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Armies
and
Enemies
of
the Crusades
96·
9
a t i o n tK tics. dress n weapons. 96 iIIustrltions.
Heath
,...,kS, HOSP
t
, lIl 11. TempI•••
,
.Syrians,
Se lju kl . F
hm
ldl .
yv u
bodl , MMnl ukl. A h l
ln
8y,.nlll . Georg
. .
. Mongol
an d
llk - idl .
W RG MES RESE RCH GROUP PU LI C TION
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Armies and
Enemies
of the Crusades
1 96 1291
Organisati
on
tact ics dr ess and wea pons 9 illust ra t ions
bylan
Heath
r nk s lI ospitallers Templars Arm en ians Sy rians Selju ks
Fat im ids Ayyubids Mamluks Assassins Byzant mes Georgians
Mongols and IIkhanids
W RG MES RESE RCH GROUPPU LI C T O
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INTRODUCTION
Although man y bo oks have bee n written on th e Crusad es ove r th e years they mostly ap proach the
subject from a pol it ical or socia l viewp oint, and with the excep tion of R. C. Smau s workmanlike
C rusadi ng War fare 1097·1 193 few o r no ne have ventured to describe in any detai l the warri ors and
armies with which Moslem and Ch ristian vied for co nt ro l o f th e Holy Land. Th e aim of this book,
ther
ef
ore, is to fill th is gap and add a litt le flesh to th e bo nes o f crusading history , by no t only describ ing
bu t
alse illustrating th e myriad wa rrior-types of Outrerner and
th e
lan ds o f Islam and Byzuntium so th at
toge th er
with
t he notes on organisat ion and tactics an entire pic ture can be built up o f warfa re in th e
Middle East in th e
tw o
centu ries
between
th e fat
ef
ul Bat t le of Manztker t in 1071 and the fa ll o f the
city of Acre to th e Mamluks 22 0 years late r.
A few n
ot e
s on terminology. I have used th e word Frank throughout to describe crusaders of
Eu ropean origin or extract ion, though the Byzanti nes tended to refer to
them more
o ft en as Latins . Where
the ir ethn ic origins are mixed or uncerta in Moslems I have usually called by that
name
, t hough where
applicab le I have sometimes substitu ted Turks r Arabs and on occasion have even lapsed int o using
th e popular term Saracen (a co rruption of Sharkeein , meaning Easterner o r Levanti ne]. Fo llow ing
convention, na tives of th e East ern Emp ire arc referred to as Byzant ines, o r sometimes as
Greeks
, which
term they were beginn ing to apply to themselves during th e course of this era, alt hough they more o ften
persisted in calling th emselves Romans even in th e 12t h and 13t h centu ries. T he Holy Land , although
it ref ers specifically to th e Kingdom of Jeru salem, l have generally used (inte rchangeab ly with Palest ine,
Frankish Syria and Outrerner ] as a collective te rm for th e mainland crusade r
stat
es
of
Jeru salem,
Tripoli, Annoch and Edessa; no mod e rn geographical boundar ies are inten de d by an y of these te rms,
and if this should at t imes cau se confusion I crave your indulgence.
European Crusades o f thi s same era , such as were fough t in Spai n, S
outhern
France and Prussia , are not
covered he re, th e part icipating armies o f t hese campaigns having already been desc r ibed in A rmies o f
Feudal 1066·1 300 .
The th ird and fina l part o f what was o nce envisaged as a single book, I th ink I can safely say that this is
th e par t which I have most enjoyed prepa ring. I ho pe you will f ind it equa lly enjoyable to read , an d that it
will encou rage further interest in on e o f the most neglected , an d yet at th e same time most fascinating,
th eatr es o f mediaeva l war fare .
lan Heat h
Febr uary 1978
Copyright lan Heath 1978
1
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° St5
3
t RUS DER STATES
FRONTIERS IN -
t lt 8
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ORGANISAT ION
THE CRUS ADER STATES
European feudalism was int rod uced int o Sy ria by th e crusaders, who founded the Principality of
An tioch ( 10< 8· 263) , th e Coun ties of Edessa ( 1098-1 144) and
Tr i
poli ( 1109-1289 , in
corpo
rating
Antioch afte r 11 19 ), th e Kingdom of Cypru s (11 91 -1489, thereafter a v cncuan co lony un til 1571 ) and
th e Kingdom of J
er u
salem
1100-
1187, thereafter in reality the Kingdom of Acre rather than Jerusalem
un t il the final extinct ion
of
th e state in 1291 ).
Feudal
co n
t ingents
Since the re was a co nstant sho rtage o f manpower , and the su rvival of Frank ish Syria depended entirely
on its military capabili t ies, general kn ight service was subject to far fewe r restri ctions th an in Europe. Fo r
instance, there seems to have been no time-lim it on t he length of service tha t might be req uired even up
to a full yea r, th ough it is not clear whether thi s was at t he expense of th e vassal or th e ten an t-in-chief';
e ither way it was not at t he king's expe nse unless it too k place out side o f th e kingd om.
Each vassal was a vassal of the king, irres pective o f whose lands he was enfeoffed upon (wi th th e exce p
tion o f th e lands o f th e chu rch and th e Milita ry Orders) , and so lo ng as he was under 60 years o f age he
was expec ted to serve mounte d an d fully -a rme d anywhere w
it h
in th e realm and within 15 days whenever
the king summoned him. In addi t ion the vassal
would
be accom panied by what ever kn ight s , se rgeants.
esquires or mercenaries his
terms
o f enfeo ffment might demand (i t
should
be noted, however c tha t a
vassal was no t allowed to subinfeuda te more of his
fief
than he hims
el f
held, wh ich ef fec tivel y resmctcd
th e size o f per sonal rerinucs ' ).
The principal limita t ion o n service to t he crown was that Edessa, T ripo li and Ant ioch were not
considered
part
of t he realm , and m ilita ry assistance from th ese principalities was only to be expected
whe n th e king was strong
en o
ugh to en fo rce it. When the crowns of Jerusalem and Cyp rus were u
nite
d
in 1268 th is problem became mor
e complicate d, Cypnote knights insist ing tha t th ey owed no mi
lih
ry
service to th e king save on the island o f Cyprus itself:
bu t
in 1273 agreement was rea
ched
that Cyprio tc
knights owed service in Jerusalem too - or
wher
ever else the king migh t have need o f
th e
m - fo r
4 mon th s every year. However, even prio r to th is dat e, as early as th e reign o f Amalric
( 1194·1 205
Cypriote feudal t ro
op
s had ap pea red in ma inland armies
on
a number of occasions; 100 Cy p riote
knights to ok pa rt in the Fifth Crusade under the Constable o f Cy p rus, and in an a ttac k on lI amah in
1233 , while perhaps
30 0
C
ypri
otes were killed at La Forblc in 1244 and at least :WOFyp
no t
c knigh ts
and 500 infantry look pa rt in the fin al defence of Acre in 129 1. (Th e Estoi re d' Eraclcs infor ms us tha t
whe n feudal tenu re was esta b lished on
Cypru
s by Guy de Lusignun, 1192-1194 , vassals 'c ame fro m the
Kingdom of Jerusalem, from Tripoli, from Anti och , and from Armenia u e Cilicia ), And
there
were
established fiefs worth 40 0 white bezants for a knight an d wort h 300 for a Turcopole with two horses
and a co at-o f-mai In all 30 0 knight 's fees were parcelled
ou
t and W Turco pole s fee s, leaving Guy
wit h scarcely enoug h land or revenue to maintain a familia of 20 - one source says 70 - kn ights.)
Because of th e shortage of land many vassals received mone y-fiefs in ex change fo r service (especially in
th e Principality of Antioch ), usually f rom th e revenues of spcctf'ic town s and ci ties: Frankish mer cenari es
were also pa id with money-fiefs (see below ), Som e of the knight s owed by the t
owns
t see Append ix 11
and
pe r
haps the ch urch as well were prob ably also supplied in e xchange for money-fiefs
Though often complicated by
th e
presence of crusading
Eu r
op e
an kings and magn ate s overall
co
mmand
was usually in the hands of th e king himself or his baill i [ regen t I, th ough in realit y a counci l of the
chief men of th c
army
decided st rategy and po licy :IS Heha ed-Din puts it ' it is their custom, when it is
a ques ti on of W:lT, to take co unsel together on horseback ], In the absence o f king or bailli th e Constable
of th e Kingdom led the army assisted by his lieutenant c th c Marshal. Su pplies and justice were
respo nsib iliti es o f the Con stable, as was th e em p loyment an d fai r paymen t of mercen aries, both the
king's an d those hired independe nt ly by the feu da l lor ds, from whom he co llec ted th e appr
op
riate
• By the mid·13th century there was considerable dispute ;u to ..hether this meant that the vassal must fa) hold at
least 51 of the fief himselF or Ib) that he need only hold more than
\Io 'lU
subinfeudated to hb ,:reatest vassa l,
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paym en ts; but t he Ma rshal act ually co mma nde d th e mercenaries in the field, In ba
ttle t he Cons ta b
le
co m ma nded a do uble-stre ngth
troo
p h e had
th e
first choice o f men af te r t he king s own tr o
op
ha d bee n
mad e up ) and ma rched in the vangua rd , immediat ely beh ind t he
Turcop
c les see page 39 ), wit h t he
xta rshal s troo p, then t he king s, be hind him , Anti och , Ed essa and T ripoli had th e ir own
cons
t ables a nd
mars hals two marshals cou ld hol d offi ce simulta neously in Antioch ) , as did
th e
great baro ns of Ja ffa ,
Si
do n
, Ga hlee an d poss ibly Oult rejo urdain an d Ceesa rea . T he Senesc hal wa s se nio r t o t he Co nstable but
he was a co urt officia l rath e r t han a mili
tary
co mmander, In
th e
Pri ncipality of An tioe h t
he r
e we re
add itional office rs i n Antioch , Jah ala and Lat ta kieh] ca lled d uces or Dukes.
Fra nki sh mercenaries
Mercen:lril s, called Sodee rs or sold iers, we re o f great import an ce fro m th e very beginnin g o f t he
cru sade r state s exi sten ce, a t leas t par tially co mpensating
fo r
t he cri tica l s
ho r
tage of feuda l
manpowe
r.
They
became eve n mo re
impor
t ant over th e yea rs as t he stea dy re conquest o f land by th e Sara cens
f
ur t
her red uc ed th e numbers of fe udal troo ps available . Some were provided o n a fe ud al basi s by
vassals who
owed
service de compaignons w hich req uire d th a t t he vassal sho uld raise
an d
pay a
specified n
umber
o f
me r
cenaries}, o t hers bei ng provided by Fr ankish knights and serge a nt s wh o stayed
o n in th e Fast af te r visi ting t he ho ly places.
Th ey were co ntracte d mo nt h by mon t h
fr o
m t he 1st of t he mon th), breac h of such a co nt rac t being
regarded as very se rious offen ce ; in t he case o f a kn ight it was pu nishab le by co nfisca t io n of his fief if
he had on e presumably la nd or mon ey ) o r his ar mour and equ ipment if he did no t, while an o rdina ry
sold ier might have his ha nd s mu t ilate d with a hot iron . On
th e
o
th e
r ha nd mercena ries were paid a t a
ve ry high rate th o ug h probably no t at 100 times the rat e of a Mosle m warrior as is sugges te d in o ne of
Usamah ib n Munqld h s anecdotes ; evide nce suggests, in fact, that Fr ank s we re pa id 2-5 t im es a s much
as t hei r Moslem co unte r parts).
- knights , se rgeants a nd infan t ry -
tended
to be hire d out ri ght ,
but me rcen ar y kn ights we re of ten paid for with mo ney-flcfs, usually fro m th e revenues
of
so me town,
city or t je de speci fied in
their
con t racts. T he revenues var ied from 3
00
bezan fs
pe r
an
nu m
to 60 0 o r
even 1
,000
dep end ing o n how secur e t he revenues wen and how ma ny men were n eed ed -
th e
mo re
me n needed ,
th e
l
ower
t he revenue. However, be cause o f a lmost co nsta nt warfare
an d
th e frequ ent loss
o f
town
s and lan ds it was
no t
uncommo n fo r merce naries pay to be we ll o verdue, an d under such
cir cu mstances th e y co uld sell t heir eq uipmen t and live of f th e proceeds, owing no service unt il t he
o uts ta nding debt had bee n paid off. O n o ther occasions th ey we re paid for by special t ax es as in 1183 ),
o r by gift s of money from European rulers in lieu of act ual tr
oo p
s; t he
ll i
st ori a Regni lI ierosoly mitani
reco rd s t hat many as 1, 20 0 me rcenary kni gh ts a nd 7,00 0 me rcenary infant ry were hired pr io r to t he
Ba tt le o f Ila tt in in 118 7, e xplaining th at th ey were paid for by a m
oney
gift from lI enry
of England
in at
onement
fo r t he mu r der o f T homa s it Bec ket), but t hese figu re s arc s om ewha t on t he high side ,
wh ile in his will of 122 2 1hilip
o f Fra nce left 150 ,000 silver marks 10
th e
king of Jerusalem a nd
th e
Orde r of t he Tem ple for
th e
ma intenance of 100 merce nary knights each Ior a pe riod o f 3 yea rs.
Likewise mon e y sent ou t to Outre mer by t he Po pe see ms t o have been largely used t o hi re me rcena ries
th roughou t th e 13t h ce ntury.
Examples of Frankish knights staying o n in Out reme r in ex change fo r pay are provided by t he 40
knight s left with a yea r s pay by Wail e r d Avesnes on his retu rn t o Eu rope in 12 18,
an d th e
F renc h
regiment o f 100 kn ight s established in Acre by Loui s IX [St Lo uis) prio r to his
o wn d ep
a rt ure in 1254
and co nt inuo usly maint a ined by gift s o f money un til th e fa ll of th e ci t y in 1291 . Alt hough no t st ric t ly
mercenary, th e un its o f Fr e nch and Ge rma n knight s ma intained by t he ba illis of Ch arles of Anjo u and
F rede rtck
sho u ld proba bly also he mentioned he re.
Na tive soldie rs and mercenaries: Syrians, Maro nit es, T urcu poles and Arm enians
Far from all mercenaries wen of F rank ish o rigin. As
me n
tioned
ab o
ve, crusaders fro m Europ e oft e n dill
stay on for pay , but th e majo rity of me rcen
an e
s were probably hired fro m
amon
gst the na tive Ch risua ns,
t he Sy rians , Arm en ians and Maronucs. T hese woul d be hired o ut righ t
rathe
r
than
being grante d money-fiefs
It has bee n suggested t ha t S yria ns may have sup plied t he bulk of t he king
dom s
inf an
try.
and t hough
th e
re is little eviden ce to support t his rather swee ping stateme nt it is un den iable
that
Sy rians are
to
be
occ asiona lly fou nd in Franki sh armies ; so me, for inst ance , he lped Raymond de Sa int-GilIes in t he
co nque st of T ripoli . Undoubtedl y o t he rs wo ul d take u p arm s in an e me rgency, as did so me in 1124,
and passages in w illiam of Tyre and F ulch e r of Cha rtres ind ica te that t hey migh t sometimes pe rfor m
6
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garrison duties. However, WilIiam also points out that in general
the
y were o f a timorous na ture, 'a race
which is regarded by us
JS
weak and effemina
te
, in wh ich he is bac ked up by Jacques de Vitry, Bisho p
of Acre, who wro te in the 13th centur y that t hey are altogether unwarlike and in ba tt le are as helpless
as wom en, save fo r some of them who use bows and arrows bu t are una rmoured and ready for runn ing
away. T hese men are known as Syr ians , For the most pa rt they are untrustwor thy, two-faced
cunning foxes just like the Greeks (Byzantines), liars and turncoat s, lovers of success, traitors, easily won
over wit h bribes, men who say one th ing and mean another, and thi nk no thing of t heft and robbery.
For a small sum of money they beco me spies and tell the Christians' secrets to the Saracens.' Hardly
reliable allies
The pr incipal nati ve Christian element in the County of T ripoli prov ided by th e Maronit cs of
Lebanon, sett led principally in Gibbat Bsarr i, Kisrawan and round Jebail. They appear to have
numbered about 304 0,000. WiIliam of Tyre praised t he militar y skill of the Maronites, 'a sta lwart race,
valiant fighters, and of grea t service to the Christian s in the difficult engagements which t hey so
freq uently had , to which de Vitry adds ' they are numerous, use bows and arrows, and are swift and
skilful in battle.' They served in most Tripolitanian armies, fighting under their own ch ieftains (called
by the Ara bic title Muqaddam) , some of whom even received fief s (which would indicate th a t a few
were actually knights; other na tive Ch rist ian knights are also to be fo und in the sou rces, with surn ames
such as Arrabi, Qelbe Arab, Elteffaha, etc. while in Ant ioch many knight s bore Greek names). Between
1192 and 1194 Gu y de Lusignan is reported to have even introduced a large numbe r of Marom tes int o
Cy p
rus th e figu re of 30, 000 is given ), these subsequently serving as a sor t of militia. Some may have
later
acco
mpan ied
the
Hospitallers to
Rh o
des, and la ter sti ll to Malta.
The most numerous, reliable and efficient Syrian element in Frankish arm ies, however, was pr ovided by
the Turcopole s, The te rm Turcopole itself, meaning literally 'son o f the Turks', had been bo rrowed from
the Byzantines, who used the name Turcopouloi fo r their ow n merce nary Tur k ish regulars (see page 28 ;
Raymond d'Aguilers sta tes th at Turcopoles were so named because they were eit her reared with Turks
or were the
offs
pring of a Christian mother and a
Tur
kish father' ), The Franks applied the te rm rat her
more loosely
to
Syr ians, nati ves of mixe d parentage (Tu rk ish fathers and Greek mo thers according to
Albert of Aix) , and co nverted Turks serv ing in their own armies. By the mid-12th cen tury, however,
judging from t he evidence of names reco rded for Turcopoles in writte n sources it would seem possible that
at leas t some, and possibly a great many, may have actually been Sy rian Franks ( Pou lains) or even European
Franks, probably equipped to fight in Turkish fashion. (I n sup por t of this last theory it is
inte
resti ng to
not e that Tu rcopouloi employed by
th e
Cat alans in Greece in th e early- 14t h cen tury include d native
Greeks who had shaved t heir heads Turkish-fashion in order to be employed in this capaci ty Although
it has been suggeste d that some
Tu r
copoles were foot-soldiers the sources seem to indica te that they
fou ght principa lly if not exclusively as light cavalry (see also no te 14 in th e dress and eq uipmen t section ).
They had their own officers called Turcop oliers (pr obab ly Fran ks) but like all other mercenaries came
unde r the overa ll command of th e Marshal o f the Kingdom.
There were 1,500 Turcopoles in the army which campaigned in the Jezreel valley in 1183 and the army
at Hatt in may have included as many as 4 ,000; Usamah records a single nobleman (William-Jo rdan, regent
of Tripoli) having as many as 200 'Turkubuli' (f rom Latin 'Turco poli' ) in his employ in 1107. Turcopolcs
served in addit ion in Tunisia (during Louis IX's Eighth Crusade ) and Cyprus and were employed in
considerab le num bers by the Military Orders - the Hospitallers supplied 5 0 0 in 1168 while the
Hospitallers and Templars together lo st over 5 00 at La Forbie in 1244.
The o
th e
r most imp
or t
ant group o f native Christia ns were the warlike Armenians of Cilicia ( Lesser
Armenia). These were numerous in th e Principality of Ant ioch and comprised most of the po pulat ion
of the Coun ty o f Edessa, and they are to he found serving variously as subjects, mercenaries and allies
under their ow n chieftai ns, supplying
both
cavalry and infan try, particulary under C
oun
t Joscelyn
11 3 1-1150 ). 1nl 108 th e Armenian prince of Kesoun, Kogh Vasil (Vasil the Robbe r), supplied Baldwin
of Edessa wit h an army of as many as 1-2,000 cavalry and 2,000 infa ntry , including a number of Selju k
renegades, while the c
hr o
nicle r Matt hew o f Edessa records that there were 50 0 Armen ian cavalry in
Roger of
An t
ioch's army at Ager Sanguin us in 1119 and a similar numbe r at 'Azaz in 1125 . When
Edessa fell in 1144 many of its mercenary defenders were Armenians, and some Armenians were even
present at the siege
of
Acre in 119 1.
shou ld be noted, however, that the Armenians (and very occasionally the Maronites) cou ld also be
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foun d figh ting against t he Fra nks. Arm en ians see m to have played a pa rti cular ly im portan t ro le in som e
Seljuk a rm ies o f t he la te- Ll t h cen t u ry , nota bly that o f T u t ush o f Damasc us 0 079-1095) , and t hey we re
to be fo u nd t oo in th e various T urkish ar mies which o ppos ed th e First Crusa de. In add it io n t he F atirnids
employ ed A rmen ian ar c her s in t h e 1
2t h
ce n
tury.
So me t imes t o o
op e
n wa rfare co uld flar e up be twee n
Ctltcta a nd neigh bo uring Ant ioch .
The flee t: t he It al ian c o mm unes
Th o ugh A nt ioch an d Tr ipo li bo t h d eveloped sm all fleet s th e Kingdom o f J eru s alem itsel f had no
per manen t flee t
of
its o wn
th o
ugh it mainta in ed arsenals at T yr e and Acre, raisi ng 33 ships fr o m th ese
at sho rt n o tice in 1 182 , prob ab ly incl ud ing It alian me rcha n t vessels in po r t a t t he t ime, while in 12 32
mo ney -fief swere pa id ou t to Po u la ins of th e co astal ci tie s for fitti ng
ou t
arm ed shi ps), Inst ead th e kings
o f Je rusalem d epe nd ed pri ncipa lly on th e Ita lian co mmune s and t he Milit ar y Ord ers for naval su pp or t
t
he Ord ers maintaining bo th t ranspo rt s a nd galleys; in a naval e ngageme nt d uring t he siege of T yre in
118 7 we find as many as 17 galleys man ned b y Hosp iralle rs a nd Te m plars). 13t h cen tu ry Cyprus
simila rly relied on It alian sh ips, usually Genoese.
The It a lia n co mmu nes seco nd in impor ta nce on ly t o th e Milita ry Ord ers in 1
3t h
ce n t ury Ou t remer ) ha d
mos tly bee n establishe d in t he earl y years of th e 1
2t h
ce nt u ry in ex cha nge fo r t he se rvices re ndered by
Ita lia n flee ts in t he ca p tu re o f t he co as ta l ci t ies whic h, wit h th e e xception o f T y re a nd Ascalon, all fell
bet wee n 1100 a nd 1 1 1 1. Fo r e xa mple 4 0 Oenoe sc ships ha d a tt ende d th e siege o f I e bail in 1 10 3, 70 were
at Acre in 1 104 , 60 at T r ipo li in 1 10 9 , 4 0 Gcnocse a nd Pisa n sh ips at Beiru t in 1 110 , a nd lat
er
as many
as 100- 1
30
Ven eti an sh ips a t th e siege o f T yr e in 1124. Such flee ts ha d bee n sup plied p rinci pally by
th e
city -st ates o f Gen oa , Pisa a nd a t fi rst to a lesse r ex ten t) Ve nice , ge nerally in ex c hang e fo r pay, t rading
co ncessio ns o r loo t, o r of te n 113; usually th ey were promised pa rt o f t h e besieged city to o , of t en a
thi rd . Th e e nd prod uct was th e establishmen t o f self-governi ng It alian co mmu nes in a ll th e co ast al c ities,
eac h
under
a co ns ul o r visco u n t v ic om te) ap p oin ted by its pa rent cit y in It aly . Ge no a possesse d suc h
co mmunes in Acre, A n t ioc h, Arso uf , Be irut , Caesa re a. Ja ffa , J eb ail, L
att
ak ieh , Sain t Sy meon , Tyre and
Tripo li, an d Ven ice had its o wn co mmu nes in t he larger o f t hese ci ties, bo th having qu a r ters in
Je rusalem to o. Pisa h ad co mmu nes in Acre, An tioch, Botrun, l attakieh, T ri poli and T yre. In ad diti o n
the re wer e A malfi t a n co m mu nes in Acre and La tt ak ie h and Marseillais co mmunes in Acre, J a ffa, J eb ail
and T y re, there even be ing a Barcelonese co mmu ne in t he la tt er. Exce pt fo r Acr e few o f these co u ld
have mustered more t ha n abou t 5 00 men ,
T hough t h e co mmu nes were un de r no o bliga ti o n
10
se rve in th e king s army t hey co uld be ca lled upo n to
help defen d
th e
cit ies in which th ey had the ir
quar
te rs a nd to le nd naval su p po rt usua lly in ex cha nge
for e x t ra p rivileges) in d e fe nce of t he co astal to wns. Italian co n t inge n ts also o ft e n wen t alo ng as all ies
in many offe nsive campaigns, an d as mer ce naries in o t he rs,
Unfor
tuna
tely for t he kingd om , however , th e Venet ian , Plsa n, G cn oese a nd o ther It alian co n t inge nts we re
mu t ua ll y hos ti le, and Jucq u es de Vit ry re mar ks
dryly
t ha t t hey would be very te rrible t o th e Sar ace ns if
t hey wo uld cease fro m t heir j ea lousy and avaric e and wo u ld no t co n t in ually fight a nd q uarre l with each
o ther. But , . , t he y mo re o ft e n jo in ba t t le agains t o ne a nothe r th a n against th e t rea
chero
us
in f
idel.
On e o f the wo rs t o f th ese bl oo dy ci vil wa rs was th e w ar o f Sa in t Sabas in Acre in 125 9, in which
allegedly hu t impr oba b ly ) 20 ,0 00 v en e t ians. C e noese and o t hers d ied.
Oth e r so urces o f t roop s
Chu rc h land s and th e to wns o f th e kingdo m were ob liged t o supply co nti nge n ts o f se rgea nt s. T ho se
co n t ingents o n record listed b y J ean d Jbelin - see A ppendi x I) va ried be tw een 25 and 50 0 each , t he
lists ap pare ntly reco rdi ng th e state o f affairs as
it
ex isted in th e reign o f Bald wi n IV 1174- 1185).
D fbcttn gives a to ta l of 5,02 5 sergeants be ing available from the se so u rces, th o ugh his figures a re p
robab
ly
incomple te a nd refle ct the se rvice o f th e k ingdo m o r J e rusale m o nly , exclusive of An tioch a nd T ripoli
Edessa had fallen in 1144 ). T hese se rgeants were no t a milit ia , se rving ra th er e xchange for se rgea nts
fees, T hey were p rob ably infa n t ry, T hou gh th er e w
er
e also mo u n ted se rgea nts Isee page 7 1) th ese we re
mo re usu ally in th e re tin ues o f k nights.
O n o ccasio n th e A rricrl:-Ban . th e levy o f all able-b odied free men , might be sum mo ned to su p ple me nt
t he feudal a nd me rce nar y co n t ingents, eit her lo cally as. fo r e xa mple, at la ffa in 1 122 a nd Acre in 121 8 ,
o r to re lieve th e siege o f B
a r
in in 113 7 ; or o n a na tio nal sca le as a t t he siege of Acr e in 1 104 , fo r a war
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against Damascus in 11 26 , at Ascalon in 115 3 w here in addi tion so me pilgrims we re hire d
temp
orarily),
at Mont gisa rd in 1177 , o r for t he lIa lli n campaign o f I 187, Pilgrims also appe a red in exchange for pay
on ot her occasio ns, as at Ram la in 110 2, Senn abr a in I I 13, a nd in t he Ain Jalut ca mpa ig n of 118 3, but
it is clea r that suc h se rvice was no t always perfor med willingly , Crusa ding knig hts c onsta ntl y arriving
from Europe also supplement ed the kingdom s army for th e durat ion of thei r stay, often staying on as
mercenarie s as men tioned a bo ve ).
Mosle ms and Mo ngols
In t he first half of t he 12t h ce ntury
Turki
sh e mtrs. fearful
of
losi ng
the
ir
indepe
nde nce t o
more
pow erful neighbo urs or eve n
to
t he Sultan, co uld be found allied to th e c rusader states a nd supplying
troops, suc h as the 600 Alcp pene cavalry a nd more than 1,00 0 T urks and Bcdoui ns who fo ugh t fo r
Tancre d of Ant io ch and Baldwin of Edessa respec t ive ly at Tell Bash ir in 1108 , a nd t he 5, 00 0 f rom
Aleppo, Mardi n a nd Damascus who serve d du ring the I l l S campaign. T he Fra nkish ar my besieg ing
Ale pp o in 1124 is reco rded to have inclu de d as man y as l OO Moslem t ents Be do uins unde r th e a mir
Dubays), c om prising one-third of th e tot al fo rce, Bedo uin spies a nd scouts being re
corded
in ad dition on
o
ther
occasions. Assassins were also to be fo und allied
to
the F ran ks o n occasion there wer e so me in
Ra ym ond of An tioch s a rmy defea ted at Fo ns Murat us) , wh ile Egypt ian troops t oo appeared in Frankish
armies, not ab ly
dur
ing the s t ruggle with Nu r ed-Din for co nt ro l of Egy pt in I 167, but they we re
regarded as poor soldiers of l it tle military significance. Th e re were also so me Sara cen arche rs introd uced
from Sicily in 1113 ; mo re accompanied Frederick d u ring t he Si xt h Crusa de of 1228- 1229 , an d
probab ly th e 300 Turco poles re po rte d in the flee t despatched by William II of Sicily in 118 7 were also
Saracens.
Even t he Mongols in t his case the Nestortan o r Christ ian-influe nced lfkhanids of Pe rsia ) so me times
foug ht for t he F rankish cause, an d in t his c ontext a ppea r so me of t he most unlikely armie s
of
t his e ra,
such as t he mi xed bag of Mo ngols, T urks , F ran ks under Bo he mon d VI
of
Antioch l, Armenian s an d
Georgia ns which campaigned in Sy ria in 1259 a nd 126 0
und
er t he Ilkha n Hulagu. In 128 1, un der his
suc cesso r Abuqa an arm y
of
similar composit io n, chiefly Mongols, Georgians a nd Ar menians but
including Hospitullc rs from t he garrison of a l-Marqab, fought the Mamluks at Ho rns. 10 years e arlier, in
127 1, Abaq a had alleged ly de spatched as many as 10,000 Mongols again st t he Mamluk s in Syria in
response to an appeal from t he English prin ce Edwa rd later Edward t hen invo lved in wha t transp ired
to be a ve ry minor crusading en te rprise.
Tot al st reng t h
In
the
Aut umn of 1099
Godftey
de Bou illon co uld muste r 3
,000
me n in Jerusalem ,
but
Albert o f Aix
recor ds that by t he Sp ring of 1100 t his ha d declined to on ly 200 k night s and 1,000 infant ry , T he ne xt
yea r Fulche r of Cha rt res record s
tha
t King Baldwin I had barely 300 c avalry a nd 30 0 infantry with which
to garri so n Je rusa lem, Ra mla, J affa and Huifa, and even at the Firs t Bat t le o f Ram la t here were as few as
260 cavalry a nd 90 0 infantry present. Baldw in found it necessary , in fact , t o establish a mercena ry
for ce to gar rison bot h Jeru salem and J a ffa a t least as early as 110 I , and in 1108 we hear of a force of as
many as OO me rcena ry k night s a nd 500 me rc en ar y inf a nt ry from t he garri so n of Jerusalem.
70 0 knights and 4,000 infantry gathered by Ba ldwi n in 111 I probably rep resented the to tal feudal
st rength of th e ki ngd om at t ha t t ime t hough here as elsewh ere to the t ota l numb er o f knights should
probably be adde d an unkn ow n num ber of mou nt ed sergeants); th e co ntingents o f Be rtrand
of
T ripoli,
Ta ncred of Ant ioeh , Bald win of Edessa 200 knigh ts an d 100 infa ntry), Josc clyn of T urbcssel 100
knigh ts a nd 50 infan t ry ), Ric hard o f Marash 60 kn ight s a nd 100 infa nt ry) and ot he rs, plus Arm enian
co nt ingents,
bro
ugh t t his fo rce up to a total strength of some 16 ,000 men.
Fo r a campaign in 11 15 Baldwi n supp lied 1,000 infan t ry and 500 knigh ts, Antioc h mustering 2,00 0
cavalry a nd infa
ntry
a nd Tr ipoli 2,000 infant ry and 200 knig ht s. To t hese were added 5
,000
Seljuk
aux ilia ry cavalry. A
noth
er Antio chene fo rce , recor ded a t Ager Sangui nus in 11 19 , co nsisted of 700
knights an d 3-4,0 00 infa nt ry and t his possibly represent s the principa lity s t ota l stre ngt h in kn ights and
serge
ants
respec t ively, t he
latte
r incl udi ng a numbe r of Sy rians and Armenians. T he tot al num be r of
knights actually availab le to An tioc h or T ri poli was probably a bout t he sa me as in th e king
dom of
Jerusale m. T he num be r of kn ights in Edessa was probably so mewha t less but a ppea rs to have been a t
least 500 . In 1138 a for ce recorded march ing fro m Samosa ta to th e relief of Edessa itself is reco rded as
numbe ring 300 kn ights a nd about 4 ,00 0 infan t ry.
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In 1183 a n army of o ver 15 ,000 t rul y e xce llent arm ed foot-soldiers and 1,300 knights is rec ord e d by
William o f T yre, while mad ad -Din gives 15-20
,000
infan tr y and 1,50 0 kn ights plu s in additio n 1,5 00
Turccpolcs. Eit her way, a t t hat t ime it was t he la rge st army t o have been mu st e re d in Frankish Syr ia,
thou gh it incl ude d so me Eu ropean crusa ders. But t he largest arm y eve r mu stered by th e king
do m
was
the force of 2Q.63,O rec orded in th e lI alt in c
ampa
ign of 118 7, Th e o n ly detailed se t of figures for th is
army gives us a breakdown of 1,000 kn ights, 1,200 mercenary knigh ts, 4
,000 Tu r
copoles, 25,000
infantry, a nd 7, 00 0 mercena ry infantry, to talling 48,
20 0
men. Ho wever, on th e evidence o f th e
It inerarium Regis Ricar d i, which recko ns mo re t han 1
,000
knights a nd 20
,000
infa nt ry ; t he Libellus de
E
xpugnat
m, which gives 1,2 00 kn ight s, many
Tu r
c opcle s a nd over 18
,000
infantry ; t he Brevis Hist orja,
which gives 25, 000 ; a nd th e Mo slem au th o r Abu Shamah, wh o reckons at least 23, 000 men , it seems a
reaso na ble assumption
that
th e a rmy was
ab o
ut 20-25,000 st ro ng, probably includi n g 1,200 kn ights of
who m abou t 200 were mercenaries, An o lh er so urce, t he I lospltallers le t t er, recor d s th e arm y t o have
been 30,
000
st rong including some 1
,2 0
0 kn ights, T he lo west figur e give n in t h e sou rces is 5 ,000, wh ich
is as im
prob
able as th e 63,
000
given in o ne Moslem so urce.
It is fro m list s o f just a few years earlier t ha n t h is dat e tha t J ean d lb elin com piled his reco rd
of
fe udal
service o wed t o th e Kingd om of J erusalem, full de tails of whic h are given in Appendix Con tinge nts
ranged in size fro m t he 100 knights eac h du e from t he 3 great baronies o f Sidon, Galil ee a nd Ja ffa and
Ascalon, right dow n to t he se rvice o f single knight s. D lb elin adds up his figures to a tota l of 57 7 knig hts,
bu t his arithm etic ap pears 10 he at fault , t he actual to ta l be ing a t the most 749 and a t th e least 636 if
cert ain d iscrepancies are tak en int o account. No r are d l helin s figures co mp lete, h is list omitt ing the
service du e to t he kin
gd o
m from
Trip
o li from wh ich he elsewhe re reco rd s t he se rvice of 100 knight s
bei ng pot ent ially availab le) and Antioch, as well as cer tain kn own fief s for wh ich he probab ly had no
info rma t ion. seems rea sonabl e to a ssum e th a t if these unk now n con t ingents were ad ded a total
st rengt h in th e region of 1,000 kn ights would probab ly be arr ived a t. Even t hen me rcenaries and th e
Milit ary Orders are not inclu ded . During t he 13 th ce ntury Cyp rus to o co u ld raise 1,000 knights.
The las t la i ; e army ra ised by t he c rusader sla tes was t hat whic h fo u gh t, and was des t roye d, at La Pcr bie
in 1244 . Figur es va ry and are not a
lt o
gethe r reliable, bu t it wo uld app ea r t hat t his totalled 6, 00 0 men
incl uding, accordi ng to th e Est oire d E racles, 600 kn ight s fro m Acre , Ja ffa, Antioch-Tripcli, Cyprus, and
the Military O rde rs o f Temple, Hospital, Teut o nic Knight s and St Laza rus, On e ch ro nicler, Sali mbene,
says that Cy p rus and An tio ch-Tripoli lost as many as 30 0 knight s eac h, which is almost cer tai nly an
exagge ration. Ho wever, t he cas ualties suffe red by th e Military Orders would ten d t o suggest th at th e
Eraclcs 600, if it is an acc urate figure, refers on ly to lay knights. Th e Patriarch of Jer usale m wrot e a
le t t er re port ing t he loss of 3 12 Templar bre th ren and 3 24 T urco pole s in th ei r
em p
loy, 32 5 Ilospita
l
er
bret hre n and 200 T urco polcs, 29 7 ou t of an
im p
robable 300 Teu tonic Knights, and th e to tal de struction
of t he l a zar co ntinge nt. Frederick
received re
po r
ts Ihat th e Hos pitatlers lost
20 0
bret hren an d the
Te mpl ars 3
00 ,
pe rhaps th eir whole Con v
ent,
wh ile Matt hew Paris record s t ha t th ese 2 Orde rs together
muste red 500 bre t hren for th e
batt
le. In all th ese figures no diff
erenti
a t ion is ma de bet ween
br o th e
r
kn ights and br other se rgeanrs.) All in all th e infe rence is t ha t th ere were abou t 1,0 00- 1,20 0 knigh ts in
tota l, poss ibly mo re, wit h prob ab ly about hal f sup plied by t he Military Ord ers.
TH E MILITARY OR D ER S
Th ese were with o u t do ubt th e most impor tant so urce of tro ops in th e c rusa der states, co ntingents o f
Te mpla rs and for lIospitallers appeari ng in every arm y mu stered by t he king o f Jerusale m from th e mid
12th ce ntury o nwards, Their military services, however, were not ob lig
atory,
the great Or der s o f Te mple,
Hospit al an d T eu tonic Knights be ing answerable direct ly - a nd only - to th e Pop e the y even dre w up
the ir own treat ies and alliances independently of th e cr o wn, o ften mo tivated by fi nancia l considerations) ,
and th e king o fte n fe lt o bliged to en courage th eir military assistance by pr o mising ext ra-large sha res of
the spoils, o r other allure me nt s; in 12 20 , fo r e xample, John de Brienn e prom ised th e T eu tonic Knight s
ha lf t he plun de r of Damict t a. R. Sm all, ho wever, rem arks in his C rusading Wa rfare t h at th e presence
of Military Ord er con tingents cost th e feuda l ru lers full military com mand o f th eir fo rces in t he field .
T he heavy reliance wh ich th e ki ng was obl iged to place o n th ese tr oo ps effec tively increased t he powe r
and independence of th e Orders, which t he granting of f
or t
resses for t heir defence against Moslem
incursions st a rt in g with Gibeli n or Bethgeblin nea r Ascalo n, granted t o t he Ifospit alle rs in 1136) did
much t o
enco
urage; at on e st a ge th e T empl ars held som e 18 fort resses in t he crusader sta tes, while
Dr. Jo nat ha n Riley-
Smith
esti mates tha t t he Hospitalle rs probably hel d 25 fo rt resses in 118 0 a nd 29
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in 1244 . It sho uld be noted , however , that none of
the
smalle r Ord er s hel d fortresse s, with
the
po ssible
exce
p
tion of
o ne to wer hel d by t he Lazars at B
etha
ny.) large f ro n t ier es tates were also p u rchased
from
lords no lo nger ab le to mai nlai n o r de fen d th em , and eve n so me to wns, su ch as Safed, To rtosa and
Ascalon, c ame in to th eir possess io n. Th e Orders wer e als o en trusted with t he defence
of some
roy al
for t resses a nd assis ted in
the
defen ce
of
o thers,
In add ition t o th eir t errit orial possession s in th e Eas t
they
also recei ved es ta tes f ro m large numbers o f
ben
efactors
th ro ugh o u t
Euro
pe , in England , Ireland, Sco tla nd , Fran ce, S pain, ortugal It aly , Sicily,
Ge rmany , Scandinavia, Hu ngar y and la te r G reece a nd
Cypru
s, Matthe w Paris estimating t he p ro
perty
o f
the Ho spital in t he mid-f J t h ce ntury at 19 ,0 0 0 man
ors
, a nd o f th e Te mp le at 9, 0 0 0 manors. was from
t heir Eur opean
commanderies tha
t t h e Co nven ts
of
O
ut r
em e r d re w their reinforcements in ti mes
of
great
need , suc h as aft er th e disaster o f lI att in in 1 187 and th e fall o f
the
key Hospit alle r fo rt ress o f A rsouf
in 126 5. Th e co mmand e ry was c o m mo n to th e
org
an isa
ti o
n o f all th e O rders, comp rising a u nit
of
brother
k nigh ts and b rot
her
se rgeants u sually 12 o r mor e b rethren) un de r an o fficer call ed a commander
I £leger
or
lI ausko mt u r in t he case o f th e Teu to n ic Knight s, Co mendudore in th e case o f Montj o le
and
the Spanish Orde rs). The Tem ple and Hospital h ad 14 a nd 12 co mma nde ries respect ivel y in Sy ria , plus
o thers in Cilid a a nd Cypru s, in add iti on t o fort ress garris
ons
.
The Ho sptt alle rs
T he Ilospitalle rs were so named be
cau
se o f th eir origi nal fo undati on c. 10 70 as a nursing b r
ethr
en f
or
pilgrim s in t he mo na
stery
ho sp ital of St Mary
of
t he l al in in J eru salem . T hey wer e gran ted Papal
protec ti o n in 1 1 13 as t he O
rder
o f th e Hospit al o f St J ohn. T h e nu rsing role o f th e Ord
er
predomi nated
at firs t a nd r
ema
in ed im po r t a nt thr oughout thi s e ra t he
750
woun ded fro m
the
Bai l ie
of
Mo n t gisar d in
1177 , f
or
ins ta nce, wer e t reat ed a t t he Hospit al in J erusalem).
Th ou gh th ey we re fai rly ce rt ain ly in exis tence earli
er
possibly as ear ly as 1I 26 , when a Con stable is
reco rded , or 1 136, whe n t he Ord er was gran t ed th e fo rtress o f G ibehn) a b r
other
k night d oes n
ot
occu r
in an y Hos pit alle r d oc ument un til 1 148 , and p rior to the mid- 12th cen t u ry it is probab le t ha t t he majo rit y
of wh atever a rmed fo r ces it mai nta ined w
er
e sup p lied by mercenaries - possib ly even including Te mpla rs.
Thereafter th ei r mili tary res ponsibilities stea d ily increase d, a nd statutes
of
120 4- 1206 ind icate that the
Ord er s
org
a nisa t ion wa s by then based o n its milit ary b reth ren , bo th kn ights a nd se rgeants.
Their mili tary hierarchy, p ro b
ably
base d on t ha t o f the mo re mili
tari
stic Tcmpla rs, was he ade d b y th e
Marshal, though t he Master had su preme co m ma n d, T he Marshal on ly first
appears
in t he I 160s though
as alre
ady
me
ntione
d a
Consta
ble is r
ecor
de d as early as 1126 an d last ed
until
at least 116 9 , p r
obabl
y
as th e Marsha l s lie ute na nt . Imme d ia tely
bene
a th the Marshal ca me t he Gonfanon ier {t he O rd er s
s
tan
dard -bearer) , th e Com mander
of the
K night s, and th e Master Esq uire o f th e Conv ent. Of th ese the
Comman d er , first rec
or
de d in 12 20 , was an
offic
e r ap poi nt ed by the Mars hal to lead a for ce in his
absence, wh ile t he Master E
squ
ire was a b ro ther se rgea nt resp
onsib
le f
or
a ll t he esqui res an d gr
oom
s.
Thr
ee
other
kno wn o fficers we re mercen a ries - th e T u rcop o lie r, th e Mast er Crossbcw man a nd th e
Master Sergea nt, T h e T u rcopolier, a b ro th er se rgea nt by 1248 and a b ro ther k ni gh t a fte r 130 3 , was
co mmander
of
th e T u r cop o le light ca valr y employed b y
the
O rder, Tu rc
opole
s are regu larly ref
er r
ed 10
in th e se rvice o f the Hospitallers , as in t he invasion o f Egyp t in 1168 , at th e Bailie o f Arsou f in 119 1,
and at La For bie in
1244
; by 1206 they we re even being assigned to t he ret
inue
s
of
t he se nio r
Hospit aller
offi
cers.
Th e brethren-a t-arms of the O rde r co nsist ed o f knight s an d se rgean ts th e la tte r o u t n umbe red by t he
former
), th ough
this
dis tin
ction
o nly firs t ap pears in do cumen ts in 120 6 , At th is d at e eac h
brot
he r
knig h t was accompanied by 4 ho rses and
probably
2 esq uires, while eac h bro th er se rgea n t ha d on ly 2
ho r se s and a single esqui re in all t he Military O rde rs t he esquires were d raw n fro m amo ngst t he se rving
brethren ), At t he end o f Ihe 13th ce nt u ry th e kn
ight
s com plem en t o f ho rses was redu ced to 3.
Broth er se rgeants
of
bo th Hospita l an d Te mpl e i
nclude
d
converte
d Arab s.
As well as th e T urco poles men t io ned
abo
ve additio nal t ro o ps o f t he O rder we re su p plied by co nfratre
o r co mr erc kni ght s and Do nat s non-breth ren affiliat ed 10 o r pe rm
itted
to join
the
Order fo r a limite d
perio d o f ti me und er special co ndit io ns, suc h as a do n at i on o f p roper
ty )
; feudal vassals fr om the O rder s
estates ; allie d co ntinge nts
som
etimes in cluding Moslems) ; a nd mer ce nar y k nigh ts, sergeants a nd
in fantry. Unfor t u
nately
co n te m po rary c h ro niclers tended no t t o distinguish be tween the a
ctua
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bre thren-at-arms and these various types of auxil jary , so
it
is ha rd to j udge with any accuracy
exact
ly
wha t the fu ll-st reng th of t he Or der in
Outreme
r mig ht have bee n. But the re are figures avai lable in the
sou rces which at least give an idea of the Order s potenti al.
The earliest large force reco rded , in 1168 . cons is ted o f 500 knights and
50 0
Turcopoles promised to
King Amalrie I fo r his invasion
of
Egyp t and probably comprised chiefly
of
merc
ena
ries
or
so we can
assume h orn th e Iact tha t the Master . Gilbe rt d·Assailly . raised huge loan s to fina nce th is fo rce).
th o ugh 4 years earlier. in 1163 . a visit or to Jerusalem wrote that the Hospita l was c
apabl
e of ho using
400 kn ights in
ad d
ition
to
pilgrims and
th e
sick . Du ring
th e
F
ifth Cru
sade of 1217· 1221 the
Order
appears to have pr ovided
70 0
kn ights (or. more probab ly. horsemen . ther
efor
e including T urcopoles,
sergea n ts and mercena ries) and 1.000 'p ersons , presumably other soldiers, wh ile for an at tack on Harnah
in 1233 a force of 100 knigh ts. 30 0 mounted sergeants and 500
o
r 1.500) infantry sergeants was
mustered. an d thi s ap pears to have rep resent ed almost th e fu ll st rength
of
the Convent of An tioch at
th is ti me. In 1244 20Q.325 Hospitallc r brethren were killed at the Battle of La Forbie , wh ile 5. 15 or
26 escaped and
o thers were
tak en captive. suggesting an overa ll t
ot
al well in excess
of
350 ;
20 0
lIospita ller Tu rcopoles were also killed , while in add ition the to tal of 350 may have includ ed o ther
auxilia rics such as
merce
nar ies. Mo sl o f the Con ven t's brethren-at-arms ap pear to have
been
los t whe n
Arsouf fell in 1265
,8 0 ·
< 0 eing killed and 180 cap tured
o
f a garrison t
ot a
lling about 1.000 m
en)
, and
a fur t her 4 5 bre
thre
n wer e killed at Caroublier th e following year . In 128 1 we hea r o f 50 knights and
50 Turco polc s being sent int o Cihcla.
Ga rrison strengths where reco rded arc
of t
en co nsi
de r
ab ly larger, t
houg
h th ese were c
ertain
ly largely
merce nary. In 1203 the Hospitaller garr isons of Krak de s Chevaliers and al-Marqah toge
ther
mustered an
army of 4·500 ca valry and 1.1OQ I ,400 infantry. plus Turcopoles, whil e in 12 12 th e same tw o fortresses
arc rec
or
ded to have bee n garrisoned by 2.0 00 and 1,0 00 men respec tively even in pea cetime. By 1271
Krak des Ch evaliers was held by 10 0 bre thren , b
ot h
knights and sergeants, under
th e
Marshal, and
al.Mar
qa b
in 1180 by 600 ho rsemen (obviously not all brethr en) , presum abl y supplemente d by infantry
in bo th ins ta nces . Bar lIebraeus reco rds mo re Ihan 100 cavalry and
50 0
infantry at al-Marqa b a t the
same da te. wh ile in 1181 : OOcavalry and 200 i
nfantry
arc reco rded in a sortie against th e Mamluks: but
in a ll th ese figu res onl y about 15-60 w
ould
have een br othe r knight s.
Perha ps the most reliab le piece of evidence for the total stre ngth o f th e Hospitallers in Octremer is a
e t te r wr it t en in 1268 by the Master Hugh Revel, in which it is sp ecifica lly slated t hat by that date the
Order could muste r only 300 br
other
knights in th e whole of Syria (Le. incl uding the Co nvents of Ant i
oc h
and
Tri
poli). Even more interesting is
an o
ther sta temen t in th e same lett er where it is cla imed th at in
th e
the O rder had been able
to
muster 10,000 men . which including vassals. Tur eop oles, mercenari es,
serving bre th ren. et c. , is not altogether impossible .
Following th e fall
of Acre in 129 1 the Hospitallc rs removed th eir h
eadq
uart ers to C
ypru
s.
an d
in 130 1
the stre ngth o f th eir Convent o n the island to talled 70 bro ther knights and 10 br o ther sergeants, thou gh
the proport ion changed slightly in 1302 to 65 knights and 15 sergeants; in add ition the y were st ill
augmented by Turcopolcs and o the r auxiliaries.
Once est ablished in Cy p rus it became obvious t hat to ma intain th eir st ruggle against the Moslems th e
On.k r was going 10 have 10 henc
ef
ort h
conce
ntrate on naval ope rations, and it was as a mar it ime powe r
th a t the Hospualle rs were to earn th
ei r
fame in th e late r Middle Ages. The y had ships even in the 12th
cent ury bu t th ese were chie fly
tran
spor ts. and it was not un ti l tow ards the cnd of th e 13th ce ntury
that
they fi rst began to co ncentrate
on
building up their
Fle
et
o f war -galleys. As early as 1
30 0
th eir small
flee t lau nched a naval a
tt a
ck o n th e Nile de lta.
In 13 10 th e Order again shi fted its hea
dq u
arters. th is t ime to the island o f Rhodes (c aptured from th e
Byzan tincs in a series
of
cam paigns which had commenced in 1306). wher e in 13 11 it was declared tb ar
the Order needed to mai ntain 1,000 infant ry and
50
0 cavalry f
or
th e island s future
de f
ence.
• Some indication ( prop
e
rnon
s
may
be
given by
the Tempjar garrison of Safed, recorded e. 124 )
10 have con sisted of SObr
ot h
er knights. 30 brothel serg
eants,
Turc
cpole
s, 300 r e o men. 820 esquires.
...-orkmen and olhe rs t larllely na tives) and 400 staves.
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The Templars
Unlike th e Hospitallers, o r for that matte r t he T eut o nic Knights t he Templars were fro m th e o utset a
purel y milita ry Or d er, In fact t he l tospi talle rs military o rga nisa t ion was t o a grea t ex tent based upon
the milita ry instit utio ns o f th e T emple, and it is even posslhle tha t in th e first half of t he 12t h cen t ury
the Hospit al act ually employe d T
emp
lar knight s to fulfil ce rtain military functions.
T he aggressiveness, belli gere nce and milit ar y im
port
a nce o f t he Tcmplurs , t he ne w Maccabees , is well
d
ocum
en ted by co nte mporaries suc h as Jacq ues de Vit ry, who w
ro t
e c. 122 5 th a t When t he Tem pters
were called to arm s th ey did no t ask ho w many th e enem y were, o nly where t he y were . On
king of
Jer usalem e ve n wrote to
Europ
e of t he Te mpl a rs t hat in t hem ind eed , a fte r God , is place d th e e nlire
re lia nce of all in t he East, and even th e Byzan tin e c hronicler Cinnam us belie ve d th at t he ma n in
co m mand o f all) t he knights in Pa lest ine was he wh o m the Lat ins ca ll t he Master of the Te mple .
The Ord er s o rigi ns, how ever, were humble. It was init ially founded in Pale st ine in abo ut 11 18 by t wo
Fre nch knights, Hugh de Payen s and Godf rcy de St Ome r, fo r th e pro tectio n of pilgrims o n IIl
l
road
fro m Jaffa to Jerusale m. At first its handful of knigh ts, 9 in num be r, rel ied on gift s a nd cast-o ffs fo r
the ir clo t hes and keep , be ing called t he Poo r Knigh ts o f Christ as a result. bu t King Baldwin 11 , suitab ly
impressed by th eir devotio n, ve ry so on granted t he m lodging in a section of th e roy al palace o f
Je rusalem whi ch was suppose d to have hee n t he site o f t he Temple o f Solomon : hence th e Order s
full t itle, t he Poo r Kn ight s o f Christ a nd th e T e m ple of Solomon. Th ey we re gra nted Pap al pr o te ction
as a Military Order in 1128.
Military co m ma nd was basically as per tha t described above fo r t he Hos
pn
allc rs, o fficers including th e
Marshal, Commande r of th e Kn ight s,
Gon
fa no nier, Mast e r Esq uire , T urco po lie r and o t he rs t here was
appa re nt ly a Turco polier in each co mma ndery). l kewise in addition t o bre th ren t he ir forces inclu ded
Tu rco poles, vassals, me rcena ries an d allies sometimes Sa race ns) - t he Te mpt er garriso n of Safe d has
alrea dy been cited as a possible ind ication o f pr o por tions. T he proportio n of T urcopolcs wo uld appea r
to have bee n simila r t o t hose of t he Hos pit alle rs, basica lly o n a level wit h th e number of bret hren ; fo r
example ut La Forbie in 1244 , whe re the T em plars may have [ 11 as ma ny as 3 12 bre t hren ,
they
also lost
324 T urcopole s. Foo t-sold iers in
the
Ord er s e mp loy were a pp aren tly o rganised in co mpan ies of 50
men - Mosle m so urces reco rd 15 suc h infant ry co mpa nies in th e garr ison
of
Le Chastc uc t.
Bre t hre n again co nsisted of kn ights a nd sergea nts the lat t er exi sti ng at least as ea rly as 114 7). T he
distinct io n be t wee n them was almost inevitab ly mo re not iceab le t han amongst t he less militar istic
Hosplt alle rs, a nd by 125 an init iate seeking e ntry into th e O rde r as a bro
ther
knigh t ha d first 10
prove t hat he was th e so n o r descen dant of a kni ght , a qua lificat io n like wise requeste d by th e
lIospil alle rs a nd t he Spanish O rde rs within t he ne xt tw o deca des.
Again, lh e full st rengt h of th e O rde r in D ut rem e r is unknown and ca n on ly be surmised fro m
the
vario us
references which are t o be found sca tt e red a mongst co nte m po rary so urces.
In 115 2 a let te r records t hat th e Ord er co uld onlygathe r 120 kn ights and 1,0 00 se rving bret h ren and
hired sold te rs t c fight in Antioc h, whi le in the kingdo m of Je rusalem as early as 115 7 85-88 Te mplars
were ca pt u red a nd allegedly 300 killed in an e ngagement with Nur e d-Din, t hese figur es possibl y
inclu ding vario us auxiliaries. Conve rsely at Mo nt glsard in 1177 t here we re as fe w as 80 bret hren prese nt .
despite th e Co nvent having summo ne d all its available knight s for th is ca m paign; the figu re wou ld
seem t o indica te th at t he T em plars full st reng t h had no t asse mbled be for e t he a rmy mar ch ed,
part icula rly since a t abou t t he same dal e WiIliam of T yre recor ds that
th
ere are in t he O rde r about 300
kn ights . . . and a n alm ost cou ntless numbe r o f lesser breth ren. In th e disast ro us ye ar of 1187 we hea r
of 90 Te m pte rs being killed in t he skir mish at Cressc n a nd a furth er 26 0 p erhaps including some
Hospit alle rs) at Huttin, fro m which a number o f o th ers escape d, which wo uld im ply that t he ir to tal
strengt h t the latt e r ba il ie was in th e region of 300, as o ppose d to pe rhap s abo ut 25 0 Hospitallers.
Duri ng t he T em plar occu pat ion o f Cy prus a fe w yea rs la te r, in 1 191 . 119 2, we hear o f abou t 12
Templar cavalry. plus infan t ry, being shipped to th e islan d ; of t he horseme n 15 were knights, 74 were
sergea nts an d 29 were pro bably T urco poles.
In th e ea rly- 13 th ce ntury Jacq ues de Vitr y reco rds tha t th e ma inland Co nve nt still co mprised abo ut
300 brother knigh ts su pplement ed by t he usual auxiliaries). Ano t her source o f similar date reco rds
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the ir sta bles in J erusale m ho ldin g up to 2,000 h o rses wh ich, all
owing
fo r th ose o f
mer
ce naries and
au xiliaries as well as spa re mo unts , et c. Tern pla r kni ght s be ing accom panied b y 2
hor
ses, as well as 2
esq uire s) , see ms t o su p port d e V it ry s figure, T he ga rriso ns o f fro n tie r fo rtr esses we re as lar ge o r even
larger; when Cas tle J aco b
l
Chaste llet fell in 1179 its Tem plar garriso n appears to have co mpr ised
8 0 kni gh ts a nd sergean ts?) an d 750 infan t ry plu s ser vants and c raf ts
men,
wh ile in I 230 t he garrison o f
To rt osa , toget her wit h t he lI ospitallers o f Krak d es Chevaliers, ra ised as many as 500 ca valry and 2,700
infant ry , o f who m a t least 20 0 c ava lr y and abou t 1,0 00 in fa ntry wer e probably sup plied b y t he Te mplars.
An anonymous 13th cen t ury so urc e reco rds t he garr iso n o f Safed as 1,70 0 men in pea cet ime and 2,200
in ti me o f war .
As wit h t he Hospit alle rs, th e Te mple too appears to have su p plied 700 knigh ts a nd 2,000 o t hers d uring
t he Fift h Cr usad e, p ro bab ly ch iefl y mer cena ry , wh ile at Darbsaq in 12 37 100 breth ren and 3 0 0
crossbowmen - appa re n tly in th e em p lo y o f th e Orde r - a re rep
or t
ed t o have b een kill ed at t his d at e
t her e may have been in a ll about 2 00 b re
th r
en in t h e Pr inci p alit y o f An ti och) . As already men ti oned , 3 I 2
bre t hren were k illed a t l a Porbie in 1244 and 4-36 mo re e sc aped, t h
ough
Matt hew Paris reco rd s th at the
who le Co nven t the figure o f 300 b rot her
knights
again ap pears) was lost ; 6 ye ars la ter in 125 0 mo re
th an 280 T
empl
ars , proba bl y incl ud ing a fair num ber o f me rce naries , wer e killed in t he ma in ba it le a t El
Mansurah, o t hers being killed o r cap t u red in e arlie r an d su bseq uen t engage ment s. Fi nall y th er e wer e
perhaps 240 a t th e fall of Ac re in 12 9 1, com pared t o possibly 140 Hosp it alle rs, on ly I S T eu to nic Knights,
a nd 25 b reth ren and 9 bret hren respect ively fro m th e O rders o f t he Hospit als o f S t Laz
aru
s a nd
St
Th
o mas Aeo n.
Aft e r th e lo ss o f t he ki ngdo m th e Tem plars co n tinue d t o hold a single of fshore st ro nghold at Ruad, o ff
To rt osa , u n til
130
3 whe n t he Maml uks finally ca p tu red t h e fo rtress a nd e xecuted its garriso n. Bef
or
e
t hen t he Ord er had wit hd raw n its head q ua rte rs first to Cy p rus, th en to F rance. Withi n a few yea rs
of
th is t he O rd
er
came to an igno minious e nd, It s great wea lt h had rou sed th e jea lo usy
of
th e avaricious
king o f Fran ce. P l p t he Fai r, who wit h Papal su ppo rt, trum pin g-up charges
of
he resy and wo rse.
inst igat ed th e arr es t o f t h e O rder s members o n a n in te rnational sca le in 130 7-1308. F oll
owin
g a se ries
o f p re
ju
diced tri als bac ke d u p b y confessions ex t rac ted und e r tor tu re th e Ord er was o fficiall y
su pp ressed in 13 12 , t he last G rand Master , Jacq ues de Mo lay , bei ng b urnt a t t h e sta ke as a heret ic in
1314.
Th e Teutonic KnillhlS
Th e Teu t o n ic Knight s, th ird o f t he great Military O rders, o wed its grea tne ss no t to its act iviti es in
Out
re me r bu t rat her to its no torio us, eve n infamous, ca mpa igns against Prussla, Lit hu an ia an d Poland ,
th e ea rly st ages
of
whic h have b ee n b riefly o u tlined in Armies o f Fe uda l Eu ro pe .
The Ord er was fou nded in 1 19 0 d u ring t he T h ird Crusa de w hen mercha nt s o f Bremen and Liib ec k
esta blished a ho sp ital fo r t he ca re o f German p ilgrims at th e siege o f Ac re, It t u rned milit ary in I 19 8
whe n some Ge rman k night s j oined fo llo wing t he a bortive Ge rman cr usad e
of
119 7. T he O rder, un d
er
the full ti tle o f th e Te u ton ic Knight s o f th e Ho sp it al o f St Mary o f J er usale m, was alway s excl usively
Ge rman a nd , e
xcep
t fo r Roman ia, t he Balt ic lan ds a nd brie fly) Hu ngary, ou tside o f O u tr e me r held
es ta tes o nly in Germa ny it self.
Officially t he O rde r s head q uart e rs was always at Acre, d es pite t he fac t t ha t t he T emplars
drov
e th e m
o u t o f th e ci t y o n o ne o ccasio n, bu t th ei r c hief st ro ngho ld fro m 12 29 un t il 12 71 was act ually Mon cr t
whic h t hey renamed Sta rken berg). Ho wever, th e
Ord
e r was always o vershado wed in Sy ria by th e
Te m ple and Hospit al a nd it inst ead co nce n tr a ted most o f its att en tio ns in t he Levan t on e n te rpr ises in
Cilicia , w here th e main fo rtresses a mo ngst it s many possessio ns were Amo uda and Har un iy e. Even so,
Te ut o nic co n t ingents we re p rese n t at most majo r e ngage men ts
of
th e 13t h ce nt u ry including Ba hr
Ash mun 1n La Fo rbi e ]24 4 ) a nd El Mansur ah 125
0
. I S b re t hren were presen t at t he fa ll o f
Acre i n 1291 , o f who m o nly t he Hoc hmeiste r t he Gran d Maste r) escaped alive. T he Order t here after
transf
er r
ed its headqua rte rs t o Ven ice, moving on t o Marie nburg in Prussia in 1308 .
l
ke t he Te mp lars a nd Ho spit alle rs, th e Teu to n ic Knigh ts e mp loy ed la rge nu mb e rs o f T u rcop ole s
p ro babl y sup plying t he b ulk o f t he alleged ly 3 00-st ro ng Te ut o n ic co nti ngent at La Fcrbie a nd c ert ainly
co mprising th e great est part
of
Star kenberg s ga rrison a t it s fall in 127 1) and also h ad b ro ther sergeants,
co nfrere b rethre n called Halbb ru de rs ], mercen ar ies , a nd t h e vassals o f its es ta tes t he Order h eld, fo r
instance, t he Seigno ry of Co u nt J o scely n afte r 1220).
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St Lazarus
After t he Temple an d t he Hos pital t h e Orde r
of
St Laza rus was the thi rd Military Order to be
establishe d in O utremer . Like t h e t wo mai n O rders it had co m ma nd eries in Europ e e.g. Burt o n Lazars
in Leices tershire) as well as Syria.
Th is was ba sically a Hosp it al
Ord
er co nce n tra ting o n th e t re
atmen
t o f le prosy and was p robably
es
tabl
ished as an o ffshoo t by the Hospi t alle rs the mselves in t he earfy
f
th ce n tu ry, tu rn ing m ilitary
c. 112 3. Templar bre th ren who co n t rac ted leprosy were tra nsferred to th e Lazars, as pro bab ly wer e
ll os pitallers. As well as th ese unclea n bre t h re n t here were als o no n-l
epers
, bu t t he
numbe
r o f military
brethre n was never particulary high an d J ea n Sire d e J o inville s statemen t ab o ut t he Master
of
St La za rus
wh o h eld no rank in t he ar my bes t su ms up th eir milita ry importan ce. Never the less a co nt ingen t o f
Lazar b re t h ren was pr esen t , an d wip ed o ut , at La For b ie, while in 125 3 t h ey fo rme d part o f the arm y
u nde r St Lou is wh ich e ncamped before J affa, a n im petuous a tt ack led b y th e La za r Master see ing all b u t
4 o f th e bret hren kille d. In 129 1 25 bre thren wer e pr esen t at Acre, all of who m were killed .
Th e
Ord
er basically ceased to in volve itself in m il it ar y ac tivities from t he ea rly - La th ce ntury .
St Thomas Aeon
Th e Hos pitallers
of
St T ho mas o f Can te rbury at Acre, usu ally ca lle d t he Knight s
of
St T ho mas Aeon ,
were established in Acr e as a nu rsin g Ord er after the cap ture o f th e
city
b y Richard 1 o f Engl and and
Philip
of F ran ce in 1191 . Membersh ip was restr icted to Engli shmen . It was al way s a small Order and
proba bly di d no t tu rn mil
itary
unt
il
t he F i
fth
Crusade o f 1217 -12 2 1.
Th e 9 b r
et
h ren p rese nt and killed a t Acr e in 129 1 are an indi ca t ion o f th ei r military po te n tial. Even w
ith
merce naries an d T urco poles
it
is imp r ob able t ha t they eve r mustered even 40 men in Ou trem er. Aft er
the fall o f Acre th e O rd er establish ed a pre
cep
tory in Cyprus and th ereafte r und erw ent a grad u al milit ar y
decline; no b ro t he r kn ights ar e reco rded aft er
1357
.
M
onl
joie
Named aft
er
a castl e ou ts ide J e rusale m t his Spanish Or d er, es tablished b y an ex-Sa nt iagan kn ight
c. 11
80
, did no t p ros per in O utr e mer,
withdraw
ing t o its co mmanderies in Aragon afte r th e de feat a t
Hatti n in 118 7 , wh ere a small co n t inge nt of
breth
ren was p rese nt . In Spa in they b eca me kn
own
as t he
Ord er o f
ruf
ac
ROMAN IA ; TH E
LATI
N
EMPI RE
Afte r th e fall o f Co nsta nti no ple in 120 4 th e Franks d ivided up th e Byzanti ne Emp ire a mongs t the m
selves, t he Lat in Emperor yet a not her Baldw in ) receiving
one
-quarter and the Ve n et i an and
Fran
kish
crusa ders th e re main in g t hree
-qu
art ers, probab ly th ree-eight hs each.
Th
es e lands wer e then divided u p
and parcelled ou t in gro u ps o f 200 .
l OO,
70 , 6 0 , 4 0, 20, 10 , 7 o r 6 k ni gh ts fees ea ch ,
10
be d ist ribu ted
by th e vassals amo ngst th eir retainers. T he greater vassals eac h rece ived th ei r Ile fs in 2 parts - one
with in t he Emperor s o wn lan ds near C
onstant
in
ople
, and t he o t he r in the p rovin ces.
Th e basis o f military se rvice, d rawn up in 1205, was tha t when th e Empe ror and his senior Vene tia n a nd
Frankish vassals d ecided tha t a c am paign was necessary all k night s - v en enans as well as F ranks - wer e
au toma t ically o bliged to se rve for a pe riod o f 4 mo n th s, fr om J un e I to Septem ber 29 . In t he case o f
inva sio n this service cou ld be requ ired fo r as long as t he Empe ro r and no bility d eemed necessary .
Bu t o f all
the
Fra nkis h
conq
uest s wh ich resu lte d fro m th e Fou rt h Crusa de, precise details o f
o rga nisat io n ar e know n f or o nly o ne o f the s
tates
th er eb y esta blished within t he o ld Byza n tin e
te rrit
or
ies - th e Pri nci pality
of
A
cha
ia, also kn own as xto rea.
As with a ll o t her Fr ankish co nq uests in th e Ea st , o rganisa tion involved the ap plication to th e co nq uere d
ter rit ories of curre nt feu dal pra ct ices. T he Pr inci pality o f Achaia was no exception . be ing divid ed u p
in to 12 Baronies with esta tes varying fro m 4 kn igh ts fees right u p to 24 ch iefl y in m ultiples o f 4 ),
with many lesser est a tes of o ne fee o r a half-fee eac h , so me held b y G reeks. T he re were also 7
ecclesias t ical Baronies. 6
.o f
4 fees held b y Bisho ps and o ne, Ach a ia its elf , o f 8 fees held by an Archbishop,
as well as 3 es tates be longing to t he Milit ary
Ord
ers
with
Temp lars, Hos pitalle rs an d Teu to nic Knight s
ho lding 4 fees ea ch .
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The service from the larger esta tes was based on the holding
of
4 fees, which was ob liged to supp ly 14
horsemen consist ing of the vassal [i. e. the Banneret ). a second kn ight , and 12 sergeants. Estates over
4 fees had to supply an extra knight or 2 sergeants for each addit ional fee. In the case o f a single fee or
half- fee the vassal kn ight or sergeant respect ively) served alone and in person. As in the kingdom o f
Jerusalem all vassals were expec ted to serve in person up to the age of 60, aft er which a so n or tenant
migh t suhsnt ute.
In addit ion to the standa rd 4 months service garrison du ty was requi red fo r a further 4 mont hs a year
(t hough the Church and Military Orders were exempt from the la t ter]. Even in the remaining 4 month s
of the year th ere might he a fur ther summons from the Prince if th e need sho uld arise. This service
could also be demanded overseas; Prince William was ce rta inly accompanied by 400 Achaian knight s in
C
ypru
s in 1249 and in Italy in 1268.
This permill ed the ma intenan ce of an a
lmo
st pe rmanent feudal army, and the number of troop s that
could be thus summoned was q uite co nside rable: at Bodon itsa in 1250 William was accompanied by
800 kn ights, and up to 1,000 are reco rded on o ther occasions, these probably represent ing the full
feudal muste r. As many as 8,000 Achaians arc recorde d in a campaign of 1246 , while at Pelagonia
there were allegedly 12,000 infan t ry in addition to an Improb able 8,000 horsemen o f whom in any
case very few would have actually been knigh ts).
Throughou t the Empire aux iliary t roo ps were supplied by the indigenous po pulat ion , bo th Greeks and
Slavs: in Acha ia the lat ter were principally from the Peloponnesian Melingi tr ibe, st ill favoured by
the
Cat alans in the 1
4th
century. An army raised in the Duchy of Athens in 1304 contained as many as
6 000 Th essalian and Bulgar cavalry · under 18 Gree k noh les (possibly organised in A
aghia - see
Byzantine o rganisa tion ), plus some 30,000 mixed infan try , chiefly Greeks and Slavs; up to 24 ,000 Greek
infantry are reco rded in the Athenian army at Keph issos in 13 11, The Slavs usu ally supplied archers and
spearmen. and t hese are certainly the types specif ically mentioned in an Achaian a
rmy
o f 1296.
Many such troo ps were supplied to the Frankish army by Byzantine Archontes (noblemen) who the
Franks had co nfirmed in their possessions, probab ly Pronolai (see Byzan tine organisatio n). The
contingents they provided were prob ably the same as they had heen obliged to supply to the Byzant ine
arm y in pre-Conq ucst days so mu st have varied co nsiderably in numbers. but in one instance in 1205
a cert ain Theodore Branas agreed to supp ly as many as 500 men. In fact the case with which many
Byzumines and Byzant ine subjects shit ted their loyalty from Byzantine 10 Frankish rule is no tewort hy,
for wit
hout
such obvious disaffection o n their par t it is unlikely that these Frankish co nquests would
have lasted fo r as long as they did o r even . perhaps. have succeeded ut all. But the d isco nten t was there
and tr proved a very real ally o f the Franks; the inco rporation int o his arm y in 121 1 of Nicaean
prisoners-of-war under their own o fficers hy the second Latin Empero r, Henry of Flanders, is without
doubt far from bein g an isola ted Incid nt, and suc h troops clearly helped to compensate fo r Ihe consta nt
and often crit ical sho rtage of man power in Frankish Greece and Rom ania. (However, it was not long
befo re the greed and general cruelly of the Franks tu rned the native popu lat ion against them.)
Othe r au xiliari es included Turks and Cumans , the latter to be foun d in allia nce with the Empire from
[239 ; th ere were ap pa rent ly Cumans present in the Achaian army defeat ed at Pelagonia in 1259. Some
Turks set tled in Achaia after 1262 and some were even knight ed and granted Iiefs Aft er the ascent o f
Charles of Anjou 10 the Achaian throne in 1278 there was a mark ed increase in the use o f Turk ish and
Bulgar auxiliari es, and in addition Saruce n archers were imported fro m his Sicilian kingd om to serve
principally as 6arriso n troops.
Frankish merce naries werealso employed qui te o fte n. an army of allegedly 60,000 recorde d under
Emperor Baldwi n II in 1239 containing Frenchmen, v enettans and Franks o f various othe r nat ion alit ies
in addi t ion to Gree ks. Moslems and Cum ans. If this army really was 60,000 st rong th en it is hardly
surprising to find tha t consisted almost ent irely of foreign mercen aries and auxiliaries. Roman ian
armies were in general ridiculously small; Henry had o nly 2,000 men at I hilippo polis in 1208 (o f whom
one-sixth were Greeks). and as few as 260 knights (p lus sergeants
and
infantry , pr esumahly) at Lake
• mercenaries :lho frequently appeared in duringme 14th century.
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Apo o nia in 1211 , t ho ugh in 1206 he ha d raised a so mew hat larger fe ud al a rmy o f 600 kn ight s in
addition t o 10,000 inf ant ry .
Alt ho ugh Fra nk ish Greece lasted until long afte r th e clos e o f th is period th e Lat in Em pir e o f Ro mania
itsel f survived o nly un til 126 1, whe n Co nstan tino p le fell
to
th e Nicacan Byza ntin es it would appe ar
that th e est ablishment in 1260 of a full-t ime , regularly-paid garriso n o f 1,000 men for th e cit y co uld
have met wit h litt le succ ess . T here aft er ti tu lar Latin Empero rs drifted ab o ut Europ e in seach o f military
aid for th e reco nq uest of
t
he ir Empire. In 126 7, for insta nce, Char les of Anjo u pro mised to pr o vide
th e ti t ular Emp e ror Baldwin
wit h 2,00 0 knight s fo r a y ear s service to wa rds th e recovery
of
Constanti
no p
le, while by a treat y o f 1281 he and th e t it ular
Em p
er or Charles de Courtenay wer e t o
provide 8,0 00
kni ght s for a no t he r e xpedi t ion planned for 1283 , to wh ich Ve nice prom ised t o co nt rib ute
40 o r mo re galleys. Gradually, how ever , t he co nce pt of eve n a t it ula r Lat in Emperor falte red and d ied.
SYRIA AND ANATO LlA : T HE SE LJUK T URK S
Und er Sul ta n Alp Arslan an d his so n and successor Mallk Sha h t he Selju ks rule d a vast te rritory st re tc hing
from An at olia as far east as Khwari zm ia and Afghani sta n,
no r
th t o t he Caucasus an d t he Aral Sea, a nd
sout h t o Syria, t he Red Sea a nd th e Persia n Gul f, and alth o ugh thi s great Em pire began t o bre ak up int o
a plet ho ra of lesse r sta t es towa rds th e end of t he I I th cent ury th e East ern Selju k Sulta ns ret ained
supremacy - albe it in many instances o nly nominal - un til th e deat h in 1157 of Sanjar, t he last great
Sulta n,
af t
er whic h t he re mna nts of th e once great Su ltana te co llapsed e ntirely.
Eve n pr ior t o t ha t date th e Sultan s influe n ce in Sy ria had declined co nside rably : T ransoxlana ,
co nquered in 10 73 , had fallen in 114 1 to t he Qarak hit ai; and t he Sul ta
na t
e o f Me rv had begun t o
colla pse int o to ta l a narchy as a result of a se ries of revolts by Ghuzz Turco man) t ribes aft er 115 3.
In 119 4 t he Su lta nat e o f Hamada n fell to t he Khw arizmian s, leaving t he Sulta nate of Rum in Anatolia
conquered in t he yea rs aft er Ma nzi kert ] as the o nly rem aining majo r Seljuk state, since th e Syrian
Seljuk prov inces, lo ng-since a u
ton
omous, had by
th a
t tim e passed to t he Ay yubid Sultana te of Egypt.
It is th ese west ern Scljuk states, of Rum and Syri a, which a re
ou r
co nce rn here, since th e int erests of
th e ot he r major Seljuk pow ers were alwa ys in t he East a nd so techn ically lie bey ond t he sco pe of t his
bo ok.
The st rengt h of a ll T urkish armies lay in th ei r bow-arme d cavalry , back ed by sma ller numbers of hea vy
but o t herw ise similarly arm ed horseme n. Infa ntr y were provided chiefly by volunteer to wn m ilitias,
called Ahdat h - lite rally Young men - in Sy ria often based o n th e F ut uwwa h, q uasi-poli tic al fac tions,
and co mparab le to t he Ayyarun a nd Fit ya n of Iraq ), plus for eign auxiliari es no tably Daylarnis] and
tribal irregula rs, tho ugh some times be tt e r-t rain ed foot-soldiers who may be professionals a ppea r in
contemporar y so urces; cert ai nly it see ms
pr o
bable th at t he na pt ha-t hro wers a nd crossbo wrnen recorded
in t he 12t h and 13th ce nt uries must have been regu lars. T he milit ias served mos t frequent ly in the
vici nity o f t heir ci ties, oft e n being used for siege and cam p d ut ies.
As in co nte mporary Fa timid arm ies, ac tual o rganisa t ion was ba sically decimal whe re it e xisted, based
on units and multiples of I D, 100 a nd 1,000.
Iqta at
Lack ing gre at wealt h and th e refo re un able to
pay thei r men in cash , the Seljuk s ad op ted a nd pe rfected
a quasi-feu da l syst e m o f milit ary land
tenu
re previously uti lised hy their
Ghaz
nuvid an d Buyid
pre decessors. Thi s was t he iqt a plural I
qta a
t } esta blishe d init ially by th e Buyi d s in t he mid
O
th
cent ur y when it was a grant of co nfisca te d or un cultivated lan d. However, iqta a t had rem aine d rare
unti l th e Se ljuk co nquests o f th e mld- Ll th cen tury , a nd were o nly fully regularised unde r Nizam
al ul j t he cele brat ed vizier of Alp Arslan and Ma lik Shah , so t hat his claim tha t previous rule rs had
neve r dis t ribute d gran ts of l
and
but pai d th e ir soldie rs only in money is prob abl y a reaso nably accurate
sta tement. Ho wever, th e iq ta could be a pay m e n t in cas h an d th e Gh aznavids were still pay ing their
iqt
a at
e xclus ively in mo ney eve n in Nlzam s ti me , so t hat the payme nt o f troo ps only in mo ney by t he
Selj u
ks
predecesso rs pr obably indicates no mo re than tha t iqt a a t were paid in cash rat he r than land .
There were 1 t ypes o f iqt a - t he qati a and th e tu rna , t he he reditary benefice and t he lifet im e bene fice
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respec tively. Either was transferable from di
st r
ict to district , since unlike the Frankish fief the milita ry
jqta represented not a persona l esta te but a payment in land revenues fo r services rend ered : and since
as a soldie r the hold er, the lqta d ar o r muq ta , might need to he posted from one area to anothe r then
his iq ta could likewise ll t ransferred with him. T he ot h er main difference fro m Frankish feudalism
was that the iq ta dar was permitt ed to levy only a specific sum (i n cash and /o r kind) from the po pu lace
of his iq ta - his act ual pay - and ot he r than thi s usually had no fu rther au th orit y over them (an
exception being the jqr
a at
gran ted by th e Zengids). The fact tha t the iqta dar had to co llect h is pay
personally at th e du e t ime was probably cont ribu to ry to the inab ility of Moslem armies to remain in
the field for long pe riods.
The gran ting o f an lqta involved in return the mili tary service of the lqt a d ur, who was usually an
anur , with a specific num ber of
so
ldiers - usually mamluk slave-sold iers (see Egyp tian nrganisaunn]
depending on the size o f the lq ra (la ter , under the Ayyubids, lq tn a t appeared in Syr ia which were
spcci ficatly called iqtu ut of 10 , iq ta ut of 20, e tc., the figures referr ing to the number of t roo ps to be
sup p lied ). Part s o f th e Iqta might even be gran ted to lowe r-ranking amirs by the lq ta dar by a process
compa rable to subinfeuda tio n, Under the Mamluks as much as two-thirds o f each amir s iq ta ha d to be
divided amongst his own rnamlu ks as pay , though under th e Ayyubids eac h am ir received 2 land grants,
one tthc khassa l for his perso nal needs, th e othe r ( the actual iqta or kh ubz ) for the maintenance o f his
troops. Certai nly by the mid-1 2th cen tury Selju k mamluk s were being gran ted their own lan ds under a
simila r system.
Askaris and auxntartes
Early Scljuk armies consisted of 2 majo r elements - the askar of th e Sulta n, a full-time force paid in
cash or lq ta ut and comprised ch iefly of mamluk slave-soldiers: and the provincial contingents o f the
amirs. who had uskars of their own, togeth er with auxiliar ies supplied by Turcomans, Bedouins,
Kurds and o ther rrtbcsmcn. The provincial aska rs numbered from a few hu
nd r
ed to several tho usand
depl nden t on the sil t of the city or distr ict - Damascus had an askur of 1,00 0 , Antio ch apparently
2,000 and so on. As mentioned above, the us karis were largely mamluks bUI
co u
ld also include freemen,
Usamah him self
serving as a paid freemen in the askars o f Zengi, Damascus, Eg
ypt
and Nur ed -Din
tt hc askar is included Kurds. Armen ians and Arabs as well as Tu rks). Organisati on was clearly o n a
decimal hasis.
In his famous writte n wo rk the Siy aset-Nameh. the Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk records the Sultan s
standing army to he as large as 400 ,000 men in th e reign o f Malik Shah ( I0 :: ·1OQ: ), all paid wit h
iqta at: a cour ticr is reputed to have advised tha t this to tal should be cui back to 70,00 0 since peace
theo reigned . though Niaam advocated an inc rease in st rength to a tot al o f 700,000 men. These figures,
if credible. prob ably represent the total strength of all th e askars, both royal and provincial, ove r the
whole , vast Sultana te, especially since ano ther sou rce reco rds the rcyal taskar un der Malik Shah o n one
oc
asion as consisting o f
46
,000 cavalry . Befor e the accession o f his successo r garkjyar uq ( 109:: -1105 )
this had dec line d to o nly 2V,OOO.
Niaam himsel f advised the mainten ance o f an elite unit of 1,000 Hasham (Guards) from amongst the
mamluks o f the Sult an, which should be increased in st rengt h to 5-10,
00 0
in wartime: these part icular
maml uks were to be tr ained fro m Daylamis. Khor asania ns. Georgians and young Tu rcomans. Much later ,
towards the end of the 13th centu ry. Ibn Bibi-Duda records mamluks in Rum (Anat olia) as chie fly
of Byzant ine, Cilic ian, Geo rgian and Cnrn ean ex tract io n, the largest number being Byzantine Greeks o r
Cilician Armenians
th
e mamluk who cap tu red the Byzant ine Empero r Romanus IV at Manzike rt was,
by a twist of fate, a Byzant jnelI . T hese were obtained by war, purchase or gift , or recruited by levy
with in the Seljuk slate itself.
After the deat h of Shah in 10Q : and the subseq uent disintegration o f centralised Seljuk po wer,
the seco nd of the afo re-mentioned elements
th
e provincial a skars and various auxi liaries) assumed the
leading role as th e provinces became practically and then 10l a y independent. On ly in the mid-I
::
th
cen tury un der Nur ed-Din. following in the foo tsteps of his father Zengi, were the Syrian provinces
forcibl y reunit ed , Nur ed-Din adding Egypt to his do mains in 1169 and thereby setting the stage for
Satadin s rise to power hy mak ing him governor, from which position it proved to be bu t a short step
10 the Sult anate , thereby succeedi ng 10 the Syrian provinces and mor e besides,
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Prior t o th ese eve nts command of t he Sy rian provincial armies was usuall y entrusted to the more
powerfu l ami rs, freq uently th e am ir of Mosuj. But unf
or t
unately the emirs did no t like tak ing ordcrs
from each other an d frequently thi s led 10 dissentio n and a lack of u nity in Sy rian armies: delibe rate
dese r t ion was often ca rried ou t by jealous ami rs in th e face o f th e enemy so as to brin g
about
the
downfall o f particularly powe rful rivals. Such disse nt; all too common, togeth er with the somewhat
tribal composi
tio
n o f Turk ish armies, mea nt th at the combined forces of a dis trict or province coul d take
mont hs 10 muste r and even then the am irs o ften required liberal br ibes to guarantee th eir co ntinued
presence and s
uppo
rt.
Both Rumi and Sy rian Sel
juks
relied hea vily on Tu rcoman auxiliaries, and th ese Turcoman tr ibesrnen
who were fie rce though un reliable sold iers - were the nucle us of Seljuk mili tary strength
th r
oughout the
whole of this period . They did not readily accept any form of authority or discipli ne and served main ly
in the ho pe of plunder coming th ei r way ; if none was fo
rthcomi
ng th ey were mor e th an likely 10
abandon
th e army. Othe rwise th eir pay o fte n took the form of ransom money taken in ex change for high-ranking
prisoners hy their employe r; sometimes when the Turcomans indiscriminately massacred their prisoners
they th er
ef
o re deprived t hemse lves o f th eir own pay Some chieftains were paid wit h ext remely large
lqtu ut which seem to have been int en ded as a sub sti tute for th e grazing land s essen t ial to such nomad ic
herdsme n. The y fo ught in triba l u nits und
er
their ow n standa rds an d chieftains. Modern estimates
haw
reck oned Turcoman strength in Anatolia a t some 30 ,000 men in the lat e t h century, but th is figure is
clear ly far too low. Frankish chroniclers, though
undou
b
tedly
going
to
the opposite ext reme , claim Ihat
du ring the Firsl Crusade t he Sultan of Rum , Kilij Arslan I,
mustere
d som e
200·360,000
ca valry, and by
far
the
major ity o f such a fo rce would have
been
Tu r
comans. Certa in ly in Ihe early-
12th
centu ry it
was poss ib le to raise 20-50 ,000 Tu rcomans from the Jazira alone,
Oth er auxiliaries were principa lly supplied by Bcdoui ns and Kurd s. Th e Kurds were a hill-pe uple from Ihe
moun
tainou
s dist ricts o f
nor
th-west Iran , accord ing to Marco 1010 lusty fijlhters and lawless men, very
fo nd of ro bbi ng m
er
cha nts ; they ofte n fea tured in Seljuk arm ies
th
er e were as many as 10 ,000 at
Manztkert} bu t , like th e Turcomans, lacked organisation and fo ught pri ncipa lly for 1001 so werc
disheartened by long or unsuccessful campaigns, Kurds were par ticu larl y prom inent in the armies of
Nur ed-Din , Salad in an d o the r Zengid , Or toq id an d Ayyubid princes, serving bo th us auxi liar ies
and paid askaris. In Rum o
ther
auxil iaries were of Persian, Arab and even Russian origin by the 1
3th
cen tury, Frankish advent urers also appeared on occasion in Syri an and Anatollan armies (see below].
The Syria n army present at Harran in 1104 may help to
giv
e some idea o f the pro port ion of au xiliaries
in th eir forces; o f 10,000 men
7,000
were Turcomans, while th e remaining 3,000 includ ed Hednuins
an d Kurds as well as Seljuks.
Rum in th e 13th century
Under Sulta ns Kai Kobad I ( 1220-1237) and Kai Khcsrou ( 1237-1246) a brief revival of Sclj uk power
took place in Anat olia , bo th Cilician Armenia an d the Byzumine Empire o f Trebi zc nd bec
oming
vassal
states of th e Su lta nate of Rum . Simon de St Quenti n, a Fr ankish visi tor 10 Rum in t he 1240s, reco rded
that Kai Khosrou was owed the service o f 1,400 lances by the Ctltcian Armeni ans for 4 months a year,
1,000 lan ces by the Sultan o f Aleppo, 40 0 lances by the Empe ror o f Nicaea, and 200 lan ces by the Emperor
o f Trebtzo nd : these may have all served for pay since Bar lIebraeus reco rds Kai Khosrou laking Aleppcnc
and Byzantine cavalry as well as Bedouins int o his
army f
or gold in 1243. Whet her th e figur es of lances
arc to he take n as the t
ota
l number o f men involved is unknown , bUI
it
seems improbable: th e
numb
ers are o
ther
wise insignificant ly low when compared to the Su ltanat e s regu lar mamluk units,
whic h perhaps totalled 60
,000
men at thi s time.
In add ition Fr ankish mercenaries were employed , par ticularly under Kai Kaus I, Kai Kobad I an d Kai
Khosrou Il , though even as early as 1148
appar
en tly 3,00 0 Fr anks captured at Atta leia dur ing the Secon d
Crusa de had taken service with Sult an Masud
I
Kai Kaus even fo rmed
I
b
odyguard
un it from Franks
he had liberated by vict or ies over rival Moslem chie ftains. Ther e wcre a t least 1,0 00 Frankish cavalry
in Kai Khosrou H s army at the commencement o f h is reign and il was principa lly tha nks to
300
of
them tha t a serious Turcoman revo lt was pUI down in 1241 ; in 124 3 he employed 2,000
mor
e and th ese
were present in his a rmy at Kuzadugh. The la tter co ntingent co nsisted chiefly o f
Cypnot
es. C
ypru
s
ulso owing service to the Su ltana te a t ab out th is date, bu t oth erwise such mercenaries were ma inly
French, German and Itulia n. Their commander held t he rank of Kondlstabl (Constab le) but he was no t
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always a Frank (for instance a Georgian named Zahiru ddaula held this office al one point in the 13t h
cen tury, and the future Byzantine Emperor Micha el VIII was Kondistabl under Sulta n Kat Kaus ).
In fact Fra nkish or
Fh enkt
t roo ps
ap p
ea r to have often included Greek elements, bot h mercenaries
employed from the Archontes and Akrita i of the Emp ire and troops levied from the Sult an s ow n Greek
subjec ts (see not e 51 in the dr ess and equipmen t secti on).
During Kai Kobad s reign the threat o f the Mongols first became a reality, when over
10,000
fleei ng
Khwarizmian troops ente red the Sultanate, Kai Kobad took them into his service, grant ing them a
number of extensive iqta ut , hut th ey abando ned these duri ng the civil strife which followed his dea th
in 1D 7 and fled across the Euphrates to take service wit h t he Ayyubids; a lready the Mongols were
raiding eastern Rum, and this was th e reason fo r the Khwarizmians ea rlier nigh t fro m certain fro ntier
iqta a t. The ab rupt departu re of suc h a large
nu m
be r of auxilia ries must have been a blow 10 the Seljuks,
who knew that
it
was o nly a matt er o f lime before a show-down with th e Mongols shou ld
pr o
ve
unavoid ab le.
Following the
almo
st inevitable defeat o f Kai Khcsrc u
at the Batt le of Kuzadagh in 1243 t he
Sult ana te of Rum becumc a vassal stat e of the Mongols, and the Seljuk army
an d
administ rati on
und erwent a rap id decline. Constant financial depression led to a grow ing need to grant ever-larger
iqtu ut to soldiers in lieu of payment , which led o nly to a fu rther loss of revenue 10 th e state
an d
enco uraged the independence o f provincial amlrs . Nor did the Sultan any longer have Ihe money 10
employ fore ign mercena ries, even if his Mongol overlords had been willing to permit it , which seems
unlike ly, and he was therefore obliged to d
epend
on the provincial armie s and th e und isciplined
Turcomans.
There was, however, a Mongol garriso n force stat ioned in the Sul tanate aft er 1256 which steadily grew
in numbe rs, its me
mbers
se ttling pr incipally in the easte rn provinces where they were nearer 10 their own
seat of power (t he Persian Ilkhanate) and to the f rontiers o f thei r enemies. The presence o f thcse
Mong
o lt
roo ps W:lS another reason for the abrupt decfinc of the Seljuk army since th ey satisfied most of
the Sultanate s remaining military requireme nts. They were mainta ined by payments of tribute (o ne of
the reasons why the Selju ks were in financial straits] and granIs o f grazing lands. some of which
ult imalely became Ihe independe nt property of Mongol chieftains.
By the cnd of the 131h ce nt ury , and particula rly af ter the capture o f Ico nium by Karama nli Turcornans
in 117 6, the power o f the Sultanate of Rum had colla psed entirely as Mongol administr
atio
n gradually
repla ced Seljuk ; by th is t ime the Mongols had a fairly firm hol d on easter n Anatolia, but in the
wes tern provinccs u number o f autonomous Turcoman amtrates arose, o f which the Karamanli was the
mos t powerful and the Osmanli (O t toman] the mos t Impo rta nt to the course of subsequ ent histo ry.
Though they relied heavily on
their
t ribesmen all of these successor amirat es em pl
oyed
mamlu ks of
th ir own.
TIlE EGYPTlA
ro
S: AM AYYllBIDS
The Fal imids
From the mid-v th cent ury Arab armies had grad ually become dependen t for regular troo p s on Iheir
conti ngen ts of slave-sold iers, the ghu lams. Of these th e white slaves, largely Turks, were properly called
mamluks (deriving from the Arahic word for
o
wned ). th e name unde r which they rose to their greatest
power. Such troops were pu rl-hascd as slaves and trained and kep i at th e ir master s personal expense,
which thcoretically ensur ed their undivided loyalt y 10 him. When they became compete nt so ldiers they
wetc Icgally freed
an d
, by the ta tc-
Faurntc
era , euch given an «u a on which 10 su
pp o
rt themselves: these
iqtu ut usually reve rted t
he mamluks master
on
the ir death ( though in the mid- I ce ntury Nur
cd-Din made th ose of his personal rnarnluks hereditary and Ih is became the norm under th e later
Zeng ids and the Ayyuhhls},
The s
nior maml uks
h l th e
rank of amir and were ex pected to supply a num her o f tr oops from the ir
iqta a
t. u
hcsc too bein g usually - though no t necessarily - slave-soldie rs, maintai ned by a process
compa rable to feuda l subinfeuda tion, The occasio nal descrmnon of larger iqtu a t as iqt a o f
10,
iq ta o f
iq ta o f 100 and thc like reflect s this practicec th e figures indicating the strength o f the iq ta da r s
[d da , his co ntingent o f hor sem n. However, prio r to t he era iqt
a d
ars were no t requ ired to
0
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maintain specific num bers o f men , t heir charte rs o nly dernunding tha t each sup po rt as
many
as possible .
More ofte n tha n not the more powerful iqt a dars commanded even larger numbers in t he field because
the co ntingents o f lesser amirs would he added to their own.
T he cen tral
co r
ps o f bot h Fatimid and later armies wer e the Roya l Mamlu ks. Under the late Fatimids
these numbered ab out 5,000, toge the r with an el it e Young Guard , th e Siby an al-Khass, o f abou t
500. The Royal Mamluks and o the r regula r regiments were hacked up in war time by the persona l
mam luks o f the amlrs. These pcrson al mamlu ks o f eac h successive Caliph. sultan or ami r were nol
disbanded after his death , but retained his
name
and conti nued to exi st as pa rt of th e regular a rmy
until th eir
membe
rs found employment elsewhere or died out; Shir kuh s regiment. th e Asadtyyah
(originally
500
str ong according to Ahu Shamah) were st ill figh ti ng in the Eg
yp t
ian army in
119 ::
des pite the fact tha t Shirkuh himself had died over
20
years earlier, in
1169.
Usually such uni ts were
absor bed into th e standi ng regiment s of the Caliph, sulta n or ami rs, though under the Ayyuhids
they were sometimes a
ttac
hed to the al-lIa lqa (see Mamluk o rganisa t ion ],
Arahs and Egyptian s were no l permit ted 10 become maml uks. Under the Fatimid Caliphate
909-
117 1)
slave-soldie rs wen: most ly Suda nese , Bcrbcrs and Turks. The Sudanese uni ts, know n co llec t ively as the
Ahid al-Shira or Purc hased Slaves . co nsisted principa lly of th e Rayhaniyyah , Juyushiyyah,
Farahiyyah and Alcxandr ian regiment s hy the mi
d·12
th centu ry, the Juyushiyyah alon e posxihly
numbering 10,000 men ; th ey gene rally served as infantry. bot h spea rmen and archers bu t prin cipally
thela t ter , So metim es Negro cavalry are to he found in co ntem po rary sources - Saladin s Qarughula ms
may have included some such - but t hese we re rare. )
In addition Tu rcoman and even Seljuk auxiliaries were sometimes to be found in Fatimid armies. as
mor e o ften were Bedouin and Berber tr ibesmen, while addi t ional infantr y might he supplied by volunt eer
irregulars. T urcomans were first employed b) the Fatimids in 107 2. Even prior to th eir unificat ion with
Egyp t under the Zengids and Ayyubids. Syrian units somet imes appeared in Egyp tia n armies - ther
were, for examplc, 1,000·1 ,300 Damascenes at the Third B
attl
e of Ramla in 1105 and an un re
co r
ded
number of Seljuks at the Battle of Ascalon in
1099.
As an ind ica tion of Fat imid field-a rmy strength, at Ascalon there were
probab
ly
20.000
cavalry and
infantry alt ogether
thela tt
r includin g volun teers and mi litia levies). while at th e f irst and Second
Battl es of Ramla in
110 1
and
110 2
t he Egypt ian forces are re
corde
d as
11,000
cavalry ami
2 1,000
Suda nesc infantry, and
20 .000
cavalry and
10.000
Sudanese infantry rcspec
tiv el y ,
bo t h armi es
co nsist ing largely o f ghulams. At least
7,000
men are reco rded by Ibn al-Athir in a raid of I
ll
(o ther sources claiming 15,000 cavalry and 20 ,000 infantry) , and
there
were 16,
00 0
Faurn tds at Yihneh
in 1123 . We also frequent ly hear of the fron tier garrison of Ascalon (500 cavalry and 1.000 inf antry)
launching its own raids int o Frankish Syria .
Du ring th is period comrnand o f the Fat imid army was generally in th e hands of the Vizier who , like th e
Cali ph , maintained a larg body o f personal mamluks: for instan ce, th e Vizier Bahram ( 1134·1 137 ) had
at leas t 2,000 Armen ian soldie rs in his service , and his successor Ahbas 3,000 Armenians in 11 54 .
( Armenian infant ry . principally archers , still constituted an important element of the Fat imid army
as lat e as 1169.)
Saladi n s ar mies, 1J69·1193
By 1169 , when Salad in succ eeded Nur ed -Din s appointee A
Sil
d ad-Din Shirkuh as governor of Egypt
unde r the last Fartm td Caliph . th e Egyptian arm y consisted of 40 ,000 cavalry and 30-50 ,000 Sudanese
infantry , th e cavalry pro bably inclu ding Qaraghulams (l iterally Black Slaves . probably Negro and Berb r
slave cavalry) and Bedouin and Tu rcoman auxi liarics as well as mamluks.
Al-Maqr iai, reco rd ing an ear lier writer s notes on a review
of
Salad in s cavalry in 1171 th e yea r wh ich
53W the final demise of th e Fat imid Calip hate] no tes tha t th e stan dard un it at this da te was t he Tulh,
apparently a Kurdish or poss ibly a Gh uzz inst itutio n. T he Tulb is the o nly u nit commonly mentioned
• No
w
as earlier each regfmentwas namedafter its o
w
n
r, for example (Vizier Amir al-Iuyush),
Haf
z
iyyah (Caliph
al-Hafszj, A Iildiyyah
(A
....
d ad-DinShtrkuh), Nuriyyah (Sultan Nur ed-Din), Salahiyyah (Saladin
Adiliyyah (Sultan al-Adi
1 .
Kamilin ah (Sultan
et-x amm.
etc.
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in thi s era , u nder ho th Ayyu hids and Mamluks, but it
W:l S
of a very loose cha r
acter
and varied
considerably in numbers, those recorded in the review comprising either 70 ,100 or 200 men ; basically
an y company led by an amir in wartime was a Tu lb, as too was th e entire
body
o f Royal Mamtuks.
Th e ami r was perha ps assisted by an NCO ca lled a Jawish. 174 Tulbs we re present a t the review o f
1171 and a fur th er 20 were absent. Those present are recorded to have num bered some 14 ,0 00 men
excluding Bedo uin auxil iaries. William of Tyre repeats the ear lier figure
of 40 ,000
, and the
differen
ce
o f 26
,000
possihly acco un ts for absent T ulbs
1, 4
00
- 4
,0 00 men ), the Bedou ins (of whom al-Maqrizi
records
7,000 including I ,300 regu lars ) , th e
Tur
comans and t he remnants o f the Fat imid mamlu k
unit s suc h as the Ascaton (Asaqila) regiments.
The Fat imid Sudanese infantr y , meanwhile, had revolt ed agains t Salad in; they were cru shed in The
Batt le of thc Blacks in Cairo in 1169 , the survivo rs being disbanded and dr iven out of Egypt, The
Sudanese present in Salad in s army at Arsouf in 1191 were und oubt edl y Irom new regiment s raised
after that dat e, and Suda nese infantry were sti ll an important element of th e Ayyu bid army in 122 1
when they harassed King John s with drawal from Dam ietta du ring the Fifth Crusade. However, their
numbers were much smaller than before and co ntin ued to dwindle so that by the time the Bahriyyah
Mamluk
dyna
sty came to power in 1250 they had
appa
ren tly disappeared alt oge ther.
By 1177 18
,000
Quraghulams and 8 ,000 Toassin o r Tawashis Ielit e, fully-armed cavalry), including t he
1,000 Roya l Mamlu ks, could he ra ised for a raid on Ascalo n and Gaza according to William
of
Tyre,
who rcscr tbes them all as light-armed ( they were de feate d at Montgisard). Moslem sources record
maximum figures o f 8
,000
Toassm and o nly 7,00 0 Qaraghu lams d uring the pe riod 1171 ·
l
l , though
in addit io n there were th e usual Kurd ish, Bedouin and Turcoman auxiliaries, as well as Muttawwi a
(Ghazis, and volu nteers paid less tha n the regulars and o nly for th e du ration of a campaign) and Arab
and Sudanese infan try . Saladin,:I Kurd himself, em p loyed a conside rable number o f Kurds, tho ugh he
disbanded many o f the m afte r his defeat at Montgisard , for which disaster he held them responsible
Iw illiam of Tyre s 18
,000
Qaraghulams
ther
efore pro bably incl udes auxiliaries since he does no t
men tion Kurds ind ividually ).
The Egypt ia n askar as reorganised by Salad in in 1181 co nsisted of I I I emirs, 6
,976
Toassin, and 1,553
Qaragh ulams, giving a total o f 8,640 men bu t not including unheneficed troops, auxil iaries, or th e
remaining Fat imid mamluks
th
e ex-Fatimid clement was by th is time very small , receiving
perhap
s
less than 2 of the
army
s to tal
pay)
.
will
he no ticed that these figure s make no provision fo r regul ar
infantry, though th ese arc know n to have existed, wh ich has led to th e suggest ion that perhaps the
Qaraghulams should he assumed to represent such tr
oops
. However Ihis seems improbable.
The army reviewed prior to the Bat t le of Ilatlin in I 187 consisted o f I 2,00 0 Eg
ypti
an and Syrian
regular cavalry and perha ps a similar num ber of volunteers and auxilia ries. H. A. R. Gibb in his article
The Armies of Salad in c alcula tes tha t th e regulars were probably,
1.000 Roya l
1,000 from the Damascc ne askar
1,000 from nor thern Syr ia and the Aleppenc askar
4,000 fro m the Egyp tian askar
5,000 fro m the Ja zira (Mesop otamia) and
th e
askars of Mosul and Diya r Bekr
The estim ated st rength o f the askars of Damascus and Aleppo at 1
,000
men eac h is based o n sound
evidence. Gibb similarly estimates the askars o f Horns and Il amah at
50 0
and 1,000 or somewhat less
resp cuvel y: certainly Shir k
uh s
Asadiyyah regimen t of 500
me n
had on ce co nstitu ted the askar o f
lIoms. The figure for th.. Jaziru, Mosul and Diyar Bekr is based on a sta temen t by Ibn al-At hir,
wh o
records some 6,500 cavalry Ior Mc sul, Dtyar Bckr and the Jaztra in 1176 , specifica lly refu ting Imad
ad-Din s sta tement that t he y n um bered 20 ,000 . G ibb calcula tes that of the 6 ,500 approx imat ely 2,000
would have been supplied by Mosut . At the same time it seems likely tha l Diyar Bekr, Mardi n and
Harran would have maintained a ska rs of 1,000 men each - Harran cer tainly had an askar o f 1,000
(o
ffk
ially) in 1242 . II must he remembered, however , that these forces only rep resent regular cavalry,
no t total available st rcngth : as examp les of th
tatt er it is o nly necessary to q uot e the co mbined force
of 6. 000 cavalry from Damascus and Aleppo rec
orded
in 114Q, whic h could undo u btedly be
sup plemented by a liberal numbe r of infan tr y .
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Alt hough no accurate breakdow n is available for Saladin s arm y as it a
ppeared
at the Battl e
of
Arso uf
in 119 1, Ambrc lse and th e It inerarium Regis Ricard i (app arent ly Old French and Lat in ed i tio ns of
the same ey e w tn ss acco unt ) give a good id ea o f th e heterogenous natu re of Egypt ian arm ies a t this
da te, rec
or
ding Bedouin s
an d
Sudanese inf ant ry, Syria n and T urco man ligh t cavalry (at leas t 2,000
and possibly 10 ,000 , a rmed with bows and javelins), and perhaps 20,000 Ambroise records 30,000 )
heavy cavalry, bo th Sal
adin
s and th o se o f his provincial 'askars, 'clo thed and eq uipped sp lendid
ly ;
th e figure
of
20 ,000, thou gh high, does ta lly wit h th e alleged stre ngth
of
Saladin 's fo rces a t Belvoi r in
1182 and pro babl y incl udes Oaraghu lams. At Jaffa in 1192 ther e appea r to have bee n 7,
00
0 cavalry
prese nt.
The lat er Ayyuhids
Kipcha k
Tu
rk s ( i.c. Cumans) forme d th e bulk o f th e mamluk t roops unde r Salad i
n s
desce ndan ts. There
was an influx o f
Kjpc
ha k mam luk s under Sultan
us-Salih 12
40- 1249 ) in p
artic
ular, as a resu lt
of
t he
stead ily
gro
wing pressure of th e Mo ngols o n their east ern fro ntier , and fr
om
amo ngst th em the elite
bodyguard unit
of
the Bahr iyyah as-Saliyyah was fo r med, some 800· 1,00 0 men, usually inco rrect ly
r
ef
erred to as the ' River' regiment.
It
was this regiment whi ch laid
th e
founda t ions of the Mam luk
sta le in 1250 when some of its office rs, led by Aybek and the future Mamlu k sultan Baiba rs .
assassinat ed Sultan Turan-Shuh. The Roya l .Mamluks appea r to have to talled M000 under al-Aziz
(] 193-1198) and 10,
00
0 unde r b
ot h
as-Sahh and his fat her Sultan al-Kam il ( 12 1
1238),
Bedo
u n and
T
ur
coman
light cavalry
co
ntin ued to suppleme nt th e mamluk reg imen ts
of
the
a s
kars.
Kurds also co nt inued to fea ture in man y a rmies, the Kurd ish Oaimariyya h reg
ime
nt bei ng a pa rt icular ly
powerfu l e lement a t th e
dose
o f the Ayyub id era, In 1258 un-Nasir of Damascus emp
loye
d as man y
as 3,
00
0 Shahrazuriyyah Kur ds.
Ot h
er auxiliaries employ ed und er a l-Kami l and as-Salih we re the Khwarizmians who had Fled from Rum.
As many as 10
,0 0
0 (o ne source says more th an 12,000) under a ce r tain Barbch Kha n wer e tak en i
nt o
service in 124 4, receiving in exchange th e lands
of
Diyar Mudar as an iqta , and these fea tu red
promine ntly in the capt ure
of
Jerusalem and th e Bat t le
of
La Forbic the same year. They we re at firs t
a powerful
eleme
nt amidst th e politica l chaos wh ic h prevai led in Egypt and Syria at tha t t i
me ,
but thei r
semi-inde pendent existence was ended ab ru ptly by a devastat ing de feat at Ho ms in 1246 at Ihe hands
of Sultan as-Salih , after which so me
of
th e survi vors again to
ok
service in th e ro yal and vari
ou
s
provincialtaskars,
thou gh in
co
nsiderably smaller numbe rs Ihan
before
. A few hund red (3 00
or
more )
wer e presen t a t the Batt le o f El
Mansu rah
in 1250, while t
heir
final appearance was in 1260 in the
Mamluk arm y which d
ef
eated
the
Mongols a t
A
in
Jatut .
Frankish mercenaries
Frank ish mercen ar ies sometimes appeared in Egypt ian armies in th e 12th and 13th cen turies, hut
alth
ough
th e
re are ma ny allu sio ns th ere is very
little conc
re te evidence. One clearly recorde d insta nce
of
Franks in Fa tim id employ, where in 11 11 Shams al-K hila fah, the gove rnor of Ascalo n, emp loyed 30 0
knights as his bodyg uard , is more appa ren t th an rea l since Sha ms was planning to han d the cit y over
to King Baldwin .
A somew
ha t
la ter indica t ion of t he appare nt desi rab ility
of
Fran kish mercenaries da tes to
I I 9 I
when ,
duri ng ne got i
ations
w
it h
King Richard
I of
England,
Saladin
is a lleged to have proposed th a t in exchange
for
co
nsiderable terri to rial concessio ns he
sh o
uld receive the se rvices fo r one year of as man y as 2,
00
0
knight s and 5,000 infa ntry fo r use agai nst the
Zcngids of
Mosul; bear ing in mind the milit ar y po tential
of the kingd
om
of
Jeru salem at this dat e th ese are very high figures indeed.
La te r in th e Ayyubid per iod we have one
of
the few certai n references to th e employ me nt
of
su ch
Fra nk ish mercenaries, several knight s bei ng
reco
rded in Damascus in 1227. La t er sti ll al-Maqrizi
reco
rds
even th e Mamluk s
ulta
n Baibars employing Fran kish knights af ter the fall o f Caesarea and lIaifa in
1265, even gra nti ng
them
feuda lesta tes
TH E MA M lUKS
Under th e Mamluk Sultans
th e
regu la r arm y co nsisted o f 3 major elements - the Royal Mam luks, the
mamluk tr oo ps o f th e emirs. and the al-Halq a.
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T he Royal Mamluks consisted o f
th e
reigning sultan s ow n guard s th e Khassa kiy ya h ), who wer e
selec ted f rom th e Ju lba n I fmp o rt ed , T u rkish mam luks
purch
ased fro m th e st ep pes, Ca ucasus o r
else w
here
), plus t he mamlu k u nit s o f fo rme r
sultans
the Sulta niyy ah) and t he u nits o f de ceased am irs
It he Saif iy ya h). Under Bai har s 1160
-1
2 7 7 ) t he R
oy a
l Mamlu ks wer e 12- 16 ,00 0 stro ng. O ne so urce
cla ims t he un likely to tal
of
40 ,00 0, Ihou gh elsewhere giving t he figu re
of
4 ,000 : al-Maq r izi re co rd s
12,00 0 , 4 ,00 0 each be ing post ed in
Cairo
, Dam ascus and Al
ep p
o. Qa la u n 1279 -129 0 ) had at t he m os t
7-12,0 0 0 and ap pa r
en t
ly on ly 6 ,00 0 by th e
cl o
se
of
h is reign : if, as Moslem so urces clai m, his mamluks
ex c
eeded in number t ho se o f any precedi ng su lt an then Baibars must have had co nsiderab ly less th a n
11,00 0 , let al
on e
16-40,000. In ad d it io n Q al
au n
jus t ifi
ably
dis t rus ted t he Bahriyyah regim
en t
a nd
raised instead a new elite un it
of
3,70 0 men wh ich ca me to be k no w n as t h e Burjiyyah
T
ower )
regi ment : these were Circassia ns and Mo ngols as o ppo sed to Kipc haks, an d th ey even tually dis placed
th e Ba hriyyah sulta ns fro m th e th r on e in 13 90 . Under Qalaun s successors Khalil 1 290-1293) and
Mo ha mm e d 1193-134 1, w
it h
intcr ru p tion s) a l-Maq riz i records th at t he Ro yal Mamluk s numbe red
11,0 00
t
hou g h els ewher e he implies tha t Khalil actually had less th an 10 ,000 . Ano ther so u rce suggests
tha t Mo hammed had 10 ,0 00 in 1299 an d it seems t hat in realit y he p robab ly had eve n less, per ha p s as
fe w as 1.000 by 13 19. In peacetime mo st o f th e Ro yal Mamluks Were sta tio ned in Cairo itsel f.
T he amirs were mo stl y, if not e xclusively , draw n fr
om
a mo ng t he Ro yal Marnluk s. They were graded
acc o rding to t he ac tu al n umbe r o f hor semen and /o r mamluks t he y em p loye d, giving rise to th e tit les
am ir o f 5, amir o f 10, amir o f 40 usually called a m ir al-tablkhanah, amir w
it h
han d ) and a mir o f 10 0 ,
and to ra n k as an m r a t a ll on e had to co mma nd 5 o r mor e maml uks or ho rsem en . T his was basically
t he sa me sy
stem
as had been employed b y
t he Ayyuhi ds
ex ce p t th a t u nde r t he Mam luk s th e prev ious ly
h ighly variable n umbe rs o f horse men had bee n st ra tif icd in lo jus t th e 4 o r 5 forma l ranks as listed
a bove and
below
. Th e ti t les th emselves are a l itt le misleading, ho wever, since co n te mporary sources
stat e t ha t
th e
ami r of 10 co uld command up to 20 ma rntuks t he t itle a mtr o f 20 also appears),
th e
a mir
o f 4 0 up t o 70-80
mamluk
s. a nd th e a m ir o f lOO u p to 110- 120. Even t hese o fficia l figures were o ft e n
sur passed, to tals of up 10 5-
70 0
, 1,500 a nd in o ne case even 3,0 00 hors
em e
n someti mes be ing recorded
in th e e m p lo y o f a single ami r, lhough suc h insta n ces we re
excep
t io nal. Vet t hey indi
cate th a
t th e
o fficia l qu o tas were or te n ex ceed ed.
Amir s o f 100 a lso th eo retically co mmande d a regiment o f 1,0 00 al-lI a lq a in wart ime , giving r ise to th e
alte rnative and
equally
inaccu
rate
ran k amir o f 1,000 ; th e inaccuracy o f t h is t itle is best
witn
essed by
the fact th at a lthough in 13 15 o nly 8 ,93 2 men a nd 204 o ffice rs o f th e al-lI alq a arc recorded in Egy pt ,
me re wer e u nder the first Mam lu k su ltans a s many as 24 a mirs
o f
1,000 in Egy pt , so that t he average
al-Halqa co mmand
of
ea c
h
amir
co uld no t have much exceeded ap proximat ely 380 men . Po ssibly t he
nu mbers wer e mad e u p wit h auxiliaries
By 13 15 th e re W l U
20 0
am irs o f 40 and
20 0
a mirs
of
l O in addition to t he 24 am irs o f lOO. A later
au t hor it y, Za hi ri, qu ot i ng a source of unknow n d at e, gives t he low er fig ures o f 14 a mi rs of 10 0
0
amlr
s o f 4 0 . 2 0 am irs
of
10 . SO amirs o f l a and 30 a mirs o f 5 in Egyp t , whil e Da mascus had 11
amir
s
o f 100 , 10 anurs o f 4 0 and 60 am irs
of
10 , a nd Alep po 6-
emir
s
of
100 . la a mu s
of
40 a nd : am irs
of
10 . T he smalles t Ma mlu k pr ovince, Gala , had o n ly 1 am irs
of
40 .
T h e al- lIa lqa it self f irst ap pe ared in 1 174 and co nsisted o f a n ehrc
of
no n-
mamluk
cavalry, mainly
Ara bs. na ti ve Fgypt ia ns a nd mamluk s so ns ho rn in Egypt. T he latter , the Awl a d al-nas , were rega rde d
as seco nd-crass be
ca u
se t hey had no t been bo rn o n t he s te pp es as true T urk s, wh ile Arahs and Egyprians
were not r m l l t o becom e mamlu ks. When Jo inville de scri bes the al-Halqa as th e Su ltan s bo dygu ard ,
an d ma mluk s to bo o t , he is
there
f
or e
und o u bte dl y
co
nf used in his te rminolo gy
t h ou gh t he
ir na me
al-lI a lq a, meaning Ring , do es te nd to im pl y a bod yguard fu nc tio n). Ho wever , th e al-Halqa o ft e n, if no t
a lways. o utnumbe
red t he Royal Mamluks. but th ey were generally po st ed in t he provinces as o p po sed
to Cairo. It has alr ead y bee n men t ion ed t hat there wer e o ver ,000 al-Hulq a in Egyp t in 13 15. Zahiri,
wh o
a
ppea
rs to he spea king o f t he 14 th o r
th e
heginn ing o f th e I 51h cen t ury. recor d s th at th er e wer e
as many as 2
4,00
0 ul-Hulqa in Egy pt which tallie s wit h 24
amir
s
of
100j , 12,0 0 0 in Damascus, 6 ,00 0
in Alep po , an d 9- 1 1,000 spread o ver 5 o u t o f t he remai ning 6 pro vinces, and t his is despit e
th e
al-Halqa
having unde rgo ne a decline in im portance si nce Ihc ea rty- f a th ce n tury; ho wever , since th ese figu res
wer e recorde d in res ponse t o a Mongol t h rea t o ne sho uld allo w fo r e xaggera
tion
an d la ke t he m all wit h
a pinch o f sal t, even th ough al-Maqrili a lso implies the imp rob able fig ure
of
14 .00 0 Egyptia n al-Halqa
at o ne po in t. A n alt erna tive acco u nt says th e al-Ha lqa nu mb er ed on ly 11 ,000 , th is figure la ter being
24
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red uced. 4.
00 0
31H31qa are r
ecor
ded to have been presen t in the arm y which fou ght at Horns in
128 1, in compariso n to o nly 800 Royal Mamluks. In ad dition
some
o f th e al-Halqa th emselves
employed 1-4 personal mamluk s.
Every 40 al-Halqa were commanded by an offic er with the ti tle Muqaddam al-Halqa literally
Commande r o f al-Halqa , equiva lent in rank to an ami f 10 ), every lOO by a Bash , assisted by a
Naq ib , and every 1,000 by an Ami r mi a Muqaddam alf. Unlik e the ami rs the al-Halq a o fficers held
th eir ran k o nly during wart ime . The organisation o f the ac tu al mamluks was probably hkewrse easeu on
a
40
or 50-man un it , with
comp
anies
of
100 (or possibly 200) and regiments of 1,000 . Amirs and
office rs were not incl uded in these t
ot a
ls. However , a much lat er author, Ibn Iyas , states that the Royal
Mamlu ks at least were not organised into regu lar un its an d sub-units un t il they se t out on campaign ,
and even then i t was th e sultan
wh o decided the sizes of the unit s.
T he overa ll stre ngth of these regular Mamlu k troo ps is no t easy to reso lve, but cer tainly 40 ,000 are
recor ded o n campaign against th e Sudan in 1289 and 10-19 ,00 0 a t the siege o f Tripoli in the same year,
while 60,000. th ough including some auxilia ry cavalry , were present at th e siege of Acre in 129 1. Gihhon,
in his Decline an d j all of the Roman Empire .
recor
ds on ly 25,000 Mamluk
u v
lry hough he does
no t ci te a so urce , o r dat e, for th e info rmatio n. Wheth er any of these figures inclu de al-lIa lqa
unit s is unk now n .
ll i iaries and infantry
In add ition to the mamlu ks and al-lIa lqa la rge numbers o f auxiliary t roops co uld be raised fro m amongst
the T urco man , Kurd, Bedouin , Syro-Palest inian and Lebanese tribesmen . Such aux iliaries were
sometimes called Khassek (er. Russian Kaza ks , meani ng freebo o ters or nomad vagabonds ].
T he l u rcomans and Kurds were settled on gran ts o f land as mili tary colonists by th e Mamtuk s. chieftains
be ing given t he t itles amir of 10, amir o f 20 or amir of 40 depending on their importance. However,
th ese chieftains remained inferior in ran k to Mamluk amirs o f t he same grade .
Th e Bcdouins we re under no obligations whatsoever and supp lied au xilia ry cavalry in emergencies o nly ;
no r were they co nsistent ly reliable. The ir chie f tai ns wer e therefore graded lower thu n th ose o f the
Turcomans a nd Kurds , be ing ranked 3S amirs o nly if th ey were powerful, o therwise being classi fied as
al-Halqa .
The semi-nomadic al- Ashair, the Syro- I a lesti nian and Lebanese t ribesmen, ap pear to have been hired
principa lly as bow and sling armed mer cenary infantry du ring this period, though th ey sometimes
supplied cavalry. Af ter 1289 mos t offici a lly became regu lar soldiers of so rts when the t ribal ch ieftains
came to ho ld the ir lands as di rec t grants from the sultan. T heir infan try
prob
ably resem bled figure 15
in the dress and eq uipment sect ion.
Zahiri records tha t the auxiliary co ntingents availa ble from these so urces numbered 180 ,000 Turcomans.
20,000 Kurds (h e says
f
ormerly 20,000 ),
93,0
00 Bedouins(
29 ,
000 from Syria and Palesline, 33,000
from Egypt. and 3 1.000
from
the lI ijaz and Mesopotamia , co ntingents ran ging from 100 to 2,000 men) ,
and 35
,000
Sy ro-Palestlnians and Lebanese. In add it io n l ah iri reco rds that every village in th e Mamluk
state was req uired to supply 2 horsemen. and he gives the Iiguee of 33,000 villages: th ese possibly
represe nt the Awl ad al-nas. These auxiliaries were all cavalry , no infantry figures being given.
However, Gib bon men tions au xiliary troop s co nsisting o f a provincia l milit ia of 10 7,000 infantry ,
almost cer tainly incl uding the
Syro
-Pales
tmian
s an d Leban ese, in addit ion to
66 ,
000 Bedou in cavalry ,
while Frankish sources record 100 ,000 and Moslem sources 100-160,00 0 irregular infa nt ry at the sieges
of Tripoli {I 289}an d Acre ( I 29 1) respectively .
Thoug h th e infan tr y were nearly always irregulars (pla ying on ly a mi no r ro le in Mamluk warfare) a
de scriptio n o f the siege of at-xtarqa b in 1285 mentions a regiment of 1,000 infa ntry called the Aqjiyyah
for ming part of th e garrison installed by the Mamluks af ter its captu re ; the regimen t is o therwise
u nkn ow n , hut they were qu ite clea rly no n-mamluk regu lars o f so me kind. perhaps Lebanese. Somew hat
earlier , in [279 , an arm y com p rised of 4 ,000 infantr y and 9,000 cavalry at tacked Qa at Rho ma ita
on th e Euphrates, and certai nly so far from home such infantry co uld hard ly have been sup plied by
irregula r mili tia. In addit io n th e axe
-arme
d Tabardariyyah regim
en t
was clea rly regular.
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Ano th er hand of infantry irreg ula rs in the Mamluk army were th e Hadj is, light -armed religiou s fanatics
comparable 10 the layla rs o f the la ter
Ot t
omans. At the siege of Acre
they
are recorded thr owing
t hemselves
into
the ditch before the walls so
that
their own infantry co uld advance, across t heir
bo dies
Engineers wer e also irr egulars, though naptha tr
oo p
s may have bee n employed full-time since naptha,
sipho ns and o
ther
incendiary equ i
pm e
nt was kep t exclusively in royal arsen als.
Th e Wafidi ya
In addit i
on
to the usual auxiliaries so me Mongols wer e to he found serving in Mamluk armies afte r
I as man y as 3, 000 tak ing service during Balhar s re ign. T hese were gene rally called by t he names
Waridiya o r Musta mina, meaning immigrants
or
t hos e who see k asylum respec t ively. ke the
Tur comans, Bedouins and Kurd s they retained their status as free men but , unl ike o ther aux iliaries,
so me act ually se rved
with
in regular Mamlu k un its, usua lly th ose of th e am irs though some even
served alongside the Roy a l Mamlu ks and even in the Khassakiyyah, the Sult
an s
perso nal bodyguard,
itself. Most, however , were enro lled in th e al-Halqa and nea rly all ran ked lower than the Mamluks
th emselves, th e ir chief ta ins being given on l y ver y low ranks, usuall y Muqaddam al-Halq a and r
ar
ely
highe r than an amir o f 40 dur ing this e ra
th
is rank was even given to
th e
Ilkha n Hulagu s son-in -law,
Turghay. who en t ered Marnluk se rvice in 129 7 wit h as many as 10, 000 or 18 ,000 Kulmuks Later ,
however , in Mo hammed s reign when the day s of such mass immigrations were past , higher ranks
were
somet imes assigned to Waridiya chieftains,)
T
il E
ASSASS INS
Th e
Assassins were fo unded in the
late l
th century by a Persian, lIasan as-Sab
ah , wh o
in
1090
se t up
his headq uarters at Alamut in the Dayl am m
oun
tains. They were an ex
tremi
st
group of
a
Shi i
te Moslem
sect , the lsma Hi tes , th eir name o f Assassins (Arabic lIashishiyun) deriving from a co rruptio n o f the
Lati n for hashish, to wh ich
they
were allegedly (hut highly improbab ly) add icted . Th e Moslems
more
of ten called them Barinis or Nazaris.
Their existence as an ind ep ende nt polit ical e
ntity
und er th e ir Grand Maste r was main ly a resu lt of the
inaccessibility o f the ir mounta in f
ortre
sses - Alamu t itself means Eagl e s Ne
st
- o f wh ich there were
perhaps
60 or more
in th e region
of
Alarnut alone by th e mid -13th century. In add it io n from the ea r ly
I ce n tury
there
was a large Sy rian o ffshoot
of
10 for tre sses, with its head
quart
er s at Masyaf aft er
1141 , most fam
ou
s leade r of whom was Rash id ad-Din Sinan ( 1169- 1
193)
know n as Sheikh al-Djabel,
The Old Man
of
the Mounta in . a ti tle
ther
eafter
born e by his successo rs.
Th eir most not a hie co nt rib ution to this era - and all e ras since - was the gentle ar t o f poli t ica l
assassin at ion , to which they gave their name. The sectaries were lin ly obedient to
th e
Grand Maste r
or the OM Man of the Mounta in and w re even
prep
ared to k
illth
emselves if orde red to do
so ,
so
they
did not fear ca p tu re or dea th in the
co
urse of executing the ir duty , whic h was a g
oo d
j ob since more
often
than no t they d id n
ot
re
turn
fr
om their
ass ignmen ts: as Bar Hcbraeus graphically
pu t
s it, killing
the y were ki lled. I Fho se o f th eir bre
thren
a
ctua
lly responsible fo r th e majo rity
of
assassina
tion
s were
the Fida is
or
Fid awis, m
aning those r
eady
to offer th eir Hves fo r a ca
use. )
Celeb rit ies removed fro m
th e course
of
hist
or y
hy ,
\s
sassin ac tivit y included Nizam al-Mulk (
1092)
, th e Fat imid vizier at-Are a
1 ~ ~
il-Bursuq i o f Mosul ( 1126), Con rad o f Montfer rat (1 192 ), and
Geng
his Kh an s s
ec o
nd so n
Jagata i
I
to nam e bu t a
k w
. Even Saladin curne
d o
se to havi ng his career abbrevia ted o n more
than o ne
occ
asion, wh ile Princ e Edwurd , la ter Ed ward I of England , narrow ly esca ped
death
whe n he
was w
ound
ed by a poisoned Assassin dagger in 1271 . There are even sto
ne s
tha t Assassins were ac tually
sen t as fa r afield as Eur
op e
, and tha t some tr ied 10 murder Lo uis IX of Fran ce pr i
or
to his
departu
re
o n the Seventh Crusa de.
Quite
of
ten such assassinations w
er e
mo tivated b) out side rs - the murder
of
th e Pa triarch of Jeru salem
in I : 14, fo r xample , was inst igat ed by the Ho spu ajlers of all people - bu t equally , if not
more
, often
rhey were aimed at con tr o lling th e bal ance o f power amongst th e Assassins enemies. For the sam e
reaso n Assassins might be fo und allied to ei t he r Franks or Moslems as the need s o f th e moment dictat ed .
Duri ng t he 13 th century th e Syria n Assassins were almos t per manently subjec t to th e Hospitallers.
TI
l1
strength
of
th e sect was ef fec tively brok en when its headqua rters at Alamut was des troy ed by th e
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Mongo ls in I
256,
t he nucleus o f th e Persian sec ranes being all but ext ermi nated by I 257. The Syrian
Assassins las ted a litt le longer , though the Mamluk Sulta n Baibar s achieved their fina l de
structi
o n by
1273 , ending their po litical
powe
r
for
ever. Nevertheless, Assassins st ill occasionally appear thereafter,
in 1275 even recapturing an d hol ding Alamut for a few mo nt hs, and
though
the rema ining sect artes
were grad ually absorbed by o ther Isma ilite groups they co ntinued to be employed as political
assass ins under the Mamluks, Ibn Bat tuta recordi ng how during the 14th cen tury th ey were normally
paid at a fixed ra te per murder.
Sca
tt e
red as the communit ies o f
the
sect were it is impossible to establish th eir milita ry po te nti a l,
hut
William o f Tyr e sta tes that the Syrian Assassi ns numbe red 60 ,000 and Burchard of Mount Sion that
t hey num bered 40,000 ; the Syrian Assassins are recorded to have fielded per hap s as many as 10 ,000
men against the Franks as early as 1128,
They
relied o n volunteer civic militias f
or
bo th infantr y and
cava lry ; these were
of
a high
stan
dard and received pay fo r the du ration o f their service, usually in the
form
of
booty, hor semen be ing pa id tw ice as muc h as foot-soldiers.
TH E BYZANTI NE EMPIRE
The traditiona l army as described in Armies
of
the Dar k Ages was defeated and all but des troyed by
the Seljuk Turks at the disastrous Battl e o f Man zike rt in 1071, and the succeed ing cen turies saw the
final de mise
of
classical milit ary organisation. The subsequent changes in Byza ntine orga nis
ation
ca n be
fairly accura tely summarised as a decline in the impo rta nce o f the provincial fo rces
of
th e Thema ta
accompanied by an inc reased reliance o n mercenaries and the co ntin gents of the landowning arist ocra cy.
Mercenaries and the Regular arm y
Though they had always been an outstanding feature of Byzantine armie s, from the practical point
of
view, and certainly as a successful solution to the Empire s imm
ediat
e needs, the principa l result of
Manzike rt was a conside rable and ever- increasing rel ianc e o n mercenaries. It was undoubt
edly
thi s
which led to
the
final disappearance amongst many of the na tive Grccke pop ulation o r any kind o f
mili tar y potential, steadily o n the decl ine since the 10 th cen tury. It was inevitahle, therefore, tha t the
Comnen i Em perors and the ir successors should show a marked prefe rence for mercenary t roo ps.
Anna Com nena describes the mercena ries in the arm y of her father Alexius I as horsemen and foo tmen
from all lands ; by th e end
of
the 11th centu ry they incl uded Colbingians tK olbingoi = Kol hyagy?
Germanic inhabi tan ts o f the sout hern Baltic coast line), Curnans, Selj uks, Pat zinaks (Pechencgsj,
Uzes
Tor
ks), Alans, Macedonians (Sla vs and Bulgars, employed ex tcnsivcly under t he early
Conmcnij.
Scrbs, Geo rgians , Armenians, Nemi tz oi o r Alamanoi (Germans and possibly Flcmings;
just
to co nfuse
th e issue F renchmen are sometimes referred to as Germans in Byzan tine so urces ), Lati ns (a blanket
te rm fo r Frenchmen, N
or
mans an d Italians ), Englishmen, Saracens, Ru ssians and Varangians, and on
the who le these elemen ts co ntinued to serve
throughou t
the I th and 13th centuries. (Some, how ever,
se rved as allied auxiliaries o r vassals rather than as mercenaries: the Serb s, fo r instance, supplied 500
caval ry for campa igns in Asia and 2,00 0 for campaigns in Europe during Manuel l s r eign. ) Niketa s
Choniates, writing in the early-13th ce nt ury, says th at each differe nt tribe or race formed a di fferen t
regiment, which must have helped to mi nimi se what would have othe rwise undou btedly been a
disas trou s
com
mun icati on
pro
blem
Alongside these irre gular unit s of mercenari es and auxiliaries there were a
num
ber of full-time
mercena ry un its which , throu ghout most of th is e ra, co nsti tu ted th e hulk o f th e regular army , the ol d
elite regiments
of
th e Tagmata havi ng been prac tica lly des troyed at xtanztkert. Tho ugh the Excubitae
arc re
cor
ded at Dur azzo in 1081 , the Ile taeria and Ikanato i elsewhere, and though
the
Schcla e
appa rently survived at least as an insti tution , these units were merely shadows
of
their forme r selves
and as elite army units fad e int o obli vion befo re the close of th e 11th ce ntury. For a brief period
du ring the reign o f Alcxi us I ( 1081-1118 ) the
resto
re d arm y nucleu s was based o n th e following un its:
- the Vardar io ts, a cavalry unit o f Christianised
Turk
s, pro babl y Uzes. from Macedonia.
- Frankish me rcenaries, lat er called th e Lat iniko n, at th is da te mainly
of
N
orman
or Fr ench extractio n,
• Although even after 1204 the Byzamines continued to j enerally call them
ve
s R homaioi
Le
Romans)
seem
10
have gradually adopted a preference for the term lIellene or Greek so as
10
avoid any confusion between
themseIves and the hated h anks.
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commanded by an office r with the feudal Eur
op
ean ti tle of Kc nostablos or consta ble . (The Maniak etes
regimen t, wh ich features in latc- I lth century sources, a lso appears to have consisted of Franks,
descendants of the mercen ar ies employed by the general Maniakes in the I030s and 1040s.)
- the Sky thiko n, at the hegmning of this era cons isting mainly o f Pechencgs, for who m the Byzantines
genera lly reserved Ihe archaic term Scyth .
-
th e
Tu rcopou loi, , Sons o f T urks , co
mp r
ised o f the sons of Christianised Turks and Seliu k and
Turcoman mercenaries.
- a number o f native Greek regiments which all vanished aft er only shor t caree rs. These comprised t he
Immortals, a large un it ( 10
,000
men acco rding 10 B
rycnniu
s) formed by Nicephoros III in 10 78 from
rem nant s of the Eastern Th c rnata sup plemented with new rec ruit s; the Choma te nc l , a cavalry regimen t
ra ised in Choma in Phrygla, also by Nicephoros, apparently num bering as few as 300 men in 1081 but
probably abou t \ ,000 when at full strengt h ; the Archontopouloi
Sons
o f l eaders ), a un it of 2,000
cavalry raised hy Alex ius from o fficers or phan s in Ihe I0 80 s; and the vesnarttee. household troops
who perhaps included in additicn
th
fam ous Varangian
Guar
d , fo unded in
thc
tate- t
nr h
ce
ntur
y by Basil
11
from Scandinavian and
Russian mercenaries. There were in add ition ot her Varangian regiments, which by
th e
end of the 11th
century also inclu ded English mercenaries.
Fr anks (o the rwise referred to in Byzantine sources as Latin s or K elt
s j
were em ploy ed in large numbers
1 0) th e
end o f the I I th cent ury, and it may have been a req uest made to the West by Alexius for
mercenaries in 10 11 o r IOQ5 that inadver
te n
t ly res ulted in
th e
Firsl Crusade AI the beginni ng of th is
era, in 107 1, when thcy were commanded by th e unscrupulou s adve nt urer Rou ssel de Oa
iJI
eul, their
strength is recorded as 3 ,000. A few years later there ap pear to have been as many as 8 ,0 00 . Their
numhers were increased co nsiderably by the
ti
no p
hile Emp eror Manucl I
11 4
3- 11
80 )
under
whom Fra nks. part icu larly Frenchmen , Germans and Italians, became the predomi
nant
mercenary
clement of Ihe army arre r the Turks.
Most of the nat ive, and some o f the mercenary, regiments me
ntioned
above had disappeared by as early
as the end of the 11th century, apparently being disbanded by Alex ius: the disappearance of ot hers was
possibly
th e
resu lt of having suffered heavy casualtie s throughout the 12th century , pa rticularly at
th e
Battle of Myriokeph alon in 1176 , whic h left the army in an even worse state compa ratively than
had Munzikert a century earlier. However, the Archon topouloi arc still recorded in Ihe Nicaean per iod
in
co u
rt circles : in 1261 there were o nly 5 2 of them, which would seem to indicate tha t they had
earlier become some rype of inner bodyguard and had declined co nsiderab ly in strength and
importance . O the rs of the old regimen ts may . like the Schotae and Archon topouloi, have gone th rou gh
a similar process of grad ual de terior ation .
The regu lar mercenary regiment s, however, thrived . Only the Turcop ouloi, a nume which appears
regula rly in Byzantine sources from the la te
- l l th
century through to the 141h cen
tury
, seem to have
undergo ne any kind of decline and th is appears 10 have been in status ra ther than strength. Alexius I
seems to have relied heavily on the Tu rcopouloi : Ihey f
eatu
re prominent ly in the events of th e Crusade
of 1101 , and he had as many as 7,0 00 Selju k Turks in his employ as early as 1083 . It is also wo rth
remarking nere tha t
under
the C
omnen
i a large number of senior Byzantine officers wer e either
Byzanun ised Turks or o f Turkish descen t.
T he other 4 regiment s - Varangians, v ardariots. Skyt h ikon and Latinikon - con tinued to fo rm the
nucleus of the regular army , changing only in their ethnic composition. Th e Sky thikon , for instance,
which had since 11 : 2 recruited its members principally from am ongst Pecheneg prisoners-of-war
settled in the European provin ces after th e decisive defea t of Eski Zagru, had begun 10 incl
ud e
Cumans
lIuring the reign o r Joh n
(1 118-1143 ) ut the latest ,
an d
though the Pecheneg
colo
nies co nt inued to
n ou r ish un t
ilthe
Lat in Conquest of 1 : 04 the Cumans seem 10 have become predomi nant hy the end
of the l I th ce ntu ry ; militarily, in fact , th e Pechencg elemen t was probably o n the de cline by the mid-
I : th cen tury and
it
seems likely that inter-marr iage and th e i
nt r
od ucti on o f reinforcements from other
T urkish peo ples brought abo ut t he gradual change or composition from Pecheneg to
Cuman.
Uaes also
appea r in large numbe rs dur ing th is century, and some at least found their way into the Skyth ikon ;
Byzantine sou rces even seem to imply that they formed the largest percen tage of Turk ish mercena ries
a t
th e
time of
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Likewise th e compos it io n of th e v arangian s, still principally Scandinavian at the beginni ng of this
per iod, graduall y cha nged , acquiring a larger and larger percentage of Englis
hmen
. In the lat e- 0 70s the
St rategicon of Cccaumenus mak es th e first men tion o f Englishm en in an apparently mili tary co ntext,
but the y ar e o nly first men tio ned in o fficial Byzantine so urces in 1080 and 1088, whe re they are
never thel ess specifically mentio ned separa tely from the Varangians. Ordericu s Vitalis, writ ing c, I 130 ,
d early records Englishm en serving th e Emperor , and there wer e certai nly English t roops presen t at
Myr iokephalon in 1176 (t hey arc men tio ned in a let te r from Manuel to King Henry ), T hough
importan t (apparently the most trusted element of the Guard und er Alexius the ir numbers were
o bviously st ill small in the
e
arly-12 th cen tury, Sax o Gr
ammat
icu s (wr iti ng c. 1101) stati ng tha t the
Emp
eror s gua rd was composed o f men o f Danish
tongue
, an d Snor ri St urlu sson reco rding a grea t
m
any
Northmen
aking service with Atextus in 1112, Th e English element , however, steadily
inc reased
unt
il by
1180 the Byzantine c
hro
nicler Ctnnamus could state qu ite specifically t ha t th e
Varangians were
o
f Brit ish race , Even so , Svemr s Saga records tha t as la te as 1195 en voys were
sen t to
the
Scandinavian kings to req uest 1
,200
men for the Guard, while Villehardouin reco rds Danis h
as well as English gua rdsm en in 1204 . alongside o ther un it s co mposed o f men o f
many
nati on alities,
After the fall o f Constantinople to th e Franks in tha t yea r the Empire devolved into 3 pr inci pal sta tes,
Nicaea, Epirus and Tr ebizo nd , of which Nicat a ap pears to have inherited th e ma in rem nant s o f the
Imperial a rmy, Theodore 1I(1 254-1258) reo rganised the a
rmy
nucle us, now called the AlIaghio n or
T axis and at least 27 Allaghi;l strong by 1259 , unde r an officer called t he Archon , later t it led the
Megas Archo n. The Varangian s and Va
rdar
iots were the mainstay o f the Tax is while th e Lali niko n
and
Skyt
hikon were loose ly associated wit h it. Pseudo-Codin us reco rds th at af
te r
126 1 the full strength
o f the Taxis pro per was 6 ,000 men , co nsisti ng of 12 Allagh ia o f 500 men each, which woul d seem to
suggest that th e Vardar iots and Varangians probably numbered about 3,000 men each, By th is time the
Sc
andi
navian elemen t o f the la tt er had practically disappeared , an d in a doc umen t of 1272 Michael VIII
refers to the Varangians as Engfinvarrhangoi which , if it needs tran slatio n, is English Varangians ,
In o ther sources th e name is ab breviated to Englinoi , Englis
hme
n ,
One o f Theodor e s o ther r
ef
orms was a reduct ion of th e wages ami privileges gra nte d to Frankish
mercen aries, since he thought that the large-scale rel iance
on
foreigners was a princip al weak ness o f the
Byzanti ne army and had a prefe rence for native Gree k soldiers , Nevert heless, the Lat iniko n seems to
have bee n as strong a t th e end of his reign as it had been at the beginn ing, so his measures p
rob
ably had
lit t le o r no
ef
fec t. T he Fr an kish mercenar ies cons titu ting the Latinikon were chiefly drawn from the
Syrian crusader sta tes and Romania by this time and proba bly had been since the mid- l t century ),
though they also include d Sicilians, Italians, Venctians and Achaia n Fra nks. T heir co mmande r s t it le
had changed to Megas Konostahlos, Grand Constab le . und er Theodore though, like the earlier
Konostabl os, he was no t alwa ys himself a Fr an k - t he fu ture Emperor Michael VIII, fo r instance , held
the rank of Megas Konc stablos under Theodore.
The Sky
thiko
n now co nsisted chi efly of Cumans, recruited af ter 1241 from some 10 ,00 0 who had been
sett led on land-gran ts in Anatolia and Thrace .
of the m, toge the r wit h
other
regular mercenaries,
were detached to serve as garrison tro ops a t strategic poi nts or under provincial commanders, this
being particularly tr ue of the Cumans, and , earlier, t he Pech enegs, th ese o ften serving as a kind o f
pro vincial police, These de tac hed units were called Megalon Allaghia or St ra to peda and
the
ir o llicers
Stra topedarchs. Even th e Varangians appear to have some times bee n used in th is way , for de tachmen ts
are found at Kalaura in Thracc, Ctbe to t o n the Ana tolian coastlin e, and possibly even at Cherson in the
Crimea.
Th e irreg ular mercenary unit s
who
backed up the regula r field a
rmy
also contained large nu mbe rs of
Franks, T heodore t s a
rmy
of 2,000 men at Anlioch -in-Pisidia in 121 1, fo r ex
ample
, contained 800
Frankish merce naries, principally Italians. 3 years la te r, in 1214 , his a
rmy
is descr ibed as consist ing o f
Germans, Romanians , Armen ians and Turks , and his successor John III Vatatzes ( 1222-125 4) is recorded
to have em ployed particularly large numbers of Frankish mercenaries. T he Nicaean army at Pelagonia in
1259 included 300 German cavalry, 1,500 Hungarian cavalry, 600 , 1,000 or 5 ,000 Serbian cavalry
ap
par
ently
includin g horse-archers, probably Turks or Cum ans), 500-1,500 Turkish hor se-archers,
4,000 Cuman s an d Alans and an
unk
now n
numb
er o f Bulgarian horse-archer s,
One ear ly O
tt o
man source even reco rds Mongol au xiliaries in a Ntca can army defeated by Kai Khosrou
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o f Rum in the INOs. The Mongols somet imes supplied troops
dur
ing Michae l VIIl s reign as well, for
example in 128 1 when 4 ,000 were sen t to his assistance by the Golden Horde, while And ron ikos 11 was
promised 40,000 hy the Ilkhan Dljeitu in 1305. Pachymeres records that 20,000 of these actually
advanced as far as c onium, while in 1308 he records another 30 ,000 being sent into Bit hynia by the
IIkha n to reca ptu re certa in places recently seized from th e Byaan tines by the Turks. Even as late as 140 2
5,000 are reco rded figh ting for the Byzuntines agains t the Ottoman s,
Unde r Michael VIII
( 1259-1282 ) there was an increased intake of Turkish mercenaries, Michae l having
a minimum of 5,000 regula rs in his employ by 1262 , and Turks and Turco po uloi , bo th infantry and
cavalry, co ntinued to ll a major cleme nt in the army o f his so n
and
successor Andr on tkos
However,
the
most mcmorahle mercenaries o f Andro nikos reign were undoubtedly the Catatans and Almughavari
of Rogcr de Flor s Catalan Grand Company, whose caree r is desc ribed in detail in Appendix 2, In
addttion to thc T urks and Catalans the o ther principal mercenary elem ent s of his arm y an reco rded
hy Puchymcres as Gazmouloi. Cre tans and Alans, IQ.16,OOOof the la tte r being em ployed as lat e as 1302,
By the ea rly yea rs
of
t he 14 th c
entu
ry, however, continu
d financial di fficulties had necessi tated a
severe
cutb
ac k in military expendit ure, to th
point where , in
abo
ut 1 120, on ly by utilising increased
taxation revenue co uld Andru nikos env isage maintaining a stan ding army o f 3,000 cavalry , and even this
plan may never have been exe
cuted
. Of these 2,000 were 10 have been sta tio ned in Macedon ia and
Thracc and 1,000 in Buhynia. Possibly these re presen ted no more than elite or purely Gree k units, hut
all in all it is not surprising to find the 14 th cent ury historian Gregoras lamen ting t he sad sta te o f the
army, cal ling it the laughi ng stock o f the worl d
Prm incial
troop
s: Themata and Strarlotes
In additjon to the regular cen tra l army based in Consrantmople there were subsid iary armies scattere d
throughou
t the Emp ire s various provin ces.
Thc
s
semi-regular provincial troo ps, however, were usua lly
rclatively f
w
in numbe r and tu Iacc any larg
scale incursion it was necessary for the armies of several
provmces to be gathered into O 1l large force, of ten reinforced in add it io n by the ce ntral army and
laced with hbcral quanti t ies of mercenaries. However, it sho u ld he noted tha t mos t provincial t roo ps
contmucd to of native stoc k i cer tainly, despite the prcpondc rence of mercenaries , native
troops con tinued to serve in Byzant ine fo rces in large numbe rs, nota bly under Alexius I, Manuell
and lsaac
Even when the Asiatic provincial re
guncms
underwent a decline in the 1190s ;lI1<1 were
r
placed with en
nre
ty new and rigorously trained regimen ts
they
were recru ited aga in from tlre native
peasa nt-far mers. In me course
of
the
lJ th
cen tury many such provincial troops were drafted into the
regular army, not ably in the reign of Theodorc
11
Lascans . though by this t ime the distin ction between
central and provincial armies was hecoming sorn
what blurred, As early as Manucl
reign we even
find the ccnrral army itsel f being billeted t hroughout the provinces in winte r so as to ease the st rain on
the
l mperjal treusury, amI this pract ice appears to have persisted t
hro
ug
hout the
remainder o f this era.
Anothe r large pa rt o f
thc
Lmpire s provincial tr
oop
s was com prised of the con tin gents o f th e Dynatoi
and Archontcs.
t he
lando wning magnates, Even before Manzikert (and at the bau e itself) such noblemen
are to he found leading thcir personal re tinues in huttle, and after 1071 th is elemen t beca me prevalent ,
till old provincial levies
of
th e Themat a at
the same
t imc unde rgoing a dramatic decline in most pa rts
of till Empire. Thelast muster o f
the
Eastern Themuta was in 1073 , and the ease with which
thl ) were defea ted hy some 3,00 0 rebel Norman mercenartcs would indicate that they were inadequa te
in qualfty and few in number. Even so, evidenc suggests tha t the mili tary ohligarions of the Themata
confinued
to su rvive; certain ly when Andronikos I marched o n Constant inople in 1181 the hulk o f his
army composed o f the Thema tic forc es of Thracesion . Paphlagoniu and x tca a, while the militar)
Theme struc ture o f Chaldia.x-omplc te with its Banda o f semi-regu lar cavalry, survived right up to 146 1.
Aft er 1071, however. many native troops were being raised in ret urn fo r an alterna tive type of land-grunt
to mat
held
hy the Thematic farmers, This was the Pronoia ( lite rally Provisio n }, which may possibly
have or iginillly evolved from the Moslem iqta (see page 17) . Though it was then chiefly a civilia n
rhere is som evid nee of military service occasio nally being per formed in exchange for Pronoiai as
earl y as the mid -lOth ce
ntury.
and ce rtainly in the immedia te post-Manzikert era VII made
incrcaxing us. o f such grants to pay his troops, The main difference o f the Pronoia from the old
Thcmauc gran t
WJ S
that the
own
er of the latt er was a self-s
upp
orting farmer who rec ived his land
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as payment for pe rfo rmed milita ry service, while t fo rmer was an estate held by a q uasi-feu dal tenant
who performed mili tary service in exchange for the grant , wh ich was usually supplemented by paymen ts
in cash and/o r kind . But , unlike th e Th emat ic gra nt, th e Pronoia was not hereditable unt il the reign of
Michael VIII ( 1259-1282 ), usually being made only for a specific
numb
er
of
years (most co mmonly the
holder s life t ime). During that t ime the tax es and revenues o f the estate were payable to the hol der
ra ther than th e Imperial t reasury, while th e ho lder himself - know n eithe r as a Pro nc iarios or
Pronoet es or, more usually, a St ra tio tes ( S oldier ) · - paid no tax at all. Instead he was ob liged to
perform mou nted military service, almost certainly though this is a mu ch de bat ed po int) wit h a
pre
de t
ermi ned number of men in th e case o f the larger es tates - in the mid- 1
3t
h cent ury a Lomba rd
receiv ed the islan d of Euboea in exchange for th e service of himself and 200 knight s, bu t whether such
troops were ever obligato ry or merely rep resent the personal at tendan ts of the great er Stra tiotai is
unknown , Most Stratiotai, ho wever, ob viously would have held only small estates and served alo ne an d
in perso n,
Alt ho ugh some members o f such co ntingents as did follow the Strat io tai were pro bab ly simi larly
armou red an d equipped as heavy cavalry o thers were equally probably lighter-armed or served as
infantry ; cer ta inly as earl y as Alexius
l s
re ign church and mona ster y lands were o bliged 10 raise levies
of light infantry , and some lesser landown ers also appear to have served as infantry, tho ugh under wha t
o bligat io n is unclear (possib ly t hey were local T hematic tr oops), Cka rly, however , Pro noiai were
regarded principally as a source of heavy cavalry, and mo re and more Pronoiai were gra nted to this end
in the co urse o f th e 12t h cent ury, th e Su a
uota
t rapidly evo lving into a qua si-feu dal military aristocracy
as their numbers grew, In fact th e general resem blance
of
this sys te m to E
urope
an feudalism is striking
and becomes even more so when we learn th at by the beg inning o f the 13th ce nt ury at th e lat es t some
such land -gran ts were ac tually called Fters, and when the Fran ks con quered vast tract s of Byza nti ne
territory aft er 1204 they fou nd the exis ting co nditions of land-tenu re so similar to those of feudal
Eur ope th a tlit tle administ rative change ( in some cases
none
whatsoever] was necessa ry.
Unde r Man uel l Prono iai were first gran ted to half-barbarians , probab ly Curnan s or Turks in Byzantine
employ , tho ugh they had been used as pay ment fo r o ther mercenar ies, chiefly Franks such as the
Norman men tioned ab ove, even in th e 11th ce n tury and dur ing the 12th ce ntury had become the
generally acce pted mea ns of main tai ning th e regular army as well as provincial un its. In this form
Pronoia i survived right down to the fall of Constantinop le in 1453, alt hough - in total contradictio n
to the pu rpose for which they had been esta blished -
some
were rece iving exemp tion from the
ob ligati on of mil itary service by the middle to late-13 th century.
Likewise many o f t he remaining Themat ic soldiers cus tomari ly exempted themselves from service by
cas h paymen ts by th c end of the I I th century. However , as no ted above, such Thematic troo ps still
served in th e 13th ce
ntury,
some perf orm ing garrison
du t
ies in local fr
on t
ier for tresses unde r office rs
called T zaousioi and Kastro phy lakcs. These garrison
troo
ps incl uded foreign mercenari es as well as native
farmers, a ll bein g gran ted Pronoia i in the vicinity
of
whichever fortress they defended, These garrisons,
of
vital imp
or
ta nce in Anato lia, dec lined considerab ly
unde
r Andronikcs
at the very end
of
this era.
Unit Si ll
Although the old Byza ntine un it organisation described in Armies of the Dark Ages survived, by the
12t h ce nt u ry at the latest , and probably as early as th e late I l rh-century , the standard unit of the
Byzantine army consisted of some 300-500
men,
comparable to th e old Bandon or
l
agma but by thi s
later date generally called by th e name Allaghio n
this
term having clearly derived a new mean ing since
the days of Leo VI s Tucfica , when it hall referred
10
a unit
of
only 50 men ).
It
is logical to assume tha t
th e unit s strength was tec hnic ally 400 bUI, like the ear lier Bandon, this cou ld vary depending o n
wheth er th e uni t was und er or over th e o fficia l strengt h. ,\ t the siege of Constantinople in 1204, for
exam
ple, the French ch ronicle r Ro bcrt de Clari speaks of th e Byzar uines muste ring 17 b
aule
s fo r an
engagement hcfore the Palace of Blachemac ; of \) of these he says there was no on e o f these 9
Bat t les in wh ich t here were n
ot
3, 000 knights, o r 4 or 5 in some , and allowing for de Clan s tendency
This term, somewhat corrupted.up peurs in theWest in the 15th and 16th cen tunes as St radiot , the name under
which Albanians andGreeks served inVenetian employ after the fall of Const mtin ple in 1453 and subsequent
conquest of Albania by the Ottomans.
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tow ards exaggeration th ese b att les probably repr esent such units of
300
,
400
o r 500 cavalry.
Th e term Mo ira (a un it co nsisting of a number of Banda in the old system) is also s t ill used
occasio nally in t he sou rces (as are Bando n and Tagma) , bu t in general the Allaghion appears to have
now been th e largest unit ; for instance , a for ce o f 6,000 cavalry reco rded in 1263 includ ing a minimum
o f 1,500 Turk s was organised as 18 Ajlaghia. Smalle r un its of 40·6 0 and 100 men also ap pear to have
existed, pr
obab
ly indicating th at the AlIaghion was subdivided into 4 un its o f 100 (official stre ngth),
each o f .2 un it s o f 50 men. Th e smallest cavalry un it was st ill of 10 men . Infantry may st ill have been
org anised in 16-m3n sub-units .
It should also he no ted that un its of a ra the r mor e feudal characte r a re to be sometimes f
oun
d in th e
so urces. Cinnamus, for instance , records a reg iment under the
Emper
or Manuel
co
nsisting o f th ose
nearest him in blood ,
among
whom were many of his most int imate associates and those who had
wedde
d his sister s ; und ou btedl y th e Si
ll
o f such a un it wou ld, like its Frankish coun terpart, adhere to
no regula t ion standard what soever.
Servallb
Paid servants accompanied Hyzantinc soldiers now as in th e earlier pe riod . By th e 13t h century th ey are
generally refer red to as the T zoutoukon ae. Like thei r earlier co unte rparts th ey were on occasion expected
to righ t , as at Serr hac in 124(1, but they were ligh tly, if no t poorly, a rmed and probab ly served chiefly
as stingers and arc her s.
The Navy
As in the crus ader states of Palestine, Byzantine naval powe r throu gh
out
mo st o f this era depended
heavily o n the contingen ts of the Ita lian marit ime repu blics, particularly Venice and Genoa but also on
occasion Pisa , which served in exchange for pay and favourab le trading concessions with in the Emp ire,
v cncuan co lonists were presen t in Constan tinople from 1084, though t he Pisan and Genoese colonies
were onl y established in I1 II and 1155 respectively and on an inferi or scale. By 1171 there wcre some
20,000 v cneua ns settled wit hin t he Emp ire , 10 ,000 of them in Co nsta ntinople itsel f, whi le Bar Hcbraeus
reco rd s as many as .l O,OOO Frankish merchants ( probah ly chiefly Pisans and Genoese] in Constantino ple
o y 1204.
An agrccmcn t mad e wit h th e v enertans in 1187 is fair ly typical o f the arrangements by wh ich such
auxiliancs saved . By th e co nd it ions of this t reaty the republic o f Venice agreed to supply 40-100
galtey s equ ipped at the Emperor s expense, o n which 3
out
of every 4 Venetia n co lonists were to serve.
Th
e)
had thei r own officers, though these had to follow t he orders of the Byzan tine admiral. In
emergencies suc h as a sudden
at t
ack b) 40 or more
enemy
ships , in wh ich sit
ua t
ion no time would have
been available to await the ar rival of th e galley s from v cnic e. Yhc co lonists were o bliged to serve instead
on Byzan
tmc
ship s. O n ti ll co nclus ion of peace auxiliary galleys could re
turn
to Ven ice
bu t
had to be
k
ep i
ready for further service. By a lat er agreement
t he
Oenocsc. in exchange for th eir re-establis
hmen
t
in Galata in I
:: 6 (fo
llowing the recouqucst of Constantinople ) agreed to sup p ly 100 galleys
for
defe nsive
warf ar 50 of th cm man n and fully armed ,t hc o th r
SO
unmanned. In ad dition furt her galleys wer e
often hired
on
a purely mercenary basis.
Th e Byzantine navy proper co ntinued a steady d ...chne, The Themat ic flee ts and Imperial fleet were
combined
under
th e co mmand of a Mcgas n ux d uring the reign of Alext us I, but although the fleet
underwent a bri ef revival at this t ime even Alcxius found it ex pedient to emp loy Venenan ships and t heir
numbe rs stea dily increased un til th e mid- I cen tu ry , when Manuc11 temporarily rec tified th e balance
by co ns: ruct ing a fleet of considerable propor t ions: as many as 200 ships, including galleys and horse
transpor ts. are recor ded in 1109 , Qu itc what reso urce s Manue
employ
ed to mainla in th is fleet , however ,
is no t c1ca r, since it was dur ing his reign tha t many o f the coastal distr ic ts and island s exempted
the mselves from naval service by pay ments in rash. No t sur prisingly, the refore, the fleet declined again
under his successors so th at by 1196 only
30
galley s remained. w hen the flee t of the
Four
th Crusade
appeared before Constantinople in I 03 no t a single large ship remain
d serviceable in th e whole
Byzurnin e flee t, which by that time consisted o f o nly 20 wo rm-eaten hu lks, and the Dux -
when he did ap pear - was in command of a de tachment o f cavalry
l.vcn so. afl l r
Constanti
nop le fell the Nicacan Despot Thcodore I Lascaris is recorded to have possessed
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a fleet of 30 galleys as early as 1205 , In th e same year Leo Gaba las, the Despot of Rhodes, co uld
muster 20-30 galleys,
33
shi ps are recorded under the Nicaea n Megas Dux in [230 , an d 10 yea rs later
John
va
tatzes had
30
galleys .
The flee t had increased to some 80 galley s by 1283
whe
n, sho rt ly a
fter
his succession, And ron ikos
disband ed it al tog
eth
er, instead placi ng to tal reliance o n Genoese aux iliary vessels, 50-60 of t hese being
employed by 1291 . Thi s was principally a finan cial cutback which increased tax at ion reven ue was
int ended to recti fy c. 13 20 by th e establishm
en t
o f a Byz
antin
e fleet o f 20 galley s; however, thi s plan
may never have been carried out.
The Gazmouloi
These were ha lf-caste Franko-Greek s (o f Fra nk ish
fath
ers an d Greek m
oth
ers), regarded by th e
Byzuntines as part icu larly good soldiers because th e ir mixed blood gave them, acco rding to Pachymeres,
bot h the wild , reckless co urage of th e Franks and th e calculating cautio n of th e Byzant ines. Tog
eth
er
wit h th c Tzako nes (Pclo ponnesia ns - Pach vmeres plau sibly iden tifies th em wit h th e descend an ts of
the cla ssica l Laco nians, the Spar tuns) they supplied a large part of the Byzan tines naval man power.
Andronikos d isbanded th em when he ab olished the flee t, which was a mista ke since th ereaft er a
number of them took serv ice wit h the Emp ire s Fr ankish enemies, o thers even going over to the
Turks
In th e 13th cen tur y a large num ber o f pirates - par ticularly Genoese pira tes - also o perated under t he
Byzantine flag agains t t he Franks an d 2 succ essive Byzant ine Mcgas Duces of the last quarter of th e
cen tury ( Licario and John de 10 Cav
e)
were themselves co rsairs. (Som e Syrian and Romanian Franks
also employed pir ate ships, such as th e 15 in the pay of Gerard o f Sidon at the siege of Ascalon in
1153.)
G EORGIA
The sta te of Georgia, f
ound
ed th rough the union o f Abasgia and Ibe ria in 10 08
th
e name de rives not
f
rom
any special association with St George but rathe r from thei r Arab ic/P ersian name, Gurj o r Kurj ),
underwent mixed fortune s du ring this peri
od ,
growing to co nside rable dimension s b
efo
re being d
ef
eat ed
in 1221, and red uced to vassalage in 1239, by the Mongols. Tho ugh Chri st ians the Georgia ns had no
special liking for
the
Fran ks of O
ut r
emer,
bu t
th eir co un try was strategically situated on the flan k of the
Moslem world an d at leas t o ne Fr ankish writer, Anseau, observed that
t
he land and kingdom (of
Geo rgia) a re for us like a rampart against th e Medes and Persians.
A feu dal system, called Pat ro nqmoba, prevailed in Georgia from the 11th cen tury o nwards and mos t
Georgian armies were composed chie fly o f the feudal co ntingents o f the nobility. The ru ling class were
the Pa tro ni, comprised of Eristavt-Eristavni, who led th e provincia l co ntingen ts in wart ime under the ir
own ban ners : Eristavni, commanders of armie s , equivalent to the Byzan tine St rategoi; Dide bulni,
literally the Grea t , subj ec t to th e local Enstavt-Eristavi (n ot to the Ersitavi) ; Spasa lari (er. th e Arabic
Sipahsala r) ; Atassistavni, commanders of 1,000 (organisati on in Georgia was decimal) ; and Aznauri ,
the basic knightly class. Many az naur had thei r own fortresses (somet imes no more tha n a fort ified
house) , an d many install ed castellans, called Tsikistavni or heads of fortresses . Th ir f euda l
co nti ngents co nsisted of th e Qma ni, cl ien ts resident on th eir estate s,
num
ber s de pend ing on th
size of
the esta t e; those Qmani who served well were given their ow n lands an d improved st
atus
in retu rn. T he
elite troops we re those from the region of Kurutli, and
was from amon gst th ese that the king
maintained a per so nal cavalry r
etinu
e, a sort o f Familia, ap paren tly 200-s
trong
under King Dimitr i in
th e la te-13th century.
No regular
army
was formall y es tah lished unt il th e reign o f David 1I Aghmashenbeli ( 1089· 1125) who
recruited a stan ding arm y o f mercen aries from amongst the Kipchaks (Cumans) and Ossenans (Alans ).
The Kipchaks, settled in large numbers in de pop ulated parts of the kingdom, co uld muster 40 ,000
men on
deman
d, as well as an elite guard unit o f 5
,000
. In fact it was a new wave of these Kipchak
mercen aries who were largely respo nsible fo r Georgia s rapid, bu t sho rt-lived , growth to milit ary greatness
in the
lat e- Lj
th centu ry unde r Giorgi I11 ( 1156-1184 ) and the celebrated Queen Thamar ( 1184 -1213),
when they were led hy a cer lain Qubasar, In addition to these troo ps a la rge force o f regular , pa id
garrison troops was mainta ined in Tlffls, the capital, and in many provincial fortresses (David
maintain ed as many as 60,000 men in th is capacity , o f whom at least some if not the grea ter pr
opor
tion
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are ce r tain to have been foreign mercena ries.)
In fact most Georgian kings appear to have ma
inta
ined such foreig n troops, Bagra t IV
of
Karat li
1027- 1072) even havi ng a
co n
ti ngent o f 3 ,000 Varangians in his e
mp
loy {chief ly Russians
bu
t
possibly including some Scan dinavian s) , as to o did Queen Thamar. In addit ion to Osse ttans and
Kipchaks, David was even em ployi ng seve ra l hundred Frank ish me rce nary knights as ea rly as 112 1,
an d Selj uks and Turcomans were em p loyed o n
othe
r occasions. All suc h tr
oo
ps were
respo
nsible fo r
su pplying their own
ar m
our an d equi
pm e
nt.
A goo d idea of the mixed nat ure o f Georgian armies can be taken from an a
rm y
of 40
,000
reco rded
in 1228 to have co nsisted of
Georgian
s, Armenians from Greate r Armenia, no t Cilicia), vario us
n omads S erifs, Lesghs, Suans and J ikils) an d as many as 20 ,000 Kipchaks. An earlier army , in the reign
o f David , included only l OO Frank ish knight s bu t compensated with 5,
00 0
Alans and 15,0
00
Kipch a ks.
TH E MONGOLS
Mongol armies were or gan ised on a decimal basis. Marco Polo records th e largest un it as be ing the Tuk o f
10 0,000 men , but this was pr obably only tru e o f the eno rm ous multi-racial armie s o f Mongol China .
The standard un it was the Touman o f 10 ,
00 0
m
en ,
consist ing o f 10 Minghans
of
1,000. Each Minghan
also cal led a Ilaraza or, in on e early instan ce, a Guran) was of 10 Jaguns o f 100 men , and ea ch Jagun
of 10 Arbans of 10 men.
Th
e Arba n, the basic unit ,
co n
sisted
of
a nu
mbe
r of Yurts, each o f 1-3 men
with a family relationship,
an d
was
co
mm
anded
by an unr e la te d o ffice r called a Baa
tut or
Baga
lu r
).
2 o r mor e Toumans, usually 3, const itu ted an arm y an d
on
e of Ihe commanders was de signated th e
senio r ; he was accompanied by a great drum see note 62 in th e
dr
ess and equipmen t section) which
could
on
ly be sou
nde
d a t his com mand , when
was the signal to a tt ack .
Oth er officers were dra n from am ong th e Dark hat , a speci al cla ss of freemen, an d the Baatuts,
Ncy a ns and Nuk uts. all noblemen by bir th ; when th e Minghan units were first formally es tablished by
Genghis Khan in the ea rly-13 th century each was co m
manded
by a Noyan, though similar Thousand
un its called Gu rans
Rings
)
recorded in 1193 wer e c
omma
n
ded
by officers called Gu
rkhans
. By
th e
1
4t
h cent ury
th e
comma
nders
of Minghans
an d
Toum ans were mos tly prin ces
of
the Imperial family.
In addit ion there was wh at ca n hest he de scribed as a cent ral
co
rps of 9 staff o ffice rs called th e Or lok,
of h om S ub ut ai a nd M
ukuf
are probahly th e bes t-know n.
Military service was
du e
from every ab le-bod ied
man
between Ihe ages
of
14 and 61 , th ough th e Great
Vasa laws
of Genghis Khan say 20 an d over . A column of reinfo rcemen ts recorded in 123 5 certain ly
co nta ined ho ys of I 3-14 years o f age , though these may o nly have been part icip at ing in esc
ort
du ty as
par t o f th e ir t rai ning. On campaign each man was accom panied by a min im um of 2 or 3 horses , or on
occasio n as
man
y as 6 or 7; o ne version of Marco 1010 recor ds each Mo ngol o
wning
on average 18
horses
an d
mares. 4 horses
p er r id er
are reco rded in th e invasion
of
Khwarizmia in 12 19 and 5 for
th e
Ilkhan id a t t
ac k
on Syria in 1299. F ria r John de Pian o Carpini, who wrot e c. 12
46
, re
cords thal
if
possible a horse ridd en one day was no t again ridden fo r th e ne xt 3 or 4.
Guard smen and auxi liaries
In addi t ion to the line Touma ns there were auxiliaries
an d
the Keshik . The latt e r was a gua rd un it
which
only to ok
th e
field when the Kha n went on campaign. is fir st m
enti
oned in 120 3 when it
co nsisted o f 70 day g
uards
I
th e
Turghaut ), 80 night guard s
th e
Kabtau
t] ,
400
e li te ar
cher
s I th e
Khorchin
). und th e Ba
atut
or Bagatur , an e lite
o f
1,000 Warriors wh o formed th e adva nce guard in
bat tle . In 1206 the Keshik was incre ased to Touman strength, wit h Turghaut of 1,000 , Kah ta u t o f firs t
800 an d the n 1,000, Khorchin of 1,000 and an ad d iti onal 6 ,000 Baa tut . wh o remained junior to th e
original Baat ut Each o f
th e
se Keshik rode horses of unif
or
m colour ; th e B
aatut
horses were black
p
oss ib ly fo r all 7 Minghans). Kesh ik warr io rs were high er in
rank
tha n co mmanders
of
line Minghans, and n
on
-co
mbatant
s
atta
ched to the Keshik higher in rank than commanders
of
Jagu ns.
Auxiliary troops th e Cherig) included Russians, Baskirs, Vol ga Bulgars, Alans, Georgians, Armenians,
Kur ds, Turcorn ans, Cum ans, Ulgurs, Qa rluqs, Ju rchids, Qa
rakhi
ta i, Kalmuks Otra ts) ,
Tangut
s, Turks ,
Khwarizmians, Bedouin Arabs, Ind ians an d Chi nese; Ch inese tro
op
s firs t d efect ed to t he Mo ngo ls in
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12 14 and w
er
e mainly inf antr y - t h e fir st ti me the Mo ngols had used large n um be rs c f fo ot -soldiers.
Office rs of
t hese variou s natio nalit ies co u ld even be fo und as gene rals in Mo ngol armies - a Tan gut ,
for insta nce, co mma nded t he Mo ngo l fo rces wh ich cr ushed t he Ala ns in 1239 - bu t mo re of te n Mo ngol
o ffi cers co mmanded a uxiliar y t ro o ps a nd o rga nised the m in Mongo l fashio n.
Ho weve r, suc h auxilia ry co n ti nge nts, co nsist ing as t he y did o f peoples the Mongols had co nq uered ,
wer e no t t otally rel iable. Even Car pini reco rd s th is d isside nce , say ing th a t if a n op po rt un ity sho u ld
ever a rise a nd th ey co uld
be
sure t hat Iheir ene m ies would not k ill t hem, th e au xiliarie s would turn
on t he Mo ngo ls t hemselves a nd att ac k th e m mo re fierce ly t ha n even t he e nemy wou ld.
is no su r prise,
ther
ef
o re, that we so me t imes find t he Mo ngo ls disba nd ing o r d ist rib ut ing t hei r au xilia ry t roop s.
Some idea o f th e scale o n whic h au xiliaries wer e e mployed ma y be tak en
from
ar mies o pera ti ng in China
12 17
a nd
1225 ;
th e fo rm er co mp rised
10 ,000
O ngut s,
20-30 ,000
Qar a kh it ai, l u rchid s a nd Ch ine se,
a nd
50 ,000
Tangu ts, bu t o nly
13,000
Mo n go ls, w hile t he la tt er alt ho ugh co n ta ining a h igher pro po rti o n
of Mo ngo ls 80 ,000 in fact, t ho ugh so me o f t hese were pro ba bly T ur ks) also con ta ined 20.00 0
Ind ians, 30, 00 0 J et es and Cum ans, and 50,000 Kh war iz mian s. Bat
u s
arm y whic h in vaded Russia
in 123 6 was simi lar in pro po rt io ns, wit h 70- 100 ,00 0 T urks and o the r au xilia ries an d 50,000 Mongols.
Engineers
Mong o l engineers were lar gely d rawn fro m Arab, Kh warizmi a n o r Chinese au xilia ries an d p riso ne rs.
Ch inese e ngin eers wer e first emp lo yed in
12 11
and ap pear ed in la rge n u mbers by la te
1213,
wh ile as
many as
10,
00 0
are re pu te d to have acco mpa nied t he a rm y wbich invad ed Khwar izmia in
12 19.
Th ey were e m ploye d t o b uild siege equ ipme nt as an d w he n req uired ; a t t he siege of Nishap ur in I 22 1
t he Mo ngols engineers a re re puted to have cons truc ted as many as 3,000 Ballistae, 300 ca ta p ults, 7
00
na
ptha
-thrc wing e ngines an d 4 ,000 siege-ladde rs. In add itio n ligh t en gines might be d isma n t le d and
carr ied b y ca mels, ya ks a nd o xe n o n a ca mpa ign.
1,000 eng ineers fro m Asia Mino r e mployed by If ulagu in 1253 a re reco rd ed to have bee n me n sp ecially
t raine d in the use of napt ha a nd gren ade s. T here is t he possibilit y too th at th e Mo ngols ma y have even
used gu n po wde r, so me so urces sugges ti ng t he use of wha t may have bee n a crude mo rtar in 123 2, used
to d ischarge a t hu nd er bo mb , an iron vessel fi lled wit h gu npow d er , w hile Frankish chronicle rs spea k of
th e Mo ngo l ar tiller y barrage at t he Batt le o f Moh i in 1241 as b eing acco mpan ied by t
hunder
ou s noise
a nd flashes o f fire . Late r, in
th e
in vasions o f Ja pan in 1274 a nd 1281 , Fi re-barrels are reco rd ed , and in
o ne
of
t-re pro d uced illust rat io n fro m th e fam o us Mo ngo l Invasio n Scro ll o f
1293
what ca n on ly be
desc ribed as so me kind of explo din g bo mb is q uit e clea rly d ep ic ted. Per ha ps th e Fire-barrels were
pri mitive ca n no n, pe rha ps not , bu t it is wor t h no t ing t ha t Ch ine se so urces ce rtainly recor d t he inventio n
in 1259 of F ire-la nces , wh ich were bam boo t u b es fr om wh ich clu sters of pellets co uld be fire d by
gun po wde r 10 a range of so me
250
ya rds.
Tot al s tre ngth
When t hey werl: first crea ted in t he early -l J t h cen t ury th e re were 95 Mingha ns, t heo retically giving
95 ,000 me n, th o u gh o f th e co mma nde rs on ly 90 na mes ar e listed, a nd on e of t h ese is k no wn to have
bee n dea d at t his date so t hat t her e may have act ually bee n less t ha n 90 Minghans a t full st rengt h.
Th e IIkh a nid vizier an d histo ria n Rasch id ai-Din, who wro t e c. 1306, records t hat o n th e dea th o f
Gengh is Kha n in
122 7
t he a rm y co mprised
129,000
men ; t his co nsisted o f t he J u ngha r A rmy o f t he
Left Wing, or Ea st ) o f
62 ,00 0,
th e B
araun
g ha r Army
of
t he Righ t Win g, o r w es t} o f
38 ,000 ,
th e Kho l
Ar my o f t h e Ce n
tre,
th e Imper ial
Ordu
s ) o f 1,000 picke d men , 4 ,
00
0 gua rd s eac h for p rinc e s l uch i,
J agat ai , and Ogoda i
to
serve as t he nuclei o f t he ir o wn mult i-racia l armies) , a nd 16,00 0 guard s for
o t her m
embe
rs of th e Imper ial famrly. A varian t co py o f t h e same so urce gives a to t a l o f 230 ,000 , with
J unghar of 52
,000
, Baraunghar o f 4 7,000 , Khot o f 10 1,000 , Im perial Gu a rd o f 1.000,4 ,000 ea ch fo r
the 3 pr in ces, an d 17,000 guar ds for t he remainder o f th e fa mily . Bot h se ts o f figu res ar e sligh t ly
suspect - w her e, for insta nce, is t he Keshik, u nless o ne is to ta ke t he Kho l in th e form er an d th e Imperial
Gu ard in t he la tt e r as b eing mista kes fo r IO,O ?
Even so, o nly th e Mo ngo ls t h em selves are acco un ted for by t h ese figures. Raschid al-Din also records
t hat in t ime of war th e co u ld mu st er as ma ny as 1,400 ,000 men , whi le Khan O godai 1229 -1241)
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is claimed
10
have mainta ined 5 armies tot alling 1,500 ,000 me n, and if
they
are to be take n seriously
such figu res must represent levies of vast
number
s of subject peo ples an d aux ilia ries, in which case
contemporary remarks about th e legions o f th e Mongols, who exceeded locusts and ant s in numbe r
wou ld seem to be justified
ILKHANID PERSIA
The Mongol armies of the Ilkhanate of Persia (which was established in 1256) were a t first main tained
by trea sures looted from the preced ing adm inistra t ion ; by nom adi c grazi ng on
th e
available pas tu re
lan ds; an d by fo rced levies in cash and sometimes men from the exist ing populace. However , under
Ilkhan Gha zan ( 1296-1304 ) and the vizier Raschid al-D in it became ap parent
that
it was imprac tic al , if
no t impossible, to mai ntai n the army in this way any longer. Th erefore a system comparable to
th e
earlier
iq ta
was established, often even retaining t he
name iqta
but technically now called Suyurghal
o r T uyul de pendi ng on whe ther the gran t was hereditary or for the holder s lifet ime o nly; the so ldiers
had to support themselves from these grants. has been plausibly suggeste d that the term lqt a survived
in use for th e smaller bene fices held by the ind igenous Turkish and Persian peoples, whi le th e Mongol
terms were app lied to those lands held by Mongol soldiers.
However, except for an inc rease in the nu
mber
of Mon gol troops presen t, military organisat ion d id not
change d rastically from tha t which th e Seljuks had originally imposed , and Persians, Turks an d
Tu rcornans continued to play an importan t military role . Add it ional elements of the army were supplied
by Kurds, Geo rgians and Armenians am ongst o thers. Cilicia n Armen ia and the Frank ish pri ncipality of
Ant ioch bo th paid t
ribute
to , and were ers twhile allies of,
th e
Mongols from 1246.
On e
intere sting co ntinuat ion of Selju k pract ice which deserves men tion was the emp loyment of Frankish
mer ce naries. The mid- 13th century t raveller Simon de Saint-Que nti n records th at th e Mongo ls were so
impressed by the figh ting spirit of those Franks they encounte red du ring their co nquests
that
they
for bade the pri nces and kings of vassal states to employ th em th ereaft er, though they employed small
numbers th emselves - for example Ilkhan Arghun had at lea st 900 in his em p loy in 1290, and a
co mpany of Frankish crossbowrnen was presen t a t th e
khanid siege of Hera t in 130 7.
As with othe r Mongo l sta tes, huge arm ies arc claimed fo r the llkhanate. In 1299 Ghazan is supposed to
have mustered 100,000 men for a campaign aga inst Mamluk Sy ria, and th is represe nted only half his
avai labl e forces , while xtarco Polo report s th at in 126 1 Hulagu was ab le to raise 30
0 0
00 .
T he Ilkha nate itself lasted only unt il 1354 , though its power de clined drastically aft er the
deat
h of the
last legitima te Ilkhan in 133 5.
TACTICAL METHODS
FRANKS AND MOSLEMS
Strate gy
For the Fra nks, stra tegy largely involved defend ing their conq uests, by the building and hold ing o f
for tresses and, in t ime o f war, th e posi tioning of f ield armies where th ey co uld pro tect th e largest
amount of agr icultural land and th e mos t towns, for t resses and roads, their primary fu nction be ing to
interfe re with any Moslem att em pt to tak e a Frankish fort ress. But at the same time these armies were
usually only create d by draw ing from th e garr iso ns o f the local fort resses (usually near ly th eir tot al
strength - ju st 2 sick men were lef t in Faba when its
Templar
garri so n rod e to des tructio n at Cresson
in 1187), so th e defeat of a field army could mean th e almos t inevitab le loss of several cast les.
It was therefore preferable to de fea t the enemy by stra tegy ra ther than bail ie , as in Count Roger of
Ant ioch s ca mpaign of 1115, Baldwin IV s ca mpaign of 1 182, an d th e bailli Guy de Lusignan s Jezreel
campaign of 1183 ; Guy , now king, was a ttempting to pursue this same pol icy in 1187 b
ef
ore he
succumbed to the ill-advice of Ger ard de Rid
ef
or l and led his army to des tructio n at Ha
lt
in . ( Hatlin
is in fac t a classic example of th e dangers of drawing on for tress garri sons to make up a field
army
.
Most of the kingd
om
s castles and wa lled t
owns
had been denuded of th eir
de f
en ders fo r th e campaign,
and the destruct ion o f th e Frank ish army resulted in most of th e king
do m
fa lling into Moslem hands
with in th e next 2 m
on t
hs.)
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Saracen str a tegy was
there
fore ob vious - 10 defea t the Fra n kish field a
rmy
, the n red uce the ir thinly
de
fended
cas tles and f
ort
ified to wns. T he disadv
antag
es, ho wever, wer e t hat b ringing
the
F ranks 10
battl
e a nd red ucing their fo r ls cou ld be l ime-consumi ng, and if Mosle m ar mies had o ne major short
co mi ng tr was t h eir inab ili ty t o remain in the field fo r pro lo nged periods. Th ey tended to dis perse o f
Ih eir o w n a cco rd if d isaffect ed as wa s o fte n the ca se ) o r u na bl e to ac hieve milita ry success, pa rticular ly
at t he o nse t o f wint er, the a pp roach o f cold , wet weather usually re su lt ing in t he dispersal o f Mosle m
ar mies. T he F ra nks, th eref or e, had to tr y a nd o utlast t he Mo slem s in t he field , th us forestalling a ny
cha nce o f military success an d by their ve ry p resen ce hast en ing t he d ispersal o f th e Mosle m
army
.
Ta
ct i
cs
Though t he t act ics of the Fra nks in a set-p iece b
attle
in O ut remer were similar to t ho se e mployed in
Europe a nd described in A rmies of F eud a l Europe , c hma xing in the delivery of t he knights decis ive
dose-order c harge, th e ir famous char ge t ha t co uld make a ho le t h rough the wa lls o f Ha hylon , such
tactics co uld only he emp lo yed successfu lly against an enemy w ho wo uld stand and t ak e its full imp ac t.
And a las, in t h is the majo rit y o f Mo slem ar mies o f this era , being largely o f T ur k ish c o m posit ion, did
not o blige. Neverthel ess
unde
r favo u rable ci rcums tan ces F ran kish kn igh ts co u ld ma noe u vre the ene my
into a sit uat ion in wh ich it was
impo
ssib le tp evad e t he cha rge as a t Ars
ou f
in I l l) I I, and o n
occ
as io n
eve n th e T ur ks mig h t
decide
o f t heir own a c
cord
to st and u p to it,
desp
it e t he fac t th a t man for ma n
t hey were no ma tch fo r th e F ran ks in d ose co mba t.
Usuall y , ho wever , t he
Tu
r ks preferred to ma ke t he best possible use o f t hei r principal
advantages
o ver
t he Fra nks - t h ei r a rchery and t he ir mo bilit y. Ho rse-a rchers, o f c o urse, were t he backbone o f all T ur kish
a rmies. in Syria just as mu ch as in Cen tral Asia. an d t he F ra n kish c h ronicles of t his e ra are full o f
refere nces to the effect s of t hei r llrche rY
t
heir sho wer s o f a rrow s wh ich fe ll J
S
t hou gh ra in was Ialfin g
f ro m t he sky.' When t he first ra nk had q u it e em p t ied th ei r q uivers a nd
sho
t all their arro ws, wri tes
Willia m of T yre o f till. Ba t t fe of Dor ylae u m 1097 ). the second , in whi c h t her e we re stil l mo re ho rsemen .
ca me on an d began to sho o t
mO
H densely t han
one
co uld belie ve. T he T ur k ish sq uad ro ns a t o nce fl u ng
the mselves up o n o ur a rmy, and loos cd such a q ua n ti ty o f arrows Iha t yo u wo uld have
though
t ha il
was fall ing from
t he air ; hard ly ha d t he firs t cloud o f the m fallen , de scri bing an ar c, th an it was
fo llo wed b y a second, no less de nse. Suc h a h igh ra te o f fire co uld he mai n tained , in fa ct, t hat Amb ro ise
repo rt ed o f King Ric hard s advance to Arso uf in II I I t hat t here was no t as mu ch as 4 feet o f groun d
t o be found t ha t was entirely Ircc o f spen t arr ow
s,
On e of th e Fra n kish deau a t Ager Sang uinu s in
1 1 19 had as many J S
4 0
arro ws in him, lh n al-Qalanisi reporting o f t he sam e ba tt le t ha t t he re wer e
'd e
ad ho rse s b rist ling like hedge hogs w ith
the
arr ow s st ic king o u t o f t he m, an d more t ha n a ce n tu ry
late r a t El Ma nsu rah J o inville t ho ugh t himself an d his hor se fo rtun a te t o have been wo unded by
arro ws only 5 an d 15 l imes res pectively.
At t he sam e tim e, howeve r, t he effect iveness o f Tur kish arc hery should no t ll o veresti mate d: duri ng
t he w hole 4
\ :z
mo n th siege o f T yre in I
II
1 th e Fr a nks lo st o nly 1 .0
00
men acc o rd ing 10 l bn al-Qalanisi,
despite the fact tha t he repo r ts the Mos le m garrison which was. ad mitt ed ly , far fr o m e xclusively
T ur kish in co mpo sition ) t o have disc harg ed
20.000
arro ws in o ne day s fighti ng alone A nd it s hould
also he bo rne in mind t hat T urkish a rro ws were relatively ligh t a nd co u ld stri ke - a nd perhaps penetra te
ar
rnnu
rv even sim ple q uilted arm o ur , with o ut ac t ually wound ing the wea rer: at Arsouf, fo r e xa mple,
F rank ish infa n t ry a re re
corde
d
Be ha cd- Din mar c hing along
uncon
cernedly w ith up to 10 arr o ws
st uck in th e ir
armo
ur, th ou gh
the
ca use fo r t his was of t e n tha t t he
arro
ws wer e to o ligh t and
sho
t a t
too gr
ea t
a ra nge several sou rces ref er to t he asto nishi ng range fro m wh ich T u rks so met imes o pened
fire and lat er test s rep
orted
hy Sir Ralp h Pay ne-Ge uwey reco rd T ur kish bo ws bein g able to fir e up 10
4 0 ya rd s - t ho ugh a t anything mu ch o ver 10 0 yar d s it s penetrative valu e was mu ch red uced ). T he
so urces im ply th a t a t closer r an ge th eir a rro ws became fa r more e ffective, A nna Co mnen a for instance
rec o rd i ng th a l th ey co uld pass d ea n th rough I n u narmou red ma n.
• To mainlain such
ithen njl: rates or fire il was obviously to ensure lhat sufficient ammunition Won
available, Each man carried at Ieasl one and often 2 013qu ivers, each capable or containing up 1060 arrowsf othcr
arrows could
he
carried in the
how
case, sluffed into
bou
ts 01 hell, and 5<1 on.
l i
tlle information i available
replenishingempty quivers on the ball lelidd . but al ll alt in Saladm 3ppalent had 70 camels b den
ith arrows,
as wellas 400 loadsof spare ammunitton for them.
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lnevitahly such arc hery was particular ly effective against unarm
ou r
ed horses. and th e Turks were well
aware o f th e im
porta
nt ro le o f ho rses in Fr ankish tacti cs (writing of Hattin , Abu Shamah obse rved
ho w
th e Frank ish knig ht s o lon g as his ho rse is safe and so und, cannot he felled but as soo n as
th e
horse is killed the knig ht is throw n down and captured ). Imad ad-Din reco rds the heavy toll th e Turkish
arrows too k o f the Pranks horse s that da y , hardly any of the thousands tha t were presen t being left
alive.
was for th is reason. jo prot ect the knights horses un t il the momen t of th e charge, that Frankish
infan t ry usually preceded the cavalry, defending the knight s like a watt as Beha puts it ; lmad
to o
USl S
a similar expression , de scr ibing Fra nkish infan try as a wall of arms . At Jaff a in 1191 Richard formed
up his infa ntry with spearrnen in th e first rank, shields to the fronl and spear-bu
tt s
braced agains t the
ground , wi th : crossbow-armed men behind eac h of th em (on e loading,
on e
firing ), a veri table wall o f
arms indeed. o ne wit h which o n that occasion th e
Turk
s re fused to
dose
. Louis IX s infa ntr y
em p loyed much the same forma tion whi lst holding the beac hhead at Dami
ella
in 1249 , hut in hot h
sit uations Ihe Franks wen: unden iably on the defensive. More usually they seem 10 have formed up in
line in rela tively d ose or de r probably several ranks deep , those armed with bows and crossbows
(const ituting a large percentage o f Frankish infan try) usually to the fore so
tha t
they co uld r
et u
rn
the fire
of
th e Turks, who soon learnt a hea lth y respect for th e crossbow in particular ; indeed , the
presence of crossbow-armed infan t ry in Fran kish armies may have been t he pr incipal reason why Turkish
ho rse-archer s often opened fire at such long range that th eir ar row s hall litt le rea l hope of penetr at ing
arm our.
William
of
Tyre, in his account of th e Bat tle of Mar; es-Safar in 1126, in fac t c redi t s Frankish infantr y,
presumably archers , with the same tactic as the Tu rk s in that they turned their
attentio
n to wounding
the horses of their adve rsaries and th us rendered t he riders easy victims to the Ch rist ians (Le . th e
knights) who were following: In the same accou nt he also gives a good descr ipt ion of th e rol e of
infant ry in close co mbat , relating how they ins tantly des patched wit h the swo rd any wou nded o r
fallen infidel who m they chanced to find and thu s prevented all possibility of esca pe. They lift ed up
those (o f th eir own cavalry) wh o had been thrown down and restored the m to the fray . They sen t
the wounded back to th e baggage train to receive care. (At th e same ba il i e we also have
on e
of th e few
refe ren ces to Tu rk ish infant ry in action , Fulcher of Chartres describing Damascen e inf
an t
ry tr ained
to spring up armed hehind the ho rsemen, who when the enem y dr ew nea r descended and fough t on
foo t ; fo r so th ey hoped to d isorder the Fra nks hy attacking them with infantry o n the o ne side and
cavalry on th e o ther. )
But in addi tion to th eir a rchery th Turk s had a seco nd major tactical advant age over th e Fr anks in th eir
mobi lity . which enable d them to evade the Frankish charge and successfu lly employ hit-and-ru n
skirmishing tactics. Bu t above all it enabled them to att ack th e Fran ks on the march, showering their
co lumns with arrows, suddenly closing an d as suddenly falling bac k, and harassing in every way th e
a rmy s advance . Attack ed thus the Fr anks had no real o ptio n but to press resol utely o n, relying on t heir
solid ity of arm y to deter the Turks, kee ping together so closely that if an ap p le had bee n th row n amongst
th em, it wou ld no t have fallen to the gr
ound
with
ou t l t
o uching a man or a hor
se.
The infantry
marched on
th e
outside of the co lumn o r o n the Ilank nearest to the enemy, those in th e rear (aga inst
which most a ttacks wer e d irected ) of te n having to march backwards in order to bea t o ff
th e
re peated
T urkish at tack s, the cavalry conforming their ow n pace to th at of th e infan tr y tha t the ranks might
not be broken and th e enemy given a chance to break in upon the formation . Often , in fact , the infantry
even carried
th e
ir own dead on camels and pack-horses as th ey ma rched , so as to conce
a lt
he number
o f casualt ies from the enemy.
As ment ioned the Turk s co ncentrated o n the rea rguard whe n atta ck ing a Frankish co lumn, in the hope
that it would lie slowed down sufficiently to cause a gap be tween it and the main body , which could
then he ex ploi ted (as happened at Mount Cadmos in 1148 and near ly happened at Halt in in 1187).
Heavy att acks were also oft en made on the vanguard in th e h
op e
that the whole co lumn might thu s be
hatr ed. Often they would also make short , co ntrolled charges in th e ho pe tha t, in th e wo rds of Abu
Shamah. jhe Franks wou ld he ca rr ied away b) blind fury and would attac k us and in this way would
give us the o pportunity to d ivide and break their mass. Con centrate d ar chery co uld likewise goad
Frankish knights into an impe
tuous
counteratt ac k, as it did at Arsou f in Il q I. The Franks , however,
learnt in turn to tr y and co ntro l the ir coun tera ttacks, the kn ights charging ou t onl y to dr ive the enemy
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away to a safe d i
stan
ce if he came too clos e, b
ef
or e rallying an d faUing bac k to
the
main co lumn Lth
...
author of the It inera rium like ns th is to bea ting off a ny which, though yo u may drive it off, will re tur n
dir ect ly you cease your ef for ts ). 0
1
0 o f Deuil, a par ticipant in Lou is VII s c rusade , gives a good
de scri ption of the organ isation of a Fr an kish co lumn o n th e march which includes all these poi nt s:
Becau se the Turks were quick to flee o ur men were commanded to endure. un ti l
they
received an orde r,
th e a t tacks of t heir ene mies; and to wit hdraw for thwit h when recalled
• .
. When th ey had learned th is,
they were also taught the order of march so th a t a person in fro nt wou ld not ru sh to the rea r and th e
guards o n the Ilan ks would not fall into disorde r. Mo reover those whom nature o r fo r tu ne had made
foot-so ld iers
were dra wn up at th e rear in order to o ppose with their bows
the
ene my s
ar r
ows.
In fact severe penalties awaite d any man who broke ranks. Exa mples of
battl
es fo ugh t on th
mu ch
incl ude Il ab ( I I 19) , Mo unt C
adm
os ( 114
8)
, Il att in (1 18 7) and Arsouf
I
191).
Because of th eir military prowess th e co nti ngents of the Milita ry Orders usually held the dangerou s
stat ions of vanguard and rearguard o n the march , being the best disc iplined troops available to th e Fran ks;
Iacq ues de Vitr y relates how they fought no t rashly or disorderly but wisely and wit h all cau
no
n , be ing
th e first to a t tac k and the last to ret reat . They were no t a llowed to turn their backs and nee , nor to
re tr eat wit h
out
orders. One car tula ry o f the 13t h cent u ry ac tu ally sta tes that it was customary fo r the
Ord ers to ho ld th e vanguard an d rearguar d positio ns, and certain ly th e pract ice was common enough
for the Mamluk Sultan Haiha rs to march out o n on e occasion with ca ptured Hospitalle r and Templar
banners in th e van in orde r to foo l the Fr anks. Examples of the practice to be found in co ntemporary
sources include Templars holding the van a t Mou nt Cadmos a nd, with the Hospitallers, th e rear at
lIa t t in ; Hospitallers the fear and Templars th e van at Arsouf and in Galilee in 1204 ; and Ilospita llers
the van a t Carou bher in 1266 . This custom may also be imp lied in de Vit ry s wo rds about the bre thre n
be
ing the first to attack and the last to ret reat .
Th e other principal use to which the T urks put the ir mobility was in feigning fl ight , still a chara
cte
ristic
Turkish tactic. The feigned n ight co uld assume one o f 3 differ
en t
forms , e ithe r a steady re treat lasting
several days, desig ned to weary th e enemy an d dr aw him away fro m his bases; as bai t for a pre-arranged
ambush : or as deliberate provocation in the hope that the enemy wou ld throw cautio n to the wind and
charge in pursuit , thus disrupting his forma tion. Examples of th e feigned flight in pract ice includ ...
lIarr an 1104), Sennabra 1113), Harim (1 164 ), al-Babein J 167) and Gal a 1239 ). The Franks too
seem to have occasionally employed th is ruse, Tancred apparently feigning nigh t at Ar tah in I 105, while
W
i Ii
am o f Tyre describes in de tail how Baldwin
11
successfully employed th is tact ic agains t the Fat imids
at Ascalon in 1125 in conjunction wit h a concealed
amb
ush, de spatching a decoy
body
o f tight-
armed horsemen to lure the Moslems in to his trap.
These light-armed horsemen may have bee n
Tur
copoles, sometimes used in a light cavalry role by t he
Fra nks. At least, th ey seem to have o ften preceded the knights; at
Sar
min in I
S, for example, and at
Ager Sanguinus in 1119, we find them in advance of th e knight s, on the former occasion at leas t
fighting as horse-archers, b
UI
in bo th instances the y app ear to have been pushed o nto the knights beh ind
th em . Even th e Livre au Ro i seems to imply that they were c
usto
marily placed in fro nt o f th e knight s,
sta ting tha t the Const able s t roo p held th e firs t place in
batt
le af ter th e Tur copoles. Another occ asion
on which they are rec
orded
being em ployed as horse-arche rs in a skirmishing role takes place during the
Th ird Crusade, when King Richard se nt his archers forward in th e van wi th th e Turco po les and
crossbowme n, to sk irmi sh with the Turks and str ive to press them till he co u ld arrive. Undoubtedly
the re arc o ther unrecorded occasions too o n whic h th e Turco poles fought as horse-archers, bu t this
aspect sh
oul
d not be overemphasised ; the infreq uency with which it does occ ur in the sources tends to
suggest tha t th ey were no t par t icular ly effective in this role
th
ough he does not record how
they
fought , WiJliam of Tyre wri tes of the Tu rcopolc s at al-Babein in 1167 th at they were fo r the most
part , useless - probably as a result of Fran kish misuse rath er than mili ta ry incompetence ). is quite
proba ble th at instead they of ten fought alongside the Frankish knight s and sergeants. They are also
occ asio nally recor ded in a reco nnaissa nce role (as, fo r ex amp le, in th e Rule of the Order of t he Temple).
• In fact in reality kni
j:h
ts of the . ilitary Orders could be just as
ilful and headstrong as their secular counterparts,
if nol moreso:
.....
Itness, for example, the actions of the Templars at Marj Ayyun (1179), Cresscn (1187) and El
(1250), and of the ltospitaJlers at Arscur. But, it should be noted, in all but the last of these instances the)
ere foUo
.....
in/l lhe orders of theirGrand Masters,
.....
hile the Hospitallers at Anouf
.....
ere following the example of
their Marshal.
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Though so far only Turkish tac tics
have:
been de scribed , it should nol be assu med tha t all Moslem armies
fo ughl in the same way , h
cr
se-arcbers. skirmishing tactics and the fe igned flight . The Arabs o f
Faumi
d Egyp l employed none of these, though small numbers of all ied or mercenary Turkish ho rse
archers Vtry oc casio nally appear in thei r armies (as at Ramla in II OS). Instead th ey fo ught with sword.
mace and couched la nce ver y much like the Franks. Usamah (him Cl( a Syrian rather Ihan Egypt ian
Arabl descrihing in detail how the lance should be held to best ef fect in th e ch arge, held by the rider
as tightly as possible with his
hand
and under his arm, close 10 his side. and (h e] should let his horse
run an d d fect the required
thru
st : Their a r
chers
were infanlry ra the r than horsemen , su pp lied ma inly
by Suda nese ghulams; like the archers o f
the
Franks these usu ally preceded
the
cava
hy
in
batt
le.
Earlier sou rces record that th ey were expert marksmen .
Ibn Khaldun slales Ihal the Faurruds employed principal formations in bat t le , th ese be ing the Persian
la ct ic o f aJv ancing in line in organised divisions, and the Bedouln or Berber ta ct ic o f altackini l in sma ll,
d iso
rp
nised gro ups . and he observes t
ha t
rhe Persian
method
was
the
more sur e o f victory in be ing
welt-organised an d a s impregnab le as a co ntinuous stone wall o r a strongly
cons
t ruc ted f
ort
: As
already men tioned , archers formed the firs t rank, with spearme n in th e second and cavalry in th e th ird,
el
ue
units usuall) f
orm
ing th e cen
tr e
, where th e arm y s main standards flew ; th e density of th e
formation de pended on th e strength of th e ene my . S
ometim
es numerical superiority p
ermut
ed an out
flanking moveme
nt,
and Bedo ums are o ften encoun tered in
this
role .
For a set-piece bat tle the Ayy uhid s and
m
used
iI
very sim ilar formation, bUI usuall y with
out
the
inf
antr
y, Th ey drew up in
J
div isi
ons
, co nsisting of centre, left
and
rig
ht,
still with the elite
units and
standards in the cen t r e (usually th e al-H abqa and ror Royal \lamluks, with the amirs co ntingents on the
flank s). The in add ition placed
aux
iliaries o n th e
extr
eme wings, usually Bedouins o n
one
wing and Turcomans on the o ther, tn ba
ute
it was n
ot
unc
omm
on fo r one wing or bo th to give way.
victors and vanqu ished dashing from the fiel d in pur su it o r rou t an d leaving th e ce n tre to resolve th e
batt le (lhis occ urred at Acre in I 1IN and at 1I0ms in I for exa mple},
Skirmish
C
rs usually preced
l1
Ihe ma in
e )
o f ca valry.
either
Turcomans or th e hes t mark
smen
. Imad
dC
S4:Tl
h
inl -
how at Hat tin Saladin p icked o ut the adva nce guar d o f archers from each c
omp
any. while a t
Arso uf th e Frankish sou rces record Iighl cavalr y coming down at us in fu ll charge and hur ling da rts and
arrows as fast JS co uld whil e th e well-ordered phalanxes of the Turks with ensigns fixed on th eir
lances were d rawn up
beyon
d Ihem. Infantry si ill somet imes preceded
the
cava lry , bu t und er
the
m
th ey wer e ext remc ly
unc
ommon except in s ieges and the themselves rarely . if ever.
Iough t o n foo l. (As early as
1 1 1 ~
Ihe t
nn
era
nu
m re
co r
ds the following alleged deb
ate
be tween some of
SalaJi n s mamluks and Kurd ish soldiers: T he Kurds said. You mamluks will have to go on root to
sieze
the
king and his peopl e, while we keep wat ch o n horsebac k 10 cut off th eir nigh t towar d s Ihe
ca
mp.
BUI the mamluks answered . It is
rathe
r yo u r business to go o n foot. fo r we are noble r
than
you.
We arc co nte nt
w t
Ihat kind o f warfa re ..... hich rightl y be longs 10 U5. Th is foo t service is your co ncern. )
E BYZANTINES
When Emperor
, u e l
over the Imperial of fice , he became co ncerned as 10 how the Romans Le
th Byu nlines) mighl improve their armament for th e fut ure , It had previously bee n customary for
th em to be a
rml d with rou nd shields and fo r the most part 10 carry qu ivers and de cide ba ttles by
bows. Such are lhe words of the chronicle r Ctnnamus in the 12t h century. Indeed
the
bow had always
hcc n, a
ndev
en af h r Manud s reforms wou ld co ntinue to be, a principal rect or in Byzantine tac tics ,
bo th in the hands o f native tro
op
s and - mor e especially - in (he hands of thei r Asiat ic mercenari es.
Byz
ant
ine
app
r cia tion o f th e bow as a major weapon .l
Olle
d hack many cen tu ries, even as far back as
rh days o f the Roman Emp ire , and co nstant co nfl ict with armies comprised chiefly o f swa rms of light
horse-archer s over th e following cen turies had repe a tedly served to confirm its Impor tance in warfare .
Horse-a rche rs in particular there fo re played an imp ortanl role in Byzant ine tact ics now as earlier. and
t hrou ghou t the co urse o f the CrusaJ C era large co ntmgent s o f horse -archers appear in every Byzant ine
army that is recor ded, pr incipally supplied by auxiliaries o f T urkish extracuon (Uzes. Sel
juks
•
• p r i s i such Turkish ilu\ ilurirs were usuaUy t \ uemely relbble - lM Pechc: nep al Manziktrl. (or eum ple,
remainedloyal tven in
~ u
and e often enroenter ( uman, in Byzanline
SL rvK e
f i P 1 l aJainu barbarian
( uma n\. S
ndle
u 10 say, however,
dC wn
ion lare somelimes recorded.
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Pec he negs, Bulgars, Hungarians, Cumuns, even Mongols, also Alans and Georgi:ms) but also , unul the
thir d
quart
er o f th e 12th ce ntury. incl uding nat ives.
Their ma in ro le o n the ba ttle ficld was as skirmishcrs, in which ca pacity we o fte n find Ihem utilising
Iheir t radit i
on
al Turkish tact ics o f harassme nt , feigned fligh t and ambush as de sc ribed o n page 38. And
like t he Turks, the Byzanti nes too soo n came to ap preciate the import ance of the horse in Fr
anki
sh
tactics, co ncen l rat ing their fi re on the knights' m
ou
nt s; the Alexiad o f Anna Com ncna rec ords how in
1083 Alex tus I ordered his tr
oo
ps {apparently cavalry , hUI possibly foo l-so ldiers ) ' to dr ive hard on the
heels o f ( the Fra nk s) . • , but nOI to figh t at
clo
se-quar ter s; they were to sh
oo
t grea l num bers o f a rrows
from a di stan ce and at the horses rathe r than the riders. Catc hing up with th e Kd ts (i .e
lh
e Fr an ks) ,
therefore, they rained down arrows on their mounts and thus co mpletely upset the ride rs.' Even in the
1
3th
century, a t Pelagonia, the Byzanti nes' Tu rk ish aux iliaries were ordered to s
hoo
t do wn the Frank ish
h
or
ses, a
co
ntempo ra ry record ing how they 'slaughtered thei r steeds and won the batt le'
Again st Turkish armies suc h tact ics inevit ably met wit h less success, the
Tur
ks in turn freque ntly
co ncent ra t ing th eir own fire on the horses o f th eir Byz
an t
ine adversa ries; Nicc
phor
os Breyen nius, in his
Commen tarii, d escrib es how at Manzike rt in 10 71 o ne of Alp Arslan' s commanders
o
rde red his men
10
surr ound the Byzan t ines
and
discha rge a ra in o f a rro ws agains t th em from all sides. The Byzan t ines,
see ing their horses struc k by arro ws, were forced to
pur
sue th e Turks .
bu t th ey suffered heavily
when they fe ll in lo ambu shes and Iraps.' And of an earlier
camp
aign All a liates reco rds how Pechc neg
hor se-archer s 'pa nic ked th e ho rses o f th eir adv ersaries by th e w
ou
nd s tha t they inflic ted and
fo rced th e Byzan t ines 10 flee ignominious
ly.
It
was in t he ho pe of red ucing th e effect s of suc h tactics
tha t Alc xius evolved a new format ion, whic h is u nsuccessfu lly desc ribed in th e Alexiad as having ' th e
ranks so orga nised that th e Turks wo uld have to s
hoo
t f rom th eir right a t the R
om
an lef t , wh ich was
pr
ot
ec ted by t he shie ld;
the
Romans, on th e
co
nt ra ry w
ou l
d s
hoo
t left -handed at the Turkish evposed
righ t ; perhaps a line angled away from the Tu rkish formation is i
nte
nded, bu t it is unfo r
tunately
impossible to be sure.
Another form ation adopted in th e face of a Tur kish arm y was
the
close-order
co
lumn alread y desc ribed
as used by th e Franks, and in fac t it was pro bably th e Emperor Alex ius who f irst taught the Fra nks
of th is tac tic, as ea rly as 1096 (a t least , Anna tells us tha t he told them 'h ow to draw up a ba ttle-line,
how 10 lay ambushes' and ' no t to pursue far when the enemy ra n away in flighl' ). The Atextad has
left us with a good descripti on of such a co lumn as em ployed in the Philomelio n
camp
aign of 1116,
de scribing how
the
Byzantincs 'ma rched in a d isciplined way, keeping in ste p 10 the sound of the
flut e In fact th e scrricd ranks
of
close-locked shields and ma rching men gave the imp ression o f
immovable mo unt ains; an d when th ey changed di rec tio n th e whole body moved like o ne huge beas t,
anima ted and direct ed by o ne single mind
The return jo urney was made slowly
and at
an ant' s
pace, so to speak, with the capt ives, women and childre n, an d all the
boo
ty in th e
cen
tre of the
column.
(11 is also interesting to no te th at the T ur ks' reac tio n to this fo rmat ion was Ihe same as if it had been a
Frankish co lumn, co ncent rati ng their a tt acks o n the reargua rd and vang uard and skirmishing along the
flan ks.]
However, the typ ical Byzant ine ba
ttle
array remained a series of successive lines, some times as many as
4 bu t m
ore
usually 2 or perhaps 3. Th e first line was frequent ly comp rised of the weaker or least reliable
co nt ingents, presumably in the ho pe th at th ey w
ould
successfully disorgan ise the
ene
my whi le at the
same
time
absorbing the impact o f his initia l charge (partic ularly important when fighting Frank s,
whose first charge was recognised by th e Byzanti ncs as po tent ially 'i rresistible' ). T he second line had
the
task of reinforcing the firs t if necessary and of fru st ra ting enemy att emp ts a t outflanking, t hereby
pro tec t ing the first line's rear . Skirrnishcrs
Le
ho rse-archers usually preceded the a rm y and /or were
pos
itioned o n the flank s (de tachments some times being concealed far o ut o n o ne or e th e r fla nk, as
at Kalau ra in 1078 ), but they ca n also be fou nd fo rm ing the seco nd, th ird or even the four th line ; at
Durazzo in 108 1, fo r instan ce. we f ind the v ardarlo ts ta regiment
of
Turksl forming the second line,
be hind th e Varangians, th e commande r o f the latt er being inst ructed ' to o pen his ranks q uic kly fo r
th em ( by moving to
left
and right) whenever they wan ted to charge out againsl th e Keus: an d to clos e
ran ks again and ma rch in close
ord
e r whe n they had with drawn .' Skirmishe-s ope ratin g in advance
of
the
main arm y generally wit hdr ew thu s when thr eatened
th
ough usually th ey took refuge beh ind lance-armed
cavalry
rath
er th an infantry; al ternatively they sometimes scatt ered to lef t and right in tb e fa ce of an
enemy charge , e nci rcling his fla nks in the process. The lancers themselves advanced in close o rder,
4 1
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appa ren fly charging wit h the lance couched ( th ough it was see mingly on ly un de r the
Em p
er o r Nan uet
th at Byzanti ne cavalry fir st 'excelled the meu te of Fren chmen
an d
Italians' in this fo rm o f co mbat -
not
that this
s
topped
a
13th
ce nt ury Fr
an k
describing a single Fr
anki
sh kn ig
hl
as wor th
Byzant ines ).
O th
er w
ise fo rma
ti o
ns and tact ics appear to have d iffered litt le fro m those described in
A rm
ies o f
the (l ar k Ages' . l he role
of
th e infa
ntry
having c
ha n
ged
on
ly in
beco
ming per
haps
even
more
seco
nda ry.
THE MO
l
GOLS
T he tactics o f
th e
Mo ngols or
T
ar t
a rs' as mediaeval Fr ankish
authors
ca lled
th e
m)
wen
sim ila r
to
those
o f the l urLs, havi ng Ihe ir
orig
in in
th e same steppe
tr adit ions. Like
th e
Turks th ey relied
primarily
o n
Ihe ir m
ohiht)
·
and th e
use o f
th e bo w
,
many
so urces tesl ifying 10
their
sk ill in a
rchery
- Frede
nck 11
des..ri bed th em ;u 'mcomparable
archers
' , whi le Marco Polo 5.1ys Iha l th ey wer e '
th e
best
th a
t ar e kn
ow n
10
th e
world.
,h with
Ihe Turks, their m
obility de m
on
strated
itself bes t in the feigned flight . 'Whe n they
a re p ursu ed
a nd t ak e
to night say s Polo , ' they fight as well
an d
as effectively.u when
they
are face 10
face
wi th the
en
emy
, When
they
are fleeing at top
speed
,
they
tw i
st ro und
w it h t he ir b ow s
and sh
oo t
their
.
UTO
W so
ef f
ectiv<ly
t ha t th ey
kill the enemy' s ho rses
an d
their
riders to o
, (
And)
When
t he e ne my
th
inks
th at he
has routed ..nd
cr u
shed
them ,
th
en he is los l ,
f
o r) as so on as the T
ar t
a rs de
cide
t ha t t he y
have killed
en
ough
of
th e pu
r
suing horses and
ho
rsemen th
ey
wheel round an d
a t ta ck .' The Armenian histor ian
Hair ho n,
wh o
wr
ot e
c ,
13 0
7, likewise cautions tha t
i t
is v
er y dangerous
to
give chase. fo r as they flee
they
sh oo t
back
over their
h ea ds a nd
do much executio n u
po n their pursuer
l. The fligh t WOlS
also
used
as bait for an ambush .
T ht )·
drew
up o n
the hattlefield
wi
th units o f
100
t.e. Ja
gu ns )
separat d
from each o t her by i
nt e
rvals .
Each
Unit drew up in S r
an k
s in d ose o rder, Ha
ithon
reco rd ing how
they
kept
very close
ran ks. so that
yo u wou ld
no t take them
for half
their
real
numbers
: In theory the
front
1 ranks wo re ar
mour
(a nd
wer e pr('sumably m
ou n te d on ar m ou
red ho rses
when
ava ilable ) wh ile the laner 3
wore
no armour.
Th e
ligh l cava lr)- of
th e
rear 3 ran ks ad vanced th r
ough th e inte
rvals o ne ra nk at a
time
and po
ured
a hail of
a
IT
OWS
an d
javelins in to the en
my
while at
th e
same t ime ei ther
on e
or
bo th
Mongol
flan
ks
would
commence
an env
el o
ping
manoeu
vre. If the light cava
lr y
wer e repu lsed then
th e
y would fa ll back
tfiringallthe
while}
an d th e f
ourth
ra nk ,
then th e
fiflh,
would
co me fo rwa rd in turn
an d
carry
on where
the o thers
ha d
le ft off ; bUI if
th
ey wer e successful in disorganising th e
...
nemy
then
t hey w
ould
wuhd
raw th rough th e in tervals and m e heavy cavalr)'
of
th
e first 2 ranks would lead a fr
ont
al a -1ult
B)'
t tu n
e , wh
et h
er the sk irmishing tacti cs had
been
suc
cessf
ul or no
tv
th e en
velop
ment of
th
e enemy
flanks was u\;uall)' comp lete too . and a feigned fligh t migh t be used to d raw an incautious en emy
de e
p...r wi
thin
t he
en c
ircli ng wings tCarpini pro ba bly ha d
th i
s in mind when he wrote
that
t he ligh t
cavalry fi red only 3 or 4 rou nds, an d th en feigned fl ight if
their
ar ch ery was ineffective. Polo. however .
spea ks o f
th e
ar
ch e
rs e
mp t
)'ing t hei r
qu i
vers). Vic to ry was alw
ay s
foll owed up by a tireless pursui t.
The ...nvelopment movement was
often
co ncea led fr om th e enem y by hills, du s
tcloud
s, da rkness, e tc.
Ca rpini reco rds t
ha l
t h enveloping tro ops
us u
ally comprised th e Mongols them selves, auxiliary t ro
op
s
gene rally Io rming a sc r n in advance of Ihe ce
nt r
... of their ma in line o f ba ttle . Mall hew Paris simi larly
rec
or
ds
th e
au ,
i1ia
ti
...
s' ro le in b
attl
e, r
elatin
g how the Mongols co mpelled them, ' reduced to the lowest
co
ndition o f slav
l
rY. lo figh t in the fore most ranks again s their own ne ig
hbours. Howeve r.T he
more
reliable of th
...
m
pr
inci pally the Geo rgians and Cilician Arm
...
nians] are o ft en to
be
fo und fo rm ing
on e
o r
bo th fla nks of t he main
bo dy
alo ngside th e Mongo ls, As well as th e scree n o f a
ux i
liaries the ma in b
ody
was also preceded by Mo ngol skir mishe rs. ca lled m e Mangudai or 'God -be loning' (w hich s
ay s
so me thing
for thei r ch
an c
es of surviva l ).
Very
O :C as
ionally so me Mo ngo ls
might
be fou nd fi
ghti
ng on foot . usually if
thei
r horses we re in poor
co ndi
ti o
n or if they felt tha t circ umsr
an c
...s or the na
tu r
e of the around were un suitable for mo
un t
ed
comba t . At Wadi al-Khaaindar [Salamiye t} in 1299 so me 10,
00 0
Mo nguls s
to o
d behind
their
horses
an d
• The c;arnailew,ouJt 'hen 2 \Io
rijli
ol armies fought
ilh each o ther u, inil these tae, in can be imagtned. · S OIa.
you can 'I(' (' an.... .-, nymF like peltinFrain, for the sky •
...
as fuUof them,'
riles Polo, 'and you could IC e hor ICmen
and hor
SCI
tumblinFdead upon the Jl
Ollnd
:
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poured volle ys of arr ows into the charging Mamlu ks, so tha t whe n those who had remained moun ted
counte r-charged th e Mamluk line o f bat tle was in co nsiderab le diso rde r. lIait hon slates t hat t he Mongols
were slow when on fool .
In add ition to their standard Asiat ic ta
ct i
cs
the
Mongols also had a formidable ar senal of asso rt ed tric ks
and de ceptions which could best be classif ied as psychological war fare. These incl uded tying branches
to th e tails of their horses an d raising grea t clouds o f dust in their wake 1 decei ve the enemy into
Ihinking th at Mongol reinforcemen ts were arri ving, an d even m
ou
nting their wom en - in addit ion 1
stuffed dumm ies - o n spa re horses 1 give the impression of a huge reserve force, as Ihey di d in Khwarizmia
in 122 1 ( the Mongols customarily
maintaining a
rese rve whenever possible). Anothe r such st ratagem was
1 put sto ries around which deli bera tely infla ted th e actual Sill o f th eir a rmy ; fo r example Mongke Khan,
invad ing part o f the Sung Emp ire in 1258 , spread
rum
ours tha t he led an army o f 100,000 men, when in
ract
he had o nly 40 ,000 . Leaving moun tain s o f skulls heaped here and
the re
in th e course
of
th eir
co nquests, as a warning to others, also falls into th e psychological warfare catego ry
Frank
s against Mongols
Th
is is based on the advice of a shrewd o bserver, Fr iar J
ohn
de PIan o Carpin i, to the rulers of the West ,
co ntained in a repo r t wrilten aft er a long sojourn amongst th e Mongols in the m id-13th cen tury
To start with he stresses th e importance
of
good
qual ity
arm s and equ ipm
en t
, pa r
ticu
larly recommending
good sl rong bows and cross bows, which he says the Mongols
part icularly
fea r, Ihe arrows for these to be
manufact ured Mongo l-fashio n so that t hey are sharp enough to pie rce their stronges t armou r. Il l a lso
especia lly recommends long-handled axes, plus lances with a ho
ok
below t hc head for dragging the
Mongols from their saddles, fo r the y fall o ff very eas ily bUI he cautio ns against ignor ing dismounted
Mongols since th ey shoot as acc ura tely and rapidly o n foot as
on
horseback (wit ness Vochan in 1272
and Salamiyet in 12( 9).
Armour should co nsist of double-mail, which arr ows from Mongol bows co uld not casi ly pierce , plus a
helmet an d an y o ther available armour. Where possible hor ses to o should be pro tec ted against the Mongol
arro ws. Una rmoured o r less-heavily equipped men are adv ised
1
fo llow the Mongo l practice o f fo rming
th e hind ran ks and should shoot overhead. But
nowhere
is Piano Car pin i s respect of Mongo l military
sk ill more
appa
rent than in his recomm
end
ation s for organisation , what fo llows
being
no more th an
imi tat ion w t uni ls of 1 000 , 100 and 10 o rgan ised in th e same mann er as the Tar tar army.
The battlefield needed to be carefully chose n, pre ferably a level plain whe re eve rything was clear ly
visible on all sides; if a site co uld be fo und whe re flanks or rea r co uld be protec ted by a forest or s imila r
all the bet te r, The ta ctics the n given are again emu la tion of the Mongols. li e adv ises tha t the army should
draw up in several lines, positioned not too far apar t, on ly th e firs t of which should be sent for ward
to
meet
the ap proaching Mongo ls. the Mongols feigned night th ey were on ly 10 be pursued with
cautio n since an ambush would und
oub
t
edly
have been prepared he forehand. An
oth
er reason fo r
cautio n was the need to avoid ti r ing th e horses, since Frank ish arm ies did not main ta in th e large
numbers of remounts available to the Mongols. The seco nd line shou ld meanw hile stand by to help the
first if needed .
Following advice on co nstant vigilance ,
mainte
nance o f the army over a p rolonged period, a nd the
advantages o f a scorched ear th p olicy (since Mongol arm ies ex isted by foraging),
Car
pini s last
recommenda tio n is tha t th e infid elity of th e Mongo ls au xilia ry a llies
sho
uld be exploited, since if
the
opp
ortun ity should arise and they could co unt o n our men no t to kill them , they would figh t
against the Tartars . and wou ld do them greater harm even th an would those who are the ir enemie s.
MA
JOR
BATILES OF THE PERIOD
MANZIKERT 1071
Taking advan tage o f a Seijuk attack against Fat rrnid-held Damascus and Egyp t , th e Byzan tine Emp
ero
r
Rornanus IV prepa red an o ffe nsive against recen tly lost Byzan tine territories in th eir rear. He assernbled a
huge bu t ill-t rained an d ill-discipli ned a
rmy
of 200-600,000 men inclu ding most of the Western and all of
the Eastern Themata , Varangian Guards and the Tagmata, as well as Russians, Uzcs. Khazars, Alans,
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Cumans. I·cchcncgs, Bufgars. Crirnea n Goth s, Armenians and Franks (mainly No
rman
s and
Germans}.Of the total, however , the largest percent age were englnccrs, servants and attendan ts for the
vast
Alp Arslan , the SdJuk Sultan, learning
of
the Byzant ine advan ce into Armen ia as he was encamped
heron. Aleppa , orde red an immedia te with drawa l from Syria . On reaching Mosul he received news from
Scljuk refugees that a de tac hmen t of Romanus army, a large force of Franki sh and Tu rkish mercenaries
under Rou ssel de Bailleul, was lay ing waste the region
round
Manzikert and Akh lat , and he now set o ut
northwards to interce pt them, sendi ng So
undaq
th e
Tur
k ahead with a fo rce
of abo
u t 5,000 cavalry
to reinforce Akhlat. Alp Arslan himself was at firs t accompanied by o nly his 4
,000
perso nal marnluks
since his sca ttered arm y had no t reasscrnbtcd, bu t he issued o rders fo r tr
oops
10 joi n him on the march
and in additio n hired some 10,000 local Kurdish tribesmen.
Romanus. hy now fore
arned of the Sult
an
s ap
pro
ach, despat ched 20 ,000 Cuman or Russian heavy
cavalry und er Josc ph Turchunio tes to assist Rou ssel s Franks and Turks
app
roaching Akhlat, while the
rest of the army took Manziker t, Soo n after, o n August 16 , Soundaq arrived o n the scene and a fierce
ski rmish ensued between the Sefjuks and 2 bodies o f Byzant ine troops und er Nlccphoros Bry
cnn
ius
and Basila kes: weigh t of
numb
ers eventually forced the Sel
juk
s back but
the
Byzantmcs, incau tiou sly
pursuing them, suffered heavy losses when they rallied, Basilakes being captured and Bryennius
w
ounded
. At abou t the same time Ro ussel and Tarchanio tes, also having suf fered heavy losses, and
receiving news that Alp Arslan himself was now close by, wit hd rew to Mehtene.
On hearing of the de feat o f his foremost units Rom anus marshalled the main army and marched out
for bat tle, bu t by th is t ime the Sejjuks had melted away and were nowhere to be seen. The arm y
therefore returned to camp and an an xious night was spent unde r the watchful eyes o f th e Seliuk s. who
had se t up their own camp 3 milt s away,
Romanus must have been aware by now that Alp Arslan himself had arrived with the main Selju k army ,
ut he was probab ly equally aware tha t this army was numerica lly inferior to his own - th e lowest
to ta l gsven in the is 12,000 ; lbn al-Athir says 15,000, UI the higher figures o f 30-40,000 seem
more probable. However, Romanus own army was not as large as it had been at the outset o f the
campaign, and probably now num bered o nly abou t I00 ,000 men of whom many were
non -om batants.
J exI mo rning Alp Arslan made an offer of peace, which was co ntemptuously rejected - since
wou ld
be financially
impo
ssible for the Empire to raise a similar army again for some time to come Romanus
had little choice hut to force a decisive sol u tion t here and then . In addi t ion it was likely
that
Alp
Arstan s proposa l was onl y in ten ded as a delay ing tactic while more t roops co uld be gathered. Therefore,
ignoring
the
advice o f his ncrats, Romanus decided 10 commit the army to bail ie on August 19.
On the day of bat t te the Byzanunes formed up in their customary 2 lines, with Tugmara in the cen tre
and Them atic t roops and Turkish auxiliaries on bo t h flank s of the first line, The reserve line, comprised
of Archontes. the Hetacna and Ge rman and
Norman
mercenaries, was put under the command of a
cert a in Andr oniko s Ducas, a nephew o f the previous Emperor and therefor e no friend o f Roma nus: thi s
factor was go ing to prove decisive. Rcussel and Tarchaniotes. meanwhile, had no t re turned.
The Byzantine advance across the pla in o f Manztkcn towar ds Alp Arslan s
camp
met with litt le
resi
stan
ce except fo r skirmishes on the ext reme flanks, which lacked an) kind o f security in the o pen.
The hul k o f the Sdju k arm) , however, stead ily withd rew before them , drawing them on un tilla te in the
da r they reached the Su lta n s camp-site , on ly to find it abandoned. Romanus, possibly fearin g an
am bush, therefor e resolved to re tur n to his own u
ndef
ended camp and gave the order to retire, tu rning
the Imperial standard to wards the rear.
The
order, however , was misunderstood and gaps
appe
ared
between ce
ntre
and flank s as un its turned thi s way and that in c
onfu
sion . Simu ltaneou sly , Andronikos
Ducas treacherously pu t a
bout
a rumour that Roma nus had bee n kill ed and, as chaos reigned in the
Byzantine ranks, Alp Arslan charged do wn on them with 10 ,000 fres h Seljuk cavalry,
A rout ensued, the Byzunfines believing
the
mselves be t rayed by eithe r their Armenian or Turkish
auxiliaries thou gh the latt er in fact rema ined lo yal to the end). The Byzantine right and lef t wings
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were swe pt away , while And ronikos, who migh t have st
saved
the
day , ca lmly ma rc hed fro m the field
with
the
desperately needed reserve line. On ly
the
ce nt re unde r Rom a nus s
too
d and foug ht o n, unt il
the Empero r wa s recognised a mid st his Vara ngian Guard s a nd cap tured by a Se l
juk
ma mluk. Af ter
suffering a ppa lling losses th e remainder of t he army t hen bro ke, pursu it of its sca tt ered units
co ntin uing th ro ugh th e ni
ght
Th e subsequent Se lj uk co nq uest o f t he Anatolian hear tland o f t he Empire had two imp
or tan t
result s:
it led ultima tel y to the found
ation
of a new Seljuk state , aptly ca lled t he Sultana te o f Rum - litera lly
t he Sulta nate o f Ro man Lands; and , even more impo rt an tly , it was respo nsib le fo r t he Cru sade mo vemen t,
fo r in Weste rn Eu ropean eyes the Byzantin es had , in Sir Stev en Runcim a n s wo rds, forfe it e d o n t he
ba ttlefield the ir tit le as protectors of Chri stendom . Man zikert j ustifi ed the interventio n o f th e West.
L UR 1078
In co m mand of an Imperial army , th e fu
ture
Byzantine Emperor Alexiu s I Comne nu s faced t he rebel
Dux o f Dyrrac hium, Niceph
oro
s Bryen nius, at Ka la u ra in T hrace.
Whe n Bryenn ius dr ew up his army he plac e d a de tachme nt o f Pecheneg light cavalry ab
ou t
a
qua
rter
of a mile awa y o n his le ft fla nk with o rders t o a
ttac
k Alexius forces in
the
rea r and gene rally harrass
th em while the
main a rmy advanced sh ie ld to shie ld. Alexius likewise t hrew
ou t
a de tached flank unit,
concealing it in ravines on his le ft with o rders to fall on the rebel rear as
soo
n as Bryenniu s had
adva nced pa st
th ei r po sitio n. Th e bulk o f his ar my , which was inferior to t ha t
of
Brye nniu s, co nsisted
o f t he newly-raise d Immor t als a nd Chom at
cno
i and a few Frankish and Seljuk mercena ries.
His attack on th e re bel rear a nd righ t flank met with on ly initial success and was soo n repulsed , while
in th e cen tre the Frankish mercenarie s dese rt ed to Bryennius a nd the Immortals bega n to give way .
Almost sim ultaneously the Seljuks and Choma teno i on Alexius righ t flank were rou t ed by the Pec he neg
detachment. Fortuna t ely, however, Ale xius himse lf ma naged to capture Bry ennius spare ho rse,
ma naging t o ra lly ma ny o f his tro op s by spreading a rumo ur t h at Bryennius himself had bee n taken.
Even
so,
the bat t le was still very much in Bryenni us favour - despite th e fact that the Peche negs,
having sa tisfied t hem selves with loot in part a t least from Bryennius o wn cam p, had no w lost interest
in th e fight ing and were headi ng for h
ome
.
At this poin t Alexius was joined by a fresh body of Seljuk rein fo rc
eme
nts, and wit h a detachm ent of
t hese an d a ra llied po rti o n o f his o wn arm y he co unt er-attack
ed,
t he n feigned fligh t a nd drew
the
overconfide nt re bels bac k t o where two o t her bodies o f Seljuks had bee n placed in a mbu sh. Disorganised
in pursu it and a tta ck ed fro m bo th sides the re bel ar my was routed , Bryen nius himse lf being captured
by the Selju ks.
D
UR ZZO
1081
A Byza ntine army of 70 000 men und er t he Em pero r Alex ius I
att
e mp ted 10 relieve t he co asta l city of
Oyrra chium Our
azzo , un der siege by a n l talo -No rman army of 15 18 000 men , includ ing Italians,
Saracens, Greeks and Balka n Slavs, unde r Rober t Guiscard an d his so n Bohemo nd of Taran to. Th e
Byzant
ine force incl ude d household troo ps, som e
Franki
sh me rcenaries, T hessalia n cavalry , Serbs
und er King Co nsta ntine Bodin, Macedon ian Slavs, Vardari ot s and Vara ngians. Alexius di vided his army
in tw o, half t o stan d before th e No rm an
c
amp
and half 10 tak e a rout e th ro ugh
the
co astal marshes
and attack th em from th e rear.
Th e No rmans, seeing o nly t he half to t heir fron t , abandoned Ihe ir ca m p a nd formed u p fo r battle, thei r
right flank pro tec ted by
the
sea and th eir left by high gro und . Atextus then arra nge d his forces in 3 lines,
with the Varangia n Gu ard a nd o the r Varang ian unit s som e of the m Engl ish) f
orm
in g the vanguard, t he
Vardario t ho rse-arc he rs be hind th em , and t hen t he main bod y under Alexiu s.
T he first No rma n a
ttack
was launched by Italian cavalry unde r
Amaury
of Bad . T hese were re pu lsed by
the Varangia ns, wh o in their e nthusiasm t he n marc hed to o far from the main bo d y and wer e cut o ff by
Bo he mo nd s left wing wh eeling against them. His crossbo wme n a nd knig ht s, the l at te r
800
strong, all
but wiped t he m ou t , man y of the survivors being burnt in the small churc h of St Michael wh ere t hey had
taken refuge.
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The mai n Norm an b
ody
th en charged and smashed the Byzantin e line. In the cen tre the Vardario ts
broke and fled and the Serbs deser ted without jo ining battle. The remainder of the Byzantines were
then pu t to flight and
the
ir camp cap tured. Wounded and alone, Alexius only just escaped the close
Norman pu rsuit. A sortie from the cit y was also repulsed.
As f w as 30 of the 1.300 Norman knights were killed , though Amau ry s Italian division suffered
co nsidera ble losses. The Byzant ines lost 5-6.000 , most ly vara ngians. Dyrrachium surre ndered to Robert
4 months later , in February 1082 , aft er a 3-day st ree t fight following the adm ission o f the Nor mans into
the city by a Venetian t raitor.
LEVUNIUM 1091
A combined fo rce of Byzan tines under Alexius I and 40,000 Cumans under Tugor khan and Bonyak
faced a superior Pecheneg army .
Despite distrust be tween the allies, the Pechencgs were routed by th e Cuman and Byza ntine cavalry
and forced back agains t their own wagon laager which effec tively blocked their line o f ret reat . Unable
to escape, many were massacred toge th er with their wom en and children wit hin the laager. Large
numbers of prisoners were ta ken, but these were slaughte red almost to a man during the night by
the ir Byzant ine guards through fear th at ei the r they might break loose or that the Cuman s might
release t hem. The Cumans, likewise distru sting the Byzantin es, took to
the
ir heel s under cover o f
darkncss.
DORYLAEUM 1097
After the ca pture o f Nicaea durin g the First Crusade the Franks divided their forces into 2 columns,
the firs t o f which was att acked soo n aft er by a supe rior Seljuk force allegedly 150-350,000 strong under
Sultan Kith Arslan includ ing Caooadoc lan and Danishmanid conti ngents under their em irs.
The Frankish co mmander, Prince Bohemond o f Taranto, at first
orde
red his knight s to di smo un t and
assist the foo t-soldiers and non-combatants in pitching camp, bu t before the task was completed it
proved necessary for the knigh ts to remou nt and ride out against the Turk s, leaving the infan try to
comp lete the prepara tion of the camp-site. However , the arche ry and mobility of the Turks, atta cking
from all sides,
soo
n force d the Frankish cavalry to fall bac k ben
eath
a hail of arrows. u nti l knigh ts.
cam p, foot -soldiers and pilgrims became one confused, tangled mass in which some knights were killed
by the spears of th eir own infa ntry . But in fact
cro
wding together thus actually saved them , for in such
a tight ly packed fo rmation the Seljuk s found it impossible to destro y them and co uld o nly att ack
ind
cislvcly.
Eventually, af ter abou t 3 hou rs o f fight ing, as Bohemond was beginning to despair o f his situation, the
seco nd crusader col umn unde r Cou nt Raymond de Saint-Gilles began to arrive on the field, surprising
Kihj Au lan who had been under the imp ression that he had surro unded the en tire Frankish army. As
the Seljuks hesitated and faltered in the ir a tta ck a further detach ment fro m the relief division, under
the Papal Legate Adhemar le Puy, appeared in their rear, and at this they panicked and fled , abandoning
their own cam p to the Franks.
The crusaders had suffered abou t 4 ,000 casualties. and the Turks allegedly as many as
30
000 The
losses of the f
orm
er wen somewhat highe r in horses tha n in men, mo st of whom were amongst the foo t
so ldiers and non-comba tants.
ANTlOCH 1098
The crusaders under Prince Bohemond , having just ca ptured Antioch but being numerically unable to
defe nd the walls, decide d to marc h o ut into the o pen to face 12-28,000 or according to som e sources
150-400.000 ) Seljuks and Ara bs, including 28 senior Turkish ami rs. unde r Kerbogha o f Mosul, who had
arr ived
too
late 10 relieve the Selju k garrison 10,
000
of whom had bee n massacred by the crusaders
after
the
fall o f the ci
ty
.
The Franks left the city by a single gate in a co lum n of 4 divisions, each of infantry and cava lry the
lat ter pe rhaps tot alling only 1,050 men I, the fou rt h co mprised mostly of dismoun te d knigh ts acting as
a reserve under Bohernond himsel f; ot her sources record the Franks to have been organised in to be tween
6 and 13 divisions. Their plan was to secu re their lef t flank on high ground abou t 2 miles fro m the city
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wa lls before ad vanci ng a gainst the T urks, who were masse d o n t heir right fla nk. Ker bogha, watching
them
depl
oy , see ms to have de liber a tely allowed the ir whole army to eme rge fro m Ant ioch rat her than
laun ch a pre ma tu re a
ttac k, presumably to e nsure t ha t his victory over t he m wo uld be as co mp lete as
possible. How ever, he did des
pat
ch one body o f 1,500 or 15,000
Tur
ks to c ut ac ross the hea d of th e
Frank ish co lumn and get be hind t heir line o f batt le bef or e t he lead ing di visio n succe eded in secu ring
t he a r my s flan k; th ese did co nside ra ble da mage before, see ing t he withdrawal o f the main Seljuk ar my
in t he face o f an attack in eche lon by t he Frankish divisions, a nd suffering a t t he hand s of a det a ch men t
from th e F rankish reserve, t hey bro ke a nd fled .
A shar p melee fo llo wed t he adva nce of th e Frankish d ivisio ns, with heavy losse s being sust a ine d by bo t h
sides, unt il the T urks, suffe ri ng as t he y wer e fro m disse nsio n a mo ngst th eir co mman de rs who rese nt ed
Ker bogha ), d isillusio ned by t he dese rt io n of a la rge co ntingent of T urc oman au xiliaries, a nd find ing
th em selves un a ble to o u t flank their adversa ries, bega n a re treat wh ich s teadily de teriora ted into a ro ut.
T he Franki sh pur suit wa s o nly slight ly hindered whe n the Se ljuks fired th e dr y grass to co ver t heir
with dra wal, t he crusad er horse s a ppa rent ly sta mping out t he flames as th ey adva nced. Th ey pursue d
th e rou ted T urks as far as t he Iro n Bridge acro ss t he River O ro n t es . slayi ng grea t numbers o f
them
a nd
in ad dit io n ma ny more T urks were later killed
of f
by loc al Arme nia ns a nd Syrian Christi a ns. Kerbogha
himself esca ped t o Mosul, his po wer and repu t at ion rui ne d.
A so rt ie by t he re mnants of t he Selju k garriso n of Antioc h, still hol ed u p in t he cit ad el, wa s co ntai ned
by an infantr y holding forc e of 20 0 me n un de r Count Ray mo nd de Saint- GiIles. Seeing th e defe a t of
Ker bogha, the co m ma nder of the garriso n surre nder ed t he cit ade l to Bohemond a fter t he ba ttle.
ASCALON 1099
A Fa timid co unteratt ac k by 20 , infan try and cava lry un der t he vizier al-A fdal, incl udi ng Syrian
T ur kish auxiliaries, was defea te d by I ,20 ).S,000 Fran kish cavalry a nd 9· 15, 000 infant ry
und
er
God frey de Bo uillo n. T he Fr an ks 9 divisions appear to have bee n fo rmed up in line, with Raymon d de
Sai nt-Gilles o n th e right flank , Ro bc r of Fla nders, Ro ber t of Nor ma nd y a nd Tancred in th e cent re a nd
God fre y o n th e left ; t heir infa ntry a rchers were sta t ioned in t he fro nt rank wher e t hey e ngaged the
Fat imids cont ingent o f 3,0 00 Sud an es e arc hers.
The
ba tt le was of ver y brief dura tio n,
the
Egyp t ia ns having bee n cau ght com plet ely unprepa red. An
att empt by Bedouin cava lry to enc ircle t he Franks left fla nk was bea te n bac k an d t he Franks
launc hed thei r charge int o the bulk of t he Egyp t ian army, closi ng wit h t hem so fast tha t t he Sud anese
arche rs succeeded in gett ing off o nly one volle y before bei ng d rive n back o nto t he ir cavalr y, who
fled a lmost immediate ly.
A fai r num ber of Egyptians ma nage d to reach t he safet y of Ascalon, o t hers run ning int o t he sea a nd
swimming
ou t
to t heir flee t mo ore d offshore. In fact th e reg ular cava lry esca ped virtu ally in tact ,
tho ugh th e infa ntry a nd th e mili ti a levies a nd o ther irregulars lost some 10,0 00 men killed,
dro
wne d or
crushed in the ro ut.
T he Franks captu red the Fa timid c am p, including the sta nd ard and perso nal te nt o f al-Af-tal, T he y
ga t hered all t he
boo
ty t he y co uld man age and bu rn t what t hey co uld no t carry.
FIR
ST BATTLE OF RAMLA 110 1
A Fati mid ar my of allegedly 11,000 cava lry and 2 1 infan try under Sa ad ad-Daulah , ma rching on
J eru salem from Ascalon, was intercepted at Raml a by a F rankish fo rce o f 260 knigh ts and 90 0 infan try
under King Baldwi n . The Fra nks d rew up in 5 o r 6 divisio ns, possibl y in ech elo n, wit h Baldw in
co mma nding a reserve. T he Fatimid line out fla nked th e m o n bo t h wings.
T he e nsui ng batt le was a co nfused affa ir. T he first 2 Fra nkish cavalry divisions to ma ke co ntac t against
the Fat im id left ) were re pulsed and alm ost a nnihilated by the Mosle ms, but Baldw tn s reserve th en
cha rged in and restor ed t he line, Bald win himsel f possibly killing Sa ad ad-Da ul ah a t t his po int. T he
Fa t im id ce n tre bro ke soon af ter. A bo d y of 500 cavalry o n t hei r lef t wing, ho wever, had ou t flanked
Baldw in s line and fallen o n t he Frankish infa nt ry asse mbled to t he rear, bad ly mau ling th em befo re
mo ving o n against Jaffa. T hese were de fea ted by Bald win the ne xt
day
as they retu rned fro m t heir sor tie]
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Despite th e co nfusion it was the Fatimid ar my whic h fled the field a fte r on ly an ho ur s co mbat and a
prom ising F rankish pursuit was on ly en ded by nigh tfa ll. Th e Moslems lost allegedly 5,00 0 men , the
Fr anks 70-80 kn ight s
probab
ly t he 2 rou ted divi sion s) and a much larger num ber of foot -soldie rs.
RAML A AN D J AFFA 110 2
Whe n new s of a relat ively sma ll Fatimid raid ing force of 70 0- 1,000 men a pproaching Ram la was received
by Baldwin in Jerusalem he ga t hered 200 knight s an d se t o ut t o a
tt a
ck t hem, his fo rce including a
number of t he leaders of th e Crusade of 110 1 suc h as Stephen of Blois, Ste phen o f Burgundy a nd Con rad ,
th e C on stab le o f t he
Emp
ero r li e m y IV. Ho wever, Baldwin ha d bee n misinformed of th e st re ngth o f
th e Fat imid ar my wh ich , tho ugh is im pro bab le t hat it comprised t he 20 000 Ara b cava lry a nd 10,00 0
Sudanese infant ry th at co nt em po raries cla im , wa s vastly superior to his o wn for ce . Even when he lea rnt
of th is Baldwin pers isted in his
atta
ck , an d in th e batt le which fo llo wed his small army , with no
inf
an t
ry s
uppo
rt , was surro unded a nd virtually wiped o ut. Baldwin himself and 5 co mpan io ns, keeping
clo se toget her, a t temp ted to hac k t he ir wa y ou t
but
o nly o ne ma n actually e sc aped with t he king, A
few others so ught ref uge in Ramla but wer e smoked
ou t
afte r 2 day s an d in a fierce figh t mo st of t hese
were killed , including Ste phen o f Blots an d Stephen o f Burgundy. Coma d was amongst t hose tak en
ca ptive.
Escap ing to J affa , Baldw in was joi ned by re info rceme nts of 170 kn ight s a nd mo unt ed sergeants from
Jerusalem and Ga lilee plus a large for ce of Eng lish an d Ge rma n pilgrims. S
hor
tly af terwards he mar c hed
o ut agai nst
the
Fa timid s for a seco nd t ime ,
but
no w with a considera bly la rger arm y. T he Falimid s
agai n e nci rcled t he Fr
ank
s, falli ng on th e in fa n tr y each tim e the kn ights c harged and th e re by ob liging th e
cavalry to fall bac k to de fend th em . Ho wever, th e infa nt ry held tog
eth
er a nd th eir sho wers of arrows
cou
pled with t he knights rep eated c harges e vent ually brok e
the
Moslem s.
Th e Fran ks were to o few in nu m ber to mou nt a pursuit , but they ca pt u red t he Fatimids cam p and t he ir
herd s of asses and camels. Th e Moslem s los t about 3, 000 me n.
HAR RAN 1104
To dis tract a T urkish attack against Edes sa by Suq man ihn-Ortoq of Mardin and Ja karmish
of
Mosul, t he
ar mi es of Ede ssa
and
Anrioc h, un de r Cou nt Bald win of Le Bourg and Prince Bohem
ond
, in veste d t he
Moslem ci t y of lI arra n. Ho wever, before t hey could occ upy th e town t he T urkish a r my having
aba nd
oned
its brier siege of Edessa ] arrived on t he sce ne , di viding in to two bodies o f which one
revic tualled th e c it y while the o t her advan ced t o
OC
CUp) th e bes ieging a rmy , d rawing
away from the
cit y by a feigned flight.
T he Franks, 3,0 00 cavalry and more tha n 7,000 infan try including many Arme nians, drew u p with
Baldwin on th e le ft and Bo he mo nd co ncea led behind a hill about a mile distant o n th e fight , t he plan
being fo r th e Edessans to ti n: th e Tu r ks, a nd pOSl ibly even to feign fligh t an d d raw th em in to an ambush.
Unfor tunat ely t he Tu rks had a very sim ilar plan an d when t he y fe igned an a
ttac
k a gainst the F rankish
left an d turn e d in flight th e Ede ssans t hr e w cau tion and th eir plan to th e win d a nd cha rged of f in
pursuit.
Once t hey were ac ross t he River Balikh t he ma in T urkish a rmy some 10.000 fresh cavalry) e merged
from a mbush, t he Ede ssa ns breaki ng in r
ou t
at t he first onse t. Meanwhile Bohe mond
and
the Antl och e nes
had advanced from hiding and
repulsed t he Tu rks o pposing t he m, but they were too la te to save t he
Edcssa ns, inst ead qu i
tting
t he fiel d in pani c a nd bei ng overtaken an d ro uted in
turn
,
F ran kish casua ltie s were very heavy , po ssibly as man y as th e 10· 12,000 men claime d by Ibn al· Athir
and ot her Moslem sources these figures probably includi ng no n-comba tan ts) . Man) Fra nks drowned
a tt empting t o recross th e Balikh , a large nu m ber o f horses were also lost , and cer tainly very few of th e
F ranks ac tu ally escaped t o Edessa. In a ddition Co unt Baldwin was take n cap tive
by Jak arm ish s men ,
and o
ther
Christian leade rs were ca ptu re d by Suq man .
THI RD BAT TL E O F RAMLA 110 S
A Fa timid army , making yet an o th er at tempt to reconquer Palest ine, t his tim e und er al-Afda l s so n
Se na al-Mulk, again found itself
opposed
at Ram la by King Baldwi n wit h an army of 500 kni ghts, an
unkn ow n nu m be r o r mo unted sergeant s, a nd no more than 2 000 infantry . T he Fat imids num bered
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5-15,000 Arab cavalry and Sudanese infantry, plu s a contingent of 1,000-1 ,30 0 bow-armed Turk ish
cavalry from Damascus.
The bat t le took place near th e Pat imid camp about 4 miles from Ramta. The Damascene ho rse-archers
led the Fatimid at tack , showering the Frank s 5 d ivision s with arrows before wheeling and falling on
their flank , But Baldwin, commanding the reserve, successfully re pulsed th e Tu rks then advanced
to the support of the o ther divisions.
Though they put up a stiff resistance for some time the Fat imid army, weakened by the de part ure of
its left wing o n a raid agains t Haifa, at length brok e and fled , the sources record ing how the Sudanese
infant ry, una ble to
outru
n
th e
Frankish pursuit, w ere slaughtered in the field s . They lost 1,200-4,000
men, b
ot h
cavalry and infa
ntry
, and their camp was captured. Th e Franks cla imed 10 have lost o nly
60 men. though Moslem sources say losses on bo th sides were abou t equal.
SENNA BRA I l l ]
Drawn in pursuit of a fo raging party o f 500 Turk s, a Fran kish a
rm y
of 2,000 infan t ry and an unknown
number
of
cavalry und er King Baldwin was ambushed by 2-7.000 mo re Turks under Toghtek in and
Mawdud , a tabe g of Mosul, and severely defea ted. The ba ttle was spo ntaneous, neith er sid e having
time to draw up in any for mal array, and hand-to-hand combat began without any prelimina ry
skirmishing. The Franks were bro ken in th e Ihird Moslem cha rge.
The Franks losl 30 knights and 1,200 infan try Ibn al-Qalan isi says 2,000 men ) and th ough Baldwin
himself escaped he lost his standard in the rout . The Frankish camp and baggage were also capt ured.
was o nly the arriv al of the troops of Antioch and T ripoli tha t enabled the king 10 ex tricate the
remnant s of his army. Th e Turks appear to have losl abou t 400 men.
SARMIN (TELL DANITII) 111 5
A Seljuk army und er Sultan Bursuq o f Hamadan was surprised by a Frankish army unde r Roger o f
Antioch whilst making camp in hilly wooded count ry. A large pari of Bursu
q s
fo rce was awa y
foraging, While others were scatte red in preparing Ihe camp site.
Th e Frank s emerged from ambush and all acked in echelon in 3 divisions, lhe lef t flank leading. This
division routed Ihe main body o f Seljuks, which had withdrawn to a hill behind their camp, while the
centre seized Ihe camp itse lf. The Frankish right was att acked by a single bod y of 300
Tu r
ks unde r
th e amir of Sinjar who drove the screen of Tu rcopole light cavalry back o nto the kn ights and caused
some confusion hefore be ing su rrounde d by the Frankish reserve and all bUI wiped oUI.
Bursuq managed 10 rally
ju s
t a few hundred men. but af ter a desperat e fight he fled the field .
AGER SANGUINUS (THE FIELD OF BLOOD) 1119
Roger of Anlioch , with
ou t
awaiting the re info rcemen ts he had requested from Baldwin and Count
Po ns o f Tripoli. set out again st llghazi of Mardin with a for ce of 70 0 knight s and 3-4,000 infantry ,
which included Tu rcc poles. Armenian s and native Syrian infant ry Hbn al-Qalanisi report s that the
Ant iochenes totalled 20 ,000 men ). Encamp ing wit hout due cautio n he was t rapped in a valley wit h
s
te e
p. Thic
kl y
wooded sides by Ilghazi s numerically superior army, which descend ed by hidd en pat hs
and had surrou nded the Frankish camp by dawn. The Turks, includi ng many Kurds but largely
comprised
of
Turcomans, numbered at leas t 7,000 men . some sou rces claiming 40 -60 ,000 .
Roger told off o ne division 10 guard his rear
th e
n drew up his rema ining forces in 4 or 5 divisions,
each of cavalry and infan lry . On the right 2 or 3 o f these had some success before the Frank ish line
was disorganised by the division of Robert de St , on th e left, breaking in rout and carrying away
par t of Roger s own d ivision with it. In the ensuing confusion, made wor se by a dust sto rm blowing
into the faces of the Fra nks, the Turks successfu lly closed in ro u nd the Frankish flank s and rear
cutting
of f
all esc
ap e
, and a massacre ensued. The bail ie was over inside an hour.
100 knigh ts managed to escape before the encircle men t was complete , and a few of the reargua rd under
Renaud Mazoir also go t awa y (Ihough the latt er - except for Renaud - were captured and execu ted
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on
ly a fe w ho urs later ), bu t o f the re mainder
on
ly 70 knights and 5
inf an try wer e taken alive. Mo st
were tor tured to
deat
h in t he s tree ts an d gardens of Alepp o t hou gh 40 o f t he r icher kn igh ts a pp ea r t o
hav e bee n spared fo r ranso m. Usarnah records tha t less th an 20 men ever returned safely to Ant ic c h . T he
sa me figure o f 20 is also reported in an
ot
h er so u rce as the to ta l n u mber o f Turk ish casu a lties.
HAB 11 19
A
Frankish co lumn o f 70 0 k nigh ts and some 2·3 ,00 0 in fa n try u nder King Bald win a nd Co un t Po ns
o f T r ipo li was att acke d o n t he ma rc h by a llegedly 20. 00 0 T urks und er Ilghaz i o f Mard in a nd
Toght
e kin
o f Damascus, who succeeded in sep arati ng a nd ro u ting t he 3 cavalry di visio ns o f t he vangua rd and t hen
atta cki ng t he infantry in t he mai n co lu m n, inflic ting heavy losses.
On the left flan k the Ant ioc hcn e kn ights
unde
r Ro bert o f Zerdana succ ee de d in r
ou t
in g t he Damascenes
and pu rs ued them from the fiel d , failing to retu rn , bu t on th e rig ht t he Tripolitanians wer e d r iven
bac k o n to t he main body . Ba ldw i n manage d to rally h is reserve a nd by rein for ci ng th e weake st points
in th e column a nd de livering a seri es of co nt ro lled charg es with his fresh t roo ps he force d so me o f t h e
Tur
ks to flee a nd t he rest to w ithdraw in
good
o rder.
The engagement was ind ecisive, bot h sides cla imin g a vic to ry . Th e F ran ks had lo st 100 kn ight s a nd
7
infan try o n the field of ba ttl e p lus a n add itiona l
unkn
ow n nu m ber o f Antioch ene knights, these bei ng
def ea te d as t hey returned tJy t he re tiring T u rks; Ilghazi ex ecu te d 30 knight s he had ca p t ured, includ ing
Ro bert
o f
Zerdana.
and these wen fa irl y ce rtain ly all
Anrio chenc s.
T he T u rks, o n Ihe o t h er hand , are sai d
by Fra nkish
author
itie s 10 have lo st 1-4,000 d ead, plu s add itional lo ss es in wo u nde d an d prisoners.
ES KI
ZAGRA
1121
Aft er th eir de f
ea t
at Levun u in
1 <
I the Peche negs re mained qu iet un ti l 1 121 , w hen they again
crosse d th e Danube int o Byzan tine te rritory , T he Emp eror J o hn
Co m nenus manage d to hold the
passes
against t hem t hrough the w in ter and in the spring of 111 2 he inv ited a large
num
ber of
Pec he n eg
ch ief ta ins to various cutes as gues ts. When t he se a rrived t he y were arrested , a nd a By za nt ine a rm y
u nd er J o h n himsel f, containing large
number
s o f Flemish and Fre nch mer
cen
ar y knigh ts and 54 0
Varangian Gua rdsm en . immedia te ly mar ch ed agains t th e remainder o f t he m, encampe d in a vas t
wagon
laa ger
into wh ich th ey withdrew af te r in itial Byzantine successes.
The Pec he negs co uld st ill m uster a co nsiderable farce, o utnu mbering the V ar an gian con tingent by
perhaps 6 to I , T hey for med up befo re their laage r a nd repulsed fir st t he Byzantine u nit s a n d t hen
lhe F l
emi
sh and
French mercenaries.
Aft er t his
the
Vara ngians a tta
cked
.
t
seems t hat th is tim e , when
the Pe
che
negs tried to
part
the ir wagon s - pre
suma
b ly to let t he ca valry o u t se e sec t io n o n Asiatic
tactics in Armieso f th e Dar k Ages ) - t hey co uld not b e moved . and becaus e o f t his o r for so me o ther
rea so n t he Peche negs see m to have pan icked a nd fled,
many
being killed and th eir commande r being
ca p t ured in t he pur suit. [ Possibly Ih is was a feigned fligh t which go t
ou t
o f ha nd , since t he Pec heneg
co mman d er was
a
half-blin d o ld man who may have had d ifficulty co n t rolli ng
suc
h a man oeuvr e
t hrough his su bo rdinates, all bu t 6 o f
whom
had fle d when th e wagon s were found t o be s tuck.)
T he wagon laager was the n sto r med a n d brea
ched
b y t he Va rangians and the rallied mer
cenar
y a nd
Byzant ine uni ts. a nd t he Peche negs were slaught ered en masse. T h is bat tl e s ee ms to have virt ually
e x te r mina ted th e Pech e negs. t he sur vivors being sell led as military co lo nists in Byzantin e lands ;
t hereafter t he Cu ma ns a nne xed their territo ry. T he Byzantines hen
cef
orw a rd cele brated the vict
ory
a nnu ally as Peche neg Day u ntil at least the end of t he 121h century.
IBE l IN Y IBNE H) 11 23
Encouraged by th e captu re o f Kin g Baldwin
by Balak o f Khanzit , a n
army
of 16 ,0 00
Fatim
ids invade d
t he Ki ngd o m o f Jerusalem. T hey we re in te rcepted at Ibe lin by a F rank ish a rmy of 7· 8 .0 00 men und er
t h e Con stable, Eus tace Ga mie r , and - despite th e ir nu merical superiority - t hey broke and fled alm o st
before t he F rankish c har ge had eve n made co n tac t ,
aband
oning the ir ca m p to t he Franks.
6·7 , 0 Fatimid s were apparen tly k illed, p resumably mo stly d u ri ng t he Fra nkish pursuit , and the cam p
yielded up 40 0 camel s, 500 asses , 3 very ric h ban ners wh ich
Fu
lcher of Cha rtres d escri bes as S tandarz ,
and muc h o t her loo t besides.
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AZAZ 1125
Invad ing t he Principa lit y o f An l io ch a t th e head o f a co nfederacy of no r t hern Syrian amirs, Il-Bursuq
of Mo sul laid siege t o th e Frankish fortress of Zer dan a. Hea ring, ho wever , of t he ap pro ac h of a re lief
force o f
1,100 cava lry a nd 2,000 infantry under King Ba td win he raised the siege an d re tired
no r t hward s t ow ard s Aza z whe re Baldwin s fo rce c
aught
up wit h him. T he F ra nk s d rew up in I
J
divisio ns, eac h of cava lry an d infan try.
Rely in g o n t heir su per ior nu mbe rs possibly tota lling 15,000 horsemen ) th e Sy rians seem to have
volu n ta r il y closed for han d-t o-ha nd co mbat ea rl y in t he ba ttl e. But t he sup e ri
or i
ty o f t he Fra n ks
a rm o ur and ph ysiq ue t o ld heav ily against th em and a fte r a pr o tr ac te d a nd blood y mele e t he T u rks
we re sca tt e red in r
ou l
, the F ra nks co llecting a n imm e nse a mo u nt o f booty from t he ba lll ef ie ld.
Frankish sou rces claim t ha t t he Tu rks los t
2,00 0
men includi ng 15 a mirs, but t hat t he ir
ow n
casualti es
a mo u n te d 10 o nly 20-24 men . In ad diti on bo t h sides lost lar ge n umbers of horses.
MARJ ES·SAFAR 1126
Marching again st Damas cu s a F rankis h ar m y u nde r Ba ldwin was co nfr o nte d by t he Damascen es
und er t he At abeg Toghtek in a bou t 20 mil es fro m the ci ty. T he Dumasc en e s incl ude d 2,000 T urcomans
and per hap s
1,000
askuris as we ll as
a n
imm e nse num be r of infan try . T he F r an ks d rew u p in
12
d ivisio ns o f cavalry an d in fan t ry .
At first t he T u rcom a ns p ut t he F ran ks to flight , th e horse-a rcher s tak ing a h eavy to ll and To gh tek in s
asker ts even p ushi ng t hro ugh t o th e ro yal camp. Bu t after bei ng p ursued fo r 4 miles th e Fran ks
ralli ed a nd as even ing dr ew in lau nc hed a co nce rted attack , t he F ra nk ish arc he rs sho o t ing d ow n ma ny
of t he Damascen e ho rses and Baldwin s k nigh ts rid ing do wn t he ir d isorganised c avalry, w ho pan icke d
w hen To ght e kin was u nh orsed . The victor iou s F ran ks wen t on to pu rsue t he rou ted Moslems to wit h in
sigh t o f D amascus, t he Dam asce ne in fa n t ry bein g c u t to pieces in t he pu rsuit. T h e Mosle ms lo st a t leas t
2
00 0
men.
Th e F ranks claime d to have lo st o nly 24 knight s an d 80 infa n try t he mselves, t ho ugh t hey also record
th at the in fa n t ry suffered badly in t he in iti a l rout . Certa inly the F rankish ca sua lt ies wer e heavy enough
to ob lige Bald win to a ba ndo n his projec ted a tta c k o n Damascus. Inst ead t he a rm y gat hered a
considerable a mo u nt of bo o t y from
th e
battlefie ld an d wit hdrew to J erusalem.
MOUNT CADMOS 1148
Ea rly in 1148 d urin g t he Sec
on d
Cru sade a F re nch arm y unde r King Lou is VII was am bushed on
Mo u nt C admos by th e Se lju ks. Th e vangu ard c
ompr
ise d largel y of royal merce naries and a c o ntingent
o f Templars], d isregar ding it s inst ructions to halt and e nca mp be fo re th e mounta in, o u ts tr ip ped th e
res t of th e ar my so t hat a wide gap o pe ned up bet wee n t he m. Th e main bo dy losi ng sight of th e
vanguard, p iled up in co n fusio n a t th e fo o t of the mountai n a s its fo remost u nits hesi ta ted , u pon wh ich
th e Seljuk s - w ho ha d been lyin g in a mbush a waiting just such a n o pport unit y - fell u pon t he infa ntry
and baggage in th e mid d le o f
their
co lu mn.
Lo uis a nd t he
40
kn ight s o f t he rear guard , heari ng t he
sounds
o f ba
ttle
advanced ra pid ly to t he sce ne
o f th e a mb us h, w h ile a messen ger was des pa tc hed t o ret rieve
t he
vangua rd. T he latt er, how ever , was
o bst ruc ted in try ing to re tu rn by large n um be rs of no n-co m ba tan ts in ro u t fro m t he ma in bo d y.
T he c harge of Lo uis an d the rearguard succeeded in dist racting th e Seljuks a t ten tion from t he remainder
o f t he n on-co mb atants, hu t in th e co nfused me lee wh ic h fo llo we d a ll 40 knig ht s were cu t dow n and
Loui s. him self un horsed, was fo rced 10 figh t his wa y to safe ty alo ne a nd on foo l.
lt was o nly
t he o nc om
ing o f night t hat
br o
ugh t an e nd to t he Scl
ju k
a ttac k, u po n whic h Lo uis a nd the
su rvivors ra llied o n th e baggage t rain. He was at las t re inforce d by th e un c
om m
itt ed va nguard, b
da r kn ess preven ted th e m
ou n
t ing o f a counter
-att
ack.
FONS MUR AT US
1 149
Lea rn ing of t he siege of t he fo rtress o f Inab by t he co mb ined ar mie s of Alcp po a nd Damascus, 6,000
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stro ng und er Nur ed-Din and Asad ad-Din Shirkuh, Raymond of Antioch set ou t wit h a relief force. But
he had failed to await a full mus ter and although accompan ied by a few Assassin allies his to tal for ce
numbered on ly 4 000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry.
Misinformed of t he strengt h of the Frank ish fo rce, Nur
ed-Din
re tired on its approach. Raymond then
weakened his army by putt ing reinfor cement s into Inab, and Nur
ed-Din,
watching his movements
from a distance. now became awar e of the inf erior strength o f Ihe Franks. Therefore when Raymond
en
cam
ped in a hollow in o pen co untry near to the Spring of Murad the Tu rks surrounded his camp
overn ight.
Raym
o nd
realised his plight in the morn ing and led a cha rge against the enci rcling Turks,
but
this
was
def
ea ted by the incline
of
the slope and the wind blowing dust in their eyes fro m the summit. Th ey
were subsequently virt ually wiped c u t . Shi
rkuh
himself slew Ray m o nd , and Nur ed -Di n sent his silver
decorated sku ll as a trophy to th e Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad .·
HARIM UAREN C) 1164
On hea ring that Nur
ed- Din
had
layed
siege to th e Ant iochene fort ress o f
Hanm
a Frankish relief force
set o ut under Bohemond III of Ant ioch, Raymond III o f Tripoli and Joscelyn III ( titular Count of
Edessaj.
In addition it included Byzantine tr
oop
s und er Constantine
Colo man,
th e Byzantine Dux of
Cilicia , an Armenia n co ntingent under T horos
, a band of French crusaders unde r Hugh de Lusignan,
and a contingent of Templars and /or Hospitallers. Altogethe r the army totalled 13.000 cavalry and
infantry.
Bohemond s
own
contingent
including 600 kn igh ts.
Nur ed-Din , par ticularl y alarmed by the presence of Byzantine t roo ps in the ap proaching army,
decided to raise the siege ra ther than risk a bat t le. but prepared a contingency plan to des tro y the
Franks should they pursue him - which, ignoring the advice o f Th oros and o the rs, Bohe
mond was
foolish enough to do. As the Frankish ca valry chased
after
th e reti ring army Nur s [eft wing rallied and
turned back to fall o n the un pro tecte d infan try , so that when the disorganised cavalry were in turn
atta cked they no longe r had infantry support. u
r s
cavalry then trapp ed them in a confined and
swampy place and broke them in the first charge.
A la rge number o f Franks were killed Incl udin g all the milit ary bre thren) and most o f the remainder
were forced to surre nde r. uhe prisoners including all the leaders except Thoros, who had pursued with
more caution than his allies
and
succeeded in escaping with his own contingent.
THE DAY OF AL·BABEIN 11 6 7
During the Syrian invasion of Egypt the Franks under King Amalric
I .
fighting in this instance as allies
of t he Fatimid Egyptians, managed to cross the Nile despite
the
pro ximity of Syrian fo rces under
Asad ad-Din Shir kuh, and as a result the Syr ians. d iscovering the crossing too lat e to o ppose it, wit hdrew
into Uppe r Egypt. Amalric pursued them as far as al-Babein, The Two Gates on the edge of the desert
10 miles south of Minya , whe re Sh irkuh decided to give batt le.
S
ir
kuh s plan
was to co nvince the Franks t
hat
his main strengt h was in the centre, and to th is end he
placed his baggage in t he cen tre o f the line but covered it with on ly a small for ce of cavalry under
Salad in. Shirkuh himself commanded the right wing, comprised of elite cavalry, intending
10
fall on the
Frankish rear when they charged his cen tre. whe re
Saladin
was to feign
[light
to draw them away from
the field. His forces numbered 9 ,
000
heavy cavalry, 3,000 ho rse-archers and 10-1 1.000 Arabs who appear
to have bee n infantry. (Moslem s
ou r
ces recor d only 1-2,000 horsemen .)
To face them Amalric, whose forces had been de pleted by de tachmen ts
dur
ing the pursuit , co uld
muster
374 Frank ish knights,
an
unknown
numb
er o f sergeants and Tu rc
op
o les, and a la rge contingent
o f unreliable Egyptians ; Bar lIehraeus recor ds that his army tot alled 10,000 men . For the att ack he
placed his knights in
the vanguard and the Egyptian co ntingents in t he rear.
• Since none of their own fronticl5 bordered on those of the f rankish slates the Abbasjds were passive throughout
the Crusad es; though Caliph Muqlali ( 1135-1160 ) is alleged to have sent an army of 20.000 men to fl l t against
the Franks 1know of no evidence of its seeing action.
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Th e ba t tle wen t en t irely according to plan. When Amalric charged Saladin tur ned in n ight , and as the
Franks follo wed in pu rsuit Shirkuh fell on the Egyptia ns. Whcn Ama lric managed to rally his sc
at t
ere d
kni ght s and re t urn to th e main part
of
th e fie ld he fo und tha t the majorit y o f the Tu rcopoles and
Fa limid s had been routed , but although th e Franks had to
aband
on the ir baggage tr ain th ey managed
to ra lly a co nsiderable number of men
and
, fo
rming
a
co
lumn, retired fr
om the
field in g
ood
order.
The y had , however, los t 100 knigh ts and an un
doubtedly
larger numbe r of Eg
ypt
ians
and
oth ers, and
st rat egically it was a Syrian vic
tory
even
tho
ugh the Sy rians themse lves are sa id to have los t 1,500 men.
The Moslems called the ba ttle T he Day o r The Event of a l-Babe in.
Soo n afte r, hearing of an
at tack
o n Fran kish Sy ria by Nur
ed -Din ,
the Fr:mk s with drew fro m Egypt
MYR IOKEPH ALON 1176
In an a
ttemp
t to c rush the Seljuks o f Rum, th e Byzan t ine Emperor Manuel I ga the red a huge but largely
mer
cenary army , co ntaining in pa rti cular co nsiderab le
number
s
of e
and Fran ks , and
mar
ched
on
th ei r
cap ital lconium, in tending to cap ture bo th th e ci ty and
the
sultan, Kilij An lan 11.
The ir march was orde rly but slow , th e la rge nu mber o f
no
n combatan ts
tt
ending the baggage t rain
dic
ta t ing the army s speed. In add ition th ey were dogged by bands o f 5- 10,000 Turcomans, who
Kilij Arslan had instruc te d to adopt a sco rched earth policy as th ey withdrew before
the
Byzam ines.
On reaching th e abandoned fo rt ress of Myriokephalon an embassy was received from the sultan
pr
op
osing
peace
which Manuel co ntemptuously refused - probab ly for th e same reasons as Ro manus
had refused Alp Arstan s offe r b
efore
Man
li k
er t a ce
ntu
ry ea rlier. Kilij Arslan
then
oc
cup
ied
the
Tzibr it ze Pass, a t the head of whi ch Myriokephalon stood.
Nex t day , ignoring
the
advice o f his officers, Manu el led his army in to the w
her
e the Se l
juk
s -
a t least
50 00
0 s trong - could ap parently be
dearly
see n in their positions o n the mountain slopes.
They gave way before th e Byzant ine vangua rd and allowed th e bulk of the army to en te r th e nar row
defile unmolested , where th e Byzan tines were packed so d ose that they cou ld scarcely move. As soon
as th e long co nvo y of Byzantine baggage carts was halfway into the pass th e Sefjuk s cha rged down
from bo th sides.
The wagons, ha rrassed hy Seljuk infan try (who had se t some o f th em o n Iire }, wer e unabit: to turn in
the narrow pass and co mpletely blocked the roa d, full y preventing any retrea t by the bu lk of the army,
and th e Tu rks ctos
d
in
on
the disorgamsed Byzanrincs. A co nfusing bat tl e ensued in which a fierce
sandstorm blinded th e comba tants so that both sides killed many o f th e ir own men , but as th e sto rm
subsided towards even ing it became appa rent th at
although
the Byzant ine vanguard had successfully
forced its wa y to th o th er en d o f the pass it was the Seljuk s who had the ad van tage .
On th
plain
bef
ore the pass Manucl managed to rally with
many
of his se nio r officers, and her e the
ma in par t of the surviving Byza
ntin
e a rmy e
ncampe
d for
the
night , in such a preca ri
ou
s situatio n
tha
t
Manuel even considered
ab
ando ning th e army and seerc t1y slip ping away. However. Seljuk cas ua lties had
been heavy to o, and desp it e the severe tosses of the Byzantines
Kilij
Arslan now sent
an
envo y o ffering
peace in exchange for an ugr ment by Manue
l
to dismant le the ron resses
of
Dorylaeum and
Sublaeum
and a payment to the sultan of ho rses, r ich cloth and 200 000 gold and silver picces, term s wh ich
Man uel now willingly accepted . t was only on the wit hdrawal of th e Byzantin vanguard from the far
end o f th e Txibritz Pass tha t it becam e ap parent to them just ho w heavy Turkish casualties must
have heen - the heads and genit al s of th e co rpses lit te rmg the pass hall cvcn been mut ila ted or removed
by the Scljuks overnigh t so tha
it
was
imp
ossible to disti nguish Moslem fro m Christ ian or
theref
ore
ca lculate
jlij
Arslan s losses.
Despit e the peace treaty the Hyzantincs were ha rrasscd as they wit hdrew by T urcoman
mbc
sm en, over
whom the sultan had littlc o r no control, and no t unt i hey reached Chonac did the pursu it end. Safe
within his own terr itory, Manue l refused to d isma nt le th e fort ifica t ions of Do rylacum. and Kilij Arslan
fel t obliged to re taliate by despat ching a rorce o f 24 ,000 cavalry to ra id the Maea nde r valley. These
did co nside rable dam age an d sac ked several towns before Manuel s for ces cau ght and des troy ed them
at the crossings of Hy
li
on
and L
eimmo
che ir.
T here wer e furthc r sp oradi c skirmishes and co unter-at tac ks against T urco man raid crs be tween Phrygia an d
Bith ymu which were et ther mo re o r less successful, bu t the campaign o f 1176 was really at an nd. It left
53
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bo th Byzantine Ana to lia and the Em p ire s military resources seriously weakened .
MONTG ISA RD 1177
While invading
Franki
sh Syria an
Egypt ia n
army
under
Sala din was surp rised and
defea
ted by the Fran ks
under Baldwin IV.
Af ter blo
ckad
ing Baldw in in As
calon
th e Egypt ians, origina lly over 26,000 stro ng accor ding to WilJiam
of Tyr e
(8,
00 0 Toassin and
18,00 0 Qaraghu
lams, all cavalry, plus
in f
antry mo unted on camels and
mules), had sca tt e red to lo
ot
an d
pillage , co nfident th a t t
here
were no fur
ther
enemy for ce s be twee n
them
and J
er u
salem. But Baldwin succ eeded in gathering
375-500
knights (in cluding
80 Templars from
Gala and somewhat und er
3,000
infantry an d , evading the sma ll E
gypt
ian h
olding
for ce, surprised
Salad
in s
main arm y as it was n
eg o
tia t ing a ravine near th e fortre ss o f Montgisard .
Many o f th e Eg
yp t
ian un its were foraging, o the rs were encamped, and the Fra nkish at t ack caught the
main b
od y
almost complet
el y
by surprise.
Th e
y had time only to draw up a very loose ba t tle arra Y, their
un its milling about in to ta l disorder and even all emptin g to revise their formatio n in the face o f the
Frankish charge. Inevitably unde r such circu mstances some units bro ke and fled even be for e th e Franks
made contac t with them , and those units which s to od wer e pra
ct
ically annihilat ed. Saladin s own escape
was covered by his personal guard of 1,000 mamluks.
So comp le te was th e Frankish vict or y th at the Egypt ians abandoned their bo o ty , baggage an d priso ners .
In addi
ti o
n to th eir heavy
losses
in th e ba
ttle
the E
gypt
ians suffered further casualties as a result o f
Bedouin harra ssmen t du r ing their withd rawa l.
Frankish losses were also high, the Master of th e Hospital recording 1, 100 dead and at least 750 wounded.
MA
R J
AYYU 179
On
receiving news th at Salad in had invaded th e dis trict o f Banyas an d Sidon a Frankish arm y under King
Baldwin IV and Count Raym on d of Tr ipo li set o ut to in tercept him. Reaching high ground overlooking
the Mar; Ayyun th ey co uld see th e t ts of Saladin s main encampm ent a t Banyas in the distance an d
resolved to de scend to the plain wit h
ou t furthe
r delayc th ough such was th ei r has te th at many
of
their
infantry, already exhaus ted by the long ma rch , were unable to keep up as the army hu rried down th e
steep slope.
Once o n the plain there was a delay o f severa l ho u rs (in which m
os t
of
th e
infant ry were pre
su m
ab ly
able to catch up
befo
re Saladin s advance guard of skirmishers, retu rning from ra ids furthe r to the
west, were in t
ercep
ted and
de f
eated, losing many dead. Encouraged by
their
success many
of
the
Frankish cavalry charged o f f in pursui t under the Master of t he T
emple
and Cou nt Raymond,
only
to
be
co n
fron ted by
Sala
din and the ma in body o f the
Moslem
army, o n which the fle eing skirmishers
now rallied. Th e Fr anks had no time to r
ef o
rm in orde rly array before the Moslems wer e o n them,
but though disorganised th ey manage d to ho ld out for a while before Salad in s superior nu m bers
overwhelmed and bro ke them, driving t hem back in rout upon Baldw in s main body
where
th e
in f
an try were st ill co ll
ec t
ing boo ty an d resting af ter the init ia l
defe
at o f the skirmishers.
Many mo re Franks were kill ed or captured in the purs
u it, th ou gh
some incl ud ing the king himself
managed to esc ape to the f
or t
ress of Beaufort. Others, who hid overnigh t am ongst th e rocks an d caves,
were hunted d
ow n
an d taken prisoner the n
ex t
morning. The Maste r of th e Temple, who was blamed
for th e disas ter, was amongst those tak en captive.
CRESSON 1187
Foll
ow
ing a raid on a Mo slem caravan during a
period
o f truce by Rey nald de Chatillon, L
or d
o f Kerak ,
Salad in resolved to invade th e Kingdom of Jerusalem.
In prep
ar
at i
on
for th is Kukburi of lIarra n and 2 o ther amirs were despa tched to make a rec
onnai
ssance
in force (6-7,000 st rong) into Pale st ine . As a result o f open enm it y bet ween KingG uy and Coun t
Raymon d o f Tri poli, permission to cro ss his Ga lilean possession s was granted by the Count on co nditi on
that the Moslems would cro ss and ret urn in a single day and should not pillage.
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Probab ly Kukbur i s reco nnaissa nce wo u ld have passe d w it ho ut inci den t bu t for t he fact tha t th e Masters
of t he Hospital an d T emple, se nt by King Gu y to pa t ch up a reco nc ilia t ion
with
Raymond, learn t o f it
e n route to Ti berias. T he Tem plar Master , Ger ard de Ridefort , immediately summoned his Marsha l and
80 mo re bre t hre n f rom t he Tem plar garr isons of Qaq un a nd Faba) and mu stered in total a fo rce o f 140
knights a nd 3-400 infantry with wh ich he a nd Roger des Moulins, Master of the Hospit al, se t out
to int ercept the Moslem s.
Th e y ca ught u p with Kuk b ur i a t t he Spr ing o f Cresso n the S pring of Saf
funy
a acco rdi ng to Moslem
so urces) as his me n were wat ering t he ir horses
du r
ing t he ret urn jo urney , a nd
th o
ugh numbe rs we re
utt erly against th em Gerard de Ridef o rt goaded th e knights into cha rging, wit ho ut eve n wa it in g fo r
th eirin fant ry
to
cat ch up. Inevit ab ly they were all but massac red . Roger des Mo ulins and t he
Marshal of t he Tem ple we re a mo ngst t hose killed , though Ge rard hi mself ma naged to escape
with
2
o ther bre th re n. Of the rest, 40 sec ular knights were ca pt ured a nd the ot her 97 Templurs a nd
Hospit alle rs all killed .
r HE HOR NS O F HAT Tl N 1187
As a result
of
t he disaster at Cresson Raymo nd of T ripo li fell obliged to put aside his qua rrel with King
G uy in t he fa ce of th e co mmo n enemy and pe ace was made be t ween th em . Th e Fra n kis h forces th en
mustered at Acre to d isput e Sa ladin s
forth
com ing inva sio n. Various so urces record this muster as
between 20, 000 a nd 60 ,000 me n see page 0 0), th e most co nvincing figure s, fo r t roop-type proportion s
rath er t han fo r quan tities, be ing th ose of t he Historia Regni Hierosoly mit anl, where th e fo llowi ng
bre
akdow
n is given : 1
,000
knights, 1
,200 me r
cenary kni ghts an d 7,000 mercenary inf ant ry, 4 ,000
Tu rco poles, and
25 ,
000 infantry. No mo unted sergean ts a re mentioned, t hough th ey are possibly
meant by t he mo
unte
d I oulai ns record ed in th e an onym ous Libellu s de Exp ugnation c Terra e Sen c tae :
th e sa me sourc e rec or ds innume rable T urco poles , but however
many
t her e may have been th e y
ap pear t o have had no e ffec t on t he subse qu e nt fighting. By co mpariso n Saladin s arm y contained
12,000 m
amluk
s from Egyp t , Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, Mardin and elsewh ere, in addition to a large
num ber of volunteers. J ud ging fro m
cont
emporary account s part isan t o bot h sides t he Mosle m arm y
was clea rly th e larger, o ne source recordi ng as man y as 8 0, 00 0 men , an o
ther
t he im possib le figu re of
700,0001 T he lo west tot a l reco rde d in Fra nkish sou rces is 25 ,000.
On Ju ly I Saladin enca mped at Ka fa r Seb t, 6 miles sout h-west o f Co un t Raymond s for tress of
T iberias, a position wh ch co m ma nded th e ma in road to bot h T iberias and Senn a bra. Half his
army
remained
there
while th e o ther half
attac
ked a nd sacked t he t ow n a nd environs
of
Ti bcrtas the ne xt day ;
th e fortress i tself , however, held out
under
t he
command
of Raymon
d s
wife, th e Co untess Esch iva,
who sen t an urgen t a ppea l for a id
10
King
Gu y
.
T he message probab ly reache d the king at Saffu riya, where his
army
had now encamped , the same
evening. Ra ymo nd, wh ose cas t le an d wife we re t ho se t hrea tened, wisely ad vised against going to t he
re lief o f Ti berias; he pointed ou t that th eir own p os it io n at Saf furiya was a goo d
o ne , a mp
ly provided
as was
with
water and pastu rage, an d sh o uld not be aban do ned a l a ny cost , particularly when their
presence alone co uld severe ly restrict Saladin s mo ve
ments
. But Guy foolishly took contrary advi ce
from the Master of t he Temple, Ge rard de Ridefort
wh o
probab ly st ill seethed
abou
t his defea t at Crcsson,
for wh ich he undoub tedly held Ra y mo n d solely responsible) , and on th e morning of Ju ly 3 t he Frank s
broke ca mp a t Saff
unya
and prepare d for thei r advance a
cr o
ss the waterless Plain of To ran. T he y
abandoned
t he Senna bra road in favo ur of a more no rtherly route, pro ba bly in part at least b ec ause
of the th rea t of the Moslem pos ui o ns on Kafar Se bt an d also because it wouldlead t he m to
th e
spri ngs of th e Wadi Hamrnan.
Salad in, probably forew arned of their c hanged route by deserte rs or by traitors wit hi n Raym ond s
con tingen t, now sh ifted his pos itio n fr om Kafar Sebt to the hills of Hut tin, which
comma
nded the
nor therly road the Franks were now ta king. T he re he was jo ined by t he majority of the troops who had
been besieging Tiberias, a sma ll forc e having been
detached
to co ntinue with Ihe siege, while skirrmshers
co mmenced 10 harrass t he Fr ankish colu mn.
All morning th e F ranks marched on , co ns
tantly
under at tack by th e Moslem skir mishers. Raymond s
vangua rd lost man y knigh ts, an d so hard-pressed wa s the rearguard of Temp lars, Ifospita llers and
T urc
opoles
th at it had b ee n dangerously slowed
down
and ran the serio us risk of being sep a
rated
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entirely from t he cen tre of the column , commanded by King Guy . Being made aware of this danger by
messe ngers from Gerard de R iddor t and Balla n d I helin , Guy or dered the army to halt and encamp (or
the night , even though they had cove red barely 5 miles and it was s till early afternoon. Raymond, who
appea rs to have been the o nly sane
comm
a
nder
in the whole Frankish host, urged that it was imperative
they should push o n and reach a nearby spring, bu t with the rearguard de
mo r
alised and the in fan
tr y
exhaus ted his advice was poi ntless; he is alleged to have then prop hesied, T he war is over; we are dead
men; the kingdom is finished By now th e Moslems had also blocke d the pass to this spring, however,
and though there was clearly some heavy figh ting nea r th e village o f Marcscalha
att
empts to dis lodge
the Moslems seem to have been unsuccessfu l. Left with no ot her option, Ray
mond
advised the king to
encamp at Marcscallia itself , with o nly half the distance to Tibcrias covered and Saladi n still holding the
wells .
During the night Saladin s army close d in. When mor n ing came the Franks made one final at tempt to
reach the spring near lIa tt in but aga in found their way blocked by th e Moslems; ba ttl e was
jo
ined at
abou t o clock, the main Moslem army advancing towa rds them with the ce ntre held back an d the
wings thrown forward , preceding their charge with a clo ud of arrows.
The Frankish infantry, ex hausted and desp
erat
e for water , failed to hold fo
rmatio
n and refused to stand;
they made a disconce rted dr ive to wards th e Sea o f Gatilee, which they coul9 see below th em, but finding
the ir pa th blocked th ey herded onto a low hill , pr
obab
ly one o f the pair
kn o
wn as th e Horns of Hat t in,
and despi te ent reaties from King Guy wou ld no t jo in the batt le, pleading that their thirst preven ted
them. They
to o
k no fur the r pa rt in the
battle
until the Moslems fell on them and killed many, taking
the re st prisone r.
The rea r and ma in battles, unsupported by their infantr y, were no w hard-pressed, parti cular ly the
Military Orders and the Turcopole s. apparently st ill in the rearguard posi tion ; Ruymond and the
vangua rd o f
abou
t
200
knights, meanwhile, had bee n separa ted from th e bulk o f the army when called
upo n by Guy to de liver th e first charge at
about
noo n , when Taq i ad-Din had open ed his ra nks to avoid
the impa ct and so let them through, thou gh inflic ting heavy casua lties o n them as they passed [
Raymond
himself receiving 3 wound s and on e of his sons being captured). Seeing how hopeless the sit uation
was and tha t he could not get back to the army , Raymond rode from the field an d w
ithdre
w to Tyre.
t was pro bahl y at this stage tha t Prince Reynald o f Sido n and Balian d Jbetin escaped from the rear
gua rd , as Ji d a small number of Tem plar s.
was also at abou t this stage,
afte
r
th e
escape o f Raymond, tha t the Moslems took advan tage o f a wind
at their hacks to fire t he d ry scrub. The smoke, blown towards the exhausted Frankish knigh ts, must
have tortured throats tha t had not touched water for 24 hou rs or more, and poss ibly even choked some
to death. The remaining knights then fell back towards one o f the Horns of Hatt in, the Moslems
revolving ro
un d
them as a globe turns on its axis. But th e Moslem
attac
ks were repeatedly rep u lsed,
despite the death of th e Bisho p of Acre and the captur e o f the True Cross by Tuqi ad-Din himself,
and the knig hts rnude a number of count er-a t tacks wh ich came within an ace of success. Their
numbers
steadily dwindled , however , and the last 15 re tired to the summil of the hill, whe re King Guy s red
tent had bee n set up.
The Moslem attacks pe rsisted un til finally the king s ten t was
overth
row n, on which the ta st few knights,
exhausted, dismounted and th rew themselves on the ground . The Moslems immediate ly surrounded
them and too k them capt ive, toget her with the king, his brother the Constable Amalric, Reynald de
C
haullo
n,
Guard
de Rid
ef
orl
oscclyn de Courtenay , Hum phrey de Toron and many
others
.
The exte nt of the disaster is well pu t over hy Ion al-Athir, who wrot e When on e saw how many were
dead o ne cou ld not believe that ther e were any pr isoners; and when one saw the prisoners one could not
believe th3t there were any dead. Beha ed-Din claims that
30 ,000
were cap tured in all, and a furt her
30.000
killed . Another source record s t hat
1,000
kn ight s were killed or cap tu red; the pri sone rs were
probahly 3 secular knights, since the
200-260
Tem plars and Hospitallers taken alive ( Bar Hebracus
reco rds on ly 80 1were execu ted . Gerard was spared, bu t Rcynald de Chautlon was executed for his
crimes, possi bly by Saladin s own hand .
The nex t day Tiberi as surrendered , realising that no he lp would now be coming, Countess Eschiva
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being allowed to depart wit h honour by Saladin.
THE G
REAT
BATT LE OF ACR E 189
Cram ped by Ihe
dose
proximit y of Saladin s field army whilst besieging Acre, King Guy was
encouraged by th e arr ival o f rei nfo rceme nts 10 launch an attack against th e Moslem camp. The Franks
drew up in 4 divisio ns, each of cavalry an d infa ntry with archers and crossbowmen to the fo re. IIis l
ef
t
Ilank rested o n the sea, his right on the River Bclus.
When
th e
Fr ankish cavalry cha rged both the Moslem Ilanks gave way, the right wing u nder Taq i ad-Din
possibly feigning night to draw the Templars of th e Frankish left from the field in pursuit. Salad in
rei nforced his ow n lef t fro m the centre which , thus weak ened , subsequently bro ke when the Fran kish
cen t re cha rged. Some Fran ks pushed on right up to the Moslem camp before Saladi n, reaching high
ground and successfully rallyi ng th e cen t re and left , launched a co unt er-att ack. The Franks, by now
dispersed in sea rch of plu nder, bro ke in panic and were dri ven back to their own camp with heavy losses.
Gu y lost 7-10,000 men, 4 10 0 of whom fell on th e right flank , incl uding many Templar bre thren :
Gera rd de Rldefort, Master o f the Temple, was again cap tured and th is t ime Saladi n had him execu ted.
Moslem losses to talled 1,500 includ ing 150 Royal Mamluks and 2 senior am irs. In addition the Diyar
Bekr
conting
ent, which had fo rme d part o f Taqi s righ t wing and Ile d du ring the initial
rout
, failed
to re tu rn after
th e
ba tt le,
only
next being heard from when they had reached Galile e
The magnitude of the Fran kish d
ef
eat might have been grea
te r
if Gu y had no t had the fo resigh t to
anti cipate a sort ie against his ow n camp by th e garrison of Acre and told oH a holding force to conta in it.
ACRE 1190
Hearing that Saladin s right ank , co mmanded by his neph ew Taqi ad-Din, had been weakened by the
despa tc h of several detac hments 10 watch the ap proach of t he remnants
of
Freder ick Barbarossa s
German cr usade , a large numbe r of Fr ankish so ldiers decided to march ou t from their entrenchments
round Acre and fall un
ex p
ected ly o n the Moslem army, against
th e
will o f their leaders.
T hey caught th e Moslcms complet ely unawares, and by the t ime the lat ter had armed
an d
mounted th e
Franks had already smashed throu gh the wea kened right wing and
penet
ra ted as far as the
camp
. They
then began to loot and pillage and became d iso rganised so that Taqi, rallying those of his troops that
were nearest , successfully la
unch
ed a counter-a tt ack. The Franks stoo d at first but were
ro u
te d when
a fresh division, the Mosul ask ar, followed by Saladi n with mo st o f the Moslem centre, jo ined t he
b
at t
le. As in th e grea t bat t le o f the previous year they were th en chased bac k to their own camp.
Th e
ba ttle lasted l it tle mor e than a co uple of hou rs, by the end of which the Franks had lost some
4,000 me n . Moslem so urces cla im that the Fr an ks lost 7-8 00 0, themselves losing only 10, bo th figures
obviou sly high ly impro bable. Few pr isoners were taken and
most
of thcm we re executed.
ARSOUf J 191
Marching along the coast road towa rds Arsouf dur ing the Third Crusade, an army of crusaders and
Sy rian Franks unde r King Richard I of England was
attacked
by a large Moslem fo rce unde r Saladin,
possibly ou tnumbe ring th e Franks by 3 : I .
Ant icipat ing the
attack
, Richard had taken me ticul ous care in arranging his line of ma rch that morning,
organising the army in 5 ba ttalions comprised in all of 12 divisions of knights, flan ked on the lan dward
side by a lightly-packe\1wall of infan try and on the seaward side by the baggage train and mo re
infant ry . The vanguard was held by Tcmplars an d the rearguard by Hcspitallers and c ho ice knight s
d ivided into squadrons, its
membe
rs so close together tha t an apple co uld no t be thrown to the
gro und wit hout touching the men or the ir horses.
Saladi n had been harr assing the Frankish column for several da ys bu t had fai led to disrupt its
for ma tio n or dr aw the knights away from the pro tectio n of the main co lumn . Now, at a po in t where
the Forest of Arsouf came down to wit h in 3 miles of the coast, he launched an al l-cut a
tt a
ck on the
Ifospitalle rs o f th e reargua rd.
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For some t ime the Fra nk s struggled on
under
a co nstant ha il of arr ows, with pre ssure steadily increasing
o n the hard -pre ssed rearguard until th e Hospitall ers, twice having been refused per mission to co unter
attac k, finall y disobeyed and charged out against the Moslems, ju st before Ric hard gave a general orde r
to do so , th eir prematu re charge giving man y of the Moslems a chance to fall back and avoid the full
impa ct of th e Fr ankish charge wh ich might have o therwise smashed them. Fo r a few
minut
es the
reargua rd was thr own int o co nfusio n as the Moslems rall ied unt il Richard brought up reinfo rcement s
fro m the cen t re and d rove them back , Moslem co unte r-attacks on bo th the Hospit aller s and t he
Normans and English guarding th e roya l s tandard likewise bei ng repulsed . Th e knight s the n rallied on
the standard and ref ormed their
rank
s. and th e army co ntinued its mar ch to ArsouL
Moslem casua lties
amounte
d to 7,000 dead, including 32 emirs. while the
Frank
s losses were under
7
incl udin g only one nobl eman o f dist inc tion . However , th e apparent vict ory was indecisive;
the Moslems
atta
cked again la ter the same day as the Franks were pitc hing the ir tents
outs
ide Ars
ou f
,
hut they were agai n repu lsed
and
driven back to th e for est.
JAFFA 11
92
King Richard, commanding a small fo rce of o nly 2,0 00 infant ry , including 400 cro ssbowmen but for
the most part I isan an d Oenoese sailors (Beha ed -Din says that th e re were o nly 300-1
infantry in
all} , and 55-80 knights of whom only 9-17 (including th e king) were mo unted, drew up an infantry
phalan x in 2 line s, the first o f spearmen and the second of archers and crossbowmen. The spearmen
set th eir shie lds before them to fo rm a wall behind which the arch ers co uld she lte r, and fixed th eir
spear h
ul l
s in the grou nd so tha t the head s were levelled against the chests of any horse that dared to
app roach . Before the whole Force a rough barricade of tent -pegs had been set up to disorganise the
e
nemy
cha rge.
T he Moslem arm y under Salad in , comprised o f Kurds and mamluks, was relu c tan t to
dose
with th is
formatio n hut att empted to charge against it in 7 successive waves, th eir attacks lasting until mid
afternoon when after a single concerted volley by the crossbowmen, th ey were dri ven away by a general
advance of the spcarmen, led hy Richa rd himself with his few mounted knights, leaving 7 men and
1,500 horses l ad . Rich ard lost on ly 2 men in addit io n to a number of wounded .
An a
ttempt
by th e Moslems to seize Ja ffa in the rear of the Franks was foiled by Richa rd s tim ely
return with J small numher of kn ights. The town was then re-garriso ne d by him with th e Pisan and
Genc cse sailors who had abandon ed th e defences when the Moslems atta cked,
ADRIANOPLE 1205
Whilst besieging Adriano ple the Roma nian Franks under the Latin Emperor Baldwin I and Doge Dando lo
were at tac ked by a Bulgarian army unde r Joa
nmts
u. includ ing Greek s as well as 14,000 Cuman
auxiharies.
Having learn t f
rom
bitter e xperience
t ha t
it was inadvisable
10
pu rsue ret reating Cumans the Fra nks
deci de d to assum e a defensive fo rmation and [c t
the
Bulgarian s
attac
k rath er than th emselves take the
offensive. However, whe n the Curnans har -assed the ir cam p the m
orn
ing after they had made these
plans the Fr ank s fo rsook their caution and pu rsued the m piecemeal.
upon
which th e Cum ans t urned
and r
ou t
ed them . capturing Baldw in in the process.
The
rout
was halted by a H lid force tha t had been
left
to co ntinue Ihe siege of Ad rianople, and when
the Bulgarian pu rsuit saw thi s second arm y they halted. The two sides faced each o ther th us un t il
nightfal l, th e Cumans persiste ntl y harr assing th e Franks wit h arro w-ure all th at time. The Fr anks
finally withdrew und er cove r of da rkn ess, having
1051
120-300 knight s and a large num ber o f sergeants
und infan try. abandoning their camp to the Bulgarians. Baldw in died or was murdered in captivity.
AN
Tl
OCH· IN·PISIDIA 1211
Accompanied by Fra nk ish mercenaries supplied by the tin Emperor Henry as wen as Phrygjan t roops
under the eposed Byzantine Emp ero r Alex ius
and his nephew Manuel Mavrozom es. th e Seljuks
under Sulta n Kai Khosrou I
of
Rum ma rche d against Emperor Theodore I of Nrcaea. th e summer
they took Allaleia, then advanced towards x tcaea and la id siege to Ant ioch-in-Pisidia.
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The 2 ,000-s tr o ng Nicaean army , also includi ng a co ntingen t o f Fr an kish merce nar ies 800 me n, c hiefly
It alian s ), co nfronted them near t he city. The who le Nicaean ar my ca rried
cro
sses o n t he ir shields in
imitati on o f th e ar my o f Co nstant ine t he Grea t a t th e Battl e
of
Milvian Bridge in 3 12.
In th e ensuing battl e the It alian s fo rming
the
Nica
ean
vanguard were overwhelmed by the Seljuks and
pra c ti cally wipe d o ut. Kai Kho
srou
then led a n a tt ac k against heo ore h imse lf and per s
onall
y
unhor
sed
him
the
Emper
or o n ly sa ving hi mse lf b y hack ing a t t he forelegs o f the Sultan s mar e. bringing do wn
both
ho rse and rider
upo
n whi ch Kai Khosr
ou
was insta n tly decapita ted by a Nicaean so ldie r. Yet th e
battle
appea
rs to have bee n inde cisive,
author
itie s variously claimi ng the r
out
o f the Nicaea ns a nd t he
Se ljuks , t ho ug h it see ms mo re p r
oba
ble th a t it was t he lea de rless T u r ks wh o broke and fled . Certainly
Alexius and Man ue l Mavro zom es were ca ptured d uri ng the pu rsuit. At the sa me time , however ,
Th
eod o re s losses ca n o nly be descri b ed as cri ppling.
DAMIETTA 121 9
As a result o f d issension in Ihe F rank ish ca m p du ring th e siege o f Du
mictta, t he leade rs o f the Fifth
Cr usad e acquiesced to th e de mand s of t heir army and marched o ut against the e ncampme nt o f th e
encircling Mo sle m field -army .
Th e Mosle ms, dra wing u p, feig ned ni gh t with their ce n tre and dre w th e inexperienced and foo lhardy
Frankish infantry in pursuit. At the same t ime Bed o uin auxilia ries fe ll o n th e Frank ish camp-followe rs,
o bliging t he King, J o hn de Brie n ne , to fall bac k to
their
d efen ce, and whe n the Ro ma n infan tr y o f Cardinal
Pelagius sa w t his t hey t hought t ha t t he kn igh ts wer e
runn
in g away a nd them selves tu rned a nd fled . T he
pa nic sp read a nd the
entire
a rmy br o ke in rout , o n ly a rear guard acti o n by King J oh n. t he Military Ord ers
and so me Fren ch and Englis h kn ight s p reven ti ng a ma
jo r
d isas ter .
The F ranks appear to ha ve lo st 20 0-400 knight s i ncl udi ng 3 3-50 Tempters. 3 2 Ho spit allers and 30
Teu to n ic Kn ight s)
and
1-2 ,00 0 , or pos sibly as man y as 5 000 , infantry ,
BAHR ASHMUN 122 1
Advancing from D amle
ua
towards Cairo un de r King J o hn a nd t he in famou s Card inal Pe lagius, a
Frankish ar my numbering 1,200-5,00 0 kn ight s, 4 000 archers {including 2,50 0 mer ce naries.
possi b ly all T urc o poles] , mo un ted sergea n ts and 20- 40 000 inf an t ry was pinne d d ow n by Egypua n and
Syria n for ces unde r Sulta n al-Kam il and al-Ash raf of t he Ja zira . Th e Mo slem ar m y included so me
7-40,000 c avalry.
After being
blockade
d wit hin t he ir fo r ti fied
enc
a m p me nt fo r a mon th, t heir lines of co mmu nica t io n
c u t by an Egyptia n flee t o n the Nile in th eir
rear
,
the
Fra nk s finall y resolved t o fall bac k o n
Darmcna
.
T he y set o u t at nigh t, hu t th e Teu t
oni
c Knigh ts were st upid en ou gh to adv
er t
ise the fac t by sett ing
fire to th e abando ned te n ts. To im ped e
thei
r withd rawa l, the Moslems o pened sluic e ga tes al o ng t he
bank s o f the Nile and b y m
or
ning , as t he Fr ank s flounde red t hro ugh t he wat e rlogged fie lds a nd d itc hes,
the Moslem s had in terce
pted
a nd su rro unded
the
m. T he Fra nk s ma naged to ho ld o u t for a da y,
repu lsing the mamluks an d Su danese in fan try se n t against t he m a nd inflictin g a bou t 1,0 0 0 casualties
on the la lt e r ), b u t fur t her ret rea t was imp ossib le. T he a rmy su rrendered o n mode rate te r ms 3 day s
late r.
AKH LAT ERZINJAN ) 1230
While e xpa nding in to the Selju k d omain s o f R um , Jal al ad-Din, Sha h o f Khwar izmia, besiege d and
ca p tu red Akhlat fr om a l-A
shraf
Musa
of
Damascus, bro th er o f th e A
yyub
id Su ltan o f Eg
ypt.
Th
is was
a polit ically un wise move since it pro mpted an alliance be t wee n th e previously implacable adversar ies
al-Ashraf
and Sultan
Kai Kobad o f Ru m against the Khwarizmians.
Ja lal ad-Din a dvance d 10 Khart p
er t
in t h e h op e o f catch ing a nd defea ting the allies individually, bu t
fa lling he was unable to p revent the junc ture of th eir fo rces at Sivas. AI-Ashraf led 5 000 elite
ca valry, and Kai Ko bad 20 ,000 incl uding nap tha-th ro wers and c rossbow-armed infa ntry.
In th e m
eanti
me Ja lal s fo rces had bee n re
duce
d by de tac hme nt s an d he was
conse
q uently
soun
dly
d
efeated
a t Erzin
jan
from wh er e he withdrew t o Akh Jat and th en
to
Azer baijan . T he Seliu k-Syrian
allies did no t
pur
sue. Instea d
they
mad e pea ce with J alal, ap pre cia t ing Khwarizmia s value as a b uffer
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stale be tween them
and
the Mo ngols.
CASAl lMBERT t 232
Thi s b
attle
to ok plac e du r jng a civil war be tween th e Imperialis t fac tio n o f Frede
nc
k
, under the
Im per ia l Lega te Richard Ftlangicri, and th e Ihe lin party of Jean d Ibeltn , th e 'Old rd of Beir ut' ,
suppo rted hy King Henry I
of
Cyp rus.
Encam ped a t
Casa
r
nbcrt
with
on
ly a very small fo rce , King Henr y,
accom
panied by Anseau de Brie
and t he Old rd 's so ns Baldwin, Hugh and Guy and neph ew Jean (aut hor of the ' Assises ) , was defeate d
hy the Lombards (i.e. the Im perialists). When da rkness fell th e lom bards had se t sail from Tyre with
11 galkys an d surprised the lbeuns. Encamped badl y Jean d' lhe lin ' s sen tries, for exam ple, had been
posted o n th e
wro
ng side of the camp) the king's par ty were caugh t to ta lly un prepared ( the
c
hr o
nicler Philip
of
Novara speaks of 'so me
on
f
oo
t ,
ot her
s on horse witho ut saddles, so me armed
with ha uberks an d o th e rwise naked , ot hers wholl y unarmed' ), hut they managed to ho ld the ca mp
until daylight ; King lIenry himse lf was mo un te d ' almost ent ire ly nak ed '
on
a horse by his bo d yguard
an d
esc aped to Acre with a small re tinue .
AI dawn Lom bar d rein forcemen ts were landed fro m th e Tyrean galleys an d the Ibelin camp was finally
taken, th e Lom bards ca p turing 24 lbe lin knights, near ly every horse left in the cam p, an d most of the
arms and
equipme
nt stored there, The surviving Ibe lins ra llied o n a nea rby hi ll, where a re lief fo rce from
Acr e unde r the Old
rd
foun
d
them
soo n after. The
Lcm bards, seeing
the
relief
for ce appro
ac h
i
ng ,
trans
ferred
as much
loot
as possib le to the ships an d began a precipita te with drawa l to Tyre by lan d and
sea , archers an d crossbowmen holding off those lbc lins who tr ied to fall o n the rearguard of th e ir
lundboun fo rce as it withdrew through the Pass of oul in
AGRID I 1232
Following up his success a t Casal lmber t 6 wee ks earlier , Filangier i had invaded C
yp r
us with the
inlent ion
of
co
mp
lete ly r
ed u
c ing the island, which was already largely in the hands of the Imperialist
Iacuon.
In tendi ng to re lieve the besieged fort ress of Dieu d ' Amou r, besieged by Filangier i, the Old rd of
Beirut lef t 50-
60
dismou nted sergeants 10 hold th e village o f Agridi then proceeded alon g a nar row pass
towards the fort in 4 divisions, in the hope that the Lombards wou ld co me d
ow n
and jo in bait le.
His vanguar d was co mmanded by his sons Hugh an d Balian with Anseau de B
ne
; t he second division b)'
Haldwin ; the third \ly Jo hn of Caesa rea : and th e f
ou
rt h by King Ienry and
th e
Old
rd hims
el f
with
his o ther sons an d neph ew Jean. Th eir fo rce was sho rt of horses and probably in a ll tot alled only
abou
t
ho rsemen, as oppose d to aho ut Imper ial ist cavalryvt he la tt er including Cyp riote Tu rcopoles
a r
u T ripo lita nian and Ci
lk i
an mercenaries .
Th
e Lombards, seei ng thi s inferior force, descended fro m their st ro ng po sit ion higher up the pass and
atta cked in 3 divisions, with Filangieri commandi ng the rearguar d. Th e im pet us o f the Lc mbard
vanguard's charge ca rried it c lear beyo nd ' the lbeli ns, upon wh ich it fled the field . The seco nd
division , however, f
ou
ght a fier ce hat tle wit h the first 2 Ibe lin divisions
unti
l Co unt Berard, its
co mmande r, was unhorsed by Anseau de Brie an d killed hy the Ihe lin infantry who had come up from
Agridi, as were man)' o ther Lom bard horsemen. More than 60 o f th e ir knight s were killed , and 40
more captured, while of the lbelins
on
ly one kn ight was killed , and he in error by an Ihelin
infant ry man .
Pita nglcri. meanwhile, wit h
t he
bu lk o f the
1,000
Imperialist cavalry , had been prevent ed from co ming
to Co u nt Berard s aid hy Ba lian d ' lbe lin who, with a handful of kn ights (5 , o f who m o ne was th e
chro nicler I' h ilip of Novaru). had distr act ed and disorgan ised his division hy co nsta nt harassment in
the
co
nfined space o f th e pass un t il the Im perial l egat e was forced 10 0 ee.
T he Lom bards' vanguard d ivision, whic h had failed to re tu rn to th e bat lie , was la ter tr a pped in a fos se
before Gastn a and its
co
mmand er and abou t 100 mo re knights were captured there. Dieu d 'Amour
was me anwhile relieved .
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DARB SAQ 1237
Whilsl bes ieging the Moslem fort ress of Durbsaq a Frankish
army
unde r William de Mont ferrat , the
Templar Prece pt or of An tioch , was
su r
prised and defeated by a Moslem relief force despa tched from
Aleppo . William had been warne d of the enemy s ap proach by Ch rislian pr is
on e
rs in Darbsaq bu t had
failed 10 act on the info rmatio n, as a result of which his
army
was cut to pieces and he him self killed .
More tha n 100 other Tem p la r br
ethr
en died as well as 300 cross bowmen in th eir emplo y and a
numbe r of secular kn ights. Th e Moslems th emselves allegedly but highly impro bably) lost 3, 000 men .
GA Z
A 1239
A det achmen t from King Tiba ld of Navar re s crusade set out to a t tac k an Egypti an force in the
vicinity of Gaza reported 10 number only ab out 1,000 men . The Fran kish force pro bably num bered
some thing be tween 1,500 and 2,000 men. including 500 cavalr y, under Co unt Henry of Bar.
Un
fo r
t
unat
ely, however, lhe Egypt ians were co nside rably superior in numbers and their slingcrs and
crossbowmen encircled the Frank ish army as it paused
fo r
a meal amongst the sandhills and du nes
nea r Gaza. At length realising th eir mistake several of the nat ive Syrian Franks withdrew , bu t Count
lI enr y refu sed to ab ando n his infantry in the face of the enemy.
The ensuing bat t le was shor t and bloody. The Fran kish crcssbowm en at first seemed like ly to succeed
in dr iving Ihe Egyp tian missile-men from the dunes but ra n
ou
t of crossbow bolt s. Th e kn igh ts th en
charge d into a na rrow valley between two du nes where they could she lter fro m the devastating barrage
the Egypt ians were layi ng do wn, scat tering the infan try who a tt empted to hold it against them.
Almost simultaneo usly, however, the Egypti an cavalry arr ived and , feigning n igh t, drew the knights
back into t he open where, unable to manoeuv re th ei r heavily laden mo un ts in the deep san d, they
were pick ed o ff by the Egyptian archers and cu t to pieces by the caval
ry .
Th e sources di ffer regard ing the number o f casualt ies, bu t it wo uld seem tha t 1,000- 1,800 men were
killed and at least 80 kn ights and 250 othe rs ca ptured; ano ther re po rt gives I co un t, I S knights and
500 o thers ta ken capt ive. Count Henr y was amongst the slain. Th e main body of King T ibald s army
subsequentl y withd rew to Acre.
KUZA DAG H 124 3
Invad ing th e Rumi province of Armen ia, a Mongol fo rce under Baichu, includingGeorgian and
Arme nian auxiliaries, a tt a
ck e
d Erzerum and razed it to th e grou nd aft er a b
rief
siege. They then
wit hd rew to win ter on the plain of Mugha n, but in response to belliger en t threats from the Selj uk
sul tan o f Rum, Kai Khosrou
, they march ed out again, th is time towards the Seljuk positio ns in th e
pass of Kuzadagh nea r Erzinjan.
Baichu , wary of the large numbers o f au xiliaries in his a rmy, disbanded a nu mber o f Geo rgian and
Armen ian units as unt rus two rt hy and dist ributed the res t amo ngst his Mongol
troo
ps to prevent
dese rti on or t reachery. On the day of battle his command is repo rted to have bee n 10-30 ,000 st rong,
prob
ably his own Touman o f 10,000 and 20,000 auxiliar ies. Kai Kbosro u s army was clearly la rger,
some
sources cla iming 100-160 ,000 men. include d Bcdouins, Georgians, Syrians from Aleppo , 2,000 or
more
Frank
ish mercenaries {chie fly Cypr iotes) and pro bab ly a co ntingen t of Trapez unt ine Byzan tines.
T he batt le itself was indecisive. Th e mai n part of Baic h
u s
Armenian and Geo rgian aux iliarie s de feated
the Seljuk s right flank, whe re a number o f amirs wer e killed , tho ugh the Seljuk lef t successf ully dr ove
back the Mongols. Nightfall ended hostilit ies and both sides encamped
on
the field , but du r ing the night
the Seljuk forces evapo
rate
d, and when Baichu launched a su
dden
a
ttac
k against the Seljuk camp at
first ligh t th e nex t mo rning it was found to be deserted. It seems tha t Kai Khosrou , dubio us of the
loy alty of man y of his amirs (who wished to surren der), had slipped away through fear
of
tre ache ry,
and his army seems to have fo llowed su
it ;
altern atively
it
may have been his a
rm y
wh ich slipp ed away
first
On disc
over
ing the Seljuks ni ght th e Mongols suspec ted that it was a ruse intended to d raw them into an
ambush. The ir pursuit was theref ore del ayed by a fu ll day , bu t even then many Seljuks we re over taken
and killed. Kai Khosrou himself esca ped to Ankara. Thereaft er the Sulta n of Rum became a vassal of
the Mongols, paying an annualtrib ute o f 12 million Hyperperes , 5,
00
0 sheep, 5
00
camels and 500
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l. A FO RBIE GA lA 124 4
Allied to al-Man
sur
of lIoms and an-Nasir of Kera k, a Frank ish arm y under Ph ilip de Montfor t and
Count Waiter de Brien ne o f Jaffa marched against as-Sat in Ayyub, Su ltan of Egypt. In add ition to 6, 000
Fra nks , incl udi ng infantry, Cypnote knights, co nt ingents from th e Military Orders (Hospital, Temple,
Teut onic Knights and St Lazarus) and Turco po te cavah y, th eir com bined army included 4-5,00 0 or more
Syrian an d edou in cavalry.
At
la
Forbie , near Gaza, an Egypt ian army und e r the ami r Baibars co nsistin g o f 5,000 elite troops and
10 ,000 me rcena ry Khwarizmian cavalry
opp
osed them.
l M
ansur
advised Ihat th e allied arm y should
fo rt ify th eir camp an d ac t
on
the defensive since the Khwarizmians were unhapp y
alla
ck ing st ro ng
positions and wou ld probably deser t , ther eby forcing the wit
hdr
awal of th e r
emai
nde r of the infer ior
Egyp tian fo rce. Co unt Waile r, how ever , insisted that they sho uld adv ance and engage the Egyptia ns
immediately , an d un f
ortun
ately his co unsel prevailed .
C
on
fron ted by t he
Khwarizmians,
most of th e Syrian s
of
th e allied cen tr e took to nigh t when
counter-a tt ac ked; on ly th e 2,O
OO s lro
ng oms
co
nt ingent did no t flee outrigh t, fight ing th e ir way off
the field in good orde r desp ite suffering perhaps as man y as 1,720 casualties, Th e d
epar
ture
of
the
Syrians, follow ed pos t-haste by the Bed ou ins posted on the lef t flan k, lef t th e ir Frankish allies on th e
righ t hopelessly outnumbered. These the Khwar izmians now at tacked in flan k while t he Egypt ian s
pressed in on the ir fr
on
t (alt emauvely the Egypt jans may have fled, leaving the Khwarizmians to encircle
the Franks).
After several hou rs of ha rd fighting Ihe Fr ank s were r
out
ed .
Em
oul say s
that
bare ly a quar ter o f the
arm
y esc
aped
, bu t they may have lost as ma ny as 5,00 0 dead . 325 Hospitaller s, 3 12 T
emp
la rs and perhaps
297 Teu tonic Knights were killed , only 12-65 (5 -26 0spitallers, 4-36 Ternplars and 3 Teu tonic Knights)
ma naging to escape, the Maste r of the Temple bei ng amongst the dead. The Lazar co nti ngent
(possibly about
40
men, ce
r
tainly no mo re ) and th e
Cvpnore
co ntingent o f 300 me n were wiped out.
In add iti
on
the Egypt ians t
oo
k 80 0 pr isoners, including Co unt Waiter and th e Master o f th e Hospital
(both of
whom died in captivit y) and perhaps 100 o the r
brethre n
o f the Military
Or
ders , Not with
out
reaso n has this ba t t le bee n descr i
bed
as 'a second Ha lt i n'
El . MANSURAH 1250
After capturing Da
mictta
during th e Seventh Crusade, an army o f 2
0, 000 crusaders unde r King
Lou is IX o f France marched o n Cairo . Althou gh la rgely French in composition, incl uding 1,80 0
-2 ,5
00
knights and 5,0
00
arch ers , the a r
my
also incl uded
400
Achaia n knights,
200
English knight s un der Earl
WiIliam of Salisbu ry, and about 700-1,000 Hospitalfe r , Templar, Cyp
no
te and Syrian Frankish knight s.
Their advance was held up for nea tl y 2 months by the Egypt ian s' defe nce of a canal j us t n
or t
h of El
MJnsurah , the Bahr as-Saghir , hut eve ntu ally a local Co pt revea led a fo rd to the m 4 miles 10 the east nea r
the village o f Salamun . T
wo day
s later the ca valry
of
the Frank ish a rmy crossed t he canal by th is fo rd ,
the plan being for them to th en ride bac k al
on
g the canal to cover the c ross ing o f the in fan t ry over a
make
shift woo den bridge. However the vanguard u nde r Louis' bro ther Rober t d 'Ar to is,
co
mprised o f some
some 1,500 knights inclu din g Q Tcm plars. fa iled 10 follow these instruc t ions and once acro ss ro de
st raigh t for the Egyptian camp. Th e Moslems were caugh t comple tely by surprise and driven from thei r
camp and in to El Mansurah with heav y losses, their commander Fakr ad-Din being killed in the
co nfusio n. Hut de spite thi s ini t ial succ ess when the Franks follow ed t he nee ing Egypt ians into th e
town they were rou ted hy 2 r namluk regiments commanded by th e emir Baibars, the Bahr iyyah an d
Jamdariyyah, and shot down by arch ers posit i
on
ed o n th e rooft
op
s, pe rhaps as many as 1,
00 0
-1,500
Frankish horsemen being killed inclu ding Robert , th e Earl of Salisbury , most of the 200 Englishmen
and 285 Temp ters.
The ma in body of F
rank
ish cavalry under jns Louis, wi th the elemen t
of
sur prise now lost, ma naged
to secure a brid gehead only af ter a ha rd Iighr, the Egy
pt
ians only being finally driven back whe n the
crossbow-ar
med
Fr
ank
ish in f
antr
y began to cross b)' their hast ily comple ted causeway towards
nightfa ll, By thi s time at least a third of the knights were dead and man y mo re were without horses, and
alth ough they succeeded in ho lding the bridgehea d against a fie rce night-a ttack the Franks no longer
had th e st rength 10 advance furt her. 3 days later another Egypt ian
at t
ack was repulsed afte r heavy
fighting in which me con tingen ts of the Military Orders were almost annihila te d,
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Aft er ano
ther
8 weeks, with disease ram pant throu gh out th e Franki sh ca m p, the presence o f an
Egyp tia n flo tilla o n the ca nal in t hei r rear pre ve nt e d further supplies ge t t ing t hrough fro m Dami etta and
finally forced Loui s to with draw . Ra cked by disease and hunger th e Franks we re su rro unded a nd
d e st roye d as the y withd rew a
fter
a running ba tt le wit h t he Egyp tia ns. When t hey rinall y surrendered
th e sic k an d weak p erhaps to talli ng 7,00 0 ) wer e massac red by their ca ptors. Of t he o ther 2
0, 0
0 0 or so
survivors Louis event ually managed to negoti ate th e re lease o f 12,000 by t he surrender of Dami ett a
and the payment of a hu ge ranso m of o ne mill ion go ld be aa nts.
Although Lou is remain ed ac tive in Ou
tremer
for a fu
rthe
r 4 years his arm y ne ver again e xceeded a bout
1,400 men a nd the disaster o f El Ma nsurah ef fect ively ended the Se venth Crusade.
PELAGONIA 12 59
In 125 9 N lchacl
o f Epirus for me d an allia nce
with
Achaia and Sicily against the Nicae a n Empire,
prin cipall y to disp ute Nicaea s possessio ns in t he Balkans. Against t his array a Nicaea n
army
was mu stered
unde r t he
Emper
or s half-b
roth
e r J o hn Palaeologus, co mprised o f 1,500 Hungarians,
30 0
Germ a ns, 6
00,
1,000 o r 5,00 0 Se rbs, 500-1 ,500 T ur ks, 4
,000
Cumans and Ala ns an d an unknown number of Bulgars
all these co n tingents being cavalry), as well as Stavs a nd Anat olian Greeks, probably to talli ng in all
20-25,00 0 men . Jo hn s princi pal reliance was placed in t he va riou s co ntingen ts of horse-archers, who
pr ior to th e ba tt le persistently har rassed the Epirotes and th eir allie s and pe rm itted th em no rest day
o r night.
Th e Eplrote s t hemselves num bered so me 8, 000 cava lry and 18,00 0 infantry. Of the ir allies t he Ac haians,
unde r Prince William Villehardouin, mustere d a n equ al number of cavalry an d 12,00 0 inf an t ry , an d th e
Sicilians 400 first-class heavy cava lry, pro bably o n barded horses, an d perhaps 2,600 Sarace n archers
th is woul d
ex p
lain th e discrepancy in the figur es of 40 0 and
3, 0
00 Sicilian s qu o ted by Akrop olites and
Pac hyrneres res pec tively ]. T he
Ephot
es a lso included an unk nown nu m ber o f Vlachs under Michael s
son J ohn. T he to tal all ied force s th erefo re mu stered in e xcess of 50, 00 0 men .
Ito weve r, t heir advantage in nu mb ers was negat e d by dis
trus
t and dissension a m on gs t the various
co ntingents - William, fo r inst a nce, was almost certainly ac t ing entirely in his o wn int erests an d , with
his better q uality tr o o ps, proba bly intended to impose his will o n Michael a fter the de fea t of t he
Nicaeans. Mich ael cert ainly suspected the lo yalty of the Achaians and d uri ng t he night before t he
ba il ie larg e n umbers of Epiro tes slipped awa y. Th at sa me night a sq uabble with t he haug ht y Achaians
alie nated th e Vlachs, and th is led t o th eir le ad e r, Jo hn , secretl y se ndi ng messenge rs to the Nicacan
cam p as a result of which it was agreed that he and his troo ps wou ld withdraw from th e line a t th e
co mmencement of battle.
So o n th e morni ng of the bat t le the Achaians seem to have fou nd the mselves
t to face the x tcaeans
alon e , since d uring the nigh t Michaelll himself appea rs to have dese r te d, th e remainder of his fo rce
presu ma bly following su it at firs t light.
is possible that he did in fac t re main , but was inac tive during
th e battle beca use part of his
son s
agreement with t he
xicae
e ns was tha t Michael and the Ep i
rote
s
sho u ld not be a ttacked.I
Prince William at first co nside red e xecuti ng a hasty with d raw al , but failed to do so. Instead t he Fr ank s
drew up in fo rmation and charged. The Nicaea n co unter-attac k was spearheaded by t heir 300 German
merce naries, wh o
were delibe ratel y sac rificed to abso rb t he impact of t he initial Fra nkish charge.
Beco ming inex tricably mixe d with th e Achaian ca valry th ey began to s uff er heavy losses, desp ite a
simulta ne ous atta ck in William s rea r by the Vlachs.
John
Palaeologus t hen o rdered his T urkish, Cum an
and Hungaria n ho rse-arc hers t o fire int o th e whole e ntangled mass o f cavalry, with co mplete disregard
for the lives of the G erma n mercenaries th erein. T heir volleys were direc ted principally at th e Franks
unarmou
re d ho rses, so th at the Acha ian a nd German k night s fe ll in large
number
s beneath t his barrage
as t heir horses wer e mowed dow n. Th e remainder th e n bro k e and fled.
Few ac t ua ll y escaped. Th e batt lefield was lit te red wit h th e co rpses o f t housa nds o f Fr anks, and th ose
who lived we re most ly ca ptured by t he Nicaeans Tu rkish ligh t ca valry. T he
40 0
Sicilian cavalry who,
o ne suspects, p
robab
ly declined to get involved in the one -side d battle since they appear to ha ve
suffered no losses, surrendered to one of the Nicaean gene rals. Prin ce WilIia m himself was t aken captive
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while hiding in a haystack, and 30 of his no bles were also captured . In fact the nob ility o f Achaia were
prac tically ann ihila ted in this on e batt le.
A IN JALUT 1260
An Ilkhanid army of 10.000 cavalry under Kitbugha, ch iefly Mongol-offlcere d Tu rks but including
Georgian and
Cilician Armenian tr oo ps, was defeat ed by a superior force of about 12
,000
Mamluks
which included Khwartzrnians and Bed
oum
auxilia ries supplied by the Ayyu bids of Kerak.
Th e Mam luks sent forward an advance guard o f Egyptian t roo ps specially chosen fo r t heir un reliability
and poor morale ; these were
comm
anded by the amir Baibars, now com
man
de r-i
n <
hief of the Mamluk
army. As anticipated, they broke and ran in the face o f the Mongols ar row sto rm and first cha rge,
drawing Kitbugha on int o a pre-planned ambush in the hills where the bulk
of
the Mamluk army under
Sultan QulUZawait ed them, filling
the
valley f
rom
side to sid e. These withstood the Mongol charge
and success fully enveloped their fla nks. The flee ing Egypt ians o f the first line now also rallied and
returned to the fray.
Despite their inferior it y in numbers the Mongols nea rly succeeded in brea king through, the batt le
rema ining in th e balance until midday when they were rout ed in a fina l counter-a ttac k. T hey rallied
once near Betsan, hut br
oke
aft er ano ther fierce figh t. Th ose that co uld fled , but th ey suffered severe
losses in the pursuit , which took the Mamluks 30 0 mi les to the very banks of the Euphrates. Kitbugha
himself was either killed in battle or cap tu red af ter his horse had been sho t unde r him and promp tly
executed, his head being used for an imp romptu game of polo
Not long after this victory Baibars had Qu tuz murdered and himself procl aimed Sultan,
JAULAN 1261
A large Templar force
under
the Marshal,
com
prising most of the kingdom s breth ren
th
e co ntingen t
of the main convent being joined by the garrisons of Safed , Beaufort and Chateau Pelerin], plus lay
knights under Jean
d
lbe lin and the Marshal of the Kingdom , mou nted a raid against a large
Tw
coman
encampmen t near Tiber ias. Th e Turcom ans, however, go t wind of their ad vance and soundly repulsed
them , presumably in an ambush. In addition to those killed 16 Templars were captured , plus Jean
d
Jbelin and several other counts and lay kni ghts. the Templars in addition losing all their ha rness ; the
prison ers were ransomed for 20,000 bezants. The Templar Marshal was blamed for the de feat and
t
emp
orarily lost his hahil and was removed fro m o ffice.
MAKRY PLAGI 1264
A Byzantine army, including
Tzak
o nes, Stavs and Turk ish cavalry, was defeated while campaigning against
the
Achalan
Franks.
Th e Byzant ines 6 ,000 Turk ish aux iliaries, disgruntled because the ir pay was 6 mo n ths in arrears, decided
to offer their ser vices to the Franks, who readily accepted. The Franks then advanced towards Kalamata,
but o n the rising crest of the pass
of
Makryplagi their vanguard was amb ushed by the Byzantine forces.
The Franks we re twice repulsed as fresh Byzantine uni ts successi vely eme rged from ambush, bu t o n their
third att empt they successfu lly sto rmed the ridge when the Tu rkish auxiliaries simultaneously appeared
in the rear of the Byzan tines and rou te d them. Seeing th is t s Byzantine units still concealed in hiding
panicked and abandoned their position s.
The Byzantine co mmanders, the Grand Domestic Phill s
and
Makre nos, we re cap
ture
d toge ther with 354
nobles and o fficers
and
5,030 o the r ranks. Philes died in cap tivi
ty ,
while Makrenos was blinded by the
Byzantines
afte r his release, fo llowi ng acc usations o f collabo
ration
with the Franks.
CAROU BLlER 1266
Following Mamluk raid s through Gali lee , King Hugh II1o f Cyprus ( regen t of Jerusalem) launched a
cou
nter-raid towards Tibenas, mustering the co ntingents of the Military Orders and the mercenary
French regimen t fro m Acre . However the vangua rd, including the Hospitallers, becom ing careless and
getting separa ted fro m Ihe main a rmy in search of loo t, was ambushed by the garrison o f Safed. 45
breth ren were killed in the batt le, while many of these who escaped were massac red in a nigh t attac k
on thei r cam p by local Bedouins.
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ALBISTAN 127 7
To th wart a p
rojecte
d invasio n
of
Syr ia by
the
Ilkhanids, Baibars
ent
er e d t he Jilia n and in
terce
p ted th e
IIkhanid ar my , wh ich was co m prise d o f the Mon gol garr ison
of
R um , divisions un d er T u k uz each
of 1,0 0 0 or mo re men , includ ing 3,00 0 Georgia ns) a nd proba bly a similar nu mbe r o f Ru mi T ur ks u nd er
t he Per vana Kee per o f t he Seals ) Suleiman. T he IIkha n Abaqa had , in fact , been forewarne d of t he
Mam lu k a tt a ck by Kin g Leo III of Ciltcla , b u t th e Pervana -
who
was hatch ing an am bitious pl
ot
of
his own - de liber ately suppressed th e in form a t io n a nd lulled the Mo ngols into a false sense of sec uri ty
so th at when the Ma mlu k army ap pea red
it
ca ugh t the Mongols un prepared.
T he
2
ar mies met at Albist an. T he ad van tage was wit h Bai ba rs from t he ou
tset
since h is ar my n u mbered
in excess
of
3
0 0
0 0 me n,
but
t he Mongo ls gained
some
headway before the Mamluks p ut t hem t o
flight ;
prob
a bly th e terra in wa s no l su it a ble fo r t he Mongols mode o f warfa re , and J o h n Ba got Gl uhb
says t hat they in fac t fo ught o n foo l bec ause of t he mountainous ter rain. What ever t he reason , t he
Mongols wer e routed wit h ap palling losses; 6 ,77 0 Mo ngols and 2,0 00 Georgia ns we re killed, inc ludi ng
T u k uz, a nd th e Seljuks proba bly suffe red
about
t he sa me number of casualties. In addi tion
Baibars executed a ll t hose Mongols w ho we re taken pri soner,
though
he spa red the Se ljuks.
Soo
n a fte r, hearin g o f
the
ap
proa
c h, o f a mu ch la rger Mongol
a rmy
un d er
Abaqa
himself, Baibars
with dre w to Syria. Aba qa t he n had th e t reacherous Perva na Sulei man arrested a nd pu t on trial; he
was fou nd guilty no t o nly o f deserting t he army in t he face o f the enemy bu t a lso of actually arra nging
fo r t he Mamluk invasion, a nd was pro mptly e xec uted as a trai to r .
HO MS 128 1
2 Mongol arm ies invaded Syria u nde r Ilk han Abaqa and his bro t her Mangu Tim u r. While the
former
proceeded 1 subdue the Marnlu k frontier fort rcsscs al
on g
th e Eu phrates, Ma ngu was joined by Georgian
and
Cilici a n Arm e nia n t roo ps under
the
ir kings Dimil ri an d Leo I Ru mi Sd j u ks, and a
sma
ll n umber
of
Hospita ller s
from
a l-Marqab a nd proceeded dow n
the Orontes
valley wit h his army 3 0
80 0
0 0 strong,
the G eorgia ns and Armenians co nst ituting abou t o ne-
third
o f t he to ta l p erh aps 30,
00 0
me n) . O utside
Horns they encoun
tered
t he Mamluk arm y un der
Sultan
Qala un .
T he
Marn
lu
s
nu mbering 50 60 000, fo rmed up with a l-lIa lqa, Ro yal Mamlu ks and Egypt ians in the
cen tre, Bedouins and Ayyubids from Ha mah a nd Ker a k 011 the righ t a nd Sy rians and Turcomans on the
left, wh ile Mangu dr ew u p with the Mongols formi ng the centre and left an d the bu lk of the a llied
conti ngents - Cilicians, Georgians an d Hospitallers - consti t uti ng the right Flank.
Des
pite
hea vy losses t he Ch ris tia ns
of
t he Mo ngol right routed t heir
u rcornan
oppo nen ts
and
the
I
: OOO
men
of
t he Mamluk left fla nk ea rly in the ba ttl e a nd p ursued t he m from t he fie ld r igh t up to t heir ca mp
be fo re t h e ga tes
of
Ho rns , where t he y killed many more. Man y
of
th e su rvivors th en fle d on to wards
Egyp t, while the vic t
ors
loo ted the aba ndoned
camp.
T h e Mongol ce n t re wit h w hich
they
ha d now lost
to uc h meanwhile cont inued to press the Ma mlu ks, until a Mamlu k officer, pretendi ng 10 desert ,
succeeded in pe ne trating the Mo ngol ran ks an d wo unded a nd un horsed Mangu. Simu ltaneously a band
o f 300 Be do uin auxi liaries attacked th e Mongo l le ft flank and proceeded to plunder the baggage t rain.
Unnerv ed and fe
aring
encirclement Mangu orde red a with drawal, and the Marnlu ks la
unched
a fin al
ch arge t o cle a r the fiel d. Whe n t h e iso la
ted
Armen ians and Georgians learn t
of
th is th ey im
mediate
ly
turned bac k t o rejo in t he main ar my, passing so close
10
Qa laun s com mand
post
- where th e S ultan
had a guard o f o nly 1,000 men - Ihat he had to
conce
al his s
tandards
and silence h is dr u ms for fear
o f d isco very. But on ce t hey had passed he fe ll u po n t heir rear and h a rassed th eir withdrawa l so t hat
the y suffered heavy losses as they foug ht t heir way ou t , especially since t hey also bu m pe d in to th e
Mamlu k right fla n k as it re turned fr
om
it s successful p u rsuit of Mangu. In fac t Mon gol losses suffered
du ring the
pursuit
we re ap
parently
heavier t han durin g th e ba ttle , b ut Mamlu k losses had also been
heavy.
ACRE 1291
Encouraged by rio ts within the cit y, a Mamlu k ar my o f 6
0 000
ca va lrY 100·160,OOO infant ry and
92 siege-e ngines co mmenced t he siege of Acre on Ap ril 5. T he Frank is h garrison, un der the absent
King Henry Il s br
ot
her Amalr ic , consisted of o nly 7-900 knig h ts and 14-18,0 0 0 infan try co mp rised
o f the Military O rders, Syria n an d Cy prio te Fr an ks, th e me rce nar y Fr ench regime n t u nde r J e a n de Grailly,
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an English contingent u n der a Swiss m
er
ce nary o ffice r named
Ot t
o d e G ran d iso n, Pisans, Venelians an d
t h e Co mmune
of
Acre . Rei nfo rcemen t s o f 200 k nights a nd 500 in
fantry
under King Henry him self arrive d
from Cy prus o n May 4 .
On Ma y I S, 6 week s a fte r t he
commencement
o f th e siege, th e cit y s
ou ter
wall fell,
undermi
ned and
breac hed in seve ral places by th e Moslem engines, an d t hou gh t he bre
thre
n o f the Military Ord er s we re
a t first successful in dr iving
out
the Mamluk s, by eve ning the F ranks had bee n for ced t o wit hdraw
behind th e in ner walls . J ust 3 days lat er th e inne r wall was also breached in t he vici nity o f the Accursed
T
ower
and the Mamluk s fought
the
ir way in to th e ci t y in the face
of
s tiff o p positio n fro m t he Military
Orders in particula r, t he Temp lar Gra nd Master and t he Marsha l o f the Hospit al bei ng a m
on
gst those
kille d in t he ch ao t ic s tr ee t-f igh t in g whi ch e nsued . Bu t the M
amlu
ks pe netra
tion
to t he in ner ci ty
mar ke d th e e nd
of
orga nised
resistance.
King Hen ry, Am alric and so me o t h er s, including J ea n de
Grai
lly an d O n o de Gra ndison , escaped by
shi p t o Cy prus ,
bu t
mo st of
t he def
enders and a huge numbe r of ci t izens died in th e s
treets
o r were
cap
tured an d so ld in to slavery Th e su rviving Tempta rs and o the r ref ugees
con
ti nued t o ho ld out from
their for t r ess by th e sea un d er t he c
ommand of
their Marshal, but on May 28, 10 days a fter the fa ll o f
the ci ty , th eir d
ef
ences wer e breach ed as a res ult
of
unde rmi ni ng and in cess an t bombard men l. 2,000
Mamluks the n storm ed t he b reach , on ly 10 bring the cru mb ling walls down on Moslem and C hr isti a n
alike .
T he Frank s abandoned T yr e the day afte r the fall o f Acre, and Beirut an d
Sidon
fell to the Mam lu k s in
J uly. With ju st 2
exce
ptions no ves tige o f the mai nla nd c rusader sta tes remained by th e end
of
t he
sum
mer, t he ex
cep
tions b ei ng t he lordship
of
Je bail, wh ic h su rvived u ntil 1298, a nd the
offs
hore T emplar
fo r tres s o f Ru ad at To rtosa. which fe ll in 1303,
WADI AL-KHAZINDAR SALAMIYET) 129 9
Th
e co nversion o f the Ilkh an id Mon gols to Islam in 1295 did lit tle
or
n
ot
hing 10 lesse n th e ir enmi ty
t owards th e M amlu ks, and in 1299 th e Ilkha n
Ghazan
Mahmu d launched ye t a no
ther
Mon gol invasio n
o f Syria. T h is
time
t hey we re intercep ted by the M
amlu
k ar my a t Wad i a l-Khaz
indar
. T he Mo ngol army ,
which in
clud
ed Geo rgians and 5,
000
Cilician s, is recorded as 100,000 st ro ng but was in Iac t much
smaller , possibly fe we r in number
tha
n th e Mamlu ks 20-40,000.
Ih
e Maml u ks we re led by Su ltan Mohammed , bu t si nce he was
only
a child a
senio
r
amir
, Sa lar, took
co mmand on th e ba rrlefietd, Il l fo rmed
the
Ma mlu k for ces up with 5,000 Bedouin a uxiliari es o n t heir
r ight Ilan k, t aking com mand o f t he ce n tre h imself while ano the r
senior amir
, Bektash, co m ma nde d
the
d t
T he Mongols deci ded to remain o n the
defe
nsive and wer e
or
de red 10 s tan d fast unti l Gh azan
himself led t he c harge.
F or so me reason t he Mamluk s decided t o rel y o n t heir swo rds an d maces and p u t t heir lances and
bow s?) aside. T heir adva nce was p re
ceded
by
mount
ed
eng
inee rs eq ui
pped
with naptha tubes , b u t
t hese see m to ha ve had no ef f ect and co nseq uen tly the cava lry cha rged. Bek t ash successfully br o ke the
Mo ngol right and pu rsue d it fr o m the fiel d ,
bu t
o n t he o pposi te flan k t he Mamlu ks me t fie rce
resist ance, the Mongols having d ismounted 10 ,000 o f
thei
r men who no w sto o d be hind th eir horse s a nd
pou red volley s o f arrows in to the c harging Mamluk s. T he Bedo uin s an d Syrian co n t inge nts see m t o have
su ffe re d par ticul arly severely , lo sin g large n
umbers of
ho rse s, a nd wer e fo rced to fall bac k.
Th ou gh st ill h ard-pressed by Sa lar , G haaa n chose t h is mo me n t to la un ch h is cc u n re r-a t tac k. T he elit e
Mam lu k Burjiyyah re gi me n t br
oke
in t he first c harge, and a fter a br ief e ngagement a sec o n d c harge
routed t he res t o f t h e Mamluks. Th e Mo ngol p urs uit took some as far as G aza a nd J erusale m, while in
ad di tion 12,000 Leb anese Dru zes se rio usly harassed the Mam lu ks as they withd rew . Mo ngol casualt ies
ap pea r 10 have to talled
some
14 ,000 me n.
Damascus fe ll 10 Gh a zan early in 1300 , and fo r a while t here seemed a possibility that
Chr
istendom
stoo d a c ha nc e o f rega ining Sy ria by an alfiun ce with the Ilk ha n w ho , Mo slem t hough he was ,
w
oul
d have welco med Ch rist ia n a llies. No thing was d o ne howeve r, a nd the o p por t u nity evap or ated
afte r th e Mo ngols de fea t by th e Mam lu ks a t Shaqhab in 1303. In 1308 his successo r O ljeitu act ually
rea ched J erusalem itsel f and r um o ur had it th at he wou ld have handed th e cit y o ver in e xch ange fo r
a Chr istian all iance . Bu t no such all ianc e was
offe
red , a nd th e death in 1304 of the p rn-C
hns
tian IIkh an
Gh azan reall y en ded for eve r th e c han ce o f a Mon gol-bac ked crusade r kingdom.
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DRESS AND EQUIPMENT
2
3
1
2. PILGR IMS
Th e dis tinguishing fea tu re of all crusaders was the cross, worn on the shoulders of the ir mantles or
cassocks or tunics o nce the y had declared th eir inte nt ion to go o n a crusade.
Alt hough the sho ulde r or right breast seem to have been the most commo n places to wear the cross it is
also reco rded worn be tween the sho ulde rs (a ppa rently signi fying th e pilgrim to be return ing from
crusade). It normally co nsisted o f a cruci form piece of clo th sewn o nto every day clo thes. Traditiona lly
it was red in co lour hu t, although this was generally th e case , by th e Third Crusade of 1189 -119 2 cert ain
co lours had begun to ado p t nati ona l mean ing - red for th e French , green fo r the Flemish, whit e for
the English an d yellow for the Germans. To a cer tain extent these dist inctions lasted into the 13th
century when , for ex am ple, Simo n de Montfor
t
s a
rmy
at Lewes in 126 4 wore the whit e cross of the
crusader , while the Fr ench who fought against Manfred of Sicily in 1266 wore red crosses ( the
en terprise having been declar ed a crusade). By the very end of this period, however , the red cross had
become a national insignia of no t the F rench but the English, while co nversely the white cross (often
on a blue backgrou nd ) was nationally adopted by the French ra the r than the English Undoubtedly
cr osses of an y co lour could be found in any army at any time, depending on what material was to
hand at the moment of ta king the cross ; man y nobili ty, for instance , wore crosses of such subs ta nce
as woven gold.
These figures are ty pical of the non-comba tants who accompanied the early crusades in vast numbers.
Bot h da te to c. 1170 and wear everyday cloth es. T hey carry the character ist ic s taff an d wa llet or
scrip-hag, the latt er suspende d from a shou lder-stra p.
Although some carr ied a how or spe ar most were unarm ed or o nly poorly equipped with farm implements.
and it is a hear t-fel t plea from more th an one contempora ry chro nicle r that more such pilgrims of the
early crusade armies migh t have been equipped w it h th e swo rd ins tead of th e wallet and the ho w instead
of the sta
ff
3. FRANKISH KNIGHT c. 1097
Th e development of armo ur in the crusader states followed exa ctly Ihe same course as in Euro pe. Since
th is has already bee n discussed in Arm ies of Feudal Europe it is no t in tended to cover the subject in
de t
ail again and the following 6 figures sho uld be taken on ly as a represent ative sele ction.
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6
a
is gene rally a
ccep ted,
qu ite r ight ly. that k nigh ts o f th e F irst Crusade a
nd,
10 a lesser ex tent th e
Second Crusa de wou ld have bee n lit t le differen t from th e Norman knights depic ted in the Bayeu x
Ta pestry and t his co nclusion is borne ou t by th is figur e who t hough he da te s 10 t he mid-12t h century
represents a knight o f the F irst Crusade. Il l. car ries a kite-shield wen
s
a co n ical helmet with or with o u t
nasal} and a kn ee-length - . sleeved haub rk and is a rm ed w it h lance and sword.
Il
l.
ca r ries t he c rusade r de vice o n helm
et
an d go nfalon an d co u ld also have had pai nt e d on his sh ield.
An E nglish knight of the Fi rst C rusade is described as having crosses o n his helmet shield. sa dd le a nd
horse
acco
utre ments and cert a i nly d uring th e earlier crusad es kn ights carr ied t he cross device c hiefly
o n shield and /o r hel me t. S hield s were o the rwise pa inted in br igh t co lo u rs and pa tt erns man y
probably rese mh li ng Baye ux Ta pest r y type s; Albe rt of A ix desc rib ing cr usad ers a t Antio c h in 109 7
spea ks of shie lds o f gold green red a nd ot her colours.
At what sta ge cr usade rs wh o stayed o n in the Hol y La nd gave u p wearing the cross is a n u nan swerable
qu estion . A ppar e nt ly so me never did th oug h seems probable t ha t t he majo rit y of se tt lers d id so so o n
a fter ful fi lling thei r pilgr im s vo ws.
4 . FRANK ISII KN IGHT
c.
1 150
Th is figure is very litt le
diffe
rent from t he last t ho ugh in ac
corda
nce with prevailing fash i
on
h is tu nic
as well as his haube rk is so mew ha t lo nger. T h e hauberk no w has wrist-le ngth sleeves which bec a me
standard in th e co urse of IIn
12
th cen tu ry. Th e cross is again in eviden ce o n his helme t.
Light er form s of ar mou r such as th is w
oul
d have remained in u se amo ngst se rgeants for much o f t his
era.
5. FRANKISlI KN IGHT c. 1 189
T his fig ure is based o n t he seal of t he most fam ou s c rusader o f the m all King Richard I o f England
know n 10 post
erit
y as Richard Coe
cr
de Lion - Richard t he Lion -Heart. The seal was probably ex ecuted
imm ediately prior to his depa rtu re fo r t he Third Cr usade.
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T he sleeves of the ha ube rk no w have mail mill ens attached , and in ad di tio n separate mail d ef en ces
called hose n or c hausscs} arc worn to pr
ot
ect t he legs. Cha usses ha d bee n in use since the mid l th
centu ry bu t o nly ca me in to widespread use
abo
ut a
centu
ry la
ter
ce rta in ly the y we re standard
equipment
for wealthie r knights hy th is dat e, a nd the aut
hor
o f the lt inerarium Regis Ricar d] no tes
with ala rm how Richard wen t in to b attle at Ja ffa without his ch ausses.
Ilis helmet is he misp herical rather than co nical ; a flat- topped varie t y co u ld also be wo rn , an d Sa, from
Richa rd s sec ond seal o f a fe w yea rs later , sho ws a nother t y pe of hel me t with a face -guard, jus t
beginn ing to
appear
at about t his d ata; no te also the e arly c rest. Another earl y occ urre nce of a crest is
in a n inci de n t at t h e siege o f Tyre in 118 7, wh ere a knight is recorded wit h a pair o f stag santlers
to his helmet.
T h e shield displ ays Richard s heraldic de vice ,
two
ramp ant lio ns facing each o ther , which also appeared
on t he back of his sad d le. Herald r y evolved in abo ut the mid- 12th century and , in Outremer, may have
bee n e ncou raged by th e Sarace ns use of perso nal dev ices.
6. FR NK ISH Kl \IGHT c. 12 50
By 123 0 the h elmet t y pe de pic ted in Sa had evolved in t o th e barrel-helm the casq ue o r hca ume j
de p ic te d her e , padded o n th e inside and with ey e-slits and bre a t hi ng holes pier ced in t he mas k. A
q uilted head -defen ce, t he arming cap , was usually wo rn under the coif from c. 1200 onwards .
O th er di fferences from the las t figur e are the addition
of sur
coa t and cuisses. T he former was m os t
probably adop ted in im ita tio n of Sara cen dress, poss ib ly as ea rly as e. 1 127 whe n a knigh t is re corded
by Usarnah ibn-Mu nqi d h to have worn a lon g, sleeved green a nd yello w silk co at o ver h is a
rmo
ur. Its
use was pro b ably fa r mo re widespread in O ut remer t han in Eu rope , whe re it was not widely worn u n til
t he ea rly- 13th ce n tu ry. It was usually sleeveless and at f irst plai n in co lour, b ut afte r t he in troduct ion
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11
of heraldry
it
oft en disp layed the wear
er s
heraldic device. In Ihis pa rti cula r instance tht su rcoar, as
well
:IS
the lance
penn
on , displays crosses. The upslanding cross at each shoulder may indic
at e
he is
weating s
om e
form of reinforced leather cuiri or iron breatpla te
under
the surcoat.
Cuisses weTe
qui ll ed t ube
s w
or n
over the thighs as add itional pr
ot e
ction . They first
appear
c. I 220 an d
arc common thereafter.
7. FRANKISH KNIGItT
c.
1275
Taken from th e w-alof Jo hn de Monlfort, lor d of Ty re and T
or o
n 270-1283 , this figure show s little
change from 6 ex cept th at he substitu tes a banner for the latter s pen non .
ke 6 he carries a fla t-topped
shid d ( th is type fiu t ap peared c. 114 0 and was the predominant shield-type by the 13th century. its
size de creasing som ewha t as tim e wen t by) .
More interest ing is the cl o
th
co vering for his horse, the housing. In Europe thi s only Iirst appeared c. 1185
bUI
it
may have ap peared in
Ou t
r
em e
r at a som ewhat earlier date under Moslem
influence
(see
93 ,
some
Frank
ish hOUlS possibly wearing
ho u
sings at Hatnn in 1187. Qu it e probably some consis ted o f several
layers or wer e quilted . in which case they wou ld have been quite capable o f
st o
pping Tu rk ish ni ght
arr ows
except
at close range. The housi ng was also
useful
(or displaying the rider s hera ldic device,
for which purpose it was already bei ng used
for
the en d of the 12th century.
8. FRANKISH KNIGHT
c.
1290
This figure, based o n mss. illustrated in Acre be tween 1280 and 1291, sho ws how knights we re equ ipped
du ring the kinlldom s closing yea rs. The barrel-helm has bee n replaced by a ty pe called a sugar-loa f
afte r ilS shape (t hough th e heaume also remained in use) and he carr ies a cross-emblazoned shield.
Colo urs of cross and field on crusader shields in the Acre mss. ind ica te that practically an y co lour
co mbinat ion was poss ible, irrespective of he raldic rules , including red on black , brown on red, red on
mauve. blue on ye llow, e tc. The cross itself also ap peared in diverse forms an d shapes.
An ached to his chausses are iron poleyns ( knee-guards), which could also
be
attached to the q uilted
cuisse. Ot her pieces of plate-armour in use by th is t ime bUI un
commo
n until the 141h cent ury were
70
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co uters
elbo
w-guards which, like poleyns, probably first ap peared c. 1225) and sch
yn b
alds {greaves,
pr o
tect ing eithe r the front or both fro nl and back o f the lower leg). There were also shoulde r pieces
called aile ttes which first appeared c. 1270 , bu t these we re of lea ther ra ther than met al; the ir
defensive value remains questionab le.
9 . FRA NKISH MOUNTED SERGEANT
In addit ion to knigh ts the re were also ar
mo u
red horsemen of lesser statu s available to the Fr ank ish
host, re ferred to variously in the sources by the terms milites gregarii, milites plcbei, cq uites lcvis
arma turac , serjans
cheval and servte nres lor icati am ong
othe
rs; all refer to mo
unte
d men o f less than
knightly status including sergeants (servientes) , the no n-knight ly elements of nob lemen s re t inues and
pro bably the wealt hier burghe rs o f th e tow ns. They are no t alway s easy to find in th e so urces, which
often list only t he n um ber of knight s prese nt , excepting, as Fu lchcr of Chartres admits in o ne passage,
those who were not counted as knights although th e) were mounted.
T hey were less heavily equip ped than the knights he nce Ievis arma tu rae ) , wearing lighte r o r old
fash ioned armour hut carrying the same a
rmame
nt o f lance and swo rd. This mid- f
Jr h
century figure
fro m Matthew Paris dr awings o f crusade batt les is probab ly fair ly typ ical.
In stric t feudal terminology
th e
sergeant was, by t he late-
12th
cen tury, the holder of a grant of land
called a sergean ty ( in Europe usually half th e size of a knight s fee) , but co ntempo rary chroniclers
mo re often tended to use the word- sergean t and its variants as blanket
-ter
ms fo r all non-knigh tly
soldiers,
often
no t even distinguishing between mounted men and infant ry. Turco poles too are
sometimes described as sergea nts.
1
0,1
1
,1 2
13. FRA NKISfI INFANTRYMEN
Infan try in the crusader stat es ranged from pilgrims armed with no more
than
spear or bow (see I and 2),
th
ro u
gh to well-armed and a
rm o
ured mercenaries an d feuda l retainers, th e la
tt e
r e lements comprising th e
la rgest percentage o f foot-soldiers in
most
armies, arme d chiefly with spear, bow or crossbow though
some may have been eq uipped with both spe ar
an d
bow. The Anonymi Gesta Franc
orum
records
crossbows in use as early as the First Crusade, as does Ann a Comnena, and certa inly by th e middle 10
late- Lj th century the crosshow was th e weapon par excellen ce of th e Frankish infan tryman.
10 and I I are based on desc riptions o f th e 12t h century. Beha cd- Din, writing of Frankish infan try at
Arsouf in 119 1, desc ribes how they were clo thed in a kind of th ick fel t , and mail corselet s as
am p
le as
they
were s trong, wh ich protec ted them again st arr ows. I have see n men with up to 10
arro ws stuck in th eir bodies marching no less easily for tha t. Ambroise, de scrib ing t he same battle,
likewise records that the infantr y were a rmed qu ite well ac cording to the cu s
to m
of foo t-sold iers,
(w
it h
) head protected by an iro n cover, (and ) a hauberk and a linen tun ic padded man y times and
difficult to pene trate, ingeniously worked wit h a needle and consequently called in the vernacu lar a
Pourpo int. Such q uilted corselet s, t
ho u
gh known in Europ e for several cen tu ries, o nly came into
widespread use d uring the Crusades t
hrou
gh co ntac t with the Moslems, amongst whom quilted armou r
was a
stand
ard form of body -defen
c e I
see note 35 -38 ); the Moslems called it al-Qutun , li
te r
ally
c
ott
on , a te rm which the Fr an ks soon co rrupted to Aketon (see figures 26-28 in Armies of Feudal
Eu rop
e )
. G ambeson was an alte rna t ive term tha t first ap peare d c. 1160 , possibly d iffering
from th e ake to n in having sleeves. Basically all such arm our consisted of a leather , line n or woollen
tunic padde d wit h woo l, cott on and old rags and qu ilted eit her vertically or diagona lly.
12, based on illust rat ions in an Acre ms. of c. 1280, gives a general idea of the ap peara nce
of
such
armou
r,
in this instance
1
such cor selets being worn one over the o ther (possibly ake to n over gambeson). Figure
13, similarly dating to
th e
la te-13th century, subs ti tutes mail co rselet and surcoat. Both wear mail
chausses in addit io n.
Unlike spearmen, crossbcw men and arc hers appa rently car ried no shields. Although most shield s were
like
th o
se of 10 and 12 it should be no te d
that
some o f the mss. illum ina ted in Acre as late as
1290
· 129 1 show circular shields in use amongst Fra nkish infantry, on e ms. o f 128 7 even
depi
cting oval
shields such as 12a .
T he clo thes o f Franks in Out remer were o f co t to n. wool, line n an d silk. Colours were generally bright,
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a
principally fed, H C O an d y el lo w, a nd a ls o
bl
ack, those
of
th e
UPrc'Tclasses
often being richly
cmhwido:rcd in r.olJ a nd c ol oured thread. Th
Fran ks W(' TC' generally cleanshaven by the
mid·
:: Ih
cent u ry . o n e co n temp or ary
pilgrim no
ling
t hat of all
th e p<'orlcs
of Outreme r t hC y 'ar e t he o nl y
one who sh llve rh beard
Fo r o
ther
infantrymen
of
thi' . era see 'Armies
of
Feudal Europe', In 3ddilion . in crusading armies
many
knlgh ls were Ir qu nl ly reduced to the roll'
of
in fan
tr y
tly
th e 10000s
o f their horses.
1-' . T URCOPO l E
Turcopnlcs 111
...
r Sy rian me rce naries em p loyed in considerable numbers b ' th e :Iol ilitary Orders
well a hy th e kinll and Frankish no bilit y.
Des
pite
111\' sra temc
ms
o f R. C Smai l in his '
Crusading
\l rfu c th at t here see ms litt le j us t ification
in
assuming,
on the ha§i§ o f
rhe s ca nt y i n fo
rma
ti o
n usually
quo
ted.Y ha t all Turcopoles were bo rn
ho
rse
me n
an d
c l ~ r s
and ,
of
hor se-archery, '
th a
t thenr is no reason 10 su p
po s
e Iha t many na
uvcs
o f
Sy ria wer e adept in us uve , it s
eems
fairly ce rtain that the Tu rcnp
nl c
s were a ll
hors
e
me n
and that
all hou gh nol a ll were oeco:ssari ly ar med with a bo w by far th e major ity we re. Th ose OIl Sarm in in 11 15
were ce rla inly arche rs, an d Usamah ibn-Munqid h act ua lly ca lls th e T urco polcs ' th e archers o f Ihe
Fra nks : in a
ddit
io n a ch
ronic
ler of me Third Crusade, describing an engagemen t w
it h
Hyzun
nn
c t roops
on Cyprus. wro te like a swift T
ut c
o polc d id the Emper
or
r i.Il , an d sho t 2
ar r
ows
l rhe
king.
Funh cr Ihat
they
wen' mounted ma y be infer red
Irom
Ill,' w
or d
ing
of
Mns
km
t rea t ies, suc h
as tho se o f I ( , 7 , I and I
all o f which eq ua te 'a knigh t for a kn ight , a Turco pole f
or
a Turcopole,
a
merchant
fo r a
me r
chant ,
fo o
t-soldier fo r a foot -soldier'. S
aladin.
dic ta ting terms for Ih,' s
urrende
r
o f Ja Ha in
1 1 < ~ , l i
~ eq uat ed knigh t fo r horseman, fool -sold ier fo r fo
ot
-soldie r and Turco p
cl e
for
ligh t-armed so l.lk r ; in all
these
tns tanc s rh very specific f oot-soldier fo r foo l-so ld ier' d e ar ly excl udes
the 1 UreOl'II1\ 5, by which \l e may
lake
it the y were mo unted. William of Tyre states q
uite
s pe,ifica lly
that they w... re ' lill.hl· r
me ,
1 horsemen',
Al firs l Ihe y we re prohahl)' ma inly ha lf-hr ds, Syr ian nanves
an d
Turk ish co nverts. hUI la te r they
included
a ,rea l ma ny Po ulain se rgeants who wer e pro bab ly eq uipped 10 figh l Sar u
ce n
-Ias
hi o
n,
Dr. J. Riley-Smilh s u g j ; ~ s
th a
t by the l J th
cent
u ry th e 100Tm Tu rco pol e
r d e
rred 10
th e
func tion
ra
ther
t ha n the race of the hol
de r
' .
In addition 10 111
0:
bow the Turco poles wo uld have carried J ligh t lance alllUor Javeli ns plus a swor d and
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16
p ossib ly a mace. Whe ther t he y wen. ar
mo u
red or no l is a mo o t point. As alr eady s een. William of T y re
a nd Salad in bo t h desc ri bed the m as ligh t-ar med , but that is also th e st
andard
contemp orary descr
iption
of Saracens, ma ny o f who m wo re light o r not-so-ligh t armour. T he fact tha t T urc op oles were o fte n
must er ed alo ngside th e knigh ts wou ld te nd to sug gest that the y wo n: light ar mour o f so me desc r
iption,
even i o nly q uilte d al- Qut u ns, a nd it is in tere st ing 10 no te that when G uy de Lusignan first cs tabtished
fie s in Cy p rus in 1 192 th ose of T u rco p oles o wed th e service a man with mail ar
mo u
r as well as 2
h orses).
t see ms p ro bable Iha t t ho se em ployed by t he Militar y Or ders wo u ld have ear ne d so me kin d of recognition
device, pro b
ably
a cr oss
of
t he a
ppro
priate
co
lour ) o n shield a nd / o r tunic. tConrrere bret hren and
mercenaries of t he Or de rs p
robably
ca rried sim ilar devices: we hear , for instance. o f shie lds w it h ch ief
gulc s a cr oss argen t, indica ti ng allegia nce to the Hospitallcrs.)
15 . MA R O N IT E O R SY R IAN C tl R IST
IAN
T h is sh o ws the pro bab le a p pearance of Maro n
ue
s a nd the few Syrian soldiers in Fra nkish armies. T he
nati ve Christ ians wo re t he same basic d ress as Mo sle ms [ Burchard of Mo un t Sio n sa ys t hey we re
disti nguished b y a woollen girdle ) a nd were in fa ct fo rb idd en by legislat io n to wea r Fran kish-st yle
cl o thes. T hey also diffe red from the Fr ank s in growing lo ng bea rds o f whic h t hey we re e xt reme ly
prou d Jac q ues de Vit ry rela ti ng ho w th e y cherish the m w ith grea t cure, and speci all y glory in them ),
T he co mposi te bo w was th e princi pal wea po n o f t he a nd de Vil ry re c o rd s t ha t the fe w
wurhke Syrians also use bo ws and a rrows, hu t are un armourc d and ready fo r run n ing a
way
th ough
t his may be a r
ef
erence to T ur
co p
oles).
Som e Mar o nit e chieftains a tt east fou ght o n horse bac k and wore ar mo u r , and var i
ou
s sources a t test the
la king o f co nside rable am ounts o f ar ms and a rmo u r fro m the Mo slems, whic h
W;l S
undo ub ted ly reused
ar te r ca p t u re. Man y ar mo ured Maro nite s wo uld t herefore have bee n in d ist inguishab le fro m Sar ncens,
a nd
t
was fairly certai nl y fo r the p ur pose of recogni tion t ha t o ne Maron it e chieftai n is recorded as
having the sign o f t he cross o n h is ar
mo u
r. Som e Fra nk ish eq u ipm
en t
was un doubtedl y also in use.
16 , 17 18. CILl CI AN AR MEN I ANS
Th
e Arme ni an pr incipal ities relied c hiefly on ban ds o f paid r et ainer s largel y na tives b u t in
cludi
ng
T ur ks, Persians and Fra n ks ) and milit ia infa n try , In e qu ipm ent and o rganisa tio n F rank ish infl u
ence
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8
soon came to pre dominate (part icu larly under Leo
11
, 1198-1221 ) an d feu dalism was introduce d from
neigh houring Anlim:h , lhc t itles Cunstab l and Baron being adopted in place o f th e old
Spar
apc t and
Nakha rar. In ad di
lio
n there were some Armenian kni ght s even in Edessa and Antioch, of whom 17
is pro hahl y fair ly represen ta tive.
16 and 17. based o n Cilic ian ms. illuminat io ns and one of the Acre mss. of c. 1280, are fair ly ty pical
of Crliclan Armenian borscmen, comprised of the nobility and their re tainers . Both wear mail
corselets, that o f 16 being of a distinct ively lJyzantine design. Frankish eq uipmen t probab ly
prcdom inatcd by the 13th century. some la te - l J th century and earfy -l
at
h century Cilician mss.
showing warriors indist inguishable
from
Fr ankish knights (
tho
ugh simple hel
mets
of
the types
worn here appear to haw bee n worn in prefe rence to t he Frankish heaume}, but it seems likel y that
a
mix
tu r
e
o f Byzantine, Moslem and Frankish gear was in widespread use througho ut most o f t his
era :
figure
ce
rtai
nly be trays evidence of all 3 sty les. Shields were either circular or kit e-shaped, the
lau
ap pa ren tly adopt
...d
pr ior to the Crusa des, probably un der Byzant ine influence.
18, like 17 based on Frankish mss o f c. 1280-1290 , wears typical orien tal garb . Th e cap is o f a type
worn by bo th Jews and Armenians in the so urces and was ap parently a co mmon form of headwear,
even am ongs t Franks. Many Armen ians wore tur ban s, and all wore bea rds. Commonest infantr y
weapons were low and spear.
19 20 21. BR
ETlIR
EN OF TH E MILITARY OR DERS IN lt ABITS
19 wears th e blac k hooded man tle, the cappa cla use, of the Hospital, with a wh ite cross sewn on ;
the
cross, a
dop
ted at some time
befor
e 1153, was p
robably
qu ite small in realit y, Rile y-
Smith
sta ting
it to be o nly
J
or 4 inches dee p. Th e cha racteristic g·po inted cross o f the Hospitallers, shown in 19a ,
seems to have been introduced du ring the first qua rter of th e 13th century bu t did not completely
replace the cross rorm ee and was apparently no t worn with milit ary dress . A blac k skull-cap officia lly
completed the habit , th ough white tur bans were of ten worn in Out remcr . A broad-brimmed hat (l ike
that
of
2) co uld also be worn.
20 wears the habit o f while woo llen tunic, mantle and skull-cap granted to the Poo r Knights of Ch s t-
t he Templars - in 1128 ; prior to thi s da re th y dressed like sec ular knights, wearing d
onate
d cast-offs.
T he red cross was w
or n
by all br
ethr
en fr
om
1147 onwards. Oth er items o f official issue dress included
linen shirts. tunic, breeches and sh
eeps
kin jer kin. In addi tio n, however,
some
breth ren o f bo th Temple
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and Hospital wore more wordly garments such as brigh t silks and gold or silver embro idered clo thes and
tu rbans.
2 1 is based o n the tomb ef figy of Conrad o f Thunngja, lI oc hmeister of the Teutonic Knigh ts I 239 -124 J•
Like the Templa rs - and despite their
op
positi
on
- th ey wo re a while habit, their r igh t to wear this
being secured for them by
the
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick (King of Jeru salem 122S-1228).
The cross was black . Sergeants luter wore a grey habi t with a 3-armed Tau cross like a capita l I
(also called a cru x commissa), and it seems probab le Ihat this dress was also worn in 131h century
Ou tremer. Bea rds were obligatory in all 3 Orders.
Th e following gives br ief details of the othe r Milita ry Orders active in Outremer (see also pages 10-15) :
Order
Knights of the
Hospita l of St Lazarus.
Knights of St Thomas
of Canterb ury at Acre
(St Th
oma
s Aeon ).
Knights of Our l ady of
Mont joie (Knights o f
Tru fac aft er 1187).
Histor y
A leper Order. Established
early-12th ce n
tury
.
Probably turn ed military
c.
1123 .
An English Order.
Established I 191. Proba bly
turned military c. 1220.
A Spanish O rder. Papal
conf irmatio n 1180. Withdrew
from Ou tremer aft er Hattin
in 1187 and returned to
Spain. Absorhed by another
Spanish Order, the Knights
of Calat rava , in \ 12 \ .
Habit
Black ?
White.
White.
Device
Green cross
from 16t h
century.
Red cross wit h
whit e scallo p
she ll at centre.
Part t-c
olc
ured
red and white
cross.
Readers may also be int erested to know that in a crusading treat ise of 130 5 it was proposed that all th e
exi sting Milita ry Ord ers should be united ; had t his been done the new Order s habi t was to have been
black wit h a red cross.
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22
23
:: :: .l 4. KNIGHTS
TEMPlA
R
An avid
admirer
o f th ... T
empter
s. SI Bcrnerd de Clairvaux, proud ly
wrote
in the 1
2th
century that Ihey
wen
:
ill k
empt and
unwa
shed, wi
th
their
beards
wild an d
their
hair c ropped sho
rt ,
r ee king of d ust , soiled
by
their
a r
mo
ur an d the heat : Ill.
vic torlan
adag.
abo
u t cleanliness be ing next 10 Godliness cle arly had
no plac
...
here
is
taken
fro m a map of Jerusale m da ting 10 c.
1170.
li e wears a long, wh ite su
rco
at an d ca rr ies a wh ile
shield
with
a red
cross
paint ed
on
it.
A
cros
s-emb
roide
red sur
coa
t.
apparent
ly ad
op t
ed by th e Templars
relat ively early in th eir hist o ry (som e authorities men
tion
cloaks ), replaced
the
cassoc k on active se rvice;
th is was
white
excep t for conrrcrc bre thren
and
sergean ts. the la tt er
of
whom wo re surcoats
of
black , or
brow n or so me o
the
r pla in
colo
ur. In fact a second figure in the same source wears a dark but o the rwise
ide ntical surcoa t to t hat w
orn
here and , despite
no
c ross being appar
ent
o n his shield, he may well
rep rese nt a sergeant. In all cases
the
cross was red.
co mes fro m fres
coes
o f a simila r da te in the French church
of
Cressac,
depicting
Templa rs fight ing
Sar ace ns. Il l appears 10 wear
eithe
r a lo ng-slecved su
rco
a r or so me form
of
cassock over his a rmour,
though o th crs wea r more typica l sleevele ss surco ats. he mix
tu r
e
of
dress
and the
absen ce
of
beards
wh ere c
hins
are visiblc, toge the r
with
the
person
al
her
aldry appn rcn t o n so me shields (as here),
tends
to suggest
tha
t th cse frescoes may depict a mi
xtu
re
of
kni ghts, sergean ts aOlI
con
frerc b
re t
hren.
However it
should
be
not
ed t
hat
it is not kn
own
for ce
rtain
how l a
dy
Tcmptar sh ields were de c
ora
ted ,
though it is
probable
(s ince some means of ide
nnfic
a
no
n
wou
ld have been necessary
from
the ver y
earliest
day
sl tha t they carried c rosses from the very beg
mnin
g. Howeve r, exta n t versio ns
of
t he O
rder
s
Rule
which
p
robably
pre
dat
e 114 7 sta te that no
decoration may
be a
dde
d to br
ethren s
sh ield s o r
lances, hu t p
robably th
is refer s o nly 10 pe rs
onal
he raldry, : 3a
depicts
a Tcmpla r shield as it
ap
pea rs in
the best -kn ow n
Tempter
sea ls,
th ough
proba bly sh ields such as th os e carr ied by 8 and were mo re
co mmon; the diagon al a
rms
are p
rob
a
bly
strengthening b
an
However
4 ,
who
is based on an illustra
tio
n of Templars in M
al l
hew Par is mid·13th centur y
Chr
on
ica
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carries an alternative type of shie ld, painted black an d white like th e Orde r s b anner Bauccant
(sec 27a and b).
Regulation arms consisted of lance , swo rd, dagger, mace and shield. addit ion all arm ou r - comprising
hau berk, chau sscs, helmet and later foo t and shoulder pieces - was officia l issue . One interes ting point
regarding arm ou r is that amongst th e Military Orders mail mi tte ns with separate fingers were apparently
forbidden as being a luxury
25
26. KNIGHTS 1I0SP ITA
lLER
25 repres
en t
s the pr
obab
le appearance
of
a
12th
century Hospitaller knight. The v
oluminou
s, enveloping
mantle , worn over their arm our on act ive service, must have imped ed the wearer consi derably in battle,
and in 1248 a Papal Bull final ly au
thor
ised the ad optio n of a wide , cross-embroidered black surcoat
(as worn by 26) as a r
emedy
fo r the fact tha t when you are wea ring the ca ppa clausa over yo ur armou r,
which hampers both your hands and your ar ms, it makes it easier for your enemies to
at t
ack you and
harder fo r yo u to d
ef
end yo urselves , The surcoats of brot her knigh ts were changed to red in 1259, sti ll
with the Or d
er
s white cross sewn upon
them
, th e w
earin
g
of
red surcoats bein g extended to brother
sergeants
from
1278. Ho
spualle
r D
onat
s wo re the unif orm of bro ther kn ight s.
As with the
Templar
s, it is not known in what way early Hospitaller shields wer e de
corat
ed tho ugh
probab ly most car ried a cross. The Hospita ller s apparently only universally adop te d a red shield with a
white cross u
nder
the Grand Mast er Nicholas de Lorgne ( 1277- 1285). Unlike the Templars
there
is a lso
a fair chance that at least some la te-12th and 1
3t h
ce ntury Hospit allers, probably the senior office rs,
bore the ir ow n coats-of-arms on th eir shields
or
so on e must assum e fro m 13t h century Hospitaller
legislat ion rep
eated
ly - and apparently unsu ccessfu lly - fo rbidding the decorat ion of arm s an d
equipment ). By the middl e to
lat
e t
centu ry Gran d Masters of te n quar tered the ir personal arms
wit h the arm s
of th e
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3
io
I
1
b
d
27
c
28
3
b
29
27 . STAN DARDS O f T HE MILITA RY ORDE R S
173 a nd b r
epre
sen t 2 variants of th e Te mp lars blac k and wh ile banner Bau cea nl a s it ap pea rs in
xta t t hc w Paris Chro nica Maj
or
a. Its n ame, usually co rrup ted 10 Beau
e
a nt o r Beaus
eant
de rives
fro m t he Low Lann fo r a pieba ld ho rse , and Jacq ues de Vilry describes how it signified t ha t t hey are
fair an d ki nd ly to ward s t heir Irle nds, b u t b lack and terrible to their e ne mies , In use a t least as
ear ly a s 11 28 though at t hat date pro ba bly a go nf alon rather th a n a ban ner), it was app ar e n tly not
act ually carried by the Ord er s sta ndard-bearer. the Gonfano nier ; o n th e march it was born e by o ne o f
h is esq uires, and in b attl e
it
was born e by a Turcop ole t h e Gonfanonier hi mse lf t aking co mmand o f t he
esquires). In bat t le it co uld ha ve a guard o f 1 k nigh ts, a nd its loss b y a b ro ther me ant ex pul sion fr om
t he Orde r. In ad ditio n t he
Tcmpla
rs had a seco nd ary ba nner o r go nfa lon o f a red cross o n a wh ite fie ld ,
and e31: 1I cnmma ndcry had its o wn ba nner plus 3 reser ve on e to be u nfur led if t he first wa s lost.
1 7c. t hl sta ndard o f th e Hospitallers , co nsisted o f a whit e cross o n a red field ; th is par t icu lar ex ampl e is
again taken from th e Chronica Majo ru, l hough Par is lI isto ria Anglorum sho ws a variant wit h a plain
cross. T his sta ndar d was in use by
1182
a t th e la test a nd p rob a bly earlier, a nd like th e Temp lars
Baucea n t was
t he
responsib ility
of
the Order s Go nfano n ie r
but
was ca rried by an esquire.
T he ba nne r or t he Teu to nic Knigh ts, 27d, was sim ply a blac k cross o n a while field. In the O rder s
ea rly d ays t he pa tt ern o r t he cross may have bee n Io r mee ra t her Ihan plain, bu t certa inly t he lat ter
fo r m soo n
came 10
predominate. Th e sh ields
or
bret h ren d isp layed t he sa me blac k cro ss o n a wh ite field.
18. TI lE ROYAL BANNE R
T his depicts th e ban ner o r t he Kingdo m o r J er usalem. Contra ry to the hera ldic rules o f tinc tu re wh ich
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co nde m n th e use of m etal on metal it co nsists of yell ow o r gold cro sses a cross pot e nt be t wee n 4
Lati n cross lets) on a white o r silver field. Earlier 12t h cent ury exa m ples o ft en sho w t he large cross with
sma ll balls rat h er t han ba rs a t
th e
en ds of th e arms. Th is banner ma y have bee n ado pt ed as ea rly as
Baldw in t s reig n 1 100- 11 18), his o wn being described as wh ite in contemporary so urc es th o ugh no
device is me nt ioned. In battle th e royal b
anne r was ca rried by t he Marshal of t he Kingdom.
Th r
oughout
thi s e ra most Chri stia n ar mies in
Ou t
re mer carried in add itio n o ther cross-embroidered
n ags as well as t he no blemen s heraldic go nfa lons a nd ba nners.
29. Til E TR UE CRO SS
T his wa s a holy relic often used by t he Fra nks as a ba tt le standard afte r 109 9 , suc h as at t he Fir st a nd
T hird Battl
es of Ramla 11 01 and 110 5), th e B
attl
e of Sarmin J 115), Ha b
J
119 ), Yib neh
1123
),
Bosra 114 7), Asca lo n 1 153), Mon tgisard 1 1
77 )
, and Ha l t in I 18 7) wh er e it was fina lly lost to t he
Sar ace ns.
t
was a lways carr ied by a cleric , often the Patriarc h of Jerusale m himself but othe rwise
an arc hb ishop , bisho p or ab bot. It s bea rer a t lIa lt in, t he Bishop of Acre, wor e the ar mour of a knigh t.
29a is based o n an illustra t io n in t he Chro nica Majo ra depicting t he cap t ure of
th e
Cross at Ha t fin ;
Imad ad-Din , who wa s prese nt a t t he bat tle, describes it as cased in go ld a nd
ad o
rned wit h
pear
ls a nd
precio us sto nes, F ulcher of Cha rtres likewise reco rding it to have be en pa r tly cove red by gold a nd
silver . 29 b is an alterna ti ve re nde ring of the Cro ss, as it ap pears in a Histo ry of Ou tre mer ms. e xecuted
in Rom e in 129 5.
Ot her similar standards we re a lso in existence, Roge r of Ant ioch, for exa mp l e, having a large jewelled
cros s with him at Ager Sanguinus in 1119.
30 . FATIMID INFA NTRYMA N c . 1100
Moslem infan tr y were gen erally un arm ou red . T his figure, from an 11th or 12 t h cen tury Egypt ian ms.,
is ar me d with swo rd a nd thrust ing spear, t he la tt er
eithe
r a T ira d o r a Mitre d , a ppa rently the sta ndard
te rm s fo r infan try spears . O thers might substitute javelins, called Ha rba h in Arabic , while in his
memoirs Usama h me nti on s infan try severa l tim es as c arrying on ly shield, sword an d dagger t h e la
tter
called by var ious nam es suc h as Dasha n , Si kh, Nimga and Sikhin a j. Oth er infa n try, of co u rs e, would
have bee n arc hers,
th o ugh un der t he Ea timid s t hese were chi e fl y Ar menian an d Sud anese slave
soldiers se e 33 ; .
Th e shield is
take
n fro m reliefs on
th e
Bab al-Nasr the G
at e
of
Victo
ry )
in Cairo, execu ted in 1
087.
t
is o f a typ e called Tu rs by t he Arabs, desc ribed by Murda al-Ta
rt u
si in his 12t h cen t ury Ta bsira h a
mil itary ma nua l writ te n fo r Sa ladin) as a
ro u
nd shield which covers mos t of th e holder , capable of
pr o
tec ting him fro m mos t sides and th erefore clea rly c on ve x in sha pe. t co uld ap paren tly be of
considerable circ umference a nd is usually
de p
icted wit h a rei nfo rce d rim and a boss or se veral bosses
see 33 - wh ere t he shie ld is taken Irom t he g
at e
of Qal at al-Gind i in Syr ia of 1187 - 44 and 54).
AJ-Tart u si desc ri bes shie ld su rfaces of un tan ned, varnished or paint e d hide, polished or bare wood,
and ho rse, ass, ca me l or giraffe ski ns one wonders wh et her zeb ra was used t oo ?) . He records in a ddi tion
shi elds o f cane se wn toget her with co tt o n and says also tha t some choose shields of iro n . Th e Daraqa , a
circu lar shie ld sma ller tha n the T urs, was always of hide.
His sh o rt, tighl -sleeved coa l an d tunic are t he sta ndard cos tume of a Moslem war rio r , allowing far mo re
fr do m o f move me nt than t he wide-slceved, flowing dress wo rn by ci vilians. Rou nd t he up per arm are
t he usu al Tiraz ban ds wo rn by Moslem s, usuall y st rips of
broc
ade or clo t h of a co nt rasting
colo
ur
rich ly embroide red in gold an d coloured t hread, ofte n with qu o ta tio ns from the Ko ra n, but so me times
plai n. Ibn Kha ldu n late r reco rds that t hey migh t have th e Su lta n s o r a n amlr s na me embroidered on
them .
L
A. Ma yer, in his Mam luk Cost um e , ex p lai ns t hat real T iraz in th e sense of an honori fic
for mula were granted on ly to iq ta d ars, eithe r by the Sul ta n o r an amir ; all ot her T ira z were technically
decor at ive fa kes .
3 1. FATIMID INFA NT RYMAN c. 1150
T his figur e an d t he nex t com e from a ms. fragme nt from
fu
stat which depicts Moslems an d Ch ristians
in batt le before a for tress. t prob ably dat es to c. 1150 but may be so mewha t ea rlier, so the Mosle m
warriors de picted are fa irly certai nly Fatimids.
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T his figur e is
baref
o o t,
arme
d o nly with sh ie ld and fr inged spear, an d wears an un usual pai r o f what a re
ap parently baggy bre eches , pe rha ps the skirt o f his tu n ic pull ed up thr ough a be lt. Th e kite-shi eld was
ca lled T ariq a by th e Moslems, a ter m which, it ha s bee n sugges ted curious ly ) , evolved from th e name o f
the small, ci rcular
Europ
e an sh ield . th e T urge th is seems
impro
bable. T he T ar iq a was possibly eve n
a d o pte d pr
io r
to t he Crusad es the re are kite-shields carved o n t he Bab al-Nasr ) but ce rtainly d u rin g the
Cr usades Tariq as w
ould
ha ve e ome ava ilable in fa r larger numbers, shield s - to get he r wit h o t he r
Frankish equip men t -
bemg recorded
to have bee n reu sed by t he Mosle ms
af t
er ca pt u re fr
om
th e Franks;
al-Qa lanisi, r
eferr
in g to the equ i
pment
of Nur cd- Din s HOOps in 1 157 , speci fica lly spea ks o f Frank ish
T ariqas. The T uriq a a ppears to have b
ec o
me p
op
ular as far east as Pe rsia see 50 and
87 )
bu t drop
ped
o u t o f use in Syria d uring th e Bahr i
yyah
Ma mluk era , th o ugh al-Maqrizi still records a u nit o f youn g
Mamlu ks equipped wit h Tariqas.
Io n al
-Athir
a
ctually
reco rds ar chers in Salad in s ar my with Ta riqas, and
al-Tartu si s T a bsirah de s
cnbes
the
Tari
q a in detail. He record s it as t he shield used
by
t he F rank s and By zan tines , wh ich is
shaped
lik e
an on ion an d pa in ted
in
all so rts of co lours , d esigns a nd ar tist ic pat terns. t is a lo ng shiel d
of
a shape
a cc
eptab
le to both th e ho rsema n and the fo ot -sold ier ; it begins rou nd at t he top ). bu t narr
ow
s do wn
litt le by
litt
le an d at t he bo t to m en ds in a sharp point like the ti p of a spea r . A var
iant
o f th e Tar iqa
was t he J anuwiya, des cri be d as like a T ar iq a
bu t
wit h a fla t te ned base so th at infa ntry in a
de f
ensive
formatio
n
co u
ld sta nd th eir shields
befor
e t he m.
A sec o nd Moslem infant ryma n in th e so urce ap pears to e ar t he same breeches but is ba reheaded and
wea rs shor t , bla ck a nkle-bo o ts. Neithe r wea r T iraz hands .
3 2. F ATIMID CA VALRYMAN c. I I
T he Sara cen co at-of-mai l see ms to have gon e und er a variet y of nam es, suc h as Dir , Zard , Yel ba , Lam at
al-Har b, Zardiyya t
Sa b
ila and Zardiyyat Musbala to menti on b u t a Ie hese refer ri ng vario usly to
sh orter o r longer cor selets. Some are d esc ribed as d ragging , whi le Sabila an d Musba la mea n
fountain-lik
e ,
bo th o f which te nd to suggest that t hey mi ght reach well below t he kne e, possib ly even
d own to t he ground . Th is wou ld be un usu al, how ever . since generally Mosle m armo ur re mained
con s ide rably light er than th at o f th e Franks; th e Itin erarium Regis Ricard i, fo r in
stan
ce, d escribing
arm ou red
<IS
welt as un arm ou red Mo sle ms at An ou f in
II
Q I , says t ha t t h ey wer e n o t weig hed d o wn wit h
h ca
y arm ou r lik e o u r kni ghlS . Th is is mor e tru e o f t he Turks than t he A rabs , ho wever , a nd eve n th en
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the re were excep tions (see 58 ); from th e sources it is appar
en t
tha t na tive Arab cavalry, as o pposed 10
Bedouins or
Turk
s, were usua lly armoured, and Mayer concludes in his Mamlu k Co stume tha t mail was
the commonest fo rm of Moslem arm our.
Th is ma n appears to wear a tur ban rather than a helmet. It has been argued tha t the tu rbans worn her e
are in fact no more than caps or co verings concealing hel mets, but since 3 1 wear s an almos t iden t ical
turban this seems unlik ely ( though still no t impossible). Unden iably helmets were sometimes
co
ncealed
benea th tu rban s, but it should also be noted th at in the 13th century Jea n Sire de Joinville wrote o f
Moslem turbans that
they
were capable
of
warding the heavy blow o f a swor d . The original
ms.
de p
ic ts
this man s tur ban as du ll red wit h black markings. They were most
co
mm only white but co uld also be
blue, black, br own or any
othe
r colour.
Though the original depicts him wit h o nly a sword a lance wou ld normally be carr ied too, bu t it is
imp or tant to note that as he is an Arab he wo uld not carry a bow. Usamah, a Sy rian Arab, do es no t
record the bo w in use by horsemen anywhere and he
ce r
tainly never used one himself ; his ba ttle anecdo tes
are almos t exclusively o f swo rd an d lance th rusts, and the Ara bs clearly relied o n t heir proficiency w
it h
these weap
on
s ra ther than the bow, though some may also have
em p
loyed javelins.
Cavalry lan ces gene ra lly
went
un der the n mes Rumh, and lIa tt iyya, ap parently all very simi lar
weap
on
s
pro
y dirrering on ly in leng
th ,
weight an d blade shape ; th e heavy Rumh occu rs most often .
Another type, the Quntariya (cf. th e Byzantme Kon t aria }, was widely used by the Franks as well and
was u ndo ubtedly a lo ng wea pon , q uite probably 12 feet. The Berber Kabarbara, reco rded hy al-T artu si,
was also
of
conside rable len gth , w
it h
a shaft of some fee t and a (sock
et
ed j
j
blade o f anot her
feel . Usamah records that c. 1120 the Arabs of Ifamah adopted an even lo nger lan ce, lengthened
by at ta
ching
on e lance to another a nd reaching a length o f 18-20 dh ira -
7-30 feet This must
he
n exaggera tion , des
pite
the fac t th a t o rd inary lances co uld cer tainly reach I S fee t. However, il
is
inte
resting to n
ot
e his descript ion of such a compound lance in use, trai ling on
the
ground like a r
ope,
the warrior una ble to raise it , w hich certainly ind ica tes tha t it was of un usua l (n
ot
to say rid icu lous )
length ; on e imagines the exper iment was sho rt-lived, Lances were usua lly of cane or wood, Imad ad-Din
writ ing of brown lan ces a t lI
al l
in.
33. SUDANESE ARCHER
Sudanese in fantry, predominant ly archers, were an important element of Egyptia n armies during the
earlier pa rt o f thi s per iod , fea turing prom inen tly in th e Fali mid era (as many as 30 ,00 0 bei ng emplo yed
by 1169 ) and less prominently under Saladin and th e Ayyu tJids. Sudanese troops do not seem to have
bee n employed at all un der the Mamluks, and aft er the fall
of
the Ayyu bids it was to be several
centuries before Negroes again appeared in large numbers in an Egypt ian a
rm y
in any role other than
as grooms or horse-boys,
Surprisingly - since so few Euro peans co uld have ever seen a Negro at this da te - Sudanese so ldiers in
Moslem emplo y exci ted l it tle o r no
co
mmen t fro m most Crusade chro niclers, from which we may
surmise th a t they were la rgely, to all appearances, iden tical to the average Ara b in all bu t skin
colouring, though at least on e lat er source reco rds that the y scarred their faces .
The unifo rms of Sudanese gua rdsmen appear to have been of ric hly de co rated brocade or dam ask , but
it should be no ted t hat ,
co
nt rary to th e impressio n created by most modern-day historian s, far from all
such soldiers were guardsmen.
Fulcher
of
Chartres, who r
ef
ers to the Sudanese as Aet hio pes, notes thei r black skin and imp lies in a t
least one passage tha t they fo ught with bow or spear. Albert o f Aix add s that they carried maces
(undoub tedly th e fla ils o r sco urges of iron not ed by bo th Gibbon and Oman) and records that at the
ba tt le o f Ascalo n in 1099 th e Sudanese archers knelt o n one knee to fir e, accordi ng to their custo m .
The ltin erarium, writ ten by an eye-witness, also mentions th e Suda nese, referring to th ose a t Arso uf
(11 9 1) as t he Nigred uli, the Negro Pack, a race o f demons ver y black in co lour , The ensuing passage
is unclear , but Am broise (t he Old Fre nch, an d possibly mo re reliable, version) rende rs the same passage
as Following th ese came a black race - Noir
et
s is their common name, or Saracens o f the ber rule
un culti vated land) - loa thsome and as black as so o t in co lour, swif t an d agile footm en armed wit h bows
and with light shields ,
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34
35
34 SUDANESE SPEARMAN
Though mos t Sudanese in Fa timid and Ayyubid em ploy were archers some were instead armed with a
spear . and il is as one such Ihal I have inte rpreted this figu re from the SI Dents wind ows (sec no te 35
belo
w
. Th e spear co uld be used as a thrusting
or
throw ing weapon, Baldwin I bein g badly wounded in
1103 by the thrown spear of a Sudanese infantryman.
is apparen t from his simp le dress that he is no l a
guar
dsman and he carries on ly a spear an d a circu lar
Tu rs. Th latt er has a reinfo rced rim and an acu tely spiked boss like that of 3 . A swo rd wou ld have
also been currie d, and Negro swordsmen
appea
r in a list
of
Fat jmid regiments recorded c. 1047-1054.
Usamah s a
necdo
tes include r
ef
erences 10 Negro horsemen
too,
and
some
mod
ern
au t
hor
it ies - such as
Lane-Po
ole
- have even in te rpre te d Salad in s Qaraghulam cavalry as Negroes (Qaraghu lam trans lating
liter ally as Black slave ) ; m
ore
p
robably
Quraghula m merely de noted no n-
Tu
rkish mamlu ks, no do ubt
including some Negroe s nevertheless.
35,36, 37
38.
SYRIAN CAVALRYMEN c.
1150
Th
ese figures are fro m a series
of
10 painted windows once in th e monastery ch urch
of
5t Dents in
Par is. These windows, o f mid-12th cen tury date, th e commissioning of which has b
een
accred
ited
to
Louis VII s c
hief
minister Abbot Sugee, were des troyed during the French Revolutio n bu t ar e known
from sketches executed by Montf auco n in 1729 (in L es Monuments de la Monarchie Fra nqo ise in which,
alas , the origina ls were no t copied altogether clearly.
T he equipment por trayed was pro bab ly based on the rep orts
of
eye-witnesses who had parti cipated
with Louis in the Second Crusade ,
tho
ugh th e episodes depic te d actually all took place d uring the First
Crusa de. The figures the mselves arc pro babl y Syrians, representi ng Turkish marnluks of the various
askars.
35,36
and 37 all appear to wear quilted al-Qu tuns (see no te 10 ), st rengthened with scales in the la tte r 2
instances, though possibly 36 may be a very poo r representation of a lamellar Djawshan (see 48); ce rtainly
the Char lemagne window o f c. 1210 in Cha
rtre
s Cathedral, wherein certa in de tails were inspire d by if no t
copied directly from the original St Den ts windows, shows Moslems wearing co rselets th at are undoubtedly
lamellar,
so
it is possible that some of the 5 t Denis figu res too themselves wore lamellar armour. Other
figures in Mon tfaucon s sketches qu ite d early wea r mai l corse lets, some times with colfs, whi le a few,
of
which 38 is the clearest, wear scale.
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l
--<1
0»
3 6
3 8
Helm et s arc all eithe r conical - probably the typ e called Baida (egg) be
ca u
se o f its shape -
O f
hemi
spherical, o r of Spangenhe tm construc tion. some times ap parently wit h cloth, lea ther or ma il aven tails.
Shields are circular and come in variou s sizes, o ften with acutely spiked bo sses like that of 36. Arms
co nsist chie ly o f sword and lance , the latt e r of no outstandi ng length und oub tedly res t ricted by the
conf
ines of th e illust ration area involved) ;
alt
hough a few hor se-archers are also ap paren t bows arc ,
ra th er cur iously. heav ily outnumbered by lances and no ne of Mon t fau con s ske tc hes sho w bo wcases or
qu ivers.
These par t icular figur es are taken res pect ively from sce nes de picting the bat tles o f Nicaca ( 109 7 I,
Asca l
on
1099) , Dorylaeum
( J
09 7 ) and Anti och ( 1098 ).
39 , 4 0, 4 1 4 2. TURK ISH CAVALRYMEN
Contem
po r
ary Christ ian chr oniclers generally used the term
Tu
rk t o descri be Seljuks, Turcomans an d
Sy ria ns or armies comprised mainly thereof - Salad in s armies, fo r
examp
le , are descr ibed as T urkish
even though they also co ntained many Hed
ouin
s, Ara bs, Kurds, Negroes and o thers. Of these fou r figures
two are Sy rians (4 1, fro m the Jaziru , a region of Northe rn Syria roun d Mosul , Raqqa and Diyar Bekr, and
4 2, fr
om
Raqqa) an d two are Seljuks (3 9 , from a P
er
sian ceramic , and 40, from Azer baija n; th ese are
typical
of
Seljuk warrio rs in genera l, figure s identica l to 39 appearing on Seljuk pain ted bowls as early
as th e 11th cen tury).
All 4 wea r longish topcoats with a right-over left n ap ( the Muqallab) at the fron t, plus emb roidered
hems, cu ff s and co llar ; round the u pper arms are the usua l Tiraz band s. Tall oose b
oo t
s , baggy trousers
and , in the case o f 39 , a small cap wit h a tu rban wrapped rou nd it ,
co
mplete the co s tu
meiJ
va shows the
same ty pe of turban hut without the embroide red , tra iling head hand. T urbans proper such as th at of
40 (who da tes to 1200)wer e also being worn at least as early as th e ta re- t th century . 41 wea rs instead
a fur
-t r
imm ed ha t wh ich hears a s triking resemblance to the mit re-caps of 18th cent u ry gren adiers and
was characte rised by a me tal pla te abov e th e forehea d.
Th
is st iff , tr iangula r ty pe of hat, ca lled by the
nam e Sha rb ush, was of Turkish origi n an d seems to have bee n worn only by amirs and chiefta ins as an
indic at ion o f rank , even Salad in being recor ded to have worn on e (c
on
cealing a ma il cap benea th ). It
was wor n unde r
both
the Ayyubid and Bahriyyah dynas t ies hut was la ter aboli shed the Ct rcassian
Mamluks. It ap pear s in illust ra t ions o nly from th e late-12t h century but had prob a bly bee n in use
somewhat earlier, th e illu st rat ion s themselves being principally of Rumi, Ja ziran , Iraq i and
Azer baijuni origin .
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a
As can he seen here and in
other
illus tra tions the Seljuk and Sy rian Turks generally
(t
hough by no
means ex clusively - sec 4 1 an d 50 ) W e their hair ver y long in 3 tai ls, one at each side of Ihe head
and one at the hac k. Mo ustaches were usual ly long (Alp Arslan coul d alleged ly l ie th e ends
of
his behind
his head ) while beard s co uld be full, sho rt or very wisp y, some times comp rising no more than a
shadow o n eit her side of
jaw and a small tuft under the bo t tom lip .
As for arms, the Itincrarium Regis Ri
car
di, descri bing Saladin s largely Syrian arm y at Arsou f in 1191 ,
records that he Turks aT • almos t w
eap
onless, ca rrying o nly a bow, a mace furnished with sharp
tee th, a sword, a lance o f reed with an iron t ip, and a lightly hung knife , Some Tu rks carried in addi t ion
a small axe suspended from the saddle, The sho rt but powe rful composite
bow
was th eir principal
weapon, The
arro
ws were light, limiti ng th eir penetra tio n somewhat so that although they could pier ce
armou r th ey of ten d id no t and when they did might inflic t
only
a shallow wound o r no wound at all
(see page 37 ). T he bow was
often
slung beh ind th e l
ef t
shoulder during close combat.
The bowcase, wh ich could doub le as a q uiver, hu ng on th e lef t, while the q uiver was suspended from the
belt at the right ; these are
occ
asionally de picted th e
oth
er way round . Quivers could co ntain up to 60
arrows. In add itio n spare bows and ext ra qu ivers were o fte n carr ied. some times as man y as J of each.
so it was quite feasible for well over l arro ws to be carried. The light lance co uld be used for thru sting
or
th r
owing. but javelins might also he Carried. Small shields held hy a single, cen t ral grip were in genera l
use, tha t of 40 being of a rather un usual design; th e rose painted at the centre may w ry well he an
heraldic device.
S
words
co uld he curved like that of 47, long like that of 40, or short and straight. From its length and
shape that of 42 is q uit e d
ef
initely an Indian weap on . Indian swords st ill being held in high estee m
th roughou t the Moslem worl d du ring th is e ra, j ust as they had been since as ea rly as the 7th century .
Whe ther this was because Ind ian swords wer e par t icularly goo d o r because Egypto-Sj-ria n sword s were
part
icu larly bad is not altoget her clear. Cert ain ly al-Tartu si reckoned Egypt ia n blades as inferio r not
o nly to Indian swords hut also to Andalusian, Maghribi and Ch inese swords too . Whatever the reason,
Indian blades, e ither o f the tradit iona l type
sho
wn here or of more mode
rn
design. wer e impor ted
in to the Moslem world in grea t numbers, o ften then being rchilred and decorated acco rding to local
taste and prevailing fashio n. Captu red Frank ish swo rds also feature and unde rwent similar ad aptati
on
.
Other eq uipment import ed from India included lances an d corsele ts
(type
unspec ified but pro bably
scale and /or lamella r),
Turk ish clothe s wer e of ten of brocade or silk and were very brigh t , usuall y involving geome tr ic pat terns
or Floral or arabesque moti fs on a bright base co lour.
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I
c
~
d
41 42
4 3 . SYR IAN CAVA LRYMAN c. 12 20
T h is A y yu bid warr ior from Mosul we ar s q uilted hip -le ng th ar mou r w it h m ail slee ves, u nd o u b t ed ly a
Kuzaghand ,
and
a h elme t w
ith
nap e-guard . Ot h er figures in t he sa me
sour
ce wear l
ame
lla r a nd mail
corselets.
T he Ku zagh and Persian Kaz haghand . caucd in west
ern
so urces a G azeganz, fro m whi ch t he te r m
Jaaeran t almost certainly evolve d ) wa s basically an early ty pe
of
Brigan d ine , so me t imes
app
are ntl y
wo rn in
co
nj u n c tio n wi t h a ma il corsele t . Al-Tart usi im p lies th at It was inven t ed by ea sterne rs
Sy rians o r Iraq is ; he d escribes
it
as a ma il co rsele t co vered in clo th a nd silk , q uilt ed ,
and
with an
o uter su rf ace o f
emb
ro ide re d material o r
bro
cade.
rec
ord
s Fa timid Kuza gha nds co vered
with brocade
and silver st ars. probab ly rivet s. Usa mah has lef t us with a de tailed de scri pfion o f o ne
o wn e d b y hi s fath er, wh ich co nsisted o f 2 co a ls-of-ma il, a lo ng F ra nkish on e wit h a shorter one,
apparen tly wais t-len gth o ver it , line d on t he inside a n d co vered o n t he o u ts id e wit h fell , t he wh ole
being pa dd ed wit h fe lt ,
rabb
it ha ir and silk and , pre sumably qu ilte d . Fr o m Ib n al-A thir we a lso kno w
th
at
t he
K uzaghand
ha d
a
co llar ,
app
arently u psta nding, wh ile la
ter
so u rc es le nd to ind icate th a t it
co u ld ha ve sle eves - as here - t ho ug h mo re
of
ten it d id not . Kuzaghands reco rd ed in use by a co n t ingent
o f Sy rian A ra bs at Ho ms in 12 80 were cov ere d with red satin and brocade , Qalqa
shand
i record ing in th e
14 t h centu ry th at cove rings we re us ually
of
red o r yell ow
bro
ca de . By the 14t h ce n tu r y, however,
Saracen Brigadines wcre manufactured in th e Euro pea n s ty lc , t he a rmo ur ele me n t consisti ng o f iro n o r
steel la m in ae rivc tt ed together ; t he resulti ng Brigan dine was ca lle d by t he name Qar q al and wa s
the
mo st
co m mon Iyp e o f later Mam lu k bod y-armou r. -
Hel me ts wit h so lid iro n na pegua rd s a pp ea r to ha ve be e n fa irly co m
mo
n du ring t h is period , Q alq ash an d i
reco rd s 2 ty pes o f hel me t in add iti o n to the
Haida
mentioned under
3 5; bo t
h were calle d Migh fa r,
o ne
with a mail
a ventail
t he Mjghfar ai-l ard t he o the r ap par ently older type with a solid
neck guard ;
4 3
probahly depic
ts a
varian t
o f t he
ta
u
r
from a
mid L
th ce n t u ry edi t
ion
o f
Jcin vine s
Memoir s. Imad
ad -Din to o refe rs t o helm e ts w ith nec kguards. 4 3 b ,
a nd d sho w ahemative he lm e ts w
ith
na sal s as we ll
as napeguu rd s from 2 ve rsio ns
of
William o f Tyre s lI isto ry o f O u tre mer
execute
d in Acre c.
128
0 ; again
writi ng o f his
fat her s
a rmour as wor n in th e
12th
c
entur
y U
samah
me n t io ns a Mosle m helmet with
a nasa l. Visors are a lso occasiona lly ment ioned but probably aventails or cotrs - perhaps like tha t
of 58 - a re meant. Baidas at least were often painted and so m e he lmets wer e even gilded as, fo r
example was Saladin s).
4 4 . SYRIA N INFA NTRYMAN
In Sy ria, Iraq
and
the I aaira infa
ntr
y a lways to ok second p lace to
the
mo u nte d military e lite o f th e
ami
rs a nd askans . Th ey were pro vide d largely by
city
mi litias suc h as Ih e Ah d a t h
and
o the r irr egu lar
volu n te e rs, a nd a p pe ar mos t fr e
qu en tl y either in bat tles in t he i
mme
dia te vicinity o f th eir home to wn s
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a
b
4 3
44
or in sieges. Ce rtainly the infant ry of
some
Syria n ci ties, pa rtic ularly Aleppo, were especially noted
for their abilities as siege-enginee rs: th ese came in 3 categories - the lI ajja rin (artillery crews). Naqqa bin
mine
rs) an d Khurasan i (crews for the ra ms an d pe nt ho uses ),
Thi s Iigure, from the same source as the last, is probably fairly Iyp ical o f Syri an milin a men , com prised
chie f'ly of po orly armed and armoured levies from the indige nous Arab po pulation. Though most wer e
Arabs the militias of so me cit ies in No
rt h er n
Sy ria and the Jaair a (such as Aleppo and Mosul) wou ld
also have included Kurds and Turk s as well as peo ples of older nat ive stoc k, while elsewhere Gr eek
speaking elements also survived.
Be ing largd y Ara bs most would have been armed with spea r or swo
rd ,
but javelins and bows, an d
sornc nmes even crossbows. also fea ture prominently in th e so urces.
4 5. SARACEN CROSSBOWMAN
During the Crusades the crossbow
soo n ear ned
a healt hy respect fr
om
the Moslems fo r its acc uracy and
de adliness and they q uic kly adopted th e weapon themselves (t hough it may have been in use in parts of
Persia as early as the r th ce ntury ].
In fact the Saraccn crossbow (of ten called th e Qaws Fa rungi o r Frankish Bow) wa s a su perior weapon to
th at of the Fra nks, using a composite bow as
opposed
to the simple self-bo w used by th e lat ter . Al-Tur tu si,
speak ing o f crossbo ws, desc ribes 4 diffe ren t ca tegories - th e Qaws al-Rigl or ' leg-bow , a nam e comparable
to the 'o ne-fo o t crossbow' o f Europe) wh ich was smalles t,
prob
ably wit h a stirru p: the somewhat larger
'Aqq ar, probab ly comparable tothe ' two-foot crossbow ; the Gar h, the largest , mo unted o n a s tand for
use in siege-wor k: and the lI usban o r ass-hoppe r , ap pare ntly a crossbow with a barre l for
shoo
ting
short , t hick bo lts. slings
toncs.
or small na ptha gre nades. He also descr ibes the met hod of load ing using
:I -elawed ho ok, :Il1a.:h<d to a toughened ox-hide belt, to pull back the string.
The Franks in turn adopted
th e
com posite crossbow fro m the Saracens, realising its superiority , and
for some time Levanri nc crossbows and their man ufact u rers were in high de mand in Europe; King
Jo hn o f Eng land 's cross bow-maker, for instance. was Pe ter ' the Sarac
en ,
and King Louis IX's was
John ' the Armeniun ,
This figure is based on an illustration in xt
a nh
cw Paris' I' bro nica Majora de picting th e Ayyu bid
garrison of Kera k in 1 4 1. wears mail and a helme t o f a ty pe which frequ en t ly ap pears in
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con temporary illust rat ions of principally in Spanis h sou rces. In the original he is
sho
wn
wearing a n arming ca p
under the helmet. T he cross how itself has bee n substituted from a 13th cen tury
Egyp tian military manual. The st irr up is o f interest since it appears to he of leathe r or ro pe ra the r th an
iro n.
46.
AYYUBID HEAVY CAVALRYMAN ACCORD ING TO MATTHEWPARIS
Illust rations in Paris'
chro
nicles and some o ther 13th cen tury so urces tend
10
depic t Moslem warrior s
in equi
pment
that mak es th em almost if no t to t ally indistmguishuble from the Frankish knight s
they
fight, a nd
the tende
ncy in t he pas t has usually been to dismiss th ese as the prod
ucts
of ar tists ignorant of
the
appe
arance of ' re ar Sarucen
armour.
However, one need o nly loo k at a few of the co ntempo rary
chronicles
10
see that this is not an al toge the r j ust ifiable conclusion.
is a well-recorded fact tha t mud
Frank
ish eq ui
pment
was reused by xtosrems after cap ture, incl uding shields, lances , swords, helmets an d
corsele ts (see 31 , 4: and 43 ) - we read , for examp le , of Arab ho rsemen at Ramla in 1101 who 't oo k up
the shields, lances and shining helme ts o f the slain an d pro udly adorned themselves' , an d one Ayyubid
warr ior at Acre in Q I similarly put on the armou r o f a Frankish knight he had killed ; ce rtainly figure
J:: above needs only to substitute a helmet for his tu rban to become a
F r
ankish' knight. The St Dcms
windows too
sho
w some Moslems in
armour
which resembles very closely that of th e crusaders they
f ight.
At th e same time Ma
tthew
Paris' illus tra tio ns also depict Moslems in more dis tinctive f
orm
s of a rmou r,
of
which this particular figUH , hascd on his dr awings of th e battles of Ars
ouf
and Bahr Ashm un , is on e.
li e wear s a
stif
f, sleeveless scale corselet ( probably based on a lea
ther foundation)
over a short coat-of
mail with a co if, and ap parently also wear s qu ilted cuisses. Whether o r nOI such
equipmen t
was ever
actually w
orn
by Egyp tian or Syrian Moslems is open [0
deb
a te, but it cer tainly was wo rn by th e
Stostems o f Andulusian Spain as explained under figu res 75 and 76 in 'Armies of Feudal Europe '.
One po int that should
noted , however, is Ihat accordi ng to
L
A. Mayor the flat-top ped varie ty of
kite-shield de picted here was never act ually
ado
pted by
the
Sarucens
th
ough again captured shields
wou ld have almost certainly bee n thus uscd t. 46a and b
sho
w
1
more ty pical shield s o f
the
Turs
varie ty f
rom
o the r illust r
atio
ns by Paris.
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48
a
GtlD 4 9
47 AY
YU ID
M MlUK c. 1240
Since he ca rries a Tu rk ish sab re rat he r tha n t he usual sword th is figure may ver y well represe nt o ne of t he
new wave of Khwa rizrnia n o r Kipchak mamluks t o he fo und in Ayyubid
emp
loy in t he 1230s and 1240s.
In additio n steppe-influence is a pparent in his ha t wit h upturned brim ; t his was the Saraq uj, ty pical o f
Mongol d rcss t see 84 ) an d a do pte d by th e Ayyu bids and earl y Mamluks via such mercenaries. Th e Saraq uj
was usuall y whil e. In t he so urce th e t unics an d coa ts t he la tt er called T arta r coa ls - see SS a nd 5 6) of
such figures are all of rich broca de. principally blue, green o r pin k in colo ur.
T he sab re came into mo re wide spread use in t he lat c -13t h o r ea rly- 14 t h centu ry under Mon gol
tnuucncc
tho
ugh cu rved swords ar e occasiona lly de pic ted o t
record
ed in US as early as
the
1 11h ce ntury,
probably introduced from Cen t ral Asia via slave-soldiers purchased in t he East.
Note
th e spu rs fixed t o his hoots. Usamaf me n t io ns K
huf
f hoo t s with spurs b p ictoria l sou rces
ten d 10 indicate tha t sp urs were uncommon am ongst Mosle ms du ring thi s era e xce pt in Andalusia an d
13 t h ce ntu ry Egyp t.
48. S ELJ UK II EAVY CAVA LRYMAN
Alt ho ugh t he maj or il y of T u rkish cavalry seem 10 have bee n una rmou red horse-arche rs. heavy cavalry
were a lso to he fo un d in their arm ies, t hese bei ng generally sup plied by t he retin ues and ma mluks of the
amns an d o t her chief tains. T he c hronicler Bar Ile braeus ma kes muc h of Alp Arslan, t he vic tor o f
Man l ike rl , putti ng on his armour bc rore
t
battle adding tha t all the Tu rk s did likewise .
T his la l. , 1 or ea rly· 13t h ce n tu ry Seljuk fro m Al l rhai; an wea rs armour th at is of t ypically Easte rn
des ign, comprising a ma il
hood
, Persian -st yle hel me t with neckguard an d a waist-lengt h Djawshu n th a t
reac hes
only
to t he ches t.
Djawshan seems 10 hav e described a lamella r corsele t of any length and al-Tart usi says
it
wa s of Persian
o rigin. Th e lame-llae were chiefly o f iron , horn or t rea te d lea
ther
and cou ld be gil de d, varnished o r
pain ted Suh a n Kha t Khosro u I is reco rd ed wearing red ar mour in I Sc ljuk a rmour was
ap paren tly o ften blackened. T hat wo rn here may ver y well h at tached to t he tu nic i ts elf in the same
way as is 48a {wit h a lt erna te ro ws o f lamellae pa inted d iff
erent
co lo u rs), f rom a store of arm s a nd
armour de pic t ..d in a n ea rly- f J t h ce n tu ry so urce. It is possibly an armou r of simi lar length th at is
reco rd ed being wor n by a n Abbasid am ir in one of Usa ma h s a nec do tes: describi ng the Bat tle o f
Qinna srin in 1137 he
mentio
ns how a Frank ish ho rsema n s lanee pie rced t his ami r thr ough th e chest
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b
5 0
and came out a t his back , despi te his gil
de d
Dja wshun.
51
52
Th is
man s
equipment inclu des lance, shield. and sword as
well
as a bo
w,th
ough Bar Hebraeus stat es
th at Alp Arslan cast aside his bow and arrows and f
ought
with spear and shield whe n he do nned his
arm our. The length of the swo rd should be noted , such long weapons freq uently
appe
aring in Syria n
an d Persian so urces of the 12t h and 13 th centuries. The
helmet
could he plu med .
By the 131 -13th century and pro bably somewhat earlier most Sdjuk heavy cavalry would have closely
resembled 58 and 89 .
4 1
50. SE
LJU
K I
NF NTRYM
N
Despit e th e predominan ce
of
caval ry in th eir
armi
es Sefjuk
in f
ant ry were, seemingly, no t uncommon, fo r
example fea turing pro minen tly at Myr iokephalon in 1176 , while Anna Comnena reco rds as many as
80 ,000 f ully-a rme d infantr y' opposing th e
fi
rst Cru sade at Heraclea in 109 7. They wer e usua lly
unarmoured and most were eit her jave linmen o r ar
chers
, some carrying sho rt spears too. By the mid- I : th
century at the latest crossbows wer e also in use, bec oming an important
in f
an t ry arm by the 13th
ce n
tury ; Rumi crossbowmen recorded at the Bat tle o f Akhlat in I : 30 wer e pro tec ted by large co whide
shields, presumably wielded by shield-bearers.
49 is fro m an ea rly- 13th century Persian paint ed bow l which shows a number
of
similar figures as well
as ho rsemen like 39.
Clothe
s a re depic ted mainly dark blue, ligh t blue , turquoise . brown and ran :
anc ma uvc so urces depic t red , gr
ee n
, black and most o ther co lours also being w
or n
. On the bow l
some infantrymen have their t rousers
cr o
ss-garte red .
50, from Azerbaijan Ithe same so urce as 40 and 48), is inte res t ing in sho wing tha t th e Selju ks too used
the kite-shield (some infa ntry figures on the painted bowl men tioned above also substi tute kite-shields f
or
circular o nes), and also in its depic tion of the more 'c haracteristic ' Turkish hairstyle which du ring th is
e ra seems to appea r o n ly in Easte rn frontie r regio ns and amongst the 'uncivilised' Tureo man nomad s.
50a and b are alt e rna tives from a Pers ian source o f e. I : : 5.
5 1. RUMI FIR ENK' IIE,\ VY CAVALRYMAN
This 12th centu ry figure in sho rt lamella r corselet bears a remarkably
cl o
se resemblance to co ntemporary
Bvzan rines (see, for exam ple, 66 and 67 . T his is probably be
ca u
se he is himsel f a Byzantine, possibly a
mem ber
o f
o ne of the in
digeno
us Greek Christian un its , u
nifo
rmed and armed in Byzantine fashion and
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with their o wn co mmanders, raised and mai ntained by the Selju k Sulta ns of Rum and late r known as
Kafir-Sipahi1t'r and Mar to tos by the
Ott
omans. So me were brigaded alo ngside Frankish merce na ries
and
the gene ral term Pirenk o r Franks was often applied to the m collectively (see page 20 . Fo r
lame llar armour in use am ongst Moslems s c note 48 abo ve.
T U R O MAN I E I ~
Turcomans (
wh o
still cxist even today, under the nam e Turkmens) supplied th e bulk of Scljuk armies.
as well as providi ng larg.. numbers of au xiliaries to the la te-Fati mids, Ay
yubid
s, Mamluks and Ott
oman
s.
Som e \·vcn served with the Almohades in Spain an d Nort h Africa, where th ey we re sti ll call..d by their
carli\·r name of Gh uaz. Though they used some in fan try ar med with spear, swo rd and how th ey rel ied
on th ir light ho rse-arche rs in baute.
This tigur is based on th e 14 th centu ry d rawings of Ustad M hmc d Siyah
Qalc
rn, 13th ce ntury
illustrations ind icating tha t th r had been no change of dre ss in the int eri m. lI is to pcoat sho ws th e
ancmauve upright-fastening rat he r than th e obliq ue Muqullab nap gene rally worn by Turks. Uslad
Mehn1l'u
sh o
ws tu nics chkny in shades o f hlue , black, brown and red. The black fu r or felt cap is fairly
stand ard. Ihn
Hibi,
however, desc rihi ng 13th cen tury Karam anli Turcomans in Anatolia, speuks of red
caps and black
coats
and boots.
Basic
equip men t ap pears to have co nsisted of now, sabr e anti 2-3 light javelins. In addition bags of 1001
wcre no rmally muc h in
videncc.
Tu rcoman womcn also re-gularly fou ght alon gside their me nfolk , Marvazi comparing the Amazo ns to such
temalc Turcoman war rio rs in th e 12th
centu
ry. Much later ( in Ihe 15th cen
tury)
one tr ibe is said to have
ratscd as many as fem ale warriors.
53
54. BEDOUlj\; T RIBESMEN
Th Bedawis or Bcdouins w
re pr incipa lly no ted as hrigands d uring th is e ra and were as likely to be fo und
robbing thcir
f
euow-Mos ms as they
w
er
to bc fight ing the Fr anks , ' it bein g well-known .' as I omville
re
cords.
' that
the
USl and c
ustom
of the lk douins is always to fall up on the weaker side.' Nevertheless
Bedouins app
ar
d as au xiliari
s in most Most
m armies (and also in S Ol o ... Frank ish ones ). se rving mainly
00
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57
® @
@ @
® ®
f
as cavalry th o ugh infan try aTC also rec orde d o n o ccas ions. In F ra n kish e mpl oy they usually su p plied
sco uts and spies.
T hese 2 figur es da le res pec tively to c. 123 7 Ilar ir i s Maq amal) and c. 1306 Raschid at-D i
n s
Wo r ld
lI ist o ry ) and tall y clos ely wit h t he d escr ipt ion o f Bedo um d ress lef t to us by Jo invillc in his xtc mcirs
o f the Seve
nt h
Crusade. li e reco rds t h eir ch arac te ristic ca mel-wool
tu n
ic , t l
long
, wide-sleeve d G u b ha.
as cove ring the whole body do wn to t he ground , while th e tu r ban was wrappe d
aroun
d t he head in
suc h a way th at o ne stri p wen t bene a th th e c hin, as c an be see n in bo th these figu res . In t he so urces
cl o thes ar e de p ic ted o r des cribed as d yed c hief ly in b right co lo urs, p redo m inan t ly re ds and bl ues o f most
shades. St riped cl
ot
hing o f t he t ype wo rn by 54 , pop ularly associa ted wit h A rabs, only be ca me
co
mm o
np lace fro m th e l I t h ce nt u ry . Hair was black .
Jo inville also rec o rd s a Bedo uin belie f t ha t no -one c an die save o n t he d ay ap poi n ted, and f
or
th is
reaso n t hey will no t wear a rmo u r: and th at in ba il ie t hey ca rry no thing b u t swo rd an d la nce , which
bas ically repea ts Willia m o f T yre s co mme nt t hat acc or ding t o thei r custo m the y fo ught wit h lances
o nl
y.
Burchard
of
Mo u nt Sio n, who wro te c. I o, ad ds tha t t hey do no t use arro ws, sayi ng t ha t it is
base be yon d meas u re to stea l away a man s life with an a rrow. T he la nce was us ually of can e reed ).
T he swor d was gene ra lly susp e nded fro m a baldric across t he right sho u lder , t he Bedouin s ap pa re n t ly
ad her ing to t his t radit io nal Moslem custo m ra t her Ihan fo llo wing t he p revalen t hab it of gird ing o n th e
sword at t he wais t : o t he r t ha n th e Be do uins o nly Nur ed- Din s arm y ap pea rs to have regularl y used t he
bald ric.
T he By za n t ine gcylitzes ms.
of
c. 1200 de pic ts Mo slem horse men in d ress ide nt ical to th at wo r n by th ese
figure s, an d like wise ar med with lance , sword an d shie ld most o f the shields rese mble t ha t o f 30 , t hough
a few ap parently carr y crescen t devices ).
5 5 56. MAML UKS
T hese figu res arc based o n t he Bapt ist ere d e Sa int Lo uis
of
e. 13 00 . Bo t h we ar T a
rtar
co a ts I
Qab
a
al-Tar rany yah ) w hich, as is ob vio us from the na me, we re
of
orig in and follo wed t he Mo n gol
pract i ce o f having t he Muq a lla b flap cross the ches t from lef t to right as
oppo
sed to t he T urkish fashio n
o f righ t t o lef t. T he left o ve r r ight Mo ngo l-st y le Muqa ltab also fea t u res in Ru mi and Per sian so u rces in
t he 13t h r e n t ury. ) Su ch coa ts wer e o ft e n worn u nder a lon ger to pcoa t sec 5 7).
In 12 8 3 so me 1,50 0 Mamluk guards me n a re d escr ibed as wearing red sa ti n or silk coats, un do u btedly
unifo rms suc h as are so me times men
tioned
in o t her co n t em po rary so urces {Fntimhl Su danese guar dsmen
9 1
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appea r to have been
unif
ormed , and cer tainly as early as 1177 Saladin s personal
mamluk
regiment is
recorded hy WiIliam o f Tyre wea ring ye llow uniform s). Red was the most common un iform
colou
r under
the Mamluks, though Ayyubid yellow was st ill some times worn . Red was also th e usua l colour fo r the
Kalaula h
cap
. usua lly worn wit h a kerchief wound r
ound
it as by figur e 55. Yellow Kalautahs were worn
under the Ayyubids an d also by the early Mamluks up 10 th e reign of Kh.. liI 1290-1293 ). They were
some times ernh r
cidered
.
Th
e Kalautah itself app ears
to
have been padded with co lt on, prob
ably
10
increase its defensive value.
Both w
ear
sashes o f c
olo
ured silk round the waist. sometimes yellow
bu t
probab ly more oft en red .
Amirs, and even a few ordinary mamluk troopers, instea d wore de cora ted Mintaqa bel ts , t hese
comp rising gold and silver links mounted with pr ecious stones ac
co
rdi ng 10 ran k. Usually a black
lea ther belt -pouch was suspended at the right.
Footwear
co nsists o f knee-length Khuff boots with covcnn gs called Saq al-Muza worn over them .
A slipper-li shoe cou ld also he worn over th e boo t . The boot s themselves had a clear seam dow n the
side (see 4 7 and 57 ) and were usually o f yellow or black leather in win ter , while leather in summer . Red
hoots an: also recorded.
Th
e dress o f amir s is recor ded as bei ng much richer th an that
of
ordinary mamlu ks. The cerem
onia
l
dress of Amirs of 1 for instance ,
con
sis ted a t on e lime
of
an
outer
coat of red satin emb roidere d in
gold and t rimmed with miniver, and a fr inged inner coat
p
rob ably a Qaba al-Tart a
ny
yah) of yellow
sat in.
TI\l Kul
aut
ah
was o f gol d brocade, wit h a muslin kerchief striped in whit e an d o
ther colours
wrap ped round it. Finally a beaver
clo
ak might be w
orn
.
Though 56 wears a helmet bo th ap pear to he o therwise unar
mour
ed, hut it sho uld be no ted that Moslems
of te n wor e b
ody-armo
ur beneath their oute r garm ents in the same way th a t th ey wore helmet s beneath
turbans an d caps (William o f Tyre, for instance, reco rds Saladi n s bodyguard wearing armour under th eir
ye llow silk un ifo rms at Montgisard) . In addit io n Usarnah, Ibn Hudayl and o the r au thor s recor d ho w
armou r was of ten carried o n pack mules and
on
ly do nned immediately pr ior 10 batt le .
57. l
UK
This figure , from a History of Outremer o f c. 128 is typical of th ose appearing in the mss. executed
in A CH in th e second half of the 1J lh cen tury . so a n be assumed 10 he a fairly relia ble re presen
tation
o f a Mamtuk warri or of tha t lime.
li e wea rs Khuff hoots. a small turban (big tur bans wer e bann ed at least in Syria in 1291 ) and a long
outer robe , th e Islami c coa
t
(Qaha al-Islamiyya). The Qaba co uld he wool . satin, silk or co
tto
n and
was appare-ntly most commonly ei t her whit e or striped in red and blue . By the 15th century o nly winter
to pcoa ts appear to have been colour ed and deco rat ed thu s, most Mamluks o ute r garments (as well as their
b
oo
ts) bei ng white in summer. Ano ther type of coat sometimes worn was th e Sallari. an outer garment
with elbow-length sleeves.
li e is armed with a mace, a favourite Mamluk wea pon, used princip ally to crus h helmets and. co nsequently.
heads. It was ca lled ei th er Dubbus or Amud (Persian Gun) de pending on whe the r
it
was enti rely of iron
or had a wooden handl... Some were Itanged or spiked. When not in use it was normally tu cked beneat h
th e knee and stirru p st r l l 10 the right of the saddle. mamluks being recorded carrying their maces from
th e st irru p in this way a t least as earl) as the mid-12th cen tury. Anot he r typical Mamluk wea pon related
to the mace hu t o nly recorded in later sources is th e Ghadd ara, a steel staf f kep t in a case l the sadd le
and capable o f cutting o ff a man s arm . One figure in the Baptistere de Saint Lo uis seems to be carrying
such a weapon. where it appears to be abou t 30 inches lo ng.
Alt hough the adopted the kite-shield (see 3 1) the Turs clearly remained far more popular. Like
thc main figure, 57a-f are all from the
Acre mss. so arc rairly typical of the hera ldic charges carried by
xtamt uks. Most no ticea ble are the large number of crescent device s. II has been claimed that the crescent
was no t widely ad
opted
amongst Moslems until the Ott omans ad opted it in the 15 th centu ry , hu t the
freq uency wit h which it
appea
rs in these mss. w
oul
d seem to dis pro ve
this
. the crescen t being, alongside
the rose tt e. the most
comm
on shie ld device
depi
cted. Sec also 64 .
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a
58 . U IN F
ULL
ARMO UR
c.
1290
~ h in full arm ou r ap pear on ly rare ly in th e sources
of
th is e ra, (hough as menti oned ab ove man y
probably wo re similar body -armo ur to tha t depic ted here but concealed it beneat h thei r topcoa ts.
li e wears a helme t , wit h plume and solid neckguard, and a
long
lamellar
jawshan.
(Ay
the cnd
o f thi s era at the la test
the
t
erm
Djawshan could also be applied to a mail co rselet reinforced with small
tin plates called Teneke, as
depic
ted in 583 ; being of m
ore
expensive co nstruc tion Ihan eit her mail or
lamellar this ty pe was generally rest ricted to amirs.) The mail coi f covering all hut his is taken fro m
the Bapt islcr e de
Saint
Loui s: similar coi ls are 10 be
occ
asionally seen in o the r Moslem sources at least
as ea rly as c. I :WO. sometimes worn without a helmet.
His
arms consist of lance , bow , sword
{with
tasselled hilt - see also 6 and 40) and circul ar shield
charged with an he rald ic lio n.
59 MAMlUK T RD R
This figure probably rep resents one of the infant ry guardsmen called Tabardar iyyah. named after th ei r
d istinctive wea pon the Tabar (a xe). l ow hig th is un it actually was does not seem to be al together
clear - it may have comprised no more than the 10 Tabardariyyah who acc
omp
anied Ille Sul tan o n
parade. Their commander was the Amir-Tabar . The axe was also em ployed by other
troo
ps , Joinville
record ing 30 al-Halq a in 1250 with drawn swords in their hands and Danish axe s hangi ng at the ir
necks : the shape o f the axe blade was appa ren tly very simi lar to the t radit ional Scandinavian design .
AI-Tartusi describes th e shape of the Nagin , a smaller , cavalry version of the Tabar, as like a half-moon .
The haf t of the Tabar could he of wood o r metal. The blades o f ceremonial axes were usually deco rate d
with inlay an d perfo rated pa tt erns.
6 M MLUK ENG INEER wrr u MJOFA
A cer iain al-Hassan al-Rammah describes and illu stra tes Ihe Midfa in a work o f c. 1280-1190 . It was
clearly an early firearm, made o r wood with a barre l only as deep as its muzzle width , used to fire
8 unduk s ?bullels) or fea th ered bo lts . The charge filled a Ihird of the barre l and co nsis ted o f a m ixture
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60
of 10 pa rts saltpetre IBuud ), 1 par ts charcoal, and l
Yi
parts sulphur .
The actual discovery of gu
npowder
is a d ubious dis tinction which has been variously cla imed for Chin ese ,
Ind ians, Byzanti nes, Ara bs , Germans and Englishmen, but the name o f the discoverer and da te of ac tual
discovery remain uncer tain. The date of th e ap plicat i
on
of gun powder 0 a proj ectile-firing weap
on
is even
more hazy , but
the da ting o f
this
Mamlu k rns. is co
rrect
then th is source is
cer
lainly amongst the
earliest pieces of evidence o utside of China.
Th
is weapon was probably no more Ih an an ex perime nta l
device
of
the Royal Arsena l an d may ncv r haw seen active service, though
the
late-13th cent ury
ch ronicler lbn •Abd al-Zahi r rema rks that for the siege o f al-Marqab in 1285 iron implements and flame
throwin g
tubes were issued by the roya l arsenals, and one wonders whet her any of the
Ma
m u
k
engi neers arme d wit h nap tha tubes at Salamiyet in 1299 apparentl y mounted ), or s torming th e
breaches of Acre in 1291 , might have actually carried such weapons.
t
has to be admitt ed that hand
siphons like th ose used earlier by the Byzantines seem mo re probable.
Midfa was also the name ap plied to th e ea rliest known Mamluk can nons, dat ing to 136 6 or possibly
1340
la te da tes con sidering the appa ren t ea rliness of the weapon described here .
6 1. ASSASSIN
The dress of the was. as is that of his mo
dem
-day co unte rpart , in no way unusual. Disguises
arc o ften
mentioned
, however; th e Assassins who killed Co nrad o f Mont ferrat , fo r instance, wer e dressed
as mo nks, and o the r incidents see the dress of merch ants, Fra nkish soldie rs and Sy rian Christians being
worn. In the ir own st ro ngho lds Assassin brethren wore white cloaks and red caps.
They normally o perated singly or in pairs, though
on
occasion con side rab ly larger gro ups appear, perhaps
to he do ubly cert ain o f success. -Bursuqi of Mosul was murdered by a hand o f 10 Assassins in 1126
and Caliph :l1Mu st:lrshid .by as many as 15 or 17 in 1135.
Their weapo n o f execution was exclusively the dagge r, some times pois
on
ed an d apparen tly sometimes
engraved wit h the name of the in tende d vict im, an ea rly inst ance o f if it s got you r name
on
it . . .
Usamah even records ba tt le ane cdot e s whe re Assassins appear to be arme d only with daggers, but
nor mally swo rd spear and shield wou ld have been added in combat, and fully -armed Assassins w
ou
ld
have been indist ingu ishable from ordinary Moslem warrio rs.
A cerem
onia
l da gger desc ribed by J
otn
vtne
cons
isted o f 3 daggers of wh ich the top 2 had their blades
sheathed in the handles
of
the lower 2. Thi s was ca rried by one of th e 3 envoy s sent to Louis IX at
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Acre in I 2
52;
an
oth
er carried a funeral shroud wrap ped
round
his arm , to be presen ted to the king
for his own burial sho uld he reject the Assassin demands Another cer emoni al w
eapon
recorded by
Join ville
was a long-handled axe carried before the Old Man o f the Mountain , the haft of which was
covered in silver and had daggers fixed to it in some way.
62
63. MOSLEM MUSICIANS
Mou
nted
hands acc
omp
anied most Moslem arm ies in ba tt le during this era , the Moslems believing
that the more noise the y made the bolder their spirits became and the mo re fear they struck into the
heart s of their enemies
t
he Bedouins in part icu lar were sensi t ive to the noise of
ru
s :
the
It inerarium
Regis Rica rdi records of Arsouf tha t b e fore the arnir s there went men clanging away wit h trumpet s and
clarion s; ot hers had dru ms, othe rs pi pes and tim hrels (
tambou
rines), ra tt les, gongs, cymba ls, and other
instruments suited to mak ing a din . To raise these noises was the specia l d uty of certa in men ; and the
louder their din the fiercer their comrades fought.
Pro bably
mos
t important of all were
t he
nakers and ke tt le-drum s. The nakcrs were great drums which
accompanied the Sultan, or his commanders-in-chief , and could o nly he bea ten at his personal command,
to t ransmi t o rders o n the b
att
lefield. The Sultan s band, commanded by the Amir- Al am. co mprised 4
nakers, 40 ket tle-dr ums, 4 hautboys, and 20 trumpets; some mu st have also carried cy mbals and o ther
instruments.
The importa nce of the bands can be
judged
from the fact that an amir with d
rum
s ( Amir al-Tablkhanah )
was
one
of the highest ranks in the Mamluk
mi
litary
hierarchy. and tha t on ly an amir with
drum
s or an
amir o f 100 were permi tted bands at all. Those of amirs o f lOOseem 10 have consisted of 8 o r 10 kett le
d rums
trumpets, 2 hau tboys, 2 timbrals , plus other inst
rum
ent s. Amin of 40 (Le. a mirs wit h dr ums )
had 3 kettle-drums, later 2 kett le-d
rum
s and 2 Ilutes. In Saladin s day the amirs commandi ng Tu lhs
were each accompanied hy at leas t a single
trump
et er.
Th ough they are ofte n shown carr ied o n mules (but only ra rely on hor ses), it was camels that were most
commonly used for carry ing
drum
s, th e drums of the Mamluks besieging Acre in 129 1 being ca rried on
as many as 300 camels.
T he Mongols used naker s in an identic al capaci ty to the Mamluks, the roll of th e Khan s or arm y
com mander s nakers being the co mmand to
at t
ack, for the Ta rtars, reports Marco Polo. do no t
dare
to start a ba tt le till their lord s dr ums begin to beat. Those of the Mongols appear to have avera ged
abou t one metre across, and were likewise usually carried o n camels though Kublai Khan had some
which a
ppear
to have been considerab ly bigger and were carried o n elephants.
Though on the balllefield they normally transmitt ed orders by trumpe t calls, even the Franks appear
to have used drums in th is capa city undou bt edly under Moslem influen ce}, WiIliam of Tyr e rela ting how
at Ascalo n in 1125 the king ordered that his men be recalled by the sound o f trum pet and roll of d rum .
64. SARACEN HERALDRY
In the Moslem wor ld heraldry played on ly a seco ndary role amongst Ihe military elite. Only Su ltan s and
all
iin
could have heraldic devices, Qalqashandi recording Ihat
it
was custo mary fo r every amir to have a
special blazon according to his choice and pr
efer
ence:
Such
devices were heredit ary only to such
descendants as fo llowed military careers. They were probably originally gran ted by the Sul tan him self
and usually represented the orrice which the bearer had he ld at the t ime that he was made an am ir.
Abu l Flda , writing in Ihe early 14th century, records that the Secretary s
embl
em is the r en-bcx. tbe
Armour-bearer s the bow, the Superin ten
dent
o f
Sto
res the ewer, the Master of the Robes the napkin,
the Marshal s the horseshoe , and th e Jawish a golden saddle.
eae -m represent a var iety of Syrian and Eg
ypti
an devices as used by the Ay
yub
ids and ear ly Mamluks.
64a is the pen-box o r the Secretary, 64 b the napk in of the Master o f the Robes, and 64c and d the sword
of the Armour-bearer, the latt er also incl uding a napkin. As mentio ned by Abu J Fida, the Arm ou r
bearer s device could also be a bow (sometimes accompanied by arrows), or even a crossbow, though
no exa mples of the latter surv ive. 64e is a device usually describe d as a crescen t , though in his Saracenic
Heraldry L. A. Mayer plau sibly suggests that it is a Saracen horse-shoe . and therefore the device of the
9l
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j
m
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Marshal (see also n
ot
e 57 ),
There were also other officers device s not list ed by Abu l Plda, f
or
instance the table of th e Taster
(64 f) an d th e cup of the Cup-bearer (6 4g and h), on e
of
the mos t common dev ices in Saracen heraldr y,
O ther devices indica tive
of
the ir bearers
offi
ces were polo-sticks (P
olo
-master, 64i), standard ( Alamdar,
or
Standa rd -bearer), drums and drumst icks [Ta blda r, or Drummer) and ho rn , 64j , a device very common
amongs t th e 13th ce
ntu
ry Bahriyyah Mamluks, Mayer suggests as the dev ice of the Dispa tch-rider .
Anima l devices were un usua l, and the on ly
anima
ls to ap pear in Saracen heraldry are the li
on
, the eag le
and occasionally th e horse. The most famous during this period was the lion o f Sultan Baiba rs
6
4k) , and
one so urce speaks of Saladin s standard and that of his br
ot
her el-AfdaJas carry ing pa irs
of
lio ns a t
Acre in 1191 , However, Saladin s device may have been an eagle, a device wh ich appears to have been
pa rticularly
pop
ular amongst the Sel
juks
; it was sometimes 2-headed , possi bly
n
imitatio n of th e
2-headed eagle
ado
pted by the Byzantines some time during t his era . ngi and the Ortoqids appear to
have used this device . T he banner
of
the vizier Fakr ad-Din, the Moslem commander at El Mansurah,
also bore an eagle.
641and m
were
also popu lar du r ing th is era. 641, usually descr ibed as a rose tt e, was a common de vice
under both Ayyubids and ear ly Mamlu ks, usually 6-pointed as here but somet ime s wit h 5 or 8 poin ts.
Th e Ileur-dc-Iis (64m) was the de vice of Nur ed-Din and also fea tu res on a large number of Ayyubid
coins. The Sarace n Ileur-de-hs differs sligh tly from that used in Frankish heraldry in tha t th e 3 leaves
grow from a commo n stem; in
Frank
ish hera l
dry
the leaves ar e ind ividual and are joined toget her only
by a band in the middle,
Some o ther devices represen ted Tamghas, the tr ibal symbols used as brands by many Asiatic
people
s
an d introduced in to th e Near East by Turkish mam luks.
From the evide nce o f surviving ex amp les it wou ld appear that the co lours used in Saracen hera ldr y
consisted of whit e, yellow, red , blue, green , brown and black. The formal regulat ions of European
herald ry , forbidding the use
of
cer ta in co lours together , do no t appear to have ap plied.
6 5. SARACEN STANDARDS
Unde r t he Ayyub ids and early Mamluks the royal standard was o f gold -emhro id
ered
yellow silk or
damask . The ir Royal Mamluk units also carried yellow st andards, each one embr oidered wit h the
herald ic device o f its un it commander. Joinville rec
ords
the se devices to have
been
in crimson,
men tio ning roses, bends and bird s as examples. Th is practice may also be intended by a remar k in t he
It inerarium Regis Ricardi that at Arso uf Tuqi ad-Din commande d 700 o f Saladin s mamluks, each un it
of wh ich carried a yellow standard together wit h a pennon (device?)
of
a differen t colour , especially
since th is source also ref ers to th e use of emblems on standards. Taqi s own standard resem bled 65a;
the It inera rium descr ibes it as a pair
of
trouse rs ,
The It inera rium ment ions banne rs and pen no ns of countless shapes and sizes, o ther sources not ing
man y different colou rs in use. Imad ad-Din records red as well as l asmin standards in Saladin s army at
lIa tt in, wh ile green sta ndards are reco rded in the Seljuk army at Dorylaeum. The Abbasid Caliphs
continued to use blac k standards up un ti l the dest ruction o f the Calipha te by the Mongols in 1258,
tho ugh in 1
057
pu rp le ba nners de
cor
a ted with gold script are also reco rded , pro bably similar to 6 5g.
In 117 1 the Ahhasid Caliph sen t black ban ners to both Saladin and Nur ed-Din.
The standa rds given here are charac teristic of those dep icted in contempo rary sources. Most dat e to the
13th ce ntu ry. T he dev ices on 65b and c of c. I 250 . and on
65d
and e which da te to I 28 7 , a re heraldic.
65f is a horsetail banne r
of
Turkish design such as was probably carried by
many
maml uk units
of
ste ppe
origin, as well as by Seljuks and Turco rnans: see also JOb. The Fatimid vizie r al-Afdal s s
tandar
d a t
Ascalon in 1099 , de scr ibed as having a go lde n ball a top a sifver-p lated staff, was pro bably just such a
banner, as were the Khwarizmian lances reco rded by Joinvdle on which were fashio ned heads with hair ,
tha t seemed like the heads o f devil s. l oinville also spea ks
of
Khwarizmian standards which w
ere
red
and indented up towards the lan ce , presumably swallowtail pennons.
65g, ha nd dep ic t a type o f standard called a Tu , an ornamenta l metal blade atop a wooden shaft. It
was usually perforated
or
damascened, o fte n with inscript ions or heraldic devices. These par tic ular
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6 5
..
f
b
-
exam ples a re from Han n s Maqumat of 123 7, while 6Sj sho ws an ac tua l Mam luk T u in detail. In th e
so urce t he rib bo ns o f 6 Si ar e blac k with go ld ba nd and fringe , wh ile th e n ag of g
is
blac k, blue. red
o r c rimson wit h blac k o r while let tering. T he T u was used in Rum, Persia. Syria and Egyp t.
= :
66. 67 68
69.
YZ
NTINE HEAVY INFANTRYMEN
In t he ir armo u r, as in many o t her respec ts, th e By
zanti
ne s o r Ro ma ns as they persist ed in calling
themselves] clung te nacio usly to their classical herit age throughout this era, the evolu tion of armour
basically sta gna ting af ter t he I lt h c en tu r y so Ihat mo st so ldie rs de pict ed in so urces of t he I 11h- 13t h
ce n tu ries di ffe r fro m o ne a no ther o n ly in de tail. Unfort un ately t her e are no military man uals o the r
t han t he so mew ha t Mach iavellian I I t h ce n t ury S tra tegi
co n
o f Cecau me nus, so we a re almo st en t irel y
dep e ndant o n suc h co ntempo rary illus tra tions
fo r
inform a tio n regarding arms a nd arm o u r.
Basic eq uipm
en t
.:k arl y co nsisted o f cor sele t. hel me t, shield . swo rd a nd sp ea r. T he co rsele t was most
Ircq uen t ly o f la mellar or sca le, le ss o fte n of mail, usua lly re ac hing o n ly to the hi ps and sho u lder s wi th
han gin g pt er uges st ill pro tec ting th e t h ighs and u pper arms. Hel me ts were o f 3 ma in ty pes - the most
co mmo n varie ty being po in ted , with th e neck pro tec te d by a scate or ma il aven tail o r h anging leather
tap pets 66-68): cc mca t with t he back e x te nded in10 a nape-guard 72 , 73 ) ; o r brimmed like a kettle
hel me t , also so me ti mes wit h a nec kguar d o f leather tap pet s o r ma il. Shie lds cou ld be ci rcular o r k
it e
shape d, th ou gh so me in fa n try st ill ca rried t he o ld ova l sh ield in t he lute- t h ce ntury. T h e k ite- shield
ap pea rs to have bee n in general use amo ngst hea vy infa nt r y a nd cava lry by the mid-12th ce n t u ry [b u t
see n
ot
e 75-7 8 ), l ho ugh Ihe ci rc ula r shield p revailed a mo ngst light infan t ry. F lat -top ped heat e r
shields like tho se o f t he Fran ks we re a lso in use b y th e 13t h ce n t ury , Ihou gh th e kite remained mo re
co mmo n; t hat ca rried by 6 9 , qu a rte red in red an d blac k. is fro m a lat e-I 3th c
en t
u ry wo o d -carvin g.
Th e infa nt ry man s spear was no w usua lly of a bou t 8-10 feel , t ho u gh t he o ld 12 fo ol Ko n t ar io n may
have rema ined in limite d use t hroug hout th is e ra. T he swo rd was mos t co m monly suspe nded from a
baldnc .
O the r it em s o f ar mou r 10 be fo u nd in use included w
oo
llen o r linen ho o ds suc h as th a t wor n by 69,
a pparentl y fairly c
ommo
n. as well as ma il co ils , the fo rme r p ro bably th e same a s t hat d escribed as
laced a t t he hac k of t he neck in Leo VI s Ta c tica ; th e o ld leath er harn es s o f breas tba nds and sho u lder
pieces 67 . 69 . 7 2 e tc .}; tu b u lar u p per-arm gua rd s : a nd greaves a nd vam bra ce s b o t h
of
t hese ment io ned
only very occasio nally d u ring th is er a).
Unifo rms . where wor n , were st ill mainly o f vario us shades o f red and blue, usua ll y wit h heav ily em broi dered
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•
•
•
67
borders and hems, often brocade . Offi cers and nob lemen wore much more ela bo ratel y em broid ered
tunics and trousers o f brocade. Embroide ry was of t en gold. Boots, a standard part of Byzantine military
equ ipmen t, were chiefly red , black, white or ye llowish leather ;
th e
markings, consisting of 2 or 3 dark
ban ds, were fairly standa rd. Some men, however, appear to have worn shoe s supplemented with similarly
marked gaiters in place of the
bo o
ts (see figure 76 ).
Hair was gene rally long en
ou g
h to cover the ears, but was neatly trimmed , while shor t beard s were
charac terist ic of the Byzantines throughout th is era and are oft en recorded in anecdot es (such as when
Richard I of England ca ptured Cyprus in 119 1 and obliged the Greek po pulatio n to shave off their
beards ' in token o f their change of masters' ).
Of
th e
4 figures de picted here , 66 dates to the lat ter part of the 11th century white 67 and 68 are from
illustr a tio ns in the famous Scylitzes ms. which pro bably da tes to c. 1200 {no te the shield devices o f these
2 figures, which closely resemble Bayeux Tapestry types ). 69 dates to the 14th century and is pro bably
rep resentat ive of Byzant ine infant ry as they appeared at Ihe time o f the 'Catalan Vengeance' an d the early
Ott oma n wars.
70
1, 72 73. BYZANTINE LIGHT INFANTRYMEN
Light infantry continued to co nstitute a fair percent age of Byzantine foo l
so hfie rs ,
some con tinuing to
resemble th e t radi t ional types described under 6 , 7 and 8 in 'Armies of the Dark Ages' (Anna Com nena,
for instance, describes light infanlry armed only with bow and small shield ). Others were stingers and some
were cro ssbowmen (ca lled Tzangratoroi). After apparen tly falling ou t of favou r in the 10th cen tury the
cro ssbow (Tzangra was rein troduced unde r Frankish tnftuence
du r
ing the 12th century ; when Anna
wro te her Alcxiad c. I 140· 1150 she still described the crossbow as 'a weapon o f the barbarians (Franks),
absolutely unknown
10
th e Greeks' and felt it necessary to give a de tailed descri ptio n of it, which
would sugges t that its use was not widespread even then
t
hough she is describing Frankish crossbowmcn
of the First Crusade). However, it is men t ioned in use dur ing Manuel's reign (1 143
·118
0 ) and cert ainly
it was in general use hy the end of the century, lsaac of Cypr
us army
in 1191 ap parent ly including a
co
nsiderable num ber of crossbowmen.
frequent ly occurs in 13th century sources.
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69 70
71
Most light infantry. howe ver, were archers or 10 a lesser extem.javebn rnen. 70 and 71 are both armed
with composite bows , though 70 (c. 1100) carries in add itio n a spear. 7 1, from the Scylitzes ms., carries
no shield : he is probably on e of the light-a rmed Anatolian provincial troo ps (Paphlagoni ans and
8 ithynians in part icular) held in high regard by the Byzant ine during th is per i
od
especia lly in Nicaean
armies of the 13 th century - there were Bithynian arche rs at i'elagon ia in I 259. for example, and at
rta tata in
12
60
,
while 800 elite Bithynian archers were the nucl eus of the army with which Alexius
Stratcgopoulos recapt ured Constantin ople in 126 1. His cap is characteristic o f both Bithynia ns and
Phrygians ( tha t of 70 is similar).
The
soeannc n
depic ted in
and 73 are pro bably fairly repres
en t
at ive of the light-armed ex-Thematic
provincial levies and the infantry contingen ts o f the Stra tiotes. T hese two date to the 12th and 13th
centuries respec tively, b
similar figures are to be found throu ghout this era. Both wear helmets o f
simila r design and carry circular shields a
bout
2 fee t in diame ter . 72 in addi t ion wears a leather corsele t
with reinforci ng hreastb
and
and pte ruges at the shoulde rs. Scyli tzes shows many such unar
mou
red
infant ry spearmen
w t
kite-shields in place of round ones.
74.
VARANGIAN GUARDSMAN
The axe remained the principal weapon of the v arangian s, l ohn VI Cantacuzenus wri ting of ' Varangians
with their axes' as late as 1329 . The usua l blade-shape can be clea rly seen in this figure, from Scylit zes ms.
A spear could also he carr ied. The illustration from which this figure is tak en ind icates that some at least
continued to carry the rou nd shield as la te as 1200 or per haps even later , though Niketas (who wrote in
the early- I3t h century) describes Varangia ns with axes and ' long' Ii.e. kite) shields at Eski Zagra in 11 22.
74a
dep
icts the head and shoulders of a Varangian Guardsma n in sta le dress from a
eo
rtratr rep resenting
Joh n VI in 1351; in thi s sou rce ha ts
an
' wh ite with gold trim and tun ics are blue . 'Sky-coloured' silk
tu nics are also recorded by l laroun ibn Yahva as being worn by guardsmen in the I Ilth ce n
tury.
pre
suma
bly Varangians since the y carried gil
ded
axes.
The ir armour was generally heavy - we hea r from Anna Com nena, for inst ance, Iha t the weight of their
arms' soo n broughl on fatigue at Durazzo in 1081. Quite wha t should be made o f an alte rnative so urce
for the same bail ie referring 10 a lack of mail co rselets amongst the English
i .e
. Varangians) I do not know .
The Guard probably ceased 10 exist towards the end o f the 14th century.
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72
74
75,7
6, 77 78. BYZANTINE HEAVY CAVALRYMEN
Byzantine cavalry were g
enera
lly less heav ily ar moured t han thei r Fr ankish counterparts. an d F rankish
chronicle rs as a result a lmost invariably d escribe th e m as se rgean ts .
T he re was l
ittl
e u niformi ty o f arm
our
, pro bab l y o nly guar d un its now maintaining a ny degree o f un iform
ap pearance. or th ese 4 figur es , 2 wear mail co rselets wit h breast bands plus sho ulde r pieces in the case
o f 78 ), o ne a scale co rselet with pterugcs, and t he fou rt h an ap pa rentl y qu ilted corselet, pr o b ably over
mail o r lame llar. T he latt er figure from Scy lit zes) wea rs in add it io n sp lin t greaves. Mo st heavy cavalry
in S
cylit
zes in fact re sem ble 68 an d 76.
I 4 c r ry kite-sh ild s d eco rated in al mo st we st ern fashion. T he kite-shield a ppe ars to have bee n invented
by the By za n ti nes in th e first half o f t he 10 t h ce n t ury see Arm ies o f the Dark Ages ) a nd by the I I t h
ce n t u ry was in widesp read use, pa rt icularly am o ngst horsemen . Ci n namus, howeve r, co n ta ins a passage
w hic h seems to imply t ha t pr ior to th e beginning of Man uel s reign 1 143) mo st cavalry were
armed
with
ro u nd shie lds a nd that lo ng shields reac hing 10 t hei r feet were o nly in tr o d uced d uri ng army ref
orm
s of
c. 1150 . Q uit e ho w th is sta te me n t sho u ld be in te rp r et ed is o pen to deb ate , b u t is w
or t
h n
ot
in g t ha t
al-Tartu si refers to th e kite-shield q uite specifically as
the
sh ield used by t he Fran ks and Byzan t incs .
Never theless, so me la t e so urces st ill o ccasion ally s
how
ro u nd shields used by By zan ti ne cava lry.
At th e beginn ing
of
t his e ra so me heav y ca valry un its still included archer s as we ll as lance rs the
Immo rt als, fo r exa mple, inlcuded bo ws am on gs t t heir eq uipme n t) b ut t hese see m
10
have stea dily
disappeared in t he co urse o f th e 12th ce n t u ry. Man uel s refo rm s we re basica lly res ponsible for their
fina l d emise see page 4 0 ) t hou gh we st ill o ccasio nall y hea r
of
hea vy ca valry ho rse-arc hers eve n at the
en d o f th e 12t h ce n tu ry ; Isaac o f Cy prus arm y incl uded h eavy hor se-archers in 1 191 , in clu ding tsaac
himse lf. Most cavalry, ho weve r, wer e lan ce rs. T he 12 fo o l Ko n to s was sti ll in use durin g muc h o f t his
e ra the Mos lem Qunta r iya, an d pr o bab ly th e Rumh to o, we re de rived fro m it ) bu t F ra nk ish and It alian
la nces wer e also used. Of ficers still seem to have carried th e Bard ouk ion
or
mace.
79 . BYZANT INE LIGHT CAVA LRY MAN
T he S
cylitz
es ms. and var ious o t he r so u rces
of
te n sho w band s o f u narmou red ho rseme n similar to t his
figure , arm ed o n ly wit h sword, lance, shield and helme t, a pparen t ly represent ing nat ive ligh t o r medium
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7
cavalry suc h as an, occ asio nally recorded in the written sources. may have been tr oops o f th is type
th at co nstituted at least a part o f th e co ntingent s o f th e quasi-feudal Stratiotes. It is probable that man y
of
the ex-Thematic cavalry as still served were also
of
th is ty pe.
They
wer e possibly uni fo rmed , and some
may h
aw
been
bow-arm ed.
However, most light cavalry of t his era were Asiatic mercenaries, particularly Pechenegs and Cumans
the Pigmalici or Pineenal i and Comans
of
Frank ish sources, b
oth
described under figures 115-117 in
Armies of Feudal Europe ; sec also figure 80 helow) and, in numbers which steadily increased during
this era, Turks, gene rally r
ef
erred to as
Tur
co p
ou
lo i.
On
e poi nt of in terest is that Pechenegs and Tor ks
r
ecor
ded fight iug fo r th e Byzantines in the Manzikert campaign were indist inguishabl e from th eir Seljuk
enemies, wh ich indicates a close af fi nit y in their dress).
80 CU
N
CAVALR Y
N
At vario us t imes du ring this per iod the Cu mans also called Kipchaks, o r Polovtsy by th e Russians) fo ught
eit he r as allie s or me rce naries for the Byzantines, Geo rgians, Mongol s and Roma nian Fran ks as well as the
Russians, Bulgarian s and Hungarians, and as stave-soldie rs in Ayy ubiJ , Marnluk and Khwarizrnian armies.
They ma y also, towards the end o f
the
11t h
centu
ry . have served with th e Khazars J uring the twilig ht
yea rs
of
th e Khaga natc.
They wore tr ousers, hoo ts, long Arab-style tunic and kafta n. Brocade, fu r, w
oo
l and line n predo mina ted,
hu t goa tskins were also worn and Ro bert de Clari, recording th e events of the Fourth Crusade, speaks of
the Cuman s wear ing a sheepskin garment wh ich may have bee n in tended to serve as light armour. Othe r
forms of armou r including scale and lamella r were also worn dep end ing
on
wealth and soci a l sta tus; fo r
suc h riche r warr ior types sec figures 115- 117 in Armies o f Feudal Euro pe .
Robcrt de Clan implies th at t he Cumans wer e armed only
with
th eir bows , but Byzantine an d Russian
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so u rces also record sa bres , lan ces, lassoes, maces a nd javelins in use , the Cu mans bei ng not ed fo r t heir
acc u racy wit h
the
latt er . Mos t shields we re small circular ones , bu t so me
uma
ns carried a small vers io n
o f t he ki te shield.
T he y a lso incl uded so me fo ot-soldiers o n oc casio n. T hese p ro bably r od e ca me ls o n t he march .
T he Curn ans Russian name Polo vtsy and Germa n name F alven bo th origi
na t
ed from wo rd s mean ing
yello w, w hic h is fa irly cer tai nly a r
ef
erence t o ski n c olour.
8 A N CAVALRYMAN
T he nom ad ic Ca ucas ian Alans al so called Osse tians) su rvived well beyon d th e dose o f t h is period , albe it
o nly in small co mm un it ies rou nd t he Black Sea co ast line aft er t he ir crushing d
ef
ea t by t he Mo ngo ls in
1239 . Alt ho ugh t hey co u ld incl ude a large nu
mber
of infan t ry t heir main arm was cavalr y and t he 14 t h
cen t ury Ca tala n c hro nicle r Munt aner rec or ds t ha t t he Alans were held t o be t he best ca valry t here is in
t he East , which cer tainl y e xp lains wh y in the By zant ine a rmy t hey received d o u ble t he pay o f th e best
native t roo ps.
Arch aeo lo gical finds p rove th at t hey wer e st ill pri nci pally bo w-armed ; t he Byza n tines, who co n tin ued to
h ire Alan s in lar ge n um bers in th e 12 th a nd 13 th ce n tur ies, usuall y br igaded the m alo ngside th eir T u rkish
tr o
o ps a nd used t he m as skirm ishers. Cin
namu
s reco rds o ne insta nce in 1 156 whe n t hey we re brigaded wit h
Geo rgian t roo ps, and cer ta in ly t his figure fro m Daghest a n co u ld equall y we ll be a Geo rgian .
O ther eq uip me nt wo uld ha ve incl uded sabre , dagger , shiel d pro bably o f wic ker an d/ o r lea t her ) an d a light
lan ce , t h ou gh f inds o f spea r-heads are co mp arat ively few in nu mbe r. Mo st wo re little if an y ar mo u r, bu t
t her e we re at le ast so me heavy cavalry ; 3 ,00 0 A gulani - A la ns o r possibly th e neigh bou r ing Albania ns
- record e d in t he Selju k ar my at nt io ch in 10 98 we re armo u red all o ver wit h pla tes of iro n probably
indica t ing la mellar ) as we re t he ir ho rses, while ma il-armou red Alans are a lso me n tio ned
durin
g th e
Mo ngo l co nq uests.
T he ir infa n tr y fo ugh t p rincipally wit h a he avy , lo ng-handl e d ba tt le-a xe.
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As wit h most steppe peopl es they were accompan ied on the march by Iheir fam ilies and wago ns, forming
the latt er in to Ihe characteris tic
de f
ensive laager when they en camped and ptiching the ir tents withi n .
They were generally blo nde
w t
blue eyes.
82. G EORGIAN CAVALRYMAN
Jacqu es de Vilry te lls us tha t the Georgians were very warlike and valiant in bat tle, being strong in body
and powerfu l in
the
co untless numbe rs of thei r warr iors , ad ding that they were much dreaded by the
Saracc ns .
•
o n whose borde rs they dwell. Marco Polo simi lar ly rela tes that the Georgians are a handsome
race of do ughty warriors. good archers and good fight ers o n the bat t lefield.
Of th eir appearance d uring Ihis era we know little and th is figure is based largely on 14t h ce n
tu r
y sources.
Arms and equ ipment ap pear to have bee n principally of Persian design and the composi te bo w was o ne
o f their main weapons, though lance, mace and sword or sabre were also carried.
Dc Vitry reco rds tha t they wore their hair and bea rds a bout a cub it lo ng , while Po lo says the y wore
their hair sho
rt
so we are o bviously no t the o n ly o nes uncerta in o f t hei r appearance
83
84. MONGOL LIGHT CAVALRYMEN
Mongol costume and equipment is described fa irly th oroughly in contempo rary so urces. w luta m o f
Rubreck recor ds t hat in summer th e Mongols wore silks, rich broca des and co tto ns from Ch ina and Persia,
and Fria r Joh n de PIano Carpini probab ly intends the same ma te rials when he speaks of buckram , purp le
and baldequin . Marco Polo also speaks of clo th of go ld (brocade ) and silk, lined or decorated wit h sabl e,
ermine , sq uirr el and fox fu r. One ty pe of Chinese shir t, first rec
or
ded in 1219 , was of raw sil k worn as a
type of armour since arrows co uld not penetra te it , instead being driven inl o the skin so Iha t by tugging
on the shirt th e arrowhead co uld be ex tracted fro m the wound clean ly,
In winter fur coats and breeches were worn , usually 2 o f the former, the inner coal with the fur on the
inside and the outer with it outside. T he outer coa t was of wolf, fox , monkey , badger, dog or goat skin
depending o n the social sta tus o f the wearer. Sheepskin and stuffed silk were also worn, plus felt which
served as a type of light armour,
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Carpini men tions white, red and blue-p ur ple tu nics as weU as ba jdequin . . H. lIowor th, desc ribi ng the
dress of mid- 19t h centu ry Mongols, says the usual colours for the outer summer coat (the Kalat ) were
blue or brown, over a bright blue or grey shirt ; tro user co lours appear to have been similar. The nap
o pening of the Kalat wen t from left to right, as o pposed to the right-over-left opening of the Turks
(see not e SS/ 56 ). An ornamen ta l bell , round fur or plush-tri mmed cap and leather boo ts with felt soles
completed
the
costume. Howor th adds that a t tha t lat e da te the cap ha d two 45 cm ribbons hanging
dow n at the back, and these appear to be mentioned in at least
one
contemporary source of our pe riod.
The alt erna tive hat worn by 84 is a Saraq uj.
1010 reco rds basic Mongol equ ipment as bow, mace and sword (other sources describe the latter mor e
accu rately as a curved, one-edged sabre). Apparently 2 or 3 bows were carr ied, or else o ne particularly
goo d on e, and 3 large q uivers o f arrows. Polo speaks o f only 60 arro ws being carried , 30 smaller o nes
for piercing and 30 larger with broa d heads for discha rging at close quarters ; armour-piercing arrows
were also in use. All had eagle-feather flights. Car pini s report ind ica tes that the arrows were 28-30 long;
ano ther so urce says they were lon ger than European arrows and had iron , bone or horn heads 3 broad.
The bow was bo th lo nger and capable of grea ter range than the type in use wit h the Turks and Mamluks.
Other arms were lasso. dagger. and lance, the latter o ft en with a small hoo k below the head to pull
en
emy
horsemen from t he saddle. Vincent de Beauvais, however, says few Mongols carried lances and
Carpini seem s to confirm this.
Polo records shields in one passage and Ea rpini says that wicker shields were carried, though he adds that
they were not used much because they in terfered wit h the use of the bow and th at he on ly saw them in
use in camp at nigh t by guardsmen such as the Keshik. Ml ng lIu ng (a Chinese general con te
mpor
ary to
Genghis Khan) seems to disagree since he lists 4 ty pes of Mongol shield : large, of hide or willow wood
(the
lat ter possibly meaning co uld be o f inte rwoven osiers ); a smaller type used by front r
ank
light
troo ps to de flec t arro ws; large to rto ise shields for use in sicge-workj and appa rent ly a type o f face-visor.
84a depicts how the Mongols wore thei r hair. The crown was shaved right round , leaving just a long lock
of ha ir on the very to p of th e head which hung do wn to the eyebrows. The hack o f the head was also
shaved. At the sides they grew thei r hair long like women , pla it ing it behind the ears. Rub reck indicat es
that there co uld also be a plait at the back of the head. Compare to the hair style of SO.
Moustaches could be grown to extt avagent length, th ough Carpini says only a few grew hair on their top
lips. All the sources agree that beards were scanty.
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a
8 MONGOL HEAVY CAVALRYMAN
Co nt empora r ies of fer a fair numhe r o f desc riptio ns
of
Mongol arm
our
, a lbeit generally vague.
Carpini records iron or steel helmet s wit h leather colfs or aventuils, mail cc rescteu, and leather bod y
armo ur of overlapping strips; he also gives an accurate and detailed description of lamellar armour used
for bot h men and horses. Marco Po lo says they wore a vcry st ro ng arm ou r 'o f lea ther that has been boiled
i.c . cu ir bo ullh. Matt hew Paris also reco rds lea ther armour, of oxh ides streng thened wit h iro n plates,
addi ng th e improbable but amus ing det
ailtha
t on ly th eir ches ts were prote
ct
ed, their backs being left
unar
mou
red to d iscourage them from runn ing away Tho mas of Spalatro desc ribes 'armour of buffa lo
hid es with sca les fas ten ed on it' ( possibly lame llar) as well as iron or leather helme ts. T he Empero r
Frcderick
JI
rec
or
ds 'untanned hid es of oxe n. horses an d asses' reinforced with plate s of iron wh ich wer e
somehow st itched in. li e also menti ons that th ere were
man
y considerably be tter-equippe d Irom the spo ils
o f
the
ir de feated enemies (he ac tu ally says
Christ
ians'
the
r
efor
e Franks). Into th is category fa ll iro n
helmets and armour of i ron pla tes' of Persian origin and ma il haube rks of Alan or igin recorded in
add ition to hardened- leathe r armour by Rubrec k. Meta l a
rmo
u r was po lished to a high shine.
Q uill' clea rly lea the r was the
co
mmo nes t f
orm
of
body
-a
rmo
ur , cons truc te d from 'overlapping plia ble
s trips' according to Carpin i. li e records that th e hide str ips - abou t
inches wide - wer e tightl y
sewn together 3 layers th ick, th en so fte ned by boi ling and shaped to fit. li e add s tha t the hide was
st iffe ned with b
itu
men, wh ich wou ld also have served to protect
it
from humi
dity.
The whole arm
ou
r
consis ted o f fro nt, bac k, arm an d leg pieces, th e fron t and bac k bei ng joined 1 the s
houl
de r (and sides,
on
e assumes) by iron plate s and bu ckles: sec a lso 89.
The s tandard Mo ngol battle-f
or
mation required tha t 40 o f the army we re heavy cavalry, but William
o f Rubreck says only th e o ffice rs and picked men wore arm our and thi s is reitereated by Vincen t de
Beauvais, who adds thal no more th an 10 of the Mongols were armoured.
86 MON O INFANTRYMAN
Alth
ough earl y Mo ngol armi es wer e exclusively cavalry
they
gradua lly came to include a large pe rcentage
of
infan try recruited from the subject p
op
ulations o f co nquered ter rito ries, principally Chinese bUI also
Tu rks, Arabs, Khwarizmians, Russians and
ot hers
.
Main weapons appea r to have
been
a lon g thrust ing spear (principally as a
defence
agains t ho rsemen ),
javelins, bo w or crossbow, and a shield
co
uld be ca rrie d. Othe rs were engineers. Th is p
ar
ticu lar figure,
from the Mongol Invasion Scroll of 129 3 , is probably a Chinese auxiliary. He wears helmet and qu ilted
body-armou r, probably o f felt .
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a b
c
90
87 88. K H ~ J L1
GnT
CAVAl RYMEr\
These 2 figures and the nex t all come fro m illustra t ion s 10 the Wo rld History o f Ras
chid
al-Din, executed
between J
306
and IJ I S.
It was und ou btedly the Ilkhanids 10 wh
om
Marco Polo was referring when he wrot e th at those (Mongols)
who
live in the Levant have ad
op t
ed th e man ners
of
the Saraccn s j though
it
is apparent fro m these
figure s th a t it was the tr ad itions of Persia rath er than Egypt or Moslem Sy ria 10 wh ich th ey had succ
umbe
d.
The dre ss of ho th these figure s particularly tha t o f 87 wit h his short-sleeved jacket and baggy trou sers)
be trays co nsiderahle Persian in fluen ce and is fairly characte rist ic of tha t worn by Persians and Moghuls
over the oc I several hu nd red years, the o nly ap parent concession to Mongol fashio n be ing the Saraq uj
wo rn by 88 . Tu rbans were also freq uentl y worn from Ilk han Ghazan s t ime ( 1295-1304 ) onwards, while
som e of Raschld s i1u
strat
ion s also show the Sharbu sh (sec al a-d I in use. Clot hing colours were bright,
with reds and blues pred omina t ing, often richly em broidered .
The ci rcu lar device on the chest of 87 may be a badge of office called a Paizah (see note 93 in Armies
and Enemies o f Ancient Ch ina ); those of the llkhanids wer e marked with 1·5 lions depen ding on
seniority, prob ably I lion for a commander of 100 men, 2 for 1,00 0, 3 for 10,000 for 100,000 and 5
for princes and commande rs-in-ch ief.
Judging from the illust rat ions bow and sabre were the principal arms, th e latter a lo ng, narr ow wea pon
with only a very slight curve. Pro bably a small shield like th at of 89 was also carri ed. 87a de pi
ct
s an
alterna tive type o f shield which was also in use, ulti mately derived from the Frankish kit e-shield ; one
illustra tio n shows such a shield slung at a warrior s back by guige-strap.
89 ILKHAN
I
HE VY CAVALRYMAN
The armo ur w
orn
he re is typical o f tha t dep icted in many tat e-t Jth cen tu ry sources and th rough out
Rasc hid at-Din s mss. , comprising a long, lamellar corselet (oft en comple te ly co vered by a heavily
embro idered surcoat j and a spiked helmet wit h aven tail. Buckles and laces are ver y clearly depicted
across th e shoulders and down the chests of some co rselets in Rase
hid s
illust ration s, indicat ing that
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:
they were co ns truc ted of several diffe ren t pieces as described
unde
r S Th e arm-pieces a re
naps
ra ther
t han short sleeves. On ma ny co rsele ts alt e rna te rows o f lamellae are so
meti
mes shown pa in ted or
o th erw ise dec orat ed .
Th
e helm et , wit h its clo th
or
leather aventa il , is almost invariab ly de picted a blue
colour
p
robab ly ind icati ng iron) wit h th e spike colo ured gold.
Other items of armou r in use bef ore the end o f the 1J th cen tury included tubu lar vambraces, knee
guards, greaves and mirror a rmour
[i.e
. plates on chest and back secured by straps).
N
ote
the clever if somewhat impra ctical me th od o f
sto
wing away the lance wh en bo th hands are needed ,
sturring
it
thro ugh the waist-b
elt
and passing the foo t thro ugh a small loop near the b
ut t
. Lances seem to
have varie d in leng th be tween
abou
t 9 an d 12 fee l, o r sometimes more, and were he ld in a vari
et y
of ways
inclu ding th e unde rarm co uc h and the j -hand ove rarm th rus t. A bow was also carried, togethe r with a
sabre and frequen tly a mace .
Shie lds seem to have been mostly 12-20 in d iamete r, ap par en tly held by a single cent ral grip .
90
. MONGOL
STANDARD
S
There appear 10 be no co nlempo rary illustratio ns of Ihe Khan s 9- lailed Tuk
sta
nda rd
th
at depicted under
94a in Armies and Enemies o f Anci ent China appe ars to be a misinterpret ation o f Hulagu Khan s ro yal
umbrella ). All we know of it is that it cons isted of 9 white yak tails, Meng lI ung adding tha t
it
had a black
m
oon
in the middle, pr
obab
ly refe rri ng to the ball at
op
th e staf f. John Creer ha s suggested 10 me in
co rrespo ndence tha l in fact th ere was no set arra ngement for th e ta ils, bUI th at pro
bably
it was th e
number of tail s tha l indicated rank. The number 9 itself was sacred 10 the Mongols, and Howor th
thinks that t he 9 yak-tai l Tuk
of
the Khan probably resul ted fro m the origina l division o f the Mongols
proper
into
9
horde
s
hy
Genghis K
ahn
s lime represen t ed by the Or
lok)
.
90a
is my
ow
n interp retatio n
o f its appearance.
Most o the r standa rds were like 9
0b
. Thomas of
Spalatro
describes Mongol standards as sho r t , made o f
bla ck or white yaks tails wit h ba lls
of
wool at the t
op
, while o ther sour ces also refe r to standa rds made
from the black horse s tail ,
one of
4 black hor se-tails apparen t ly being a
nother
of
their
main ba ttle
sta ndards. The Mongol standard at the Battl e o f l eign itz in 124 1 desc ribed by Ge
rman
chronicle rs as a
demon with a gr ey head and a long black bear
d
was und oub
tedly of
th is type . The Mongols a t Ain
Jalu t
in I
260ap
pea
rto
ha ve had whi le standards, bu t o thers may have
been
dyed red or o th er co lours.
O
ther
standards might be
of
clo th as was Kublai s, described by Marco Polo as carry ing a sun and
moon
device. T hese may have resembled
90
c , from Raschid al-D tn s ms. o f 1306 .
9 1. FRAN KISH HORSE
Because the Fra nks
depended
so heavily
on
the charge of th eir mailed knights horses were
ex t
remely
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valu a ble in O
utr
e mer, eve n mor e so t han in Eur ope beca use of the c onstant da nger o f inju ry o r loss in
b
att
te as a result o f T urk ish ar ch ery t actics. Rest or , t he cust o m o f repla cing a vassal s horse if killed or
inj ured in ba t tle see page 6 in Armi es o f Feu d al Eur op e ) , may have act ually evolved in Fr ank ish
Sy ria in t he early-
12th
ce n
tury
; Usa mah reco r d s in an ane cd ot e how Tan cred ,
to l
d by his men d uring a
batt le o f c. 11 10 t hat t hey feare d for their ho rses, pro mised to replace a ll t hose hur t in th e fighting
T he ho rses are my p rope rty. Whosoever o f yo u loses his ho rse shall have it repl ace d. ) and th is a ppears
10 be t h e ea rliest recorded insta nce o f Rest or.
Ho rses in Ou tre mer came c hiefly fr o m Syria an d Cypr us, Arab st eeds were p ar ticu lar ly highly prized ,
an d h igh prices we re also ra id fo r Kurdish and Persian horses, fine steed s o f gr eat value accord ing to
Marco 10 10. Tu rc
oman
T urquema n or T urquan ) horses wer e also used bu t t hese were clear ly
smaller.Tike t he hard y hor se s o f Cilician Armenia, bo t h t her
ef
or e bei ng r id den ma inl y by sergeants
th
ough
Templa
r sta tu tes ind icate tha t Co mmanders , as well as t he Grand Mast e r and o ther o fficers,
also had a T urqu eman eac h ).
Eur op ean ho rses also fou nd th eir way to th e Itol y La nd wit h th e var iou s crusading arm ies b ut if t he
so urces ar e to be belie ved mo st of the m did no t last lo ng, th e major it y o f th o se that ca me o verland
d yin g of ex hau stion, sta rvatio n o r wound s lo ng
befo
re t hey reached Sy ria. add ition th e Military
Orde rs fr
equ
en t ly had horses sen t
ou t
10 Ihe m by shi p from t heir Eu ropea n Con vent s: th eir regulatio ns
also specified th at no b ro th er was allo wed to take a ho rse fro m O ut re me r bac k to Europe if he sho uld
be po sted , Th e Moslems, incid
en t
ally, d id not t hi ng mu ch o f Eu ropean horse s, despising th e m as
overlargc in t he bod y and la ckin g spirit .
Mo st k night s were e xpe cted t o se rve with 2 or 3 sp are horses, and even se rgeants so me t imes h ad 10 have
o ne re mo unt.
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96
93 MOSLEM HORSES
One of th e charact eristic fea tures of Moslem harness was the collar Mishadda) wor n at the throat.
usually with a plume of horse-hair suspen ded from it as in figure 9 2. It hJS even been suggested
that
this
may have been colo ured as a means of identification. A second plume was often suspended h orn
the breast-si rap together with o the r pendant s; 92 has in ad di tio n 3 pendants hanging from long straps
on
e ith er side of the saddle, apparen t in many illustrat i
on
s of Turkish horses throughou t th is era.
The saddle itse lf was of ten very ornate: Usamah describes one as black and quilted. and anot her as gold
wit h a black centre and the rider s name in black lett ering rou nd the edge. Th e saddle-cloth Zunnari), which
usually cove red about half
of
th e
horse s bac k, also t
en d
ed to
be
rich ly de co rated.
H a Seljuk mou n t dating 10 c. 1115 , is int eresting in tha t it wea rs a housing, called Kan bush by the
Moslems {
comp
are to tha t of figure 7). T hese wer e probab ly in use by the 121h century and were fair ly
commo n by the
en d
of
th e
Ayyu bid era .
Th e
Malllluk sultan Baibars had a horse wit h a black housing
at his coronano n in 1160 , and at Acre in 129 1 Ihe Templar of Ty re re por ts of th e Mamluks th at tt hey
had the ir mou nted men all armed , and their horses in housings. At 1I0ms too , in 1281, many of the
Mamluk ho rses ap pear to have wor n housings . Probably th e h
ou
sing sometimes co ncealed arm ou r.
Hor se-arm o ur was in use among st the Moslems even bef
or e
th e Crusades bu t owing to the predom inan ce
o f light cavalry in th eir armie s it appears only rarely in th e sources. There were a t lea st 3
,000
armoured
horses in the Seljuk army de fea ted at An t ioch in 10< 8, an d Sultan Kilij Arslan I rode an armoured horse
at the Bail ie of Khabar in 1107. In his Raymond III of Tr ipolis M. W. Baldwin even implies that there
were arm
ou
red ho rses in Sal
adin s
army at Ilal tin in 1187, appa rently ci ting Ibn al-Athir and Abu
Sham ah . Moslem terms fo r ho rse-armour were Barasim bard I, Baraki cha nfro n) and Tigfaff qui lte d
armo ur).
Th
e Franks ado pt ed horse-a
rm o
ur in th e late- 12th ce n tury , an d its use stead ily increased
throughout the 13t h cen tury: for Frank ish ho rse-armou r see figures 120 and 121 in Armies of Feu d al
Europe .
< 4. BYZAN
TINE
HORSE
Thi s is typicaI of Byzantine harness thr oughout the I l th. 1
2t h
and 13th ce nturies. It ap pears to have
mos t commonly been dyed red or black.
Horses we re mostl y from Analolia and
Sy r
ia - Ann a Comnena mentions Dama scene. Edessan and Arab
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horses being bought fo r the army, an d the Byzant ine wor d for horse (Pharrhi} itself derives from th e
Ara bic. Anoth er type held in high regard fo r its speed was ca lled the Wild Horse by th e Byeantincs.
ap parentl y th e same as the Tu rcoman or Frank ish Turqu ernun horse. Th cssa tian ho rses were a lso of
goo d qualit y .
The Byzan tin es wore th eir st irru ps sho rte r th an th e Franks. Spurs arc absent fro m most contemporary
illustrations, bu t they
do
oc casiona lly occ ur as, for instance, in on e or two pictures in the Scylit zes
ms. Some Byzan tin es [ possibl y those of Tu rkish an cestr y or extractio n ) ap pear to have followed the
Turkish custom of cont rolling the horse by use of a small wh ip suspended at th e wrist .
I
know of no Byzantine sources of th e Crusade era which de pic t or ment ion the use o f horse-armo ur by
Byzant incs, thou gh this does no t prove that it had completely disappeared. It seems more prohahie tha t
its use simply became less widespread with th e gradual deterioration of the milita ry
es tablishment ,
and th a t
o nly those wealth y enough (or with access to Imperial armo uries) were ab le 10 o btain horse-armour af ter
th e cnd of th e I 1th ce ntury or meearly part o f the 12th cen tury.
9 MONGOL PONY
Mongol pon ies were sho rt-legged and stoc ky-and stood o nly 13-14 han ds high bUI th ey were, in the
Emperor Freder ick lI s words, swift and at need long-enduring: Each man had a t least 2 and possibly
as many as 18 horses, these apparently
being ridden
in ro tat ion fro m da y to day . They
were
mainly
geldings and mares.
The
har ness
de pict ed here is fairly typical,
most
horses having a plume suspended at throa t or chest.
The tail was normally t ied or short ened and the st irr ups were w
or n
shor l. The saddle was made of
woo d , rubbe d wu h
sheep s
fa t to
pro tect
it against the rain.
Some were armo ured or
half-armoured.
Car pini record s leat her horse-armour o f
2
or
3
layers pro tec t ing
the horse down to its knees, a lso des cribing horses w it h their shoulders and brea sts pro tec ted ,
apparen tly
with metal armour. In ad ditio n he records lamellar hor se-armour and iron head-pieces. Withou t ci ting a
so urce
. Lamb, in his Genghis Khan , s ays tha t the sh ock divisions had ho rses encased in lacquered
lea th er -
red o r black , by which he may
be
ref
er r
ing to
Keshik
units. For the pro bable appearance of
Mongol horse-armou r sec figure 122 in Armies and Enemies of Ancien t Ch ina .
Solid coloured horses were gene rally preferred since they co ncealed the blood o f ho t h their own and
their riders wounds, white horses be ing generally shunned f
or
the
same
reaso n (whi te ho rses we re in
fact sacred amon gst the Mongo ls). The Baat ut rode blac k horses. wh ile greys. chestnuts. bays, sorrels and
skewbalds are also record ed.
T he Ilk hanids appear to have main ly ridden large Ara b
s teeds.
Like all Asiat ic nomads, the Mongols directed the horse w
it h
:I
wh ip rat her than spurs. Such a whip can
be see n suspended h orn th e wrist of figure 84.
96 . CAMEL
Camels were the main mea ns o f huggage t ranspor t in the Middl e East and accom panied most armie s
Moslem , Mongol or Fran k ish - in large numbe rs ; Beha ed-Din records th e Fra nks ca pt uring as many as
3,000 came ls fro m o ne of Saladin s supply caravans in 119 2 the Itinerarium claims the even higher
figure o f 4 ,700 ) in addi t ion
10
mul es ami asses, a lso used in large numbers, and th is was o nly o ne o f 3
similar co nvoys. In addition to carr ying baggage the camels o ften doubl ed 3S infa nt ry mounts o n the
march , bu t th ey do no t seem to have bee n ridden in bat tle except by some Arabised Negro tribes o f th e
Su d
an , such as the Bega. Mamluks usually had at least one camel each, mor e oft en 2, wh ile non-mamfuks of
the al-Halqa received 3 per 2 men .
xtoslem caravan s generally had lheir own escorts , comprised o f cavalry, in ad dit ion to which the drivers
were usually arme d, Fu lcher of Chart res describ ing how the drivers of th e Fatimid supp ly column at
Ramla in 1102 carried staves and missiles in their hands for fight ing. Of the 3 caravans reported in I 192 ,
two were esco rt ed by Bedoui ns; in all th e 3 caravans seem 10 have had a combi ned escort strength of
2
,000
cavalry
in
clud ing 500 eli te mam luks ) plus nu
mero
us foo tmen , pro hably th e camel drivers.
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PPENDI ES
APPENDIX I MILITARY SERVICE OWED TO THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM AS RECORDED BY
JEA N O IBELlN
Jea n d be lin wro te c. 1265 but ap pea rs to have re
cor
de d military ser vice as it probabl y exis ted in th e
re ign o f
aldw
IV, ther
ef
or e some lime be tween 1174 and 1185, The re are several vers ions of his lists
ex t
ant in which , inevitably, ce rtain discrepancies have been introduced; these are noted where they
app
ear . A la ter list by Marino Sanudo
sho
ws
certa
in o ther
differences-and
these to o are no ted . D l be lin s
Livre de s Assises de la
aute
Cou r .
from
which this da ta is taken, is q uot ed in fu ll in Volume I of
Recue tt des Histone ns des Cro isad es, Lois publis hed in 184 1 (a facsimile edition was publi shed in this
co untry in 1969 ).
KNIGHT SERVICE
The Barony of the Co unt of Jaff a and Ascalon , includ ing Ram la, Mirabel and Ibelin, owed 100 knigh ts
(
one
version .eves the improbable figu re of 500)
thu
s:
Ja ffa 25
Ascalon 25
Ram la and Mlrabcl 40
Iod in
I Q
The Bar
ony
of the Prince of Galilee owed 10 0 kn ights
t
he same one version again says
500)
thus:
The land s to the cast of the River Jordan 60 ( one version says 40 )
The lands to the west o f
the
River Jordan 40
The Baro ny of Sidon , including Beaufort , Caesarea and Beisan , owed 100 kn ights ( one version again
says 500 , while S
anudo
doe s no t list this Barony at all)
thu
s:
Sidon and Be
auf
or t 60
Caesare a 25
Beisan 15
T he Seigno ry of Kerak, Mo nt rea l
and
Hebro n owed 60 knights
thu
s:
Kera k an d Montr eal
Oultre
jourda in) 40
Hebron 20
T he Seignc ry of Coun t Joscely n owed 24 knight s (one version says 50 ) thus:
Chateau do u Rei (Mi iJiya) 4
Sain t George (Lydda ) 10
The lands of Ge
of
frey le Tor t 6
The lands of Ph.ilip le Ro us 2
The Chamberlain 2
d lbelin lists the knight service which the bishop s of the kingdom of Jerusalem owed (one version
includes th ese as pa rt o f the Seign
ory
of Count Josccly n : they are no t li
sted
at all by Sanudo) thus:
The Bishop of Saint George o f Lydda 10
The Archbishop of Nazareth 6 (one version says 10 )
(T he Scignory
of)
Toron and Maro n 18 (one version says I S) th us:
T
oron
15
Maron 3
D Ib
ehn
th en moves on to the knight service owed by the cit ies of
the
kingdom .
Of
these Jerusalem ,
Nab lus, Acre and Daro n comprised the roya l demesne at th is time.
Th e service which the 1I0 ly City o f Jerusalem owed was 41 knights (4 3 in 3 versions, but 4 1 in San
udo
)
th us:
Lore ns de Francleuc 4
Anscl Babin 5
112
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The wife of Jean Comain 4
Raymond le Buffile 3 ( 5 in 3 versions)
Henr y des Mons
Nicho las d Art ois
Simon the son of Peter l Erm in 2
Andrew of the Temple 2
Pet er d An ti
Amalric the son of Arnold 3
Baldwin de
Saint-G itles 3
Simon o f Bet hlehem
Engeram de Pinquegni 2
Lady Gille, the wife of Jean de Valence
Peter le Noir 2
Fulk le No ir
Anse l le Borgne
Hugh le Petit
The children of Roben de Pinquegni 2
Eustace Pat ric I
The city of Nablus ( NeapoJis) owed 85 knights (on e ver sion says 80 , another
102,
but
85
in Sanudo )
thus:
The Viscou nt 10 (50 in one version)
Renier Rohart and his mother 8
Jean Belarnier 5
Eudes
dou Mer le
4
The wife of lI ugh de Mimars 4
The wife of Baldwin le Prince 3
The wife of
Raymon I
Jean de Saint Bertin
(3
in versions)
Constantine the bro ther o f Raymond
William le Queu
Henry the so n of Guy Rays I
Th e wife o f Baldwin o f Paris
Isaac de la Pessine I
Roger l Asne I
Aubrey de Roi 2
Ber nard Fouchier I
Richa rd o f Nazare th
Raymond Bahin I
Baldwin de Ro trtnes I
T he wife o f Robert Salibe I
The wife o f Michacl le Grant
Gerard Passerel I
Baldwin of Ibelin 4
The Lady o f Cacsarea 2
Henry the Crossbowrnan
uy
of Naples I
Arnold of Tripol i I
Rey nald de Soissons
Amalric de Landre I
Philip o f Nazaret h I
George l E scrivain 1
Balian of Ibe lin , fo r the land which he holds in Nablus 15
Simon de Darria n 2
The city (or seigno ry in one version ) of Acre owed 80 knights (3 versio ns say 72 , but Sanudo - who calls
the city by its classical name of Pto lomais - a lso says 80 ) t hus:
The Co nstable (Amalric de Lusigna n) 10
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Balian o f l affa, the Chambe rlain 7 6 in one vers ion)
Pagan of lIaifa
7
Raymond o f Scandehon 7
Philip le Rou s I
The wife
of
Eudes 2
Gerard Espinal I
Lady Gille 3
William de
Molcmbcc 2
The wife
of
William
of
Ant ioch
Waiter de Saint
Denis 2
Robert Tah
or
I
Raou l of Nazareth
I
Simon de s M
ou l
ins I
Foun
t Joscety n I
Jordan de Terrcmonde
Michael of Mo unt Sinai I
Dreux the bo the r of Gilbert de Fia r I
wafter of Blunchegarde 9, of whom Am old de Br ie supplied
The wife of Adam Cost
e
I
wetter le
Bel I
Eudes de la Midi I
Gace the
son of
Robcr t
ille de Calavadn 4
The Seneschal 3 (4 in onc version)
Quast rin Benoit 2
Am old de ifoille I
The Vis
cou
nt (Williarr. Ill Flor)
Jordan Harenc
l ean de Rains
I
The ci ty or seignory j o f Tyre
owed
28 knights (25 in one version) thus:
The vcncnaus 3 ( I in on e version)
Simon lie 3 (I in
one
version)
The wife
of
WiIliam le Grant 2
The wife of
Gilhert
v em ter
I
Fu lk de la Fal aise
2
Ansel the so n o f Charles
Gera rd Ga zc 2
Henry de Machefin I
Adam of At souf
I
Dents
the son
of
Geoffrey
Raoul de Bou telfie r 2
Roger Sau veri 7
Sirnon des Moutms
Roger le Gast I
The
city
(or seignory l of Daron owed 2 knights thus:
Ocra rd de Do uai I
Reynald o f Mon tgisard I
The ci ty
o
r scignory l of Beirut owed 21 knights No deta ils given. Neither Daron nor Beirut appear in
Sanudo s list).
D I belin adds up his
ow
n figures to a t
ot
al of 577 knights:of the other vers ions one gives 56 7 2 give (,77 ,
an d 3 give 6 66 . while Sa
nudo
- who, as n
ot
ed above, omits several figures _ gives 5 18. However, his
arith metic is at f
ault
in severa l places (Nah lus add s up to o nly 8 1, Acre 10 76 ) and his sum total is
lik ewise wrong. Adding th e figures for you rself, yo u will a rrive in fac t at 675 . Small. in his Crusading
Warfare , say s th a t however the figures are a
dde
d,
the
ir to ta l ca nnot be less tha n 64 bu t in fact by
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l aking eac h minimum t ot al 40 ins tead of 60 for Eastern Galileo, 15 instead o f 18 for l o ro n/ Ma ro n , 8 0
instead of 85 fo r Nablus,
n
instead o f 80 fo r Acre , and 25 instead of 28 for Tyre ) the Iota I ca n he
reduced a litt le furt her, to 636 . Conversely by taki ng th e highest figure in eac h case Iex cept for th e
impossible 50 0 o f t he 3 great Baronies: t herefo re 50 ins tea d of 24 for Co unt Josce ty n , 10 instea d o f
6 fo r Nazare t h, 43 instead of 41 for Jerusale m, and 12 7 ins tead of 8 5 fo r Nablus, incl udin g 50 instead of
10 fo r t he Viscou nt ) it is possible to increase th e to tal to as m uch as 74Q. How eve r. as no ted o n page 10
the figures arc clear ly inco mple te ; d lbel in him self admits his lack o f knight se rvice dat a for Banyas an d
Subei be bot h ca pt ure d by Nur ed-Din in 1164 ) a nd C ha tea u Ne uf , an d it is known t ha t o t he r fids suc h
as Arso uf, which o wed 6 knights and 21 se rgea nts -
Le.
16
1 r
knights - in 1261 ) have also been omi t ted.
S ERGEANT SE RVICE
This service appears to have bee n o wed o nly by church lan ds and th e burgesses of t he cities. like th e
list of knight service , is al mos t cer t ainly incom ple te we
kno
w , fo r inst ance , t ha t Magna Ma ho meria
pro vided 65 fight-armed yo ut hs - und o ub t edly a co nti ngent o f se rgeants - a t Gaza in I 170 ). D Ib clin
lists t he fo llowing :
T he Pat riarch of Jerusale m 500
T he Cha pte r of th e Holy Sepulchre 500 Sa nudo says just 5)
Th e Abbey of St . Mary of Je hosa phat 150
T he Ab bey o f Mo un t Sion 150
T he Abb ey of t he Mo unt o f Olives 50 150 in 3 versions. No t list ed by Sanudo)
T he T em plum Do mini 50 3 versio ns sa y 150, as do es San udo )
T he Lat ina 50
T he Bisho p o f Tt bcna s 100 500 in 2 ersions )
T he Ab be y o f Mo unt Ta ho r 100 500 in 2 versions )
T he City of J e rusale m 500
T he Cit y of Acre 50 0
The City of T yre 100
The Cit y of Nablus 300
Th e Cit y of Caesa rea 50
Th e Bisho p o f Bet hleh em 200
Ramla, Mira he1 an d Ibd in 150 Sanudo sa ys 100)
T he Bishop of Sa int Ge orge o f Lydda 200
Arso uf 50
T he Bisho p of Seb ast ea 100 500 in 2 versions, 150 in an ot he r)
T he Bisho p o f Acre 150 550 in o ne versio n )
T he Bisho p o f lI eb ro n 50 5 50 in o ne versio n)
T he Arch bisho p o f T yre 150
T he Archbisho p of Nazar et h 150 No t listed in 2 version s. Sa
nudo
says 50 )
T he Bisho p o f Sidon 50
The Arc h bishop of Caesarea SO No t listed in one version)
Ascalon I SO 100 in 3 ersion s, and in Sa nu do )
Ja ffa 100 N o t listed in 3 versio ns, no r in Sanudo
Le Lyo n 1 Leluo n in Sanudo} lOO
Le Ge rin
?
- Leyr im in Sanudo ) 25
lIaira SO
T tberias
200
T his lime d l he lin add s u p his figures co rrectly to a to ta l of 5, 02 5. t hou gh o ne
ersion miscou nts to
5, 175. T hose ersion s with varian t figures
add
up to 4,975, 5,075,
6,12
5 a nd 7,0 25 t ho ugh 3 version s
iU
ve
the ir o wn to ta ls inacc urately as 7
.075
. Sanud o s t ot a l of 4,2 80 is much lo wer t han an y of th ese.
APPE ND IX 2 ROGER DE FLOR AND THE CATALAN GRA ND CO MPANY 130 2-13 11
Cat alan mercenarie s arc first recorded in Byzant in e service in 1279 , d u ring t he cam pa ign lead ing up to
t he Bau lc of Negro ponte . Co rsairs of Cat a la n o rigin also appeared o n oc casion in the flee ts o f t he pirat e
Megas Duces Licarlo a nd Jo hn de
10
Cavo , bUI it was no t un til 130 2 tha t the Byzan tincs e mp lo yed
Cala lans in pa rti cular ly large numbers.
11s
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The previous yea r the Sicilian wars which had commenced with the so-called ' Sicilian Vespers' of 1282
had finally been ended by the Peace o f Callabc'lIotta , and Frederick of Aragon, King of Sicily, could
finally dispense with the service of the mer
cenar
y Grand Company of Catalans under Roger de Flor -
not with out a sigh o f relief They I t his service some 18
.000
strong, in addition to t rue Cata lans incl
udin
g
al t hat time Italians, Fren chmen , Germ ans, and some Aragonese: when first ra ised by Pet er o f Atagon in
1281 the comp
any
had even included IO
OT
S.
Roger de Flor (whose real name. Rut ger vow Blum, was considerably less roman tic ) is described by a 1
4th
cen tury Ffore n
une
ch roni cler as 't he fat her of all
Condorneri
li e was an apostasized Templar sergeant
who had made his fame and fortune at the fall of Acre in 1291 , when he had commandeered a Femplar
galley and charged exorbitant pr ices for passage 10 the safety of Cyprus Atter a period o f piracy as
captain o f a Oenoese ship he had jo ined the mercenary troops of Fredenck III and become commander
o f the Cata lan Grand Company , and It was he who, an
tr
the Company had been made redundant by
Fredenc k, managed to extor t co nsiderable privileges from the Byzantine Empe ror Andro nikos in
eacha nge for the promise o f its service against the Tu rks of Asia linor . Byzantine sources re cord the
strength o f the
Compa
ny when it sailed from Sicily fo r Constanl
inop
le as 2-8 ,000 men, while the more
reliab le t unl aner, de F1or' s secretary, reco rds them as 36 ships and 6 ,500 men , comprised of 1,500
cavalry, 4.
00
0 Almughavari (Aragonese mou ntainee rs - see figure 64 in 'Armies of Feudal Europe') and
1
,000
o ther inb ntry. This t
ot
al
does
not include the seamen, who pr
obab
ly account for the diffe rence
between xtun taner s 6, 500 and Pechymeres' 8 ,000. (The latter, ho wever, reco rds the size o f de Flor's
fleet as o nly 18 , alleys and 4 'grea t shi ps': since Genoa supp lied a number o f his ships this figure may
represent only those which were his own.) Eith er way, by the Spring of 1303 the Cal alans numbered
about 6 ,000 men.
On his arr ival a t Constan tino ple de Flor was created kgas Du ll hy Adronikos ( this being one o f the
term s of their agreement and , following scurrles with Genoese colonists in the ci ty , the Cata lans were
prom ptly shipped over to Asia Minor for a campaign against the Turks, of whom they subse
que
ntly killed
more Ihan 50 ,000 in engagements at Cyzic us, Philadelphia and the Iron Gates. Unfor tunalely these
successes went to de H oe's head , so that he abused his au
thor
ity and gradually became openly hostile to
Andr
onik
os, seeing himself as ru ler of a suzerain Byzant ine state which he had plans to carve ou t in
Anal olia. Despite his elevation to the rank of Caesar, an official request 10 reduce the numbers of his
Iroops 10 3.000 was ignored, and inciden ts co ntinued unt il Michael IX, Andronikos' son and eo-Emperor,
resort ed
10
having de Flor assassinat ed in
130
5,
and
in the ensuing carnage some 2,300 or mor e o f the
Company were hunted do wn and killed : Muntaner records that th eir numbers were reduced to 3,307
men and 206 ho rses.
Leadertess and demoralised the majorit y of the survivors then disbanded. DUI 1,500 o f them, a mixture
of Almughavari and French men (the latte r, together with Catalan knighls. und
oubt
edly providing the
cavalry element) Iortrtied themselves in Gall ipoli, from which they succC'ssfully re pulsed two
Byzantine attacks. They were gradually reinforced by motley ban ds of adven turers plus some 3,800
Turcopotes and Turks (1 ,800 cavalry and 2,000 infa nt ry] who had dese r ted from thc Byzantines.
Ultimately internal d issensio n fo rced them to abandon Gallipoli and split up . The largest part , some
8-9,000 men includi ng 3,00 0 Turks, marched inland into Thessaly in 130 8, finall y heading towards the
Frankish Duchy of Athe ns, where Duke Waiter de Bne nne employed Ihem against the Byzantincs and
the
Duchy o f Nenpatras , from whom they seized over 30 for tresses for him within 6 mon ths. when peace
was co ncluded the Duke no longer desired to employ suc h a vast number o f unmanageable mercenary
troops : h.. instead granted land s to 500 o f the m
: OO
cavalry and 300 Inf antry) and dismissed the rest
with
out
pay
(wh
ich was 4 months beh ind). InevitablY
t
he Catala ns were not con tent
10
leave
it
at tha t.
and event s ultimately culmina ted in the decisive Battle of Almyra or Kephi ssos in 13 11, where Duke
Waiter's cavalry, be tween 2,000 and 6 ,40 0 strong and includ ing
atlca
st 700 knighls from all Franki sh
Greece, eft tricked by
the
Catata ns into charging headl ong inl o a can-fully concealed marshy plain
wher e thei r horses wer e down. The Catalans, wbo now include d 3, 500 cavalry and 4.000 infantry
( the latter largely Almughavari but including some Dyunl me prison ers-of-war pressed int o serv ice
because they were good archers), then all but e xterminated th
C
Frank ish army - so thoroughly Ihjt
only
4 or 5 noblemen are known to have escaped with their lives. Of the 4·24 .000 Frankish infant ry present
cla ims that 20 ,000 wer e killed .
Therea fter
the
Duchy of Albens became a Calala n state , ·hich lasted down to 1379 .
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APPENDIX 3 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following is a list o f th ose h
oo
ks which I found to be th e most use ful during th e course o f my research .
is fair ly exte nsive bu t st ill a long way from being co
mp r
ehens ive, and th ose who wish to delve dee per
still are recommended
to consult the bibliographies and foll ow up th e references th at many o f th ese
include , as I did . T he bibliography in Armies of Feudal Eur ope shou ld also be consulted . Where it is not
clear from the ti tle o f a modern tra nslation which source it is tha t has bee n tr anslate d the name o f the
original au th
or
s) is given in brackets afte rwards. Translat ed passages in th e main text are base d largely on
th ese mo dem translati
on
s.
Ali
en
, w. E. D.
Histo ry
of the Georgian Peo ple 1932
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Archer, T. A. T he Crusade of Richard 1 1189-1 19 2 (ex t racts from various co ntempo rary sources) 1888
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Ayal
on
,
David.
T he Wafi diya in the Mamluk Kingdom Islamic Culture XXV , 1951
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Studi es XV, 1953 and XVI, 1954
Baldwin , Marshall Whithed . Raym
on
d
of T ripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem (1 140-1 187) I
93 6
Bart hold, W. Turkestan do wn to the Mongol Invasion 1928
Beeler , Joh n . Warfare in Feudal Europe 73 0· 1200 1971
Benvenisti, Meron. The Crusaders in the Holy Land 1970
Berry, Virginia
G. {transj.
De
Profec tio ne Ludc vici
VII in
Ortcrucm (Od e
of
Dcuill
194 8
Blondel, S. Nabites th e v arangian Classica et
Mediaevalia
, 1939
Boase, T. S. R. K ingdoms and Stron gholds of th e Crusaders 197 1
Bradfo rd ,
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1
204
1 9 74
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Bucht hal , lI ugo. Miniature Painting in the Lat in Kingdom of Jerusalem 1957
Buckler,
Georgina
G. Anna
Comnena:
A Stud y 1929
Budge, Em est A. Wallis ( trans ). The Chr onograp hy o f Gregory Abu J Faraj (Bar lIebraeus) 1932
Cahen, Ctaude. La Campagne de Mantziker t d apres les So urces Musulmanes B yzantic n IX, 1934
Un T rait e d Ar murerie Compose pou r Saladin (Murda al-Tnrt usi, in Fre nch ) Bulle t in
d Etu
des
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1948
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C
am p
bell, G. A. The Knights Templars, Their Rise and Fall 193 7
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Ctrac Est op a han, Sebast ian . Sky llit zes Matnten sis, Tomo I Reproduci ones Y Minia turas 196 5
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XXXVII ,1 94 7
Donovan , 1. P. Pelagius and th e Fift h Crusade 1950
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96 0
- (in progress )
Finlay, George. H istory of the Byzantine and Greek Emp ires
from
716 10 1453 (2 volumes) 1853-1854
F
olda
, Jaroslav. Crusader Manuscr ipl llluminat i
on
at Saint-Jean d Acre
1275-1291 1976
Gabrieli. Prancesco ( trans]. Arab Historians o f th e Crusades (extrac ts from var iou s con te mpo rary
sources) 1969
Gar dner , Alice. The Lascarids of Nicaea : The Story of an Empire in Ex ile 19 12
Geanakop los, D. Graeco- Laun Relat io ns on th e Eve of th e Byzant ine Restora tio n: The Bai l ie of
Pelagonia 1259 Dumbarton Oaks Papers VII, 1953
-
T h
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or Michael Palaeologus and th e West I
258-12
82
1959
Gibb , H. A. R. (t rans). Th e Damas
cu
s Ch ronicle of the Crusades (l bn al-Qala nisi) 1932
- The Arm ies o f Salad in in S tudies
on
the Civilization of Islam 1962
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or k
s of Imad ad-Din and Baha ad-Din
1973
Glubb, John Bagot . Th e Course of Empire : The Arabs an d th eir Successo rs 1965
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- ' The Lost Cen tu ries: From the Muslim Empires to the Renaissance of Europe 1145· 1
453
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th e
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lI ill, G. 'A lIi story o f Cyp rus' (3 vol umes) 1940- 1948
lI ill, John
Hugh
and
lIi1l, Laurita
l t
r
an s). 'Raymond d A
guilcrs:
lI istoria Fra nco ru m Qui Ceperunt
Iherusalem' 1968
lI i l Rosalind ( tra ns). 'T he Deeds
of
the Franks an d th e Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem' (Gesta
Francor um) 1962
lI itt i,
P.
K. (
trans)
. ' An Arab-Syrian Gentleman of the Crusade s'
[Usamah ihn
Munqidh ) 19 29
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of
the Assassins' 19 55
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Hubert ,
Merton Jerome
( trans).
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Lion-Heart'
(A mbroise) 1941
King, Edwin Jarnes.
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Ho ly La
nd
1931
Komroff, Manue1
[ tr ansj.
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, E. A. trans). ' A History of Deeds done Beyond th e Sea' (WilIiam o f Tyre,
2 vo lumes) 1943
Lane Poc le. Sta nley . 'Saladin and the Fall of th e Kingdom of Jer usalem' 1898
- 'A History of Egyp t in th e Midd le Ages' 192 5
Latha m, J. D. ' No tes o n Mamluk Horse-archers' Jou rn al o f th e Brit ish School
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- and Pat erson, W. F. ' Sarace n Archery ' 19 70
Latham, Ronald ( tran s).
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he Tr avels
of
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Levy, Reubcn. 'T he Social Stru ctu re of Islam ' 1957
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Lowe, Alfonso. 'T he Ca talan Vengeance' 1972
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Mar tin ,
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Martin, Michael E. ' An Adri atic Hasl ings, 1081 ' IIislory To day XXV II , 1977
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Mayerc L. A. 'Saracentc Herald ry : A Surv ey ' 1933
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me Arms and Arm
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Ars Islamica X, 1943
- 'Mamluk Cost
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1952
Miller , William. 'The Latins in the: Levant: A lI istory o f Frankish Gre ece 1204 -1566' 1908
- 'E ssays on
th e
Lat in Orient 1921
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Greek
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La Monte, John L. ' Feudal Monarchy in t he Lat in Kingdom of Jerusalem 11001
01
29 1'
1932
- and Huber t. Mert on Jeromc
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T h
e Wars
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Nicholson, Ro bert
L.
' Joscetyn I. Prince
of
Illinois St udies in the Social Sciences XXXIV No. 4,
1954
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th e
Fall o f the Crusader Sta les, 1134·1 199 ' 19 73
I I:k ol , Donald M. 'T he Despota te
of
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Nico lte , David.
E ar
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N
orgate
. K. ' Richard the Lion Heart ' 1924
Norman, Yesey. 'T he Medieval Soldier ' 1971
Oldcnhou rg, 'T he
Crus
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Oman ,
C.
W. C. 'A lI isl ory of thc Art of War in the Ages' L vo lumes) 19 24
Ostrogorsky , G. ' History o f th e Byzantine Slate ' 1952
Pemou d, R; ginc 'Th e Crusad es' {
ex t
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temporary sources)
1962
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1968
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ourn
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Prawdi n, M. 'Th e Mongol Empire' 1940
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