Office of Aviation Safety
Continental AirlinesFlight 1404Human PerformanceWilliam Bramble, Ph.D.
2
The Captain
• Experienced pilot
• Substantial time in type
• Substantial recent experience
• No history of performance deficiencies
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The Captain (continued)
• No medical issues
• No toxicological impairment
• No stressful life events
• No evidence of fatigue
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The Captain’s InputsRelative wind
Crosswind
Weathervane effect
Right rudder
X
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The Captain’s Inputs (continued)
Rudder pedalHeading
ExclamationRight wheel and tiller
Tim
e (L
ocal
)
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The Captain’s Inputs (continued)
50.0
75.0
100.0
125.0
150.0
175.0
200.0
225.0
250.0
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
18:18:13
18:18:14
18:18:15
18:18:16
18:18:17
18:18:18
18:18:19
18:18:20
18:18:21
18:18:22
Cal
cula
ted
Airs
peed
(Kno
ts)
Load
Fac
tor (
g's)
Verticalacceleration
Airspeed
Hot-1:“Reject”
Thrust levers reducedTiller use began5.75 seconds
Time of theexcursion
2.7 seconds
1.5 to 4 seconds
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The Captain’s Inputs (continued)
• Takeoff crosswind components of 30 knots or greater rarely encountered in line flying
• Flight 1404 encountered crosswind component of 30 to 45 knots
• Accident crosswind likely exceeded captain’s line flying experience
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Crosswind Training
• Continental Airlines 737 flight training included crosswind takeoffs
• High-crosswind training provided during 2004 / 2005 recurrent training– Steady 35-knot crosswind (no gusts)
• Accident crosswind exceeded captain’s training experience
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Crosswind Guidelines
• Demonstrated crosswind (737-300/-500)– 31-36 knots
• Boeing’s Airplane Flight Manual (737-300/-500)– 35 knots
• Supplemental guidance published by Boeing– 40 knots
• Continental Airlines crosswind guideline– 33 knots
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Crosswind Guidelines (continued)
• Manufacturers not required to demonstrate crosswind takeoff performance in very gusty winds
• Gust factor present during certification flight testing not generally published
• No FAA standards for supplemental crosswind guidelines development
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Applications for Operational Flight Data
• FAA participates in safety programs involving operational flight data analysis
• FAA could pinpoint where and when high-crosswind takeoffs are occurring
• FAA could use information to reduce high-crosswind takeoffs and excursion risk
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