EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 1
Running Head: EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP
What Evolution Teaches Us About Leadership:
Some Lessons From The Past
Mark Van Vugt
University of Kent
Robert Hogan
Hogan Assessment Systems
Invited paper prepared for end-of-year theory issue of Leadership Quarterly (2005)
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Abstract
Taking a Darwinian perspective, this paper suggests that leadership is the product of an
evolved design for within-group coordination. Group coordination involves collective
decision-making about what to do, how, and when to do it. Leader-follower distinctions
emerge when two or more individuals adopt different but complementary decision rules in
order to engage in joint action. These decision rules are adaptive in that they are the product
of an evolutionary process, selecting for individuals who were better at solving problems of
social organization. This perspective produces various novel insights into the origins of
leadership and followership and offers an agenda for future research. Furthermore, an
evolutionary approach to the study of leadership serves to integrate a dispersed set of theories
and findings.
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What Evolution Teaches Us About Leadership:
Some Lessons From The Past
“The UP [Universal People] have leaders, though they may be ephemeral or situational. The
UP admire, or profess to admire, generosity and this is particularly desired in a leader. No
leader of the UP ever has complete power lodged in himself alone. UP leaders go beyond the
limits of UP reason and morality. Since the UP never have complete democracy, and never
have complete autocracy, they always have a de facto oligarchy” (Brown, 1991; p. 138).
In “Human Universals” Donald Brown investigated what all people, societies,
cultures, and languages have in common and identified leadership as a human universal.
Similarly, in a review of modern and traditional hunter-gatherer societies, Boehm (1999)
concluded that, even in strictly egalitarian bands and tribes, band members exercise
differential influence on group decision-making. This is supported by the experimental social
psychological literature. When individuals form groups to work on collective tasks, leader-
follower patterns emerge quickly and spontaneously even when groups initially lack a leader
(Bales, 1951; Mann, 1959). Leadership functions might not even be restricted to the human
species. In studies of nonhuman primates and other social mammals, there have been
numerous observations of social interactions that resemble leader-follower patterns in
humans (e.g., Boehm, 1999; De Waal, 1996; Wilson, 1975).
For example, De Waal (1996) observed the following in a captive chimpanzee colony
at Arnhem Zoo in the Netherlands: “On one occasion, a quarrel between Mama and Spin got
out of hand and ended in fighting and biting. Numerous apes rushed up to the warring
females and joined in the fray. A huge knot of fighting, screaming apes rolled around in the
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sand until Luit [the alpha male] leapt in and literally beast them apart. He did not choose
sides in the conflict, like others; instead anyone who continued received a blow from him”(p.
129).
Given the vast literature on leadership, accumulated by scientists in disciplines
ranging from psychology and management to political science and primatology, one might
expect there would be an effort to make sense of all the findings. Currently, however, there is
no such grand theory. As Hogan and Kaiser (2005) stated recently “The academic tradition
[in the study of leadership] is a collection of dependable empirical nuggets, but it is also a
collection of decontextualized facts that do not add up to a persuasive account of leadership”
(p. 171). This is partly due to the fact that the research is fragmented across different
disciplines, and there is little communication among them. What seems to be lacking is a
larger theoretical context in which to interpret and integrate findings across disciplines
(Chemers, 2000; Rost, 1991; Yukl, 1989).
Moreover, such as theory could also provide a more efficient guide for future research
This article presents a theory of leadership, inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution via
natural selection and adaptation (Buss, 1999; Darwin, 1859; Dawkins, 1976; Van Vugt &
Van Lange, in press). This perspective offers a new way of looking at an old problem.
Evolutionary thinking can help integrate a massive body of empirical data into a coherent
conceptual framework and develop non-trivial hypotheses on leadership and followership
processes. Moreover, evolutionary theory is a good place to start because other models of
leadership drawn from economics, psychoanalysis, personality, social, cognitive, or cultural
theory must ultimately be consistent with evolutionary theory to be viable (Barrett, Dunbar &
Lycett, 2002; Buss, 1999). For example, any trait-based theory of leadership (Stogdill, 1974)
must ultimately account for how the particular traits evolved in the human species. Any
cognitive model, such as leader categorization theory (Lord & Maher, 1991), must explain
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how leader prototypes evolved and why they are so influential. Finally, cultural theories of
leadership (House et al., 1999) must ultimately account for the human capacity for culture—
and explain how leaders in different cultures learn which style of leadership is effective
(Boyd & Richerson, 2005).
A Darwinian Perspective on Leadership: Asking the Why-question
Why do people defer to leaders? Tinbergen (1963) described four ways to answer the
why-question, each representing a different level of analysis from an evolutionary
perspective. First, one might ask what motivates a person to follow or lead another person at
any particular point in time. This is a question about the proximate or immediate causes of
behavior, and it is the question in which most psychologists are interested. Answers to this
question would refer to the motivation of individuals to lead or follow, and how they
perceive their relationships. For example, people might defer to a leader because they expect
doing so will be instrumental in securing such benefits as money, prestige, safety, or sexual
favors (Hollander, 1985). Alternatively, they might follow a leader because they are attracted
to and identify with the person (Bass, 1997; Hogg, 2001).
Second, one might ask if there is something about a person’s developmental history that
prompts him/her to lead or follow in a particular context? This question concerns the
developmental or ontogenetic causes of leadership and would interest developmental,
personality, and educational psychologists studying leadership (Ilies, Gerhardt, & Le, 2004).
For example, do leaders and followers have different personalities, and, if so, are their
differences based on heritable factors or different experiences in childhood or adolescence?
A third question concerns the evolutionary history of leadership. When and why did
this behavior arise? Through cross-species comparisons, one could determine whether
leadership can be found in other social species including the nonhuman primates. In addition,
studies of modern hunter-gatherer societies (Barrett et al., 2002; Boehm, 1999; Diamond,
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1997) might reveal the development of leader-follower relations in humans. This is the
phylogenetic or historical cause of behavior, which concerns anthropologists and students of
animal behavior.
The final question concerns the functional or ultimate causes of leadership, which
interests evolutionary psychologists and evolutionary biologists. This perspective is linked to
the concept of natural selection. Does leadership confer reproductive advantages on leaders
and followers and does leadership contribute to the survival of these individuals and their
groups? If so, we might have an ultimate explanation of leadership.
Each of these questions analyzes leadership from a different perspective and these
perspectives are fairly independent from each other (although they are also interconnected).
For example, a developmental or ontogenetic understanding of why some people with
particular personalities and life histories are more likely to emerge as leaders tells us little
about whether or not leadership contributes to the reproductive success of individuals.
However, if we investigate leadership from different levels of analysis, we will derive a
better account of this phenomenon. For example, finding a proximate mechanism – that
people readily and strongly identify with their leaders (Bass, 1997; Hogg, 2001) – that
produce the ultimate reproductive benefits of followership – being a loyal follower enhances
one’s survival and reproduction abilities – strengthens an evolutionary account of leadership.
What must be avoided at all costs, however, is confusing one level of analysis with
another. For example, it is pointless to argue about whether people become leaders because
they are ambitious and energetic people, or because they want to enhance their reproductive
success. Both views may be right, but they concern a different level of explanation. Hence,
they complement each other, but they are not alternative explanations.
Finally, we should note that a Darwinian account of leadership and followership does
not assume that the decisions and cognitions associated with these roles are always
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conscious. People may often not consciously be aware of why they take up a position of
leader or follower in their social groups. This is presumably because evolution has done the
thinking for us in such situations. Based on millions of years of evolutionary engineering,
humans are designed to act in certain ways in response to particular environmental stimuli
(Buss, 1999; Dawkins, 1976; Pinker, 2002; Wilson, 1975). Of course, there are individual
differences in the strengths of these inclinations, which accounts for why some people
emerge as leaders while others become followers. But these dispositions and their associated
cognitive, motivational, and behavioral elements may not be consciously acknowledged by
individuals. Their response is driven by the interaction between situational stimuli and
tendencies latent in a person’s genes.
Natural Selection and Adaptations for Group Life
How might natural selection account for the emergence of leadership in social
interaction? Natural selection operates via three principles (Darwin, 1859). First, individuals
in a species differ in terms of behavioral, physical, and physiological traits – this is the
Principle of Variation. Second, part of the variations in phenotype is heritable and will
therefore be passed on from one generation to the next (Principle of Inheritance). Third, some
of these variants allow individuals to compete more effectively for scarce resources
(Principle of Adaptation). As a consequence of these premises, some individuals enjoy
greater reproductive success because their traits give them an advantage: They are more
successful at mating, finding food, or avoiding predators. Their offspring will inherit their
successful traits and natural selection will have taken place. Through this process, organisms
thus become “adapted” to their environment (Barrett et al., 2002; Buss, 1999).
A crucial element of the human environment is other human beings (Alexander, 1979;
Sober & Wilson, 1998). Through natural selection, humans have acquired behaviors that
enable them to interact with other humans, sometimes in groups containing relatives and non-
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relatives (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003). Natural selection has produced a variety of adaptations
that facilitate group living. These include, for example, parental investment, food sharing,
collective defense, and behaviors that minimize the costs of group life, for example, conflict
and violence, struggles for status and dominance, and jealousy (Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003;
Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Van Vugt & Van Lange, in press). Leadership might have emerged
in human history as a way to maximize the benefits of group life while minimizing its costs.
Evolution, Leadership and Group Life
Many adaptive group challenges faced by the ancestors of modern humans involved the
coordination and organization of actions of smaller and larger social units. Human ancestors
lived in semi-nomadic groups of 30-50 members for about 95% of human history (Barrett et
al., 2002). They necessarily had to make collective decisions about what to do, when and
how to do it. For example, they would have needed to move frequently between waterholes
(Gamble, 1993). Given the risks of being attacked by predators or rival groups, it would pay
to stay together on the move. Yet, how would a group decide where and when to go? This
decision required some form of leadership, whereby someone would take initiative, and the
rest would follow. Similarly, there would be occasional conflicts between individual
members that threatened to spill over to the rest of the group (Chagnon, 1997; Diamond,
1997). Again, it would be useful for someone with the support of the rest to step in, resolve
the conflict and restore order in the group.
Problems of coordination and conflict resolution may have paved the way for the
emergence of a primordial distinction between leadership and followership. The evolution of
these social roles would have been unlikely unless there were clear benefits for all involved,
for example, in terms of improved group mobility, hunting success, food distribution, and
group defense and security. Especially in the case of followership, it is hard to argue why
people would voluntarily defer to another individual unless there were clear rewards. Once
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these roles were “invented” they presumably became fine-tuned over time by being subjected
to natural selection forces (Boyd & Richerson, 2005). Furthermore, specific problems would
presumably have given rise to the emergence of different types of leaders. For example, an
intragroup conflict might persuade followers to endorse a neutral and impartial leader,
whereas an imminent attack from a rival group might lead to the endorsement of an
aggressive, coercive style leader such as in Big Man societies (Chagnon, 1997; McCann,
1997). We now turn to the literature to present a more detailed evolutionary account of
leadership.
Leadership: Lessons From a Distant Past
To indicate how an evolutionary perspective contributes to understanding leadership,
we offer six propositions (Table 1). We support each proposition with relevant theory and
research. Our list of evolutionary-based ideas about leadership only focuses on the main
issues. Some of our propositions can be derived from frameworks other than evolutionary
theory. However, it would be hard to find an alternative theory that accounts for this broad
range of leadership and followership phenomena.
_______________________
Insert Table 1 here
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Proposition 1: Leadership and Followership Are Adaptive Decision Rules
To determine the adaptive significance of leadership and followership as two separate but
complementary decision rules, we might consider two pieces of evidence (Buss, 1999;
Schmitt & Pilger, 2004). First, are there indications for differences in reproductive success of
individuals or, for that matter groups, that varied in the ability to establish good leader-
follower relationships? We believe that there is evidence that leader-follower patterns confer
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certain benefits to people that would be otherwise unattainable. Second, is there evidence that
leadership is designed specifically to solve a set of group problems that would otherwise
remain unsolved? Again, we believe the evidence is there.
Reproductive Benefits Associated With Leadership and Followership
Historical data show that, in traditional societies, higher ranked males had more
offspring (Betzig, 1986). For example, one emperor of Morocco had more than 1000 children
with many different wives, and his harem was arranged in such a way as to maximize his
reproductive success (Betzig, 1986). There are also many proximal benefits associated with
leadership in contemporary society that might enhance reproductive success. For example,
leaders are generally wealthier than followers (Bass, 1990) and enjoy better health (Marmot,
2004). Experimental social psychological research shows that putting people into positions of
leadership enhances their mood and optimism and reduces their stress levels (Hardy & Van
Vugt, 2005; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003).
What about followers? An evolutionary account of followership requires reproductive
benefits for this role to emerge as well. Although followers are likely to extract fewer
benefits from group cooperation and coordination than leaders do, members of groups with
leaders should do better, overall, than members of groups without leaders. For example, if a
group had no leadership structure, it would have trouble moving to a new waterhole in time
when the old one dried up (Boehm, 1999). Similarly, when a group is attacked by rival
groups, deferring to a leader might be preferable to not having a leader at all (Diamond,
1997). Although there is no firm evidence to date to suggest that leaders enhance the
reproductive success of followers, case studies of work teams and army units clearly show
the benefits of good leadership in terms of enhancing performance, satisfaction and rewards
for followers (Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994). Leadership also increases the contributions to
public goods from which all group members profit (Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).
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The above suggests that leader and follower roles might have evolved through natural
selection forces operating at the individual level as well as the group level – the differential
success rates of groups competing with each other. Although group selection models have
been criticized by evolutionary scientists in the past, recent treatments of group selection like
D. S. Wilson’s multilevel selection theory (Sober & Wilson, 1998) and Boyd and
Richerson’s (2005) cultural group selection model have been endorsed and are gaining
influence in the scientific community. This is not the place, however, to discuss these
models.
Evidence of Special Design
A second line of evidence suggesting that leader and follower relations are adaptive
concerns whether these behaviors show evidence of “special design” (Dawkins, 1976;
Williams, 1966). This judgment is based on criteria involving the complexity and efficiency
of the attribute or behavior and its appropriateness for solving problems that humans have
faced through evolutionary time. Consider, for example, humans’ highly specialized tool
making ability. Making axes and spears allowed our ancestors to hunt large animals and
defend against large predators in a hostile savannah environment (Gamble, 1993). It is an
ability that all humans possess. In contrast, gorillas who live in regions without predators and
eat plants, do not need tools and therefore have no tool making ability.
Is there any evidence that leadership is the product of special design? To answer this
requires integrating evidence from many different disciplines (Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004).
First, we have noted that leadership is a universal attribute of human societies (Brown, 1991),
including modern hunter-gatherers whose living arrangements resemble those in which our
ancestors lived (Boehm, 1999; Diamond, 1997). Second, there are patterns of leader-follower
relations among chimpanzees, our closest living relative (De Waal, 1996), baboons (Dunbar,
1983) and other social mammals like dolphins (Packer, 1983). Third, adaptive challenges in
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human groups require individuals to coordinate their activities, for organizing a hunt or group
defense. Moreover, evidence from game theoretical simulations show that stable leader-
follower arrangements emerge when two (or more) individuals coordinate their actions but
have slightly different preferences for what activity to take, for example, to rest or eat
(Browning & Colman, 2004; Van Vugt, 2005).
Fourth, demographic studies show a correlation between leadership and reproductive
success (Betzig, 1986) health and wealth (Marmot, 2004). Fifth, evidence from psychological
experiments suggests that, in groups of strangers, leader-follower differences quickly emerge
(Hemphill, 1950). Sixth, people process information about leaders automatically and have
prototypes of leadership that are readily available and difficult to change (Lord & Maher,
1991). Finally, evidence from behavior genetics research suggests that traits such
extraversion, ambition, and boldness, which are related to leadership emergence, show some
degree of heritability (Ilies et al., 2004; Rushton et al., 1986)
Summary. Obviously we need more research to establish the adaptive significance of
leadership and followership behaviors and to examine the specific evolutionary trajectories
of these social roles. But the evidence so far is encouraging. Leadership and followership
might have evolved as special designs for facilitating group action and coordination. Yet we
still know very little about the evolutionary advantages of becoming a follower nor about the
role of group selection forces in the emergence of leadership.
Proposition 2: Leadership and Followership are Strategies for Group Coordination
Evolutionary game theory (Maynard-Smith, 1982) suggests how leadership might have
emerged in our species’ history. Evolutionary game theory is like classic economic game
theory (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), only the pay-offs are in terms of reproductive rather than
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economic costs and benefits (although they might be related, of course). Evolutionary game
theory has been used to model a range of social behaviors like cooperation and competition,
and suggest how these behaviors evolved (Maynard-Smith, 1982). The goal is to determine
which strategies succeed when pitted against others as well as themselves (Axelrod, 1984).
Successful strategies spread through a population by virtue of the superior decision rules they
adopt in relevant situations, whereas unsuccessful strategies become extinct—and this
resembles the process of natural selection. How do leadership and followership fare as game
strategies?
The Leader Game
Because leadership involves coordination, initiative-taking, risk, and responsibility
(Bass, 1990), it is appropriate to use a group coordination game as a model for the evolution
of leadership (Rapoport, 1967). The simplest version of the leader game involves two
players, 1 and 2, each with two strategies, say to Wait or Move (Figure 1). There are four
cells in Figure 1, each with two outcomes (pay-offs in reproductive terms). The first pay-off
is always for player 1 and the second for player 2. For example, if both choose to wait, they
receive a zero pay-off, and if both choose to move simultaneously, they receive a negative
pay-off of -100 – for example, they could bump into each other if they move at the same
time. They can solve this problem only if they coordinate their actions such that one player
waits for the other to move and then follows. Moving is the most attractive option (a pay-off
of 200), provided that the other waits (who then gets 100). However, moving is also the risky
option because if both move at the same time, both players receive -100. If the players
coordinate their actions, they can both win, but the player who makes the risky move (200)
does better and emerges as the leader and the player playing the cautious option (100), to
wait, becomes follower.
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As a real-world example, imagine two individuals on a hostile savannah who need to
stay close together for safety. At some point, they must decide to stay where they are, or
move on for food. They will differ in how hungry they are; the hungriest individual might
make a move at some point and thus obtains the best pay-off because he eats when he is
hungry. This means that the less hungry individual must follow, otherwise they end up at
different locations and lose each other’s protection. Another example is a village that is being
attacked by men of a neighboring clan. The village members must decide whether to defend
themselves or run away to hide. Given that they must stay together for protection, the best
option is for one of the members to decide what to do, fight or flight, and for the rest to
support that decision. The first person then emerges as the group leader, and receives a
higher pay-off because he can impose his preference on the others.
In game theory, (Move, Wait) and (Wait, Move) are referred to as the equilibriums of
this game. Thus, once the players’ strategies settle into either of these cells, neither player has
an incentive to choose a different strategy. Consequently, the strategies become stabilized in
a population, because they cannot be improved by any alternative strategies. From this, one
would expect behavioral adaptations for leadership and followership to become increasingly
complementary and fine-tuned. Furthermore, the logic of the leader game dictates that a
leader-follower pair (Move, Wait) would always receive a higher pay-off than any dyad of
leaders (Move, Move) or followers (Wait, Wait). This implies that these roles may have co-
evolved over time, producing a stable mixture of leaders and followers in a population at
large (Frank, 1988; Maynard-Smith, 1982; D.S. Wilson et al., 1996).
________________
Insert Figure 1 here
_________________
Evolutionary Hypotheses
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Conceptualizing leadership and followership as complementary strategies in a
coordination game leads to a number of testable predictions about leadership. We have done
that elsewhere in greater detail (Van Vugt, 2005). Table 1 summarizes the main predictions
about leadership from a game theoretical perspective. For example, we predict that
individuals who are dispositionally more inclined to take the initiative, are more likely to
emerge as leaders in any given situation. This is clearly supported in the psychological
literature (Gough, 1984). Also, emergent leadership should correlate with intelligence
because individuals would want to wait until a wise person makes a first move and then
follow him or her (Bass, 1990). Leaders, according to this analysis, are also expected to be
wealthier because their relative pay-off is expected to be higher (in Figure 1 it is 2x the
followers’ pay-off). This is supported overwhelmingly in the literature (Bass, 1990). Yet
signs of generosity should and do matter as well (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002),
because before people become followers, they need to be sure that a leader is willing to share
the benefits with them (according to Figure 1, they should expect at least 100 in pay-offs).
________________________
Insert Table 2 here
________________________
Summary
Evolutionary game theory provides an account of how strategies producing leadership
and followership behaviors might have evolved and spread through the population (at the
expense of alternative strategies) and become increasingly fine-tuned to each other. Also, it
makes a number of predictions, some of which deserve further testing, about the likelihood
that people with particular personalities emerge as either leaders or followers. Furthermore, it
explains what particular set of attributes followers might be looking for in their leaders.
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Proposition 3: Leadership Emerges in Response to Group Threats and Opportunities
As indicated earlier, there are certain costs associated with following another person, because
followers give up their preferred outcome (200 in Figure 1) in order to coordinate their
actions with leaders. To offset the costs, there must be substantial benefits associated with
group coordination before a leader-follower structure emerges. From an adaptionist
framework (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004), designs for leadership and
followership should be context-specific. Because these behaviors have evolved to solve
specific problems associated with group life, they should be elicited only when organisms
perceive situations as relevant to these problems.
What are these situations? Kenrick et al. (2003) identified six social problem domains
in response to which group-relevant cognitive and behavioral adaptations might have
evolved: (1) coalition formation – forming and maintaining alliances, (2) self-protection --
protecting oneself against threats to survival and reproduction, (3) status – gaining respect
from and power over others, (4) mate choice – obtaining a partner to insure one’s fitness, (5)
relationship maintenance – maintaining a bond with a partner, and (6) parental care –
promoting the survival and success of one’s off-spring. The first three domains are
particularly relevant to the evolution of leader and follower behaviors.
Coalitions
Several authors have discussed the adaptive value functions of cooperative alliances
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Diamond, 1997). For example, hunting large game provides the
ingredients for a healthy and nutritious diet, and sharing food provides an insurance policy
for survival through bad times. Trade with benevolent others provides access to otherwise
unavailable resources (food, tools, status objects). Finally, political coalitions facilitate
gaining and holding power in a group as well as dominating other groups (Sidanius & Pratto,
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1999). Coalitional behavior requires that some individuals take the lead and others follow.
For example, to organize a group to hunt large animals, it would be useful if one individual
would tell the rest what positions they should take and follow his orders. By engaging in
collective action, everyone would benefit, although some individuals would clearly benefit
more than others, for example, because they are more instrumental in organizing the hunt.
Self-protection
Self-protection is another problem domain in response to which leader-follower
adaptations might have emerged. Here it is useful to distinguish between intra- and
intergroup threats (Van Vugt, 2004). The social life of our hunter gatherer ancestors involved
constant conflict and violence and homicide was a leading cause of death (Buss, 1999;
Chagnon, 1997). To minimize conflict in small bands, peacemakers are needed to prevent
fights, particularly when they threaten to incorporate the rest of the group. Because such
interventions depend on the support of other group members, this would have encouraged
followership behavior. Groups were in competition with one another. Minimizing conflict
within the group improves its viability vis a vis other groups. Interestingly, peacemaking
behavior is found in most of the nonhuman primates, suggesting that it has ancient origins
(Boehm, 1999; DeWaal, 1996; Wilson, 1975).
Intergroup threats would have also created selection pressures for the evolution of
leadership and followership. The main threat here would be attacks from outgroup members
on oneself or other members of one’s ingroup. Alexander (1979) has suggested that
intergroup rivalry and warfare acted as a strong selection pressure for the evolution of a
whole range of social behaviors, including altruism towards ingroup members, conformity,
morality, and perhaps even religion (D.S Wilson, 2002). Leadership may have emerged
through intergroup pressures as well. Because defeat in an intergroup battle would mean
almost a certain death for oneself and one’s relatives, it would be functional to act as a unit to
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 18
fend off such threats (Boehm, 1999; Chagnon, 1997; Van Vugt, 2004). Good leadership and
disciplined followership would be vital to group and personal survival and thus may have
evolved for this particular purpose.
Again, this adaptation might have an ancient origin. Boehm (1999) observes an
encounter between rival groups of chimpanzees in the colony at Gombe: “Goblin [the alpha
male and leader] moves forward quickly to a vantage spot to peer across the valley and
Mustard now emulates him. As Goblin (number one), Satan (number two) and Evered
(number three) scan the valley, they break off several times to look at one another quickly.
After nearly 60 seconds, Goblin suddenly makes his decision and begins to vocalize and
display, The entire group, which includes adolescents Freud and Beethoven, immediately
follows suit. And the result is the usual one: Both groups vocalize and display ferociously
the slowly retreat into their home ranges.” (p. 28).
Status
The adaptive problems, coalition formation and self-protection, explain why individuals
might be keen to follow another individual. But what is in it for the leaders? Why would they
take on dangerous roles as peacekeepers or warriors? Their benefits derive presumably from
the emergence of a hierarchy in human groups, whereby those at the top enjoy greater
rewards than those at the bottom. Although human hierarchies are much flatter than those of
even the most egalitarian non-human primates, high ranking individuals still have more
respect and status (Boehm, 1999; DeWaal, 1996). As a result, humans are almost certainly
programmed to seek status gains and avoid status losses (Buss, 1999; Kenrick et al., 2003).
Leadership confers status, which allows access to such resources as wealth, health, and,
ultimately, more and better mates (Chagnon, 1997; Perusse, 1993).
Opportunities for Leadership
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Is there any evidence that leadership emerges in response to the various threats and
opportunities of group life? The answer appears to be yes. First, group members are more
willing to endorse a leader when their shared resource is being depleted (Samuelson &
Messick, 1986; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Second, people show leader and follower
behaviors when faced with natural crises such as earthquakes (Baumeister et al., 1989). The
Robbers Cave experiment shows that when a group faces competition, one of its first
activities is to select a leader (Sherif, 1966). Finally, leaders sometimes strengthen their
position by inducing intergroup competition – for example, Margaret Thatcher and the
Falkland War (Rabbie & Bekkers, 1978).
An evolutionary perspective also suggests that different types of leadership emerge in
response to different group challenges. Protection against aggressive outgroup members
encourages followers to endorse aggressive and coercive leaders, presumably because they
are more effective warriors. McCann’s (1997) US-presidential study confirms this. The
public voted for more aggressive candidates when faced with an external threat. Anecdotal
evidence also supports this conclusion. The tough-minded Winston Churchill only became a
viable candidate for the role of Prime Minister of Britain when war broke out, and when it
ended, the public no longer supported him. Thus, aggressive and coercive forms of leadership
may be endorsed in crisis situations, but may not be tolerated otherwise.
Leaderless groups
An evolutionary analysis suggests that leadership is unlikely to emerge when groups
face relatively simple coordination problems, there are no conflicts of interests, and there are
no pressures to solve the problem quickly. This hypothesis is supported by the literature on
leadership substitutes (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). For example, when group activity is routine
and predictable, no leadership structure is likely to emerge (Comstock & Scott, 1977).
Friendship groups and other small cohesive units usually do better without a leader, because
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 20
power differences undermine group cohesion (Haslam et al., 1998). Finally, improvements in
technology and communication, such as the internet, may make leadership irrelevant because
group members can coordinate their actions without central control (Kerr & Jermier, 1978;
Wright, 2000).
Summary
An evolutionary perspective assumes that leadership and followership are associated
with specific problems of group life - coalition formation to acquire valuable resources, and
self protection against ingroup and outgroup threats. In combination with a universal drive
for status, individuals emerge as group leaders when there is a need for direction and
coordination. Still, simple coordination problems can be solved without leadership
sometimes.
Proposition 4: Leadership Styles Are Flexible
There are phylogenetic similarities in the social behavior of human and nonhuman primates.
There are important phylogenetic differences as well. Leadership in gorillas, chimpanzees
and bonobos is tyrannical, but human leadership varies from dictatorship to egalitarianism
(Boehm, 1999). The alpha male chimpanzee, for example, bullies the lower ranked males and
harasses the females in the group. However, this behavior is less extreme than that of Stalin,
Hitler, or Mao, who were willing to kill anyone they disliked. Thus, a theory of leadership
needs to explain the variability in leadership styles found in human populations as well as the
unique nature of human leadership.
Compared to other social species, humans show great behavioral flexibility (D. S.
Wilson et al., 1996). Being flexible is adaptive in environments that are relatively unstable in
terms of climate, risks of predation, and availability of resources such as food and water. For
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 21
example, when food is scarce, it would be useful for a group to fission into smaller groups,
whereas when food is abundant, it is useful to merge into a single larger group. Fission-
fusion tendencies are characteristic of human social life, and they require flexibility in
organizational structure (Diamond, 1997; Hart & Van Vugt, in press). Similarly, different
leader structures should emerge in response to different group challenges. To understand
variations in leadership, we must look at the specific contextual dynamics in which
leadership structures emerge. This can be clarified by using a game theoretical account of
leadership.
Autocratic versus Democratic Leadership Styles
The distinction between autocratic and democratic leadership is an old one. Autocratic
leaders decide group matters without consulting their followers, whereas democratic leaders
involve followers in decision-making and try to build consensus (Bass, 1990). Followers
endorse autocratic leaders when they are desperate, for example, when faced with war,
famine, or drought when the group must move together quickly (Vroom & Yetton, 1973).
Furthermore, the support for an autocratic leader should be greater when deviants threaten to
undermine group unity and group unity is necessary to fend off threats (Van Vugt & De
Cremer, 1999). Of course, once leaders have such powers, it is difficult to take them away
because, for leaders, they make life so much easier (Kipnis, 1972).
When individuals are reluctant followers and they have options elsewhere, leaders must
generally become more democratic. To compensate for the losses that followers incur in
autonomy and wealth, leaders must share the decision-making with them so that they can
influence the direction of the group action or decision. The democratic leader is more like a
“primus inter pares.” We would expect democratic structures to emerge when two conditions
are met. First, there should be obvious benefits associated with group coordination so that
everyone, leader and followers, has a stake in acting together to achieve their goals. Second,
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 22
individuals must have alternatives to following a particular leader, for example, following a
different person, acting independently, or joining a different group. For example, in medieval
times, noblemen involved mercenary soldiers in their decision-making, because they much
needed their support and did not want them to join a rival army (Betzig, 1986). Exit
opportunities give followers some power in negotiating with their leader (Van Vugt et al,
2004). The result is a shift towards a more democratic structure. Nonetheless, leaders can
stop the democratic drift by creating group threats—e.g., wars—which foreclose the options
for group members and strengthen the case for an autocratic system (Rabbie & Bekkers,
1978).
Figures 2a and 2b show the pay-off structures associated with the emergence of
autocratic or democratic leadership, respectively. In Figure 2a, to Move is the dominant
strategy for player 1. He is not dependent on the strategy of player 2 to achieve good
outcomes for himself (either receiving a pay-off of 200 or 100 by choosing to move).
Therefore he should always make a first move and by doing so leaves player 2 no other
option but following. This is essentially what autocratic leadership is about. In contrast,
Figure 2b shows a situation, like in Figure 1, in which the players have to coordinate their
actions to achieve good outcomes for both of them. But in contrast to Figure 1, the costs of
not coordinating are smaller, putting pressure on leaders to share more with followers. This is
essentially a model of democratic leadership
____________________________
Insert Figures 2a and 2b here.
____________________________
Task or Relationship Leadership
From a Darwinian framework, different adaptive problems underlie the difference
between task-oriented and relationship-oriented leadership (Fiedler, 1967; Hemphill, 1950).
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 23
Task leaders focus on group goal achievement, whereas relationship leaders are concerned
with establishing and maintaining good relations within the group. This difference reflects
the extent to which the interests of leaders and followers overlap (Figure 3a) or conflict
(Figure 3b). For example, in organizing a small group for a collective hunt, individual goals
should be congruent. Hence, the leader primarily faces a problem of coordinating activities
so as to maximize the success of the group but there is no conflict between leader and
followers about what to do (i.e., each party receives a pay-off of 150). Yet, when a band of
nomads must decide where to move next but they disagree about the direction of the move –
thus following is costly (see Figure 3b) -- then a leader who has good relations with followers
should be more effective. This is corroborated by research with Fielder’s (1967) contingency
model which suggests that in situations that are moderately but not dismally unfavorable, a
relationship leader is most persuasive.
___________________________
Insert Figures 3a and 3b here
___________________________
Transactional versus Transformational Leadership
Transformational leaders inspire followers with charisma and vision, and persuade
them to move beyond their immediate self-interest (Bass, 1990). Transactional leaders, in
contrast, appeal to followers’ self interest by providing them with favorable outcomes in
return for tangible and symbolic rewards (social exchange; Hollander, 1985). Again, it is
instructive to ask what adaptive problems might give rise to these two forms of leadership.
Transactional relationships (Figure 4a) follow pretty closely the pay-off matrix of the Leader
game (Figure 1). In exchange for their commitment to the leader, followers get rewards and
the higher the rewards relative to those of non-followers or leaders, the more dedicated
followers will be.
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 24
Transformational relationships change the pay-off matrix so that individuals believe
they are better off by following the leader. Thus, followers may think that their outcomes are
actually better than what leaders receive. Leaders seemingly turn followers into leaders
(Figure 4b), which explains the enthusiasm of followers supervised by transformational
leaders (Bass, 1997). Bass (1997) suggests that “the followers experience a magnetic
attention that transcends their usual experience. They become zealots and leaders in their
own right” (p. 40).
Certain conditions must be met for transformational leadership to occur. First, the
benefits associated with group coordination must be such that there is no attractive
alternative course of action for individuals. This might explain why transformational
leadership is more likely to emerge when a group is threatened and followers are uncertain
about what to do (Bass, 1990; Yul, 1999). Hence, they become willing to follow someone
with the vision and willingness to take the initiative.
Second, the leader must persuade followers that there are no costs, only benefits accrue
to coordinating their actions with the leader. Not surprising, such leaders are great actors
(Gardner & Avioli, 1998), and probably score high on a Machiavellian scale. One strategy is
to invent an ideology that justifies following a particular leader. Religions and national
identities provide such justifications; consequently, charismatic leaders often emerge in
religious groups, political settings, and the army (Bass, 1990; Burns, 1978). A second
strategy is for leaders to display self-sacrificial behaviors, for example giving up status,
giving away wealth, or even risking their lives so that followers think they are as well or
better off than their leader (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2003). Not surprising, Burns
(1978) labels this as heroic leadership and the game depicted in Figure 4b is known as the
Hero game (Rapoport, 1967). In this game, the first to move – the leader – actually gets a
lower pay-off (100) than the people who wait – the followers (200). Indeed, no one is more
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 25
charismatic than a leader who suffers for his/her people, think of Jesus of Nazareth, Thomas
Beckett, Joan of Arc, or, a more recent example, Nelson Mandela.
______________________________
Insert Figures 4a and 4b here
_____________________________
Summary
An evolutionary perspective illuminates the variability in leadership styles in human
groups. Different problems give rise to different strategies for both leaders and followers. For
example, autocratic leadership is associated with a dominance game, in which leaders can
play their preferred strategies with little regard for the interests of followers. Democratic
leadership is associated with a game in which people are reluctant followers because they
have reasonably attractive alternatives beyond coordination with a leader. This enhances their
negotiation power with the leader. Transformational leadership in essence transforms the
leader game such that followers believe that their outcomes are as good as if not better than
what the leader gets. Thus, they turn into dedicated followers.
Proposition 5: Leadership Can Be Both a State and Trait
A common misconception about evolutionary explanations of behavior is that they imply
genetic determinism (Kenrick & Simpson, 1997). This is wrong. For example, a boy might
have genes that make him a potential leader, but if he is dominated by his older brothers or
bullied by his class mates, this inclination might not materialize. Similarly, a person
somebody with no predisposition for leadership might emerge as leader in an emergency,
when he is the first to notice a danger (Baumeister et al., 1989). All that can be said is that if
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 26
there is a genetic basis for leadership, then an individual with the right combination of genes
is statistically more likely to emerge as leader.
Furthermore, a key adaptive feature of human behavior is its flexibility or, to use the
proper term, phenotypic plasticity (Barrett et al., 2002; D.S. Wilson et al., 1996). This
flexibility enables humans to cope with a variety of environments. The complexities of group
life suggest that individuals need many strategies for social interactions, from aggression to
altruism, from conformity to deviance, and from leading to following. Phenotypic plasticity
makes social life possible. Without it, human groups would be like beehives, with each
individual assigned by birth to a specific role in the group (Wilson, 1975).
There might be a genetic basis for leadership, but environmental factors determine
whether this inclination results in the phenotypic expression of leadership. Ultimately,
empirical research must choose among personality, situational or interaction models of
leadership. Although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence (Simonton, 1994), there are only a
handful of studies on the heritability of leadership traits (Ilies et al., 2004; Rusthon et al.,
1986) but none on followership traits as far as we know. Twin studies are the appropriate tool
for evaluating the genetic basis of leadership. Recent studies show strong heritability
coefficients for traits associated with leadership, such as extraversion, intelligence, ambition,
and empathy (Rushton et al., 1986). Furthermore, there is a relationship between children’s
desire for leadership roles and the ambition levels of their parents (Bass, 1990; Klonsky,
1983). In addition, people who have been rated as leaders at college are more likely to
emerge as leaders later on in life (Russell et al., 1986). Finally, when group composition and
group tasks change, the same individuals still emerge as leaders (Kenny & Zaccoro, 1983;
Zaccoro, Foti, & Kenny, 1991).
Ontogenetic factors moderate the influence of traits on leadership. For example, in
children between the age of 3 and 8, the physically stronger children exercise more influence.
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 27
By the age of 12, friendly children are more likely to be leaders of their peer group (Barner-
Berry, 1982). Both physique and friendliness are influenced by genes, but they predict
leadership in a different age range. Trait models of leadership are further qualified by cultural
factors. For example, Hofstede (1980) presents evidence for a more hierarchical leadership
style among East-Asian and Middle-East managers than among Northern European
managers. This suggests that an authoritarian person is more likely to be a leader in Japan
than in the United Kingdom. Even within the same culture, perceptions of leadership
potential can change. In an analysis of US-elections, McCann (1992) found that the
electorate voted for a more aggressive and conservative president when the US faced either a
domestic (economy) or international crisis (war).
Summary
To summarize, the evidence suggests that leadership is determined by both heritable
and non-heritable factors, but the exact weighting of the two is yet unclear. More research is
needed to establish the relative importance of these two sources of influence on leadership.
We know relatively little about the determinants of followership, however. The evidence also
suggests that flexibility or adaptability in leadership style may be key to leadership
effectiveness, and that preferences in leadership style can change as a function of age,
culture, and the specific environment that requires leadership.
Proposition 6: Leader-Follower Relationships are Fundamentally Ambivalent
Most theories assume that leaders and followers work together to pursue shared goals
(Chemers, 2000; Fiedler, 1967; Hogg, 2001). However, a Darwinian perspective suggests
that, in reality, there are frequent conflicts between leaders and followers. The criteria in
evolutionary theory is relative reproductive success, that is, how well individuals do,
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 28
compared to others, in terms of propagating their genes into subsequent generations (Barrett
et al., 2002). Consequently, in nature, competition is likely to be the rule and cooperation the
exception. Humans are slightly odd in that the benefits associated with cooperation are so
substantial that we have evolved into an ultrasocial species. Nevertheless, human nature is at
best ambivalent, torn between cooperation and competition (Boehm, 1999; Hogan, 1982).
Leader-follower relationships are an example. These adaptations have evolved to reap
the benefits of coordinated action. At the same time, coordinated actions frequently produce
unequal outcomes such that leaders benefit more than followers (Figure 1). This creates
constant tension between leaders and followers. Leaders want to maintain or increase their
relative benefits, whereas followers want to reduce their relative losses. This creates selection
pressures for self-serving leadership behaviors as well as selection pressures for undermining
the self-serving activities of leaders.
Staying in Power
There are at least five strategies that leaders use to maintain their privileged positions
(Diamond, 1997). The first two are prosocial, because they benefit both leaders and
followers. First, leaders can strengthen their position by redistributing the gains of collective
action generously and fairly among followers. Anthropological research suggests that, across
many different societies, generosity is one of the most important traits in a leader (Boehm,
1993; Brown, 1991). Interestingly, in hunter-gatherer societies the head man gets to eat fist
when large game is killed but all members of the hunting party eat equivalent portions
(Boehm, 1999). Social psychological studies have also shown that promoting fair outcomes
increases the legitimacy of and support for leaders (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
A second prosocial strategy involves providing security for followers. Group members
are always at risk for attack from hostile outgroups and unhappy ingroup members (Chagnon,
1997). Leaders who effectively reduce these threats tend to receive greater respect and
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 29
endorsement. For example, in a recent survey, Winston Churchill was voted the Greatest
Briton of all times, primarily for his contribution as Prime Minister during the Second World
War. In post-war France, Charles De Gaulle, the leader of the French resistance, won this
election (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2005). In addition, leaders must also be seen to deal effectively
with violence, cheating, and other antisocial behaviors (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; Van
Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Because conflict resolution is so important for the cohesion of a
group, a leader’s impartiality, honesty and neutrality are seen as essential leader traits (Tyler
& Lind, 1992).
Using evidence from many hunter-gatherer societies, Boehm (1993) concluded that “a
desirable leader is likely to be of high social standing, generous, wise, experienced,
successful in what he does, and self-assertive in general. It also helps if he is fair minded,
tactful, reliable,, morally upright, apt at resolving disputes and a competent speaker.”
Nonetheless, it is often easier for leaders to maintain their privileged position by adopting a
more selfish strategy. The most obvious strategy is to distribute the outcomes from
coordinated action to their allies. Although leaders’ corruption and nepotism undermine
societies, there is little systematic research on the matter. Anecdotal evidence from
investigative journalists suggests that the practice is widespread in some countries. Pitt
(1985) reports that over 90 % of company managers in South Africa had observed colleagues
taking bribes from suppliers.
Another more obvious exploitative strategy is to physically dominate and coerce
followers. Once people emerge as leaders and gain a privileged position, it is easy to
strengthen this position by limiting the choices of followers. This is often justified by
appealing to civil disorder, which enhances the perceived need for coercive leadership (Bass,
1990). In essence, tyrants do what they want with little regard for the needs and concerns of
followers (Figure 3a), and those that do not comply with their dictates are punished. In an
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 30
ingenious laboratory experiment, Kipnis (1972) showed that when leaders of small groups
were given coercive powers (penalizing poor performing members), they were more likely to
use this power, regardless of the performance of the group members. This finding is
consistent with the old saying that “power corrupts, but absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
A more subtle but selfish strategy is to impose an ideology that justifies one’s position
as leader. Throughout history, leaders have adopted religions which give them and their
descendants privileged access to resources -- the divine right of kings. In traditional
chiefdoms, the chief either combines the offices of political leader and priest, or he supports
an elite priesthood who justify the chief’s position (Diamond, 1997). Modern monarchies use
the same methods to justify hereditary leadership. Furthermore, charismatic leaders gain
influence by their connection to a religious or political ideology. Why do followers accept
this farce? The evolutionary anthropologists Tiger and Fox (1971) note that “We are so
committed to the notion of hierarchy that even our mightiest leaders must subserve to
something or someone” (p. 52).
Leveling The Power of Leaders
Our ambivalence model suggests that, in order to reap the benefits of group
coordination, followers would have developed a range of counteracting strategies to monitor
their leaders, control them, and, if necessary, reduce their power position. These strategies –
which can be referred to as “leveling” mechanisms (Boehm, 1999) -- presumably have an
evolutionary basis as well, because they enable individuals to reap the benefits of coordinated
action without paying excessive costs (e.g., losing autonomy, being exploited ). As in a
nuclear arms race, follower strategies have co-evolved with leader strategies in order to
undermine the exploitative intentions of leaders. The result is an evolutionary stable
equilibrium that balances the benefits to leaders and followers. Yet, in any particular
environment, the balance can shift in favor of the leaders or the followers, and this may
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 31
explain the variability in leadership structures that are found across human groups and
societies today.
What strategies do followers use to curtail the power of leaders? Drawing on Boehm
(1999), we suggest the following. The first tactic involves undermining the authority of
leaders by gossiping privately about them or by holding meetings in which the leader’s
decisions are scrutinized publicly. Leaders’ decisions in hunter-gatherer and Big Man
societies are largely overridden by group decision-making, often in public meetings and
through the manipulation of minorities by the majority (Meggitt, 1977). Human societies
across the world show remarkable consistency in the use of private gossip and public debate
to control the decision-making of leaders.
A second control strategy is to criticize and ridicule leaders openly. In African and
South American tribes, for example, people shout down leading hunters who become
overassertive (Maybury-Lewis, 2000). In the Philippines, when a chief misbehaves, he may
be publicly criticized and if he tries to give commands, he is rebuffed (Freeman, 1970). In
modern society, it is largely the role of the media (TV, newspapers, and internet) to criticize
self-serving leaders, who are often caricatured in cartoons.
Third, group members may simply disobey self-aggrandizing leaders. Among the
Bedouin, leaders who tried to impress European visitors by exercising their authority were
simply disobeyed. Freeman (1970) reports that Phillipine chiefs who issue commands as
opposed to suggestions are ignored. In traditional African societies, leaders cannot order
people to do things that they do not want to do. Disobeying leaders can be effective, because
they are sanctioned without being replaced.
Fourth, followers ostracize or shun exploitative leaders. Moore (1972) reports that,
when aggressive tribal leaders start a feud, the tribesmen distance themselves by no longer
regarding them as one of theirs. This allows rival groups to kill the ostracized leader with
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 32
impunity because he is no longer defended by his group. The social psychological literature
confirms that ostracism is a severe group sanction with implications for the mental and
physical well-being of the ostracized (Williams & Sommer, 1997).
Fifth, followers can depose selfish leaders and turn them into ordinary group members.
Field research shows that chiefs are deposed for attempting gross injustices or for failing to
consult about important decisions. Leaders who become violent or behave immorally may
also be replaced. In some African tribes, stingy leaders are also routinely removed from
office (Lewis, 1974), suggesting the importance of sharing. Sometimes followers simply
desert an exploitative leader. This reaction has been observed in both African and South
American societies (Boehm, 1999). An experimental study in social psychology found that
attrition rates in groups supervised by autocratic leaders are four times higher than in groups
supervised by a democratic or laissez-faire style leader (Van Vugt et al., 2004). As a
consequence, many of the autocratically led groups collapsed before the experiment was
over.
Finally, selfish leaders may be assassinated. The chief of a South American tribe was
killed for making private deals with outsiders (Boehm, 1993). In New Guinea, a Big man
who seriously oversteps his prerogatives can be killed by the community (Hogbin, 1951).
Political murders also occur in modern society. In US-history, several presidents have been
murdered and some survived attempts on their lives, making it one of the most dangerous
jobs in the world.
Ambivalence Model of Leadership
Gossip, criticism, ridicule, disobedience, ostracism, desertion, and violence are key
strategies for reducing the exploitative tendencies of leaders. Both the self-serving strategies
of leaders and the leveling strategies of followers reflect our evolutionary history, creating
leader-follower relationships that are fundamentally ambivalent. This ambivalence model
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 33
may explain why human leadership structures are so varied, compared to other social species
(Vehrencamp, 1983).
Under normal conditions, one would expect that the self-serving tendencies of leaders
and the leveling tendencies of followers would balance out, resulting in a structure that is
somewhere between a dictatorship and a true democracy, a de-facto oligarchy perhaps (see
our opening quote about the Universal People; Brown, 1991). Constitutional monarchies, for
example, are a compromise between the interests of monarchs, hereditary leaders, and the
lower ranking members of a society (Tiger & Fox, 1971). However, this balance could be
changed if forces push a group towards the autocratic or democratic end. For example, Hitler
moved a democratic society in an autocratic direction and Germans with authoritarian
attitudes supported the trend (Altemeyer, 1988). In contrast, a democratic leader with a group
of assertive and self-confident followers would push a group towards the democratic end of
the scale.
In addition, external or internal conditions can shift the equilibrium. For example,
during times of war, where quick decisions are often needed, conditions create opportunities
for leaders to exploit followers. Furthermore, under these conditions, it becomes difficult to
criticize, ridicule or desert leaders, thereby firmly shifting the balance of power toward the
leader (Van Vugt et al., 2004). In contrast, in situations where followers can stand up to,
criticize, desert, or take up arms against their leaders, the leadership structure should become
more democratic. Obviously leaders will be tempted to oppose these democratic movements
by restricting criticism (limiting free press), limiting exit opportunities for followers
(selectively granting passports), or disarming them (creating laws against gun possession).
Summary
By viewing leadership as an exchange relationship—the result of strategic interactions
between individuals engaged in coordinated action—a Darwinian perspective can account
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 34
for the variation in leadership styles observed in societies. Based on the assumption that
leader-follower relationships are inherently ambivalent, this analysis makes various
predictions about the type of leadership found in groups, depending upon the interaction
between external and internal conditions as well as the personalities of the actors involved.
Furthermore, this model specifies how leadership changes might come about and what
leadership structures become stabilized in groups over time (all else being equal). These
predictions can be tested using archived data, survey data, and small scale experimental
research.
Conclusions
This article puts forward a Darwinian perspective on the study of leadership, based on
the principles of natural selection and adaptation. Leadership and followership are evolved
designs for solving recurrent coordination problems among individuals. Across evolutionary
time, these complimentary behaviors have become increasingly synchronized and fine-tuned,
becoming part and parcel of human functioning in groups.
We have reviewed the evidence for six key propositions about leadership, emanating
from an evolutionary perspective. First, there is ample evidence that leadership and
followership are adaptive solutions to problems associated with group life, in particular
problems involving group coordination. Second, these decision making problems can be
modeled as coordination games that have presumably been played out across human
evolutionary history. Third, the design for leader and followership is extremely context-
specific. These behaviors are elicited only when there is a need to form coalitional alliances
to achieve certain goals like access to valuable resources or the protection of oneself or one’s
group. Fourth, the interplay between genetic and situational factors accounts for the
variability in human leadership styles, which can range from a despotic and autocratic style
to more benign, democratic styles. Fifth, leadership is based on a complex, dynamic
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 35
interaction between both heritable (genetic) and non-heritable factors. Finally, relationships
between leaders and followers are fundamentally ambivalent. There is a constant tension
between cooperating with each other to achieve mutual goals and competition to stay ahead
of each other in the reproductive game.
Theoretical Issues
Rather than offering a definite account of the evolutionary history of leadership, the
main aim of this article is to build a bridge between various behavioral science disciplines
studying leadership such as anthropology, biology, psychology, and management. As various
researchers have pointed out, there is a wealth of data on leadership but a lack of integration
into a universal theory of leadership (Bass, 1990; Chemers, 2000; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).
Evolutionary theory is a good candidate for such an overarching theory, first, because any
middle-level social, psychological or cultural theory of leadership must ultimately be
consistent with it to be viable. For example, Freud’s psycho-analytic theory of leadership can
ultimately be understood in terms of a fundamental conflict between the reproductive
interests of leaders versus followers (Hogan, 1982). Second, an evolutionary approach
requires researchers to take an interdisciplinary approach by analyzing leadership from many
different angles, including examining the proximal, ultimate, ontogenetic and phylogenetic
causes of leadership.
Misconceptions. There are certain misconceptions about the evolutionary perspective
that might prevent it being incorporated in the study of leadership (Kenrick & Simpson,
1997). The first is that genes cannot influence complex social behaviors like leadership. Yet
there are a host of equally complex actions that, according to experts, have deep evolutionary
roots such as altruism, group identity, political, and religious behaviors (Boyd & Richerson,
2005; Van Vugt & Van Lange, in press; D. S. Wilson, 2002). A second misconception that
we have refuted is that evolutionary explanations imply genetic determinism and ignore the
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 36
role of the environment. But genes associated with leadership can only become manifest in
the context of a particular environment, for example, when leadership is required due to an
intergroup or intragroup threat (Sherif, 1966; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).
A related misconception is that culture is more important than genes. Yet this is a false
dichotomy in that culture, or at least the capacity for social learning, is ultimately also a
product of evolution (Barrett et al., 2002). Moreover, cultural innovations that are successful
can spread through a population in much the same way as genes – so-called memes (Boyd &
Richerson, 2005; Dawkins, 1976). An evolutionary analysis of leadership memes seems
therefore quite appropriate. Finally, cultural improvements ultimately affect gene frequencies
in a population via the process of natural selection and adaptation (Boyd & Richerson, 2005).
For example, leadership in proto-human groups may have started as a cultural innovation
initially, but by virtue of its success on group life, it influenced the genetic make-up of early
humans.
A final misconception is that leadership researchers can ignore evolutionary
explanations because they operate at a different level of analysis. This would be a mistake. If
we want to understand leadership, we simply cannot ignore studying the cross-cultural, cross-
special and ontogenetic similarities and differences in the manifestation of leader and
followership.
Why an evolutionary perspective? There are a number of reasons why we think
leadership researchers should seriously consider a Darwinian perspective. The first is to
avoid saying things about leadership that are clearly wrong. For example, various
psychological theories of leadership assume that the goals of leaders and followers are
interchangeable, and that leaders always work for the good of the group. An evolutionary
perspective makes clear, however, that there is a fundamental tension in the relationship
between leaders and followers. As each is trying to pursue their reproductive goals, there will
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 37
be frequent conflicts of interests, for example, in the distribution of the benefits or burdens of
collective action.
A second reason is to avoid incomplete explanations for leadership phenomena. An
evolutionary analysis delineates that there is little point in studying leadership without
examining the motives and desires of followers (Yukl, 1999). In many ways, followership is
the most interesting of the two roles from an evolutionary perspective, because the benefits
of following are not always clear-cut. A more specific example is research on leader
categorization theory (Lord et al., 1986; Lord & Maher, 1991). This body of research shows
that followers have fairly stable impressions regarding the desired attributes in their leaders --
so-called leader prototypes. Examples of leader prototypes are intelligence, determination,
and honesty. An evolutionary account can help to understand where these intuitive beliefs
about leadership come from, why they are likely to be universal, and why they are so readily
accessible. Evolutionary theory can thus provide the underpinnings for such social-cognitive
models of leadership.
A third reason for adopting an evolutionary approach is to account for findings that are
difficult to explain with traditional leadership theories. A major criticism of leadership
research is that it has failed to account adequately for the relationship between leadership and
a diversity of factors such as age, height, weight, health, appearance, and speech fluency
(Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974). Such patterns begin to make more sense if one assumes that
evolution has selected for attendance to cues that signal leadership potential or ability. In
ancient history (and sometimes today) it would be potentially lethal to follow the wrong
person, for example, in moving a long distance towards a fresh water hole (Gamble, 1993).
Information about the health status and physical attributes of a leader would thus be
important to consider.
Practical Matters
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 38
Our Darwinian analysis suggests various new directions for leadership research. There
is already considerable evidence for the proximate benefits of leadership for those who
occupy such positions, but future research might want to address whether this is paid out in
reproductive success (Betzig, 1986; Perusse, 1993). Furthermore, what are the benefits of
leadership for those that follow? According to our analysis, loyal followers should be better
off under leaders that are good, but they should suffer under bad forms of leadership
compared to more opportunistic followers. Future studies could use data from businesses and
other organizations to test whether this is true.
Laboratory research is also needed to examine decision making in experimental games
like leader (Figure 1) to find out if there are personality differences that can meaningfully
predict whether some people are more likely to make a risky first move. For example, do
risky choices correlate with indices of empathy, extraversion, risk-taking, and
Machiavellianism? Furthermore, do choices in the Leader game correspond to displays of
leadership in the real-world? To our knowledge, there have been very few studies on the
Leader Game (Kremer & Mack, 1983) in contrast to, for example, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004).
Finally, cross-cultural data could be gathered to examine the similarities and
differences in leadership and followership style across diverse societies. Although we believe
that the human potential for engaging in leader-follower relationships is universal, there
might be cultural factors determining the exact nature of this relationship. Differences in
climate, food provision, kin relations, intergroup rivalries, and status hierarchies within
groups might determine the type of leadership that is most likely to emerge in a particular
culture. For instance, the hierarchical style leadership and the importance of seniority
leadership that one finds in collectivistic cultures in East Asia (Hofstede, 1980) might well be
the product of a less mobile society in which people tend to stay in one place longer. Because
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 39
exit options are limited, power differences between superiors and subordinates are enhanced.
Similarly, we expect more aggressive and coercive forms of authority and leadership in
cultures in which conflicts between neighboring communities are frequent (Chagnon, 1997).
Before closing we should not some implications of a Darwinian perspective on
leadership. One implication is derived from the assumption that leadership is the product of
the particular phylogenetic history of humans as a highly social and highly organized species.
This unique history puts constraints on the way humans organize their societies. For
example, unlike gorillas or even chimpanzees, a leadership system based exclusively on
dominance, coercion and threat is not sustainable. Human leaders can not ignore the wishes
and preferences of followers for too long, otherwise they are ridiculed, replaced, put in
prison, or sometimes even killed. As Boehm (1999) states “it only takes one little arrow.”
Dictatorship is the right theory, but simply for the wrong species.
A second implication from a Darwinian account is that the relationship between leaders
and followers is always likely to contain elements of an Arms race in which both parties have
an incentive to cooperate as well as compete. While leaders will look for ways to extend their
power base, followers must try to keep leaders in place through a combination of subtle and
sometimes aggressive tactics. From the perspective of followers, their best outcome is to give
leaders the opportunity to strengthen their privileged position through prosocial means like
honesty, generosity, and offering safety and protection. Yet at the same time, leaders will
always be tempted to exploit their position for selfish means by benefiting themselves and
their close relatives (nepotism). Recognizing the fundamental ambivalence in the relationship
between leaders and followers is perhaps the greatest merit of a Darwinian model of
leadership.
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 40
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EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 50
Author Notes
Correspondence regarding this manuscript may be sent to Mark van Vugt, University of
Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP, England, [email protected].
Portions of this paper were presented at the EAESP leadership small group meeting in
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, June 2003 and the Human Behavior and Evolution conference
in Austin, US, June 2005
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 51
Tables
Table 1. Propositions about leadership and followership from an evolutionary perspective
Propositions Descriptions
___________________________________________________________________________
1 Leadership and followership are adaptive decision rules
2 Leadership and followership are strategies for group
coordination
3 Leadership emerges in response to group threats and
opportunities
4 Leadership styles are flexible
5 Leadership can be both a state and trait
6 Leader-follower relationships are fundamentally
ambivalent
_____________________________________________________________________
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 52
Table 2. Results Supporting the Evolutionary Game Hypothesis of Leadership
Hypothesis Rationale Result Reference
1. Leadership
correlates with
initiative taking
Those who take the
initiative are more
likely to emerge as
leaders
Leadership
correlates with the
following trait
measures:
- activity and
energy levels
- ambition
- assertiveness
- extraversion
- shyness (negative)
- active
participation in
group discussion
- initiating structure
is one of the
primary leadership
activities
Bray & Howard
(1983)
Gough (1984)
Sorrentino &
Boutilllier (1975)
(Hemphill, 1950)
2. Leadership
correlates with (social)
intelligence
More (socially)
intelligent persons
know better what
group action is
- Leadership
correlates with
general measures of
intelligence
Bass (1990)
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 53
needed and what
followers want
- Verbal ability
correlates most
strongly with
leadership
- Sociability
predicts leadership
- Individuals who
appear more
intelligent (high
Machs) emerge
more often as
leaders
Korman (1968)
Kenny & Zaccaro
(1983)
Christie & Geiss
(1970)
3. Leaders Show
Competence
Individuals would
only follow a leader
if they can be sure
the leader achieves
his goals
- Leadership in a
particular domain
correlates with
expertise in that
domain
- The successful
head of an
accounting
department is a
better accountant
than most
- Group members
are more willing to
Aidar (1989)
(Tsui, 1984)
Hollander (1985)
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 54
follow directions
from those with
task ability
4. Leadership
correlates with
generosity
Followers are more
dedicated to leaders
that show a
willingness to share
- Leadership
correlates with self-
sacrifice in social
dilemmas
- Leaders score
high on trust scale
- Leaders who are
procedurally and
distributively fair
get more support
- Stingy leaders are
replaced
De Cremer & Van
Knippenberg
(2002) Hardy &
van Vugt (2005)
Sgro, Worchel,
Pence, & Orban
(1980)
Thibaut & Walker
(1975)
Tyler & Lind
(1992)
Boehm (1999)
5. Leadership
correlates with health
Individuals expect
their leaders to
deliver long-term
benefits
- Leaders appear to
possess above-
average health
- prospective
leaders (e.g.,
presidential
candidates) must
appear healthy to be
elected
Bass (1990)
Marmot (2004)
Simonton (1994)
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 55
6. Leaders are
wealthier than
followers
Leaders benefit
more from
coordinated action
than followers
Leadership
correlates with all
kinds of socio-
economic indices of
wealth:
- income
- class
- education
- property
- Village leaders are
of higher caste and
have more property
Switzer (1975)
Roy et al. (1974)
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 56
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Leader Game; When Leader-Follower Patterns Emerge;
Figure 2a. Dominance Game; When Leaders Dictate the Outcomes of Followers;
Figure 2b. Democratic Game; When Leaders Must Share Power With Followers;
Figure 3a. Coordination Game; When Leaders and Followers Want the Same Thing;
Figure 3b. Conflict Game; When Followers Are Reluctant;
Figure 4a. Leader Game;
Figure 4b. Hero Game; When Followers Become Leaders;
Notes with Figures: The first value is for Player 1, and the second for Player 2; The pay-
offs represent fitness benefits (+) or costs (-) for the actors involved.
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 57
Figure 1
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
0,0
200,100
100,200
-100,-100
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 58
Figure 2a
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
0,0
200,100
100,200
100,-100
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 59
Figure 2b
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
50,50
150,50
50,150
-50,-50
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 60
Figure 3a
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
0,0
150,150
150,150
-100,-100
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 61
Figure 3b
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
0,0
300,0
0,300
-100,-100
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 62
Figure 4a
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
0,0
200,100
100,200
-100,-100
EVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP 63
Figure 4b
Player 2
Player 1
Wait
Move
Wait Move
0,0
100,200
200,100
-100,-100