1
“Implementing EUs Water Framework Directive in Norway: Do new water
regions represent effective networks for multi-level coordination or a
decentralization of dilemmas?”
To be presented at: The 7th ECPR General Conference, Water management Across Borders, Scales
and Sectors: How to Adress Recent Developments and Future Challenges in Water Policy Analysis?
Panel 2. Collaborative Water Resource management: Defining/Evaluating Policy Process “integration”
for Effective Participation and Efficient Policy Outputs.
By:
Sissel Hovik, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Oslo and Akershus University
College of Applied Sciences.
Jan Erling Klausen, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo
Gro Sandkjær Hanssen, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research
Knut Bjørn Stokke, Associate Professor, Department of Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning,
University of Life Sciences
Marthe Indset, Researcher, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research
WORK IN PROGRESS – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates how Norway’s complex, decentralized system of EU Water Framework
Directive (WFD1) implementation has performed so far, in terms of dealing with the unusually broad
range of aquatic environmental stressors found in this country. A common perception among actors
involved in the WFD system is that the integration of environmental policy aims has progressed with
a slower pace in some sectors than in others. This paper analyzes these perceptions with reference
to variances in regulatory instruments, institutional set-up and policy-making traditions in these
sectors.
Norway has implemented the WFD in a manner that sets it somewhat apart from the mainstream. In
line with the traditional emphasis on decentralization in Norwegian government, Norway has
delegated the planning responsibilities laid down in the WFD to as many as 11 national River Basin
Districts and more than 100 Sub-districts. In organizing these districts Norway has, furthermore,
allowed very few deviations from the ecosystem-based principle. Finally, in accordance with
Norway’s traditionally strong emphasis on participation and civil society involvement, a plethora of
actors participate in WFD-related activities throughout the planning process.
Norway is, however, an interesting case of WFD implementation for another reason: There is a
particularly diverse composition of water-related activities and, as a result, a highly composite
pattern of aquatic environmental stressors that needs to be dealt with in order to achieve the WFD
aims. A coastal country with high mountains and deep fjords, water has played a pivotal role in the
industrial development of Norway. Norway is Europe’s biggest hydropower producer with a total
production volume of 122 TWh2, and the EU Renewables directive has set the pace for further
development. In later years, coastal aquaculture has developed with a tremendous speed. Sales of
Atlantic salmon and Rainbow trout has almost tripled the last decade to more than 1,2 million tons,3
generating significant export revenues and much south-after activity in remote areas. Power
production and fish farming is perceived as a threat not least to wild Salmon fishing in Norwegian
rivers, which is a popular and profitable pastime as it draws tourists from across the globe. While
agriculture has been in a decline for several decades, it is still a significant stressor to the aquatic
environment in some regions, notably the south-eastern parts. These stressors often coincide with
sewage discharge from diffuse sources, due to Norway’s highly dispersed pattern of habitation.
Point-source pollution from the processing industries is still significant in a few locations, but diffuse
discharges from closed-down mines may all in all constitute a graver problem. All in all, achieving
1 Directive 2000/60/EC
2 2011. Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate
3 Source: Factsheet, Directory of Fisheries
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good environmental status in all of Norway’s waters implies potentially running against powerful
actors and dealing with numerous conflicts of interest. Huge profits are at stake, and the political
clout of some of the industries involved is very significant.
Our theoretical point of departure is to regard the WFD as a case of environmental policy integration.
This concept emanates from a discourse initiated by the World Commission on Environment and
Development. The Commission’s call for “the major central economic and sector agencies of
governments [to] be made directly responsible and fully accountable for ensuring that their policies,
programmes and budgets support development are ecologically as well as economically sustainable”
(WCED 1987 p. 314) was integral to Agenda 21 following the Rio summit in 1992. It was adopted by
the OECD, and was given a legal basis through its inclusion in the Single European Act (EU 1987) and
later on in the Maastricht Treaty (EU 1992).
The concept of environmental policy integration has been thoroughly explored by Lafferty (2004) and
associates (Lafferty and Hovden 2003, Lafferty and Ruud 2006). A definition of environmental policy
integration emanating from this work is as follows:
the incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of policymaking in non-
environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of this goal as a guiding principle for
the planning and execution of policy; accompanied by an attempt to aggregate presumed
environmental consequences into an overall evaluation of policy, and a commitment to
minimise contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by giving principled
priority to the former over the latter. (Lafferty, 2004: 201)
Lafferty and Ruud (2006) presented a simple conceptualization of environmental policy integration
based on two dimensions; one horizontal and one vertical. “Horizontal” policy integration denotes
the “greening” of the sectors of government; the extent to which each sector has integrated
environmental concerns into its operational goal structure. “Vertical” policy integration is about the
pursuit of environmental concerns across sectors – mediating conflicts between sectors, between
environmental and other social concerns or between “alternative possible consequences of specific
environmental initiatives” (ibid. p. 457).
The “sectors” in question in the context of the present paper are hydropower, aquaculture,
agriculture, sewage and processing industries. We chose to conceptualize “sectors” as established
patterns of interplay and interdependence between business actors, governmental agencies and
interest groups that relate to the sector’s key activity – a point to be elaborated further on.
Furthermore, we assess the sectors in terms of how their engagement and commitment to the WFD
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processes are perceived by actors in the system, as a proxy for actual “integration of environmental
concerns into goal structures”.
Following this, the main research question is as follows:
To what extent have the sectors in question allowed themselves to become integrated in
Norway’s system for WFD implementation?
At the time of writing, the first comprehensive round of River basin management plans in Norway is
still underway. As a consequence, it is for the time being not possible to answer this question based
on an assessment of the actual measures that are needed to achieve or maintain the environmental
aims laid down in the WFD. A comparative analysis of the measures implemented in the various
water-related sectors needs to be postponed until the first round of planning has been completed.
The ambition of this paper is to provide tentative insights based on the present situation, and to lay
down the groundwork for a comparative analysis of the measures.
In the following section (2), Norway’s system of WFD implementation is described in some detail.
Data and methods are described in section 3. Following this, the systems of regulation, institutional
set-up and policy-making modes of the five sectors are presented briefly in section 4. After this, we
turn to empirical evidence concerning perceptions about the various sectors’ actual WFD
involvement, which is analyzed with reference to the particular regulatory and institutional
contingencies in each sector.
The paper is based on research carried out by WAPABAT,4 a project funded by the Research council
of Norway in 2010-2013. The bulk of empirical research has been carried out by the authors.
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE IN NORWAY
It can be contended that Norway’s water management system is among Europe’s most fragmented
and multi-faceted. As noted, there is a unusually broad range of water-related activities and
environmental stressors, notably hydro-power, industry, fish-farming, agriculture, roads, waste-
water and sewage, and urban-and rural planning (Hovik and Stokke 2004). In addition, New Public
Management (NPM) reforms have been associated with increased fragmentation of the public sector
in general, as in many other countries (Christensen and Lægreid 2011).
4 Water pollution abatement in a system of multi level governance
5
The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) addresses the problems of fragmentation in water
management, addressing not only the chemical aspects of water protection, but also its ecological
aspects. The main purpose is to make water management capable of reaching the environmental
goals of ecological good water status, as well as distributing the relative advantages and costs as
cohesive as possible, so that all affected parties are addressed (European Parliament, Council 2000).
This requires coordination of sector politics and of public actors at different governmental levels
(Nielsen, Fredriksen et al. 2013), and to achieve this, the WDF enforces a new system of
comprehensive water management5, based upon an ecosystem principle. The application of this
principle entails the designation of catchment areas and river basins as management units. The idea
is that water planning is to be integrated across all water uses as well as integrated with other
related policy-sectors (Nielsen, Fredriksen et al. 2013, Hammer et al 2011).
As one of few European countries, along with Sweden and Poland, Norway has understood article 3
in the WFD as opting for a scalar fit between ecosystem boundaries of the river basins and decision-
making unit (Nielsen, Fredriksen et al. 2013), designing new units. The 11 new River Basin Districts
(RBD) and 104 Sub-Districts (SB), are cutting across existing municipal-(428), County (19)- and
regional state administrative borders. Each of the River Basin Districts is guided by a cross-sector,
cross-level RBD-Water Board comprising all affected authorities at local, regional and national level6.
Local level participants in the boards are representatives from municipalities, often the Mayor and
the chief executive. The national level is represented by the regional branches of national agencies,
regional state authorities, representing sector concerns7. The regional level is represented by
Counties, one of them being assigned an important multi-level and multi-sector coordination role as
the formal “River Basin District authority”. As formal RBD-authority, the County chairs the Board (the
main formal network), and designates a fulltime-coordinator for this task. The coordination role is
restricted to being process-coordinator, while the County Governor maintains the role of
coordinating professional actors and knowledge.
Each RBD may cover parts of the territory of several counties. Due to this, one County has been given
a coordinating role in each RBD. This role entails the coordination of different regionalized state
agencies over which they have no binding authority, like the County Governor,8 The Directorate for
5 It requires that “Member States shall identify the individual river basins lying within their national territory
and, for the purposes of this Directive, shall assign them to individual River Basin Districts” (Directive 2000/60/EC, art. 4). 6 11 River Basin Districts (RBD, Vannregion), River Basin District Boards (RBDB, Vannregionutvalg), Sub-Districts
(Vannområder), Sub-District Boards (Vannområdeutvalg). 7 County Governor, The Directorate for fishery, The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the
Norwegian Food Security Authority and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration 8 The County government is a general-purpose regional office of the central government.
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Fishery, The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the Norwegian Food Security
Authority and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. Many of these regional subdivisions,
however, are not of the same size and shape as the Counties. The Counties are also expected to
coordinate the efforts of the several municipalities within their River Basin District, but these enjoy
extensive autonomy and their authority is traditionally compatible or even stronger than the
Counties.
This institutional complexity can be illustrated with the organization chart of one of the River Basin
Districts (Vest-Viken), presented below.
Figure 1. Illustrating the complex cross-sector, multi-level organization of one of the River Basin
Districts (Vest-Viken9)
Private actor interests are included by the establishment of broad advisory reference groups. The
RBD-Boards are charged with drawing up mandatory Management plans which, by consensus,
identify all environmental threats and risks to water bodies within the catchment area, formulate a
joint plan for goal-achievement, and give an overview of relevant measures. The planning process
9 http://www.vannportalen.no/enkel.aspx?m=36904
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follows the EU schedule, having 6-year planning cycle10. In this process, 104 Sub-Districts (SB), with
their SD-Boards, are important arenas giving input. All the SBs have a full-time/half-time coordinator,
often financed by groups of municipalities, but also by private actors like hydro-power firms.
3. METHODS
The paper uses three types of data. Our discussions are based on public documents describing the
different sectors and the new water management system. In addition, we also use a national survey
to all members of the Water Boards in all the 11 River Basin Districts in Norway (digital survey
distributed by e-mail in April 2013). The actors represented here are municipalities, the county
municipalities and a specter of different national sectors authorities (their regional offices)
representing the interests of agriculture, businesses, environmental authorities, road and traffic
authorities etc. The size of these Water Boards varies – from about 270 participants in one Board, to
about 12 in another. The total number of respondents in the survey was 733, 301 answered, giving a
response rate of 41. Of these respondents answering the questionnaire, 64 percent represented
municipalities, and of the municipal representatives 41 percent were politicians, while 58 percent
represented administration/public services. Of the total number of respondents answering the
survey, 24 percent represented national sector authorities (regional offices), while 8 percent
represented county municipalities. 2 percent represented other actors.
The third data-source is semi-structured interviews of key actors in three River Basin Districts. The
key actors are the coordinators of River Basin District and the Sub Districts in three River Basin
Districts, as well as local politicians and county politicians, different regional state authorities, and
administrative representatives from the counties.
The following section (4) highlights some key features of the governance set-ups in the five sectors
covered by the study.
10
The cycle has five mandatory elements, starting with a baseline in which the existing conditions are mapped and analyzed. In Norway this has implied a classification and categorization of the quality of all 17 000 water bodies in the country. In the next step, essential challenges are formulated and pressures on water bodies identified, and then analyses of necessary measures are conducted, and environmental targets and norms for river basins defined. Then comes the formulation of a Management plan and a Programme of measures (PoM) and a Monitoring programme (2015). As in Poland and Sweden (Nielsen et al 2013), the processes of producing the Management plans involve several levels of government.
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4. WATER MANAGEMENT IN FIVE SECTORS
Agriculture
Eutrophication is a significant problem in parts of Norway, mainly in calcareous waters in heavily
populated areas where agriculture is a dominant industry. It constitutes a huge pollution problem in
the south-eastern and south western part of Norway, as well as in some intensive farming districts in
other parts of the country. Agriculture is considered the third most important water polluter in
Norway.11 Nutrients leakages (phosphorous and nitrogen) from farmland causing eutrophication is
seen as the most serious problem.
While all sorts of pollution are generally prohibited in Norway, pollution from agriculture is
exempted. The ambition of reducing nutrient leakages from farm land is enforced by economic
incentives and other voluntary measures.12 First, in order to receive general production grants,
farmers need to fulfill some requirements, including the preparation of a fertilization plan for the
farm. Secondly, there is an environmental program for the agriculture sector. The farmers can apply
for grants in exchange of avoiding plowing in the autumn, constructing buffer zones along
watercourses, or implementing other measures. This program is targeted to the most important
environmental problems in each county, water pollution being the most prominent one in several
counties. Thirdly, local incentive schemes are designed, aiming at stimulating environmental friendly
investments, for instance constructing or repairing drainage systems or sedimentation ponds. These
schemes are handled by the municipalities. Economic incentives are combined by environmental
agreements and other voluntary programs, designed at local level. The county governor can issue
regulations forbidding autumn plowing in limited areas. This is, however, so far only implemented in
one sub district in Norway.
These incentive schemes and regulations are handled by the agricultural authorities at national,
regional and local level. The role of the municipalities is mainly to execute state policy. To secure and
increase food production are important aims of Norway’s agricultural policy, complemented by aims
of securing district settlements and sustainable agricultural production (Meld St 9 2011-2012).
The agricultural agreement is subject to annual negotiations between the government (Ministry of
Agriculture and Food) and the farmers’ associations. The price of agriculture products, diverse
market regulations and the level and distribution of diverse state subsidies are themes for
negotiation (www.regjeringen.no), including the total amount of money spent on the regional and
11
Source: Norwegian Environment Agency (miljøstatus.no) 12
Point source pollution from manure (lagre), silos, etc. is regulated by legal instruments, and is no longer an important pollution problem in Norway.
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local environmental programs. The profile of the regional environmental programs (running for four
years) is subject to consultation between agricultural authorities and the farmers organizations at
central and regional level. If the goal of good environmental status in all water courses is possible to
achieve through the existing voluntary measures of the agriculture policy, this corporatist feature of
the policy field might lead to strong compliance. This corporatist feature does however probably
make policy innovation and learning hard to achieve, making paradigmatic changes in policy goals or
instruments difficult. If compliance with the environmental goals of the water management requires
such changes in agriculture policy, we would expect low goal fulfillment. The policy allows for
flexibility in the farmers adaptation. The corporatist nature restricts the room of maneuver open for
the agricultural agencies, making the policy less flexible regarding adaptation to various
environmental circumstances.
Waste water
Another source of eutrophication is pollution from waste water. The main problem is the total
number of discharges from houses and cottages in sparsely populated areas, due to lack of or
ineffective (old fashion) treatment systems. Discharges of waste water from sparsely populated areas
are considered to be the fourth most important stressor to the water environment13. Discharges
from cities and towns are less prevalent, due to intensive remediation in the last 30 years. But it is
still a significant stressor in some places.
Discharges of waste water require allowances, or pollution permits. The authority to give allowances
for single households and small settlements (less than 50 pe) and towns (less than 2000 pe to fresh
water/10 000 pe to ocean) is maintained by the municipalities, for larger towns and cities the
authority is placed at the county governor (state representative). National and local regulations
define the standards for the treatment and the limits of discharges. Regarding discharges from
smaller settlements, the municipalities can decide local regulations covering the whole or parts of
the municipality. They can also demand that households connect to the municipal waste water
pipelines, if this is not too expensive. All municipal expenses are covered by waste water fees. The
system of pollution allowances and local regulations, results in a highly flexible regulatory regime,
both in time and place. The regulations can adjust to new technologies as well as to the vulnerability
of the recipient.
The water supply and waste water sector is described as highly compartmentalized – it is a sector
with strong vertical and weak horizontal linkages (Hovik et al forthcoming). The sector is strictly
13
Source: Norwegian Environment Agency (miljøstatus.no)
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regulated by international (EU) standards and national regulations, but with regard to discharges
from smaller settlements, the municipalities are given much discretion. The policy field is dominated
by professional expertise, both professional organizations and R&D-institutions play a significant role
in policy formulation (Hovik et al forthcoming). Neither national nor local politicians show much
interest in the area, due to the technical character and the financial autonomy of the sector. In
addition, the target group; the house owners, is not well organized and represents no strong
pressure group. As such, this policy field is an example of majority policy (Wilson 1973), both the
costs and benefits is shared by almost everybody, making in hard mobilized behind any of them.
The activity of the sector is often outlined in long-term waste water plans, where the need for
upgrading and extension of the waste water treatment system is described, the necessary economic
and professional resources identified, and a time schedule is formulated. The planning process is
dominated by engineers, but approved / decided by local politicians.
Industrial pollution
Point-source pollution from the processing industries has traditionally represented significant
stressors to the aquatic environment in Norway in a number of localities. New technologies as well as
a general decline in some industries have however caused the significance of these stressors to
decrease substantially. On the national level ongoing point source pollution from industrial plants is
no longer among the most significant impediments to WFD goal achievement, except from in a few
specific locations.
According to the Pollution act of 1983, industrial plants need to apply for a pollution license to
operate, in case they discharge pollutants to air or water. These licenses are granted by the
Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA), a unitary regulator which as the name implies is an
environmental authority, subsumed under the Ministry of the Environment. Licenses for smaller
plants are granted by the county governor, a multi-purpose regional administration of the national
government. The pollution license is a highly “flexible” regulatory instrument, in the sense that it
provides considerable leeway for direct intervention. Firstly, §16 of the act empowers the NEA to lay
down stipulations as preconditions for being granted a license. Such stipulations may include
measures for pollution abatement or damage reduction, energy efficiency, filtering/cleaning
measures or recycling. Furthermore, according to §18 of the pollution act, licenses can be revoked by
the NEA and the licensee can be subjected to entirely new conditions for being granted a new
license. For instance, in case emerging technologies allow further pollution abatement, the
implementation of these can be a precondition for a renewed license. Licenses may also be revoked
if the impacts of the pollution have turned out to be substantially more adverse or of a different
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nature than expected when the license was granted. Furthermore, requirements of different
strictness may be applied to similar plants in different locations because the sum total of stressors to
the water body is greater in one location than in another. Licensees are furthermore required to
monitor and report on their discharges, production volume, energy consumption and waste disposal.
Point source pollution from industry to aquatic receptors is not a politicized issue in Norway. The
NEA and the agencies preceding it have executed the pollution act of 1983 in a legal/technocratic
manner.
Fish farming
Both historically and today, oceanic fishery is a substantial industry and trade. However, fishing has
been replaced by aquaculture or fish farming as one of Norway’s largest export industries. Farming of
salmon and trout dominates the fish farming industry in Norway. Aquaculture has several impacts on
the environment, as emissions of nutrients, sea lice and escaped fish. Along the Norwegian coast
from Lindesnes to the Russian border, fish farming is the biggest source of eutrophication in the
sea14. Increased knowledge and improved technology have contributed to fish farming constructions
are moved from inner fjords and bays to the open sea where the environmental conditions are
better, which reduces the problem with local eutrophication. However, the production of fish
farming has increased more than fivefold during the last two decades, with the impact of a significant
increase in emissions of nutrients to the sea.
The recent years there has been increasing focus on the challenges associated with escaped fish and
sea lice (Riksrevisjonen 2012). Escaped trout and salmon is seen as a significant threat for wild fish
stocks, both genetically and ecologically. The ecological impacts are related to competition about
food and spawning. In addition escaped fish may increase the risks for resurgence for deceases and
parasites. The genetic impact is that farmed salmon will live together with wild salmon, and thus
reduce the survival conditions for wild salmon. The sea lice is a problem because this parasite is living
on the salmon (of its blood, skin and mucus), which reduces the survival rates of the smaller salmon.
Sea lice has always been a part of the Norwegian fauna, but has increased because of the growth in
the aquaculture industry.
Fish farming requires a license. The process is authorized in the Aquaculture Act from 2006. The main
objective in the acts is to secure profitability to the industry in a sustainable way. A license is
dependent upon permission from a number of sector authorities (the Environmental Department at
14
Source: Norwegian Environment Agency (miljøstatus.no)
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the County Governor, the Food Safety Authority, the Norwegian Coastal Administration and the
Norwegian Water and Energy Directorate), in addition to the local municipalities. The government
reform from 2010 delegate the responsibility for giving licenses to fish farming from the Directorate
for fisheries to the County Councils. The County Council gives the final decision according to the
Aquaculture Act. The license period is 5 years, and environmental stipulations may be included in the
license.
Hydropower
Norway is one of the world’s ten leading producers of hydropower, ranking 6th in 201015.
Hydropower constitutes about 98 per cent of total electricity production in Norway, and about 70
per cent of Norwegian water courses are regulated for the production of electricity. Thus,
hydropower is the number one environmental human influence on the country’s aquatic
environment.
Environmental damages are caused by manipulation of natural water quantity levels for storage
purposes, drainage of river sections by the use of pipelines, the drying out of river deltas and
marchlands due to reduced discharge of water, and the artificial filling of water magazines. Such
drainage and water flow manipulation threaten the bio diversity, fish stocks and flora. However,
climate changes have triggered the demand for renewable energy resources. With the
implementation of the WFD, the dilemma of how to balance renewable energy production with the
protection of water eco systems and biological diversity is revived.
The Norwegian state holds several roles in the management of water resources. On the one side, the
state is the owner of production capacity and hydropower plants as well as and large parts of the
hydropower grid, and on the other side it is also the regulator and the licensing authority for
hydropower production16. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Energy Ministry) is responsible for
the energy policy and the energy system, including hydropower. Through this, the Ministry serve as
secretariat for the political leadership.
Two of the most important tasks in Norwegian hydropower management are the issuing of licenses
for new hydropower production and revision of terms (i.a environmental terms) set out in existing
licenses. Revisions imply a new assessment and changes in the legal terms and requirements set out
15
International Energy Agency (2012): “Key World Energy Statistics”, IEA Publications 16
State responsibility for electricity transmission and ownership of the grid is managed through a state owned
enterprise called Statnett. The tasks as hydropower plant owner and an actor on the free energy market is
handled by a state owned company called Statkraft. The state’s ownership of Statkraft is managed by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry.
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in licenses, but not a revision of the license itself. Licensing and revision are two separate legal
procedures. In Norway, the licensing authorities for hydropower are the Parliament and the
Government, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the subordinate Norwegian Water Resources
and Energy Directorate (WRED). Other Ministries and subordinate agencies, like the Ministry of
Environment and the Norwegian Environment Agency, have important roles as advisors in the case
handling procedures, but they are not considered a part of the licensing authorities.
The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (WRED) is a subordinate regulatory agency
to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and is delegated the managing responsibility according to
the main acts regulating hydropower17. The WRED is also delegated the responsibility to issue
regulations and to make individual decisions and perform preparatory procedures of cases to be
resolved by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Furthermore, it calculates the quota
arrangements for the energy market and is the supervisor of hydropower production.
The legal framework for licensing of new hydropower production and for revision of (environmental)
terms is rather comprehensive. Very simplified, there are four main legal processes: 1)The licensing
of new, large-scale hydropower production, 2) the licensing of new, small-scale hydropower
production (< 10MW), 3) the revision of terms set in existing hydropower licenses, and 4) the up-
grading or refurbishment of existing hydropower plants. These processes are pursuant to different
legal acts and follow separate legal procedures. While the WRED prepares and issues proposals for
1) and the Ministry gives advice upon a final Governmental approval, the WRED both prepares,
proposes and decides for cases under 2). As for the revision of terms set out in existing licenses, the
Ministry is the final decision-making-authority, while the WRED prepares the cases and makes the
proposals. Despite comprehensiveness in legal case-handling terms, we see that the much of the
case-handling and all the decision-making authority are kept within the sectoral, licensing authorities.
So, whereas the state’s general activities within hydropower is divided between two Ministries, two
state-owned companies and a regulatory agency at the subordinate state level, the regulation of
hydropower is kept within one rather integrated sector. However, there is some vertical division of
tasks between the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the WRED.
Although the Norwegian Water Regulation is implemented in pursuance of the Water Resources Act,
no legal adjustments were made in the existing regulatory framework for hydropower. This has led to
discussions whether the existing provision are sufficiently flexible in order to comply with the 6-years
planning cycles and the continuous adjustments to environmental norms that are required by the
17
The Energy Act and the Water Resources Act. The WRED assists the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in managing the Industrial Licensing Act and the Act Relation to Regulations of Water courses
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WFD. One issue is the time-frames for licenses and revisions, which have been referred to as rather
rigid. Some of the old hydropower licenses are perpetual. For those, a revision of the terms set in the
licenses may be conducted every 50 years. Depending on when they were issued and according to
what law, revision of terms set out in licenses can be done every 50 or 30 years. For other time
frames, other stipulations apply.
5. REGULATORY DIFFERENTIATION
As is apparent from the brief exposition in the preceding section, the five sectors vary tremendously
in terms of their regulatory frameworks and institutional set-ups. This variation could potentially
affect the relative degree of goal achievement related to the WFD environmental aims. We will, in
short, argue that the potential for “vertical environmental policy integration” seems greater in some
sectors than others, due to apparent differences in environmental governability. Table 1 below
summarizes a few key features presented so far.
Table 1: Key features of regulatory frameworks for WFD relevant issues in five sectors
Legal mandate
Regulation of activity
Regulation of stressor
Nature of regulation
Regulator (location)
Predominant level of government
Aquaculture [Aquaculture Act]
License License terms
Flexible Mixed Regional
Industrial pollution
Pollution act - Pollution permit
Flexible Environ-mental adm.
National/ regional
Hydropower Water resource act
License License terms
Time-limited
Sector adm. National
Agriculture - - - Incentive-based
General-purpose gov.
Regional
Waste water
Planning and building act, pollution act
Local regulations
Local regulations, pollution act
Flexible General-purpose gov.
Municipal
Legal mandate refers to the legal instrument which mandates environmental regulation in each
sector. A few items of variation should be noted:
The absence of a legal mandate for regulatory intervention in agriculture should be noted.
Agriculture is exempted from the provisions in the Pollution act, and there is no “Agricultural
act” in existence to mandate coercive regulation.
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Since the Water regulation is not a law, it needs to be mandated by other laws. It should be
noted that the Water regulation is mandated in the Pollution act, the Water resource act and
in the Planning and building act, but not in the Aquaculture act.
It should also be noted that these laws take precedence over the Water regulation. The
implication is that the Water regulation does not give legal basis for interfering with
decisions made on the basis of other laws.
Regulation of activity and stressor refers to the instruments available for regulating the activity in
question and/or the associated stressors to the aquatic environment.
The absence of either in agriculture should be noted, as well as the difference between
Industrial pollution and Aquaculture/Hydropower.
There is no license as such for running an industrial plant, rather the object of regulation is
the environmental stressor (the pollution) itself. In Aquaculture/Hydropower, however, the
environmental stressor is regulated through the introduction of terms in a license which
otherwise has the activity itself as the object of regulation.
The nature of the regulation refers predominantly to the scope for regulatory intervention:
In agriculture, policy measures are predominantly incentive-based. The County governor may
issue binding regulations, but this instrument is seldom used.
Hydropower licenses are, as noted, time limited. This constitutes a major impediment to
regulation, because the license terms are not open to revision until the end of the time limit
– which may be as long as 50 years. This is very much in contrast to the scope for
intervention in the sectors of Industrial pollution and Waste water. The term “flexible”
implies that the regulator is very much at liberty to introduce new environmental demands
to the polluter.
As for the regulator’s location and level of government, there is also great variation:
Note that pollution permits are issued by an environmental authority whereas hydropower
permits are issued by a sectoral authority. Both reside predominantly at the national level,
and both are unitary, consolidated authorities – there are no formal powers of veto vested in
other agencies.
Note the role of general purpose governments in environmental regulation, especially in the
Agriculture and Waste water sectors. These are, moreover, located on the regional or local
levels.
16
It would probably be presumptuous to put forward highly specific assumptions concerning the
feasibility of achieving vertical environmental policy integration in each sector, based on these
differences. The direct implications of each variable seem tentative at best, and there is small
guidance in the literature on environmental regulation to support theoretical assumptions. On a
more general level, however, we would argue that the absence of legally binding regulatory
instruments in agriculture, as well as the prominence of incentive-based instruments, could provide
actors in this sector with an ability to contravene environmental demands set down in the Water
regulation. The high degree of regulatory “flexibility” in Industrial pollution and Waste water,
moreover, suggests that these sectors will allow environmental policy integration to a greater extent
than hydropower, due to the time limits set on revising the licenses.
We now turn to the empirical results. How do key actors in Norway’s WFD system assess the relative
degree of vertical and horizontal “environmental policy integration” of the various sectors? And to
what extent can these assessments be attributed to differences in the regulatory frameworks?
6. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECTORS’ DIFFERENT REGULATRY FRAMEWORKS ON VERTICAL AND
HORIZONTAL POLICY INTEGRATION
The integration of the different sectors in the Norwegian system for WFD implementation is
perceived as more or less challenging by the involved actors. As shown in Figure 2 below, the River
Basin District Board members report that it is more difficult to reach agreements regarding fish
farming, hydropower and agriculture, than regarding pollution and waste water. An obvious
explanation to this variation is that the responsible regulators of pollution and waste water is the
environmental authorities at central and local government level, while the sector authorities are
responsible for the regulations within the other sectors. As such, our finding supports the
observation made by Jansen and Mydske (1998) that the Ministry of environment has been most
successful on areas where the Ministry itself controls the policy instruments.
17
Figure 2. It is very difficult/ difficult to reach agreement on the following subject/sectors (Percentage,
survey to the participants in the River Basin District Boards, N=301)
While the environmental authorities share the goal of ecological good water status, the sector policy
goal guiding the activity of fish farming, hydropower and agriculture authorities will compete, and
some time may be contradict, the environmental goal of water management. The results reported in
Figure x (above) can be interpreted as a very coarse indicator of vertical environmental policy
integration (VEPI). The institutional frameworks of the sectors elaborated in part 4 and 5 above
define important conditions for the degree of VEPI.
Within agriculture, there is a dominant perception of goal conflicts between water and agriculture
policies. Particularly the combination of fulfilling the sector policy goal of increased food production
and the perceived WFD goal of zero pollution is understood to be impossible. “(….) there are limits to
how much we can impose on agriculture and still expect an increase in food production” (County
governor’s agriculture agency).
Furthermore, central paradigms of agriculture policy which are obstructing implementation of the
goal of ecological good water status is not questioned or discussed. This is true both regarding the
channeling policy of distribution of production forms across the country and the principle of
voluntary based instruments. As a representative of a farmer’s organization expressed with reference
to the process of formulating the regional environment programs:
“(…) you are sort of checkmate before starting, because there is the white paper (on
agriculture policy) which set the guidelines for how farming should be in Norway. This white
paper defines a tool kit and presupposes continuation of the so called channeling policy: The
30
25 24
17 16 15
11
23 23 26
11 12 12 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
River Basin District
Sub District
18
lowlands shall have a monoculture of grain, and the livestock districts shall keep the number
of domestic animals”.
The local and regional incentive schemes are adjusted to the WFD-implementation, as the grants
targeting to reduce discharges of nutrients are increased in counties facing huge problems of
eutrophication. Considerations regarding distributional effects on farmers’ income are effectively
limiting both the size of the reward for environmental friendly farming and the use of legal
instruments regulating the farming in catchment areas facing severe problems. The corporatist
nature of the policy field probably makes policy change and innovations harder to achieve. The policy
formulation processes is dominated by sector actors (representing both government and farmers),
actors representing other interests and perspectives are kept outside. The environmental
considerations and goals stays subordinated the considerations and goals of the sector policy,
resulting in a restricted VEPI.
We find a much higher degree of VEPI in the waste water sector, which is no surprise since the sector
is sharing the WDF goal of good ecological status in water bodies. The implementation of the WFD is
to a large extent perceived as a continuation of the existing sector policy. The representatives of the
sector do not see any conflict between the sector and the water management system. The
management plan of the pilot areas and the WDF-work in general is used to defend the existing
practice, if members of the target group do question the requirements: “… we use it (the WFD) for all
it is worth” (waste water manager at municipal level).
There are, however, also examples where the WFD-processes influence policy and practice of local
municipalities. Within the pilot river basins, we find examples where the WFD has trigged local waste
water regulations or revisions in existing regulations, imposing stricter demands regarding waste
water treatment in sparsely populated areas. There are also examples of minor adjustments of waste
water investment plans, such as changes in pace as well as in prioritizing among settlements. The
waste water sector is a sector with a unitary regulator managing sufficient and flexible regulations,
which seem to have incorporated the goals and rationales of the WFD into its policymaking and
practice. Even though agriculture represent a more important stressor to the aquatic environment
than waste water, efforts to handle eutrophication is mainly put on waste water. As expressed by a
coordinator of the local WDF-work in one municipality:
“… we do still lack the opportunity to do anything with the agriculture, as long as the state do
not put in requirements in the agricultural settlement (negotiations with the farmers
organizations) …… Regarding waste water from sparsely populated areas, there we have laws
and regulations making it possible for us to do something”.
19
These observations correspond to the analysis of Wang Andersen (Kart og Plan 2013, forthcoming),
who identifies specific legal areas where the Norwegian regulatory framework is insufficiently
adapted in order to secure a legal fulfillment of the environmental quality norms of the WFD.
The WFD (and the Norwegian water regulation) requires that deterioration of the aquatic
environment must be prevented for both ongoing and new activities. According to Wang Andersen
(2013), the no-deterioration requirement18 of the WFD is applied differently by the regulatory
agencies. While the pollution authorities apply the no-deterioration requirement as material limits
for the licensing of discharges in each case, the hydropower authorities seem to have incorporated a
general referral to “the exemption provision in the Norwegian water regulation §12”, without stating
the specific assessments that were made in each case. Whereas the WFD also apply for coastal
waters, the approximation of the WFD into Norwegian law did not make the WFD explicitly pursuant
to the Aquaculture Act. Thus, the aquaculture authorities do not seem to apply the provisions of the
WFD at all in their individual case handling i.a of licenses. Doing so would imply “a legal shortcircuit”
according to an official of the Norwegian Costal and Fisheries Ministry, since it is the Aquaculture Act
that is set to guide the case handling of new licenses (Interview 04.02.2013).
Furthermore, different application of the alteration provisions is evident. In order to comply with the
WFD objectives of “good ecological” or “good chemical” status, it can be necessary to alter the
environmental terms set out in existing licenses that permits activity. In Norway, the provisions for
altering such environmental terms are found in the respective sectoral legal acts. These were all
issued before the WFD was adopted. Wang Andersen (2013) questions whether both the Pollution
Control Act and the water regulation acts sufficiently take into account the environmental objectives
of the WFD and argue that adaptation of the national provisions is probably needed. The lack of
adjustment of the existing regulatory framework and the rigid case-handling procedures has been
particularly evident for the revision of environmental terms of hydropower licenses. This has led to a
complaint to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, as explained in section 4 on hydropower.
Diverse or lacking adaptation of the existing regulatory framework may lead to shortages as to
ensure a coherent application of the environmental objectives of the WFD, due to a noncompliant,
fragmented regulatory framework, in other words lacking VEPI. Incoherent application of the WFD
environmental objectives involves a breach of Article 3 § 4 of the WFD, stating that “Member States
shall ensure that the requirements of this Directive for the achievement of the environmental
objectives established under Article 4, and in particular all programs of measures , are coordinated
18
This means that new activity may well be permitted as long as it doesn’t cause any deterioration of the respective water body. If deterioration is expected, exemptions can be made pursuant to art. 4 §7 of the WFD
20
for the whole of the river basin district (our italic). In other words may shortages in the Vertical Policy
Integration of the sectors cause shortages in the Horizontal Policy Integration required by the
directive.
As we have presented above, the legal regime established in Norway to change terms and conditions
in permits is not designed to ensure compliance with environmental objectives. Secondly, the
"Norwegian Water Regulation» might fall short as to ensure a consistent application of the
environmental objectives by the different administrative bodies (Andersen 2013). In addition, the
institutional set-up of the different administrative bodies regulating pressures on water, as well as
their instruments at hand, varies. This affects their ability to effectively regulate the pressures on the
ecological status of water. In addition, our studies have revealed that there are differences in the will
to address these questions in the different sector administrative bodies, which results in different
degree of vertical environmental policy integration (VEPI) in different sectors. The lowest degree of
VEPI is found in fish farming, hydropower and agriculture.
Nevertheless, our studies also show that the network arenas established to implement the EU Water
framework Directive in Norway, especially the cross-sector and multi-level arenas of the River Basin
District Boards and the Sub-District Boards, have resulted in a certain degree of horizontal
environmental policy integration (HEPI).
We have asked the participants of the River Basin District Boards, which consist of sector
administrative bodies (regional state authorities), county municipalities and municipalities, about
how they evaluate the usefulness of catchment area as an organizing principle, and of the
management plan as a coordinating instrument of different sector interests (including environmental
interests). The figure below shows the results.
21
Figure 3. Percentages that agree on the following statements (Survey to the participants in the River
Basin District Boards, N=301).
The figure shows that the majority of the participants find the use of catchment area as organizing
principle to give a more comprehensive approach to water management. Here, participants
representing the county municipalities are the ones that agree the most, but also three of four of the
participants from municipalities and regional state authorities do agree.
When it comes to the question of how effective the management plans for each River basin district is,
or will be, as an instrument for coordinating different interest (environmental interests versus
interests that represent pressure on good ecological water status), a majority of the participants are
positive. Here the county municipalities are more reluctant, and this might be explained by the fact
that they are responsible for the planning process and are more aware of the challenges ahead.
Thus, these results might be interpreted as that the new water management system has resulted in a
certain level of horizontal environmental policy integration (HEPI). The interviews reveal that the
new water management system – with its network arenas, function primarily as arenas for
information and knowledge-sharing. This is presented as a major improvement, compared to the
earlier situation with sectors/ silos without meeting points. As a municipal representative
commented;
”The best thing about the EU Water Framework Directive is that we now have a joint system.
We now have common concepts, and every aspects of water management are – to a certain
degree – coordinated and discussed. And, not at least, we get to know each other (across
sectors)” (representative from a municipal agriculture authority)
73 73
82
65
75 78
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Catchment areas/river basins give a more comprehensive
approach to water management
The managment plan is/ will be a useful instrument for
coordination
Municipality
County Municipality
Regional State Authority
22
”It is very informative to be at the same arena as waste water, hydropower, transport, fish
interests. The information that is shared here contributes to mutual understanding among us
in these different sectors. We also understand that we face different challenges. And it is
useful for us that others question our way of doing things; it increases our consciousness and
sharpens us” (Representative from the agricultural authority within the County Governor)
However, as the earlier discussions have revealed, there are reason to question if the Norwegian
implementation of the EU Water framework directive is harmonized with the existing legal regime in
Norway and the politically decided aims of each of the sectors. Both the existing legal regime, the
fragmented system of water management, and the varying institutional set-up and instruments of
the sector authorities in Norway – represent severe challenges.
When asking the participants of the River Basin District Boards about this, we got a strong impression
that the aims and instruments of the EUs water Framework Directive are not in themselves
sufficiently strong to curb strong sector interests that represent pressure on the ecological status on
water. Even if many of actors find the new water management system – with its network arenas – as
useful constructions, many of them are doubtful that this is enough. This is clearly an impression
from the survey, where the figure below shows how the participants assess the new water
management system.
Figure 4. Percentages that agree on the following statements (Survey to the participants in the River
Basin District Boards, N=301)
57
39
61
45 41 38
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
The current water management system is adequate/functional
to acheive good ecological status
Water policy is still formulated on the sectors' terms
Municipality
County Municipality
Regional State Authority
23
The figure shows that much lower percentages of the different respondent groups – compared to the
questions in the figure above, consider the current water management system to be adequate to
achieve good ecological status. In the interviews the participants explain this by the lack of
coherence, and lack of will to curb strong sector interests – especially hydropower, agriculture and
fish farming. The second question in the figure strengthen this impression, as around 40 percentage
of all the respondent groups report that water policy is still formulate on the terms of the different
sector interests. This indicate that the coordination achieved at the arenas of the new water
management system is suitable for mutual learning and raising awareness, as reported above, but
have few ‘muscles’ to clarify hard sector conflicts. As one of the informants representing the County
governor expressed,
“everyone knows that it is impossible to get things done in such [network] arenas.. There is so
much hard work to be done in implementing the WFD that it does not work with committees,
- people sitting and chatting two hours every third month” (Representative of the County
Governor).
Similar findings are reported in the policy-field of climate change adaptation (Winsvold et al, Hanssen
et al, 2013, forthcoming).
In addition to the lack of fully harmonizing the WDF with Norwegian Law, as has been discussed
above, the problem also seems to be conflicting politically decided goals. These goal-conflicts are
most evident between the Water Regulation (implementing the WDF in the Norwegian legal regime)
and the sectors of hydropower, agriculture and fish farming. For example, representatives from
agricultural authorities and interest organizations stress that agriculture never will be able to be a
zero-polluter, as long as they also are expected to produce food. Lack of national prioritizing between
these conflicting goals and interest are reducing the ability of River Basin District Boards to be
effective arenas. As one representative of the County governor (regional state authority) comments;
“One of the huge problems with the Water regulation is that things (interest conflicts) are not
settled at national level” (County governor).
Some of the informants contend that the agricultural sector has been let off easy in terms of footing
their part of the bill for averting eutrophication from diffuse sources, and feel that this is in conflict
with the principle of WFD of prioritizing the most cost-efficiency measures (this is also reported in
Norwegian Water 2009, Magnussen og Holen 2011a:38-9). This affects the possibility to achieve the
overall goal of good ecological status. As a municipality comment;
24
‘Of course the waste-water and sewage-sector has to take action, but the main challenges
remain within the agricultural sector. The contemporary practices in agriculture cannot be
reconciled with the goals in the Water regulation, regardless of how much that is invested in
the waste-water and sewage-sector” (Norwegian water 2011:47).
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pending the availability of hard data to assess each sector’s relative contribution to WFD goal
achievement, the observations and contentions made by the informants possibly provide the best
picture of the present situation currently available. While this picture is not unequivocally bleak in
terms of the feasibility of achieving environmental policy integration, it does give grounds for
concern regarding Norway’s potential for achieving the WFD’s aims. Institutional and regulatory
issues seem to be a significant factor in this regard.
Issues to do with the aquatic environment have the potential to set off potent conflicts of interest.
The reason for this is very straight-forward: Large sums of money are at stake, as well as export
revenues, employment, renewable energy production, to mention a few issues. It is no big surprise if
some business actors as well as public authorities are less than enthusiastic about implementing
environmental measures that go directly against the basic aims of their particular sector. The analysis
in the present paper indicates, however, that this kind of situation seems to require a system of
governance which is a great deal more consistent and authoritative than is the case today. Legal
inconsistencies seem to provide “loopholes” for shirking environmental demands. The fact that the
Water regulation is subordinate to the laws mandating the measures, that the Aquaculture act does
not mandate the Water regulation and that §12 in the Water regulation is used somewhat
indiscriminately by the hydropower authorities suggests that conflicts of interest need to be
addressed with a more consistent and unambiguous legal framework than the one currently in place.
Furthermore, the use of a network-like system of “voluntary” coordination may prove less than ideal
in a situation where a number of actors are motivated to shy away from the most costly measures.
Such a course of action would, furthermore, seem to be especially tempting in a sector marked by
absence of binding regulation – agriculture. It has become conventional wisdom that municipalities
carry a disproportionate part of the costs related to diffuse source nutritient leakage, and the
incentive-based system of regulation in agriculture probably has a lot to do with this.
This is not to say that environmental aims are not taken into account by decision-makers in the
aquaculture, hydropower and agriculture sectors, but it remains an open issue to what extent this
can be attributed to the system for “horizontal” environmental policy integration – the River basin
25
districts and the sub-districts. For the time being, their most important functions seem to be one of
deliberation and knowledge sharing, to a lesser extent mutually binding and enforceable
agreements. The regional coordinators – the county governments – are probably (and quite
paradoxically) the least powerful actors in the entire system, in the sense that they hold very limited
formal powers over the measures that have to be implemented. As long as regulatory power largely
remains sectorized, the question is whether this is sufficient to achieve the aims laid down in the
WFD.
[To be elaborated]