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EQUAL PROTECTIONPeople of the Philippines vs Cayat
EqualProtectionRequisites of a Valid Classification Bar
from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-
Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of
their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the
Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this
Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to
be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt
but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He
averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an
attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as
inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with
their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equalprotection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the
requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasizedthat it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classificationrests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth
or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-
Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the
contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of
the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of
their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those
privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as
there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in
fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of theirprogress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with
their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC95 SCRA 392L-52245January 22, 1980
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor ofNueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions theconstitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that
.Any retired elective provincial city or municipal officia
who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been
65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for
the same elective local office from which he has retired. He
likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously
against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds,
therefore, class legislation.
Issue:Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 isvalid.
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, whohas retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee
has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change ofmind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason
that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny
equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all lega
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is
not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to
the same class.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
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Ramon Ceniza et al vs COMELEC, COA & National Treasurer
EqualProtectionGerrymandering
Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to
give an unfair advantage to the party in power.
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC
adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in
chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter),
highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, andcomponent cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting
in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other
hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly
urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list
of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in
behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or
Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the
constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They
said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is
a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners
claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind
the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of
Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is
politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick
and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,
close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would
be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the
province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of
Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver
that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including
Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not
allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is
inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane
to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for andregulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore
such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal
protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equalprotection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards thefullest autonomy of local government units. In the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis.
The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province,
city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval
by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement
that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is
prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the
creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence
on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and
component cities on the basis of their regular annual income
is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city
would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic
and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued
support of the provincial government thus justifying thecontinued participation of the voters in the election of
provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City
are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in
other component cities are allowed to vote for provincia
officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincia
officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another
component city is a matter of legislative discretion which
violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of
suffrage.
Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of thePhilippines
EqualProtectionCreation of the Sandiganbayan
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the
Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused
before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents committed in connivance
with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases
It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative
of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayanproceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection
becauseappeal as a matter of right became minimized into
a mere matter of discretion;appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the
facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to
appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and
facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and
thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violatesequal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution hadprovided for the creation of a special court that shall have
original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials
charged with graft and corruption. The constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court
the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be
tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into
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force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met
the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane
to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of
the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are
reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showingthat decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached
than other trial courts.
Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds
not belonging to the government or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to
appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and
thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds
are on the same category as graft and corruption committed
by public officers, who, under the decree creating the
Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par.3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606).The fact that the Sandiganbayan is acollegiate trial court does not generate any substantial
distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three
judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of
justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by
one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual
competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a
review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly
ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the
decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the
SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power ofthe SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or
conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving
offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions
of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by
the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in
criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to
review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the
evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment
and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and
prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the
Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV,
1973 Constitution).
PASEI vs DRILON163 SCRA 380
Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., isengaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males andfemales. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting
to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states
where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to
ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification inthe challenged Department Order No. 1.
Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there hasbeen valid classification, the Filipino female domestics
working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no
question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract
workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equalitybefore the law under the constitution does not import a
perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantia
distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to trave
does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of public safety as
may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic
helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as
been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the
DOLE with rule making powers.
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Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary PetePrado et al
EqualProtectionFranking Privilege of the Judiciary
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal
Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the
total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of
this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice
and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759.Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to
P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners
reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The
postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable
volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must
be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented
Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the
said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the
communication within the judiciary as it may impair the
sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is
discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the
Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of
others such as the executive, former executives and their
widows among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equalprotection before the law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equalprotection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege
so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is
the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs.
The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the
removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order
to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster
would intend to cut expenditure by removing the frankingprivilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the
franking privilege all at once from all the other departments.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether
from all agencies of the government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or
may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and
the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al
EqualProtectionIn 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be
paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company
Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one
per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a
production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on
the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable;
the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is
exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest
averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose
an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or
otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative
to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being
liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in
the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equa
protection.HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted thateven if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a
latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized
LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of thei
turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection
The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifuga
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification,
to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from
the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a simila
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company
Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
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Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy
EqualProtectionOil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history
shows that the government has always been finding ways to
alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such
law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA
8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products
from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operaterefineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,
subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on
imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the
3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil
refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in
the downstream oil industry who do not have their own
refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products
from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products
and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly
which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied
that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled
by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and
Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil
market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As
the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of
existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differentialof 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts
and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a
high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that
intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and
Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend
billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but
compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of
increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing
on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff
differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.
Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell
and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an
idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it
discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed
them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established
oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions
already being observed by the latter.
CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS)EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKOSENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARYRESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act)
took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP
and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the last
proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall:
(c) Establish a human resource management system which
shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer
promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shal
aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of
the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies
and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shal
be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentrals human resource development program: ProvidedThat the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform
as closely as possible with the principles provided for unde
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided
however, that compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed unde
Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is
that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP
officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-
and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It
is contended that this classification is a classic case of class
legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnels position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the
purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most
important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the
following sub-set of arguments:
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a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the
questioned proviso does not appear in the original and
amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 1235;
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file
employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats
the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and
excellence eat all levels in the BSP;
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendmentsintroduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235,
without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law,
and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against
low-salaried employees of the BSP;
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from
the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file
personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP
rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization
among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross
disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP
officers.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not
reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause,
which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the proviso in question without affecting the other
provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition,
as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been
prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented.
Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso
has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation
of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has noappeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course except through this petition for
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of,
considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue
involved.
Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause and
can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as
fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound
principles of management.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive
Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to
prevailing laws and policies of the national government.
ISSUE:
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in
this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c)
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutiona
mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equa
protection of the laws."
RULING:
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS
VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges
indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection"
clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable.
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs
FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF
THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within
the legislatures power, we hold that the enactment ofsubsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees o
other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance
be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts
and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another
time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its
practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay fo
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equa
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
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Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid
classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except when they run
afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.
When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety
of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been
proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court,
but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any
inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill
proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the
SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the rational basis test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial
of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak
and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether
the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private
person or the government itself or one of itsinstrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional
or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of
the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions
or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by
the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the
judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are
the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential
form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and
the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority
nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are
under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the
highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution - to settle it.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the
basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin
to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the
higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld
from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive highe
compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are
limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications
are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid
the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees
higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given highercompensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering
that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist o
people whose status and rank in life are less and limited
especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the
officers - who have the real economic and financial need for
the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard
of living, and improve the quality of life for all. Any act of
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater
concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent
rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees
in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a
collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file
employees represent the politically powerless and they
should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their
unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited
for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be
asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be givenany waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save
them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation
and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
LAO ICHONG VS JAIME HERNANDEZ
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by
Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the
country to take advantage of business opportunities herein
abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954
when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to
Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the
RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection
clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese
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businessman engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersedetreaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generallyaccepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
1180. The equal protection of the law clause does notdemand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause
is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a
treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute
must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence,
Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.
PEOPLE VS. DELA PIEDRA
FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria LourdesModesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends
Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of
Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is
there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela
Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived.Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit
down.
They listened to the recruiter who was then talking
about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the
visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee
and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was
P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The
recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.
Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-
data forms and were required to submit pictures and a
transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave theinitial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that
she was authorized to receive the money.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie
Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an
unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the
recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected
illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain
Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where
the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon
arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos
entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos
remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he
was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos
even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about
the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and
the documents that the applicants have to comply with
Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio
data form in hand.
Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt
Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to
organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A
surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report
After which, a raid was executed.
Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by
the trial court of illegal recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for
illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the
constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crimeFirst, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code
defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness
and, thus, violates the due process clause.
The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) Recruitment andplacement refers to any
act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring orprocuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract
services, promising or
advertising for
employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That anyperson or entity which, inany manner, offers orpromises for a feeemployment to two ormore persons shall be
deemed engaged inrecruitment andplacement.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, asamended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is
unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and
therefore should be exculpated
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HELD:
(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment andplacement is void for vagueness and, thus,
violates the due process clause.Due process requires that the terms of a
penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their
part will render them liable to its penalties.
In support of her submission, dela Piedra
invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court
criticized the definition of recruitment and
placement.
The Court ruled, however, that her
reliance on the said case was misplaced.
The issue in Panis was whether, under the
proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal
recruitment could be committed only whenever
two or more persons are in any manner promised oroffered any employment for a fee. In this case, the
Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that
would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso.
The absence of such records notwithstanding, the
Court was able to arrive at a reasonable
interpretation of the proviso by applying principles
in criminal law and drawing from the language and
intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is
not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is
merely couched in imprecise language that was
salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for
vagueness.
Dela Piedra further argues that the acts thatconstitute recruitment and placement suffer from
overbreadth since by merely referring a person
for employment, a person may be convicted ofillegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant
apparently considers as customary and harmless acts
such as labor or employment referral (referring
an applicant, according to appellant, foremployment to a prospective employer) does not
render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra
misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it
operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or
religion. A generally worded statute, when
construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague
to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning o
the boundary between the constitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute.
(2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes theequal protection clause in her defense. Shepoints out that although the evidence purportedly
shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out
application forms and even received Lourdes
Modestos payment, appellant was the only one
criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand,
remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that
the prosecution discriminated against her on
grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a
Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and
the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The Supreme Court held that the
argument has no merit.
The prosecution of one guilty person whileothers equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The unlawful administration by officers of a statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application
to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not
a denial of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory
purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing
of clear and intentional discrimination.
In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to
show that, in charging her, there was a clear and
intentional discrimination on the part of the
prosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that the
prosecuting officers regularly performed their
duties, and this presumption can be overcome only
by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.
As said earlier, accused has not presented any
evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere
allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged
with the commission of a crime, while a
Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes,
was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that
the prosecution officers denied appellant equal
protection of the laws.
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SEARCHES & SEIZURES
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary
investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery
filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale
harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining
Arangales land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted therecords of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding
that there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in
the complaint. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records
was premature because Judge Samulde failed to include
the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge
Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that
although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not
believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a
mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to
issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the
performance of the act to be required of the judge and that
the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless,
Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with
Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether it
is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the
accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that
there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited
the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE
INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the
1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to holdthe accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should
issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing
and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by
searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a
probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the
accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely
discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for
the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the
accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to
his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead,
have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-
60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and theycertified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had
been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found.
Upon receipt of said informations, respondent judge set the
hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of
issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court
affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary
evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the
exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of
probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for
certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue
warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals
certification in the informations of the existence of probable
cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issuewarrants of arrest
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for thepurpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to
submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for theexistence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the
judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a
warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing
magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals certification and require submission of
the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the
conclusion as to existence of probable cause
Petition dismissed.
Soliven vs Makasiar
on October 29, 2011
Constitutional Law PresidentsImmunity From Suit Must
Be Invoked by the President
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with
others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself
filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasia
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because
this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his
contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued
However, if a president would sue then the president wouldallow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may
not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus
she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked byBeltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of theprivilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
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distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a
criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
Enrile vs Salazar
on October 30, 2011
Constitutional Law Political Question Restriction to the
exercise of judicial power
In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged
together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt.
Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed
for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged
against him is non existent. That he was charged with a
criminal offense in an information for which no complaint
was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted,hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or Enriles arrest is valid. HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was deniedbail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle
one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him
however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated
murders the intention of the prosecution was to make
rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty
thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such
crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple
Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those
that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is
absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC
however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that
should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be
admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts
before petitioning for habeas corpus. The SC further notes
that there is a need to restructure the law on rebellion as it is
being used apparently by others as a tool to disrupt the peace
and espouse violence. The SC can only act w/in the bounds of
the law. Thus SC said There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illega
activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyondinterpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly
within its province.
HO vs PEOPLE (1997)Panganiban, J.
FACTS On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of thePhilippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S
Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678
respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and
Leonardo Odoo. The complaint was for alleged violation o
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer
from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of
the government if it is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being then
the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a
government-owned or controlled corporation organized and
operating under the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the
President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private
corporation organized and operating under our Corporationlaw, was said to have entered without legal justification into a
negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the
NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of
P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was
entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they
have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the
Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping
Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 pe
Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation.
Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in
determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the
resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without
other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled
jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in personally
determining the existence of probable cause, must have
before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties
other than the information filed by the investigating
prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance
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of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be merely
described in a prosecutors resolution.
Sandiganbayans Denial: Considering, therefore, that this
Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the
information in this case in the determination of whether
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts
and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of
responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of thewarrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought for, cannot
be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly
shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the
facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the
preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the
entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced
before it, including the evidence submitted by the
complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to
be an exercise in futility.
ISSUE May a judge determine probable cause and issue awarrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the
prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the
preliminary investigation, without having before him any of
the evidence (such as complainants affidavit, respondents
counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been
submitted at the preliminary investigation?
DECISION & RATIO NO.
Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2, 1987
Constitution)
The word personally does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present
Constitutions intent to place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
under the previous Charters.
Soliven vs. Makasiar: In satisfying himself of theexistence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
People vs. Inting: There is a difference between thejudges goal from that of the prosecutors.
First, the determination of probable cause is a
function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincia
Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain.Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a
Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause.
Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries
are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the
objectives.
The Court, in this case, reiterated and elaborated on thedoctrine laid down in People vs. Inting and ruled that:
First, as held in Inting, the determination o
probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose
different from that which is to be made by the judge
Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes
upon. The judge, on the other hand, determine
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for
placing him under immediate custody in order not tofrustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both
should base their findings on one and the same
proceeding or evidence, there should be no
confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the
judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutors
report will support his own conclusion that there is
reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold
him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report
upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to
issue an arrest order. This responsibility o
determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is
lodged in him by no less than the most basic law o
the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease
the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation
process by forwarding to the latter not only the
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information and his bare resolution finding probable
cause, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to
issue a warrant of arrest
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or
entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the
judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the completerecords of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What
is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause. The point is: he
cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this
case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions, which in turn gives his
report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance
of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently
held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies
merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.
IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied fully and
completely upon the resolution of the graft investigationofficer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor,
attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture
that the Ombudsman would not have approved their
recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no
other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines) or the People from which to
sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists.
Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of
discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of
arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the
issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such
bare findings and recommendation.
Salazar Vs. Achacoso Case DigestSalazar Vs. Achacoso183 SCRA 145G.R. No. 81510March 14, 1990
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filedwith the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.
Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a
telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the
complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated
that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that
petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deployworkers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was
then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen
went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a
certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team
confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a
letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,
because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said
Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated
sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated
against her will and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of
the Labor Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of
seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on
Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We
reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The
power of the President to order the arrest of aliens fo
deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to orde
arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the
one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in
the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the
warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically
the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph
(c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return al
materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search
and Seizure Order No. 1205.
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ALVAREZ VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABASG.R. No. L-45358, January 29 1937
FACTS:
The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez
David, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, the petitioner kept in his house, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him
in connection with his activities as a money-lender chargingusurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by
him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the
Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock
on the night, and seized and took possession of the following
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936,
one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books,
four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three
bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of
purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of
lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of
purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one
receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles
of invoices and other papers many documents and loan
contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,
promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corporation.
The search for and a seizure of said articles were made withthe opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below
the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents.
As the articles had not been brought immediately to the
judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through
his attorney, filed a motion, praying that the agent, be
ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the
office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared
guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.
HELD:
No. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the
following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely
upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal
knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because
the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal
proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner
for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it
does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles
were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place
indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at
night.
Mata vs Bayona
G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination ofwitnessesFACTS:Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree(PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against
him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged
bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as
Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai
Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing
of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of
the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so
that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts,
and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the
court. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion
to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court
has made a thorough investigation and examination under
oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members
of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II
INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect;
and that the fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the
criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does
not specify when these documents are to be attached to the
records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court,
with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that
the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in
the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE:WON the judge must before issuing the warrantpersonally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions
in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him?
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HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrantshallissue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. More
emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that thejudgemust before issuing the warrant personally examine on oathor affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attachthem to the record, in addition to any affidavits presentedto him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnessesare thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to takedepositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence
of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search
on the premises of MetropolitanMailand WeForum
newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been
used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issuedfor the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable
cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one
and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to
the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure
of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two
warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and
immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place
sought to be searched set forth in the application. The
purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties,
the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill
Co. v. Castillo,ruling thatmachinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of
the tenement, property or plant, but not so when p