Atoms for Peace in the Middle East: What Might Go Wrong
A Presentation by
Henry SokolskiHenry SokolskiExecutive Director
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
www npolicy orgwww.npolicy.orgbefore
Moving Toward a Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destructionin the Middle East: Challenges for 2012in the Middle East: Challenges for 2012
June 13‐15, 2011Washington, D.C.
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LWR – the Reactor of Choice – Is Considered P lif i R iProliferation Resistant
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Result: Many, Large, Reactors Planned by 2030 i h M Ein the M.E.
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Wh Mi h G WWhat Might Go Wrong
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M.E. Nuclear Customers Suspected of NuclearM.E. Nuclear Customers Suspected of Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Fuel Making Ambitions
Iran & Syria ‐‐ violated IAEA safeguards with covert reactors and fuel making plants
Algeria ‐‐ tried to build a large covert research reactor in excess of its needs inAlgeria tried to build a large covert research reactor in excess of its needs in desert surrounded by air defenses and has hot cells to batch reprocess spent fuel
Egypt – declared interest developing bombs, hired Germans to help in the l950s on nuclear program caught playing with undeclared nuclear fuel relatedon nuclear program, caught playing with undeclared nuclear fuel related
experiments.
Turkey – declared interest in developing bombs, studied how might use LWRs to make weapons usable pumake weapons usable pu,
Saudi Arabia – declared interest in acquiring bomb option, financed and visited Pakistani nuke program, acquired nuclear capable PRC missiles
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Jordan – Declared interest in enriching uranium
Some Nuclear Visitors to Iran Are Hardly Pushing y gAtoms for Peace
New York Times, “Nuclear Aid byDrs. Prasad and Surendar,Indian tritium extraction experts “advising” on Bushehr’s“safety”; USG sanctioned both
New York Times, Nuclear Aid by Russian to Iranians Suspected”October 9, 2008, PARIS— International nuclear inspectors are investigating whether a Russian scientist helped Iranwhether a Russian scientist helped Iranconduct complex experiments on how to detonate a nuclear weapon.
WMD Commissionunanimously recommended IAEA require visitors to registerIAEA require visitors to register at any IAEA safeguarded site, p. 50
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Bifo Russian Weapons Lab High Speed Cameras, R i HWR F l T h & IAEA UF6 H l IRussian HWR Fuel Tech & IAEA UF6 Help to Iran
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The Reactors Are blA Problem Too
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But the Reactors Will be LWRs : Aren’th “P lif i R i ” E h?they “Proliferation Resistant” Enough?
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ld ’ h d d l l kiBut Wouldn’t the Needed Nuclear Fuel Making Plants Be Difficult to Hide?
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Small, Covert Reprocessing Plant Can Make 20 or More Bombs/Month from Spent Fuel
What the IAEA Has Missed in the M.E.What the IAEA Has Missed in the M.E.
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How the Mid‐East Nexus Between Reactors and Bombs Has Been Handled to Date
13 Military Strikes against IAEA member13 Military Strikes against IAEA member states’ large reactors since 1980
11 against safeguarded reactors since 19801980 Iran against Osirak1980 Iran against Osirak1981 Israel against Osirak1980‐1985 Seven Iraqi strikes against Bushehr
1990 US against Osirak1990 US against Osirak2003 US against Osirak
2 against IAEA member states reactors1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted against Dimona
2007 Israeli strike against Syria’s Reactor
Israeli 67 war a Russian provocation aimed at
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Israeli 67 war, a Russian provocation aimed at Dimona reactor that Israel claimed was “peaceful” for electricity 13
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What About the the Economic and EnvironmentalWhat About the the Economic and Environmental Arguments for Nuclear?
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Middle Eastern Natural Gas: Production Is I iIncreasing
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North Africa and the ContinentNorth Africa and the Continent
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Latest Levant Basin Natural Gas Finds: “Bigger than A thi W H A d i th US” USGSAnything We Have Assessed in the US” ‐‐ USGS
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Rising Costs of Nuclear Power Plant C iConstruction
12000
10000
)
Construction Cost Projections
6000
8000
ed K
W (2
008$
)
Average of the Projections for Each Year
4000
6000
Dol
lars
/Inst
alle
2000
D
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02000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Natural Gas Likely to Stay Cheaper, More Plentiful than Nuclear for Some Time
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Largest US Nuke Utility Says New Reactors Bad Buy for Reducing Carbon for the Next 10‐20 yrsfor Reducing Carbon for the Next 10‐20 yrs.
chart courtesy Excelon
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RecommendationsRecommendations
• Restrict nuclear sales to nonweapons states that forswear making l f l d f dd l lnuclear fuel and ratify Additional Protocol
– Amend US AEA to penalize suppliers doing business in the US that fail to adopt these conditions with regard to their exports
– NSG agreement to the Gold Standard as a condition of supplyNSG agreement to the Gold Standard as a condition of supply• Clarify what IAEA can and cannot effectively safeguard against diversion
– Work with IAEA – Do national evaluations (FY 2009 House State Authorization Act)Do national evaluations (FY 2009 House State Authorization Act)
• Compare costs of different energy projects with an eye to which is the quickest and cheapest way to reduce carbon– G‐20 effort to agree to common energy project accounting standards– IRENA UN effort– national evaluations (that include cost of subsidies)
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