INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED
Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan for
Expansion of Oil Terminal At
Dist. Deoghar, Jharkhand
6(b) Isolated storage & handling of hazardous chemicals, Category B
Prepared By
ABC TECHNO LABS INDIA PVT. LTD.
AN ISO ISO 9001:2008, ISO14001:2004 & OHSAS 18001:2007 certified
Environmental Engineering and Consultancy Organization
(NABL Accredited & MoEF Recognised Environment Laboratory)
QCI NABET Accredited for Sector 5F (Certificate No. NABET / EIA / 1316 / RA001)
Corporate Office:
No.2, 2
nd Street, Thangam Colony, Anna Nagar West, Chennai – 600040.
Tamil Nadu, India.
Tel: 044 – 26161123 / 24 / 25
Mumbai Office:
A-355, Balaji Bhavan, Plot No. 42 A, Sector 11, CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai – 400614.
Maharashtra, India
Tel: 022 27580044
www.abctechnolab.com [email protected]
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
RISK ASSESSMENT & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
1.1 Introduction
Industrial plants deal with materials, which are generally hazardous in nature by
virtue of their intrinsic chemical properties or their temperature or pressure of
operation or a combination of these. Fire, explosion, hazardous release or a
combination of these are the hazards associated with industrial plants. These have
resulted in the development of more comprehensive, systematic and sophisticated
methods of Safety Engineering such as Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment to
improve upon the integrity, reliability and safety of industrial plants.
The primary emphasis in safety engineering is to reduce risk to human life and
environment. The broad tools attempt to minimize the chances of accidents occurring.
There always exists, no matter how remote, that small probability of a major accident
occurring. If the accident involves highly hazardous materials in sufficient large
quantities, the consequences may be serious to the plant, to surrounding areas and the
populations therein.
M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) have proposed to install additional
storage tankages of MS, HSD, SKO and 4Nos. bottom filling loading bays (TLF bays)
within exiting terminal at Jasidih, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand. Product such as MS,
HSD and SKO have received through Haldia-Barauni product pipeline. Construction
of additional tankages is utmost need to fulfil the need of petroleum product as per
market requirement in nearby area. Since the petroleum products are highly
inflammable, it is necessary to evaluate to risk from this installation. IOCL has
retained ABC Techno Labs India Pvt. Ltd. as a consultant for carrying out the risk
analysis study of the proposed additional tankages of MS, HSD and SKO at Jasidih
terminal, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand. Scope of work includes:
(i) Identify different hazard scenarios, which are likely to cause damage to the
installation and other properties, operating staff as well as the surrounding
communities and installations.
(ii) Evaluate the damage potential of the probable hazardous events in relation to
their location to assess the magnitude of the impact and the impact zones.
(iii) Suggest remedial/preventive measures.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
(iv) Prepare an effective on-site disaster management plan.
1.2 Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification
Risk is defined as the unwanted consequences of a particular activity in relation to the
likelihood that this may occur. Risk assessment thus comprises of two variables,
magnitude of consequences and the probability of occurrence of accident. The first
step in risk assessment is identification of hazards. Hazard is defined as a physical or
chemical condition with the potential of accident which can cause damage to people,
property or the environment. Hazards are identified by careful review of plant
operation and nature of materials used. The various scenarios by which an accident
can occur are then determined, concurrently study of both probability and the
consequences of an accident is carried out and finally risk assessment is made. If this
risk is acceptable then the study is complete. If the risk is unacceptable then the
system must be modified and the procedure is restarted.
1.3 Scope of Risk Analysis
The scope of risk analysis study includes:
(i) Identify potential hazard sections of the plant, which are likely to cause damage to
the plant, operating staff and the surrounding communities in case of any accident
due to the proposed plant facilities.
(ii) Assess overall damage potential of the hazardous events in relation to main plant
and environment.
(iii) Assessment of total individual risk.
(iv) Recommended emergency preparedness plan to mitigate the effects of any
accident.
1.4 Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis of any plant / installation handling hazardous materials include –
1.4.1 Hazard Identification
● Identify potentially hazardous materials that can cause loss of human life/injury,
loss of properties and deteriorate the environment due to loss of containment.
● Identify potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and consequent
hazards like fire, explosion and toxicity.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
1.4.2 Consequence Analysis
● Analysis of magnitude of consequences of different potential hazard scenarios and
their effect zones.
● Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important for taking
precautionary measures for risk reduction as for well as mitigation of effect in
case of such accidents happening.
This report has been prepared by applying the standard techniques of risk assessment
and the information provided by IOCL. Based on the Risk Assessment, Disaster
Management Plan (DMP) has been prepared.
1.5 Glossary of Terms used in Risk Assessment
The common terms used in Risk Assessment and Disaster Management are elaborated
below:
“Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death)
occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be
either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances.
“Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury, damage
to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria.
“Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its
chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human
beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment.
“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry,
which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected
therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment.
“Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic
disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on a
scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or
community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and release of
toxic gases or chemical substances etc.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
“Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal injury
or property damage or both.
“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This
highlights the typical nature of emergency “It will be after experience that enough is
not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is
not possible to avoid them always.”
“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management.
Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons
engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before,
during and after an emergency.
1.6 Scope of Study
The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various
statutory bodies for similar type of projects:
● Identification of potential hazard areas;
● Identification of representative failure cases;
● Identification of possible initiating events;
● Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the
impact zones from the accidental scenarios;
● Consequence analysis for all the possible events;
● Assess the overall suitability of the site from hazard minimization and disaster
mitigation points of view;
● Furnish specific recommendations on the minimization of the worst accident
possibilities; and
● Preparation of broad Disaster Management Plan (DMP).
1.7 Approach to the Study
Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of
an event or sequence of events. The description of the tasks of the various phases
involved in risk analysis is detailed below:
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
Phase-I: Hazard Identification
The technique employs for the Hazard Identification is MCA analysis. MCA stands
for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum
damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include
quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice, the selection
of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering
judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.
Process information study and relevant data would help in the identification of hazard
prone section of the plant. Inventory analysis and Fire and Explosion and Toxicity
Indices and following manufacture, storage and transport of hazard chemicals rules of
Government of India (GOI Rules, 2000) are also the methods used in hazard
identification.
Phase-II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation
Ranking of each unit in hazard prone sections are done based on the Fire and
Explosion Index (F & EI), Toxicity Index (TI) and Inventory Analysis. Safety of
hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis.
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a part of the US Military Standard System
Safety Program requirements. The main purpose of this analysis is to recognize
hazards early, thus saving time and cost, which could result from major plant
redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar
procedure under a different name. It is generally applied during concept or early
development phase of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is
a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary
phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or no
insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA
focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the
plant design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on
procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be
released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards
related to:
● Pipeline / equipment;
● Interface among system components;
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
● Operative environment;
● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.);
● Facility; and
● Safety equipment.
The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent
plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence
Analysis.
Phase-III & IV: Disaster Management Plan (DMP) and Emergency
Preparedness Plan (EPP)
Safety review of especially vulnerable process units is covered in this phase. This
helps in reducing the risk qualitatively while the outcome of Phase-I and Phase-II
would reduce risk in quantitative terms. Emergency Preparedness Plan based on the
earlier studies is covered in this activity. Customarily, major industries to have their
EPP‟s and therefore, there is a need to look into those details and recommend a
realistic EPP based on the above studies.
1.8 Hazard Identification
1.8.1 Introduction
Identification of hazards in the proposed project is of primary significance in the
analysis, quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals
and process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the
characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident. Hence,
all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined to
assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of
events, which can be termed as an accident. Typical schemes of predictive hazard
evaluation and quantitative risk analysis suggest that hazard identification step plays a
key role (Refer Figure - 1.1). Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its
consequences form the basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property,
environment or personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of
release of a toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its
damaging effects, the area involved and the possible precautionary measures required
to be taken. The following two methods for hazard identification have been employed
in the study:
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
Identification of hazardous storage units based on relative ranking technique, viz.
Fire-Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI); and
Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA).
1.8.2 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance
Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely flammable
substances, unstable substances, and toxic substances.
Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized.
Under certain circumstances the vapours arising from flammable substances when
mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if present in
sufficient quantity such clouds may explode in open air also. Unstable substances are
liquids or solids, which may decompose with such violence so as to give rise to blast
waves.
Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life when
released into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals based on
flammability, reactivity and toxicity are given in NFPA Codes 49 and 345 M.
1.9 Dow Index
1.9.1 Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI) Approach
Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Indexing (FE & TI) is a rapid ranking method for
identifying the degree of hazard. The application of FE&TI would help to make a
quick assessment of the nature and quantification of the hazard in these areas.
However, this does not provide precise information. Respective Material Factor
(RMF), General Hazard Factors (GHF), Special Process Hazard Factors (SPHF) are
computed using standard procedure of awarding penalties based on storage handling
and reaction parameters. Before hazard indexing can be applied, the installation in
question should be subdivided into logical, independent elements or units. In general,
a unit can logically be characterized by the nature of the process that takes place in it.
In some cases, the unit may consist of a plant element separated from the other
elements by space or by protective walls. A plant element may also be an apparatus,
instrument, section or system that can cause a specific hazard. For each separate plant
process, which contains flammable or toxic substances, a fire and explosion index F
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
and/or a toxicity index T may be determined in a manner derived from the method for
determining a fire and explosion index developed by the Dow Chemical Company.
1.9.2 FE and TI Methodology
Dow‟s Fire and Explosion Index (F and E) is a product of Material Factor (MF) and
Hazard Factor (F3) while MF represents the flammability and reactivity of the
substances, the hazard factor (F3), is itself a product of General Process Hazards
(GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). An accurate plot plan of the plant, a
process flow sheet and Fire and Explosion Index and Hazard Classification Guide
published by Dow Chemical Company are required to estimate the FE & TI of any
process plant or a storage unit.
1.9.3 Computations and Evaluation of Fire and Explosion Index
The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is calculated from the following formula:
F & EI = MF x (GPH) x (SPH)
The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as
per the criteria given below:
F & EI Range Degree of Hazard
0 – 60 Light
61 – 96 Moderate
97 – 127 Intermediate
128 – 158 Heavy
159 – Up Severe
1.9.4 Toxicity Index (TI)
The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health hazards
established by the NFPA in Codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA 345 m. However,
the products handled are not toxic.
1.9.5 Classification of Hazard Categories
By comparing the indices F&EI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of
the following three categories established for the purpose (Table - 1.1).
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
Table 1.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index
A. C
ate
gor
y
B. Fire & Explosion
Index (F&EI) C. Toxicity
Index (TI)
D. I E. F & EI, 65 F. TI < 6
G. I
I H. 65 < or = F&EI <
95 I. 6 < or =
TI < 10
J. I
II K. F&EI > or = 95
L. TI > or =
10
Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the
three hazard categories.
1.9.6 The Basic Data
1.9.6.1 Basic Data for Motor Spirit
(i) Substance stored-Motor Spirit
(ii) Quantity stored-10694 KL (max) in three Tanks, two tanks with a Capacity of
4241KL and one Tank with a capacity of 2212 KL
(iii) Quantity to be stored -10592KL
(iv) Type of storage-Internal Floating Roof Vertical Storage Tanks
1.9.6.2 Basic Data for HSD
(i) Substance stored-High Speed Diesel
(ii) Quantity stored-15814 KL (max) in four tanks (two tanks each of capacity 5303
KL & two tanks each of capacity 2604 KL)
(iii)Quantity to be stored-9025KL
(iv)Type of storage- Conical Roof Vertical Storage Tanks
1.9.6.3 Basic Data for SKO
(i) Substance stored-Superior Kerosene Oil
(ii)Quantity stores-4882 KL (max) in three tanks, one with a capacity of 3006 KL &
other two tanks each of capacity 938 KL
(iii)Quantity to be stored-2100KL
(iii)Type of storage -Conical Roof Vertical Storage Tanks
1.9.6.4 The Properties
The relevant properties of the above substances are given in Table-1.2.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Jharkhand
1.9.6.5 The Results
The detailed calculations are summarized in Table- 1.3.
1.9.7 Comments
The recommended minimum features, according to DOW Fire and Explosion Index
have been given at Table-1.3. Based on these features and the various values obtained,
the following conclusions can be drawn:
(i) The SKO and HSD Storage Tanks pose a “LIGHT” hazard, with an exposure
radius of about 40.10 ft. and 33.59 ft. respectively.
(ii) The Radii of Exposure for the MS Storage Tanks is 64.16 ft. and the hazard
potential is “MODERATE”.
(iii) Except the Fire Proofing for the Motor Spirit Tanks, all other “Recommended
Required” as per Table - 1.3 are optional.
Table 1.2 Properties of MS, SKO and HSD
Sr.
No. Tank No. Stored Material
Capacity
m3
Density
Kg/m3
Flash
Point oC,
max
Boiling
Point oC,
max
1. T-101, T-
102, T-103 Motor Spirit 10694 730.0 <18.0 215
2. T-108, T-
109, T-110
Superior Kerosene
Oil 4882 810.0 > 35.0 300.0
3.
T-104, T-
105, T-106,
T-107
High Speed Diesel
Oil 15814 800.0 > 32.0 380
4. T-111, T-
112, T-113 Ethanol 210 780.0 13 78.29
Table 1.3 Calculations for Dow Fire & Explosion Index
Tank No. Stored
Material
Material
Factor MF
General
Process
Hazard
Factor
F1
Special
Process
Hazard
Factor
F2
Unit
Hazard
Factor F3
Fire &
Explosion
Index
F&EI =
F3xMF
Exposure
Radius
(ft.)
Degree of
Hazard
T-101,
T-102,
T-103
Motor Spirit 16.00 1.55 3.08 4.774 76.384 64.16 Moderate
T-108,
T-109,
T-110
Superior
Kerosene
Oil
10.00 1.55 3.08 4.774 47.74 40.10 Light
T-104,
T-105,
T-106,
T-107
High Speed
Diesel Oil 10.00 1.55 2.58 3.993 39.99 33.59 Light
T-111,
T-112,
T-113
Ethanol 16.00 1.55 2.33 3.6115 57.78 48.5 Light
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Jharkhand
1.10 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) Approach
1.10.1 Introduction
A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with a
maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable.
MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an
accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of probability
that is still believed to be credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat arbitrary. In
practice, the selection of accident scenarios representative for a MCA-Analysis is
done on the basis of engineering judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis
studies, especially accident analysis.
Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA
analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and
calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic
releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the
major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous
materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective
hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the
surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. Figure-
3.2 depicts the flow chart for MCA analysis.
As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and
storage units and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level or risk
for the surroundings in terms of damage distances. For this selection the following
factors have been taken into account:
● Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic;
● Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity; and
● Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and
presence of incompatible materials.
In addition to be above factors, the location of a unit or activity with respect to
adjacent activities is taken into consideration to account for the potential escalation of
an accident. This phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The units and
activities, which have been selected on the basis of the above factors, are summarized;
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
accident scenarios are established in hazard identification studies, while effect and
damage calculations are carried out in Maximum Credible Accident Analysis Studies.
1.10.2 Methodology
Following steps are employed for visualization of MCA scenarios:
● Chemical inventory analysis;
● Identification of chemical release and accident scenarios;
● Analysis of past accidents of similar nature to establish credibility to identified
scenarios; and
● Short-listing of MCA scenarios.
1.10.3 Common Causes of Accidents
Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents are
identified as:
● Poor house keeping;
● Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities;
● Unsafe or defective equipment facilities;
● Lack of proper procedures;
● Improvising unsafe procedures;
● Failure to follow prescribed procedures;
● Jobs not understood;
● Lack of awareness of hazards involved;
● Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities;
● Lack of guides and safety devices; and
● Lack of protective equipment and clothing.
1.10.4 Failures of Human Systems
An assessment of past accidents reveal human factor to be the cause for over 60% of
the accidents while the rest are due to other component failures. This percentage will
increase if major accidents alone are considered for analysis. Major causes of human
failures reported are due to:
● Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavourable environmental
conditions, fatigue, etc.
● Lack of training in safety and loss prevention;
● Indecision in critical situations; and
● Inexperienced staff being employed in hazardous situations.
Often, human errors are not analyzed while accident reporting and accident reports
only provide information about equipment and/or component failures. Hence, a great
deal of uncertainty surrounds analysis of failure of human systems and consequent
damages.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
1.10.5 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)
Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures or catastrophes, causing
possible damage to the surrounding area. This section deals with the question of how
the consequences of the release of such substances and the damage to the surrounding
area can be determined by means of models.
It is intended to given an insight into how the physical effects resulting from the
release of hazardous substances can be calculated by means of models and how
vulnerability models can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of injuries
and damage to exposed population and environment. A disastrous situation is general
due to outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes,
which eventually lead to loss of life, property and ecological imbalance.
Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA
analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and
calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic
release, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the
major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous
materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective
hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the
surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. The
MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential
vulnerability.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Fig. 1.1 Flow chart for Maximum Credible Accident Analysis
IS THE SD (EEC)
APPLICABLE
START
PLANT VISIT
DATA COLLECTION PROCESS DESCRIPTION
PROCESS CONTROL LOOPS PRI/PFD OPERATING
MANUAL START UP/SHUT DOWN PLOT PLAN
METEOROLOGICAL DATA PAST ACCIDENTS DATA
ALL RELEVANT PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL DATA OF
CHEMICALS INVOLVED
SELECT THE SECTION
SELECT THE UNIT
CLASSIFY VESSEL/EQUIPMENT OR PIPELINE
INVENTORY ANALYSIS
COMPARE QUANTITY - 50 YES
NO
IS FE/FET IN
SEVERITY? ADOPT CHECK LIST
APPROACH YES
CALCULATE EFFECT
IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD PRONE SECTION
CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION
PLOT DAMAGE DISTANCE
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7.
Fig. 1.2 Steps in Consequence Analysis
RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
BLEVE
EFFECTS
CONTINUOUS INSTANTANEOUS
HEAT RADIATION
PRESSURES WAVE
FLASH
PRESSURES WAVE
LIQUID
VAPOUR
FIRE
IGNITION
TWO PHASE FLOW
NO
VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
DISPERSION YES
HEAT RADIATION
IGNITION
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Jharkhand
1.11 Risk Analysis
1.11.1 Properties of Materials Handled
Petroleum products like, Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), and High
Speed Diesel (HSD) shall be handled in the Terminal. All these products are a
combination of hydrocarbons and are highly inflammable. Motor Spirit is a class-A
type petroleum liquid (Flash Point <23oC), Superior Kerosene and High speed diesel
are of Class B type (Flash point between 23oC and 55
oC) according to convention.
The products, when spilled from the containment will cause fire if they get a contact
with an ignition source. Incomplete combustion of these hydrocarbons may generate
carbon monoxide, which may cause toxicity as well as explosion. However, fire is the
main hazard. Lower the flash point, higher is the possibility of ignition and hazard.
The light hydrocarbons will evaporate from these petroleum oil liquids, which may
catch fire if they get into contact with an ignition source. Properties of the products
handled are given in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4 Properties of Liquid Handled
Properties Products
MS SKO HSD MS (Xtra) ETHANOL
1. Boiling point, oC (range) 50-215 150-300 260-380 50-215 78.29
2. Density at 15 oC 0.73 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.78
3. Flash point, oC <18 >35 >32 <18 <13
4. Vapour press. At 38
oC
(Kg/Cm2 abs)
0.73 0.2 0.1 0.73 0.079 at 250C
5. Heat of combustion
BTU/LB 18,800 21700 18,700 18,800
26847.8
KJ/Kg
6. Auto ignition tempoC 280 210 380 280 -
7. LFL (% V/V) 1.4 0.7 1.8 1.4 4.3
8. UFL (% V/V) 7.6 5.0 5.6 7.6 19
1.11.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products
The hazard of equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products is the potential loss of
integrity of the containment with subsequent release of liquid causing fire. The
pipelines carry large quantities of petroleum liquid. A rare pipeline fracture would
release large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product would get collected in the
neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a fire hazard if it gets source of
ignition and proper precautions are not taken.
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Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon, which
may occur due to earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. However,
vapour coming out through the vent line of fixed roof tank or through vapour seal
around the shell in floating roof tanks may be ignited through lightning. However,
such cases are also very rare. In such cases the whole tank may be on fire. Corrosion
in the tanks may cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid from the tanks.
However, in such cases the oil will be contained in the dyke. In case of oil spill
collected on ground an oil pool will be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called Pool
Fire. It creates long smoky flames. The wind may tilt the flame towards ground
causing secondary fires and damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense
near the fire but falls off rapidly beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very
destructive within the plant area and near the source of generation.
In case of formation of small holes on the above ground pipeline the liquid may
escape in the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due
to heat radiation from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the
ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and the pipelines causing domino effect.
1.11.3 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities
Because of the inherent hazard potential of the petroleum products to be handled in
the installation, due care is required to be taken in the design and installation of the
storage tanks, pipelines and other associated facilities e.g.
i) Well established code of practice in design and installation.
ii) Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118).
iii) Provision of weather resistant painting for protection of exposed areas of
pipelines, valves and equipment.
iv) Provision of dykes and fire walls around storage tanks.
v) Well planned Fire Fighting Facilities.
vi) Well established organisation entrusted for design, inspection & erection of
the facility.
vii) Well trained manpower for operation and maintenance.
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1.11.4 Fire Fighting Facilities
(i) Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities: Well planned Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities have
been considered in the installation e.g.
a) Fire Hydrants and Monitors
Fire Hydrants and monitors shall be provided around the dyke walls of storage tanks.
They will also be provided for Pump Manifold, Pump Bay & Road Tanker Loading
gantry. Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves have been made in
such a way that Fire Tenders can approach to put out fire in any possible area.
b) Spray Protection system
Storage tanks containing motor spirit shall be provided with water sprinkler system.
Perforated spray water pipes shall be provided around the shell of the storage tanks
and shall be located at the top of the shell.
Fire Fighting Systems has been designed as per guidelines of OISD-117 and TAC
rules.
(ii) Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus
Following types of Fire Extinguishers and other fire fighting apparatus shall be
provided in vulnerable areas of the plant, administrative block, control Room, Fire
Water Pump House. MCC etc. as per OISD guidelines.
S.No. Type of Area Portable Extinguishers
(i) Storage of Class-A/B products 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2.
In packed containers and stored
In open/closed area
(ii) Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 2 pumps
(Class - A & B)
Above 50 – 100 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for each
pump.Beyond 100 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. or 1 no. of 25 Kg.
DCP for each pump.
Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 4
(Class – C) pumps upto 50 HP
Above 50 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 KG
DCP for 4 pumps.
(iii) Tank Truck loading and unloading 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for
every 2 Bays for POL/speciality
products and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile unit
for each gantry.
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(iv) Tank Wagon loading and 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 50 m
unloading gantry (siding) length and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP
mobile
unit in each siding.
(v) Above ground Tank Minimum 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or
1 x 25 Kg. DCP per tank and
4 x 75 Kg. or 6 x 50 Kg. DCP mobile
unit per
installation.
Underground Tank Farms 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg.
DCP
(vi) Fire Pump House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2
pumps.
(vii) Admn. Building / Store House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 200 m2.
(minimum 1 x 10 Kg. DCP on
each
floor)
(viii) Generator Room upto 250 KVA 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP and 1 no. 4.5
Kg.
CO2 for every Generator
Above 250 KVA 2 nos. 4.5 Kg. & 1 no. 10 Kg.
DCP
(ix) Main Switch Room 1 no. 4.5 Kg. CO2 for every 25
m2
(x) Computer Room/Cabin Halon / Its proven equivalent – 2
nos. 0.6 / 1 Kg. for 50 m2
or 1 no.
per Cabin whichever is higher
(xi) Security Cabin 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP
(xii) Canteen 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2
(xiii) Laboratory 1 x 10 Kg. DCP & 1 x 4.5 Kg.
CO2
(xiv) Effluent Treatment Plant 1 nos. 75 Kg. & 2 nos. 10 Kg.
DCP
Extinguisher
(xv) Workshop 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP & 1 no. 2 kg.
CO2
Extinguisher
(xvi) Transformer 1 no. 6.8 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher
(xvii) UPS / Charger Room 1 no. 2 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher
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1.11.5 Safety Valves
To prevent building of pressure and consequent damage two numbers of pressure
vacuum valves shall be provided on the roof of MS tanks to release pressure.
1.12 Risk Assessment
1.12.1 Introduction
The Jasidih Terminal of M/s IOCL, which includes the facilities for receipt, storage
and despatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted and
accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due safeguard is being taken in design,
installation and operation of the system to prevent any unwanted release of
hydrocarbons from their containment. However, in the event of release of
hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The chances of explosion
are less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard
scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis.
Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure
scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the
distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for
consequence analysis are manifolds like -
Computation of risk.
Aid better plant layout.
evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties &
human lives.
Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures.
Formulate safe design criteria and protection system.
Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan.
The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all
known and unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and
to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also gives
the plant authorities, workers, district authorities and the public living in the area an
understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be taken.
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1.11.2 Modes of Failure
There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The
leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small dia
pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms, leakages due
to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to overpressure, pump
mechanical seal failure and any other sources of leakage.
1.11.3 Damage Criteria
The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to thermal
radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released since the
petroleum products are highly inflammable specially Motor Sprit oil whose flash
points is low.
The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally spread
on the ground as a pool or released in the form of jet in case of release from a
pressurised pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present in the
petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet as well as
liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage tanks due to
ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may also be regarded as
pool fire.
Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of burns on
human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building
and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects due to thermal radiation
intensity are elaborated in Table - 1.5.
Table 1.5 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity
Incident Thermal
Radiation Intensity
KW/M2
Type of Damage
37.5 Can cause heavy damage to process equipment, piping, building etc.
32.0 Maximum Flux level for thermally protected tanks.
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood.
8.0 Maximum heat flux for uninsulated tanks.
4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within
20 sec. (First Degree Burn).
1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure.
0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation.
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Table 1.6 Physiological Effects of Threshold Thermal Doses
Dose Threshold KJ/M2 Effect
375 3rd Degree Burn.
250 2nd Degree Burn.
125 1st Degree Burn.
65 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin
caused.
1st Degree Burn Involve only epidermis, blister may occur; example - sun
burn.
2nd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn plus
some portion of dermis.
3rd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis and dermis; subcutaneous
tissues may also be damaged.
In case of motor spirit having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility
of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over pressure is given in
Table 1.7.
Table 1.7 Damage Effects Due to Blast over Pressure
Blast Over Pressure
(Bar) Damage Type
0.30 Major Damage to Structures
0.17 Eardrum Rupture
0.10 Repairable Damage
0.03 Damage of Glass
0.01 Crack of Windows
1.11.4 Dispersion and Stability Class
In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapour plays an
important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion is mainly
Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness. One of the
characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an important role in dispersion
of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to which it allows vertical motion by
suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is generally a function of vertical temperature
profile of the atmosphere. The stability factor directly influences the ability of the
atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most
dispersion problems relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground.
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Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the
vertical temperature profile.
Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height. The
rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It varies from
time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature with height under
adiabatic, or neutral condition is approximately 1oC per 100 metres. The atmosphere
is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the lapse rate is less than, equal or
greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1oC per 100 metres.
Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F
A = Extremely unstable
B = Moderately unstable
C = Slightly unstable
(a) D = Neutral
E = Stable
F = Highly stable
1.11.5 Selected Failure Cases
The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is first to select the probable
failure scenarios. The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table 1.8.
Table 1.8 List of Failure Cases
Sl.
No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences
Credible/
Non-credible
1] Tanks on Fire
i) MS Tank
ii) SKO Tank
iii) HSD Tank
Thermal Radiation
Partially-Credible
2] Vessel connection failure for
inlet / outlet lines of MS, SKO,
HSD tanks
Thermal radiation for
MS, SKO & HSD and
also explosion for MS
Partially-Credible
3] Gasket failure in pump discharge
line SKO, MS and HSD (Road
Tanker Loading Pump)
Thermal radiation
Credible
4] Failure of 3” dia loading arm
(i) MS, (ii) SKO & (iii) HSD - do -
Partially-Credible
5] Hole in pump discharge lines (25
mm) HSD, SKO & MS (Road
Tanker Loading)
- do - Credible
6] Mechanical seal failure for MS,
SKO & HSD pumps for Tank
truck loading
Thermal radiation Credible
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7] Ethanol pump discharge line full
bore failure. Thermal radiation Non-Credible
It will be seen that most of the probable cases of failures have been considered for
Consequence Analysis.
1.12 Consequence Analysis
Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done to evaluate and
identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable measures in
operational phase to prevent and mitigate such failure events.
1.12.1 Storage Tanks on Fire
Two numbers of floating roof tanks of capacity 4241 KL each and another additional
one number of capacity 2212 KL for storage of Motor Spirit, 2 nos. for storage
capacity of 5303 KL each and 2 nos. of 2604 KL each for H.S.D (Cone. roof) and 2
nos. of 938 KL and 1 no. 3006 KL for SKO (Cone roof). 3 nos. of Ethanol Tanks
(Underground) each of capacity 70 KL will be provided. In addition to dykes the
tanks of different products will also be provided with fire wall around them.
A floating roof tank is susceptible to fire hazard, if a static charge or a spark ignites
the vapour being released from the rim vent, causing fire. Vapours coming out of
vents of cone. roof tanks can catch fire by lightning. If the fire is not controlled at the
initial stage it can lead to collapse of the roof and total liquid becomes exposed to fire.
The hazard posed by such failure and subsequent fire is intense thermal radiation. The
thermal radiation emanating from such tank fire can cause damage to nearby tanks
and persons' in the vicinity. As per IP Code, thermally protected facilities and storage
tanks can withstand a thermal radiation of 32 KW/M2 while unprotected tanks and
process facilities can withstand only upto 8 KW/M2. Normal persons can withstand an
intensity of 1.5 KW/M2 for a long duration. A radiation intensity of 4.5 KW/M
2 can
cause 1st degree burn if a man is exposed for more than 20 seconds.
Hazard distances due to thermal radiation as a result of fires in storage tanks are
shown in Table 1.9.
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Table 1.9 Hazard Distances Due to Storage Tanks on Fire
(All distances are from edge of the tanks)
Incident Thermal
Radiation KW/M2
Hazard distances (m) for
1F 2B 3D 5D
MS TANK (DIA-20 M)
37.5 N R N R N R N R
32.0 N R N R N R N R
12.5 13 13 13 13
8.0 14 14 14 14
4.5 15 15 15 15
HSD TANK (DIA-22.0 M)
37.5 N R N R N R N R
32.0 9 9 9 9
12.5 13 12 12 12
8.0 14 13 13 13
4.5 15 14 14 14
SKO TANK (DIA-16 M)
37.5 N R N R N R N R
32.0 9 9 9 9
12.5 9 9 9 9
8.0 10 10 10 10
4.5 11 11 11 11
NR = Not Reached
It is seen from the above table that in case of tank fire for MS the hazard distance for
thermal radiation level for 8 KW/M2
will extend upto a distance of 14 m. In case of
tank fire for HSD distances to 8 KW/M2 is 14 m and for SKO tank distances to 8
KW/M2 is 10 m. All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam
pourer system & all MS tanks will be provided with water sprinkler system. It is also
seen that the distances upto 8 KW/M2 remain within the battery limit of the proposed
installation.
However, such tanks fires are very very rare. Also the vapour pressure of HSD and
SKO being much low at atmospheric temperature, the chances of ignition of vapour
are very low and practically nil.
1.12.2 Vessel connection failure for tank inlet/outlet lines
All the storage tanks are having two lines (one inlet and another outlet) connected at
bottom of the tank. Diameter of inlet/outlet lines from storage vessels are - 12"/14",
12"/10" and 12"/14" for MS Tank, SKO Tank and HSD Tank respectively. Such
vessel connection failure is very rare i.e. 3x10-6
. In case of failure of such nozzles
liquid will spill inside the dyke and will form a pool. The liquid pool may get ignited
if the vapours come into contact with an ignition source. Hazard distances for 37.5
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KW/m2, 32 KW/m
2, 12.5 KW/ m
2, 8 KW/ m
2 and 4.5 KW/ m
2 are calculated and
presented in Table 1.10.
Table 1.10 Hazard Distances Due to Pool Fire
(All distances are from edge of the dyke)
Incident Thermal
Radiation KW/M2
Hazard distances (m)
1F 2B 3D 5D
MS TANK NOZZLE FAILURE
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32.0 NR NR NR NR
12.5 41 43 43 43
8.0 43 45 45 45
4.5 47 48 47 47
Incident Thermal
Radiation KW/m2
Hazard distances (m)
1F 2B 3D 5D
SKO TANK NOZZLE FAILURE
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32.0 NR NR NR NR
12.5 33 34 34 36
8.0 35 35 35 36
4.5 37 36 36 37
HSD TANK NOZZLE FAILURE
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32.0 NR NR NR NR
12.5 45 46 46 46
8.0 47 47 47 47
4.5 50 49 49 48
NR = Not Reached
Ignition of the pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks inside the dyke and
nearby equipment/pipeline.
As such action shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam
compound. In case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent
damage.
Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS tank nozzle failure. The vapour
from the pool may disperse in down wind direction along wind and may come into
some ignition source causing vapour cloud explosion. The hazard distances for UVCE
under different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table 1.11.
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Table 1.11 Hazard Distances Due to Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
(MS)
S.
No.
Wind Speed
m/sec./Stability Class
Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of
0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
1. 1F 156 171 213
2. 2B 171 181 209
3. 3D 211 221 250
4. 5D 171 208 232
It is evident that in case of vapour cloud explosion heavy damage may occur in
nearby equipment and structures. The overpressure distances may extend outside
battery limit of the plant in the direction of wind flow. The overpressure distances of
0.3 bar (heavy damage) for MS extend upto 211 metres. However, since the failure
probability is very low, the occurrence is very rare.
1.12.3 Gasket Failure in Pump Discharge Lines
Gasket failure is one of the credible failure scenarios in a plant. The pump discharge
lines diameters are 8" for MS, 10" for HSD and 8" for SKO. Failure area of 25% on
the perimeter of the gasket for MS & SKO and 20% for HSD and 3 minutes release is
considered before ignition as it is assumed that action will be taken for stopping the
leakage by that time. Hazard distances for 37.5 KW/ m 2
, 32 KW/ m 2
, 8 KW/ m 2
, 4.5
KW/ m 2 and 1.6 KW/ m
2 are calculated and presented in Table 1.12.
Table 1.12 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to Failure of Gaskets
In Pump Discharge Lines
(All distances are from centre of the pool)
Incident Thermal
Radiation
KW/m2
Hazard distances (m)
1F 2B 3D 5D
MS PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.01 kg/sec.
37.5 12 13 13 13
32.0 13 14 14 14
12.5 31 32 32 33
8.0 34 34 34 34
4.5 37 36 36 36
SKO PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.36 kg/sec.
37.5 11 11 11 11
32.0 13 13 13 13
12.5 47 47 47 48
8.0 49 48 48 49
4.5 51 51 50 50
HSD PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.36 kg/sec.
37.5 13 13 13 13
32.0 14 14 14 14
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12.5 47 47 47 48
8.0 49 48 48 49
4.5 51 51 50 50
Table 1.13 Hazard Distances to UVCE Due To MS Pump Discharge Line
Gasket Failure
Sl.
No
.
Wind Speed
m/sec./Stability Class
Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of
0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
1. 1F 42 45 51
2. 2B 52 53 58
3. 3D 52 63 67
4. 5D 51 53 57
It is seen that in case of failure of gaskets in pump discharge lines pool fire thermal
radiation distances for 37.5/32 KW/ m 2
are 13/14 m, 11/13 & 13/14 m in case of MS,
SKO and HSD respectively. For gasket failure in HSD line, the distances for target
radiation of 8 KW/ m 2
and 4.5 KW/ m 2
are 49 m and 51 m respectively from pool
centre and may go outside the Depot premises towards canal. In case of vapour cloud
explosion for MS pump discharge lines the distances to 0.3 bar / 0.1 bar /0.03 bar
extend upto a distance of 52 m / 63 m/ 67 m respectively. Hence, in case of any
leakage immediate action has to be taken to prevent any fire/explosion and to put out
the fire.
1.12.4 Snapping of 4 inches diameter loading arm for Tank Truck Loading
Failure probability of 4 inches diameter loading arm is in the order of 3x10-8
per hour
of operation. Although the probability is very low, however the failure scenario is
taken for calculation of hazard distances due to failure of loading arm for different
products. The consequences have been calculated for 3 minutes release as it is
assumed that action will be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing
the isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to
snapping of loading arm for different products are presented in Table 1.14.
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Table 1.14 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to Loading Arm Failure
(All distances are from centre of the pool)
Incident Thermal
Radiation
KW/m2
Hazard distances (m)
1F 2B 3D 5D
MS LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 12.6 kg/sec.
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32.0 17 17 18 20
12.5 50 50 51 50
8.0 54 54 54 52
4.5 58 57 56 54
SKO LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 16.2 kg/sec.
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32.0 NR NR NR NR
12.5 85 86 86 85
8.0 88 88 88 86
4.5 93 91 91 88
HSD LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 20.0 kg/sec.
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32.0 NR NR NR NR
12.5 94 95 95 95
8.0 97 97 97 97
4.5 102 101 100 99
It is evident from the above table that in case of snapping of 4 inches diameter loading
arm for Tank Truck Loading action has to be taken to stop leakage immediately as
well as for prevention of fire.
Table 1.15 Hazard Distances Due to Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
(MS)
S.
No.
Wind Speed
m/sec./Stability
Class
Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of
0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
1. 1F 77 85 105
2. 2B 93 95 103
3. 3D 104 108 120
4. 5D 104 107 117
1.12.5 Creation of 25 mm dia hole in Pump Discharge Line
Formation of hole in a pipeline is a credible phenomenon as corrosion may occur if
proper protection is not taken. 25 mm dia hole has been chosen for risk analysis. Due
to formation of 25 mm dia hole in pump discharge lines the liquid at high pressure
will pass through the small opening in the form of jet. The jet of liquid may be ignited
if it comes into contact with any ignition source. The ignited jet may damage any
object in its path causing subsequent fire and domino effect.
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Jet fire is possible in case of flammable liquids with relatively high flash point i.e.
MS. Even if ignition of jet does not take place, the liquid will fall on ground and may
cause "pool fire". Hazard distances due to pool fire for such release and ignition of the
pool is presented in Table - 1.16.
Table 1.16 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to 25 MM Dia Hole of Pump
Discharge Lines
Incident Thermal
Radiation
KW/M2
Hazard distances (m)
1F 2B 3D 5D
MS - Release Rate: 5.12 kg/sec.
37.5 12 13 13 13
32.0 13 17 17 17
12.5 35 35 36 36
8.0 37 37 38 38
4.5 41 40 40 40
SKO - Release Rate: 5.47 kg/sec.
37.5 13 16 16 16
32.0 14 17 17 17
12.5 52 52 53 53
8.0 54 54 54 54
4.5 57 56 56 55
HSD - Release Rate: 5.75 kg/sec.
37.5 19 16 16 16
32.0 20 17 17 17
12.5 53 53 54 54
8.0 55 55 55 55
4.5 58 58 57 57
Frequency of formation of 25 mm dia hole in 200 mm dia pipeline is 1.1x10-6
/m/year
and the same for 250 mm dia pipeline is 9.2x10-7
/m/year. The distances for 8 KW/M2
for MS, SKO and HSD due to leakage through 25 mm dia hole in Road Tanker
loading pump discharge lines are 38 m, 54 m and 55 m respectively. Ignition of the
pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks and nearby equipment. As such action
shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In
case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage.
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Table 1.17 Hazard Distances to UVCE Due to 25 MM Dia Hole in MS Pump
Discharge Line
S.
No.
Wind Speed
m/sec./Stability
Class
Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of
0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
1. 1F 52 54 59
2. 2B 51 53 57
3. 3D 62 63 68
4. 5D 61 63 67
It is evident from the above table that the distance to heavy damage (0.3 bar) extends
upto 62 m.
1.12.6 Pump Mechanical Seal Failure
The frequency of failure of mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling
light hydrocarbons is quite high and poses risk due to fire and explosion. Failure of
seal releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a
hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal especially for
light hydrocarbon services. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon
releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the
plant. However, the type of seal, single or double, does not effect their release rate or
the hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the pump mechanical
seal failure. A shaft diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 1 mm for MS & SKO and 50
mm shaft diameter and 1 mm seal gap for HSD pump have been assumed for release
rate calculation.
The hazard distances to pool fire are given in Table 1.18 below:
Table 1.18 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Pool Fire
For Pump Mechanical Seal Failure
Incident Thermal
Radiation
KW/M2
Hazard distances (m)
1F 2B 3D 5D
MS PUMP - Release Rate: 0.72 kg/sec.
37.5 7 7 7 7
32.0 8 8 8 8
12.5 15 15 15 15
8.0 16 16 16 16
4.5 17 17 17 12
SKO PUMP - Release Rate: 0.74 kg/sec.
37.5 7 7 7 7
32.0 9 9 9 9
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12.5 20 20 20 20
8.0 21 21 21 21
4.5 22 22 22 22
HSD PUMP - Release Rate: 1.06 kg/sec.
37.5 8 8 8 8
32.0 9 9 9 9
12.5 24 24 24 24
8.0 25 25 25 25
4.5 27 26 26 26
The above table shows that the hazard distance of 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2 may
extend up to distance of 27 meters from centre of the pool for pool fire for pump
mechanical seal failure.
1.12.7 Ethanol Pump Discharge Line Failure
The Ethanol pump takes its suction from the Ethanol tank and pumps it for blending
with MS. In case of Ethanol pump discharge line failure ethanol shall fall and spread
on the ground .The spilled liquid forms liquid pool and catches fire resulting in pool
fire. The results of the above consequence envisaged are presented here below in
Table 1.19.
Table 1.19 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Pool Fire
(b) For Ethanol Pump Discharge Line Full Bore Failure
S.
No.
Thermal
Load
KW/m2
Distance (m) from centre of the pool
Release Rate: 2.57 kg/sec.
1F 2B 3D 5D
1. 37.5 11 15 16 17
2. 32.0 12 16 17 18
3. 12.5 21 24 24 24
4. 8.0 26 28 28 27
5. 4.5 33 35 34 33
From the above Table - 1.19, it is evident that the distance to thermal radiation of
4.5 KW/m2 extends to a distance of 35 meter in case of full bore failure in pump
discharge line. It is also evident that distance to 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2
remains confined within the factory boundary.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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1.13 RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY
The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable
event as well as likelihood of harm of damage being caused to life, property and
environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/ accidental release
of any hazardous material from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of
hazardous material can occur due to failure of component systems. It is difficult to
ascertain the failure probability of any system because it will depend on the
components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the probability of fire and the extent
of damage will depend on many factors like:
(a) Quantity and physical properties of material released.
(b) Source of ignition.
(c) Wind velocity and direction
(d) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby.
Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments, pressure
vessels and other equipment manufactured in India are not available nor any statutory
authority has tried to collect the information and form an acceptable data bank to be
used under Indian condition.
Failure frequency data for some components accepted in U.S.A. and European
Countries are given in Table 1.20.
Table 1.20 Failure Frequency Data
S.No. Item Failure Frequency / 106 Years
1] Shell Failure
(a) Process/pressure vessel
(b) Pressurised Storage Vessel
3
1
2] Full Bore Vessel Connection
Failure (Diameter mm)
< 25 ........
40 ........
50 ........
80 ........
100 ........
>150 …….
30
10
7.5
5
4
3
3] Full Bore Process Pipeline
Failure
d <50 mm
........
50 <d <150 mm ........
d >150 mm ........
0.3 *
0.09 *
0.03 *
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4] Articulated Loading / unloading
arm failure 3x10
-8**
* Failure frequency expressed in (/m/106 years)
** Failure frequency expressed in (/hr of operation)
1.14 Recommendations & Conclusions
The recommendations and conclusions as revealed from Risk analysis Study are as
follows:
(i) The Individual Risk value of 1.0 E-6/year as evident from the Iso-Risk
Contour (Drg. No. 2) is confined mainly within the plant premises. Hazard
distances arrived from the consequence analysis also reveals that in most of
the cases hazard is confined within the plant premises. Hence, installation of
the Terminal of the place is safe from risk point of view.
(ii) The fire fighting system for storage tanks shall be designed conforming to
OISD norms. Fire hydrant network should be considered taking into
consideration of additional cooling water required in addition to the tank on
fire.
(iii) Health check and maintenance of the equipment and pipelines should be
done at regular intervals to avoid any major failure.
(iv) Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated at regular
intervals to prevent any wrong signalling and consequent failures.
(v) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should be
always kept in good working condition. Safety appliances should also be
checked and kept in good working condition.
(vi) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals.
(vii) To reduce the failure frequency due care has been taken in design,
construction, inspection and operation. Well-established codes of practices
will have been followed for design, inspection and construction of the
facility.
(viii) The installation should be operated by experienced personnel trained for
operation of such facility and also in fire fighting.
(ix) Smoking should be strictly prohibited inside the installation.
(x) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any spark.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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(xi) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in Tank Lorry Filling Shed should
be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static electricity.
(xii) Vents in case of cone roof tanks should be provided with wire mesh.
(xiii) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area.
(xiv) Good liaison should be maintained with outside organisation and District
Administration, hospitals and nursing homes in the locality.
(xv) A mutual aid agreement should be done with nearby industries, hospitals,
nursing homes, so that help may be obtained in case of any major hazard.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP)
1.15 Introduction
The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is prepared for meeting any emergency
response in the event of fire accident, hazards etc., through the effective and
optimum utilization of all the facilities inbuilt in the plant and available in the
neighbouring areas as such. This plan has got two sub chapters, First chapter guides
for meeting the „On - Site Emergency” and the Second chapter guides “Off - Site
Emergency”.
This off- site emergency response is prepared to ensure the participation of all the
concerned civil agencies in and around this plant with a view to seek their
preparedness in meeting such emergencies and to bring about a coordinated task
force involving in district authorities. Fire service department, railways, factories
inspectorate, electricity board and other protection forces available in similar type of
industries meeting of all the above agencies is also the method of operation of „ On
site Emergency Plan / Disaster Management Plan”.
Disaster management plan will have necessary scope for review of its effectiveness
in its working and adapting to any new systems of further improving upon the
implementation of the plan itself.
The objective of any plant should be safe and trouble free operation and smooth
production. This is ensured by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design
of plant, equipment/pipeline as per standard codes, ensuring selection of proper
material of construction, well designed codes/rules and instruments for safe operation
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
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of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the plant by trained
manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may happen due to human error or
system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause
loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations
are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural
disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are
like major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and
liquids, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc. The damage caused by any
disaster is determined by the potential for loss surrounding the event. It is impossible
to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might strike on undertaking.
However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. pre-planned procedure involving
proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize the loss
to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.
1.16 Statutory Requirement
Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for IOCL‟s Jasidih Terminal.
The applicable regulations are:
(a) Factories Act, 1948 and as amended
(b) Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified
under Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.
(c) Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical
Accidents, 1996.
(d) Stipulations of OISD-168
(e) Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
The Disaster Management Plan has been prepared based primarily on Schedule-11 of
the rule, Manufacture, storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 and
amended in 1994.
1.17 Objective of Disaster Management Plan
Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The
plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:
The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organizational
set up and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any
emergency situation in order to:
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside
resources
b) Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.
c) Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.
d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.
e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry
f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.
The above objectives can be achieved by –
i) Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard
potential and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.
ii) Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment
and manpower)
iii) Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and
communication facilities as well as warning procedure.
1.18 Definitions
Disaster
Disaster is a general term, which implies a hazardous situation created by an
accidental release or spill of hazardous materials, which poses threat to the safety of
workers, residents in the neighbourhood, the environment or property.
Emergency
Emergency condition and Disaster Condition are synonymous.
ON-SITE Emergency/Disaster
In an On-Site Emergency the effect of any hazard (fire/explosion/release of toxic
gases) are confined within the factory premises. An accident taking place inside the
depot and its effects are confined within the boundary wall.
OFF-SITE Emergency/Disaster
In case of any hazard inside IOCL, Jasidih Terminal the effects that are also felt
outside the boundary wall.
1.19 Description of Industrial Activity
Name and Address of the person furnishing the information
Chief Terminal Manager
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (MD)
Jasidih Terminal, Jasidih Industrial Area, Jasidih,
Dist: Deoghar, Jharkhand
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(a) Site Location
The pipeline terminal is located in the village Badladih (Jasidih) in the district of
Deoghar in Jharkhand. The Terminal is being set up on 27 acres of land owned by
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
(b) Population around Site
There is no any major habitation within a radius of 1.0 KM of the factory.
(c) Activities & Facilities
A brief description the activities in Jasidih Terminal are:
i) Receipt of the petroleum products e.g. Motor Spirit, SKO, and HSD shall
be received through a pipeline tap-off from Haldia - Barauni pipeline
near Jasidih.
ii) Existing and proposed tankages details are as follows:
A. Existing Tankages
SR.NO. TAG.
NO. SIZE DIA X HT PRODUCT
NORMAL
CAPACITY
TANK
TYPE CLASS
1 T -101 20m DIAx 14.5m HT MS 4241 KL FR A
2 T-102 20m DIAx 14.5m HT MS 4241 KL FR A
3 T-103 16m DIAx 14m HT MS 2212 KL FR A
4 T-104 22m DIAx 14m HT HSD 5303 KL CR B
5 T-105 22m DIAx 14m HT HSD 5303 KL CR B
6 T-106 16m DIAx 13m HT HSD 2604 KL CR B
7 T-107 16m DIAx 13m HT HSD 2604 KL CR B
8 T-108 16m DIAx 15m HT SKO 3006 KL CR B
9 T-109 10m DIAx 12m HT SKO 938 KL CR B
10 T-110 10m DIAx 12m HT SKO 938 KL CR B
11 T-111 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A
12 T-112 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A
18 T-113 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A
13 T-116 10m DIAx9m HT MS 500 KL FR A
14 T-120 2.0m DIAx 6.0 LG HSD 20KL U/G
B
TOTAL 32120 KLS
13 T-114 24m DIAx 15m HT WATER 5600 KL CR
14 T-115 24m DIAx 15m HT WATER 5600 KL CR
SUB TOTAL 11200 KL
B. Proposed Tankages & 4 bottom loading bays
15 T-116 24m DIA x20m HT HSD 9025 KL CR B
16 T-117 26m DIA x20m HT MS 10592 KL IFRVT A
17 T-118 14m DIA x 14m HT SKO 2100 KL CR B
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SUB TOTAL 21717 KL
GRAND TOTAL 53837 KL
iii) Pump House
10 Nos. electrical driven centrifugal pumps have been proposed in pump house for
Road Tanker filling. Details of pumps provided are as follows:
Product Service Type (Capacity
LPM)
Head
(m) No. of Pumps
MS Loading 4000 42 1+1 = 2
HSD Loading 6000 40 3+1 = 4
SKO
(PDS) Loading 4000 40 1+1 = 2
SKO
(IND) Loading 2400 40 1+1 = 2
Ethanol Mixing 200 200 3
iv) Tank Lorry Filling / Tank Lorry Decantation
Tank Lorries are filled in filling bay by pumping products from storage tank to filling
bay. 12 Nos. of bays are provided. The discharge pipeline branches are connected to
tank Lorries by loading arm through a flow control valve and flow meter. The tank
Lorries are properly earthed before receiving the petroleum products.
1.20 Safety Related Utilities
i) Water
Fire water requirement is as per norms of OISD-117.
Water Storage Facilities: As per OISD-117
(Two water tanks)
Source of Water: Deep wells provided inside the depot.
Fire hydrants/monitors shall be provided in all the vulnerable areas of the plant.
All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer system &
all MS tanks will be provided with sprinkler system.
ii) Power
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The terminal‟s power requirement is supplied by J.S.E.B. at 11 KV and Emergency
power: DG Set.
1.21 Disaster Planning
Modern approach to disaster management plan involves
a) Risk analysis Study
b) Action Plan
Risk analysis study involves
a) Risk Identification
b) Risk Evaluation
Risk identification involves
i) Identification of hazardous events in the installation, which can cause loss of capital
equipment, loss of production, threaten health and safety of employees, threaten
public health and damage to the environment.
ii) Identification of risk, important processes & areas to determine effective risk
reduction measures.
Risk evaluation involves calculation of damage potential of the identified hazards
with damage distances (which is termed as consequence analysis) as well as
estimation of frequencies of the events.
Hazardous areas with different hazard scenarios and their damage potential with
respect to fire & explosion have already been mentioned in earlier section. However,
failure rate of different hazard scenarios has been discussed broadly based on data
available for similar incidents outside India.
Probability of any hazardous incident and the consequent damage also depends on –
a) Wind speed
b) Wind direction
c) Atmospheric stability
d) Source of ignition and also
e) Presence of plant assets & population exposed in the direction of wind.
Action plan depends largely on results of risk analysis data and may include one or
more of the following:
a) Plan for preventive as well as predictive maintenance.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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b) Augment facilities for safety, fire fighting, medical (both equipment and
manpower) as per requirements of risk analysis.
c) Evolve emergency handling procedure both on-site and off-site.
d) Practice mock drill for ascertaining preparedness for tackling
hazards/emergencies at any time-day or night.
1.22 Identification of Hazards
1.22.1 General Nature of Hazard
In Jasidih Terminal petroleum products to be handled are highly inflammable and also
have explosive properties.
Any small fire in the installation, if not extinguished at early stage can cause large
scale damage and may have a cascading effect. Hence the terminal requires.
a) A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned
safety and fire fighting system.
b) Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems
safely.
c) Well trained personnel to handle safety and fire fighting equipment to
extinguish fire inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of
emergency.
d) Well planned Disaster Management Plan.
1.22.2 Hazardous areas of the Plant
The plant activities handling petroleum products can be subdivided into the following:
Activities Place
a) Receipt of petroleum products i) Pipeline Manifold.
b) Petroleum products storage i) Tank Farm Area
c) Petroleum products pumping i) Pump House
d) Dispatch of petroleum products i) Road Tanker Loading Bay
1.22.3 Hazard Scenarios and effects
This has been discussed in detail in the Chapter on Risk Analysis. However, a brief
outline is given in the following table:
S.No. Scenarios Effect/Effect Distances
1. Tank on Fire. Fire in any one storage tank can damage the
tank as well as other tanks in the immediate
vicinity and may have a cascading effect.
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2. Vessel connection
Failure / Catastrophic
Failure of Storage
Tank.
Can cause fire damaging all the tanks if the fire
is not tackled immediately. Explosion can occur
due to failure of MS tank nozzle failure/MS
tank catastrophic failure.
3. Gasket Failure in
Pump Discharge Line.
Can cause pool fire/jet fire and explosion,
damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other
properties.
4. Hole in Pump
Discharge lines.
Can cause pool fire/jet fire and explosion,
damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other
properties.
5. Failure of loading
Arm.
Can cause fire/explosion damaging the trucks,
pipelines and entire loading bay.
6. Mechanical seal
failure of pumps.
Can cause fire damaging the pipelines and other
pumps.
7. Ethanol pump
discharge line FB
failure.
Can cause pool fire/jet fire, damaging adjoining
pipelines and other properties.
All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However,
maximum damage can happen due to storage tank pipeline connection failure or in
case of tank fire.
In all the above cases fire/explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of
petroleum products coming out from the containment. The sources of ignitions
may be (I) Hot work in the vicinity (ii) Smoking (iii) Lightning (iv) Generation of
static electricity (v) Radiant heat from outside. (v) Deliberate ignition or sabotage.
1.23 Safety Related Components Provided in the Depot
1.23.1 Safety Measures:
Jasidih Terminal is being provided with safety related measures right in the design
stage, which will minimize any accident e.g.
i) Layout of the plant with sufficient safety distances.
ii) Use of proper material of construction for equipment and piping
iii) Storage tanks provided inside a dyke wall with sufficient height.
iv) All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer
system & all MS tanks will be provided with water sprinkler system.
v) Pumps shall be provided with mechanical seals to avoid spillage through
gland.
vi) All electrical items have been carefully selected and are either flame proof/
intrinsic safety type in licensed area.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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vii) Proper earthing of all storage tanks, pipelines, structures and trucks for
filling/despatch of petroleum products.
viii) Loading Arm shall be provided whose failure rate is much lower than
loading hoses.
ix) Provision of oil separation in Oil Separator for separation of oil to avoid any
oily water going out of the depot or spoiling ground water.
x) Arrangement of fire hydrants monitors and hose boxes have been kept in all
the hazardous areas and fire water storage tanks.
xi) Use of level indicators and level control measures with alarm system to
ensure storage tanks are filled upto the desired level only.
xii) Use of flow control devices and meters for tank truck filling to ensure that
each compartment in the tank truck is filled to the desired level.
xiii) Provision of portable fire extinguishers at vulnerable places to extinguish
fire.
xiv) The plant shall be properly guarded by a boundary wall of sufficient height.
xv) Licensed area shall be properly guarded for any unauthorized entry of
personnel.
xvi) All areas in the depot shall be properly illuminated through lighting.
Requisite numbers of High Mast Towers have been proposed around the
depot for better illumination.
xvii) Emergency Diesel Generator Sets are being provided to ensure operation
and illumination during power failure.
xviii) Emergency shutdown switch shall be provided to stop all operations.
1.23.2 Other Safety Measures
Some of the preventive & pre-emptive measures which are to be taken during
operational phase are as follows:
a) Safety measures
Following safety tips should always be borne in mind while working in the
plant to avoid emergency & hazardous situation.
i) Follow specified procedures and instructions for start-up, shut down
and any maintenance work.
ii) Follow permit to work system.
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iii) Identify correctly the part of the plant in which work is to be done.
iv) Isolate the part, machine properly on which work is to be done.
v) Release pressure from the part of the plant on which work is to be
done.
vi) Remove flammable liquid/gases thoroughly, on which work is to be
done.
vii) Use non-sparking tools.
b) Plant Inspection
Apart from planned inspection, checks and tests should be carried out to
reduce failure probability of containments.
i) Storage vessels and pipeline should be checked regularly during both
their construction and operational phase.
ii) Critical trips, interlocks & other instruments should be checked
regularly to avoid fail danger situation.
iii) Fire fighting system should be checked regularly to ensure proper
functioning during emergency situation.
iv) Proper lightning protection system should be provided and checked
regularly to avoid lightning effect.
c) Performance or Condition Monitoring
A systematic monitoring of performance or condition should be carried out
especially for large machines and equipment, which may be responsible for
serious accidents/disaster in case the defined limits are crossed.
i) Vibration, speed & torque measurements for pumps, DG sets etc.
ii) Thickness and other flaw measurements in metals of storage vessels,
Inlet & Outlet lines from storage vessels etc.
Many types of non-destructive testing/condition monitoring techniques are
available. X-ray radiography, acoustic emission testing, magnetic particle
testing, eddy current inspection techniques etc. are used for detection of
flaws and progression of cracks in metals. Testing equipments are also there
for checking vibration, speed, torque etc.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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The above condition monitoring techniques should be applied regularly by
internal/external agencies. Immediate corrective measures should be taken
if any flaws are detected.
d) Preventive Maintenance
A schedule for preventive maintenance for moving machineries should be
prepared based on experience in other similar plants as well as instruction of
the suppliers. The schedule should be followed strictly during operation as
well as planned shutdown period.
e) Entry of Personnel
Entry of unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited inside the premises.
The persons entering the plant should not carry matches, lighters etc.
f) Hot work
Hot work should not be permitted except in-designated areas with utmost
precaution and proper work permit.
1.23.3 Details of Fire Fighting Facilities
Modern fire fighting facilities shall be provided in the depot in line with norms of
OISD.
i] Fire Hydrant System
The entire TERMINAL area shall be provided with a looped fire hydrant
pipeline connected to fire engines on auto system and always kept under
pressure to meet emergencies. Two numbers of fire water storage tanks
(adequate capacity) shall be provided, which are kept full and take care of
fire fighting requirement for four hours. The source of water shall be tube
wells provided inside the depot. The fire hydrant line shall be equipped with
required numbers of single/double headed hydrant valves, monitors and
hoses. The system can also be connected to foam making branches for
generating foam for extinguishing the fire.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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ii] Sprinkler System
Water sprinkler system with spray nozzles have been proposed for three
numbers of MS, SKO and HSD storage tanks for cooling the tanks if
required.
iii] Portable Fire Fighting Equipment
Following portable fire fighting equipment have been proposed in the plant
as per OISD:
Sl. No. Type of Area Portable Extinguishers
i] Storage of Class-A/B products 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2.
In packed containers and stored
In open/closed area
ii] Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 2 pumps
(Class - A & B)
Above 50 – 100 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for each pump.
Beyond 100 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. or 1 no. of 25 Kg.
DCP for each pump.
Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 4
(Class – C) pumps upto 50 HP
Above 50 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 KG
DCP for 4 pumps.
iii] Tank Truck loading and unloading 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2
bays
for POL/speciality products and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile
unit for each gantry.
iv] Tank Wagon loading and 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 50 m
unloading gantry (siding) length and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP
mobile
unit in each siding.
v] Above ground Tank Minimum 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or
1 x 25 Kg. DCP per tank and 4 x
75 Kg or 6 x 50 Kg. DCP mobile
unit per installation.
Underground Tank Farms 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg.
DCP
vi] Fire Pump House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2
pumps.
vii] Admn. Building / Store House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 200 m2.
(Minimum 1 x 10 Kg. DCP on
each
floor)
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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viii] Generator Room upto 250 KVA 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP and 1 no. 4.5
Kg.
CO2 for every Generator
Above 250 KVA 2 nos. 4.5 Kg. & 1 no. 10 Kg.
DCP
ix] Main Switch Room 1 no. 4.5 Kg. CO2 for every 25
m2
x] Computer Room/Cabin Halon / Its proven equivalent – 2
nos. 0.6 / 1 Kg. for 50 m2 or 1 no.
per Cabin whichever is higher
xi] Security Cabin 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP
xii] Canteen 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2
xiii] Laboratory 1 x 10 Kg. DCP & 1 x 4.5 Kg.
CO2
xiv] Effluent Treatment Plant 1 nos. 75 Kg. & 2 nos. 10 Kg.
DCP Extinguisher
xv] Workshop 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP & 1 no. 2 kg.
CO2
Extinguisher
xvi] Transformer 1 no. 6.8 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher
xvii] UPS / Charger Room 1 no. 2 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher
v] First Aid
Jasidih Terminal have First Aid kits equipped with First Aid medicines as
per factory act.
1.23.4 Emergency Control Centre & Shelter Room
The emergency control centre shall be situated in the office building. The office room
of Terminal In-charge shall be designated as Emergency Control Centre. P&T
telephones, Alarms, Emergency Control Manual and Safety and Personal Protective
Appliances have been arranged in sufficient numbers and kept in the room.
Emergency Shelter
The room has been proposed outside the licensed area for giving shelter to
employees/other personnel who are not involved in emergency control actions.
1.23.5 Alarm and Communication System
a] Alarm System
i] Electrical Sirens and Hand Sirens shall be provided in office
building/Emergency Control Room and other vulnerable areas like Tank
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Jharkhand
Farm Area, Pump House, Receipt Manifold, TLF for warning the public
as well as employees inside.
ii] The sound of electrical siren shall be audible upto 3 KM.
iii] For fire condition electrical siren will be wailing for minimum 2 minutes
and for all clear signal it will be a straight run siren for 2 minutes.
iv] For disaster condition the wailing sound shall be repeated with a
minimum 10 seconds gap.
b] Communication System
For communication with officers/employees page phone services, manual
call points and intercom services shall be provided with sufficient nos. of
P&T telephones at different places including Sr. Depot Manager‟s room for
communication with other agencies.
1.23.6 Mutual Aid
It is not possible to combat large scale fire/disaster single handed effectively by any
organization. Assistance of resources of fire fighting and other services are of utmost
importance during the hour of crisis. Following type of mutual aids are envisaged:
i] Assistance by fire fighting teams & equipment.
ii] Medical and first aid assistance.
iii] Assistance of vehicles for any emergency requirement.
iv] Help in liaisoning with police, District Collectorate, Fire Brigade and
Hospitals.
1.24 Disaster Control Plan
The plan include three major plans –
i] Equipment Plan
ii] Organization Plan
iii] Action Plan
1.24.1 Equipment Planning
Equipment plan i.e. arrangement of fire fighting, safety, transport etc. has been
discussed earlier.
1.24.2 Organization Plan
The disaster management organization and action plan is made in such a way that it is
capable of quick response at any time to meet emergency situation. The plan gives a
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Jharkhand
detailed chain of command, area of responsibility of each personnel involved,
information flow pattern and coordination activity required to meet the emergency. A
typical Disaster Management Organization Chart is given below:
CHIEF EMERGENCY
CONTROLLER
SITE EMERGENCY
CONTROLLER
INCIDENT
CONTROLLE
R, FIRE
FIGHTING
INCIDENT
CONTROLLER,
SECURITY
INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
, RESCUE,
EVACUATION,
TRANSPORT
INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
, MEDICAL
AID,
WELFARE
Chief Emergency Controller
Chief Emergency Controller is the person to head the group during emergency
situation. Generally chief of the installation e.g. Terminal In-charge shall be the Chief
Emergency Controller. In his absence next man in the hierarchy or any designated
officer shall take charge.
Chief Emergency Controller is the ultimate authority in directing emergency
operations. He will be assisted by other incident controllers i.e.
i] Incident Controller - Fire fighting
ii] Incident Controller - Security
iii] Incident Controller - Medical Aid & Welfare
iv] Incident Controller - Rescue, Evacuation, Transport & Welfare
Main task of Chief Emergency Controller is to ensure that facilities are made
available without any confusion. He also activates District Crisis Group/Local Crisis
Group for necessary action during Pre Emergency and during emergency period.
He shall be responsible for –
a] Essential communication & liaison with outside agencies.
b] Fire fighting & rescue operations.
c] Emergency plant shutdown and declare emergency.
d] Demolition and repairs.
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e] Accident investigation.
f] Ensuring safety of important records.
g] Public relations for giving authoritative information to news media and
others.
h] Removal of casualties, giving information to their relatives & compensation
i] Arranging medical aid for treatment of the injured.
j] Bring back normalcy as early as possible.
Site Emergency Controller
He maintains close liaison between Chief Emergency Controller and other functional
Incident Controllers and controls emergency at site. He coordinates with different
team members to ensure that various activities are carried out promptly without any
chaos. He acts as per guidance of Chief Emergency Controller and takes charge in
absence of Chief Emergency Controller. The main functions of Site Emergency
Controller are :
i] Maintains close liaison with Chief Emergency Controller.
ii] Controls operation depending on situation. Shut down loading and unloading
operations and isolate storage area pipelines.
iii] Give alarm siren to warn all employees and public.
iv] Evacuate non essential persons to the designated place if required.
v] Operate water sprinklers on storage tanks for cooling if fire is inside dyke or
nearby.
vi] Start fire fighting till arrival of designated fire fighting crew from inside and
outside if necessary.
vii] Initiate rescue operations and first aid to the injured person till the arrival of
doctor and ambulance.
viii] Notify adjacent factory authority and local administration.
ix] Enforce entry of persons with authorized duties from outside with due care.
Functions of other incident controllers are detailed below:
Incident Controller – Fire Fighting
He will keep close liaison with Chief Emergency Controller. His main functions
are –
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i] Arrange and keep necessary appliances and supplies to combat emergency.
ii] Guide the fire fighting people under his command and render technical
assistance to combat fire/emergency.
iii] Establish barricade in the danger zone, if necessary.
iv] Keep liaison with fire fighting team coming from outside.
Incident Controller – Security
His functions during emergency operation will be –
i] Check entry of unauthorized personnel inside the installation.
ii] Control mob and spectators.
iii] Keep careful watch to prevent any further damage by sabotage.
iv] Help fire fighting controller to cordon affected area/danger zone.
Incident Controller – Rescue, Evacuation & Transport
His functions are –
i] Plan and organize rescue and evacuation services and train team members
both inside and outside if necessary.
ii] Arrange vehicles, ambulance etc. for transfer of injured personnel to nearby
hospitals, rural health centres and nursing homes as per instruction of
medical assistance coordinator/designated doctor.
Incident Controller – Medical Aid & Welfare
His functions are –
i] Designate doctors from outside who can be available during emergency and
keep liaison with them.
ii] Prepare plant dispensary under readiness for emergency.
iii] Call the designated doctor during emergency.
iv] Provide first aid to the injured and arrange to transfer them to nearby
hospitals, other designated doctors depending on the gravity of the injury.
v] Arrange food and shelter to the evacuated employees.
vi] Inform relatives of the victims.
In Jasidih Terminal in-charge shall control all activities with the help of officers,
workers, clerical staff, casual workers and security staff. All of them shall be trained
in fire fighting and use of safety appliances.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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In case of any leakage of petroleum products or fire anybody witnessing the same
should take immediate necessary action to stop leakage and extinguish fire with the
help of fire extinguishers as well as inform Terminal In-charge through page phone or
through messenger or shouting.
In case of any fire or explosion Terminal In-charge takes charge of the situation and
controls it with a well organized plan.
If any accident e.g. fire occurs during night, security personnel shall attend it and in
case of emergency Terminal In-charge and others shall be informed / called from their
residence.
1.24.3 Action Plan
This gives guidelines to prevent, control and terminate an emergency and consists of
three parts.
a) Pre-emergency action
b) Action during emergency
c) Post emergency actions
Pre-Emergency Actions
These are essentially PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE measures and are
extremely important. They include mock drills, checking of fire fighting facilities,
keeping personal protective equipments in good condition in proper places, medical
equipments, scheduled checking of safely devices, safety audits, preventive
maintenance, good house keeping, training of employees, education to the public and
liaison with State Fire Services, Police and district administration etc.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Public Awareness
In case of major accidents like large fire, explosion, effect of which may spread
outside the plant boundary, people of the adjoining area may be panicky due to
ignorance and may aggravate the problems. To avoid panic, the depot management
will make easily understandable pamphlets in local language about the properties of
petroleum products and actions to be taken by them during an Off-site Emergency.
Training and education will also be imparted to the local public by audio-visual
system with the help of local authorities. This will be done through Local Crisis
Group consisting of District Administration.
Mock Drills
This is periodic simulation of emergency condition, sometimes in consultation with
District Crisis Group/Local Crisis Group. The sequence of operation undertaken by
Disaster Management Team members and systems provided like alarm &
communication system, information flow pattern etc. are carefully put into operation
by competent officials and the deficiencies/problems are recorded. Based on this
observation appropriate actions are taken to improve the efficiency of the plan.
Training of Employees
Regular training will be conducted to educate the employees about safely, fire
fighting and Disaster Management. A selected number will be given intensive
training in first aid, evacuation and rescue operation so that they can be utilized as a
part of Disaster Control Team.
Liaison with Police, District Administration & State Fire Services &
Neighbouring Industries
Help of Police and District Authorities are essential for off-site Emergency such as
evacuation, transportation and treatment of individuals etc. In case of On-Site
Emergency help of Police, District Administration, local hospitals and also fire
services at Deoghar district headquarter may be required depending on the severity of
the situation.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Pre-Emergency functions of Site Controller are mainly
a) Ensure implementation of Emergency Planning
b) Ensure that all drafted for emergency are undergoing regular training.
c) Ensure all disciplines are fully prepared for tackling emergency.
d) Ensure that simulation of emergency condition is regularly arranged.
e) Ensure preventive and pre-emptive measures.
f) Keep liaison with outside agencies, police, district authorities etc.
Pre-Emergency functions of other Incident Controllers and their team are
a) Keep all the team members ready for tackling emergency.
b) Ensure that all members understand their specific duties during emergency.
c) Ensure regular participation of their team in mock drills.
d) Ensure supply of adequate number of safety & fire fighting equipment in
proper place and in good working condition.
Actions during Emergency
Actions to be taken by Chief Emergency Controller and other Incident Controller
have been discussed in the Organization Plan. In short the actions are:
a) Declare Emergency by electrical siren.
b) Instruct total/partial shutdown.
c) Arrange the team for tackling emergency.
d) Ask for outside help, if necessary.
e) Keep liaison with outside agencies and provide authoritative information to
news media and others.
Post Emergency Actions
These are directed towards termination of emergency, restoration of normalcy and
rehabilitation. It also includes identification of victims, information to their next of
kin, notification to various government authorities, appointment of enquiry committee
for identification of causes and suggestions to ensure that similar accident does not
occur.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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1.25 Disaster Combating Action Plan with Specific Reference to the Team
As already stated number of officers and staff within plant are less and Terminal In-
charge has to prepare the plan with available officers & staff only.
a] During general shift on working days
(Chief Emergency Controller) : Terminal In-charge
Role:
1] Take overall charge of the situation.
2] Rush to the spot where fire/explosion has occurred. Issue instruction for
speedy combating of the incident and preventing of damage to other
areas.
3] Stop all operations locally/shut down complete plant.
4] Declare emergency and operate electrical siren to inform employees,
authorities and public.
5] Inform nearby factory authorities over phone and ask for assistance.
6] Inform local Fire Brigade.
7] Inform higher authorities and seek assistance for coordination of civil
authorities, Fire Tenders from State/other agencies.
8] Inform Chief Inspectorate of Factories & Boilers, Deoghar.
b] Fire Combating Team
In-charge : AM/DM (Operation)
Assisted By : i] Operation Officer (Fire)
ii] Section In-charge, TLF/TLD
iii] Security Supervisor & Guards on duty.
Role:
On hearing Fire Alarm –
1] Rush to the disaster spot and organize the team for combating fire as per
direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
2] Security supervisor to ensure starting of Fire Engine and pressurization
of fire hydrant.
3] Pump House Operator to stop all pumps and close all valves of the
pumps as well tank body valves and join the team.
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4] Operator of TLF section to stop loading operations, remove loading arm
properly and join the combating team as per directions of control room
in-charge.
Section In-Charge TLF/TLD to ensure the above and act for combating
emergency as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
c] Emergency Rescue Team
In-charge : Operation In-charge
Assisted By : Security Guards on duty
Role:
On hearing the Fire Alarm –
1] In-charge to organize the team with office staff and other members as
per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. If needed the In-charge
should seek assistance of outside agencies.
2] Remove the injured from the spot after taking proper safety and personal
protective appliances.
3] Arrange for First Aid of the injured and hospitalization, if necessary as
per instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.
d] Emergency Team (Transport & Security)
In-charge : Operation Officer (OO)
Assisted By : Security Supervisor & Guards on duty
Role:
1] Stop entry of all unauthorized personnel.
2] Arrange transport for taking the injured personnel for hospital.
3] Seek assistance for vehicles/ambulance from outside agencies &
hospitals nearby as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
e] Emergency Auxiliary Team
In-charge : Accounts Officer
Assisted By : One Security Guard
Role:
On hearing Fire Alarm-
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1] In-charge to rush to spot, coordinate with team as per direction of Chief
Emergency Controller and organize the team and be ready for further
instruction.
2] Get all the operations in the field stopped and all tank valves to be
closed. Electric mains to be switched off.
3] The electrician to get ready with Fire Proximity Suit and other life
saving equipment for any need.
4] To ensures that half-filled T/Ts do not run away with product and
documents.
5] Take control of all employees in the field other than fire combating team.
6] Team In-charge to ensure uninterrupted supply of all available fire
fighting equipments and materials as well as water to the combating
team.
7] To supplement/replace injured or exhausted combating team persons.
f] Fire during night time and on Holidays
In-charge : Shift In-charge
Assisted by : Security supervisor on duty
Security guards on duty
Role:
1] Shift In-charge Security Guard on duty seeing the fire, will shout Fire
Fire and shall need assistance from other guards on duty in different
pockets and shall fight the fire with nearest available fire equipments.
2] Subsequently, Shift In-charge/Security Supervisor on duty will telephone
to the residence of Terminal In-charge and Asst. Manager (OPS).
3] Immediately telephone to Deoghar Fire Brigade and Police Station for
assistance.
4] The Security Guards to control the gates and ensure that no unauthorized
person enter the premises.
1.26 Role Orders for Disaster Combating Action Plan
i] General Instructions
(a) The In-charge of the section/sections (TLF) / Tank Lorry Decantation /
Administrative Office etc. affected shall ensure to take immediate action
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to isolate, close valves and mobilize enough equipment from nearby
places.
(b) In-charge of stores shall keep the list of equipment available at various
locations and coordinate with auxiliary team in-charge who mobilises the
materials.
(c) Auxiliary team in-charge shall ensure replenishment of water to static
water tanks from deep tube wells and nearby other sources.
(d) After actions, Stores-in-charge to take inventory of all fire fighting items
and to indent the shortfalls.
(e) All those moving towards scene of incident shall move with fire fighting
equipment available.
ii] Pump House
Role Orders –
(a) Operator (Pump House) to stop all pumps.
(b) Close all valves including those of main tanks.
(c) Report combating team In-charge.
iii] Administrative Block
Role Orders –
(a) Section officers to ensure stop all loading operations.
(b) All T/Ts go out of TLF bays in orderly manner after closing T/T valves
and manhole covers.
(c) Closing of all valves at TLF manifold.
(d) TLF officer to report to Fire Combating Team.
(e) Others to report to Auxiliary Team In-charge with available fire fighting
equipment.
iv] Generator Room
Role Orders –
(a) Operator to remain in Generator House for instructions from Chief
Emergency Controller.
(b) To switch off unwanted electrical connections as instructed by Chief
Emergency Controller.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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v] Stores
Role Orders –
(a) In-charge to keep ready all fire fighting/first-aid/personal protective
materials and arrange speedy disbursement to the ECT/ERT crews.
(b) To issue materials as per demand.
(c) To liaise among Controllers / in-charges.
(d) To make proper inventory of all items and shortfall to be identified as
early as possible.
vi] Security Guards on Duty
Role Orders –
(a) To control the gate by allowing contract labourers to go out, ordering,
moving out of vehicles as instructed by Terminal in-charge with valid
documents.
(b) To prevent unauthorized entry of outsiders.
(c) Security Guard posted at the main entrance gate to ensure proper control
of traffic so that approach road is not blocked. Other Security Guards
posted other than the gates, to report to their in-charge for further
instruction.
1.27 Action Plan for Specific Cases
a) Fire/Explosion in TLF Shed
Facilities: 8 nos. of Filling Bays with multi-product filling points.
Products handled: MS, SKO & HSD
Structure: Entire TLF structure shall be of elevated iron structures with
proper roof, iron platforms and movable iron ladders with chains fixed to each
bay.
Hazard Minimiser
(a) TLF in-charge with his officers and staff
(b) Fire Extinguishers
(c) Fire Hydrant Points
(d) Foam
(e) Water Jet
(f) Water Gel Blankets
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(g) Alarm
(h) Combating as per disaster organisation chart
Special References
(a) Operate ESD
Fire in filling shed should be attacked promptly with fire extinguishers.
(b) Close all valves promptly.
(c) Ensure orderly removal of TTs.
(d) Stop spreading over of fire and call for help.
(e) Put sand on small oil spills of fire to put off the fire by preventing source
of O2.
(f) Apply foam on burning oil on the floor. Apply foam gently so as not to
scatter the burning oil and spread the fire. Apply foam from one side of
the fire and with the foam blanket from that side across the oil pool.
Remember that water destroys foam and water streams must not be turn
on fire which is blanketed with foam.
(g) Apply water cooling to neighbouring T/Ts.
(h) Remove records/documents to safe place.
(i) When oil is burning under the truck and tank is not leaking, remove the
truck away from fire, if possible or cover the oil with sand. Use water to
cool the tank truck.
(j) Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine, raise the hood direct the
stream of fluid at the base of fire.
(k) Use water or foam to fight fire in the cabin.
(l) Use water to fight fire on the tires.
(m) Whenever the leak is seen in the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the
tank so that oil level will be above the leak.
(n) In case of dome fire, close the dome cover immediately.
b) Fire in Pump House
Facilities: Building with sheet roof, electric power/diesel engine driven pumps.
Hazard Minimiser
(a) Staff members assigned to the pump house
(b) Fire Extinguishers
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(c) Fire Hydrant Points
(d) Foam
(e) Water Jet
(f) Water Gel Blankets
(g) Main Switches in the Switch Room
(h) Alarm
(i) Fire Resistant Asbestos Suit
Action Plan as per disaster organisation chart
Special References-
(a) Operate ESD.
Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading.
(b) Shut down the pumps by cutting off power supply.
(c) Remove any person who is working in the manifold.
(d) Close all tank wagon valves and manifold valves.
(e) Put foam on burning oil spills.
(f) Put foam on burning oil spills. Do not splash burning oil.
(g) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on electrical fire.
(h) Cool the manifold with water.
(i) Wet down the structure close to the fire with water.
(j) When burning oil is running from the pump house or out of a broken
connection in the manifold, check the flow or direct it to the points
where it will not endanger structures and the surrounding properties.
c) Fire at small leak in pipeline
1] Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the
nearest fire extinguishers.
2] Shut off the flow of oil in the line by closing valves and by stopping
pumping.
3] Cover the oil pool with sand and build up the sand so as to cover the
leak.
4] Put foam on the burning oil pool.
5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire
as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the
same in containers.
7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool.
d) Bursting of Gasket / leakage through joints
1] Stop pumping.
2] Stop flow of oil through drain. Keep oil within limited area.
3] Close line valves.
4] Dig pits to collect oil.
5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil.
6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire
as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the
oil in containers.
7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool.
8] Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care.
e) Fire in electric Sub-station / Transformer Room / Switch Room
Facilities: HT OCB, HT Switch, FUSE UNIT
TRANSFORMER: 450 KVA
GENSETS, PANELS: 1X250 KVA, 1X75 KVA
SWITCH ROOM, CONNECTION CABLES
Hazard Minimisers
(a) Generator operators and other employees
(b) Fire extinguishers
(c) Sand buckets
(d) Main switches
(e) Alarm
(f) Earthing
Action Plan as per disaster organisation chart
Special Reference –
(a) Cut off power supply by switching off the mains
(b) Apply DCP/CO2 extinguisher or dry sand.
(c) Call for outside help if required.
(d) Do not allow anybody to touch any electrical appliances.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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(e) Take action to prevent spreading of fire.
(f) If fire is not extinguished, extinguish by spreading water with fog nozzle
only after ensuring complete isolation of electrical supply.
f) Fire in Tank Farm
Facilities:
Storage Tank:
Floating Roof- 10694 KL (3 nos.) - for MS Storage
Cone Roof - 4882 KL (2 nos.) - for SKO Storage
Cone Roof - 15814 KL (3 nos.) - for HSD Storage
Hazard Minimiser
(a) All employees particularly the employees of loading/receipt section
(b) Fire Extinguishers
(c) Fire Hydrant Points
(d) Foam
(e) Water Jet
(f) Water Sprinklers
(g) Asbestos Suit
(h) Alarm
Disaster Combating Plan: As per Disaster Organization Chart
Special Reference –
(a) Operate ESD
A fire burning at the vent will not normally flash back into tank and explode if
the tank contains product since flame arrestors are provided.
(b) Start cooling of tanks by using water sprinklers provided on tanks as
well by wet jets.
(c) Close all valves since any removal of product will result in air being
sucked inside, with the resultant flash back and explosion.
(d) Close manhole covers of other tanks if they are open. Also stop
loading/receipt of oil in tank.
(e) Use foam to extinguish fire. Small fire can be handled with portable fire
extinguishers.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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(f) Call for help from outside agencies before fire is aggravated with the
instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.
g) Fire in Tank
(a) Fire in tank will normally burn quietly till the oxygen inside is consumed
unless temperature of the product is allowed to increase uncontrolled.
Hence, care must be taken to ensure that product temperature does not go
high by cooling with water sprinklers and jets. This also avoids
possibility of tank rupture due to hydrostatic Pressure.
(b) Care should be taken to ensure that the fire does not spread to other
areas. If there is product spill to outside, foam should be used to cover
the same.
(c) In such cases, foam should be pumped inside the tank for blanketing the
fire simultaneously taking action to cool the tank shell with water and
also removing the product by pumping it out to some other tank.
(d) Uncontrolled use of water on the burning product will result in product
spill over and spread of fire. In the case of heavy ends this will result in
boil over and frothing at the surface.
(e) When heavy ends like HSD burn, a layer of hot oil is formed below the
surface, which extends towards the bottom. Temperature of this layer is
of the order of 250 degree C to 300 degree C much above the boiling
point of water. When water turns into steam, it expands approx. 1600
times and this result in boil over. The boil over may overflow the tank
resulting in spreading of fire. Hence, in case of such fires, cool down the
tank by water sprinkler and also by continuous water jet on the tank
shell, transfer the product to other tanks and judiciously use foam to
smoothen fire.
(f) In case of F/R tanks, fires normally occur at F/R seals. Efforts should be
made to put foam in the correct place simultaneously cooling the tank
shell from outside.
(g) Do not waste foam by using it for cooling.
(h) Usage of water also should be in a controlled manner so that maximum
benefit can be obtained.
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
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Jharkhand
h) Natural Calamities
(i) High Wind Storms/Cyclones
All structures/buildings in the depot have been designed to withstand
cyclonic storms and hence not much of damage is anticipated.
Action Plan
(a) Switch of all industrial electrical connections.
(b) Ensure immediate closing of oil/water separator outlet (conventional) if
any tank collapse happens.
(c) Inform Chief Emergency Controller.
(d) Keep constant touch with local authorities – District Magistrate and
Police authorities.
(e) Stop all operations and do not resume it till clearance is given by Chief
Emergency Controller.
(f) Bring all vehicles to a halt and ensure that hand brake is applied.
(g) Evacuate persons from damaged buildings/structures.
(h) Avoid going on Terminal of high structures/storage tanks.
(i) After the cyclone has struck, assess the situation and take necessary
action as per the direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
(ii) Lightning
In the event of lightning strike, any of the following or all emergencies
may occur:
(a) Fire in the tanks
Action Plan: Already described under the topic of tank fire.
(iii) Floods
There is no river near the depot and in case of heavy rains during rainy
season the rain water gets cleared through the drainage provided.
Although the depot is not expected to get flooded, some precautionary
measures need to be taken to avoid any situation arising out of flood.
Action Plan
(a) Keep in touch with District Authorities
(b) Keep main gate closed
(c) Keep round the clock vigil and water level inside/outside the depot
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(iv) Earthquakes
All buildings/equipment are designed to withstand earthquakes and
therefore, major disaster is not expected. However in case of an
earthquake of much heavier scale may lead to
(a) Fall of structures/buildings
(b) Subsequent fire/explosion
(c) Release of petroleum products
Action Plan: Already described under the topic of fire at various
locations.
k) Riots / Sabotage / War
Action Plan
(a) Close all gates.
(b) Maintain tight security.
(c) Chief Emergency Controller to keep contact with local authorities.
(d) Keep round the clock patrolling.
(e) Alert all employees of disaster control action plan and activate in case of
requirement.
1.28 Important Telephone Numbers
D.C. Deoghar : 232680 (O)
232720, 232967 ®
9431166999 (M)
S.P. Deoghar : 232733 (O)
232777 ®
9431122777 (M)
S.D.O. Deoghar : 232326 (O)
232327 ®
9431134140 (M)
S.D.P.O. Deoghar : 232284 (O)
Sadar Hospital, Deoghar : 222247
Fire Brigade, Deoghar : 232260, 101
Deoghar Municipality : 232786 (O)
Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil
Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,
Jharkhand
9835354454 (M)
Deoghar Thana : 100, 222304, 9431390692 (M)
Jasidih Thana : 270234