INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
BOOK II
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEETO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESUNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WiTH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, ANt) SEPARATEVIEWS
APRR. 26 (Ies1ative day. April 14), 1976
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The resolution creating this Coiiunittee placed greatest emphasis Ofl whether intelligence activities threaten the ârights of American citizens.â I
The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can he maintained in the course of theGovernmentâs effort to protect their securitw The delicate balance between these basic goats of our system of government is often difficult to strike, but
it can. and must, be achieved. We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our stnigstle against
the enemies of freedom. Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could
properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.
Americans have riulitfsillv been concerned since before Workl War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage.
Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefulb focused intelligence investigations can help
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prevent such acts. But too often intelligence has lost thu focus and domestic intelligence activities have invaded individual prnâacy and violated the rights
of Liwtiil assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation. donsestie intelligence activities threaten to
undermine our democratic society and tiindamentallv alter its nature.
We liasâe examined three types of âintelligenceâ activities affectuig the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collection -- such as
infiltrating groups with informants. wiretapping. or opening letters. The second is dissemination of material svlsicli has been collcctecL The tlurd is covert
action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups ansI individuals deemed a threat to the social order. These three types of âintelligenceâ
activity are closely related in the practical world. lndermation wluch is dissenunated bâ the intelligeisce conussunity 2 or used in disruptive programs has
usually been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between collection, disscmmmiation and covert action is analtically useful both in
understanding why excesses have occmmrrred mis the past and in devising remisedies to prevent those excesses fruns recurring.
.1. Iiurc/lrgciicâc .4svisâirtâ: .4 Yew Form of (*uiâcârytincâiiral Posrcr to Impair Cit zeusâ Rug/irs
A tensiois between order aisd liberty is usevitablc in any society. A Goveriunent insist protect its citizens from those bent on engaging iii violence and
crinsinal behavior, or hi espionage and other hostile forepem iistelligeisce actisitv. Main of Use ustclhmgence programs reviewed in Usis report were
established for Usose purposes. Intelligence svorlc has, at tunes, successfully prevented daiigerous and abhorreist acts, such as honshings and foreisus
spviiig. aisd aided hs Use prosecution of those rcspoissible for suds acts.
But. iistdlligence activity us Use past decades Isas. all too often, exceedcd tIme restzausts on Use exercise of goverisineistal power svlsiehs are ummposed by our
countryâs Constitution., laws, and traditioiss.
Excesses hi Use nansc of protecthsg sccmmmity arc not a recent dcvelopisscnt hs our natioiiâs history. In 1798, for example. shortly after the Bill of Riglsis
was added to the Constitution, the Allen and Sedition Acts were passed. These Acts, passed us response to fear of proFrcnch âsubversionâ, made it a
crhne to criticize the Goveriuusent.3 Durhsg the (âivil War, President Abralsani Luicohs suspeisded Use writ sif habeas corpus. Hundreds of Ameriean
citizeiss were prosecuted for aistiâwar statenients durhsg Workl âiVar I. and thoissaiids of âradicalâ aliciss were seized for deportation duruig Uic 1920
Paliuser Raids. Durhsg Use Secoiscl World War, over the opposition of 7. Edgar Hoover aiid militâirv ustellistence, 4 120.000 Japanese-Ansericans were
apprehended and uscarcerated hi detention cansps.
Those actions. however. were t4indansentallv different froni Uie ustdlligcnce activities cxanshsed by this (âonunittee. They were generally executed
overtly under the authority of a statute or a public executive order. The victhmis loiew what was bchsg clone to thens and could challenge the
Goveriunent hi the courts antI oUser foruisi.s. Intelligence activity, on the oUter hand, is generally covert. it is concealed front its victhns 5 and is seklons
slcscribed in statsitcs or explicit executive ordcis. The victusi nsay ncsâer suspect that his nsisfortiincs arc Use intended result of activities undertaken by
lieu goveriuiscnt, and accordingly niay hasâe no opportunity to challenge the actions taken agausst bins.
It is. of cosuâse, proper mu maisy circunistaisccs â- such as dcvelopusg a crunusat prosecutic)lm ââ fur Use Governmmient to gather intânrmation about a citizeis
and misc it to achieve legiiunate eisd.s. souse of which niiuslit he uteirintental to the eitizeis. But hi crhnmmial prosecutions. the courts have struck a hahaiscc
hetweeim protccthig the rights of Use accused citizen and protecting the society whuchi suffers the consequeisccs of crune. Essential to Uie halancuig
process arc Use iâules of crunuial law which châcumscrihc the tcchuwques for gathuermiig esâidcnce 6 the bias of evidence that may be collected, and the
uses to wâhisch that evichcuce niaybe put. In addition. tIme cruiuiiah defendant is given an oppoiâtsmmsitv to discover and then challenge Use legality of howâ the
(iovcriuiseist collected uiforniatiois about him and the usc whsichs the Goveriiment intend,s to make of Usat uifonnatiois.
This Conmaittce has cxanshscd a realist of goverinnenta I hsfornsatiois collection which has not been governesh by restrahtts consparabhc to those hi
crhnhmal proceedhigs. We have exaniincct the collcctmon of intelligence about Use pohitmcal advocacy aisd actinn.s and Use private lives of Ansermcais
citizens. That hifonsiation has hteen used covertly to discredit the ideas advcueatcd and to âneutralizeâ the actions of them proponent.s. As Attonsey
General Harlamm Fiske Stone wanted us 1924. whemi lie souighst to keep federal agencies fronm uivestmgating âpolitical or other otmuuiomi,sâ as opposed to
âconduct orbidden by Use lawâsâ:
When a police systenm passes iscyomid thsese limits, it is dangerous to Use proper admmihsistration of jmmstice and to hsunsan hibemty. wlsich
it should be our first concenm to clserrhi.
There is always a possibility that a secret police may heconse a nscnace to free governnsent and free institutions because it
carries sviUi it the possibility of abuses of power whsichs are not ahsvass quickly apprehended or understood. 7
Our hsvcstigatmomm has confinised that svarmiing. We have seems scgmnestts of our Govermsmnemst, us Uscuâ attitudes aisd action. adopt tactics unworUmy of a
democracy, amid occasmonalbi rentusiscent of time tactics of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent paftcrn us wâhmich programns initiated with
limssmted goals. such as prevemstmng crsissmmsah violence or ichemitmfrhsg foreigmm spies. were expamidesh to whm,âit witmmeeses characterized as âvacumumiss clcammersâ.â
ssveephmg hi hifomsatmon about lawful activities of American citizcnue
The temmdemiey of intelligemice activities to expammd beyond their initial scope us a thenme wâhuchs rsmms.s Uimâoumghs every aspect of our ssvestmgatmve findings.
Intdllmgemmce collection programs muaturally gemierate esâer-mmscreasusg demands for isew data, And once mntdlli ence has been collected, Usere are strcung
pressmmres to use it agausst the target.
Time pattermm of hitellmgemmce agemmcies expanding the scope of their activities was well dheseribed by one witness. who hi 1970 had eoordhmated an effort by
nsost of Use intelligence communumisity to obtammi asmthmority to smndertake more illegal donsestie activity:
The risk was that you wâommld get people wâho would he susceptible to political eonsideratiomss as opposed to national seeumrityconsideratiomss. or would construe political considerations to be national security con.sicherations, to move from the. kiul with a bomb
to the kid with a picket sigis, asid from Use kid with the picket sign to the kidh with the bumper sticker of Use opposhsg camididate. Andyou just keep gohig down Ume line. 9
1mm 1940. Attomey General Robert Jackson sawâ time sante risk. He reeogmimzed that using broad labels 111cc ânational securityâ or âsnbversicsmâ to invoke
tIme vast power of Use govennnent is dangerosis because there are âiso dlefâinite standards to determine what constitutes a âsubversive activity, such as
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sre have for murder or larceny.â Jackson added:
Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle forexistence may be regarded as âsubveisiseâ by those whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those who are in officeare apt to regard as subversive the activities of any of those who would bring about a change of administration. Some of oursoundest constitutional doctrines were once puirislied as subversive. âWe must not forget that it was not so long ago that both theterm âRepublican and the terni âDemocratâ were epithets with sinister meaning to denote persons of radical tendencies that wereâsubversiveâ ofâ the order ofâ things then douiuiiant. 10
This wise wariiing was not heeded in the conduct of inteilisieiice activity, ssâliere the âeterisal vigilanceâ which is the âprice of hibertcâlias Iseen forgotten.
IL The Questions
We have directed our investigation toward answering the, follosvusg questions:
\\isicli governmental agencies have engaged in doniestic spvnig?
How many citizens have been targets of Goveriuuenta I intelligence activity?
What standarrts have governed the opening of nitelligence investigations and sslien have intelligence investigations been terminated?
Where have the targets fit on the spectnim hetsveen those who conunit violent criminal acts and those who seek only to dissent peacefiilh fromGovernment poli_ây?
To svhat extent has the iiiformation collected included nitnnate details of die targetsâ personal lives or their political views, and has ssich informationbeen rlissenunated and used to injure indivirhialsâ?
Wlsat actions beyond surveillance have aitelligence agencies taken, such as attempting to disrupt discredit, or destroy persons or groups who have beeisthe targets of surveillanceâ?
Have intelligence agencies been used to serve die political aims of Presidents, otlser hieh officials, or the agencies themselsâes?
Hosv have the agencies responded either to proper orders or to excessive pressures froni their superiorsâ? To what extent have intelligence agenciesdisclosed, or concealed them from. outside bodies charged with overseeing themâ?
Have intelligence agencies acted outside the lawâ? What has been the attitude of the intelligence community toward the rule of lawâ?
To what extent has die Executive branch and the Congress controlled intelligence agencies and held them accountable?
Generally, howâ well has the Federal system of checks and balances between the branches worked to control intelligence activity?
C. Sissisnssi-sâ of the Ala ii Prohlcs;ss
The answer to each of these questions is disturbing. Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and to nwiehinfonnation has been collected. The Goveriussent has often undertaken die secret ssirs-eillanee of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, es-ensyhen those beliefs posed iio threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Goveniment openiting primarily throsigh secretinfisnnants, but also using other intmsive techniques such as sviretaps, microphone âbugsâ surreptitious mail opening, and breakâhis, has swept in vastamounts of infisnwation about the personal lives,views. and associatiows of .-5,.auerican citizens. Investigations of groups deenied potentially daiigerous --
and es-en of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous organizations -- have continued for decades, despite die fact diat those groupsdid not engage in unlass-ful activity, Groups and nislis-idnals have been harassed and disrupted because of flick political viesvs and dick lifestyles.Investigations have been based upon vague standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable, Unsasâonâ and vicious tactics base beenemployed -- nichndmng anonymosis attempts to bieak up niai-riages. disrupt nieetings. ostracize persons froni dien professions, and pros-oke target gi-oupsnito rivafries that midst resnht in deaths. Intelligence agencies has-c sen-ed the political and personal objectives of presidenla and other Isighi officials,While the agencies often coimnittcd excesses in response to pressure froni high officials in the Executive branch and Congress. they also occasion hIsniits-ited anproper activities and then concealed dieni froni officials svhoni they had a duty to hiforni.
Gos-enwwentah officials -- nichuiding diose whose prnicipal duty is to enforce die lass --has-c s-iolated or ignored the law- over long periods of time andhave ads-nested and defended their right to break the lawâ.
The Constitutional systeni of checks and balances has not adeqsiatclv controlled intelligence activities. Until recently the Executive branch has neitherdelineated the scope of penmssibhe actis-ities nor estâihlsâihied procedures for supervising intelligence agencies- Congress has fIiiled to exercise sufficientos-ei-sigjit, seldom upiestioning the use to whelm its api-opriatsnns were being put. Most domestic intelligeiice issues have not reached the courts, and hidiose eases when diey have reached the courts, die judieian- has been reluctant to grapple wids diem.
Each of dicse points is briefly illristrated below, and covered in substantially greater detail in die frslhosving sections of die report.
I - The Niouihesâ ri/People .4f/ècrcd by Dome-size Intelligence .4crzsâiriâ -
United States intelligeisce agencies have nis-estsaated a s-ast nnniber of American citcen.s and doniestie organizations. FBI headquarters alone hasdes-eloped over SOtt.tt)0 doniestic intelligence files. 11 and dicse liasâe been auigissented by additionalfiles at FBI Field Ofiâiees. The FBI opened 65.000
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of these slomes tic intelligence files in 1972 a lone. 12 In flict. substantially more indivisluab and groups are subject to ustelhsence scrutiny than theinunber of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains inforniation oii more than one inslisidoa I or group. andthis infonuation is readily retrievable through the FBI General Nanse Index.
The number of Ameneans and domestic groups caught in the donsestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:
-- Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 1953-1973. producing a CIAcomputericed index of nearly one and oneâha if million names. 13
-- At least 130.0(1) first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities. 14
-â Some 300,OttO individuaLs were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7.200 Americans and over 100domestic groups shieing the course of CIAâs Operation CHAOS (1967-1973). 15
-- billions of private telegrams sent from, to. or through the United States were obtained by the National Security Agency froni 1947 to 1975 umisler asecret aiTaisgeisseilt widi three United States telegraph companies. 16
ââ An estimatesl lOO.OOtt Americans were the ssmhiects ssf Uissted States Anny uiteffigence tiles created between die mid 1960âs and 1971. 17
-- Intelligence files on more than 11.000 inchvidnals aisd groups were created by Use Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and taxinvestigations were started ois the basis of political rather than tax criteria. IS
-- At least 26.0)))) uidivmduats were at one point catalosued on ass FBI lust of peisous to be rounded up us Use event of a âhatioisal ensergencvâ. 19
.2. Too :1 1itch JnThrsusirussn Is Collected For Too Long
hitclligence agencies have collected vast aissotmmits of uifornsation about the intimate sletails of citizensâ lives and about their participatiois ii legal andpeacefid political activities. The targets of intelligence activity have uscludesl political adherents of Use right aisd the left ranging froiss activitist to castialsupporters. Investigations have been directed agausst proponents of racial cansea and womeisâs rights. outs1soken apostles of nonviolence and raciallsarmssoisy: establislusseist politicians: religious groups: and advocates of iiew life stles. The widespread targetuig of citicens aiid domestic groups. and theexcessive scope of the collection of smsfornsation, is illustrated by the follosving exansples:
(a) The âWoissenâs Liheratiois Movenseistâ ssas infiltrated by iufornsaists who collected material about the nsovensentâs policies, leaders, aml iisdivmdualissembers. Oise report hscluded tlse nanse of cs-cry svonsais wlso atteisdesh meetings. 20 ansI another stated that each woman at a umeetuig Isad describedâhow she felt oppressed. sexually or otherwiseâ. 21 Another relsort concluded Usat the moveisseistâs psiqsose was to âflee svssiien frous die lmuiudruissexistence of being only a wife and nucilserâ. hut still reconusseuded dial tIme intelligence usvestmssatiois should be continued. 22
(h) A pronsiisent civil rights leader and advisor to Dr. Martus Lsitlier usg. Jr.. svas insestigatcd on the suspiciois tlsat lie nught be a Coisussunmstsynspadiicerâ. Use FBI field office coiscluded he was isot. 23 Bureau headquarters directed Usat the usvestigation contintie using a theory of âguilty untilproven innocent:â
The Burreau does not agree with the expressed belief of Use field office that ââââ-ââ------â---â 24 is not sxmpathetic to theParty cause. While there may not he any evidence tlsat âââââââ-â---â-âââ- is a t âonussummast iseitlser is there aity substantialevideisce that lie is anti-Consusunist. 25
(c) FBI sources reported on the fonssation of die Conservative Aasserican Cluistiais Action Coiuscil in 1971. 26 In the 1950âs. Use Bureau collectedinfornsation about the John Birch Society and passed it to Use White House because of the Societyâs âscuirillosis attackâ on Presishent Eisenhower andodser high Govemnsent officials. 27
(d) Souse investigations of the lawful activities of peaceful groups have continued for decades. For exausple. Use NAACP was investigated to deternsiisewhether it âhad coiuiectiou.s withâ Use Consasuinrst Party. Use iisvestigation lasted for over twentyâfoe years. although nothing was found to rebtut ai-eport during the first ;ear of Use iisvestigation dial the NAACP had a âstrong tenslencyâ to â(steer clear of Conuntusist activities.â 211 Sunilarlv. the FBIhas aslissitted Usat die Socialist Workers Party has conumtted no crinuiial acts. Yet the Btireasi has investigated Use Socialist Workers Party for morethan three decades oit die basis of its revolutionary rhetoric-which the FBI concedes falls shsoit of unciteusent to violence-and its clainsed ustensatmonallinks. Use Btireau is eiurrentlv sususg its umfornsants to collect usfonuation about Sâ9,âP nsensbersâ political vuesvs. mneludimsg those on âLT.S. usvolvcnsent usAngola.â âThod pnces.â âracial nsatters,â the âVietssans War,â and about any of their efforts to support mson-SWâP candislates for political office. 29
(e) National political leaslers fell within Use broad reach of intelligeisce investigations. For exnnsple. Anusâ Intellmgnmce nec nsaintaiisesl files on SenatorAdlam Stevenson and Congressnsan Abner tshikva because of dseiuâ participation us peacethil political nseetusgs musder surveillance by Anny agents. 30 Aletter to Richard Nixon, wlule lie was a candidate for President us 1968, was intercepted under CIAâs imuail opeisimig program. In the 1960âs PresidemmtJohus,sois asked die FBI to compare various Senatorsâ statensents on \âietnans with the Comuassuums.ast Party line 32 ansI to consluct name checks oms leasIngantiwar Semsators. 33
(f) As pail of dick effort to collect iisfornsatmois which ârelated es-en rensotelsâ to people or grotups âactisâeâ hi comsusssusmties wâlsihs had âShe potentialâ forcivil disorder. Arnssâ usteffigeisce agencies took such steps as: semsdusg agents to a Hallosceen party for elenseustary selsool chldreum in Washimsgton, DCâ.,because they suspected a local âdissidentâ nsiglst he present: nuomutorhsg protests of weltisre nsothsersâ organfratiou.s in Ivlilwauhure: infiltrathsg a coalitionof church youth groups ii Colonmdo: and sending agemmts toil priestsâ cousference hi Washusgton. D.C., hselsI to discuss birth comstrolmeassires. 34
(g) In Use, late 1960âs and early 1970s, student groups n-crc subjected to imutense scuutimsy. In 1970 Use FBI ordered iisvestigatious.s of every nscmuuber ofthe Students for a Deiuuocratmc Society and of âevery Black Student Umon ansI suuilar group regardless of their past or present usvolveuuent inslisorders.â 35 Files were opemsed on thoumsaud.s of s-ouusg ussen ansI women so that, as the fonsser head of FBI ustelligence explained . the imsformoation
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coukl be used if the; ever applied for a government job. 36
In the 1960âs Bureau assents were tnstnieted to increase their efforts to dsseredtt âNew Leftâ student demonstrators by tactics including publishingphotoeraplts fliaturallv the ntost obnoxious picture should be usedâ). 37 using âmisnufonnationâ to falsely notify menibers events had been cancelled 18and writing âtellâtaleâ letters to studentsâ tuarents. 39
(Is) The FBI Intelligence Division conunuottlv investigated an;- iitducatiout tlsat âsubversiveâ groups already under investigation were seeking to influenceor control other groups. 40 tItle example of the extretue breadth of tltis âinfiltrationâ theory was an FBI instruction in the mid- 1960âs to all Field Officesto iinestigate every âflee universityâ because some of them Itad come under âhuhversne influence. â41
(ii Each adnsineitration from Fraiuklin II. Rooseveltâs to Richard Nixonâs perissitted. and soituetnuses encouraged. goveriunent agencies to handleessentially political uutelligenee. For exanuple:
-- President Ruosevelt asked the FBI to put in its fdes tIme nanses of citizens sendiisss telegrams to the Wlsite House opposing hss ânational defenseâpolicy and supportitsg Cot Charles Lindbsigh. 42
-â Fresideist Truissais received inside iiiforinatioit on a former Roosevelt aideâs efforts to influence Isis appoiittinents. 43 labor union negotiatnig plans. -14and the publusluuig plans of journalists. 45
--President Enenliosver received reports on purely political and social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch. 46 Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, 47and Supreme Coui-t Justice Williani 0. Douglas. 47a
-- The Kenned;â Adnuuiusstratmon had the FBI -wiretap a Congressional staff inenuber - 48 tluâee executive officials. 49 a lobbyist. 50 aisd a. Washingtoiilaw firm. SI Attorney General Robert F- Kenisedy received the fniits of a FBI âtapâ on Martiii Luther Knsg. Jr. 52 and a âbugâ on a Congressniais bothof which yielded inforiua lion of a political nature. 53
-- President Jolussotu asked the FBI to conduct âhaute eluecksâ of his critics and of metubers of tIme staff of his 1964 opponent Senator Ban-vGoldsyater. 54 He also requested purely political ustellsoence on his critics iii the Senate. and reeeisâed extensive intelligence reports on pcihtical aetnâitvat the 1964 Democratic (.âousvention froni FBI electromc surveillance. 55
ââ President Nixon authorized a pi-ograni of sviretaps whicls produced for tlse White House purdy political or Isersulsil information uiurelated to nationalsecurity, including iumfhrnsation about a Supreme (.âouurt justice. 56
3. Cou-euâtAcâtiâiuu ourS i/ic (âso off/logo? or Jtsipuoper Meusuus
(a) Covert Actiots. -- Apart froni utucoverisug excesses in the collection of intehhistence. our investigation has disclosed covert actions directed againstAmericans. and the use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques In gather imufonuation. For exansple:
(i) The FBIâs COINTELPRt) -- counterintelligence program -- was desiened to âdisruptâ groups and âneutralizeâ individuals deemed to he tlueats todomestic secunty. The FBI resorted to counterintelligence tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing law could not control theactivities of certanu dissideist groups. and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intehligeisce conusuuusitv. âsVliatever opumunis oiue holds about tImepolicies of the targeted groups. niany ssf the tactics enuploved by tlse FBI syere indm.sputahlv degraulnig to a free society. COINTELPRO tactics included:
â Anonvmuuoiuhv attacking the political lseliefs of targets us uider to induce their employers to time them:
-- Anonynsouislyiuuailiuug letters to the spouses of intelli enee targets for the put-pose of destroying their man-iages: 57
-- Obtainnug from IRS the tax return-s of a target and then attenuptnsg to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterriumg a protestleader fronu attendimig the Densoeratie Natioiual Convention: 58
-- Falsely and anoiuynsouslv labeling as Goveriunent infonnants menshers of groups known to be violent. thereby exxuslumg flue falsely labelled meniber toexpulsion or physical attact 59
-- Pursuant to nustruictious to use âmisinformationâ to disrupt demnoms.stratuon.s. enapkuving such nieans as broadcasting fluke orders on the sanie citizensbaud radio frequuenev used by demonstratinis isuarslualls to attenipt to control deiuuonstration.s. 60 and duuplicatuiug anul falsely fillimug out forms snhieitiuughousing for isersons coining to a demonstration, thereby causing âlong and useless jouruuevs to locate tlsese adult-easesâ: 61
-- Seuuding au annn;-nuous letter to tlse leader of a Chuieago street gang (described as âsinlenee-prouteâ) statiuug that the Black Pantluers were supposed tohave âa hit out for youâ, flue letter was suggested because it âmay iuutensifv - - - atsimnosutvâ and cause flue street gang leader to âtake retaliatory aetiousâ.62
(ii) Fronu âlate 1963â until his death in 196$. Martnu Luutluer Kiiug, Jr.. was flue target of sum umuteuusms-e canupaign by tlse Federal Bureau of huvestigatinn toâuseutralazeâ hen as aim effective civil rights leader. Its flue words of flue nuan in charge of flue FBIâs âwarâ against Dr- Kiuug. âNo luohds were haired.â 63
The FBI gathered mnfornuatinn ahouut Dr. Kingâs plaiss amuul activities throuuglu an extensive surveillance programuu. euuupksving iuearlv every intelligencegatluernug teehsnuqume at the Bureauuâs disposal iuu oruler to ohtaiim infonuatuon abouut flue âprivate activities of Dr. Kimug and his advisorsâ to uuse toâcompletely discreditâ tlsem. 64
The program to destroy Dr. Khug as the leader of the eivd rights nsovenseiut nuelusded efforts to discredit hins witlu Executive bramuelm officials,t:âongressuonal leaders, foreign hears of state, Ausserican ansbassaulors. eluuirelses. universities, and flue press. 65
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The FBI ma dad Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in Ins hotel rooms winch one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr.Kiiigâs marnage.66 The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the taperecording unless Dr. King conunitted snicide. 67
The extra ordinary natnre of the campaign to discredit Dr. King is exident from two rtocuments:
ââ At the August 1963 March on Washington. Dr. King tokt the country of his âdream that:
all of Godâs chiklren, black men and wlnte men, Jews and Gentiles. Protestants and Catholics. will be able to join hands and sing inthe words of the old Negro spintnaL âFree at last, free at last, thank God Alinig)itv. Iâm free at last.â
The Bureauâs Domestic Inteffigence Division concluded that this âdemagogic speechâ establsihierl Dr. King as the âmost dangerous and effective Negroleader ni the country.â 68 Shortly afterwards, and within days after Dr. King was nanied âMan of the Yearâ by Tinie niagazine. the FBI decided toâtake luni off his pedestaLâ reduce hun completely in intisience.â and select and proniote its own candidate to âssssune the role of die leadership of theNegro people.â 69
ââ In early 196g. Bureau headquarters explauied to the field that Dr. King must be destroyed because lie war seen as a potential âmessiahâ svhn couldâ)uufs and electrd*â the âblack nationalist movementâ. Indeed, to the FBI he was a potential threat because he nright âabandon Ins supposed âoberhienceâto white liberal doctrines (nonâviolence) .â 70 In short, a non-violent nian was to be secretly attacked and rlestroved as insurance against his abanrlnningnonâviolence.
(h) Illegal or Iniproper ?cleaii.s. -- The surveillance which we investioated was not only vastly excessive ni breadth and a basis for degradnigcounterintelligence actions. hut was also often conrlucterl by illegal or improper means. For example:
(1) For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a program of indiscrnuinatelv opening citizensâ first class niail. The Bureau alsohad a mail opening program. but cancelled it iii 1966. The Bureau continued. liosvevci to receive die illegal fniits of CIAâsirogrimr In 197tt, the heads of both agencies signed a documemit for President Nixon, which colTeetly stated that mail opening wasillegaL tâslselv stated that it harl been discontinued. anrl proposed that the illegal opening of niail shonkl be resumed becatmse it wonklprovide useful results. The President approved the program. hut svithdrew his approsil five days later. The illegal openingcontiiuied nonetheless. Throughout diis perK CIA officiale kmiew dial mail opening was illegal, but expressed commcern about theâflap potentialâ of exposure. not about die illegality of their activity. 71
(2) Froni 1947 suitil May 1975. NSA received from international cable couipaniss millions of cables which had been sent byAmerican citizens in the reasonable expectation dint they woukl he kept private. 72
(3) Snice the early 1930âs. intelligence agencies have târequenllv wiretapped and hugged American citizens without die benefit ofjudicial warrant. Recent court decisions have curtailed die use of diese techniques against domestic targets. But past subjects ofdiese surveillances have included a United States Congressman. a Congressional staffâ nieniber, journalists and newsmen, andninuerous individuals anrl groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who poserl no genuine threat to die national securritv. suchas tsvo White House doniestic affairs advisers and an anti Vietnani War protest group. WIule the prior written approval of theAttorney General has been required for all warrantless wiretaps since 19-ho. the record is replete with instances where thisrequirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only after-the-fact authorization.
Until 1965. microphone surveillance by intelligence agencies was wholly tinregulated ni certaui classes of cases. Within weeksafter a 1954 Suprenie Cosirt decision denouncing die FBIâs installation of a niierophone ni a defendantâs bedroom, the AttonieyGeneral nifonoed die Bureau diat he did not believe die decision applied to national security cases and pernu ted die FBI tocoutnisie to install microphones subject only to its own ânitelligeot restraintâ. 73
(4) In several cases. purely political inforniation (such as the reaction of Congress to an Admiisistrationâs legislative proposal) andpurely tiersomwl iu.forniatioii (such as coverage of die extra-marital social activities of a high-let-el Executive official undersurveillance) was obtained from electrrsmic surveillance and disseminated to die highest levels of die federal goveriuuent. 74
(5) Warrantless break-ins have been conducted by isitelligeoce agencies since World War II. Durisig die 1960âs alone, the FBI ansi(âIA coorlueterl htuidreds of break-nis, muanv against Anieriean citizens ansI doniestie organizatiomia. In some cases. these break-insssâere to nsstall niierophiones: in other eases, diev svere to steal such itenis as menihership lists froni organizations eoiisideredâsubversiveâ by the Bureau. 75
(6) The niost pervasive snnâeillance teehimquc has been the mnforniaut. lii a randoni sample of doniestie intelligence cases. 83%involved inforniants and 5% involved electronic surveillance. 76 Infonuants have been sued against peaceful. law-abirhing groups:duey have collected mnfonuatmon about personal and political views and activities. 77 To maintani their credentials in violence-pronegroups. nifonuants have nisâolved dieniselsâes in violent activity. This phenoutuenon is ssâell illustrated by an infonnant hi die Klan. Hesyas present at the n-murder of a civil rights svorker in Mississippi and asibsequentis helped to solve die crime anrl convict theperpetrators. Earller. however, while perforniing duties paid for by the Gosâermoent. he hail prevmsâuslv âbeaten people severely, hadboarded buses and kicked people, had [gone] into restaurants and beaten them [blaclei] with blackjacks. chains. pistols.â 78Although die FBI requires agents to instruct inforniants that diey cammot be involved hi violence, it svas understood that hi the Khaii,âlie eonkliiât be an angel and he a good infonnant.â 79
4. Igoou-oug f/ic Low
Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally iâecognized that certain activities were illegaL but expressed concern only for âflap Potentialâ Evenniore dnsturbuig was die frequent testimony diat the law, and the (âonstitutmon were simply ignored. For example. the author of die soâcalled Hssston plantestified:
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Question. \kas there nov persoii sviio staled tisit the activity recommended. which you have previously sientified as being illegalopening of (he niaih and breaking and entry or burglary ââ was there an; single person who stated that such activity shonkl not bedone because it was unconstitutional?
Answer. No.
Question. Was there ails single person who said such activity should not he done because il was illegal?
Answer. No. XO
Similarly, the iuan who for ten sears headed FBIâs Intelligence Division testifed that:
never once did I hear anybody, ineludnig myself, raise the question: âIs this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful.ii it legaL is it etlucalor moraLâ âWe never gave any thought to this line of reasoning. because we weie ust naturally pragmatic. 81
Although the statutory law and (be tâonstitution were often not âgtsen] a thonglitâ 82 there was a general attitude that intelligence needs wereresponsive ma luglser law. Thin, as one witness testified at justifying the FBIâs mail opennug program:
It was my assimniption that what we were doing was gistitied Isy what we bad to do ... the greater good. the national security. 83
5. DefLâmc,meiex /n .4 sâconnr,mb,lThâ nod Congo!
The overwhelming number of excesses contintiimsg over a prolonged iseriod of tinse were due as large measure to the fact that the system of cheeks ansIbalances ââ created ni our (âoisstitution to limit abuse of t3overinnental power ââ was seldom applied to the intelligence conuuuiutv. Guidance andregulation from otit.side the intelligence ageitcies -- where it has been imposed at all-- has been vague. Presidents and other seiuor Executive oftictalim,particularly the Attorneys General. have virtsialh abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for inteffigence activity. Seniorgovernment officâiah generally gave the agencies broad, general niandates or pressed for mnuuediate results oii pressing problems. In neither case dadthey provide guidance to present excesses and their broad niandates and pressures themselves often restmhted in excessive or insproper intelligenceactivity.
t:ongress has often declined to exercise meaninefial ovemsisdit. and on occasion has passed laws or niade slatenients whtls were taken by inlellmeeneeagencies as supporting overlvâhroacl investigations.
On die oilier hand, die record reveals instances when intelligence agencies have concealed nnproper activities from then superiors in the Executivebranch and lions the Coneress. or have elected to disclose only the less questionable aspects of their activities.
There has been, in short a. clear and stistansed failsire by those responsible to control die intelligence eonununitv and to ensure its accountability. Therehas been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to filly inform die proper asitliorities of their activities aiid to comply withdirectives frons diose authorities.
6. TIme Advem:se Jogioct of Jnmprojserlmmtelh,gemmce .4ettmâitm
Many of the illegal or unproper disruptive efforts directed against .Ainerican citizens and domestic organizations succeeded mis injuring their targets.Although it is sonsetnues difficult to prove that a targetâs misfortunes were causesl by a counter-intelligence program directed against hint, die possibilitydint an arm of the Untied States Govenunent imitended to cause die harm anil might have been responsible is itself abliolTaut.
The Committee has observed numerous examples of the nulsact of intelligence operations. Sometimes die barns was readily apparent -- destruction ofmarriages, loss of friends orjobs. Sometimes die altitudes of the public and of Govermnent officials responsible for forinsihatmng policy ansI resolving vitalessues were influenced by distorted intelligence. But the most basic harni was to the values of privacy and freedoiu which our Constitntion seeks toprotect and wluch intelligence aetivily infringed on a broad scale.
(a) General Efforts to Discredit. -. Several efforts against inslisiduats and groups appear to have achieved dieir stated aims. For example:
ââ A Bureati Fiekl Office reported that die anonymous letter it had sent to an activisfs husband accusing his wife of infidelity âcontributed very stronglyâto the subsequent breakup of the marriage. 84
â Anodser Field Office reported that a draft counsellor deliberately, and falsely, accused of being an FBI informant was âostracftedâ by his friends andassociates. 85
â Two instructors were reportedllv put on probation afler the Bureau sent an anonymous letter to a universitsâ administrator about died funding of anantiâadnunistration studeiit newspaper. 86
The Bureau evaluated its atteuspts to âput a stopâ to a contrihsution to die Southern Christian Leadership Coiufereuce as âquite successfuLâ 87
â An FBI doeuiiuent boasted dint a âpretextâ phone call to Stokehey Canumichiaelâs mother telling her dial niembers of die Black Paudier Party inteiudedto kill her son left her âshockedâ The memorandum intiniated diat (lie Bsureau believed it bach 6een responsible for Cannichaets flight to .Africa diefollowing slav. 88
(b) Media Maiupuhatiniu. -. The FBI has attempted covertly to influence die publicâs perception of persons and organizations by dissenuuinatingderogatory infonnatioui to die pess. either anonymosrshy or through âfriendlyâ news contacts. The inipach of diose articles is generally ditficuuht to
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measure, although iii some cases there are fairly direct coiuiections to injury to the target. The Bureau a Iso attempted to nstlueuee iuedn reportingwhich would have auv impact on the public image of the FBI. Examples include:
-- Plautnug a series of derogatory articles about Martin Luther Kmg, Jr.od the Poor Peopleâs (âampaign. 89
For example. iii anticipation ofâ the lX,t4 ââpoor peopleâs march on \Va shnigton. D.C..â Bureau lâleadquarters granted authority to turuislu ââcooperativenews media sourcesâ an article âdesimied to enrtail success of hIartin Luther Kingâs fund raising.â 90 Another menioramluui illustrated howâphotographs of demonstratorsâ could he used in drscrediting the coil rushts movement. Six photographs of participants in the poor peopleâs campaign inCleveland accompanied the niemorandum with the following note attached: âThese [photographs] show the militant aggressive appearance of theparticipant.s and might be of interest to a cooperative news source.â 91 Information on the Poor Peopleâs Campaign was prosided by the FBI to friendlyreporters on the condition that âthe Bureau nnist not be revealed as the source.â 92
ââ Soliciting information from Field Oflâices âoii a contimiing basisâ for âprompt ... clissenunation to die news media . . to discredit the New Leftmovement and its artherent.s.â â[he Headquarters directive requested, among oilier things, that:
specific data should be fiunu,shed depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature. of many of the characters, activities, habits, andliving condations representative of New Led arllierents.
Field Offices were to be exhorteit that: âEvenâ avenue of possible einbarrassnuent niust be vieorouslv ann enthissiasticallv exploreit.â 93
â Ordering Field Offices to gather information which woutd disprove allegations by the âliberal press. the bleeding hearts, and the forces on the ledâdiat the Chicago tsobee used undue force in dealing with demonstrators at die 196$ Denuocratic Convention. 95
ââ Taking artvantage of a close relationship widi die (.âliainnan of the Board ââ described hi an FBI menioranstuni as âour good friendâââ of a niagazimuewith national circulation to hifluence articles sihsiti relatest to die FBI. For example. dirongli tIns relationship the Bureau: âsquelchedâ an âsuntâ,ivorahlearticle against die Bureauâ written by a freeâlance writer about an FBI mmivestigation: âpostponed publicationâ of an article cii another FBI case:âforestalled publicationâ of an article by Dr. Martin Luther Kimig. Jr.: and received infonnation about proposed editing of Kingâs articles. 96
(sâ) Distorting Darts to JnJhtnâiccc (3sâsâc,ionsânt Pohciâ and Pub/ic fâcrcâeptioi;s
Acciuâate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound government policy. However, as the past head of die FBIâs Donuestic Intelligence Divimumon reminded the(âoniniittee:
The facts hsâ themselves are not too nieanimugfimt The;â are sonicdihig like stoiies east unto a heap. 97
On certain crucial subjects the doniestic intelligence agencies reported the âfactsâ in svaâmâs that gave rise to niisleailhig inipressions.
For exaniple. die FBIâs Doniestic Intelligence Division iiiitially mtiscoiuited as an âobvious failureâ the alleged atteiiiptâs of Coinnnuiists to hifluence thecivil iâighits movement. 9$ Widiout any siiiticant change hi the faetualsituatioii, the Bureau moved froni the Divisionâs conclusion to Dhâeetrir Hoovciâspublic congressional testhnony characterizing Comniunsust influence on the civil rights iiioveiiient as âvitally hnportant.â 9$a
FBI reporthig on lsrotests against die Vietnam War provides another example, of die nianncr hi wInch the hiformation provided to decisksn-niakers canhe skewed. In acquiescence with a udignent afready expressed by President Johimison. the Bureauâs reports on nlemonstradoii_s agahist the War hiVieuiamn einghiasned (âonussnnsut efforts to mmitâliienee die anti-war niovenuent and underplayed die fact diat die vast majority of nlenion.strators were notCoiiiiiiunsst controlled. 99
(ct) âChilâigâ First Amendment Riglds. -- The First Ainendnient protects die Rights of American citizens to engage hi free ansI open discussions, and toassociate with persooss of their choosing. Intelligence agencies have, on occasion, expressly attenipted to hiterfere with diose rights. For example. oneinternal FBI nienioraiidum called for âtuiore hiteiâviewsâ uvith New Left subjects âto enhance die paiâanoia endemic hi diese circlesâ and âget die pohitacross there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.â 100
More impu.srtaimdv. the governmentâs snrveihhauice activities iii die aggregate -- whether or not expressly hitennled to rho so -â tends. as the Consmuiitteeconcludes at p. 290 to deter die exercise of First Amnemiclesh Rights by Aniermcan citisens who become asyare of the govermnemitâs domestic hitelligenceprogram.
(e) Preventhug die Free Exchange of Ideas. -- Speakers, teachers, writemâs, and publicatiomis dienssehves were targets of the FBIâs coummiterhitelligeneeprogram. The FBIâs efforts to interfere widi the free exchange of ideas huehushech:
-- Anonynsonshv atteisspting to prevent an alleged âComiuuuiinist-froiitâ group froni holding a forum on a niidsvcst camumpu.s. and then hivestigathig the judgewho ordered that die meeting he allowed to proceed. 101
-- Ushig anodier âconfidential snuuirceâ in a foundation wInch comitributed to a local ccuflege to apply pressure on die school to fhâe an activist professor.
-- Aiion;anoushv contacting a umnisersitsâ official to urge luins to âpersuadeâ two professors to stop funuhhig a student newspaper. in order to âelimhiatewhat voice die New Led hasâ hi due area.
-- Targeting die New Ivlexmeo Free l.tnivcrsity for teaclumiug âeonffrniitatioui politicsâ and âdraft counseling taahihigâ. 102
7. Cost and Irs/use
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Domestic intelligence is expensive. Pc have afreadv indica ted the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in ternis of the harm to victims, theinjury to constitutional values, and the damage to time democratic process itself The cost in dollars is also significant. For example, the FBI has hudgetedtor fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domestic security mnfonnant program. more than twice the amount it spends on informants aganist organizedcrane. 103 The aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign counterintelligence is at least $80 million. 104 In the late 1960s andearly 1970s. svlmen the Bureau was joined by the CIA. the military, and NSA in collecting iisformatioii about the antiâwar movenient and black activists.the cost svas substantially greater.
Apart fiâoin the excesses described above, the nsefiiliicss of many domestic nmtelligence activities ni serving the legitimate goal of proteetnig society hasbeen questionable. Properly directed niteliigence investigation.s concentratuig upoii bostde foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuableresults. The Conamiuttee has exanummed cases where the FBI uncovered âillegalâ agents of a foreigii power engaged in clandestine intelligence activitiesiii violation of federal law. Iiiforination leading to the prevention of serious violence has been acquired byâ tIme FBI through its informant penetration ofteiTorist groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names of persons actively involved with such groups. 105 Nevertheless, the mostsweeping doniestic intelligence surveillance progranm.s have produced surprisingly few useful returns ni viesv of their extent. For example:
-- Between 1960 antI 1974, tIme FBI conducted over 500.000 separate investigations of persons and groups wider the âsubversiveâ category, predicatedoii the possibility that they might he likely to overtlwosv the govenunent of the United States, 106 Vet not a single individual or group has beenprosecuted since 1957 tinder the laws which piâohihit plauming or advocating action to overtlmmâow the government and which are the main allegedstatutory basis for such FBI investigations. 107
ââ A recent study by the General Accounting Office lass estimated that of sonic 17.528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of individuals am 1974,ouhâ 1.3 percent resulted am prosecution and conviction, and in unIv âabout 2 percentâ of the cases was advance knowledge of any activity -- legal orillegal -- obtained. 108
-- One of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of intelligence about urban unrest and anti-war protest was to help responsible officiatscope svitli possible violence. Hosvever. a former White House official with major duties in this area sumcler the Jolum.soii ailininistratioma has concluded, iii
retrospect. that ââmum none of these s ituatiomm.s ...woukl advance intelligence about dissident groups [have] been of imich help.ââ that ssâhat svas neesledsvas âph;sical inteffigenceâ about the geography of major cities, and that the atteiumpt to âpredict violenceâ was isot a âsuccessful undertakingâ 109
-- Domestic intelligence reports have sometimes even been counterproductive. A local police eluef, for example. described FBI reports ssâluclm led to tImepositioning of federal troops near lao city as:
almost completely coimmposecl of unsorted and unevaluated stories. tluâeats. and rumors that had crossed nay desk am NesvHaven. Many of these had long before been discounted by our Intelligence Division. But they had niade their svay from NewHaven to Washington. had gained completely unwarranted credmbilit3: and had been submitted by the Director of the FBI to thePresident of tIme United States. They seenied to present a consâincing picture of impending holocaust. 110
In considering its recommuanendations. the Comamamuttee undertook an evaluation of the FBIâs claims that domestic intelligence was necessary to combatterrorism, civil disoiâders, âsubversion.â and hostile foreign intelligence activity. TIme Conaanittee reviewed voluminous materials bearing on this issue andquestioned Bureau officials. localpohuce officials, and present and tâonncr federalexceutive officials.
We have found that we are in funslainental agreenient with the svisdom of Attorney (3eneral Stoneâs initial warning that intdlligeiacc agencies nmust notbe âconcerned smith political or other opiniomss of isuclividualeâ and nmrust be limitesl to investigating essentiillv only âsuch conduct as is forhislden by thelasvs of the United States,.â âlâhe (âonunitteeâs uâecord deinonstmâates that domestic intelligence which departs fiâonm this standard raises grave rislcs ofundcrmnimming the democratic process and harming the interests of individual eitiaeu.s. This danger sveighs heavily again.st tIme speculative or negligiblebenefits of the ill-defined and overhroad investigations authmoriced in the past. Thus, the basic purpose of the reconuaaendations contained iii Part IV ofthis report is to limit the FBI to imuvestigatimig conduct rather than ideas or associations.
The excesses of the past do not however, justly depriving the United States of a clearly defined and effectively controlled domestic intelligencecapability. The intelligence services of this nationâs nmternational adveiâsaries continue to attempt to conduct chandestume espionage operations witbin theUnited States. Ill Our reconmssaendatuon.s prosâide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreign immtehligence activity.
Moreover, terrorists have engaged iii serious acts of violence wbachm Isive brommglmt death and injury to Amamericans and threaten further smuch acts. Theseacts. not time politics or beliefs of those svho svouhd conmait thmena. arc time proper focus for immsâestmgatmons to anticipate terrorist violemuce. Accorcliiaghv. theConummittee would penmmmt properly comutrolled nutelligemace nmvestmgatioum.s am those narrosv cmremmmnstammces, 112
Commcemmtration on iimmmmmiument violence can avoid the wasteful dispersion of resources whmichm has chmaractericed time ssseepimmg (amid fruitless) dommmesticnmtehligence investigations of the past. But time most imnportammt reason for time fundanmental ehammge in time dommiestic intelligence operatiomm.s which onrReconunendations propose is time need to hmrotect tIme constitutional Rights of Americans.
In light of time record of abuse resealed by our iumquirv, the (âoumummittee is mmot satisfied with the position that umuere exposmuâe of svhat has occmunâed iii thepast will prevent its recurrence. Clear legal stammdards auth effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that dommuestic immtehligence activitydoes not itself undernmimme time deammocratic system it is immtenched to protect.
Footnotes:
1 S. Res. 21, see. 2 (12). The Senate specifically charged this Committee with investigating âthe condnct of
domestic intelligence, or cotulterintelligetlce operations against United States citizens.â (See. 2(2) ) Theresolution added several examples of specific charges of possible âillegal, improper or unethicalâ governmentalintelligence activities as matters to be filly investigated (See. (2) (1)-CIA domestic activities: See. (2)
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(3)âHuston Plan See. (2) ( L0)âsurreptitous entries, electronic surveillance, mail opening.)
2 Just as the term âIntelligence activityâ encompasses activities that go far beyond the collection and analysis ofinformation. the term âintelligence communityâ includes persons ranging from tie President to the lowest fieldoperatives of the intelligence agencies.
3 The Alien Act l)rovided for the deportation of all aliens judged âdangerous to the peace and safelyâ of thenation. (1 Stat. 570. June 25. 1798) The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to publish âfalse. scandalous andmalicious writingâ against the United States government, the Congress. or the President with the intent to âexciteagainst themâ the âhatred of the good people of the United Statesâ or to âencourage or abet any hostile designs ofany foreign nation against the United States.â (1 Stat. 596. July 14. 1798) There were at least 25 arrests. 15indictments, and 10 convictions under the Sedition Act. (See James M. Smith. Freedomâs Fetters: The Alien andSedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press. 1956).)
4 Francis Diddle. In Brief Authority (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962). p. 224: Roger Daniels. ConcentrationCamps USA: Japanese Americans and World War H (New York: Holt. Ritehail. and Winston. 1971). p. 66,
5 Many victims of intelligence activities have claimed in the past that they were being subjected to hostile actionby their government. Prior to this investigation. most Americans would have dismissed these allegations.Senator Philip Hart aptly described this phenomenon in the course of the Committeeâs public hearings onclonestic intelligence activities:
âAs Iâm sure others have. I have been told for years by. among others. some of my own fanmilv. that this is exactlywhat the Bureau was doing all of the tine, and in my great wisdom and high office. I assured them that they were(wrongj-it just wasnât tune, it couldnât happen They wouldnât do it. What you have described is a series of illegalactions intended squarely to deny First Amendment rights to some Americans. That is what nâ children havetold me was going on Now I did not believe it.
âThe trick now, as I see it. Mr. Chairman, is for this committee to be able to figure out how to persuade thepeople of this country that indeed it did go omi And how shall we insure that it will never happen again? But itwill happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept that it did go on.â Senator PhilipHart. 11/18/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. p. 41.
6 As the Supreme court noted in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436. 483. 486 (1966). even before tIe Courtrequired law officers (o advise criminal suspects of their constitutional rights before custodial interrogation, theFBI had âan exemplary recordâ in this area-a practice which the Court said should be emulated by state andlocal law enforcenent agencies.â This commendable FBI tradition in tie general field of law enforcementpresents a sharp contrast to the widespread disregard of individual rights in FBI domestic intelligenceoperations examined in the balance of this Report.
7New YorkTines. 5/13/24.
8 Mary J0 Cook testimony. 12/2/75), Hearings. Vol. 6. p. 111: James B. Adams testimony. 12/2/75. Hearings.Vol. 6, p. 135.
9 Tom Charles Hustontestimonv. 9/23/75. Hearings. Vol. 2. p. 45.
10 âTIe Federal Prosecutorâ. Journal of the American Judicature Society (June. 1940), p. 18.
II Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.
12 Meinoraixlum froni the FBI to the Senate Select Committee. 10/6/75.
13 James Angletontestinionv. 9/17/75. p. 28.
14 See Mail Opening Report: Section IV, âFBI Mail Openings.â
15 Chief. International Terrorist Group testimony. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States.3/10/75. pp. 1485-1489.
l0ofl58/l6/20l08:5IAM
16 Statenint by the Chairman. I 1/6/75 re: SHAMROCK. Hearings. Vol. 5. pp. 57-60.
17 See Military Surveillance Report: Section 11. âThe Collection of Information about the Political Activitiesof Private Citizens and Private Organizations.
18 See IRS Report: Section II. âSelective Enforcennt for Non-tax Purposes.â
19 Menxrandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardirnn. 12/8/54. Many of the iremoraiila cited in this reportwere actually written by FBI personnel other than those whose nans were indicated at the foot of the docunntas the author. Citation in this report of specific nmoranda by using the naiurs of FBI personnel which so appearis for docunntation purposes only and is not intended to presume authorship or even knowledge in all cases.
20 Memoraixlumfrom Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 10/20/70. (Hearings. Vol. 6. Exhibit 54-3)
21 MeLnoralKiuni from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/28/69. P. 2. (Hearings. Vol. 6. Exhibit54--i)
22 Memoraalum from Baltimore Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/11/70. P. 2.
23 Memorandinufrom New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/14/64.
24 Nan deleted by Committee to protect privacy.
25 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Meld Office 4/24/64. re CPUSA. Negro question
26 James Adams testimony. 12/2/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. P. 137.
27 MeIm)ralthuulfromF. T. Baunardnerto William C. SuLlivan. 5/29/6.3.
28 Memorandum from Oklahoma City Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/19/4 1. See Developiuent of FBIDomestic Intelligence Investigations: Section IV. âFBI Target Lists.â
29 Chief Robert Shackleford testimony. 2/6/76. p. 91.
30 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Report. 1973. p. 57.
31 Senate Select Committee Staff sunuuarv of HTLTNGUAL File Review. 9/5/75.
32 FBI Sumnurv Memorandum 1/31/75. re: Coverage of TX. Presentation.
33 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson. 7/15/66.
34 See Military Report: See. II. âThe Collection of informationAbout the Political Activities of Private citizensand Private Organizations.â
35 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SACâs. 11/4/70.
36 Charles Brennan testimony. 9/25/75. Hearings. vol. 2 p. 117.
37 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SACâs. 7/5/68.
38 Abstracts of New Lefi Docuients #161. 115. 43. Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBIHeadquarters. 1/21/69.
39 Meinoranduinfrom FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.
40 FBI manual of Instructions. See. 87. B (2-f).
41 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office. 7/23/69.
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42 Memorandumfrom Stephen Early to J. Edgar Hoover. 5/21/40: 6/17/40.
43 Letter fromJ. Edgar Hoover to George Allen, 12/3/46.
44 Letter fromJ. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry Vaughn. 2/15/47.
45 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to M. T. Connellv. 1/27/50.
46 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon AlKierson, 11/7/55.
47 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler. 2/13/58.
47a Letters fromT. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler. 4/21/53-4/27/53.
38 Menrai1um from J. Edgar Hoover to tl Attorney General. 2/16/61.
49 MemoraiilumfromJ. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney GeneraL 2/14/61.
50 Menxraithim from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General. 2/16/6 1.
51 Menraahun from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62.
52 MeniramJum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan. 12/19/66.
53 MeniraiLunifromJ. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General. 2/18/61.
54 MenraidiuufromT. Edgar Hoover to Bill Movers. 10/27/64.
55 Meinaraidum from C. D. DeLoach to JoIni Mohr. 8/29/64.
56 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to HR. Haldeman, 6/25/70.
57 Meinaraalum from FBI Headquarters. to San Francisco Field Office. 11/26/68.
58 Meinarandum from [Midwest Citvj Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 8/1/68: inenrandum froni FBIHeadquarters to [Midwest City] Field Office. 8/6/68.
59 MenKraidumfronl Coluntia Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 11/4/70. re: COINTELPRO-New Left.
60 Menoraidum from Cbarles Brennan to William Sullivan 8/15/68.
61 Meirnraithuii from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.
62 Meinarandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 1/30/69 re: COINTELPRO. BlackNationalist-Hate Groups.
63 William C. Sullivan testimony. 11/1/75, p. 49.
64 nnurandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan. 2/4/64.
65 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 12/16/68: inenxrandum from FBIHeadquarters to Chicago Field Office. 1/30/69. re: COINTELPRO. Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.
66 William C. Sullivan. 11/1/75. pp. 104-105.
67 Andrew Young testinxniy 2/19/76. p. 8.
68 Memoraiilumfrom Sullivan to Belmont, 8/30/63. Menoranchunfrom Sullivan to Belmont. 1/8/64.
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70 MeinaraiJum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs. 3/4/68.
71 See Mail Opening Report: Section IL âLegal Considerations and the âFlapâ Potential.â
72 See NSA Report: Section I. âIntroduction and Summary.â
73 Memaramthim from Attorney General Brownell to 3. Edgar Hoover. 5/20/54.
74 See finding on Political Abuse. To protect the privacy of tie targeted iiiiviclual. the Committee has omittedthe citation to tie ireinarandum concerning the example of purely personal information
75 Meireramium from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach 7/19/66. p. 2.
76 General Accounting Office Report onDonistic intelligence Operations of tie FBI. 9/75.
77 Maw Jo Cook testimony. 12/2/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. p. 111.
78 Gary Rowe deposition, 10/17/75. p. 9.
79 Special Agent No. 3 deposition. 11/21/75, p. 12.
80 Huston testimony 9/23/75, Hearings. Vol. 2.1).
81 William Sullivan testimony. 11/1/75. pp. 92-93.
82 The quote is from a Bureau official who had supenâised for the âBlack Nationalist Hate. GroupâCO1NTELPRO.
âQuestion Did anybody at any time that von remember during the course of the program. discuss theConstitutionality or the legal authority, or anything else like that?
âAnswer. No. we never gave it a thought. As far as I know, nobody engaged or ever had any idea that they weredoing anything other than what was the policy of the Bureau which had been policy for a long tine.â (GeorgeMoore deposition. 11/3/75. p. 83.)
83 Branagan. 10/9/75. p. 41.
83 Meinaraalumfroni St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 6/19/70.
85 MemoraithnufromâSan Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/30/69.
86 MeinaraiLumfrom Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 12/9/70.
87 MemDrarKhnn from Wick to DeLoach, 11/9/66.
88 MemorandumfronĂŽ New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/9/68.
89 See King Report: Sections Vand VII.
90 Memoram:Iumfrom G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.
91 Memoraiilumfrom G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/68.
92 Menx)raalulu from FBI Headquarters to Ivliami Field Office. 7/9/68.
93 Memoraithunfrom C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.
94 omitted in original.
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95 Memoranduinfrom FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 8/28/68.
96 Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to DeLoach. 11/3/64.
97 Sullivan. 11/1/75. p. 48.
98 Menrandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan. 8/26/63 p. 1. Hoover himself construed the initial Divisionestimate to mean that Communist influence was âinfinitesimal.â
98a See Finding onPolitical Abuse. p. 225.
99 See Finding on Political Abuse. p. 225.
100 âNew Left Notes -- Philadelphia.â 9/16/70. Edition #1.
101 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/26/60: Memorandum from P1STHeadquarters to Detroit Field Office 10/27. 28. 31/60: Memorandum fromBaumgardner to Belmont. 10/26/60.
102 See COTNTELPRO Report: Section 111. âThe Goals of COINTELPRO: Preventing or disrupting theexercise of First Ainendnnt Rights.â
103 The budget for FBI informant programs includes not only the payments to informants for their services andexpenses. but also the expenses of FBI personnel who supervise informants, their support costs. andadministrative overhead. (Justice Department letter to Senate Select Committee. 3/2/76).
104 The Committee is withholding the portion of this figure spent on domestic security intelligence (informantsand other investigations combined) to prevent hestile foreign intelligence services from deducing the anvnmtspent on counterespionage. The $80 million figure does not inchide all costs of separate FBI activities whichimv be drawn upon for domestic security intelligence purposes. Among these are the Identification Division(maintaining fingexprint records), the Files aiid Communications Division (managing the storage and retrieval ofinvestigative and intelligence files), and the FBI Laboratory.
105 Examples of valuable infornunt reports include the following: one informant reported a plan to aniushpolice officers and the location of a cache of weapons and dynamite: another informant reported plans totransport illegally obtained weapons to Washington. D.C.: two informants at one meeting discovered plans todynamite two citâ, blocks. All of these plans were frustrated by further investigation and protective measures orarrest. (FBI menuranduin to Select Committee. 12/10/75: Senate Select Committee Staff menurandumIntelligence Cases in Which the FBI Prevented Violence. undated.)
One exalr4,le of the use of information in Bureau files involved a âname checkâ at Secret Service request oncertain persons applying for press credentials to cover the visit of a foreign head of state. The discovery of datain FBI files indicating that one such person bad been actively involved with violent groups led to furtherinvestigation and ultimately the issuanoe of a search warrant. The search produced evidence, includingweapons. of a plot to assassinate the foreign head of state. (FBI nnurandum to Senate Select Committee,2/23/76)
106 This figure is the number of âinvestigative mattersâ handled by the FBI in this area, including as separateitenu the investigative leads iii particular cases which are followed up by various field offices. (FBImemorandum to Select Committee. 10/6/75.)
107 Scluckelford 2/13/76. p. 32. This official does not recall any targets of âsubversiveâ investigations havingbeen even referred to a Grand Jm-â, tuider these statutes since the I 950s.
108 FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations -- Their Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved.âReport by the Comptroller General to the House Judiciai Committee. 2/24/76. pp. 13 8-147. The FBI contendsthat these statistics may be unfair in that they concentrate on investigations of individuals rather than groups.(Ibid.. Appendix V) In response. GAO states that its âsample of organization and control files was sufficient todetermine that generally the FBI did not report advance knowledge of planned violence.â Iii most of the fourteeninstances where such advance knowledge was obtained, it related to âsuch activities as speeches.
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denoiistrations 01 iietingsâa11 essenthlllv i1OIP toleni.â (Ibid.. p. [44)
109 Joseph Califano lestinunv. 1/27/76 pp. 7-8.
110 James Alieiiitestimonv. 1/20/76. pp. 16. [7.
I Ii An indication of the scope of the probLem is the increasing munber of official rcpresentati es of communist
governments in the United States. For example the niunber of So; jet officials in this country has increased from
333 in 1961 to 1.079 by early 1975. There were 2.683 East-West exchange ;isitors and 1.500 commercial
isitors in 1974. (FBI Meiwranduiu. âIntelligence Activities Within the United States by ForeLgn Governments.â
3/20/75.)
112 According to the FBI there were 89 bombmgs attributable to teriorist activity in 197S. as compaied with
45 in 1974 and 24 in 1 97. Six persons died in terroristâclaimed bombings and 76 persons were injured in1975. Five other deaths were reported in other tpes of terrorist incidents. Monetary damage reported in
terrorist bontings exceeded 2.7 million dollars. It should be noted however, that terrorist bombings are only a
fraction of the total number of boinbing,s in this coiuflr. Thus. the 89 terrorist bombings in 1975 âaere alneng a
total of over l.90() bombings. nust of which were not according to the FBI . attributable dearly to terrorist
activilv. (FBI memaranduin to Senate Select Committee 2/23/76.)
Trc,n,r r1Jfion and hint! by Paul Wolf 2002.
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