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8/10/2019 Article on Cancer Immunotherapy
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William
B.
Quandt
^m^ THE MIDDLE EAST CRISES
^JL^
^o
area
of
the world had
a
greater
impact
on
American
politics,
national
security,
and
economic
well-being
than did
the
Middle
East
in
1979.
With the fall of
the
Pahlavi
regime
in
Iran
early
in
the
year,
a
profound
change
in
the
regional
balance of
power
took
place.
In
November,
when
the
deposed
Shah
was
admitted
to
the United States
for
medical
treatment,
militants
seized the U.S.
Embassy
in Tehran and at the end of the
year
were
still
holding
about
50
Americans
hostage?with
the
support
of
Ayatollah
Khomeini,
the head of the
new
Iranian Islamic
Republic.
And
in
late December the
Soviet
Union
used its
own
forces
to
replace
one
communist leader
in
Afghanistan
with
another
more
to
its
liking
and
subsequently
sent over
50,000
troops
to
secure
the
new
regime
and
to
put
down
insurgents
in
the
countryside.
In
the face of these
developments,
U.S.
officials
turned
their
attention
to
issues
of
military
power,
bases
and
arms
transfers
to
help
stabilize
the volatile
region
surrounding
the
Persian Gulf.
The
keystones
of the
Carter Administration's
early
foreign
pol
icy?human
rights,
arms
control,
non-proliferation?receded
in
importance,
and
power
politics
once
again
seemed
on
the
ascen
dant
in
Washington.
Public
and
congressional
sentiment
against
the Soviet
Union
led
to
the
shelving
(at
least
for the
present)
of
the
painstakingly
negotiated
Strategic
Arms
Limitation
Treaty
(SALT)
and
with it
much of
what remained
of the
prospects
for
d?tente with the Soviet Union. President Carter's
handling
of the
crises
over
the
hostages
in
Iran
and
the Soviet
troops
in
Afghani
stan
initially
won
wide
support
and
appeared
to
have
dramatically
improved
his chances
of reelection.
Pakistan
and Iran
loom
as
the
most
likely
early
tests
of
the
President's
policies.
In
any
event,
it
now seems
clear that
in
the
1980s
it will
be the
oil-rich
Persian Gulf and
the
surrounding
area?Iran,
Iraq
and
Saudi
Arabia,
as
well
as
Afghanistan
and
William
B.
Quandt
is
a
senior fellow
at
The
Brookings
Institution.
From
January
1977
to
mid-1979,
he
served
on
the National
Security
Council
staff,
where
he dealt
with Middle
Eastern affairs.
He is
the author of several
books,
most
recently
Decade
of
Decisions: American
Policy
Toward
the Arab-Israeli
Conflict,
1967-1976.
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THE
MIDDLE EAST
CRISES
541
Pakistan?where
superpower
rivalries
will
be
most
acute,
where
the economic
interests
of the industrialized
world
will
be deter
mined,
and where local rivalries will
increasingly
carry
with them
the threat of
global
confrontation.
The
more
hopeful
and
idealistic
phase
of
President Carter's
foreign
policy,
that
is,
up
to
the
taking
of
the
hostages
in
Iran
and
the
Soviet
intervention
in
Afghanistan,
did
produce
one
genuine
achievement
in
the
Middle East?the
Egyptian-Israeli
peace
treaty
of March
1979.
A
product
of
long
and difficult
negotiations,
the
treaty
promised
to
reduce the
danger
of
Arab-Israeli conflict
just
as
the
risks of
confrontation
were
growing
elsewhere
in
the
region.
The
remaining
issues
involving
the
Palestinians,
Jordan,
Syria
and
Lebanon
seem as
intractable
as
ever.
The
unresolved
Palestinian
issue
in
particular
has
a
direct
bearing
on
stability
in
the Arabian
Peninsula
and the
Gulf,
and
thus
must
remain
near
the
top
of the U.S.
foreign policy agenda,
if
not
in
1980
at
least
in
1981.
Because
of
the divisions the
treaty
produced
in
the
Arab
world,
it
did
little
to
enhance American
prestige
and
credibility
with
countries such
as
Saudi Arabia.
And it
was
the
Saudis,
as
much
as
anyone,
who held the
key
to the
escalating
price
of oil.
During
1979
alone,
oil
sold
by
members of the
Organization
of
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
(OPEC)
doubled
in
price
from
less than
$13
per
barrel
to
around
$30
per
barrel.
For
the United
States,
this
spelled
slower
economic
growth,
a
weakening
of
the
dollar
and
boosted inflation.
With
luck,
it
might
also
mean
a
commitment
to
an
effective
energy
policy
that
would
reduce
vulnerability
to
the
disruption
of
Middle East oil
supplies.
But
there
was
little
sign
of
this
at
year's
end.
In
all,
the events of 1979 have created awesome
problems
for
the
Middle
East and for
American
policy
in
the
region.
The
revolutionary
situation
in
Iran,
the
challenge
of
Soviet
power,
the
stalemate
in
the search for
a
broad Arab-Israeli
settlement,
the
insecurity
of moderate
regimes
in
the
area?above
all Saudi
Arabia?confront
American
policymakers
with
extraordinarily
difficult choices.
The stakes
include
the
continued
access
of
the
United States
and the
West
to
Middle
Eastern
oil,
as
well
as
whether the
price
of
that
oil
can
be
kept
within
manageable
limits. The
challenge
to American
diplomacy
and to the
ability
of
the
United
States
to
marshall all
its
levers of
influence?diplo
matic,
economic and
military?may
be
the
greatest
since the
onset
of
the cold
war.
The
analysis
of these
problems
and
their
interrelationship
will
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542
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
begin
with
what
happened
in
Iran
and
on
the
Israeli-Egyptian
front
in
1979,
and then
will consider
the
implications
of
these
two
situations for Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states. The events
in
Afghanistan
and the
Soviet
policy
toward
the
region
will
then
be
examined,
and
finally
the
implications
for American
policy.
ii
The dramatic
events
that led
to
the fall of the Shah of Iran and
his
replacement
by
a
militant Islamic
Republic
go
back
to
1978,
but
deserve
brief
review
here.
In
retrospect
it
seems
clear that after
the
massive
riots
of
early
September
1978
there
was no
real
possibility
that the Shah could have maintained his
authority
in
undiluted
form.
Even
the
large-scale
use
of
his
army
had failed
to
quell
the
riots,
and
he
himself
apparently
recognized
that
some
new
political
formula
was
needed.
The
real
question
at
the
peak
of the
crisis?on
which
he
consulted
extensively
with
the
American and
British
Ambassa
dors?was
whether
he
might
have been able
to
preserve
the
institution
of the
monarchy
on a
new
basis
if
he
had been
willing
to
turn
over
some
power
to
a
competent
civilian
government
or
to
the
military.
The Shah did ask the United States for advice on
how
to
deal
with the
growing
unrest
in
the
country.
But
he showed
little enthusiasm
for
either
a
civilian
or
military
government,
and
joked
about
the
incompetence
of
the
people
to
whom
he
would
have
to
entrust
the
leadership
of
the
country.
Perhaps,
he
said,
they
would
help
convince
the
masses
that
the
only
real
alternative
was
the
iron fist.
Hearing
these
confused
plans,
U.S.
officials
were
not
prepared
to
take
responsibility
for
telling
the Shah
how
to
govern
his
own
country.
The Shah
proceeded
to
name,
in
turn,
a weak
military
and
then
a
weak
civilian
government,
but
neither
was
able
to
restore
order,
to
end
the
strikes
that
were
paralyzing
the
country,
or to
defuse
the
growing
alienation
from
his
rule.
The American
hesitancy
to
give
advice
to
the
Shah
reflected,
to
some
degree,
the
post-Vietnam
aversion
to
overinvolvement
in
the
internal
affairs
of
other
countries.
It
may
also
have
reflected
a
misreading
of
the
Shah,
who
reportedly
wanted
to
be
told
what
to
do.
He
subsequently complained
that
he
never
knew
what
the United
States
wanted
of
him
during
the
crisis,
and he
appears
now to
blame
the
United
States
for his downfall.
Those who had
known
the Shah
in
earlier
periods
recognized
a
familiar
pattern
of
psychological
dependency.
In
the
end
he
lost
all control
of the
situation
and
left
the
country
in
January
1979. After
a
brief
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THE
MIDDLE
EAST
CRISES
545
from the
United
States
to
Panama
in
December
had
little
effect.
The
one
man
whose voice
seemed
to
carry authority, Ayatollah
Khomeini,
remained adamant
in
calling
for the Shah's
return
to
Iran
as
the
price
for
the
release of
the
hostages,
and
carefully
orchestrated American
pressures
seemed
to
have little
impact
on
his
thinking.
Nor
did
the domestic turmoil
in
his
own
country,
with
separatist
movements
active
in
Azerbaijan,
Kurdistan,
Khu
zestan
and
Baluchistan,
convince the
Ayatollah
to
turn
his
atten
tion
to
internal
problems.
Instead,
in
the
image
of
a
true
revolu
tionary,
Khomeini
remained
obsessed with
the
evils of
the Shah
and
with
the
great Satan,
the
United
States.
One
of the
questions
that surrounded
the
Iranian
Revolution
from
its
onset
was
whether
Khomeini and
his Islamic
Republic
might
signal
a new
resurgence
of Islamic
feeling
and
solidarity
that
would
affect
other Islamic
nations,
especially
those
in
the
Middle East.
Iran
was,
to
be
sure,
a
special
case,
not
only
because
of
the
centralized
personal
rule of
the
Shah,
but also
because
of
the
dominance
there of
the
Shi'ite
version
of
Islam,
which
with
few
exceptions
is
elsewhere
in
the Islamic world
a
small
though
at
times
disturbing minority.
Islamic reaction
to
the
new
regime
in
Iran
reflected
these differences.
Muslim
leaders
expressed
criticism
of
Khomeini,
coupled
with
concern
for Shi'ite activism
in
countries
such
as
Iraq,
Kuwait,
Bahrain,
and
the
eastern
province
of Saudi
Arabia.
While
it
would be
wrong
to
conclude
that
a
wave
of
fundamen
talism
is
sweeping
the entire Islamic
world,
it
is
fair
to
say
that
many
Muslims
have
a
renewed
sense
of
pride
in
their
own
civilization,
a
sense
of
power
derived
from
the
explosion
of
oil
wealth
in
some
countries,
and
a
resistance
to
foreign
interference
in
their
affairs. These
sensitivities manifested themselves when
accusations
were
made that
the United
States had
been involved
in the
attack
on
the
Grand
Mosque
in
Mecca
in
November
1979.
While
false,
these
charges
resulted
in
violent
anti-American
dem
onstrations
in
Pakistan
and
Libya,
the
former
culminating
in
the
destruction
of the
U.S.
Embassy
in
Islamabad.
This
suggested
that
an
overt
military
threat
against
Iran
over
the
hostage
crisis
might
also
serve
to
mobilize Muslim
opinion
against
the
United
States, just
as
many
Muslims reacted
harshly against
the Soviet
invasion of
Afghanistan
in
December.
In
sum,
the Iranian Revolution
was
unquestionably
the
most
disruptive
upheaval
in the
Middle
East
in
the last
generation,
exceeding
in
the breadth and
depth
of
its
implications
even
the
Arab-Israeli
wars
of
1967
and
1973.
The
damage
to
American and
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546
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Western
political
and economic
interests
in
1979
alone
was
very
great.
These losses
were
not
immediately gains
for the
Soviet
Union,
but the
spreading
chaos
in
Iran,
the
emergence
of
strong
regionalist
tendencies,
and
the
persistence
of
a
small
but
organized
Left
raised
the
possibility
that
in
the future the
Soviet
Union
might
be
well
positioned
to
exploit
Iranian difficulties.
This
could
pose
new
threats
and
new
challenges
to
American
policymakers,
who
showed
few
signs
of
having
devised
a
strategy
for
dealing
with
Iran
either
under Khomeini
or
in
the
event
of
his
departure.
m
In
contrast
to
the
events
in
Iran,
the achievement of
peace
between
Egypt
and
Israel
represented
a
welcome
development
in
the
Middle
East
from
the
perspective
of
the
United States
and
some
of
its
closest
allies.
While
considerably
less
than
the
compre
hensive
peace
the Carter
Administration
had
initially
favored,
the
peace
treaty
signed
in
March
was
nonetheless
a
significant
step
toward
the broader
settlement
which remained
an
objective
of
American
diplomacy.
The
treaty
was
to
be
implemented
in
phases,
resulting
in
full
Israeli
withdrawal from
the
Sinai
by
the
spring
of
1982.
Under
the
schedule,
negotiations
began
in
May
1979 on a
Palestinian
self-governing
authority
to
be elected
for
a
five-year
transitional
period
pending
a
final
settlement.
The
target
date for
concluding
these
talks
was
May
1980.
Independently
of the
Palestinian
negotiations,
Egypt
and
Israel
are
obligated
by
the
terms
of the
treaty
to
carry
out
a
carefully
balanced
set
of
commitments.
With
the
return
of
the Sinai oil
fields
to
Egyptian
control
in
1979,
Egypt
undertook
to
supply
Israel
with
agreed
quantities
of
oil
at
somewhat
advantageous
prices.
Israel
is
now
to
withdraw
its
armed
forces
to a
line
running
from El-Arish
to
Ras
Muhammad
by
January
26,
1980,
and
at
that
time
diplomatic
relations
are
to
be
established
and
shortly
thereafter
ambassadors
will
be
exchanged.
A
series
of
additional
negotiations
are
envisaged
after
the
establishment
of
diplomatic
relations
which
will deal
with
trade,
communications,
cultural
relations
and
civil
aviation.
In
addition,
the leaders
of
the
two
countries
adopted
the
practice
of
periodic
summit
meetings
to
discuss
bilateral
relations
as
well
as
issues
of broader
strategic
concern
such
as Soviet
policy
in the
area.
In
brief,
a
remarkable
new
chapter
in
Egyptian-Israeli
relations
was
being
written.
It
was
less
clear,
however,
that
this
would
lead
to
progress
in
solving
the Palestinian
question.
Whatever
the
potential
of the
Camp
David
accords
in
laying
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THE MIDDLE
EAST
CRISES
547
the
foundations
for
an
overall resolution of
the
Arab-Israeli
con
flict,
the
American role
in
the
second
phase
of
negotiations
dealing
with Palestinian
autonomy
was a
sharp
departure
from
previous
efforts
to
press
the
reluctant
parties
to
make
substantive
conces
sions.
This
stance
reflected
changes
in
the
American
negotiating
team,
as
President Carter
and
Secretary
of
State Vance
in
May
1979 turned
over
much
of
the
responsibility
for the
peace
talks
to
Robert
Strauss.
Wary
of
taking
on
the
sensitive
questions
involving
the
Palestinians
until
he
was
fully
in
command of the
issues and
had
a
feel
for the
personalities
involved,
Strauss
preferred
to
go
slow
at
the
outset.
The burden of
the
negotiations
fell
increasingly
on
the
Egyp
tians and
Israelis,
with the Americans
contenting
themselves with
offering
support
and
providing
encouragement.
This
seemed
to
be
a
satisfactory
arrangement
to
Sadat and
Begin,
who
began
to
develop
for the first time
a
cordial
personal
relationship.
On
two
occasions
the United
States
showed
signs
of renewed
activism
in
the
search
to
broaden the
peace
negotiations.
By
midsummer
1979,
an
Arab
initiative
was
being
floated
at
the
United
Nations
concerning
a
possible Security
Council
resolution
which would reaffirm
U.N.
Resolutions
242
and
338
on
Middle
East
peace,
while
adding language
on
the
right
of the
Palestinians
to
self-determination. Rather
than
turn
such
efforts
aside,
the
Administration
decided
to
explore
the
possibility
of
producing
a
balanced
resolution,
which,
if
successful,
could
bring
the
Palestine
Liberation
Organization
(PLO)
for the
first
time
to
accept
Israel's
right
to
exist. This would
remove
an
obstacle
in
the
way
of
a
U.S.
Palestinian
dialogue.
In
order
to
gain
time
to
develop
the
text
of
a
moderate
U.N.
resolution,
U.S.
diplomats
in
late
July
sought
a
postponement
of
the
debate.
As
part
of
this
initiative,
the
American Ambassador
to
the United
Nations,
Andrew
Young,
held
an
unannounced and
unauthorized
meeting
with
an
official
of
the
PLO.
While
success
ful
in
obtaining
the
postponement,
Young
was
less
than
forthcom
ing
in
his
reports
to
Washington
of the
meeting,
resulting
in
a
political
crisis
which
ended
in
his
resignation
on
August
15.
American black
leaders
resented
what
they
saw
as
Israeli
pressure
to
remove
Young,
and
for
a
period
of
weeks
black
community
leaders
angrily
denounced
Israel and
sought
to
open
contacts
with
Palestinians.
Meanwhile,
the
Administration
doggedly
pursued
the
search
for
a
balanced U.N.
resolution.
Carter
sent
Strauss
to
the
Middle
East
in
mid-August
with firm
instructions
to
inform
Begin
and
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THE MIDDLE
EAST
CRISES
549
balance
of
power
so
dramatically
in
favor
of Israel
that
any
future
negotiations
will
largely
result
in
Israel
being
able
to
dictate
her
own terms.
Even
if
the
Egyptian-Israeli
treaty
stands alone for
the
moment
as a
separate
peace,
from
an
American
perspective
it
will
serve
several
useful
purposes.
It
virtually precludes
a
resumption
of
a
large-scale
Arab-Israeli
war,
such
as
occurred
in
June
1967
and
October
1973.
Thus the
risk
of
a
U.S.-Soviet confrontation
in
the
Middle East
over
this issue has been
sharply
reduced. Nor
is
the
Soviet
Union
likely
to reenter
Egypt
as a
dominant
power
now
that
Egypt
no
longer
requires large
quantities
of
Soviet
weapons.
Indeed,
a
profound
change
has been
taking place
in
Egypt's
foreign policy.
Sadat has
embarked
on
a
new
strategy
as
a
result
of
the
peace
treaty
with Israel
and
it
will be
extraordinarily
difficult
for
him
to
reverse course
and
return
to
a
state
of
belliger
ency.
To
do
so
would
risk
sacrificing
most
of
the
gains
he has
made
in
recovering Egyptian territory,
and
even more
important
in
terms
of the
new
U.S.-Egyptian
strategic
relationship.
Peace
with Israel
is the
precondition
for
Egypt becoming
a
special
partner
of the United States. Sadat
understands this
relationshipand seems
prepared
to live with its
implications.
But
unlike
the
United
States,
Sadat
has
not
welcomed Saudi
Arabia
as
a
party
to
the
new
relationship.
He
seems
to
prefer
a
direct
U.S.-Egypt
bilateral
tie,
undiluted
by
Saudi
economic
assistance.
American
aid,
in
his
view,
is
more
reliable
and
comes
with fewer
strings
than
Saudi aid.
As
a
result,
Sadat has
often
seemed
to
be
deliberately pushing
the Saudis
away
from
Egypt,
as
in
a
provocative speech
on
May
1,
1979.
He
has likewise
shown
little
concern
with his
growing
isolation
in
the
Arab
world.
The United
States,
from Sadat's
perspective,
is
likely
to make
up
for
the
loss
of aid
from
the
other
Arabs.
And
to
a
substantial
degree,
the
United
States
has
been
forthcoming.
When Saudi
Arabia
withdrew
its
offer
to
pay
for F-5E
jets
for
Egypt,
the
United
States
took
over
the
financing
and
even
offered
a
better
airplane,
the
F-4
Phantom. One billion
dollars
annually
in
Amer
ican
economic
assistance,
coupled
with
$500
million
per
year
of
military
credits,
represents
a
substantial
step
in
the
direction of
meeting
Egypt's
real
needs
in
these
two
areas,
and there
has
been
speculation
that the amount of
military
aid
may
be
significantly
increased
in
fiscal
year
1981.
Some of
Sadat's
colleagues
are
genuinely
concerned
by
the
degree
to
which
he
has
split
Egypt
from the
Arab world and
by
his
somewhat
unrealistic
expectations
of
American
support
in
the
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THE MIDDLE
EAST CRISES
551
exchange
of ambassadors
in
February
1980.
On
balance,
it
appears
that
the
Egyptian-Israeli relationship
will
evolve
with
only
mini
mal
movement
on
the
Palestinian
front.
Neither
breakthroughs
nor
breakdowns
in
the
Camp
David
negotiations
can
be
expected
in
the
near
future.
Instead,
the
parties
will
tend
to more
urgent
matters,
and,
it
is
hoped,
recognize
that
in
due
course
the
Pales
tinian
issue
will have
to
be
confronted
forthrightly
and with
the
same
degree
of commitment
and
perseverance
that
was
needed
in
the
successful
Egyptian-Israeli
peace
treaty
negotiations.
But
the
time
for such
renewed
efforts
will
most
likely
be
1981,
not
1980.
While
Egypt
and Israel
can
take
satisfaction
in
their
new
peaceful
relationship,
other
Arabs have been
deeply
opposed
to
what
they
see
as a
separate
peace.
Meeting
in
Baghdad
in
March
1979,
after
the
signing
of the
peace
treaty,
nearly
all
Arab
coun
tries
decided
to
break
diplomatic
relations with
Egypt
and
to
terminate
aid
commitments.
Palestinians,
through
their
self-designated spokesman,
the Pal
estine
Liberation
Organization,
were
vociferous critics
of
Sadat's
policies,
but
were
also active
in
promoting
the
idea
that
the
Palestinians
should be
brought
into
negotiations
at
some
time
in
the
future.
And while their attitude
toward the
Camp
David
process
was
predictably
negative,
they
sought diplomatic
recog
nition
in
Western
Europe
and
dropped
hints that
their future
policies might
be
more
moderate than
those
of
the
past.
By
the
year's
end,
the PLO
had received
unprecedented
recog
nition
in
Europe,
as
well
as
in
virtually
all of
the Third
World.
Even
within
the
United
States,
significant
currents
of
opinion
were
calling
for
some
kind
of
dialogue
between
the
United
States
and
the PLO.
The
mainstream of
the PLO
welcomed these
developments
and
anticipated
that
at
some
point
contacts
with
the
American
government
would
take
place.
But
the
PLO
still
seemed
reluctant
to
enforce
a
uniform
policy
on
its divided
ranks,
and
in
particular
it
continued
to
withhold
the
card,
as
PLO
chairman
Yasir Arafat
called
it,
of
recognizing
Israel.
There
were
some,
however,
who
saw
in
the
Jordanian-PLO
dialogue
a
positive
step
toward Palestinian
acceptance
not
only
of the
reality
of
Israel,
but
also of
the
inevitability
of
a
link
between
any
future
Palestin
ian
entity
and
Jordan.
IV
If
the
PLO
seemed
to
be
relatively
self-confident and assertive
during
much of
1979,
the
same
could
not
be said
of
Saudi Arabia.
There
the
events
of
Iran
and
the
Egyptian-Israeli
peace
treaty
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552
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
caused
a
great
deal
of
anxiety
and
ambivalence,
coupled
with
a
loss of
confidence
in
the
United
States. To
allay
the
fears
caused
by
the events in Iran,
Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown visited
Saudi
Arabia
in
February,
as
well
as
Egypt,
Israel and
Jordan.
He
promised
a
more
active
U.S.
role
in
the
region,
and
specifically
consulted
with the Saudis
on
threats
to
their
security.
The Saudis
felt
particularly
vulnerable
when,
just
after
Secre
tary
Brown's
trip,
South Yemen
attacked North
Yemen.
That
brief
incident alarmed
the
Saudis,
who
appealed
to
the
United
States
for
immediate assistance. The
American
response
was
swift
and
substantial.
Nearly
$500
million
in
arms was
promised
and
rapidly
delivered to the Sanaa
regime,
but this was not immedi
ately
translated
into
U.S. influence.
Instead,
North
Yemen contin
ued
to
hedge
its
bets
by
also
accepting
arms
from the
Soviets,
talking
of
unity
with South
Yemen,
and
keeping
some
distance
from
the Saudi
embrace.
Anxious
to
preserve
a
close
relationship
with
the United
States
despite
differences
over
the
Palestinian
issue
and
Camp
David,
the Saudis
were
generally cooperative
on
oil
pricing
and
pro
duction
during
1979.2
In
January
1979,
the Saudis
were
producing
at their maximum sustainable
capacity,
about 10.5 million barrels
per
day
(mb/d),
in
order
to
make
up
for
the
shortfall in Iranian
production.
But
even
at
that
level,
supply
was
not
able
to meet
demand.
In
these
circumstances,
the
Saudis
were
unable
to
re
strain
OPEC
decisions
in
mid-1979
to
drive the
price
of oil
up
by
60
percent.
Saudi
Arabia
did, however,
sell its
oil
at
$18
per
barrel
during
most
of the last
two
quarters
of
1979,
and
output
was
kept
at
9.5
mb/d.
Other
OPEC members
were
charging
$6-10
more
per
barrel
than the
Saudis,
and
the
spot
market
price
of
a
barrel
of oil hit $40. When it
appeared
as if Saudi Arabia was
forgoing
current
income
largely
as a
subsidy
to
American oil
companies
(whose
profits
hit record
highs by selling
less
expensive
Saudi oil
in
the
uncontrolled
European
market),
the incentives
for further
Saudi
price
restraint
were
weakened.
Just
before
the Caracas
meeting
of OPEC
in
December,
the Saudis
raised
the
price
of
their
oil
to
$24
per
barrel.
Price
increases
helped
the Saudis
meet
their
growing appetite
for
income.
For
two
years,
in
1977 and
1978,
the
Saudis
had
overspent
their
budget
and had been
obliged
to draw down on
some
of
their
reserve
holdings.
The oil
price
increases
of
1979
returned
Saudi
Arabia
to
a
position
of
accumulating
substantial
2
For
details,
see
the
article
by
Robert
Stobaugh
and Daniel
Yergin
in
this
issue.
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THE
MIDDLE
EAST
CRISES
557
eliminated
in
favor
of the
Khalq
faction led
by
Noor
Mohammad
Taraki
and
Hafizullah
Amin.
As the Taraki
regime
tried to extend its
sway
into the
country
side,
it
encountered
armed resistance from
fiercely
independent
Afghan
tribesmen.
By
the fall of
1979,
the
Soviets
apparently
concluded
that
President Taraki
needed
to
broaden
his
political
base
and
to
that end
he should
remove
his
controversial Prime
Minister
Hafizullah
Amin.
Not
surprisingly,
Amin
reacted
by
ousting
Taraki,
in
a
coup
in
September
that
caught
Moscow
unprepared.
From that
moment
on,
the Soviets
appear
to
have
developed
a
strategy
for
removing
Amin and
replacing
him with a more
amenable
client. Under
the
guise
of
helping
the
regime
against
the
Muslim
rebels,
Soviet
military
advisers
entered
Afghanistan,
followed
in
late December
by
combat
troops.
In
addition,
several
Soviet
divisions
were
poised
across
the
border.
Soviet forces
first
settled
the
score
with
Amin in
a
quickly
executed
coup
which
brought
Parcham leader Babrak
Karmal
to
power.
Amin
himself
was
executed,
as
Soviet
troops
poured
into
Afghanistan,
their
numbers
exceeding
50,000
within
a
matter
of
days,
clearly
with
the
objective
of
putting
down the
insurgency
and
establishing
firm
and
lasting
Soviet
control.
This
unprecedented
display
of
Soviet
military
power
outside
Eastern
Europe
brought
U.S.-Soviet
relations
to
a
crisis
point
and
raised serious
questions
in
Washington
about
Soviet
aims. Presi
dent Carter
noted
that Soviet
behavior
in
Afghanistan
had
done
more
to
educate
him
about
Soviet
intentions
than
any
other
event
during
his
presidency.
As
a
result,
he
postponed
Senate consider
ation
of
the SALT
II
treaty,
cancelled
17
million
tons
of
grain
sales
to the
Soviet
Union,
and
announced
a
series
of
other
punitive
measures.
If
Iran
were more
stable,
if
oil
were
less
vital
to
the
West,
and
if
U.S.-Soviet relations
were
otherwise
in
good
repair,
the
events
in
Afghanistan
might
have
had
limited
impact
on
American
thinking.
But
in
the
existing
circumstances,
the
Soviet
occupation
of
Afghanistan
served
to
crystallize
a
number of
converging
trends,
the
net
effect
of
which
was
to
reinforce
American
concern
for
Persian Gulf
security.
While Iran was
likely
to
prove
the most
significant
arena
of
confrontation,
it
was
neighboring
Pakistan
and its
Baluchistan
province
that seemed
most
vulnerable
to
pressures
from
the Soviet
military
presence
in
Afghanistan.
Arms
supplies
to
Pakistan
were
one
response;
aid
to
Afghan
rebels
another. The
search
for
naval
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558
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
and
air
facilities
to
support
a
stronger
American
military
posture
in
the
area
was
also
accelerated.
But
the
diplomatic
challenge
loomed
large.
Could the U.S.
capitalize
on
Pakistani,
Iranian and
even
Iraqi
fears
of Soviet
expansion
to
insure
that
Moscow's
influence
could
be contained? Or had U.S.
prestige
sunk
so
low
that
Afghanistan's
neighbors
would
prefer
to
accommodate the
Soviets
rather than
try
to
resist Soviet
pressures?
As
the 1980s
began,
the
question
could
be
raised,
but
not
answered.
VI
As of
mid-January
1980, it is too
early
to assess the full
impli
cations
of
the
Soviet invasion
of
Afghanistan.
Continuing
Soviet
dominance
there could
threaten Pakistan
in
the
immediate future.
By
supporting
Baluchi
dissidents,
the
Soviets could weaken
both
Pakistan
and
Iran,
perhaps
eventually bringing
the
Soviets closer
to
gaining
a
foothold
on
the Arabian Sea.
In
any
event,
there
can
be
no
doubt that
in
Middle
East
terms
what has
happened
in
Afghanistan
has
greatly
accentuated
the
already
serious
problem
of
security
and
stability
in
the vital
region
surrounding
the world's
largest
reserves of oil.
Nor is
it
now
possible
to
assess
the reaction
in
Iran
to
a
totally
Soviet-dominated
Afghanistan.
One
might
expect
Iranians
to
recognize
that
it is
the
Soviet
Union that threatens
the
indepen
dence and
unity
of
Iran. This
could result
in
a
turn
to
the United
States
after
the
hostage
issue has been
resolved.
But
Khomeini
shows
little
sign
of
drawing
such
conclusions,
and
thus Iran's
future
orientation
remains
clouded.
Many
in
the
Middle
East
expect
that
Iran
will
eventually
slip
into the Soviet
sphere
of influence. This could occur if a pro
Soviet
regime
were
to
come to
power.
Or
it
could
result from
Iran's
fragmentation,
with autonomous
governments
in
Azer
baijan
and
Kurdistan
turning
to
Moscow for
support,
as
happened
after
World
War
II.
The
Soviets
have
several factors
in their favor
in
Iran.
They
could
provide
needed
military equipment
to
the Iranian armed
forces.
They
could
offer
protection
against
Iraqi
military
threats.
They
could
help
Iran circumvent
a
U.S.-sponsored
economic
blockade. And
they
have
supporters
in crucial sectors such as the
Tudeh
party,
among
the oil-field
workers,
and
in
the
provinces
along
the
Soviet
border.
Iran
will
not
inevitably
go
the
way
of
Afghanistan,
and
the
Soviets
will doubtless
have
difficult decisions
to
make
as
they
pursue
their
long-term
objective
of
enhancing
their influence
in
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THE MIDDLE
EAST
CRISES
559
Iran.
But
the Soviet
incentive
for
gaining
a
privileged
position
in
Iran
is
likely
to
grow
in
the
1980s
if
the
U.S.S.R.
does
in
fact
become
an
importer
of
significant
quantities
of
Middle Eastern
oil. Predictions
of Soviet
supply
and demand for
oil
are
uncertain,
but
one
line
of
analysis
leads
to
the
conclusion that the
Soviets
will
need
to
import
oil
by
the
mid-1980s.
For
Moscow,
this raises the
problem
of
how
to
pay
for
the
oil,
since
virtually
all
producers
insist
on
payment
in
hard
currencies.
If
the
Soviets
were
to
import
only
one
mb/d
at
1980
prices,
they
would
need
to
spend
nearly
$10
billion
annually. Any
arrange
ments
whereby
the Soviets
could
supply
arms or
goods
to
offset
this
cost
would
be
highly
advantageous,
and Iran
stands
out
as
one
country
where such
terms
might
be
met
if
a
sufficiently
friendly
or
dependent
regime
were
to
come
to
power.
Thus,
in
assessing
Soviet
attempts
to
take
advantage
of
insta
bility
in
the
Persian Gulf
and
Arabian
Peninsula,
Iran is
likely
to
be
the
most
dangerous
arena
of confrontation.
Having
failed
to
come
to
terms
with
Khomeini,
the
United States
may
begin
to
look
beyond
his
rule
to
the
kind
of
Iran that
may
emerge
at
a
later date.
For
the
moment,
American
influence
over
Iranian
events
is
at
the
lowest
point
since World
War
II.
But
whatever
the
outcome
of the
hostage
crisis,
President Carter's
dilemmas
will
not
be
easily
resolved.
The
question
will
remain of how
to
influence
events
in
Iran
so
that
eventually
U.S.-Iranian
relations
can
be
resumed
on
a
level
commensurate
with
American
interests
in
the
region.
One element
of
an
effective
American
Middle
East
policy
involves
military
power.
During
the
Iran
hostage
crisis,
it
became
common
wisdom
to
declare that the post-Vietnam
era
had
come
to
a
close.
Iran
had
supposedly
convinced
Americans
that
an
anti
interventionist
foreign policy
was
inadequate,
that
military
power
could
not
be
neglected,
and
that U.S.
prestige
must
quickly
be
restored
if
vital interests
were
to
be
protected.
In
this
atmosphere,
it
was
almost inevitable
that
President
Carter
would
seek
a
larger
military budget
and
that
plans
would
be made
to
acquire
U.S.
bases
in
the
Persian Gulf
region.
A
reflection of
this
change
was
an
increase
in
U.S.
military
capabilities
in
the
Indian
Ocean and
Persian Gulf regions by the end of 1979. Two ships were added to
the
Bahrain-based Mideast
Force;
units
of the Pacific
and
Medi
terranean
fleets
were
rotated into the
Indian Ocean
to
create
a
continuous
presence;
defense
spending
for
a
Rapid
Deployment
Force
was on
the
rise;
U.S.
radar
planes
were
operating
from
Egyptian
airfields;
and
at
year's
end
a
U.S.
mission
was
sent to
Saudi
Arabia, Oman,
Somalia
and
Kenya
to
look
at
basing
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560
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
possibilities.
It is entirely appropriate to think of how tomake this dimension
of the U.S.
presence
more
effective
and
credible.
But
there is
a
risk
of
concentrating
on
the
technical
requirements
of the
military
without due attention
to
political
and
diplomatic
contexts.
Bases
or
facilities
may
or
may
not
be
useful
in
a
strictly
military
sense,
but
if
they
serve
to
weaken
a
regime,
or
provide
openings
for
Soviet
influence,
they
may
be
politically
counterproductive.
In
addition
to
strengthening
the
U.S.
military
presence
in
the
Middle
East,
some
analysts
have
recommended
that
the
United
States take the lead in developing a collective security framework
modeled
on
NATO.
Egypt,
Israel
and
Saudi
Arabia
are
usually
mentioned
as
the
prime
candidates;
the
incentive would
presum
ably
be
a
common
fear of
Soviet
power.
The NATO
analogy
serves more
to
highlight
the
difficulties of
security
in
the
Middle
East
than
to
prescribe
a
remedy.
Whereas
the
NATO countries tended
to
perceive
the
Soviet threat
in
similar
terms
and held
many
political
values
in
common,
the
major
powers
of the
Middle East
are
far from
being
a
cohesive
bloc.
Egypt
and Israel
are
groping
their
way
toward
a
new
relation
ship
which
might
in
time include
cooperation
in
the
security
area,
but the
United States
can
do
little
to
force the
pace.
Saudi
Arabia
wants
no
part
of
an
Egyptian-Israeli
alliance,
seeing
in
their
relationship
one
of the
prime
reasons
for
growing
Soviet
influence
in
the Arab
world.
For the
moment,
national
rivalries overshadow
any
recognition
of
common
security
problems.
The
best that
the
United
States
can
hope
for
is
a
network of
bilateral relations?
with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan and Somalia?
which
might
in
time lead
to
broader
cooperation.
VII
While the
events
of 1979
in
the Middle East will
undoubtedly
have
the
effect
on
U.S.
policy
of
pushing
the
Persian
Gulf and
Arabian
Peninsula
region
to
the
top
of
the
foreign
policy agenda,
it
would
be
misleading
to
conclude that
the
more
conventional
American concerns with the Arab-Israeli conflict can be relegated
indefinitely
to
the back burner.
In
the
first
place,
there
is
a
link
between
stability
in
the
Arab
oil-producing
areas
and the
Pales
tinian issue.
Second,
the United States continues
to
occupy
a
unique
diplomatic
position
as
the
only acceptable
and
credible
mediator
in the
Arab-Israeli
dispute.
The successful
Egyptian
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THE
MIDDLE
EAST
CRISES
561
Israeli
negotiations
stand
as
testimony
to
what
can
be
achieved
by persistent and imaginative American diplomacy.
Several
specific
policy
choices
involving
the Palestinian
question
will
be
faced
by
the
Administration
in
1980 and
beyond.
Most
important
will be
how
to
proceed
in
the
negotiations
after the
May
1980
target
date has
passed.
The Israelis
are
likely
to
want
to
continue
the
talks
within the
Camp
David
framework. The
Egyptians
may urge
a
broadening
of the
negotiations.
As
the
architect
of
Camp
David,
President
Carter
will
become
the
likely
arbitrator.
If
the
negotiations
have
produced
few
results
in
the
course of one year, it will be hard to justify continuing with the
same
terms
of
reference.
This
suggests
that the formal
talks
might
be
recessed,
pending
a
redefinition
of the
underlying
principles
of
a
Palestinian
settlement,
or
that the United
States
might begin
to
put
forward
substantive
positions
of
its
own
in
order
to
keep
the
negotiations
alive.
The
U.S.
motivation
for
resuming
an
activist
role
in
the Pales
tinian
negotiations
need
not
be fear that
a
stalemate
could
jeop
ardize
Egyptian-Israeli
relations.
And
activism
for its
own
sake
is
pointless. But the Administration does need to think about the
questions
of
stability,
Soviet
influence,
and American
credibility
in
the Arab
world,
and
to
some
extent
each
of these
issues
will
be
affected
by
the
stance
taken
by
the
United States
in
the
ongoing
peace
negotiations.
It
will do
little
for
U.S.
prestige
as a
superpower
if
Egypt
and
Israel
appear
to
be
dictating
American
policy
in
the Middle
East.
Quite
apart
from
the
perceived
interests of America's
two
partners
in
the
peace
negotiations,
the United
States has
important
rela
tions with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Jordan. Sadat may
treat
the Saudis
and
King
Hussein
with
disdain,
but
that
is
no
reason
for
Washington
to
follow
suit.
By refusing
to
see
King
Hussein
in
the
fall
of
1979,
President
Carter added
unnecessary
strain
to
U.S.-Jordanian
relations and
reduced
even
further
the
chance
that
Jordan
would
adopt
a
helpful
role
in
the
search for
a
Palestinian
settlement.
Indeed,
the
deterioration of
U.S.-Jorda
nian
ties
during
1979
was a
striking
and
worrisome
development.
Thus,
one
step
toward
restoring
the
United States
to
an
influ
ential role in the Arab Middle East will involve a resumption of
serious
initiatives
to
resolve the
Palestinian issue.
No
one
expects
instant
results,
especially
in
an
election
year,
but
many
Arabs
still
look
to
Washington
as
holding
the
key
to
peace
in
the
region.
This
is
both
an
asset
and
a
liability,
depending
on
how
the
Adminis
tration
plays
its
hand.
But
to turn
away
from
the
Arab-Israeli
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