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Effectiveness of the
Convention on Nuclear
Safety (CNS)
International Conference on Effective
Nuclear Regulatory Systems
Vienna, 12 April 2016
Dr. Georg Schwarz, Deputy Director General ENSI
Annatina Müller, Head International Affairs ENSI
Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Condederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra
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The CNS in brief
The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) was
adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994 and entered
into force on 24 October 1996:
• The Convention is a legally binding instrument;
• So far there have been six Review Meetings
(1999, 2002, 2005 2008, 2011 and 2014) and
two Extraordinary Meetings (2009 and 2012);
• As of April 2015, there are 78 Contracting
Parties (CPs) to the Convention and 10 signatory
states that have not yet ratified the Convention.
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The CNS is an incentive Convention
Regulation: The CNS defines the
basic safety standards which shall
be met by Contracting Parties (CP)
Verification: Compliance is
based on a self-assessment
by the CPs and a Peer
Review
Enforcement: The CNS does not
provide for any type of enforcement.
In addition, the contents of the
debates are confidential
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Basic obligations of the CNS
Being a Contracting Party (CP) to the CNS implies
the following three essential commitments:
• To prepare and submit a National Report for
peer review by other CPs and to respond to the
written questions submitted by other CPs;
• To attend the Review Meetings of CPs;
• To participate actively in the review process in
order to allow other CPs to discuss the report and
seek clarification.
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Contracting Parties to the CNS
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Compliance with the CNS obligations
The Summary Report of the 6th Review Meeting
lists the following non-compliances with the
obligations of the CNS:
• Eleven CPs did not submit a National Report;
• Four CPs submitted their National Report after
the deadline for the submission of questions;
• Seven CPs did not attend the Review Meeting;
• Thirty-four CPs did not post any question or
comments.
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Countries with NPPs
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Significance of CPs with NPPs
CPs with NPPs in operation, permanent
shutdown or under construction:
• Have to report on Articles 6 to 19 of the CNS in
their National Reports;
• The CNS Review Meetings provide a unique
overview of nuclear safety provisions and
issues of these CPs;
• This is especially important for neighboring
countries to those operating NPPs.
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Non complying countries with NPPs
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Countries embarking on nuclear power
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Countries embarking on nuclear power
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Significance of CPs embarking on
nuclear power
CPs planning the construction of their first NPP:
• Are encouraged to report on Articles 7 to 19 of
the CNS in their National Reports;
• All necessary steps taken, or planned to be
taken, prior to the commencement of
construction of the plant with regard to long-
term planning and establishment of the
requisite infrastructure should be described.
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Non complying embarking countries
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Countries with no NPPs planned or in
operation
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Non nuclear Contracting Parties
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Significance of CPs with no NPP
planned or in operation
CPs with no nuclear power plant planned or in
operation:
• Have to report on Articles 7, 8 and 16 of the
CNS in their National Reports;
• In addition these CPs are invited to report on
other types of civilian reactors than NPPs on a
voluntary basis;
• A number of CPs use that possibility to submit
their regulatory infrastructure or the safety of
their research reactors to a voluntary peer
review process.
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Non complying non nuclear countries
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How to improve the CNS?
The analysis of the deficits identified during the 6th
Review Meeting leads to the following areas of
improvements:
• Extension of membership: Encouraging
countries operating NPPs or planning to construct
NPPs to ratify the CNS;
• Improving compliance: Encouraging countries
embarking on nuclear power to actively
participate in the CNS review process;
• Improving the peer review: Clearer guidance,
process improvements, more transparency.
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Improvements to the CNS
Fukushima
Daiichi
Accident
March 2011
Working
Group on
Effectiveness
and
Transparency
6th CNS RM
March/April
2014
Diplomatic
Conference
February
2015
2nd CNS
Extraordinary
Meeting
August 2012
IAEA
Action Plan
September
2011
5th CNS RM
April 2011
Informal
Working
Group IWG
Amended
CNS
Guidelines
INFCRIC
571/572/573
Vienna
Declaration
on Nuclear
Safety
7th CNS RM
April 2017
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Guidance on National Reports
The amendments to INFCIRC 572 include new
reporting requirements inter alia on:
• Peer Review Missions: Planned missions,
publication of review reports;
• Beyond Design Base Accidents: Containment
integrity, SAMG;
• EPR: Resources, multiple reactor sites;
• PSRs: Overview on results, safety culture, hazard re-
evaluation.
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Improvements to the review process
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the peer
review process the 6th RM adopted a number of
amendments to INFCIRC 571:
• Training courses for the Officers;
• Peer review ahead of the RM not limited to asking
questions to other CPs;
• Introduction of the Country Review Report
(replacing the Rapporteur’s Working Document);
• Availability of the National presentations and the
Country Review Reports on the secure web site.
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Transparency and confidentiality
The contents of the debates during the review of the
national reports are confidential. Transparency
enhancements are therefore limited to:
• Encouraging CPs to publish their National Report,
Questions and Answers and their Country Review
Report;
• Invitation of Journalists to the opening session as
well as to the last part of the final session;
• Web stream of parts of the meeting and of the press
conference.
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Improving/strengthening the safety
objectives of the CNS
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Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
Principles for the implementation of the objective of the
CNS to prevent accidents:
• New NPPs are to be designed consistent with the
objective of preventing accidents and, should an
accident occur, mitigating possible releases of
radionuclides causing large or early releases;
• Safety improvements are to be implemented in
existing NPPs that are oriented to meet the above
objective;
• National requirements and regulations for
addressing this objective are to take into account
the relevant IAEA Safety Standards.
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Extension of the National Reports
The Vienna Declaration (VD) contains two
commitments to extend the scope of the National
Reports (NR) starting with the 7th RM:
• The principles of the VD should be reflected in the
NRs, with special focus on Art. 18 as well as other
relevant Articles, including Art. 6, 14, 17 and 19;
• Each NR should include an overview of measures for
the safety improvements identified for existing
NPPs.
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Conclusions
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Conclusions
The CNS was very successful since it was adopted in
1994:
• The CNS covers with few exceptions all operating
and planned NPPs of the world;
• The Guidelines of the CNS have been significantly
improved in the last years;
• It is nearly impossible to amend the CNS even in
the aftermath of a severe nuclear accident.
• It still remains to be proven, if voluntary
declarations like the VDNS lead to a credible and
committed improvement of nuclear safety
worldwide.