Download ppt - DNSSEC 101

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Page 1: DNSSEC  101

•WWW.OIT.DUKE.EDU•

DNSSEC 101Kevin Miller

Page 2: DNSSEC  101

•WWW.OIT.DUKE.EDU•

DNS Underpins Everything

Email

Web

Enterprise

Systems

VoIP

IMCMS

Page 3: DNSSEC  101

•WWW.OIT.DUKE.EDU•

DNS Underpins Everything

Email

Web

Enterprise

Systems

VoIP

IMCMS

Inbound Email VolumeInbound Email Volume

Received EmailSpam, virus filtering using DNSReceived EmailSpam, virus filtering using DNS

10+ DNS QueriesPer Message

10+ DNS QueriesPer Message

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•WWW.OIT.DUKE.EDU•

Risks from DNS Attacks

• Impersonate your web site• Redirect your phone calls• Man-in-the-middle (password theft)• Reroute or block your email• Disrupt your network, application services• Attack vectors for malware (data theft)• Denial of service

Diagram source: Internet Storm Center

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DNS Attack: Cache Poisoning

Where is website.com?Where is website.com?

Answer: 67.11.23.9Also, www.bank.com – 12.1.2.3

Answer: 67.11.23.9Also, www.bank.com – 12.1.2.3

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DNS Attack: Forgery

Where is educause.edu?Where is educause.edu?

Answer: 198.59.61.65Answer: 198.59.61.65

Answer: 12.1.2.3

Answer: 12.1.2.3

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DNS Attack: Indirection

Where is educause.edu?Where is educause.edu?

Answer: 12.1.2.3

Answer: 12.1.2.3

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DNS Attack: Amplification

60 byte request60 byte request

4000 byteresponse

4000 byteresponse

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Software Defects

Buffer overflowOther vectors

Buffer overflowOther vectors

Page 10: DNSSEC  101

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Risk Reduction To Date

• Improving weaknesses in DNS software– Patching software defects– Limiting cache poisoning opportunities

• Improve operational best practices– Restrict access to DNS recursers– Install anti-IP spoofing filters

• Improve host security– Anti-virus, anti-malware defenses

Photo source: BCP38

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DNSSEC

• Cryptographically sign DNS records– Also the absence of records

• Maintains DNS architecture– Hierarchical, distributed signatures

• Significant risk reduction, if used widely– Protects you (www.school.edu)– Protects your users (www.bank.com)

Page 12: DNSSEC  101

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What Can Be Done Now?

• Discover local implications– How do you manage DNS? What tools are used?– What impact would DNSSEC have?– Do your vendors support it?– Can you servers handle DNSSEC overhead?

• Begin building expertise, experience– Sign a test zone– Deploy a test DNSSEC recurser

• Deployment– Sign your zones– Utilize DNSSEC-enabled recurser with DLV

Page 13: DNSSEC  101

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Additional Resources

• http://www.dnssec.net• http://www.bind9.net• http://www.dnsreport.com• http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/• http://www.uoregon.edu/~joe/port53wars/

port53wars.pdf• http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0606/damas.html


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