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Indefinite Descriptions are Referring Terms

Orthodox Semantics: The Great Divide

Noun phrases that are referring terms.Noun phrases that are quantifiers.

What is the status of indefinite descriptions?

A: Indefinites are QuantifiersB: Indefinites are sometimes

Quantifiers, sometimes Referring Terms.

C: Indefinites are always Referring Terms.

Jane caught a hippo. It was very fat. Jane did not catch a hippo.If Jane caught a hippo, it was small.

What makes an expression a referring term?

Theory1. Denoting:E is a referring term iff E denotes an object.

Theory 2: Intending to Denote:E is a referring term iff E is used with the

intention of denoting an object.

Theory 3. The Denoting Kind:E is a referring term iff E belongs to a noun-

phrase class some members of which denote objects.

Theory 4. Advertising Theory

E is a referring term iff E is used to advertise an intention to denote something.

Denotative Technique:

DT[Smith]: Smith is a device that we use to denote something exploiting the fact that certain tokens of the phonological-type Smith already denote.

What constitutes the fact that in uttering Smith U is tokening a name?

The fact that U is intentionally engaging in a behaviour characteristic of someone who has an intention to denote an object exploiting the denotative technique DT[Smith].

Advertising an Intention to Denote:

In uttering a term T, U advertises an intention to denote an object iff

U utters T and intentionally engages in, or is disposed to engage in, behaviours characteristic of someone who has an intention to denote an object using denotative techniques of a certain kind, e.g, nomic, anaphoric, demonstrative, indexical, etc.

Proto-referring

A proto-referring act is an act in which U utters an expression with the syntax of a noun phrase and advertises an intention to denote using some denotative techniques.

Proto-referring, Pretence, and Seriousness.

Proto-referring--advertising an intention to denote an object--is neutral between pretence and seriousness.

Smith: Homer wrote The Odyssey.

Jones: Homer did not. He never existed.

Smith--serious

Jones--pretence.

Both: proto-refer.

Theory 4 Restated: Proto-act definition of a referring term:

E is a referring term iff E is used in a proto-referring act.

Covers: names, anaphors, indexicals.

Are indefinites referring terms?

In using a hippo, does U employ a hippo in a proto-referring act?

Does U utter a hippo advertising an intention to denote something?

Yes!

Denotative Technique?Plausible conjecture:

DT[an F]: An indefinite an F is a term that can be use to pick out an entity O through the fact that O uniquely satisfying some contextually given descriptive content {..F..}.

U utters a hippo as an indefinite iff:

U utters a hippo intentionally engaging in a behaviour characteristic of someone who has an intention to denote an object exploiting the denotative technique DT[a hippo].

Indefinite Proto-referring act:

In uttering a hippo as an indefinite:U advertises an intention to denote an

object x: x uniquely satisfies {..Hippo..}.

Case One:Jane caught a hippo.

U advertises an intention to denote an object x: x uniquely satisfies {..Hippo..}.

Sentential augmentation of descriptive content:U advertises an intention to denote an entity x:x uniquely satisfies {..Hippo, Caught by Jane..}.

Jane caught a hippo. It was very fat.

Anaphoric Link: U utters it advertising an intention to denote whatever was denoted by a hippo.

U has the anaphoric intention.

It--the hippo that Jane caught.

Objection I: Singular referring terms carry uniqueness implications of some kind. But indefinites do not.

Claim: Jane caught a hippo =Jane caught at least one hippo.

Reply I: Anaphoric Relations

Jane caught at least one hippo. It or they are outside.

Jane caught a hippo. *It or they are outside.

Reply II: Definite Descriptions

Jane saw a hippo yesterday. The hippo Jane saw yesterday was black.

Jane saw at least one hippo yesterday. *The hippo Jane saw yesterday was black.

Objection II: This account collapses the distinction between definite and indefinite.

Reply:Indefinites have sententially determinable

descriptive content.Definites have pre-sententially determined

descriptive content.

Pre-sentential Determination: the descriptive resources associated with the hippo must be secured independently of the main-clause predication in the sentence. So descriptive uniqueness needs to be established prior to processing of the whole assertion:

The F and an F are used in the same basic proto-act, but the F has the added meaning that its descriptive content is established prior to its use in a sentence.

Jane caught a hippo.Jane caught the hippo.

Both work by descriptive uniqueness.

Objection:Q: Did you see a hippo today?A: Yes, I saw a hippo. Indeed, I saw

many.

(i) A-speaker has some particular hippo in mind.

(ii) Yes-answer does not imply that A affirms ‘I saw a hippo’.

Bivalence Failure: With failure of uniqueness there is failure of bivalence:

There is a man in China

Cannot say true, false, not true, not false, etc.

There is the man in China.

Case 2: Jane did not catch a hippo.


1. U lacks the intention she advertises.2. No sentential augmentation of content.

Non-denoting name comparison

Pegasus does not exist.Jane did not catch a hippo.

In both cases terms fail to denote, and U lacks a denotative intention. But U advertises an intention to denote.

In both cases U employs a referring term.

Objection: There is a difference in determinacy between Pegasus and a hippo:

Pegasus does not exist.Jane did not catch a hippo.

Pegasus does not exist. He is fictional.Jane did not catch a hippo. *It was….

Jane did not catch a hippo. *Jane did not see it.

‘It’ inherits a hippo’s content, so must be indeterminate. But ‘it’ must be determinate for the second sentence to be acceptable.

Compare:Jane did not catch a hippo. *Jane did not

see the hippo.

Case 3: Predicative UsesHerman is a hippo.Herman is identical to a hippo.

1. U has the intention.2. Augmentation: U advertises and has an

intention to denote an object x: x uniquely satisfies {..Hippo, Identical to Herman...}.

Herman is the hippo.

Case 4: Conditional AntecedentsIf Jane caught a hippo, she sold it.


1. U lacks the intention.2. Sentential augmentation: U advertises an

intention to denote an object x: x uniquely satisfies {..Hippo, Caught by Jane..}.

If Jane caught a hippo, she sold it.

Anaphoric Link: U utter it advertising an intention to denote whatever was denoted by a hippo.

U lacks this anaphoric intention.

If Jane caught a hippo, she sold the hippo that she caught.

Objection: Uniqueness and antecedents

(*) If Jane caught a hippo, she sold it.

(*) implies that where Jane caught 50 hippos she sold each one.

Problem: I cannot assert ‘Jane caught a hippo’, where she catches 50--uniqueness implication.

The implicit additional descriptive content of a hippo in (*) is undecided:

(*) If Jane caught a hippo, she sold it.

Indeterminacy. Implicit Generality. Any--an indefinite signalling substitutional

indifference.

Corresponding assertion: Jane caught a hippo (that is F)

Commitment of: If Jane caught a hippo, she sold it.

Is:

For any assertion of the form A( Jane caught a hippo (that is F))one must assert: A(Jane sold it)

Case 5: Generic UsesA hippo is usually placid.


1. U lacks the intention.2. No sentential augmentation of content.

Generic Interpretation of Indefinites

The proto-act performed with a hippo is interpreted as a template for members of a class of acts, whose members are proto-acts R(T)pro, with the descriptive content {…Hippo…}.

Commitment: most of the instances of T is fat are true.

Conclusion:

A. Indefinites are referring terms; they are always uttered as components of proto-referring acts.

B. They differ from definites only in this respect: they have sententially determinable referential content.

C. Indefinites qua referring terms are often used in contexts in which they do not denote, and speakers know they don’t, and it is required that they don’t.

D. Question: What is the extent of the

domain of referring terms?

Question: What uniform account can be given of the semantic contribution of an indefinite description?

Bold conjecture: A pragmatic, speech-act theory of what constitutes a referring term is the counterpart of a pragmatic speech-act semantics.

The Speech-Act Theoretic Approach to Semantics

Semantic contents are speech-act types.

The semantic contribution of a referring term is the speech-act type associated with it: the proto-referring-act type.

Renewing Meaning (Oxford 2004)

Meaning of a Name:

Character of Smith:

Proto-referring act type in which U advertises an intention to denote something already denoted by some token of Smith.

Semantic Interpretation of Smith:

The proto-referring act-type all of whose tokens are nodes on a certain referential true.

B

B

T

T

T

S

BB

B

TT T

BB

The Meaning of an Indefinite:

Character of a hippo:

The proto-referring-act type with descriptive content {…Hippo…} which has sententially augmentable content.

The semantic interpretation of a token of a hippo is a proto-referring act type, which depending on the context will be:

(i) the character itself; (ii) a descriptively enriched character;(iii)a (sententially determined) descriptive

proto-referring-act type. (iv) the character modified by a mode. (v) a type defined by a referential tree.

Referential/Attributive use and pronominal contradiction:

Smith: A guy fell in front of a train this morning.

Jones: He didn’t fall. He was pushed.

Referential uses of a guy:

(a) anaphoric: U advertises an intention to denote whatever was picked out in some earlier NP, or a demonstrative.

(b) Anaphoric content trumps descriptive content.

(c) Anaphoric connections are secured by advertising intentions to denote whatever is denoted by the antecedent.

A guy fell….. He didn’t fall.

Advertising an intention to denote by He what is denoted by a guy.

The Meaning of a Definite:

Character of the hippo:

The proto-referring-act type with descriptive content {…Hippo…} which has presententially determined content.

The semantic interpretation of a token of the hippo:

A proto-referring act type, which depending on the context will be:

(i) a (pre-sententially determined) descriptive proto-referring-act type.

(ii) the character modified by a mode. (iii) a type defined by a referential tree.

What are the Semantic Interpretations of Sentences?

The semantic interpretations of sentences are speech-acts (types)--that can have proto-referring-act types as parts.

The semantic interpretation of a declarative sentence is a proto-assertion.

What is assertion?

In asserting something with a sentence S, U uses S and defends a state of mind.

To defend a state of mind is to manifest a reason giving disposition for tokening a property .

What is state of mind-type or mental defended in assertion?

One Answer: belief that P

Asserting that P = to utter a sentence S that means that P intending to defend belief that P.

The Plurality of -properties:

Reports: Snowy is black ---

-property: intention to represent by S a complex of the form <Snowy, black>

Negations:Not-S -property: Rejecting -A(S).

T is not F-property: Rejecting the disposition to apply is

F to T.

Truth and Falsity

Truth AscriptionsThat S is true-property: commitment to -A(S).

Falsity Ascriptions That S is false: --- defend commitment to

rejecting -A(S).

What are the semantic interpretations of declarative sentences?

Uttering S advertising defence of a -property.

A compositional -property semantics?

No Frege/Geach problem

Proto-assertions can embed.

There are rules that specify what -properties are assigned sentences given their constituents and context.

Semantic Structure of a Simple Sentence

T is F = R(T)pro Pred(is F)

-property?

Depends on the form of the predicate.

Case One:

Jane caught a hippo.

-property: intending to represent a complex of the form <x caught y>, where x is denoted by Jane and y denoted by a hippo.

Case 2:

Jane did not catch a hippo.

-property: rejecting the application of Pred(caught a hippo)pro to R(Jane)pro.

Case 5:

A hippo is usually fat.

-property: being disposed to accept most of instances, T is fat, for R(T)pro that are instances of R(a hippo)pro.

Case 6:

A hippo was not fed.

-property: accepting the application of Pred(not fed)pro to R(a hippo)pro, where R(a hippo)pro has a topic interpretation.

Conclusions

….

Objection 1: The proto-referring theory is too weak; it captures a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a referring term.

Reply: It is doubtful that there is a refinement that excludes indefinites, and doubtful that it is of any semantic interest.

Objection (Uniqueness again)

a largest prime

A largest prime is very large.

There exists a largest prime.

Repertoire Rule:If U wants to denote an object exploiting

the fact that it uniquely satisfies some contextually given descriptive condition {..F..}, then she can utter an F, and, if the context is right, and her beliefs about {..F..} are right, she will achieve her goal.