Transcript
Page 1: China's New Government Takes Shape :: The 2013 National People's Congress
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Leadership transition over

The 2013 National People’s Congress saw the Xi Jinping administration begin to take shape as China’s long leadership transition finally concluded. Key personnel and structures are now in place. While there were few concrete policy outcomes, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang ended the Congress with hints about their government’s future policy direction.

Top appointments

Senior appointments largely followed the script, particularly the appointments of Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang and Yu Zhengsheng to their respective government positions. Li Yuanchao’s appointment as vice president surprised some and broke with recent tradition as Li is not a member of the Standing Committee. Li’s appointment restores some of the factional balance at the top, given his close affiliation with Hu Jintao.

Key ministers

The appointment of the vice premiers and state councilors also went broadly as expected, and the retention of 15 of 25 ministers sent a strong message of stability. Many of the new faces were at key ministries, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Commerce, Finance and the National Health and Family Commission. These appointments will be vital to shaping the policy environment affecting foreign companies.

Government reorganization

The widely anticipated government reorganization was less dramatic than many expected and many anticipated changes failed to materialize. NDRC and MOST emerged unscathed and there was no creation of new super-ministries for energy, culture or finance. The changes that did take place – especially the abolition of the Ministry of Railways and a newly strengthened food safety organization – seemed to reflect public pressures, an increasingly important feature of politics in today’s China.

Wen’s final work report

Wen Jiabao delivered his final work report on a predictable note, laying out conservative targets for growth, inflation and money supply for 2013 and emphasizing policy priorities closely in line with those of recent years. The absence of specific policy initiatives was appropriate for this swansong speech.

Policy direction

While the NPC itself did not produce significant policy initiatives, Xi and Li used the last day of the Congress to hint at the future direction of their administration. Xi reiterated his rhetoric about “national rejuvenation” and the “Chinese dream,” suggesting an elevated role for nationalism in his administration. Li Keqiang hinted at a policy program consisting of increased market economic reforms, a pledge to maintain or increase levels of social spending, anti-corruption, urbanization and reform of China’s re-education through labor system.

Implications for foreign business

Foreign enterprises now know the shape of the government they will face for the next five years. Xi has moved quickly to consolidate his authority. While policy continuity in the short-term seems likely, Xi and Li’s comments suggest considerable room for policy change in the coming months. The contours of those changes may become more evident as we approach the Party’s Third Plenum in the fall. Public expectations run high, especially on corruption and pollution, and many policy-makers believe that change is needed to sustain economic growth. Finally, the tone of Xi’s rhetoric highlights the continuing dangers that nationalism poses to foreign enterprises in China. Foreign enterprises should prepare to adjust their engagement and advocacy strategies as well as their crisis management procedures to reflect these changing realities.

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WHAT IS THE NPC AND WHO ARE ITS

DELEGATES?

The NPC is China’s “rubber stamp” parliament, with just under 3,000 delegates. It is nominally China’s highest political institution and meets each spring at the same time as the Chinese People’s Consultative Congress (CPPCC), an advisory body of some 2,200 members.

These “two meetings” (liang hui) are carefully scripted and staged, but nevertheless mark a key point in China’s political calendar where the Party leadership lays out themes for the year ahead, confirms key government appointments and approves the annual government work report and budget. The meetings also provide an important networking opportunity for aspiring officials and offer the Party the opportunity to legitimize itself under the guise of political pluralism.

As well as representatives from the Party, the central government, the military and China’s provinces, the NPC includes many of China’s wealthiest business people. According to research conducted by the Hurun report, China’s NPC includes 31 USD billionaires and the CPPCC includes another 52.

THE 2013 NPC: TRANSITION OVER,

HARD WORK BEGINS

The 2013 National People’s Congress (NPC)

marked the end of the six-month leadership

transition process which began in November with

the Party Congress. The tripartite reins of power

– party, military and government – have now

officially moved to Xi Jinping.

In keeping with the NPC’s limited role in policy-

making, the meeting produced little in terms of

concrete policy outcomes. Nonetheless, the

announcement of high-level government

appointments and the results of the government

reorganization will alter the regulatory and

stakeholder environment faced by many

businesses in China. Most notably, closing

remarks by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang provided

hints at the direction of their newly consolidated

regime, with Xi emphasizing nationalism as a

unifying theme and Li laying out the case for a

greater reliance on market forces in the Chinese

economy.

XI JINPING’S ADMINISTRATION: OLD AND NEW FACES

The mysteries about who will constitute Xi’s government leadership team are now resolved. There

were few surprises at the top, although ministerial appointments involved several interesting moves

directly relevant to foreign businesses.

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TOP LEADERS

Senior assignments largely followed the script, particularly the appointments of Xi Jinping, Li

Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang and Yu Zhengsheng to their respective government positions, although Li

Yuanchao’s appointments as vice president surprised many and broke with recent tradition.

Xi consoliates his grip: Xi’s assumption of the presidential title, even if a foregone

conclusion, marks a further step in his consolidation of power and leaves him with a tighter

grip on the Party, governmental and military levers of power than Hu Jintao enjoyed until

several years into his administration.

Li Yuanchao as vice president: Li’s appointment as vice president runs contrary to recent

convention that the vice president is usually a Standing Committee member, but there have

been such exceptions in the past. Despite rumors of a scandal-linked career setback in 2012,

the appointment appears to signal Li’s strong chances of promotion to the Standing

Committee in 2017. Li’s appointment also restores some of the factional balance at the top of

Chinese politics, given his close affiliation with Hu Jintao. Li now ranks 8th in the official

hierarchy.

VICE PREMIERS

The line-up of vice premiers, each of whom is responsible for coordinating the work of several

ministries within given policy portfolios, was also in line with most people’s expectations. To date,

there have been no official announcements made about the portfolios held by each vice premier, but

we offer some educated guesses based on their backgrounds.

Zhang Gaoli, the executive vice premier and viewed as a strongly establishment figure, is

expected to assume the finance portfolio previously held by Wang Qishan.

Liu Yandong will likely retain her previous responsibilities for education, science and culture,

while also taking on health.

The reform oriented Wang Yang’s portfolio is not yet clear, but there is speculation that he

may receive the agriculture brief.

Ma Kai, former head of the NDRC, might take on a broad economics portfolio (potentially

including NDRC, MOFCOM and SAIC), making him one of the most influential individuals

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affecting the macro-environment for foreign businesses in China. Among the still unassigned

portfolios are telecommunications and state assets.

STATE COUNCILORS

Few of the state councilor portfolios have direct implications for foreign businesses, with their focus

on internal and external security and the administration of the State Council. However, Wang Yong’s

potential appointments to the industry and transportation portfolio (including MIIT and the Ministry of

Transport) given his background in the aerospace industry may be significant. In his previous role as

the head of China’s state-owned enterprise regulator, the state-owned Assets Supervision and

Administration Commission (SASAC), Wang earned a reputation as a staunch defender of the

interests of the state’s role in the Chinese economy. This could present challenges for foreign

multinationals in terms of continued support for the policy indigenous innovation and other tools for

economic protectionism.

MINISTERS

The retention of 15 of 25 ministers in their current positions sent a strong message of stability.

Among the news faces are several of particular importance to the foreign business community:

NDRC: Xu Shaoshi takes over as head of the powerful NDRC; as a former minister of land

and resources with close links to Wen Jiabao, his appointment may reflect Li Keqiang’s

attention to urbanization as a key economic driver and core policy aim. Xu is from Zhejiang

province and studied hydrogeology.

MOFCOM: Gao Hucheng, China’s chief trade negotiator since 2010, and a vice minister

since 2003, was made minister of commerce, a post usually given to rising provincial chiefs.

Gao has significant international experience, having studied abroad, worked in industry and

as a diplomat in Africa. He has a doctorate in sociology from the University of Paris and is a

fluent French speaker.

Finance: Lou Jiwei returns to his home base, having served as vice minister of finance for

10 years before assuming charge of China’s sovereign wealth fund. Lou worked closely with

former premier Zhu Rongji and has a reputation for being pro-reform. Zhou Xiaochuan’s

retention as head of the People’s Bank of China, despite having reached the official

retirement age of 65 for government ministers, was notable.

Health: Li Bin’s appointment as chair of the newly created Health and Family Commission

taps into her previous background at the National Population and Family Planning

Commission and work on health care issues at the provincial level in Jilin and Anhui. She

has a doctorate in economics.

Foreign Affairs: Wang Yi, a highly experienced diplomat who has experience dealing with

many of China’s most difficult foreign policy areas, was appointed minister of foreign affairs.

Wang is a former Chinese ambassador to Japan and previously served as head of the State

Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, as well as having represented China in the Six-Party Talks

with North Korea.

GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING: INCREMENTAL TINKERING

In addition to the leadership appointments, the greatest expectations surrounding the 2013 NPC

concerned possible changes to China’s government structure, the State Council. Changes were

modest when compared to the last round of restructuring in 2008, when five ministries were

restructured and one was eliminated. In fact, the final results were more notable for what they

omitted than what they included.

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STATE COUNCIL REFORM: WHAT DIDN’T CHANGE?

NDRC unchanged: Despite rumors that its role in micro-economic decision-making would be curtailed, China’s primary economic planning organization, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), emerged from the reforms unscathed and in fact took on additional responsibilities for the policy aspect of family planning and regulating electrical power use.

MOST remains intact: Despite rumors that the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the primary architect of China’s controversial indigenous innovation policies, would be abolished, the Ministry survived this round of reforms.

No new super ministries: Despite anticipation that the State Council would create several new super ministries – such as for the energy, financial, and cultural sectors – none of these materialized.

WHAT CHANGED?

Long-expected change:

Ministry of Railways dissolved: After many previous attempts, the Ministry of Railways

(MOR) has finally been relegated to the dustbin of China’s bureaucratic history. The Ministry

has long been a world to its own, with its huge employee base and budget. MOR’s

regulatory functions now rest with the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) and commercial

operations move to a newly established China Railway Corporation. The changes reflect

widespread anger at MOR’s notorious corruption and role in the 2011 Wenzhou train crash,

but also represent the longer-term normalization of China’s transportation bureaucracy under

the management of an over-arching Ministry of Transport, just as was the case when the

Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) was moved under MOT’s supervision in 2008.

Bureaucratic tidying up:

Strengthening food safety: The creation

of a General Administration of Food and

Drugs, a new ministerial-level

organization, represents the government’s

determination to centralize and improve

management of an issue that has aroused

strong public indignation – an unsafe food

supply. The new General Administration

replaces the old vice-ministerial level

State Food and Drug Administration

(SFDA) and takes on food safety

functions from the Ministry of Agriculture

(MOA), General Administration of Quality

Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine

(AQSIQ), and State Administration for

Industry and Commerce (SAIC).

Merging health and family authorities:

A newly-created National Health and

Family Planning Commission will combine

the former Ministry of Health (MOH), the

State Administration for Traditional

Chinese Medicine, and the majority of the National Population and Family Planning

Commission’s (NPFPC)’s functions. The move reflects the increasingly complementary role

of these various entities, which led to calls for a merger.

Combining media regulators: A new General Administration of Press, Publishing, Radio,

Film and Television combines the former functions of the Sate Administration of Radio, Film

and Television (SARFT) and the General Administration of Press and Publishing (GAPP).

Expanding the National Energy Administration: The NPC approved a slightly enhanced

National Energy Bureau (now incorporating the responsibilities of the State Electricity

Regulatory Commission) which continues to work under NDRC.

Coordinating maritime law enforcement: The State Oceanic Administration will expand its

functions to include maritime law enforcement in order to strengthen coordination and reduce

the potential for bureaucratic miscommunication in this sensitive area. Supervision was

previously split between the Ministry of Agriculture (fisheries), the Ministry of Public Security

and the General Administration of Customs.

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WEN’S LAST WORK REPORT: CONTINUITY DESPITE GROWING

CHALLENGES

In his final work report as premier, Wen

Jiabao enumerated China’s growing list of

challenges, including corruption, urbanization,

population shifts, environmental pollution,

wealth disparities and health challenges. He

reiterated his now famous 2007 remarks

about China’s current growth model,

describing it as “unbalanced, uncoordinated

and unsustainable.”

While the work report identified some of

China’s most fundamental structural

problems, the targets and policy goals put forward by Wen showed remarkable continuity with

reports delivered in previous years.

Similar targets. The report’s key targets reflect the government’s ongoing effort to shift

toward consumption-led growth, improve the quality of investment, upgrade the industrial

base, and move away from an investment-led, growth-at-all-costs model:

Growth: 7.5 percent growth target for 2013 (the same as in 2012)

Inflation: 3.5 percent inflation rate, a drop from last year’s 4 percent

M2 money supply: 13 percent growth, the lowest in a decade

Similar policy goals. As with the numeric targets, the policy goals laid out in the work report

largely reiterate established policy goals. The report roughly divides the main goals of 2013

into three categories:

Improve the growth model: Expand domestic demand by increasing consumption;

optimize investments in key sectors; upgrade and restructure industries; promote

strategic emerging industries; expand services sector; modernize agricultural sector;

spur urbanization.

Address social problems: Improve environmental protection, promote balanced

development between regions, increase employment, improve the social security

system, reform the healthcare system, accelerate reform of household registration

system, adhere to basic population policy, improve food and drug safety, tighten

regulation on real-estate market, develop education, and advance the cultural sector.

Deepen financial reform: Reform financial and tax systems, improve the banking,

insurance and securities markets, reform the income distribution system, reform the

interest rate system, make the RMB exchange rate more market-based.

While some commentators had expected significant policy announcements on the property market,

reform of China’s household registration (hukou) system or China’s re-education through labor

system (laojiao), Wen did not lay out concrete measures in any of these areas. Perhaps reflecting

the fact that this was the work report of the outgoing premier, Wen’s report is notable in that it does

not introduce any new reform programs that could ostensibly reflect policy priorities of the new

administration. Indeed, hints at the substantive policy direction to be taken by the new administration

did not come until Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang addressed NPC delegates and journalists respectively

on the final day of the Congress, discussed in more detail below.

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ANOTHER HARMONIOUS BUDGET: CONTINUITY IN SPENDING

PRIORITIES

The 2013 budget also represented significant continuity with previous years, with a focus on

increasing domestic demand and raising living standards. Two of the three increases that exceed

the 11 percent mark (the target GDP growth rate plus target inflation rate) are those that relate

directly to social programs – namely, health care and social security/employment:

Health care: Poised to grow a dramatic 28 percent as China continues with major reforms

and improves access in rural areas.

Environmental protection: An increase of 18.8 percent aimed to address one of China’s

most pressing domestic problems. Pollution has become one of the most common causes of

social protest, meaning this spending increase is also a way for the government to show its

responsiveness to popular opinion.

Defense: Much was made in the international media of China’s projected 10.7 percent

increase, but this amount actually represents a drop from last year’s 11.2 percent increase.

In both cases, the budget item reflects only part of China’s total defense spending.

ONLINE DISCUSSION: CITIZENS AND DELEGATES IN SOCIAL MEDIA

As the use of social media grows in China, so does the number of voices commenting on the NPC.

Chinese citizens increasingly use the government gathering in Beijing to discuss and debate on

Weibo (China’s Twitter) the key issues facing the country. Despite online censorship, these online

discussions are significantly more vigorous than those which take place inside the conference halls.

Corruption: One of the most discussed Weibo topics was Xi and Li’s efforts to eradicate

government corruption. Weibo users posted several recommendations, including making

government salaries public and limiting the relatives of government officials from business

dealings.

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Pollution: Another hot topic during the session was China’s environmental problems, with

extremely negative commentary from netizens about government capacity to solve the

problems. As one Weibo user noted: “the Chinese government’s investment of billions of

RMB has had no impact, most likely due to local government and companies…evading

environmental supervision.”

Delegates engage with social media: NPC delegates also got in on the act. It is only two

years since the first NPC delegate created a Weibo account to discuss issues affecting

Chinese citizens. Today, 171 NPC delegates and 217 CPPCC delegates have Weibo

accounts. Several of the delegates used this platform to bring the debates within the hall to

Chinese citizens and to express their own opinions about the issues facing China today. For

example, NPC delegate and former National Bureau of Statistics official, He Keng, with more

than 200 thousand followers, expressed his support for lowering taxes on the poor and

raising them on the rich.

XI AND LI SET MOOD MUSIC FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

The final day of the NPC saw Xi Jinping and Li

Keqiang hint at the future policy orientation of the

new administration. Between them, they took the

first steps towards adding flesh to some of the

reformist rhetoric and symbolism which have

characterized the early months of the

administration, including Xi’s decision to use his

first trip outside of Beijing to replicate Deng

Xiaoping’s “Southern tour” which reignited

economic reform in the early 1990s and the

vigorous anti-corruption campaign he has

spearheaded with Wang Qishan, China’s new

anti-corruption czar.

XI JINPING’S “CHINESE DREAM”

Since taking office, Xi Jinping has spoken prominently about what he calls the “Chinese dream,”

which he describes as the “great revival of the Chinese nation.” Xi made these themes the focal

point of his keynote speech at the closing of the NPC on March 17, in which he emphasized the

need to follow a “Chinese road” and to maintain “Chinese spirit” and “Chinese power.”

The Chinese dream has few concrete policy implications at this stage, although it demonstrates Xi’s

desire to continue using nationalism as a core part of the Party’s legitimacy, given the idea’s explicit

association with “national rejuvenation.” It is also consistent with what many have seen as the tough

stance his administration has taken so far on foreign affairs, especially issues relating to China’s

territorial integrity.

Whether the Chinese dream becomes a defining theme of the Xi administration, or is merely an

attempt to gain legitimacy by “wrapping himself in the flag,” remains to be seen. However, foreign

companies should monitor this rhetoric given the way that nationalism has been used as a tool

against foreign businesses in the past to deflect domestic criticism of the regime. It has also been

used as an excuse for restrictions on foreign investment, the uneven enforcement of regulations,

and introduction of indigenous innovation policies.

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LI KEQIANG’S EMERGING AGENDA

Li Keqiang’s first press conference as premier,

held on the last day of the NPC, allowed him to

elaborate on the many calls for reform he has

made in the months since the November Party

Congress. In general, Li was clear about his

determination to promote a reformist policy

agenda, fully aware that this will generate

opposition among powerful vested interests. “We

have no alternative,” he said, “reform is about the

destiny of our nation.”

While Li laid out few specific policy measures, his

remarks hinted at the potential for substantial policy change in a wide range of areas:

Market-oriented reform: Li spoke clearly about the need for an increased role for market

forces in China’s development and the importance of “curbing government power.” In this

spirit, Li pledged to cut bureaucratic obstacles to business by cutting the number of

government approval by at least a third. He also spoke of the importance of allowing private

capital greater access to the financial, energy and railway industries, fiscal budget reform,

international currency reform, as well as reform of income distribution.

Anti-corruption: Li highlighted the fight against corruption by calling for “establishing an

anti-corruption mechanism,” echoing previous comments by both Xi Jinping and Wang

Qishan about the incoming government’s focus on anti-corruption efforts. Li emphasized the

importance of creating a “transparent environment” as a vital part of anti-corruption efforts.

Ring-fencing social spending: Li promised to maintain or increase levels of social

spending, even at times of fiscal austerity, stating that spending cuts in other areas may be

necessary to meet this target.

Urbanization and agricultural modernization: Li reiterated his vision of urbanization, a

theme which has emerged as one of his top policy priorities since he officially emerged as

premier-in-waiting in November. He stated that “urbanization is not about building big

sprawling cities” and stressed that it must go “hand-in-hand with agricultural modernization.”

Food safety and the environment: Li placed a strong emphasis on quality-of-life issues as

a key part of economic development: “I want to fully upgrade the Chinese economy,

including providing clean drinking water, safe food and clean air.” In solving these problems,

Li emphasized the importance of openness, transparency, as well as media and public

supervision in forcing enterprises and the government to meet standards in these areas.

Reforming the re-education through labor system: Li also briefly alluded to reform of

China’s notorious “re-education through labor” system, stating that “it is being researched by

relevant departments and will possibly be released within this year”.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS

Power consolidated at the top: With assumption of the top party, military and government positions, Xi Jinping has moved faster than his two predecessors to consolidate his power. That means he is in a stronger position to engender policy change than his predecessor was at this stage in his term. But he also faces numerous challenges and entrenched interests.

Continued role of public pressure: The most notable restructuring changes were both related to highly sensitive issues with the Chinese public – corruption in the case of the Ministry of Railway’s abolition and food safety in the case of the strengthened food and drugs regulator. The fact that these two ministries were selected for reform illustrates how responsiveness to public demands has now become a hallmark of politics in China. This was also demonstrated by the low-key attire worn this year by many NPC delegates. Designer outfits and expensive watches were not the fashion this year.

Policy continuity, for now: No concrete reform programs have yet emerged despite strong reform-oriented symbolism from the incoming leadership. An emphasis on familiar themes suggests that foreign companies’ messaging for government outreach does not need to change dramatically at this stage. However, potential policy shifts in the coming months mean that MNCs should remain prepared to alter their messaging and reevaluate government partnership programs should government priorities shift.

Potential for economic reform in coming months: Xi and Li provided hints about the policy direction of the new administration during their closing day remarks. Li spelled out the possibility for substantial economic reform in the coming years. More details are likely to emerge quickly, either at the Party’s Third Plenum meeting this fall, or from NDRC, which is expected to issue a plan for economic reform before the end of 2013. Companies should monitor these policy developments closely in the coming months and assess their potential impact on their long-term growth plans in China.

Need to map out new stakeholders and revise engagement plans: Foreign MNCs should map out new stakeholders, including newly created or augmented organizations, as well as newly appointed personnel. This is especially important for companies directly affected by the changes to China’s ministerial structures, particularly in the transportation, food and agriculture, energy, healthcare and culture/media sectors. Companies should then seek to revise their 2013-2014 government engagement plans in line with changes to their stakeholder environment.

Potential for increased nationalism: While the concrete policy implications of Xi Jinping’s rhetoric about “national rejuvenation” and the “Chinese dream” are unclear at this time, his speeches have taken a more nationalistic tone than those of Hu Jintao. Foreign businesses should be aware of the increased risks that nationalism can pose, particularly in times of reputational crises or when domestic political crisis cause the government to seek scapegoats. Companies should ensure that their crisis management procedures provide contingencies for the risks that nationalism presents.

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ABOUT APCO WORLDWIDE

APCO Worldwide is an award-winning, independently-owned global consulting firm and leading

provider of government relations, stakeholder engagement and strategic communication services in

China. We have been serving clients’ interests in China since 1989. Today, our China team includes

more than 100 professionals from a diverse range of backgrounds, including business, government,

journalism, academia and civil society. We are based in well-established offices in Beijing, Shanghai

and Hong Kong.

As a political economy in transition, China is a complex, heavily regulated market that welcomes

foreign investment while being highly protective of its developing domestic industries and

transforming society. APCO Worldwide partners with clients through every aspect of their business

development strategies to help them navigate the Chinese context, optimize and protect their

investments, and maximize their returns.

APCO’s clients include multinational firms, leading Chinese companies, governments, chambers of

commerce, issue-based coalitions, multilateral organizations and nonprofit interest groups. We work

daily with colleagues in APCO offices around the world to ensure consistency in servicing global

clients and facilitating Sino-foreign trade and inward and outward investment.

For more information about APCO Worldwide in China, please contact:

Kenneth Jarrett chairman, Greater China

2102 CITIC Square 1168 Nanjing Road West Shanghai 100022 China

Phone: +86.21.5298.4668 Fax: +86.21.5298.4669 [email protected]

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1601 NCI Tower A12 Jianguomenwai Avenue Chaoyang District Beijing 100022 China

Phone: +86.10.6505.5127 Fax: +86.10.6505.5257 [email protected]

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Phone: +86.21.5298.4668 Fax: +86.21.5298.4669 [email protected]

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Phone: +852.2866.2313 Fax: +852.2866.1917 [email protected]