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Furthermore, Ibn H.azm contends that there are bad people in
Madīnah as well as in other cities. For instance, he maintains that in his time Madīnah was inhibited by the extremist Rawāfid.
(Deserters).131
Based on this contention, the agreement of this
kind of people could not be accepted, in Ibn H.azm’s view, in
spite of their living in Madīnah.
As for the validity of good people living in Madīnah,
whom the Mālikīs claim to have special privilege, Ibn H.azm
refuses this stand and wonders where they got this privilege
which was not available to the people of other cities.132
Just as he refutes the first argument advanced by the Mālikīs, so he
does with the remaining arguments. Ibn H.azm maintains that the
s.ah.ābah knew more about the ah.kām (sing. h.ukm) put forward
by the Prophet than the people of Madīnah. They knew the
Prophet’s last deeds, they knew the nāsikh and mansūkh without any preference whether they lived inside or outside Madīnah. To
refute the idea that any h.ukm could not be unknown to the
people of Madīnah who were the majority of the s.ah.ābah, Ibn
H.azm contends that this could only occur if his opponents find
an issue reported by all of the s.ah.ābah who were in Madīnah,
and every one of them gave his legal opinion on it. This, in Ibn
H.azm’s view, did not happen. There were legal opinions given
by some of them. In this case, it is possible, according to Ibn H.azm, that a h.ukm given by the Prophet was not known by a
group of s.ah.ābah, but known by one or more among them. This
is significant, because the element of majority is not actualized
and cannot be applied to Madīnah alone. Moreover, the s.ah.ābah
might stay in or leave Madīnah.133
Ibn H.azm contends further
that the above ijmā‘ is based either on ijtihād or tawqīf from the Prophet. If it were ijtihād of the s.ah.ābah or the people of
Madīnah, Ibn H.azm rejected ijmā‘ based on ijtihād; if it were
based on tawqīf, Ibn H.azm argues that should a h.ukm be known
by some s.ah.ābah inside Madīnah, they must have informed
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people outside the city, so that the knowledge of people inside
and outside Madīnah becomes equal. Had not they done so, then their ‘adālah would become nullified, and they would become
subject to the curse of Allah. Ibn H.azm is referring to the
Qur’ānic verse:
“Those who hide the proofs and the guidance which We revealed,
after We had made it clear in the Scripture, such are accursed
of Allah and accursed of those who have power to curse.”
(Qur’ān 2:159).
Since Allah protects them from this character, Ibn H.azm
contends the necessity of ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah becomes void.
134 Ibn H.azm rejects the argument of the Mālikīs
and maintains that the Mālikīs are at fault because they adhere
blindly to the opinion of their imām, i.e., Mālik ibn Anas (d.
179/795).
One of many examples given by Ibn H.azm is that ‘Umar
read (chapter 84) and (chapter 32) of the
Qur’ān while he was delivering his khut.bah (Friday sermon),
and then he descended from the minbar (pulpit) and prostrated,
followed by the people of Madīnah. This practice, according to
Ibn H.azm, was not followed by the Mālikīs.135
Moreover, Ibn
H.azm argues, most of the forty issues which are considered by
Mālik as the ijmā‘ of people of Madīnah are disputable among the people of that city themselves.
136
It should be noted that al-Sarakhsī, like Ibn H.azm, rejects
the position taken by the Mālikīs on the same ground. Though al-Sarakhsī accepts the merits of Madīnah, yet he maintains that
these h.adīths apply exclusively to the age of the Prophet. As for
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the other ages, al-Sarakhsī rejects the merits of its people. He
maintains that in his time there is no place in the Muslim lands where people have so less knowledge, are so ignorant, and so far
removed from the motive of goodness than that of Madīnah. The
h.adīths mentioning the merits of Madīnah, in al-Sarakhsī‘s
view, refer to its condition in the time of the Prophet when the pilgrimage was enjoined, where Muslims gathered in the city,
while bad people and apostates did not settle there. Al-Sarakhsī
argued further, that the place could be protected though the people who were living in it were not on the right way. The
example given by al-Sarakhsī was the condition of Makkah
during the Year of the Elephant, when Allah protected the city from the invasion of Abrahah and his troops, though its
inhabitants were idolaters.137
In spite of Ibn H.azm’s attack on this type of ijmā‘, the
opinion of the people of Madīnah on the exact measure of mudd
and s.ā‘ is accepted unanimously by the whole ‘ulamā’.138
The
Madīnian mudd in the early period of Islam is 1.053 liter, if we
estimate that 77 kg wheat equals 100 liters. The Madīnian s.ā‘,
which equals four mudd is 4.2125 liters. However, the measurement of mudd in other Muslim cities is different.139
Ibn
H.azm contends that it is not the ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah
which is accepted in this case, but the h.adīth which goes back to
the Prophet transmitted successively ( ) upon which there is
also disagreement among them. A Madinese, Mūsá ibn T. alh.ah
ibn ‘Abd Allāh was reported to have a different opinion on this
issue. On the other hand, Ibn H.azm contends that if the
acceptance of this issue should be extended to others, the opinion of the people of Makkah would more deserve to be
accepted. This is because the whole Muslim community agree to
accept their opinion upon the locations of ‘Arafah, Muzdalifah, Mina, etc.
140 Moreover, the opinion of the people of Madīnah
on the measure of mudd and s.ā‘ is accepted by Ibn H.azm, not
because it is the opinion of the people of Madīnah, but because
it is the minimum measure mentioned in the controversy. Some
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people, whom Ibn H.azm did not name, held the opinion that one
s.ā‘ equals eight pounds, others assume that it is more than that,
while the people of Madīnah maintain that it is five pounds and
more. Therefore, there is no disagreement among the ‘ulamā’ in the acceptance of this minimum measure of s.ā‘ .
We do not agree with Ibn H.azm in assuming that the
measure of the Madinian s.ā‘ is accepted by Muslims because it
is the minimum measure in the controversy. It is true that s.ā‘
equals 5 1/3 pounds in Madīnah and 8 pounds in Baghdad, but
the measure of the s.ā‘ is still the same, i.e., 4.2125 liters.141
This is because one Madīnian pound (rat.l) equals 1.5
Baghdādian one. The measurement of pound is also different in
other Muslim countries For example, one pound in Madīnah, Iraq (as well as Yemen), and Andalusia is respectively equals
609.375 g, 406.25 g, and 453.3 g.142
Although Ibn H.azm does not give us any details on the
measure of mudd, his opinion in this issue and of the s.ā‘ is not
different from any other school. This is because this issue is
accepted as a mutawātir report by the people of Madīnah,
handed down from the Prophet. An issue of this kind is considered h.ujjah by the four Sunnī schools. Abū Yūsuf from
the H.anafī school, after receiving the explanation of this matter
from Mālik, said that had this mutawātir report reached Abū
H. anīfah, he would have accepted it. This report of the people of
Madīnah is considered by Ibn Taymiyyah as the first category of ijmā‘ of the people of that city, which is, in Ibn Taymīyah’s
view, accepted by Muslims as h.ujjah. The second category of
this type of ijmā‘ is the earlier practice of the people of Madīnah
before the assassination of ‘Uthmān. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this practice is accepted as h.ujjah by the Mālikīs,
the Shāfi‘īs, the H.anafīs, and apparently also H.anbalīs, as they
accepted the practice of the rightly-guided caliphs as h.ujjah.
The third category of this type of ijmā‘ is that in case two dalīls
contradicted one another in a certain issue, for example, two
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h.adīths or two qiyāses, and it is not known which of the two
h.adīths or qiyāses is arjah. (preponderant), but one of them is
practised by the people of Madīnah, the Mālikīs and the Shāfi‘īs
choose the practice of the people of Madīnah. Abū H...anīfah
does not have any preference for the practice of the people of Madīnah. In the H.anbalī school, Ibn Taymiyyah gives two
views: a) al-Qād.ī Abū Ya‘lá and Ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 513/1119) do not
choose the practice of the people of Madīnah; b) Abū ’l-Khat.t.āb
(d. 138/755-756) does, which is also the view Ah.mad ibn
H.anbal. Generally speaking, these three categories of ijmā‘ are
accepted by the jumhūr al-‘ulamā’. The fourth category of ijmā‘
mentioned by Ibn Taymiyyah is the late practice of the people of
Madīnah. This is not h.ujjah according to the H. anafīs, Shāfi‘īs,
and H.anbalīs. This is also the view of the effective defenders
of Mālikīs doctrines. Ibn Taymiyyah assumes that some Mālikīs in North Africa (al-Maghrib) consider it as h.ujjah. If this
assumption is true, this might also be true for the Mālikīs in
Andalusia whom Ibn H.azm attacks severely.143
In summary, the Mālikīs as we have seen are the advocates of this type of ijmā‘, and the position to which they adheres is in
sharp contrast with Ibn H.azm’s. Since Spain during Ibn H.azm’s
time adhered dominantly to the Mālikī school why does Ibn
H.azm reject the Mālikī position? The answer to this question
lies in the doctrinal and political rivalries between the Z.āhirī
and Mālikī doctors. Doctrinal rivalry, because Ibn H.azm
represents the Z.āhirī school, and it is known that the Z.āhirī s
adhere to the nas.s. as the only source of law in religion. Political
rivalry, because his motive is to demonstrate to the people and
rulers in his time the falsehood of the Mālikī jurists in following
their imām Mālik ibn Anas, instead of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. This criticism can be interpreted to mean that Ibn H.azm
was actually denouncing Mālikī judges and rulers themselves.
In Spain the position of wazīr (vizier, minister) and qād.ī were
important ones and the Mālikī jurists did indeed occupy these
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positions. This was because the official madhhab to which the
rulers of Spain adhered during Ibn H.azm’s time was the Mālikī
madhhab. In the meantime, the rulers prevented Z.āhirī jurists
like Ibn H.azm from occupying judicial and non-judicial
positions in the government, because the Z.āhirī madhhab was
strange to them. By so doing, Ibn H.azm was expressing his
criticism against the religious orientation of his contemporary rulers and the Mālikī jurists who exercised taqlīd
144 instead of
ijtihād.
4. Ijmā‘ where no Challenge is Known
According to Ibn H.azm, this type of ijmā‘ was advocated
by the followers of the H.anafī, Mālikī, and Shāfi‘ī schools.
Unknown leaders of these schools maintain that if a legal judgement of a particular issue was put forward by a t.ā’ifah of
‘ulamā’, it becomes ijmā‘, provided that no ‘ālim has ever
challenged its legal authority.145
Ibn H.azm cites two reasons
for its legality: 1) the attribute of virtue, i.e., ‘ulamā’ involved
in the legal judgement belong to the people of grace and
religion (ا) whom Allah enjoins the believers to
obey; 2) the ‘ulamā’’s acceptance of the decision of the jurists
involved in the judgement. Therefore, the advocates of this
type of ijmā‘, as stated by Ibn H.azm, maintain that the absence
of any challenge indicates common agreement.146
But Ibn H.azm refuses to interpret the absence of challenge
of an ‘ālim to the judgement of the ‘ulamā’ involved as an
indication of common agreement. There are grounds for thinking that Ibn H.azm totally rejected the legality of this type
of ijmā‘, i.e. the ijmā‘ where no challenge is known. The
grounds for this are comprised of historical precedent, the use of
nas.s. as the basis of ijmā‘, and the tendency among mankind to
disagree in their daily life. Ibn H.azm is also uncertain whether
the legal judgement involved, in effect, spread out among the ‘ulamā’, because they have been scattered through dār al-Islām.
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Since this is the case, the absence of challenge, Ibn H.azm
contends, is highly unlikely to occur. Moreover, Ibn H.azm is
also uncertain whether the absence of disagreement can be
interpreted as positive agreement among the involved ‘ulamā’. Ibn H.azm also contends that there are ‘ulamā’ among jinn
(demons, genii), whom we do not know whether the legal
judgement concerned reaches them or not.147
For Ibn H.azm, the
absence of disagreement in a legal context can also be viewed as
a legitimate disagreement in the same context. One historical precedent which Ibn H.azm cites is the example concerning the
experience of the s.ah.ābī, Abū Ayyūb al-Ans.ārī.148
During the
caliphate of ‘Umar he stopped performing two rak‘ah after the
‘as.r (late afternoon prayer), while prior to that caliphate, he had
been consistently performing these two rak‘ahs. But after the
death of ‘Umar he returned to his previous practice. When he was asked why he stopped practising the two rak‘ahs during the
time of ‘Umar, but resumed it later on, he said that he did so
because ‘Umar beat people who performed it.149
Ibn H.azm
interpreted this example as a proof that the fear caused by ‘Umar’s beating was responsible for Abū Ayyūb’s suspension of
that prayer, and with the absence of such fear, he resumed it. It
follows that his fear is also the cause of his silence in concealing his disagreement with ‘Umar in the matter of the two rak‘ah
prayer.
In addition to fear, Ibn H.azm mentions other reasons,
among which is that the ‘ālim may maintain silence, because the
side of the truth is not yet visible to him. In other words, he does not know whether the legal judgement of the ‘ulamā’ which
reaches him is right or wrong, and therefore, he cannot
challenge it. His silence, then, does not mean his agreement. Another reason for maintaining silence of the ‘ulamā’ is that
they actually give their disagreement, but they do not reach us,
though they reach other people in other parts of Muslim countries. Therefore, we think that they are silent, while actually
they are not.150
This argument of Ibn H.azm also indicates his
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rejection of the ijmā‘ sukūtī (tacit ijmā‘), though he does not
deal with it in a special chapter in his book al-Ih.kām.
Ibn H.azm also disputes the meaning of agreement or
disagreement on the basis of textual consideration. In his view,
a nas.s. is the key for deciding whether or not the ijmā‘ has any
validity of its own. According to Ibn H.azm an ijmā‘ on nas.s. is
undoubtedly a valid one, because it involves yaqīn (certitude).
Other than the element of yaqīn, any ijmā‘ based on any notion such as z.ann and ra’y has to be rejected. Ibn H.azm cited verses
from the Qur’ān which indicate the invalidity of z.ann, such as
the following verses:
“When ye welcomed it with your tongues,
and uttered it with your mouths that whereof
ye had no knowledge, ye counted it a trifle.
In the sight of Allah it is very great.:”
(Qur’ān 24:15, italics mine);
“Lo! ye are those who argue about that
whereof ye have some knowledge. Why then
ye argue concerning that whereof ye have no
knowledge? Allah knoweth. Ye know not.”
(Qur’ān 3:66, italics mine).
Ibn H.azm contends that assuming the occurrence of ijmā‘ on a
particular issue simply because no challenge is known is a kind of z.ann. Therefore, ijmā‘ based on z.ann is also based on what
someone has no knowledge of. This practice is forbidden by
Allah, and therefore, this type of ijmā‘ has no legal value.151
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In addition, the same thing is true about human nature and its tendency to disagree on a common issue. In Ibn H.azm’s
view, disagreement is inherent in man and more dominant in
him than agreement is. This means that Ibn H.azm does not
wholly believe in the absence of disagreement in the ijmā‘
where no challenge is known. To support this belief Ibn H.azm
cites the following Qur’ānic verses:
“…, yet, they (mankind) cease not differing save him on whom
their Lord hath mercy; and for that He did create them...”
(Qur’ān 11:118-119).
These verses indicate the natural tendency of mankind to
disagree with others. So far, Ibn H.azm’s belief in the nature of
disagreement among mankind leads him to reject ijmā‘ based on other than nas.s.. The reason for this thinking is that a Muslim
cannot disagree to the nas.s..152
Ibn H.azm’s argument in refuting ijmā‘ where no
challenge is known indicates that he consistently takes into
account the nas.s. as the only basis of ijmā‘ and that he insists on
rejecting anything in religion based on z.ann. Moreover, through
his observation of man’s psychology and the Qur’ānic verses dealing with human nature, he is convinced that there is not a
single agreement without any challenge except ijmā‘ based on
nas.s., because disagreement is natural in man. As a historian, he
gives us examples which prove the invalidity of his opponents’ argument.
So far, we have been discussing Ibn H.azm’s view of ijmā‘
where no challenge is known. Now we shall look into his view of ijmā‘ where one challenge is known. This type of ijmā‘ is
considered as ijmā‘ by its advocates, in spite of the existence of
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a challenge to it. Ibn H.azm opposes this type of ijmā‘.
Compared to the previous type of ijmā‘ this type is less
important, due to the existence of one challenge. However, it had been dealt with and rejected by leading ‘ulamā’ before Ibn
H.azm, like al-Shāfi’ī (d. 204/820). But it is still important to
know the argument of rejecting this type of ijmā‘ from the
Z.āhirī point of view as presented by Ibn H.azm.
5. Ijmā‘ with One Challenge
The advocates of this type of ijmā‘ disregard the challenger and insist on its legality, because they consider the
one challenger as an isolated instance from the opinion of the
‘ulamā’ in general. Ibn H.azm, it will be seen, rejects this
opinion and insists that a single challenge is itself a disagreement on the ground that there is no unanimity of
opinion which constitutes the ijmā‘. Moreover, the challenger,
contrary to the emerging view of the ‘ulamā’, might very well be on the true side, for Ibn H. azm contends that religious truth
does not depend on the number or numbers of its adherence.
To begin with, Ibn H.azm raises the problem of this type of
ijmā‘ in the context of a statement by the H.anafī qād.ī Abū
H.āzim ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-H.amīd153
and the historian
Abū Ja’far Muh.ammad ibn Jarīr al- T.abarī on the disagreement
of the s.ah.ābī Zayd ibn Thābit with the first four caliphs as to
what to do with the remainder of the inheritance left by a dead
person. Unlike the four caliphs, Zayd ibn Thābit thinks that this
remainder of the deceased should go to bayt al-māl (public treasury).
154 But Abū H.āzim disregards this view because he
abolishes the law of giving the bayt al-māl a share in inheritance
and adheres to the opinion of the caliphs, namely, the remainder
of inheritance should go to the deceased’s relatives on the
maternal side () .155
Al- T.abarī’s view is not stated. We
only know that he disregards a single challenger in ijmā‘.156
Since Ibn H.azm treats the two eminent scholars together, we
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assume that al- T.abarī probably shared with Abū H.āzim the
same view.
Ibn H.azm does not tell us his view on the issue of the
remainder of the inheritance. Nevertheless, there is enough
evidence to indicate that he disagrees with Abū H.āzim and al-
T.abarī and those who disregard a single challenge in the
occurrence of ijmā‘. He offers us three arguments by his
opponents defending this type of ijmā‘.157
One, the opponents of Ibn H.azm claim that a single challenge of ijmā‘ is shudhūdh
(deviation) and madhmūm (reprehensible), while following the
opinion of the community is desirable. Two, a good number of
h.adīths indicate the infallibility of the Muslim ummah (nation,
people) and the injunction to the Muslims to adhere to the majority. Three, through the application of reason they (i.e., the
opponents of Ibn H.azm) are uncertain whether or not a single
challenger of ijmā‘ belongs to the jamā ‘ah (community). While
they do not doubt that those who are challenged by the single challenger belong to the jamā ‘ah, it is reasonable for them to
follow the majority whom they are sure belong to the jamā ‘ah
rather than the single challenger, who has no such distinction. This is because they cannot accept the idea that a single person
could constitute a jamā ‘ah.
Why is a single challenge shudhūdh and madhmūm?
According to Ibn H.azm’s opponents who advocate this type of
ijmā‘, an ‘ālim who stands alone in challenging the jamā ‘ah is considered by them as deviating from it. Therefore, a single
opinion which challenges that of the jamā ‘ah, which is
considered deviation and something reprehensible, as shudhūdh in religious definition is meant to embrace deviation from the
jamā ‘ah, which is forbidden in matters relevant to the
sharī‘ah.158
Ibn H.azm rejects this view by stating that the shudhūdh is
not altogether a matter of deviation from the jamā ‘ah. Rather, it
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means disagreement at the expense of religious truth () ,
and anyone who disagrees in the realm of religious truth is
himself shādhdh (a deviated opponent). Ibn H.azm differs from
Abū Sulaymān Dāwūd ibn Khalaf, the founder of the Z.āhirī
school, and the jumhūr of Z.āhirī ‘ulamā’ on the occurrence of
shudhūdh. According to Abū Sulaymān and the jumhūr of his school,
shudhūdh occurs when the ‘ulamā’ agreed upon an issue,
and having done so, one of them challenged the agreement after
he had agreed to it.159
Why does Ibn H.azm see shudhūdh in the context of truth
alone? For him, the justification for not defining shudhūdh
merely as the deviation of one ‘ālim from the rest of ‘ulamā’ arises from the idea that the one ‘ālim might be correct, and
truth cannot be shādhdh. He contends that if shudhūdh is
defined as the separation of one ‘ālim from the rest of ‘ulamā’ this is not acceptable for him, because if the ‘ālim mentioned
above is true in his opinion he will become mah.mūd (praised)
and mamdūh. (laudable). As shudhūdh is madhmūm
(reprehensible) it should be impossible for a person to be
mah.mūd and madhmūm at the same time. As an example, Ibn
H.azm mentions that all the s.ah.ābah disagreed with Abū Bakr in
his intention to fight the apostates, while he alone was right and the whole s.ah.ābah were wrong.
160
Ibn H.azm’s contention that the one ‘ālim might be correct,
and truth cannot be shādhdh is also indicated by his rejection of
the claim made by his opponents in the context of a series of unlimited numbers of shudhūdh, suggesting that either they
should stick to the provision of limitation, or they should not
give such limitation. Ibn H.azm contends that if it were the
former, then they would give false statement without introducing any dalīl, so that they themselves would become
shādhdh from the truth. On the other hand, if it were the latter,
then the number of shudhūdh would be extended until they turn
away from al-ma‘qūl (the reasonable) and the ijmā‘ of the
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community; again they themselves would become shādhdh from
the truth.161
This view of Ibn H.azm on the position taken by his
opponents is linked with another consideration, i.e., the use of
h.adīths as reliable grounds to prove the infallibility of the
Muslim community, plus the injunction of the Prophet to the Muslims to adhere to the majority. So important is this
consideration that it largely accounts for Ibn H.azm’s challenge
to his opponents in this matter. As illustrative examples we
shall mention two h.adīths. The first h.adīth says:
“The community of Muhammad will never agree
on an error. Follow the majority. He who goes his own
way will also go his own way to hell.”162
The component element of the h.adīth focus on the
relationship of shudhūdh to the overriding nature of errors and
judgement by the majority. The opponents of Ibn H.azm judge
the contents of this h.adīth by responding that the h.adīth actually
refers to the infallibility of the community. This community by inference represents the majority of its members, whose
agreement is in effect an ijmā‘.163
Any opinion which isolates
itself from that of the majority (which is infallible) is automatically wrong and should be disregarded. One view
which agrees to the interpretation of Ibn H.azm’s opponents for
the h.adīth is preserved by al-Āmidī. They give an example that
if we say that Banū Tamīm protect their neighbours and give
hospitality to their guests this statement is to be interpreted to indicate that the majority of the Tamīmīs follow this practice,
and this by inference applies to the Tamīmī tribe as a whole.164
This view is not accepted by Ibn H.azm, because he throws
doubt upon the veracity of the h.adīth by disputing the reliability
77
of one of its chain of narrators, al-Musayyib ibn Wād.ih. by
name. Ibn H.azm contends that Ibn al-Musayyib is not a reliable
transmitter, because he falls into the category of munkar al-
h.adīth (a traditionist whose h.adīth gains no recognition).165
Ibn H.azm asserts that even if the above h.adīth were
sound, it would be irrelevant to the issue of an ijmā‘ based on
the opinion of the majority, so long as it indicates the necessity
for Muslims to follow the truth. The reason for underlining the truth as the h.adīth’s implication, is that Ibn H.azm interprets the
words (whoever deviates) in the h.adīth as
(whoever deviates from the truth), though the truth embraces
one person.166
But the first part of this h.adīth which has a
similar verse and constitutes a h.adīth in itself (i.e., “My
community will not agree on an error”) has been rejected by
several leading Orientalists, on the ground that al-Shāfi‘ī did not cite it as an argument for the validity of ijmā‘. Al-Shāfi‘ī did not
cite it either because he did not know it (as assumed by
Schacht), or he knew it, but he did not consider it genuine.167
Watt asserts that some Western critics consider it to be a forged
h.adīth intended to justify the validity of ijmā‘.168
In this
instance Ibn H.azm’s judgement in doubting the authenticity of
the above h.adīth cannot be totally ignored.
The second h.adīth cited by Ibn H.azm’s opponents says:
“O people, honour my s.ah.ābah, then the following generation
[i.e., the tābi‘īn], then the following of the following generation
[i.e., the tābi‘ī al-tābi‘īn]; afterwards falsehood will appear, so that
77
a man would swear before being asked and would bear witness before
being asked; whoever among you seeks the pleasure of Paradise, he
should follow the community; a man should not be alone with
a woman, for Satan would be the third of the two; Satan
can pursue one person, but stands far away from two;
whoever is displeased with his bad deeds and
pleased with his good ones is a believer.”169
According to Ibn H.azm’s opponents, this h.adīth justifies the
validity of ijmā‘ with one challenge, because it enjoined the Muslims to follow the
jamā‘ah. Moreover, one challenge in
ijmā‘ comes from one person whom Satan can pursue, while the
jamā‘ah is protected by Allah, because His hand is upon them. Again, Ibn H.azm is not sure of the soundness of this h.adīth,
because he asserts that it has not been reported by any
traditionist who makes the soundness of a h.adīth as the
condition of reporting it ( ( . But
Ah.mad hmad Shākir, the Egyptian qād.ī, asserts that Ibn
H.azm’s contention is false, and claims that the narrators of this
h.adīth were thiqāt (reliable authorities).170
Like to foregoing example, Ibn H.azm sees no relationship
between the implication of the h.adīth and the acceptance of
ijmā‘ under discussion. Moreover, the above h.adīth has no
bearing on religious questions (( 171
and should
not be taken in its wider context () . Ibn H.azm
adheres to this view, because he argues that by the reference to
Satan in the above h.adīth the Prophet would not mean that a
person who resides alone at home would be accompanied by Satan. He contends that if the above h.adīth were relevant to
religion and were accepted in its general meaning, falsehood
could be changed into truth. A person whose opinion differed
from that of other people, his opinion would be false, because as the h.adīth says, Satan can pursue him. But if his opinion was
backed by another one, this false opinion would turn into truth,
because Satan is away from the two. This is not the nature of
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religion, because false remains false even though it is backed by
thousands of people. Ibn H.azm contends further that the Prophet
would not have meant that Satan was away from infidels like the Jews, the Christians, or Muslim heretics, because they were
more than one person, or that they constitute the majority of
people. On the contrary, in Ibn H.azm’s view, the more they are
in number, the stronger is Satan with them than with one person.
172
Ibn H.azm was probably right in considering that the above
h.adīths have nothing to do with ijmā‘, but his views are
exaggerated. There is an indication that the Prophet warns his followers of separation from the Muslim community which
actually happened later. Every member of the community has
the right to express his opinion, but it does not mean that he has to leave the community. Moreover, difference of opinion is in
the nature of human beings. The solution is that everyone
among the community explains his argument honestly, for the sake of finding the truth, so that opponents can be convinced.
Otherwise, the opinion of the majority is to be accepted by all as
ijtihād of the ‘ulamā’, not as ijmā‘.
Furthermore, Ibn H.azm interprets the word jamā‘ah in the
h.adīth as reference to the jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq (the community of
the truth). This jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq, in Ibn H.azm’s view, has no
relation with the strength of its numerical order. In equating the jamā‘ah with jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq, Ibn H.azm insists that they
constitute the minority of people. He cements his argument
with: 1) historical evidence, like the conversion of the Prophet’s
wife Khadījah to Islam; 2) nas.s. as based on the Qur’ān and the
Sunnah, all indicating that the believers constitute a minority and that though they are small in number, they belong to the
jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq; 3) reason as exemplified by the non-believing
community, or by the Prophet’s relationship to his own
community.
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To be precise, the historical evidence cited by Ibn H.azm to
prove that the jamā‘ah intended in the second h.adīth is the
jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq and that they belong to minority is the state of
the Prophet just after he was chosen as a prophet by Allah. At
this time he was the only person who belonged to the truth. The rest of the world were in falsehood. In this case it was the
Prophet alone whom people should follow, although the people
of his community were unbelievers and constituted the majority of people. When Khadījah converted to Islam she and the
Prophet belonged to the truth, because of his prophethood and
Khadījah’s acceptance of his message, while the majority of people opposing them were in falsehood. Similar evidence
mentioned by Ibn H.azm is the case of Zayd ibn ‘Amr ibn
Nufayl, who lived in pre-Islamic Arabia, and who refused to
worship idols instead of Allah. Because of this attitude he was the only person in his time who belonged to the truth, and
according to a h.adīth, he would be raised on the Judgement Day
as an ummah (a nation, a community, people) in itself.173
It was
narrated by Jābir ibn ‘Abd Allāh that the Messenger of Allah was asked about the case of Zayd ibn ‘Amr ibn Nufayl who
faced the Ka‘bah and said:
"O Allah, my god is the god of Abraham,
and my religion of the religion of
Abraham, peace be upon him",
then prayed and prostrated. The Prophet said:
"This [person] is a nation by himself,
he will be assembled [in the Resurrection Day]
between me and ‘Isa ibn Maryam,
peace be upon him.".174
He was said to have been seen by the Prophet plunging in the rivers of Paradise.
175
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There are a good number of Qur’ānic verses and prophetic traditions which Ibn H.azm uses to support his contention that
the jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq belongs to minority. In the course of his
presentation Ibn H.azm cites four verses and seven h.adīths. Of
this total, the verses revolving around the term mu’minīn
(believers) and the h.adīth equally relating to it constitute the
focus of this argument. We shall first cite two nas.s.es and then
present the analysis. One Qur’ānic verse occurs in sūrat Yūsuf
(chapter 12) verse 103, which belongs to the Makkan period and relates a group of people (nās) to the term mu’minīn, and does
not refer to jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq. This verse runs as follows:
“And although thou try much,
most men will not believe.”
(Qur’ān 12:103).176
Ibn H.azm‘s comment on this verse is limited in two
points: 1) that the believers are meant to be the jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq; 2) that the latter, in turn, constitutes a minority. This
view of Ibn H.azm is shared by qād.ī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d.
415/1025) who maintains that the greatness in number of the
upholders of an opinion does not indicate that it is true, nor that
the smallness in number indicates its falsehood.177
Ibn H.azm
defines jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq as people who follow the Qur’ān and
the genuine h.adīth of the Prophet ( ) . Ibn H.azm
means that believers who mistakenly follow a forged or an
unsound h.adīth do not belong the jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq, and
therefore, they should not be followed by other believers.178
The other verses quoted by Ibn azm to indicate that the
jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq belong to minority are as follows:
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“…, save such as believe and do good
works, and they are few.”
(Qur’ān 77:77).
“…but most of mankind know not.”
(Qur’ān 12:21, 40, and 68).
“…If thou obeyedst most of those on earth
they would mislead thee ...”
(Qur’ān 6:116).
The h.adīths which Ibn H.azm cites as a proof to support
his stand revolves around the key-word mu’minīn and jamā‘atu
’l-h.aqq. Moreover, Ibn H.azm believes that the h.adīths as
naes give vidence to the meaning derived from the verse.
Among these h.adīths are as follows:
“The Doomsday will not come upon
someone who says ‘there is no god
but Allah’ [i.e., a believer]”.
“Verily, the Doomsday will not come except upon
those who have no good with them.”
From these h.adīths Ibn H.azm extracts two points: 1) a
believer belongs to jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq, and 2) this jamā‘ah
belongs to a minority, as the number of believers will diminish before Doomsday; and during that day, there would be no
believer.
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As for his reasons, Ibn H.azm argues that the only possible
meaning of the jamā‘ah whom the Muslims should follow is the jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq, i.e., the Muslim community in its general
meaning, because non-believers which are also jamā‘āt (sing.
jamā‘ah) should not be followed by Muslims, though they
constitute the majority of people. In its particular meaning, jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq means any group that follows the Qur’ān and
the genuine h.adīths of the Prophet, because Muslims themselves
are divided into jamā‘āt. The heretics among them are excluded
from the jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq, while the Sunnīs are divided into
jamā‘āt, i.e., the H.anafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī, and H.anbalī schools,
as well as the people (followers) of Tradition () , and
none of them deserves more to be jamā‘atu ’l-h.aqq than the
others, because of their equality in authenticity.179
For evidence by reason, Ibn H.azm states the view of his
opponents on the issue whether the one challenger of ijmā‘
belongs to the Muslim ummah. Dissociating with this one
challenger, they assert that those who participate in ijmā‘ belong to the Muslim ummah whom every Muslim should follow. With
regard to the one challenger, they doubt he belongs to that
ummah. They contend that it is reasonable to follow those whom they are sure belong to the Muslim ummah rather than
those whom they doubt belong to it.180
But Ibn H.azm rejects
this view, because he maintains that it is disobedience to Allah,
who enjoins Muslims to refer to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah whenever a dispute arises. He is referring to the Qur’ānic verse
which reads:
“…; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter,
refer it to Allah and the messenger…”
(Qur’ān 4:59).
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The existence of one challenge is a legal and binding dispute
according to Ibn H.azm and it cannot be disregarded.
To sum up, what Ibn H.azm wants to prove is that the
notion of religious truth in Islam has noting to do with the
number of people who adhere to it. While his proofs are largely
a combination of Qur’ānic verses and Prophetic traditions, and while reference to the Z.āhirī school is not evident, this may be
because he found that the true madhhab corresponds with the
Z.āhirī to which he belongs and represents. Hence, his strong
attempt at propagating and defending it is obvious. It should be
recalled that this school applies the nas.s. of the Qur’ān and the
Sunnah as proofs to implement sharī‘ah and reason. It is nas.s. which guides reason to find the religious truth. Reason alone is unreliable in its judgement, because it is merely a worker, and
not a ruler.
The difference between this type of ijmā‘ and the previous
one is that this type of ijmā‘ is less important than ijmā‘ where
no challenge is known, because the existence of one challenge in ijmā‘ causes the loss of its unanimity, which is a condition for
the agreement in the occurrence of ijmā‘ brought about by the
majority of ‘ulamā’.
We have discussed and anylized Ibn H.azm’s argument in
refuting ijmā‘ with one challenge. We have also discussed Ibn H.azm’s view about ijmā‘ on what is known by necessity, ijmā‘
of the s.ah.ābah, ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah, and ijmā‘
where no challenge is known. Ijmā‘ on what is known by
necessity is the strongest one in Ibn H.azm’s view, as no Muslim
will remain Muslim if he denies it. Ijmā‘ of the s.ah.ābah is the
second ijmā‘ accepted by Ibn H.azm, where no s.ah.ābī denies it.
Ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah is rejected by Ibn H.azm,
because, in his view, the people of that city have no privilege
over other people in other cities. Ijmā‘ where no challenge is known is also rejected by Ibn H.azm on the basis that knowing
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the opinion of the whole ‘ulamā’ other than the s.ah.ābah in a
certain issue is impossible due to their greatness in number.
Likewise, knowing the existence or non-existence of any challenge to this type of ijmā‘ is also impossible.
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131
Ibn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 4, pp. 554. The Rawāfid. (sing. Rāfid.ah)
was originally applied to groups of soldiers who have deserted their
leader. It was applied to a certain sect of the Shī‘ah of Kūfah who
deserted Zayd ibn ‘Alī ibn al- H. usayn ibn ‘Alī when he refused to speak
against Abū Bakr and ‘Umar, for he said: “Both were ministers of my
grand-father Muhammad.” The term Rawāfid. is also applied by Sunnī
Muslims to any sect of Shī‘ah. Finally, it is applied to apostates or
schismatics who speak against the s.ah.ābah.132
Ibid.
133Ibid., pp. 554-555
134Ibid., pp. 558-559.
135Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 556-557; vol. 6, p. 878.
136Ibid.. vol. 4, p. 558; vol. 6, p. 879.
137For further details, see al-Sarakhsī, Us.ūl al-Sarakhsī, vol. 1, pp.
314 ff. Unlike al-Sarakhsī, Ibn Taymīyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah
from the H. anbalī school lean to the Mālikī position. As for the argument
of Ibn Taymiyyah for the ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah, see S.ih.h.at
Us.ūl, pp. 17 ff; for the opinion of Ibn Qayyyim al-Jawziyyah, see, I‘lām
al- Mūqi‘īn, vol. 2, pp. 434 ff.138
Ibn Taymiyyah, S.ih.h.at Us.ūl, p. 23. 139
For further details, see Walther Hinz, Islamische Masse und
Gewichte, Handbuch der Orientalistik, ed. Bertold Spuler, suppl. Vol. 1,
book 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955), pp. 45-47 and 51. (Hereafter referred to
as Islamische Masse). 140
Ibn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 6, p 876.141
See W. Hinz, Islamische Masse, p. 51.142
For further details on pound (rat.l ), see ibid., pp. 28-33.143
Fur further details, see Ibn Taymiyyah, S.ih.h.at Us.ūl, pp. 23-27;
see also Muh.ammad al-Khud.arī, Us.ūl al-Fiqh, 4th
ed. (Cairo: Mat.ba‘at
al-Sa‘ādah, 1382/1962), pp. 304-307.144
Ibn H. azm denounces taqlīd. For his arguments against taqlīd,
see Ih.kām, vol. 6, pp. 793 ff.145
Ibid., vol. 4, p. 531. This type of ijmā‘ had been alluded by al-
Shāfi‘ī, see Jimā‘ al-‘Ilm, pp. 60-64. 146
Ibn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 4, p. 531.147
Ibid., p. 535.148
Abū Ayyūb was one of the s.ah.ābah, who gave their futyā
(fatwá, formal legal opinion) in one or two issues only. Ibid., vol. 5, p.
666 line 21; idem, Jawāmi‘, p. 320.
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149
It is important to remember that the Prophet recommended that
people perform sunnah prayers at home. Moreover, when his house and
mosque were being built in Madīnah he lived temporarily in the house
of Abū Ayyūb. Idem, Jawāmi‘, p. 95. Perhaps during this time he saw
the Prophet performing this two rak‘ah prayer. For further details, see
idem, Ih.kām, vol. 4, pp. 536-537.150
For further details, see ibid., p. 537.151
Ibid., pp. 533-534. For further arguments of Ibn H. azm in
refuting al-z.ann, see ibid., vol. 1, pp. 117 ff passim.152
Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 502-503.153
It is probable that instead of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-H. amīd,
the correct name of this H. anafī qad.ī was Abū H. āzim (or Abū Khāzim)
‘Abd al-H. amīd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. He died in 292/904. See Abū Ish.āq al-
Shīrāzī, T.abaqāt al-Fuqahā’, ed. Dr. Ih.sān ‘Abbās (Cairo: Dār al-Rā’id
al-‘Arabī, 1970, p. 141.154
Ibn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 4, p. 544; vol. 1, p. 180.155
Ibid., p. 544156
Ibid.157
Ibn H. azm does not give us the argument of Zayd ibn Thābit, but
he does criticize his opponents among the Mālikīs and Shāfi‘īs for
following Zayd ibn Thābit. Ibn H. azm does not believe in the soundness
of the h.adīth claiming that “Zayd is the most learned man among you on
the law of inheritance ) ).” Ibn H. azm contends that if this
h.adīth were sound it would be against his opponents themselves, because
it goes on with “… and Mu‘ādh is the most learned among you in Islamic
jurisprudence ( ) .” This is because they do not follow Mu‘ādh
in his fatwá dealing with the penalty of death upon apostates (without
asking them to repent) and the legality of inherited property by a believer
from a non-believer. Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 819-820.158
Ibid., vol. 4, p. 544; vol. 5, p. 661.159
Ibid., vol. 5, p. 661. 160
Ibid.161
Ibid., p. 622. This is in the main the style of Ibn H. azm. He cites
other examples, too. For details, see his arguments on the issue regarding
the number of chains of transmitters in the khabar al-tawātur. Ibid., vol.
1, p. 95.162
This h.adīth is a combination of three of h.adīths, totally cited by
a single chain of narration, see ibid., vol. 4, p. 545. The first one, “The
community of Muhammad will never agree on an error” was cited by
many h.adīth collectors, but with different versions, (i.e., “My
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community…” instead of “The community of Muhammad…”), among
which are al- Bukhārī in his al-Jāmi‘ al-S.ah.īh. (Kitāb al-Fitan), al-
Tirmidhi’s al-Jāmi‘, (the chapter dealing with Fitan), Ibn Mājah’s
Sunan (chapter Manāsik Fitan), Ah.mad ibn H. anbal’s Musnad, IV, 101
and V, 145; another version was also cited by al-Ghazālī, al-Must.ass.fá,
vol. 1, p. 175. The second h.adīth was cited by Ibn Mājah in his chapter
on the nature of Fitan. The third h.adīth with a similar version was
cited by al- Ghazālī, see ibid.163
Ibn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 4, p. 545.164
Al-Āmidī, Ih.kām al-Āmidī, vol. 1, p. 339.165
bn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 4, p. 545.166
Ibid. 167
Joseph Schact, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), p. 91; George F. Hourani, “Basis of
Authority,” pp. 157-158.168
W. Montgomery Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [c. 1961]), p. 204 as quoted by A.
Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad:
Islamic Research Institute, 1970), p. 157.169
Ibn H. azm, Ih.kām, vol. 4, p. 545.170
Ibid., p. 546. This is one of many sound h.adīths which is
considered weak by Ibn H. azm. Sound h.adīths are disputed by Ibn H. azm,
either through finding weak narrators in their sanad, or through his
investigation on the matn (text) of h.adīths, like the one mentioned above.
For sound h.adīths which are doubted by Ibn H. azm, see ibid., vol. 5, p.
702; vol. 6, pp. 764, 809, 820, 1003, and 1015.171
Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 548-549. Notice that Ibn H. azm repeats the
words three times during the course of his argument, see
ibid., pp. 548 (line 26) and 549 (lines 18 and 26).172
Ibid.173
Ibid., pp. 546-547. Another proof to justify the possibility of
considering a person who belongs to the truth as an ummah which is not
used by Ibn H. azm is the following Qur’ānic verse,
“Lo! Abraham was a nation
(ummah), obedient to Allah, by nature upright, and he was not of the
idolaters.” (Qَur’ān 16:120).174
Ibn Banī ‘Āim, al-Āād wa ’l-Mathānī, vol. 2, p. 363 (al-
Maktabah al-Shāmilah).
77
175
Qurt.ubī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muh.ammad ibn Ah.mad al-Ans.ārī al-.
Al-Jāmi‘ li Ah.kām al-Qur’ān. 20 vols in 10 bindings. (Beirut: Dār Ih.yā’
al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 1967), vol. 10, p. 172 (al-Maktabah al-Shāmilah). 176
Ibid., p. 547. 177
‘Abd al-Jabbār, Sharh. al-Us.ūl, pp. 61-62.178
Ibn H. azm, Us.ūl, vol. 4, p. 548.179
Ibid.180
Ibid., p. 550.