Government alternation and legislative agenda setting
A presentation by: Alica Jung, Marco Carotta, Juliette Dubois, Katharina Dahms
Main questions What are the reasons for the evolution of the
Executive‘s agenda setting power?
Which methods can be used in order to control legislative agendas?
What are the distinctive characteristics of the development?
Explanation for the increase of the Executive‘s power in lawmaking
What have been drivers for this evolution?
What are the characteristics of the increase of power?
Historical approach Under which circumstances was the
constitution composed? End of World War II: Italy was deeply divided and
ideologically polarized
proportional representation congruent and symmetric bicameralism
Relatively weak Executive
Executive‘s role in lawmaking according to the Italian constitution
Ordinary procedure (art.72) no special role/ same position as any MP according to
bill proposal
disadvantage: Every bill needs to be approved by commitee, floor and
other chamber = long procedure
Other procedures1. decentralized2. decree law3. delegating law
Decentralized procedure (sede legislativa)
decentralized procedure (sede legislativa) whole legislative procedure takes part in the
commitee crucial players: members of commitee (1/5+1) ,
floor (1/10+1), responsibile ministers veto power
only under the condition of quasi unanimity of commitee and floor
possibility to skip the floor
Decree law procedure under the condition of necessity and urgency (!) Executive passes a bill without approvement of
parliament 60 days for converting the decree law into a regular law otherwise the former law is valid again disadvantage: any MP in the committee and floor can
propose changes outcome not what government intended
extensive use of reissuing non converted decrees Constitutional Court‘s sentence in 1996: reiussing not
possibile anymoreStrenghtening the Executive‘s power
Delegating law procedure a law with a section (delega) that delegates the
responsibilty to proclaim a new law (legislative decree)
a general framework and a deadline is given by the parliament
advantage: last word by Executive in case the framework of the law is too far from the
Executive‘s desires: refusal possible therefore Executive‘s desires considered in advance
most powerful evidence for the Executive‘s increase of power
Modification of executive role: italian executive was one of the
weakest in the world attempts of the legislative to fight
filibustering, obstructionism and centralize the agenda formation
it failed, just strengthened internal bodies
Chamber of deputies did not give the executive a special role
1971:new standing orders: no improvement end of the 1971: party fragmentation started
increasing 1980’s: government still had not any decisive
role in planning the business 1988 in Senate, 1990 in chamber of deputies:
for the first time executive’s indications were one of the source for planning parliament activity
end of the 1990’s: government won the right to present the conference of group chairpersons but no special proposal or voting rights about
planning parliamentary activity
problems: the amendment is not necessarily the
last one and come only from executive
in the senate: executive has as many privileges as the committee
in the chamber of deputies: (beginning 1980’s) abnormal submission of amendments
most important change about voting and amendments (1988):
the chamber of deputies standing orders require two distinct voting, the first one on the article and the final on the bill
the so-called maxi amendments
Maxi amendments When was the issue raised ?
In 2004 the President of the Republic reminded us about a principle in the Italian procedure for the vote of law : the bills must be approved section by section.
In this particulare case he reproaches that the articles are two long.
This anomaly is an italian practice called « maxi amendments »
What are maxi amendments : It's a way for the Government to pass laws
easier : at last minute, a single amendment replaces
all of the sections of a bill.
To the amendment, a question of confidence is attached so that :
1) the bill has the priority II) It’s difficult for MPs to vote against
Consequences : Then the processus goes really faster
The final content really looks like what the government wants,
The bargaining equilibrium shifts to the executive area : the executive leads the legislative process
Harmful consequences : Less understandable,
More difficult to amend,
Lack of constitutionality ? (as the pdt said, sections must be. Show a lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a « trick » to pass his laws
Lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a « trick » to pass his laws in the Parliament
When did it appear ? Already existed during the First Republic but is
widely utilized during the 2nd Republic.
At first it concerned only decree laws, but then was extended to any bill.
Started to be used a lot under the 13th and 14th legislatures (2 maxi amendments during the 10th, and 24 during the 14th).
Budgetary process
A legislative sequence for the vote of budget was defined for the first time in 1978.
Why ? Because of the bad financial results, and the bad management of its provision
How does it work ? They introduced a government financial bill
and a financial parliamentary session
The Executive instruments that we've studied before are used aswell for the budget
The procedure was changed 3 times since 1978
The rationalization of the budgetary process increased the agenda-setting power of the Presidents of the Chambers and of the Budget Committees.
He can :
“declare inadmissible any amendments and additional sections dealing with subjects that are unrelated to the Finance and Budget bills”.
decide to set aside the measures unrelated to the subject according to the law.
ask to re-table amendments during the Floor aswell.
Impact of the introduction of a budgetary process
The importance of the Europeanization makes difficult to estimate the impact
But according to the text, the financial goals established by the money government bills seem to have been substantially respected up to 2001
A tentative explanation
Demand of strong executive’s role has met an increase of exceptional instruments Delegating laws Deleghe Degree laws
Big changes in italian political system End of old parties New electoral rules (bipolarism)
differences between I and II republic
Italian first republic Only one party can rule : Dc (with ally) No government will be possible just with Msi and
Pci Only changement during a long period is party
fragmentation
Italian second republic Two broad coalitions Both coalition can rule
Growing of delegating laws and deleghe in the ‘90 Financial crisis No integration in european union
No decreasing of deleghe and delegating laws, the alternation had become a real possibility In ’96 the leftiest coalition in italian history at the
government 2001 a center-right coalition righter than Dc
What means alternation? In new government coalition status quo is far
enough to overcome the existing transaction costs that plague a still fragmented coalition government, and allow the policy change by a change in the allocation of the agenda setting power.
For some of the government parties could be more convenient a no policy change. A relatively bad decision can be convenient for a party member of the government if it can prevent the alternation.
Why until now we have not changed the formal rules? Formal changes reinforced the Executive:
Some of the new formal rules need to be passed by costitutional laws
The two coalition find a reform useful when they are member of the government and dangerous when they are at opposition.
Pro-executive changes in the parliamentary standing order are easier to be done: They need only the absolute majority of MP’s(No
popular referendum required) Crucial role of the presidents of the chambers
conclusion Hypothesis is that the istitutional or procedural
change follows the same logic of the policy change. The alternation helps the delegation of the agenda
setting power It changes the set of veto players increasing instability It introduces a prospective change of veto players in the
strategic calculations moving the reverse point farther than the present SQ
We should expect to find a strengthening of the government agenda setting where The alternation is more frequent Distance between alternative government is larger Veto players pareto set is small