and 1980s)
suggest that younger people are not only different from their parents but might also have influenced their views.
3 There are, to be sure, some exceptions, often in countries with strong socialist parties that mobilize less educated
working class voters (Powell 1986; Norris 2002; Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 2004).
4 Importantly, this class was slated for 10th grade, when most youths would still be in school.
5 We also interviewed their History and Life Orientation teachers, as well as a sub-sample of their parents , though
we will not use teacher or parent data in this paper.
6 While we had intended on also producing an IsiXhosa translation, teachers and school administrators pointed out
that students would not be used to reading technical or specialized terms in Xhosa since all their textbooks and
instruction are either in English or Afrikaans.
7 Factor analysis extracts a single unrotated factor that explains 50.1 percent of the common variance across all six
items. The scale also has an acceptable level of reliability (Cronbach‘s Alpha=.66).
8 Thirty percent of the students said they were not taking History.
9 Regressing knowledge on media use (either item alone or both together) yields a significant coefficient for new but
not for traditional media.
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