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debates within the social fabric of each respective country. Through a
comparative policy analysis, our paper does so by contextualizing higher-education policies within a welfare regime framework.
The key for a meaningful comparative analysis is a comprehensive
understanding of the trade-offs with which each country is faced when
endeavouring to expand its higher-education system. It is simply not possible
to achieve all of the following goals at the same time: low taxation, low or no
tuition fees, high non-repayable student aid, and a high participation rate in
adequately funded higher-education institutions. Policy decisions are necessary
to prioritize these goals all of which are advocated by at least some interest
groups. How countries deal with and respond to these trade-offs largely
depend on their welfare regimes and the political traditions within which theyare embedded and upon which they rely. We propose that the concept of the
welfare regime is a useful analytical tool to understand the different national
approaches in higher education funding and development.
Conceptual Perspectives
Considerable variation can be observed in the social policies of advanced
industrial nations. According to Hega and Hokenmaier (2002, 2), the specific
nature of their provisions for healthcare, work injury, unemploymentcompensation, and old age pensions bear important consequences for the
socioeconomic opportunities and outcomes of individuals and groups. A
nations social programs reflect the socioeconomic and political institutions
that shaped them. Categorization and classification of public social policies
according to their content and extent of their provisions has resulted in the
development of national profiles that have been further aggregated into
typologies of welfare state regimes. The latter has been accomplished by
generating categories according to the similarity of their social programs, by
their tendency to produce similar and distinctive public policies (ibid.). In this
paper, we employ the typology of welfare regimes advanced by Esping-
Andersen (1990, 1999). Although other schemas exist, Esping-Andersens
typology is described as a modern classic (Arts and Gelissen, 2002) that has
dominated the field of research on welfare states (Hicks and Kenworthy, 2003).
We prefer this framework as it incorporates a complex set of policy dynamics
embedded within the state, market, and family. As Esping-Andersen (1999, 4)
argues, such an approach allows for the interaction between the composite
parts that, in unison, form contemporary welfare regimes. It is beyond the
scope and page limitations of this paper to provide an extensive review of the
literature. For such reviews, see for example, Arts and Gelissen (2002), Bradleyet al. (2003), Hicks and Kenworthy (2003), and Starke (2006).
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However, another related body of literature is worth mentioning. Iversen
and Stephens (2008) have compared the welfare regime typology with theproduction regime approach of the varieties of capitalism theory (Hall and
Soskice, 2001). The latter approach specifies differences in liberal market
economies and coordinated market economies by contrasting the extent to
which different regimes focus on general vs specific skill formation and the
extent to which they provide vocational training. The interrelationships among
social insurance, skill formation, and financing public education are central to
the production regime typology. The extent to which each is embraced defines
the location of a given country into one of the three worlds of human capital
formation defined in this approach. Iversen and Stephens explicate how
relationships among institutions, political parties, and electoral systemsinfluence and shape skill formation regimes. Elsewhere, we (Pechar and
Andres, 2010) have employed such a comparative approach to examine
educational and skill formation in secondary and tertiary education. In this
paper, however, we focus on tertiary education and hence our conceptual lens
is directed on general level skill formation.
Welfare Regimes
Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three types of welfare regimes that are shaped
by political traditions and are characterized by coherent patterns of welfare policy.He describes different welfare regimes as qualitatively different arrangements
between state, market, and the family (p. 26). A key concept of this typology is
de-commodification, which refers to the degree to which individuals, or families,
can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market
participation (p. 37). The main criteria employed in Esping-Andersens typology
is de-commodification of welfare provisions for old-age pensions, healthcare, and
unemployment compensation (p. 50). The three types are as follows:
Liberal welfare regimes(e.g., Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, and UK)
are characterized by a low degree of de-commodification and a strong role for
markets in the production of welfare. In liberal regimes, states provide a
residual function; that is, the state assumes responsibility only when the family
and market fails; it seeks to limit its commitments to marginal and deserving
groups (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 20). Other characteristics include heavy
reliance on minimal means tested benefits for clientele of low income (which
often leads to stigmatization when receiving such benefits) and subsidies to
private welfare schemes.
Conservative welfare regimes (e.g., Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands,Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium) are characterized by a strong corporatist
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legacy and a commitment to preserve social structures and hierarchies, and in
particular the traditional family. They are dominated by status-preservingsocial insurance schemes. Conservative welfare regimes support preservation of
thestatus quoand its inequalities. Social rights are attached to class, status, and
work effort. The primary provider of welfare insurance is the state, with the
market and private insurance playing only marginal roles.
Social-democratic (universal) welfare regimes (e.g., Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, and Finland) are characterized by universal benefits based on
citizenship, equal access to benefits and services of high standards, and a high
degree of de-commodification. Welfare coverage is universal and the state
attempts to treat all citizens equally and at a much higher standard thanminimal need. The goal is to guarantee the individual and families a socially
acceptable standard of living independently of market participation (Esping-
Andersen, 1990, 37) without discouraging individual aspirations or denying the
opportunity for private socio-economic achievement.
This typology has been criticized for not including education as part of the
policy packages of welfare regimes. Although Esping-Andersen (1990) clearly
delimited his attention and empirical investigation to income maintenance,
pensions, and health services, he did acknowledge the importance of education
as part of welfare policy:
What, then, constitute salient dimensions of welfare-state stratification?
Apart from its purely income-distributive role, the welfare state shapes
class and status in a variety of ways. The educational system is an obvious
and much studied instance, in which individuals mobility chances not only
are affected, but from which entire class structures evolve.y[Moreover],
the organization of social services, particularly for women, is decisive for a
nations employment structure. (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 58)
Moreover, he points out that except for the examination of the role of
education in mobility studies, job attainment in relation to the welfare state has
been largely unexamined (p. 146). In his more recent writing, he addresses the
importance of education more directly (Esping-Andersen, 2009). Hokenmaier
(1998) and Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) maintain that education policy
should be included both conceptually and empirically in such analyses. After
World War II, higher education was incorporated as an essential part of a
coherent welfare-policy structure (along with healthcare, education, housing,
and employment). However, from the 1950s to the 1970s, as welfare policies
proliferated in most OECD countries, systematic differences prevailed.
According to Hokenmaier (1998), education policy is clearly one component
of a nations total public policy package; and it is not independent of othersocial policies (p. 710). Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) assert that education
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is no less than other public programs, recognized as a core entitlement in most
Western countries (p. 2) in that it allows for upward social mobility, reducesthe extent to which individuals are dependent on wage labour and market
forces, allows for the ability of individuals to improve their socio-economic
status, and hence ameliorates individual overall life chances. As a result, more
highly educated individuals are less likely to place demands on social safety
nets; in turn, decreased demand will lessen the pressure on welfare states to
provide income assistance and other social welfare programs. Castles (1989)
points out that because of the possibility that education marches in step to a
different drummer from other aspects of the peoples welfare (p. 432), it
warrants particular attention as part of the welfare policy rubric. In Esping-
Andersens (1999) later work, somewhat more of the discussion is devoted toeducation and skills in relation to equality. However, he invites educational
experts to design a workable system of skilling entitlements, one that would
befit an ideal postindustrial welfare regime (p. 184).
Because the educational policy arena is vast, in this paper we focus primarily
on higher education.1 Specifically, we seek to determine the nature and extent
to which there is a consistent relationship between higher-education policy
making and the different welfare regimes by examining whether systematic
differences exist in (1) tertiary2 participation and graduation patterns; (2) pre-
tertiary prerequisites for entry into tertiary education; (3) the role of
government with respect to funding higher education; and (4) tuition feesand student financial aid policies and arrangements. However, in order to do
so, we need to introduce the conceptual dimension of trade-off into the
discussion.
The Trade-Off Argument
By adding education to the mix of social welfare policies to which countries
must direct financial attention, we can consider whether and the extent to
which educational policy competes with other welfare policies for public sector
funding support. A small body of literature has demonstrated this relationship
(Heidenheimer, 1981; Castles, 1989; Hokenmaier, 1998; Hega and Hokenmaier,
2002). In an analysis of long term public policy trends in Europe and the USA,
Heidenheimer (1981) concludes that a trade-off occurred in the extent to which
countries have historically invested in either providing public post-primary
educational opportunities or social insurance programs. Castles (1989) explains
that the two sets of policy alternatives have different goals. Whereas social
welfare policies such as unemployment insurance and old age pensions are
intended to ensure equality of condition, the goal of educational policies is toenhance equality of opportunity. This trade-off thesis adds explanatory power
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to the paradox that although liberal regimes exhibit more inequality with
respect to most indicators (e.g., income, Gini co-efficient, and housing patterns),they are socially more inclusive than conservative regimes in regard to
educational participation and completion rates at all levels beyond post-primary.
By directing resources toward education rather than toward policies that
would buttress the development of other forms of social welfare, support for
public education over social protection programs becomes an alternative
welfare state policy strategy (Castles, 1989). The latter is future directed that
is, oriented to improving the life chances of future generations, as opposed to
supporting equality of condition of the current generation. However, historical
funding preference for one set of social programs over the other may lead to
difficulties in switching policy directions in the future (Hega and Hokenmaier,2002). Hega and Hokenmaier add that countries favouring post-primary
educational opportunities are signalling that public safety nets exist only as
temporary assistance and to buffer the effects of extreme socioeconomic change,
not to insulate the individual from every risk of life, societal competition, and
market forces (p. 4). In doing so, greater self-reliance on the part of the
individual is encouraged and expected and education serves to provide the
individual with the necessary human capital to succeed in the market.
Some authors have attempted to link the trade-off thesis to Esping-
Andersens theory of three distinctive welfare regimes by claiming that
particular tendencies in educational policy correspond to Esping-Andersenswelfare regime types. We agree with Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) that it is a
useful exercise to consider this typology in relation to the extent that there is a
trade-off between public funding support for education and other social
programs in welfare states. In this paper, informed by the findings and
following along Hega and Hokenmaiers line of inquiry, we seek to further
explore the relationships among welfare regimes, extent of expansion of higher
education, and related trade-offs.
One can question whether trade-offs that imply choosing between two
alternatives are unavoidable. The welfare regime typology offers three
perspectives, one of which appears to transcend such a binary trade-off. For
that purpose, the concept of a trilemmaof subsidization, coverage, and public
cost, as specified by Ansell (2008), may be more valid as it includes level of
taxation as one of the dimensions of the public policy process. We revisit this in
the conclusion and in light of our findings.
Research Design
To examine our analytical framework, we advance a few hypotheses. First, weexpect to find systematic differences in participation in tertiary education
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among the different welfare regimes. We expect that conservative regimes
constrain the expansion of higher education. The main reason is the strongpreference embedded in the institutional arrangements of conservative
regimes for preserving the established social order. Hence, educational
opportunities are strongly linked to social estates.3 As a consequence, these
regimes practise a strong kind of sponsored mobility (Turner, 1960). That is,
the potential of the young generation is identified at a very early age and high
potentials are encouraged to stay in the educational track that leads to the
highest educational credentials; at the same time, the ambitions of the rest are
discouraged and they are assigned to more modest opportunities (e.g., different
tracks at lower secondary school and early vocational specialisation for the
majority of the age group).We hypothesize that both liberal and social-democratic welfare regimes
differ from the conservative approach in that they both welcome and
encourage expansion at the tertiary level on the grounds of human capital
enhancement and for equity considerations. Hence, we would expect a
comparatively long period of comprehensive schooling, less (or even no)
emphasis on vocational training at the secondary level, and, as a consequence,
high entry and graduation rates at the tertiary level. However, we would also
expect differences between the two regimes:
Liberal regimes foster unrestricted human capital creation, they emphasizeindividual achievement and responsibility, and advancement to high levels of
study based on meritocratic criteria (Turner, 1960). Education tends to be
socially inclusive, through encouraging high aspirations and expectations
(by, e.g., giving second and third chances) and by fostering social mobility.
Encouragement of social mobility also serves to mitigate conflicts about
social inequalities. There is very little (if any) social engineering and
adjusting individual ambitions and societal needs. However, the strong
emphasis on individual rights goes hand in hand with the requirement of
large financial investments by individuals, unmatched by any other regime.
Social-democratic regimes strive for a delicate balance between individualrights and the collective order. This collective order is not (as with the
conservative regimes) the established hierarchy of social estates, but rather
a notion of public welfare constructed by rational policy making. Hence,
human capital formation is embedded within an overarching welfare
structure and labour market policies (e.g., state economic and social
planning, active labour-market policy, public responsibility for full employ-
ment, and the provision of high-quality jobs in the public sector).
Higher levels of tertiary participation require higher levels of funding.
Hence, we look at different indicators for funding of tertiary education. First,we hypothesize that liberal regimes spend a high percentage of both total public
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adult population aged 2534 years who have attained tertiary level A and B
credentials; adult population aged 2564 years who have attained tertiary level A and B
credentials.4
Second, we employ four pre-tertiary indicators as measures of prerequisites
to tertiary education entry. These indicators are measures of the preconditions
in place that determine the extent to which students can enter the next levels of
education. For example, early tracking, as indicated by age of first selection
into upper levels of education is a powerful instrument of social selection in
that individuals are routed to institutions which, in turn, will largely determine
their future life chances. The proportion of the age group engaged in general orvocational levels of education illustrates the proportion that will potentially
enter university-level education, or conversely, an indicator of those destined
for early vocational specialization. The likelihood of the students in vocational
programs to enrol in tertiary education is smaller than those in general
programs. The expectation to participate in International Standard Classifica-
tion of Education (ISCED) level 5A or 6 is an indicator reflecting the
ambitions of students shaped by the cultural climate and the expectations of
society. The indicators we employ are as follows:
first, age at which selection takes place; the proportion of age group in general programmes of upper secondary
education5;
the proportion of age group in vocational programmes of upper secondary
education;
the proportion of students expecting to complete ISCED level 5A or 6.
Third, we examine the implications of these different welfare (and education)
regimes on funding tertiary education, using the three indicators as specified
separately below:
public tertiary educational expenditures as a percentage of total publicexpenditures.
This indicator signals the extent to which tertiary education policies have
priority within the overall framework of government policies.
public tertiary educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
This indicator is a measure of the extent of public tertiary educational
expenditures in relation to the wealth of a country.
tertiary expenditures from public and private sources on educationalinstitutions as a percentage of GDP.
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These are measures of (a) the extent of spending on tertiary education in
relation to the wealth of a country, and (b) the proportion of public and privatesources of these expenditures.
Finally, we look at the different patterns of tuition and student aid. We use
the following indicators:
estimated average annual tuition fees charged by tertiary-type A public
educational institutions: actual amounts in USD;
proportion of students with loans;
annual gross amount of loan available to each student: actual amount in
USD;
proportion of graduates with debt;
average amount of debt at graduation in USD.
We employ these data to systematically relate the various dimensions of
higher education within a framework of the welfare arrangements of each
country. We have selected 16 of the 18 countries used by Esping-Andersen
(1990)6 and organized our analyses around three different types of welfare
states: conservative welfare states (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands.
Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium), liberal welfare states (Canada, USA,
Australia, New Zealand, and UK), and social-democratic (universal) welfarestates (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland). We use the data described
above to demonstrate the logic of the relationships among participation in
tertiary education, pre-tertiary prerequisites, educational funding, and levels of
tuition and student financial aid.
We recognize that extensions to Esping-Andersens original model have been
proposed. For example, Mills and Blossfeld (2003) suggest a fivefold typology
by adding two categories: the family-orientedregime of the Southern European
countries (e.g., Italy and Spain) and the post-socialistic welfare regime to
account for countries of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.
Similarly, Castles (1993) has asserted that the liberal regime should be further
divided to account for the role of labour movements in policy formation of
some countries. However, Esping-Andersen (1999) has addressed these
concerns and demonstrates that the explanatory benefits obtained by extending
the number of categories is a matter of greater refinement, more nuance, and
more precision (p. 92) but not of additional dimensionality. In this paper, we
delimit our analysis to Esping-Andersens original three-regime framework.
However, because we are focusing on tertiary education and as such are using a
different set of indicators from those previously employed in other analyses,
the results may suggest that an expansion of this framework is warranted. Wewill take up this issue in the discussion.
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Results
The most coherent and reliable database for international comparisons in
education is that which contains the OECD indicators. However, this data set
is far from perfect. Not all countries provided data for all indicators we wanted
to include in this comparison. Also, some indicators are difficult to interpret.
Despite its limitations, this database allows for an initial assessment of the
soundness of our hypotheses. The data are summarized in Tables 1 to 4.
Most of the data have been extracted from the 2008 OECD Education at a
Glance (OECD, 2008a). Occasionally, we supplement missing data from this
report with data available in the 2007 and 2006 reports (OECD, 2006a, 2007).
In addition, when it is reasonable to do so, we supplement missing OECDindicators as specified above with indicators related to tuition and student
financial assistance compiled by Usher (2005) and with data on tuition and
student financial aid reported by Vossensteyn (2004). A more complete data
profile permits a thorough examination of the types of student financial
assistance provided by these countries. Data from sources other than the
OECD 2008 report are identified in the tables.
In Tables 1 to 4, we observe that there is wide variation within each of the
three groups and a significant amount of overlap among the different regimes.
Nonetheless, there is a correspondence between the indicators and welfare
regimes.By examining enrolment and graduation patterns (Table 1), conservative
regimes are clearly at the bottom with respect to expansion of tertiary
education, with the Netherlands being a sort of outlier, whereas liberal regimes
are at the top. Entry rates into tertiary-type A institutions vary between 35 and
58% in conservative regimes, between 59 and 76% in social-democratic
regimes, and between 57 and 84% in liberal regimes. This pattern remains
evident in graduation rates (tertiary-type A), with conservative regimes varying
between 21 and 43%, social-democratic regimes between 41 and 48%, and liberal
regimes between 36 and 59%. Graduation rates from tertiary-type B institutions
range from 7 to 19% in conservative regimes, 0 to 10% in social-democraticregimes, and 10 to 24% in liberal regimes. The range of the adult population aged
2534 years of age holding tertiary-type A credentials extends from 1334%
(conservative), 2940% (social-democratic), to 2935% (liberal). Comparable
figures for tertiary-type B are 122%, 20%, and 526%, respectively.
The long-term impact of educational expansion can be assessed by
examining the proportion of the population aged 2564 years with tertiary-
level credentials. Again, the proportion with tertiary-type A credentials within
the conservative countries is low (1028%) when compared with social-
democratic (1931%) and liberal regimes (2235%). Also, those aged 2564
years holding tertiary-type B level credentials is low in both conservative and
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Table1
IndicatorsofparticipationintertiaryeducationinselectOECDcountriesa
Conservative
Liberal
Socialdemocratic
AU
FR
DE
NL
IT
CH
BE
CA
US
AUS
NZ
UK
SE
DK
NO
FI
Entryratesintotertiaryeducation
Tertiary-typeA
40
39**
35
58
55
38
35
m
64
84
72
57
76
59
67
76
Tertiary-typeB
7
34**
13
n
m
15
36
m
m
m
49
29
10
22
n
a
Grad
uationratesfromtertiaryeducatio
n
Tertiary-typeA
22
27**
21
43
39
30
m
37
36
59
52
39
41
45
43
48
Tertiary-typeB
7
19**
11
n
n
10
m
m
10
m
24
15
5
10
1
0
Populationaged2534yearsthathasa
ttainedtertiarylevelcredentials
Tertiary-typeA
13
24
15
34
17
23
19
29
35
29
30
29
31
32
40
29
Tertiary-typeB
6
18
7
2
1
9
22
26
5
10
14
8
9
9
2
9
Populationaged2564yearswithtertiarylevelcredentials
Tertiary-typeA
10
16
15
28
12
20
14
24
35
24
23
22
22
27
31
19
Tertiary-typeB
7
11
9
2
1
10
18
23
5
9
15
9
9
8
2
16
Changebetween2534and3564yearspopulationwithtertiarylevelcred
entials
Tertiary-typeA
+3
+8
0
+6
+5
+3
+5
+5
0
+5
+7
+7
+9
+5
+9
+10
Tertiary-typeB
1
7
2
0
0
1
+4
+3
0
1
1
1
0
+1
0
7
Total
2
15
2
+6
+5
+2
+9
+8
0
+4
+6
+6
+9
+6
+9
+3
aDatasources:OECD,2008aandsupplementedwithOECD,2005,2006a,2007whennecessary.
n
Magnitudeiseithernegligibleor
zero.
a
Dataarenotapplicablebecausethecategorydoesnotapply.
m
Dataarenotavailable.
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Tab
le3
Educationalexpendituresin
selectOECDcountries
Conservative
Libera
l
Socialdemocratic
AU
FR
DE
NL
IT
CH
BE
CA
US
AUS
NZ
UK
SE
DK
NO
FI
Educationalexpenditures
Publictertiaryeducationalexpendituresasa
percentageoftotalpublicexpenditu
res
3.0
2.2
2.4
3.0
1.6
3.3
2.6
4.2
3.5
3.5**
4.8
2.7
3.5
4.5
5.3*
4.0
Publictertiaryeducationalexpendituresasa
percentageofGDP
1.5
1.2
1.1
1.4
0.8
1.5
1.3
1.7
1.3
1.1
1.5
1.2
1.9
2.4
2.3
2.0
Expenditureoneducationalinstitutions
asa%
ofGDP(publicandprivatesources)
Total
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.3
0.9
1.4
1.24
2.6
2.9
1.6
1.5
1.3
1.6
1.7
1.3
1.7
Public
1.2
1.1
0.9
1.0
0.6
1.4
1.2
1.4
1.0
0.8
0.9
0.9
1.5
1.6
1.3
1.7
Private
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.1
1.1
1.9
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
Tab
le2
Pre-tertiaryindicatorsinselectOECDcountries
Conservative
Liberal
Socialdemocratic
AU
FR
DE
NL
IT
CH
BE
CA
US
AUS
NZ
UK
SE
DK
NO
FI
Pre-
tertiaryindicators
E
arliestageofselection(years)
10
15
10
12
14
15
12
16
16
16
16
14a
16
16
16
16
Proportioninuppersecondary
generaleducation
22
57
41
33
40
36
31
95
100.0
38
100**
58
45
52
40
35
Proportioninuppersecondary
vocationaleducation
72
43
59
68
25
64
69
5
0
62
0**
42
54
48
60
65
Proportionexpectedtocomplete
IS
CEDlevel5Aor6
24
35
19
41
52
18
35
63
64
63
39
32
33
26
26
52
aWe
useage14yearsfortheUKbasedoninformationprovidedinthesesites:inhttp://www.direct.gov.u
k/en/EducationAndLearning/14To19/
Yea
rs10And11/DG_10013567;http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/EducationAndLearning/QualificationsExplained/DG_10039024;
http
://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmchilsch/169/16905.htm.
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Tab
le4
Tuitionandstudentfinancia
laidindicatorsintertiaryeducationinselectOECDcountries
Conservative
Liberal
Socialdemocratic
AU
FR
DE
NL
IT
CH
BE
CA
US
AUS
NZ
UK
SE
DK
NO
FI
Tuitionandstudentfinancialaid
Estimatedaverageannualtuition
fee
schargedbytertiary-typeA
pu
bliceducationalinstitutionsor
government-dependentprivate
ins
titutions(USD)
837
330a
1,210b
1,505b
1,017
1,873c
574
3,464
5,027
3,855
2,6
71
1,859
0
0
0
0
Finan
cialaidtostudentsasa%
oftotalpublicexpenditureontertiaryeducation
Studentloans
m
a
5.1
15.5
n
0.2
N
2.8
8.6
17.7
30
.0
19.1
16.8
5.0
37.1
n
Scholarships/other
grantstohouseholds
16.8
7.9
14.1
12.3
16.8
2.2
15.2
11.5
14.9
14.7
11
.6
6.7
10.3
25.8
10.9
16.6
To
tal
16.8
7.9
19.1
27.7
16.8
2.4
15.2
14.4
23.5
32.3
41
.5
25.8
27.1
30.8
42.6
16.6
Proportionofstudentswithloans%
0
0
0
28
0
0
1
m
38
79
m
m
80
42
100
26
Annualgrossamountofloan
availabletoeachstudent(USD)
0
0
0
5,730
0
0
m
3,970
6,430
3,450
4,3
20
5,480
4,940
2,500
8,960
2,710
Proportionofgraduateswithdebt(%)
0
0
15d
15d
0
0
0d
50d
65
67
57
79
83
49
78b
39
Averagedebtatgraduation(USD)
0
0
6,973d
12,270
0
0
0c
14,170d
19,400
10,838d
15,320
14,220
20,590
10,430
20,290
6,160
aFranceaverageoftheOECDrange160490.
bDa
tafromVossensteyn,2004in2005USD.
cSwitzerlanddiscrepanciesaredueto
roundingerrors.
dDa
tafromUsherandCervenan,200
5in2005USD.
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social-democratic regimes. In contrast, there is wide variation in countries
within the liberal regime rubric. When compared with the 2564-years agegroup, only two conservative countries (France and Belgium) have experienced
large increases in the proportion of 2534 year olds participating in tertiary
education. Yet, the proportion of the 2534-years age group with tertiary-type
A credentials in these countries remains relatively low. The US has experienced
zero growth. However, the 2564-years age group of this country is the most
educated when compared with the same age group in all the countries we have
included in the analysis. In other words, post-secondary expansion occurred
much earlier in the US (see OECD, 2008a, Chart A1.3, 32). Goldin and Katz
(2008) have demonstrated that the US was the pioneer of tertiary expansion,
but since the 1980s has lost momentum.These systematic differences observed at the tertiary level could be
anticipated and indeed are evident at earlier stages of educational careers.
Table 2 demonstrates that selection into different school tracks commences
much earlier in conservative regimes than in liberal and social-democratic
regimes. Also, in conservative regimes, only 1841% of students at age 15 years
expect to complete ISCED level 5A or 6, compared with 2652% in social-
democratic regimes and 3264% in liberal regimes. However, the proportion of
students attending upper secondary general studies varies considerably both
within and among regimes at 2257% (conservative), 3552% (social-
democratic), and 38100%7 (liberal regimes). Similarly, the proportion ofstudents enrolled in upper secondary vocational education varies across
regimes, but is overall considerably lower in liberal regimes.
These systematic differences in indicators that point to different levels of
tertiary expansion and its preconditions are consistent with the differences at
the level of funding. Consistent with enrolment and graduation rates, Table 3
reveals the range of expenditures on tertiary education. The pattern is one of
low contributions in conservative regimes and higher contributions in both
liberal and social-democratic regimes. For example, public tertiary educational
expenditure as a percentage of total public expenditure is low in conservative
regimes (1.63.3%), moderate in liberal regimes (2.74.8%) and high in social-
democratic welfare regimes (3.55.3%). Public tertiary educational expendi-
tures as a percentage of GDP mirror these findings at 0.81.5% in conservative
regimes, 1.11.7 in liberal regimes and 1.92.4% in social-democratic welfare
regimes. In terms of total expenditure on educational institutions as a
percentage of GDP at the tertiary level, liberal regimes are highest (1.32.9%),
followed by social-democratic regimes (1.31.7), and conservative regimes
(0.91.4%). If we differentiate between private and public expenditures, it
becomes evident that the exceptionally high level of tertiary spending in some
liberal countries (mainly North America) is possible only through very highprivate contributions. Private expenditures on tertiary education as a
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proportion of GDP are moderate in conservative regimes (0.10.3) and even
lower in social-democratic regimes (0.10.2). In contrast, there is widevariation in liberal regime countries (0.41.9). However, it is noteworthy that
UK with the lowest percentage exceeds event the highest percentage from any
other regime. The US is exceptional in that private expenditures exceed public
expenditures.
The most important facet of private tertiary expenditures is tuition fees.
Average annual tuition fees in the liberal regimes vary between 1,859 and 5,027
USD. In conservative regimes they vary between 330 and 1,873 USD. Social-
democratic regimes charge no fees at all (Table 4). Respectively, the relatively
high level of spending in social-democratic regimes is reflected in high public
expenditures on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP (see paragraphabove), whereas in conservative and liberal regimes the range is similar. These
findings support our funding matrix hypothesis; that is, conservative regimes
have low/medium public expenditures in combination with low/no tuition fees.
Social-democratic regimes have high public expenditures and no tuition fees.
Liberal regimes combine low/medium public expenditures with high tuition
fees. Conservative and social-democratic regimes share a strong tendency to
de-commodification, hence no/low tuition fees. Social-democratic and liberal
regimes share a commitment to expansion of tertiary education; hence, they
must raise not only sufficient resources but also the sources for funding tertiary
education differ.The commitment to tertiary expansion requires sufficient means for student
aid. According to the OECD (2008a),
a key question in many OECD countries is whether financial subsidies for
households should primarily be provided in the form of grants or loans.
y Advocates of student loans argue that money spent on loans goes
further: if the amount spent on grants were used to guarantee or subsidise
loans instead, more aid would be available to students and overall access
would increase. Loans also shift some of the cost of education to those
who benefit most from educational investment. Opponents of loans arguethat student loans are less effective than grants in encouraging low-
income students to pursue their education. (p. 275)
OECD data reveal a clear relationship between the availability of student
loans on the one hand and the amount of public financial aid to students on the
other hand. Of all the countries covered in this paper, only those with loan
schemes exceed the OECD average of public student aid as a percentage of total
public expenditures on tertiary education (Table 4). Owing to a few outliers,
variation does exist within all welfare regimes; however, a clear pattern can be
identified. In the conservative regimes public student aid as a percentage of totalpublic expenditures on tertiary education ranges from 2.4 to 27.7%. Only the
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Netherlands (substantively) and Germany (marginally) exceed the OECD
average of 17.6%. These are the only countries within the conservative familywith public loan schemes available. In the liberal countries, student aid ranges
between 14.4 and 32.3% of total public expenditures. In all liberal countries
public loan schemes are available; all but Canada spend more than the OECD
average. The social-democratic regimes spend the highest percentage of their
tertiary expenditures on student aid (16.642.6%). Finland, where loans only
play a marginal role, is an outlier; hence, it is slightly below the OECD average.
We can conclude that loans predominate in those countries, which are
committed to tertiary expansion. As no country can afford to support a large
number of students only by non-repayable stipends and scholarships (a pattern
of support that was dominant in an era of elite higher education when thenumber of students who applied for support was small), social-democratic and
liberal regimes have designed a wide range of student loan schemes.
Conversely, in conservative regimes where expansion has remained low, loans
play either a less important or no role at all. As expected, over 50% of students
in liberal regimes graduate with student debt and the average amount of debt at
graduation is high (i.e., greater than 14,000 USD). However, contrary to our
hypotheses, a high proportion of students from social-democratic countries
also have high debt loads and the average amount of student debt is high.
Finland is the exception.
By combining tuition fees and student aid data, the OECD has identifiedfour patterns that strongly align with the welfare regime typology. We can
summarize the OECD findings as follows8: The first pattern defined by no or
low tuition fees but quite generous student support systems (OECD, 2008a,
272) includes the Nordic countries. The second pattern that is defined by high
level of tuition fees and well developed student support systems (p. 273) and
includes the liberal countries and as an outlier the Netherlands.
Compared with the liberal countries, tuition fees in the Netherlands are
moderate. Finally, the other conservative countries constitute a pattern that is
defined as low level of tuition fees and less developed student support systems
(p. 274).
Correspondence Analysis
Thus far, the analyses have demonstrated that there is reason to believe that the
three welfare regimes differ in terms of participation in tertiary education, pre-
tertiary prerequisites, educational funding, and levels of tuition and levels of
borrowing. To further illuminate and confirm these relationships, we employ
the analytic technique of correspondence analysis (CA). CA is a multivariatedescriptive data technique that summarizes information to provide a visual
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representation of data distribution in a two-dimensional map (Greenacre,
2007). As Greenacre (1990) explains, CA is an exploratory statistical techniquewhich displays the rows and columns of a rectangular data matrix as points in
a scatterplot (p. 1). It is similar to principal components analysis in that it is a
method for decomposing the overallinertiaalong principal axes, but is applied
to cross tabulations and hence allows for the analysis of categorical data. In
CA, the patterns of association portrayed in larger data sets (and contained in
the rectangular data matrix) are examined through a graphic description of
tabular data, where each row and each column is depicted as a point. For an
introduction to CA, see Greenacre (2007).
Data are organized into columns and related rows. The columns in this
analysis are the 16 countries. Rows are comprised of 17 indicators selected tobest represent the four categories identified in Tables 1 to 4. Our choice of
indicators was also constrained by missing data for some countries. Only
indicators with complete data for each country were employed in the
correspondence analysis. We employ correspondence analysis to determine
the combined role of four tertiary participation indicators, four pre-tertiary
indicators, four funding indicators, and four tuition and student financial aid
in relation to country. These indicators and their corresponding labels are
listed in the legend. In other words, we are interested in measuring the
correspondence between the columns (countries) and rows (educational
indicators).CA is versatile in that through the transformation of continuous data into
ranks,9 we are able to conduct this multivariate analysis using indicators
contained in the OECD reports. Each indicator was recoded into a rank
ranging from 0 (lowest) to 15 (highest) to create a positive pole; this figure is
then subtracted from the maximum value of the positive pole (in all instances, 15)
to create a negative pole. In doing so, we have created a set of complementary
scales which represent the number of scaled points above and below the actual
value (Greenacre, 2007). According to Greenacre, since the ranks are analysed
and not the original values, the analysis [is] robust with respect to outliers
and can be called a nonparametric CA of the data (p. 184). We used XLSTAT
to compute the w2 coordinates of profile points and the statistical tests of
the analysis.
The data are displayed in a symmetric two-dimensional map, which reveal
the relative positions of row and column profiles. The challenge in this analysis
is to interpret the principal axes by identifying the latent (hidden) variables that
explain the amount of the total inertia along each axis. w2 distances separate the
row and column profiles and are used to compute inertia (or variance), which
measures the dispersion of these profiles in a multidimensional space. The CA
map corresponds to a lower-dimensional subspace defined by a pair of
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principal axes and displays the location of profile points as close as possible to
the true set of profiles represented in the multi-dimensional space.The correspondence analysis map in Figure 1 positions the points
corresponding to the 16 column profiles assigned to the country categories in
relation to the 17 row profiles. This map displays the projection of points in the
subspace defined by the first two principal axes that account for the largest
amount of the overall inertia (37%).
By examining the horizontal axis, with the exception of Finland, the groups
of countries we have identified as belonging to the conservative regime, are
AU
FR
DE
NL
IT
CH
BE
CA
US
AUS
NZ
UK
SE
DK
NO
FI
P_25_34trtcrdA+
P_25_34trtcrdA-
P_25_34_trtcrdB+
P_25_34_trtcrdB-
P_25_64_trtcrdA+
P_25_64_trtcrdA-
P_25_64_trtcrdB+
P_25_64_trtcrdB-
PT_agesel+
PT_agesel- PT_upscgen+
PT_upscgen-
PT_upsecvoc+
PT_upsecvoc-
PT_ISCED5a6+
PT_ISCED5a6-
F_TPE_tert+
F_TPEtert-
F_EGDPtert+
F_EGDPtert-
F_EGDPtertpublic+
F_EGDPtertpublic-
F_EGDPtertpriv+
F_EGDPtertpriv-
FA_tuition+
FA_tuition-
FA_loans+
FA_loans-
FA_grants+ FA_grants-
FA_propdebt+
FA_propdebt-
FA_averdebt+
FA_averdebt-
-0.6
-0.2
0.2
0.6
0.80.40-4.0-8.0
F2(17.6
3%)
F1 (39.35 %)
Figure 1. Correspondence analysis of countries and tertiary, pre-tertiary, educational expenditure,and tuition and student financial-aid indicators.
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located to the left and are opposed to all other countries to the right side of the
map. This axis accounts for 39% of the average total inertia. The columnprofiles that contribute the most to this axis correspond to Austria on the left
and the USA on the right; these two extremes define the axis. Also, the profiles
of Belgium and Italy are well aligned along the first axis toward Austria and
New Zealand and Canada are well-aligned on the right with the USA. Sweden,
Denmark, Norway, and Australia are aligned along the first axis, but less
strongly so, toward the USA. Switzerland and France are similarly aligned
toward Austria on the left. Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK contribute
the least to the first axis and hence remain outliers of sorts. The placement of
row profiles reveal that average amount of student debt at graduation, the
proportion of the 2564-years age population with tertiary-type A credentials,the proportion of graduates with debt, and the proportion of the 2534-years
age population with tertiary-type A credentials are well matched along the
horizontal axis. The profile is also associated with the following variables: the
proportion of students in upper secondary general education, age of selection,
total loans to students as percentage of total public tertiary expenditure, and
public educational expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of (a)
total public expenditures and (b) GDP. These variables also contribute most to
the axis. We interpret this axis as an educational expansion dimension with the
less expansion row profiles matching with the country column profiles to the
left and more expansion row profiles matching well with the country columnprofiles to the right. Also included in this expansion dimension are pre-tertiary
indicators, which determine whether young people have the prerequisites to
engage in tertiary study. Finland is oriented closer to the left because of a
relatively low proportion of the age 2534 and 2565 years population with
tertiary-level credentials and low student debt. Conversely, this proportion is
high in the Netherlands. Also, in the Netherlands financial aid to students as a
percentage of total public expenditure on tertiary education does not fit the
profile of a conservative regime country. As such, it is an outlier on this
dimension.
The vertical axis accounts for 18% of the total inertia, and mainly contrasts
the column profile that corresponds to Finland (up) with the profile
corresponding to Italy (down). Three row profiles associated with (a) public
and (b) private expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of GDP,
and annual average tuition fees charged by tertiary-type A institutions
contribute the most to this axis. Hence, the second dimension is a tertiary-
funding dimension.
Finland and Italy represent the two extremes of the vertical axis. In terms of
public expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of GDP, Italy ranks
lowest of all countries (0.6%) and Finland highest (1.7%). Conversely, Italy(0.3%) (along with the Netherlands) ranks highest of all non-liberal countries
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in terms of private expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of
GDP, whereas Finland ranks among the lowest at 0.1%. Canada is drawncloser to the upper part of the map on the vertical dimension because of
relatively high public expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of
GDP (at 1.4%), which aligns more closely with the Nordic countries. The
Netherlands is an outlier because of relatively higher private expenditures on
tertiary institutions as a percentage of GDP and higher tuition fees.
In summary, this analysis demonstrates three clear clusters of countries that
align with Esping-Andersens welfare typology. And they are indeed
significantly associated with indicators of tertiary participation and gradua-
tion, pre-tertiary indicators, and funding indicators (w2547.87, d.f.495, and
po0.0001).
Discussion
Our analyses demonstrate a relationship between welfare regimes and patterns
of education policy. In addition, our findings support the trade-off hypothesis
that claims that there is a conflict of goals in either providing tertiary
educational opportunities or investing in social insurance programs. The
results reveal that countries that lean toward the goal of equality of condition
invest less than those countries that strive for either enhancing equality ofopportunity or enhancing both equality of opportunity and condition. We
continue by highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each regime.
Welfare regimes and higher education
Countries that adhere to the liberal welfare approach minimize their efforts to
establish equitable living conditions, but they apply a strong human-capital
philosophy that involves the highest resources spent on higher education and
the highest participation rates among the three welfare regimes. Clearly, this
arrangement is in accordance with the basic requirements of knowledge-based
economies to increase the stock of human capital. One problem of this pattern
relates to those individuals who do not excel academically and, as a
consequence, cannot benefit from the comparatively generous opportunities
in postsecondary education. Individuals who drop out of high school or who
do not continue their education at the tertiary level for other reasons seem to
fall short of the minimal requirements expected for stable, well-paid jobs.
Although the percentage of the age cohort with no tertiary education is smaller
in liberal regimes than in any other regime, it still encompasses a significant
proportion of the population. Because of the relative lack of vocational skillprovision and social safety net policies, the status and the labour market
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chances of this group is more precarious than those in comparable groups in
the other welfare regimes. This is re-inforced by the general tendency of theliberal welfare regime to tolerate high levels of inequality of living conditions.
Another issue of concern is the high amount of debt incurred by a large
proportion of graduates. Under a liberal human capital approach with low
levels of de-commodification, individuals are expected to contribute to the
direct cost of their education. In most liberal countries, cost of higher
education grew much faster than median family income during the last two
decades. Hence, debt levels have escalated (The National Center for Public
Policy and Higher Education, 2008).
To summarize, liberal regimes provide tremendous opportunities for
individuals who comply with the requirements of knowledge society (e.g.,minimally accepted level of academic ability, ambition to succeed, readiness to
embrace lifelong learning). Those who fail to meet these requirements carry a
heavy burden. The Economic Council of Canada has emphasized this weakness
of a liberal market model:
A drawback of this excessive emphasis on individualism is that certain
people may lack the resources or influence to compete equally in the
learning system and the labour market. This weakness can be tempered
by the high level of accessibility of the system, which opens up a wide
range of opportunities to everyone. However, individuals are largely leftalone to confront the world that surrounds them. (Economic Council of
Canada, 1992, 46)
Conservative welfare regimes, by contrast, provide better conditions for
those who will never attain tertiary level credentials. The attitudes in these
countries are shaped by remainders of an ideology that assigns individuals to
their proper place in society. Educational streaming is a powerful mechanism
of social reproduction. It is taken for granted that students from different
social/educational backgrounds have different educational and career trajec-
tories, but because of the de-commodified welfare provisions of these regimes
the lower social estates still enjoy comparatively high standards of living.
The extensive system of vocational training in most conservative countries
plays an important role in providing an alternative training route for academic
low achievers. Graduates of the apprenticeship system enjoy a higher social
status and better labour market chances than do individuals in the liberal
welfare regimes without tertiary education. This characteristic of conservative
regimes contributes to the comparatively high level of equitable living
conditions, but it comes at a high price. The other side of the coin is an
education system that constrains expansion of learning at the tertiary level and
discourages the ambitions of students who struggle to meet the requirements ofelite secondary schools with selection mechanisms that start as early as age 10
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years. As Lehmann (2005) points out, this system has been criticized as
outdated and archaic [and] narrowly skills-based which has not yet addressedthe more broadly defined demands of new work places (p. 119). The
consequence of maintaining patterns of sponsored mobility (Turner, 1960)
even at the fringe of a knowledge based economy is that that conservative
welfare regimes lag in expanding their systems of postsecondary education,
whereas most other parts of the world move ahead. Advocates of extensive
vocational training at the secondary level emphasize the danger of over-
education and highlight the need for labour market planning. In the past, this
strategy was relatively successful. The lack of tertiary graduates could easily be
compensated by an ample supply of graduates of vocational training. Two
recent trends could endanger this pattern. First, the expansion of a knowledge-based economy depends much more on a growing supply of tertiary graduates
(Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003) to assume jobs in a world increasingly
defined as one of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000). This is in contrast to solid
modernity characterized by Fordist type regimes of past decades. Second,
globalization of labour markets will advance the standardization of, and need
for, education certificates. It is questionable if the conservative regimes will be
successful in maintaining their niche.
Trade-offs and higher education
Our findings suggest that the trade-off hypothesis is confirmed through a
comparison of liberal and conservative welfare regimes. However, it appears
that social-democratic welfare regimes seem to avoid some of the trade-offs
faced by liberal and conservative countries. The socially embedded human
capital approach of these countries allows for expansion of higher education
without neglecting those parts of the age cohort who are unable or unwilling to
make use of that opportunity. Unlike the laissez-faire approach of liberal
regimes, there is a certain degree of social engineering in balancing and
adjusting supply and demand of higher learning opportunities by fostering the
development of both general and specific skills. For example, all Nordic
countries limit their seats for research universities through Numerus Clausus.10
The commitment to de-commodification strategies results in resistance toward
introducing tuition fees. Hence, those who are talented do not need to invest
their own resources for the direct cost of their higher education. Only countries
within social-democratic welfare regimes maintain a no fee philosophy that
spread globally during the late 1960s but were subsequently reversed in most
countries. Although there are no fees, the high level of public spending results
in significantly higher total expenditures for tertiary education (as a percentageof GDP) than in all conservative regimes, where in most cases public
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expenditures are supplemented by admittedly low tuition fees. This
pattern, however, depends on belief systems that have evolved over manydecades, encompassing not only egalitarian values but also a high trust in
public administration (and hence an unparalleled readiness to pay high taxes).
The question remains to what extent this Nordic exceptionalism can be
maintained in an area of declining national sovereignty. The global trend in the
last three decades has been to emphasize the benefits of markets and to reduce
the tax base of governments. The Nordic countries have not been excluded
from this trend. As in most countries, public expenditures as a proportion of
GDP have also dropped in the social-democratic regimes (OECD, 2008b).
Hence, the policy response to the subsidization, coverage, and public cost
trilemma, as specified by Ansell (2008) may change.Another issue of concern is the amount of debt carried by graduates, which
is similar to levels held by graduates in liberal regimes, hence not confirming
our hypothesis in this regard. Such debt loads are somewhat surprising, given
that university students in social-democratic regimes do not pay fees. However,
the generous conditions for student loans allow students in these countries a
high standard of living, for example living independently from their parents
and not being obligated to work while completing their studies.
The issue of loans11 reflects the different attitudes of the three welfare
regimes in a nutshell. Conservative regimes have either no loan schemes for
students or comparatively restrictive conditions. As a consequence, a highproportion of students work while studying to cover their costs of living. For
example, Euro student data (Orr, 2008, 119) reveal that the employment rate
of all students during the academic term is 4675%12 in conservative regimes
compared to 4356% in social-democratic regimes (119). The need to self-
finance results in less time available for students to devote to their studies
(Orr, 2008, 121). Both liberal and social-democratic regimes foster their
expansionist education strategies by providing loans to students. They differ,
however, in the prerequisites for receiving loans and the restrictions for which
students may make use of the money. In liberal regimes, students need loans to
cover the fees for tuition and living expenses. In social-democratic regimes,
students need loans only for the latter.
Outliers
Although we emphasize the relationship between educational policies and
welfare regimes, we recognize that additional (independent) factors influence
education policy, and result in identified outliers. For example, the welfare
regime typology does not explain within regime differences such as, forexample, educational expansion between North America and the UK. North
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America, and in particular the US, has been a pioneer in expansion of upper
secondary and tertiary education (Goldin and Katz, 2008). The UK was alaggard (not only compared with the US, but until the 1980s also with
most European countries). The UK has a well-entrenched class system, and a
historically stronger tradition of sorting students (e.g., into O and A levels).
Also in the UK, a large proportion of the school population historically exited
school at age 15 years or engaged in apprenticeships; as such, it was far slower
to expand from an elite to mass higher-education system. Likewise, the
Netherlands13 differs in many respects from the patterns observed in other
conservative regimes. Nor does Finland fit neatly into the social-democratic
framework. We believe that these outliers do not invalidate our thesis of a
systematic relationship between welfare regimes and patterns of educationpolicy. Further investigation of these questions would not only contribute
to a better understanding of this relationship, but of the welfare typology
itself. The addition of countries from southern Europe and post-socialistic
regimes in future analyses will further strengthen the analytical power of
this theory.
Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been on the refinement of an analytical frameworkfor cross-national comparisons. We argue that combining the analysis of
higher education and welfare policies furthers our understandings of national
differences in both areas. Our focus is not on making normative judgements
about the superiority or the deficiencies of the various national clusters.
However, it is an intriguing question to ask whether some regimes are
better equipped than others for the challenges of a knowledge-based
economy.
We conclude with a general observation about policy change. To a certain
degree, each country is open to new dynamics; however, it is also bound by
different historical forces and follows distinct trajectories from which it cannot
easily or quickly diverge. Policy makers who intend to change this direction
should be aware of this inertia. Adopting policy strategies from other contexts
requires careful consideration of the underlying societal structures and
traditions. The first step for governmental and educational policy makers is
to recognize that their respective countries fit into a particular regime
framework. Second, they need to assess the goals for higher education and
the extent to which these goals are in line with current path dependencies.
Third, they need to take the courageous step of aligning higher education
policies with desired goals and outcomes which may require stepping beyondthe bounds of a given welfare regime framework.
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Notes
1 Other authors have demonstrated that systematic differences among welfare regimes exist at the
secondary level. Allmendinger and Leibfried (2003) have identified four worlds of competence
production on the basis of Programme for International Student Assessment data (PISA), three
of which align with Esping-Andersens welfare typology. Social democratic regimes combine
high levels with low variation of these competences. Liberal regimes have both high levels and
high variation of competences. Conservative regimes combine low levels with high variation of
competences. The three worlds of human capital production described by Iversen and Stephens
(2008) match the three regimes that we employ in this article. However, Iversen and Stephens
focus on skill formation primarily at the secondary level.
2 We use the terms higher education and tertiary education interchangeably.
3 The concept of social estates refers to the broad divisions of society throughout the history of
Europe. Originally the concept distinguished nobility, clergy, and commons. In contemporarysociety it refers to the almost impermeable social divisions between upper, middle, and lower
classes in some countries (Cox, 1945), which Allmendinger and Leibfried (2003) describe as
adherence to a traditional feudal notion of class (p. 63).
4 Tertiary-type A credentials are earned at institutions defined as largely theory-based and are
designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry into advanced research programmes and
professions with high skill requirements (OECD, 2006b). Tertiary-type B credentials are earned
at institutions that are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and focus on practical,
technical or occupational skills for direct entry in the labour market (p. 15).
5 The proportion of the age group enrolled in general or vocational education is a proportion of
total enrolments in upper secondary education. These two figures do not necessarily add up to
100% because in some countries students are enrolled in pre-vocational programs.
6 Japan was excluded from the analysis because the traditions of Asian countries deserve an
analysis in their own right. As rapid social and economic changes in Ireland may distort the
analysis, we have not included it.
7 See footnote 3.
8 One pattern (Japan) is not relevant in our context.
9 Owing to the nature of the data, it was necessary to use a ranking procedure. We follow the
tenets of Greenacre (2007) to form the ranks. Because of the small sample size and the
categorical nature of the variables, it is not possible to conduct either factor or cluster analyses.
10 A Numerus Clausus approach specifies restrictions to admissions in those countries where
certification earned at the secondary level entitle individuals to tertiary entry.
11 We consider only state supported loans, not other types of loans such as private loans with
banks.12 Italy, at 39%, is an outlier among the conservative countries.
13 Goodin et al. (1999) locate the Netherlands in the social democratic regime category, which
indicates that this country is not easy to label.
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