THE MY LAI MASSACRE:
A STUDY OF THE EVENT, AFTERMATH, AND IMPLICATIONS
,
by
Michael C. Howard
A SENIOR THESIS
m
GENERAL STUDIES
Submitted to the General Studies Council in the College of Arts and Sciences
at Texas Tech University in Partial fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
BACHELOR OF GENERAL STUDIES
Approved
DR. CATHERINE MILLER Department of History
Co-Chairperson of Thesis Co~
DR. JAMES RECJ<:i{ER ---u
Department of History .f:e Chairperson of Thesis Committee
Accepted
DR. MICHAEL SCHOENECk£ Director of General Studies
MAY 2001
^ p f f f
T S TABLE OF CONTENTS
^'ACKNOWLEGEMENTS
y • ' '
.11
INTRODUCTION iii
CHAPTER
L THE MISSION 1
Background 1
Landing and Massacre 3
II. COVER-UP: AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS 7
Initial Reports 7
m. FRAMING MY LAI 14
Criminal Investigation and the Peers Panel 14
VVAW and the Winter Soldiers Investigation 23
IV. ASSESSMENT 30
Why the Massacre Happened 30
Why the Cover-Up Happened 33
BIBLIOGRAPHY 36
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Catherine Miller and Dr. James Reckner for their
exhaustive work as the co-chairpersons of my thesis committee. Without their endless
hours of advice on research, organization, and editing, I would never have been able to
write this thesis.
Secondly, I would like to thank Chad Miller for helping me with the research of
the Winter Soldiers Investigation. Without his help, the Winter Soldiers section would
have been much different.
Finally, I would like to thank Megan Miller for putting up with me through the six
months it took me to research for and write this paper. Without her help, I never would
have been able to keep my sanity and finish this thesis.
INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 1968 in Vietnam, the small hamlet of My Lai (4) was completely
destroyed by American soldiers expecting to engage in a tough fight with a brigade of
enemy soldiers of the National Liberation Front (NLF). During the chaos, livestock were
killed and left to rot, food caches were destroyed, huts were set on fire, underground
tunnel systems were destroyed, women were raped and beaten, and between 100 to 500
people were brutally murdered. Some American soldiers systematically moved through
the hamlet killing civilians while others struggled or refused to take part in the slaughter.
Some of the Vietnamese civilians tried to run or hide from the Americans, while others
stood their ground hoping to seem unthreatening; however, American soldiers killed
indiscriminately. Vietnamese women, old men, and children were herded into groups
and shot for no apparent reason.
The soldiers who destroyed My Lai (4) did nothing to report the massacre to their
superiors. Reports of the operation were falsified and included no mention of the vast
number of civilians who had been killed. The number of people killed was drastically
reduced from an estimated 500 to 128. For the most part, the officers who received the
reports of the My Lai Massacre did not question anything submitted to them. The few
questions that did arise were quickly silenced and the incident was covered-up. The My
Lai Massacre did not resurface until 1969. when an ex-G.I. began writing letters to
officials in the military and government to describe the brutal operation.
A massacre worse than any recorded in American military history, the My Lai
Massacre has lived on past the rest of the Vietnam War. At the time, it shocked the
American public and showed many people in the United States that the American soldier
did not always do the right thing. The memory and consequences of My Lai pervade
American society's thinking to the present day. A small subhamlet of the Son My village
in the Quang Ngai Province of South Vietnam, My Lai (4) became far more influential to
the American presence in Vietnam than the soldiers who participated in the atrocity could
have ever guessed.
Scholars trying to determine why the massacre and the ensuing cover-up
happened have studied My Lai for more than thirty years. The military held two separate
investigations into My Lai in order to find out who or what could be blamed for such an
atrocity. The anti-war group, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), held public
hearings in 1971 discussing the issue of American atrocities in Vietnam. Public debate
raged in the late 1960s and early 1970s about the fate of the men who had destroyed the
hamlet and its inhabitants.
In assessing the My Lai Massacre, it becomes obvious that nothing is black and
white. Nothing about the massacre or the cover-up is simple and clear-cut. Conflicting
testimony, different explanations, and different sources of blame make the My Lai
Massacre one of the most controversial topics in American History.
CHAPTER 1
THE MISSION
Background
In the spring of 1967, the U.S. military formed Task Force Oregon to clear the
soldiers of the National Liberation Front (NLF) from Quang Ngai Province and to pacify
the civilian population. The NLF controlled much of the province even though the U.S.
military had long before declared it a "free-fire zone" in which all civilians were
automatically suspected of being either NLF or NLF sympathizers. In these zones. U.S.
forces did not have to get permission from local or Saigon officials to conduct bombing
or artillery missions because it was presumed that there were no innocents to be harmed
in the area. While Task Force Oregon operated in the region, 138,000 civilians were
made homeless and about 70 percent of the dwellings in Quang Ngai Province were
destroyed (Hersh, MY LAI 4 4-5). The Saigon government's Strategic Hamlet program,
along with the devastating results of this heavy fighfing, made pacification efforts in the
area very difficult because the population had little reason to turn or trust the American
and South Vietnamese forces.
The primary enemy of the American and ARVN forces in the region was the 48""
Local Force Battalion of the NLF. Shortly after the Tet Offensive of 1968, this battalion
was repelled from Quang Ngai City into the Tra Khuc Valley by American forces. U.S.
intelligence reported that since being pushed out of Quang Ngai City the battalion had set
up its headquarters in the region designated "Pinkville" on U.S. military maps.
Intelligence officials believed the enemy base was located just outside of the small
hamlet of My Lai (4) with an estimated strength of 10,000 to 20,000 men. Overall, the
area was known to have been an NLF stronghold for 25 years during which the South
Vietnamese troops (ARVN) were not willing to enter (Medina File, Vietnam Archive).
In order to deal with the formidable presence of the NLF, the Americal Division
was assigned to Quang Ngai Province. Task Force Barker was created out of the
Americal to crush what remained of the NLF 48"' Battalion and to pacify the population
in the northern portion of Quang Ngai Province. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker
commanded the new task force, which was divided into Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie
Companies.
Captain Ernest Medina, a former enlisted man who was seen by his superiors in
the U.S. Army as a bright, rising officer, commanded Charlie Company. On March 13,
1968 Barker and Medina devised a plan for the 1̂* and 2"'̂ platoons of Charlie Company
to make their way into My Lai (4) while the two other companies of Task Force Barker
set up blocking positions to keep the NLF from fleeing. The assault was to come in two
waves that were to land 150 meters west of the small village.
Lieutenant William Calley, the leader of Charlie Company's T' Platoon, was very
different from his immediate superior. Captain Medina. As a young former enlisted man,
Medina related to his troops well and was extremely enthusiastic as well as very well
liked by his men. He was known to be tough and to expect the best from his men;
however, the soldiers of Charlie Company also looked to him with respect and affection.
Lieutenant William Calley was just the opposite. After attending college for one year
and dropping out, Calley joined the Army and trained to become an officer. Calley
joined the military at a time when the premium was set on fresh bodies rather than quality
officers. Disliked by his men and considered unreliable and worthless by his superiors.
Captain Medina even called him "Lieutenant Shithead." One of the men in Charlie
Company summed up Galley's inadequacies when he told a reporter that Calley routinely
got the men lost becau.se he did not know how to use a compass (Olsen and Roberts, 13).
Landing and Massacre
On March 16, 1968, any NLF soldiers that might have been in My Lai (4)
received advanced warning of the attack when, in accordance with U.S. Army policy,
units supporting TF Barker shelled the area surrounding the Landing Zone (LZ) prior to
the drop of troops. So, as the American helicopters approached between 7:30 and 8:00 in
the morning, any NLF in the area would have been able to flee into the brush surrounding
the village (Gershen 5-9). In fact, upon landing with the first wave. Captain Medina
reported that he had encountered no direct resistance. Later, during the initial
investigation of the incident, Medina testified that after he reported that there was no
immediate resistance on the ground, the pilots of the helicopters circling above radioed
that both the helicopters in the air and the troops on the ground were receiving fire from
the village. In this chaotic situation, Medina did not question this contradictory report,
and declared the LZ "hot," or dangerous due to enemy fire. Medina then moved his
troops out in a single line, walking abreast towards the village.
Military intelligence had incorrectly reported to Medina that all the civilians
inhabiting the village would be out selling rice and vegetables at the Quang Ngai market,
so the troops of Charlie Company expected only NLF and their sympathizers to be
present (Medina, Vietnam Archive). The Phoenix Program's agent for Quang Ngai
Province, Robert B. Ramsdell, probably obtained the intelligence for the operation at My
Lai (4). Ramsdell was well known in the region for paying large sums of money for
intelligence reports, which often led the informants to "puff up" the reports to make more
money (Hersh, Cover-Up 85-96). Lieutenant Clarence Dukes, a U.S. Army intelligence
officer, later told investigators that the exact opposite of Task Force Barker's intelligence
would have been true; by daybreak all the men of the village would have been out
working the fields while the women and children would have been left alone in the
village.
As the men of Charlie Company approached the village, a Vietnamese farmer in
the field came running to greet the soldiers yelling, "G.I. number One!" and was
immediately shot (Hersh, MY LAI 4 45). This set the bloody tone for the day. Private
First Class (Pfc.) Paul Meadlo of the T' platoon later said that after the farmer was killed,
the troops moved into the village and gathered the civilians into large groups. Men,
women, and children were rounded up and taken to the center of the village. Lieutenant
Calley approached one group of thirty to forty people and ordered Meadlo to kill them
all. When he saw Meadlo hesitate, he stepped back ten or fifteen feet and started firing
into the group of unarmed civilians. Meadlo then joined in, using up four clips of
seventeen rounds each from his M-16 rifle. He later estimated that he killed ten to fifteen
people in this single incident (Gershen 19-21). Other troops witnessed Galley's actions,
including Pfc. Herbert Carter, a soldier who allegedly shot himself in the foot to avoid the
hellish killing. In a later interview Carter recalled the day: "We went into that village
with guns blazing. . .each was trying to outdo the other to prove he was a better man.
People were pulled out of their huts and kicked and beaten. If a woman looked good
enough, she was raped, kicked and beaten" (Gershen 124). Another incident involving
Lieutenant Calley was reported by Pfc. Michael Terry, a member of the third platoon.
Terry reported that Calley ordered a machine-gunner to shoot a group of mostly women
and children. The soldier followed orders and shot about half of the people in the group
before stopping in disgust. Calley grabbed the machine gun and shot the rest himself
(Gershen 27-29).
All the men saw and did different things around the village, so it is very difficult
to get a coherent picture of what actually happened. Many of the men, when questioned
by the army investigators performing the initial invesfigations, tried to justify the killings
by saying that they thought that the fleeing villagers they had shot and killed were armed.
They were not. They rationalized that those fleeing were obviously doing something
wrong or dangerous, so they were shot in order to protect the American soldiers
(LaCroix File, Vietnam Archive). Some, however, openly admitted that their fellow
fighting men seemed soulless in the village that day, killing people without feeling or
remorse. Carter later said that Calley seemed pleased with his gruesome work while the
other man ordering the killings, Sgt. Mitchell, looked upset and confused
(Gershen 113). "Everyone was more-or-less doing something that they shouldn't be and
way down inside they knew it wasn't right, and yet they felt they were getting re\enge,
and what we felt, we was destroying the enemy," said Carter (Gershen 123). Other
troops there that day did not see their brutality as wrong. Echoing the theory of a "free
fire zone," Simpson recalled, "To us there were no civilians. They were V.C.
sympathizers. To us they were V.C." (Gershen 136).
After watching the chaos from the air and realizing that there was no real
resistance coming from the villagers. Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson landed
between advancing G.I.'s led by Calley and a group of Vietnamese civilians. He
instructed his doorgunners to return fire if the Americans were to fire on him or the
Vietnamese he was trying to rescue. Thompson was able to persuade the Vietnamese to
come out of their bunker and saved them from an almost certain death. This appears to
be the only attempt by an American soldier to prevent the atrocity that occurred at the
small hamlet of My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968.
When Army investigators returned to My Lai in November 1969, they found three
mass graves containing between 450 and 500 bodies of women, children, and old men
(Hersh, MY LAI 4 75). On the other hand. Colonel Frank Barker reported to his
superiors at Americal Division headquarters that the total body count for the operation at
My Lai was 128 killed with only three weapons captured (Hersh, MY LAI 4 77).
CHAPTER II
COVER-UP: AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS
Initial Reports
After the bloodshed that took place at My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968, the soldiers
of Charlie Company returned to their ba.se and many acted as if nothing unusual had
happened. Although most of the men later admitted that they had trouble dealing with
what they had just done and even though many felt extremely guilty, no one made any
type of report of the massacre to their superior officers. When Lieutenant Calley
submitted his official report of the operation, there was no mention of anything unusual.
Calley reported that 69 NLF (or Viet Cong as the report referred to enemy troops) had
been killed; he completely left out any mention of civilians (Calley File. Vietnam
Archive). On March 17, 1968, an official summary of the Son My Operation (the overall
operation that included the incident at My Lai) that was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel
Blackledge, Colonel Henderson's Aid, was submitted to Americal Division. The report
classified the mission as a "victory" for American forces and claimed that the enemy
killed during the operation had been "evading" when shot by Charlie Company; again
there was no mention, whatsoever, of civilians killed (Hersh, Cover Up 144).
The initial investigations into what happened in My Lai (4) began a few hours
after the massacre. Sometime after three o'clock on March 16, 1968, Colonel Henderson
decided he wanted Charlie Company to retrace its steps back to My Lai (4). Colonel
Henderson radioed Captain Medina and ordered him to take his men back to the hamlet
to determine precisely how many civilians had been killed. Medina protested the order.
claiming that it was getting late and that going back would be extremely dangerous
because it would keep the men from preparing their nighttime defensive positions (Hersh.
Cover-Up 121).
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker learned of the order at almost the same time as
Medina and took an immediate and unusual step to stop it. Lieutenant Colonel Barker
went over the brigade commander's head and took his protest to Major General Koster,
who was flying in a helicopter nearby. Barker explained to General Koster that this order
would send the men of Charlie Company back into what he considered a very dangerous
area as darkness approached. Koster agreed with Barker that the order should be stopped
and broke in on Medina's radio, and telling him to disregard Colonel Henderson's recent
order. Unfortunately, Henderson's failed attempt to order Medina and his men back into
My Lai (4) was the most direct attempt made by anyone at the time to determine what
actually happened (Hersh, Cover-Up 121-122). When asked about the civilian body
count, Medina told General Koster that he had seen between twenty and twenty-eight
civilian bodies in the hamlet and Koster responded, according to the Captain, "Well, that
sounds about right" (Hersh, Cover-Up 122).
On March 17, Jay Roberts, the 11"' Brigade combat correspondent, met with
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker. Roberts, who was on the ground with Charlie
Company in My Lai the day before, was disturbed about what he had seen the previous
day and unsure what he should write about the operation in his report to Americal
Division headquarters. Barker told Roberts that he should write up the operafion as an
overwhelming success. In an interview with Seymour Hersh, Roberts remembered
Barker suggesting that his report convey "something to the effect that it had been highly
successful, that. . .two entire companies . . .had moved swiftly with complete surprise to
the VC in the area" (Hersh, Cover-Up 120). When Roberts asked about the high body
count and the usually low number of captured weapons, Barker told him that he would do
a good job writing the story and that he should not worry about such details (Hersh,
Cover-Up 120). Roberts went on to write the report exactly as he had been told, leaving
out any information that might have raised questions about the report's accuracy.
Because of the report's spin on the operation, the army reported to the United States
public that the operation at My Lai (4) had been another overwhelming success for the
U.S. Army in Vietnam.
Only Hugh C. Thompson's after action report dealt with the numerous civilian
deaths at My Lai (4). Thompson, whose intervention on the ground in My Lai (4) had
stopped American troops from killing a group of Vietnamese civilians, was infuriated
about the actions of American troops that day. Thompson filed a report to his superiors
on March 16, 1968 that detailed what he had seen and what steps he had taken to stop the
chaos he had witnessed on the ground. The report was submitted and reviewed by
Captain Barry C. Lloyd, a section leader with the 123'̂ '* Aviation Battalion. Captain
Lloyd was disturbed about what he read and even underlined parts of Thompson's bitter
report. To add emphasis, he wrote the word "NOTICE" in capital letters next to a
statement about civilians being killed at My Lai (4) (Hersh, Cover-Up 129).
After submitting the report, Thompson immediately went to see his chaplain.
Father Carl Creswell, to talk about what he had seen and what he could do to make sure
the Army investigated the incident properly. Creswell told Thompson to file a formal
complaint through the "command channels" and told Thompson that he would file a
complaint through "chaplain channels." Creswell immediately went to see his superior.
Reverend Francis Lewis, to report Thompson's allegations. Creswell was assured that
the report would be forwarded to Jesmond Balmer, then the operations officer for the
division; however, Lewis decided to wait (Hersh, Cover-Up 138).
Major Fredric W. Watke was the next officer to review Thompson's After-Action
Report dealing with the operation at My Lai (4). As the commanding officer of the 123"̂
Aviation Battalion, Watke received the report from Captain Lloyd. After reading the
report, Watke had a major decision to make. Watke later said that he knew at the time
that reporting an atrocity like My Lai would ruin his advancement in the Army, but he
still felt he had to report the alleged incident. After struggling with his dilemma, Watke
met with Lieutenant Colonel Holladay in the late evening of March 16"' to discuss the
allegations.
Early in the morning of March 17"', Major Watke and Lieutenant Colonel
Holladay arrived at Americal Division Headquarters to report the My Lai incident to
Brigadier General George Young. Major Watke said he relayed what was in Warrant
Officer Thompson's report, specifically images of Lieutenant Calley firing into a ditch
filled with Vietnamese civilians, and told the general of the suspicious discrepancy
between the number of enemy soldiers reportedly killed and the meager number of
weapons captured. Holladay recalled General Young's reaction to the allegations as very
odd. "The general seemed more upset over Thompson's action in landing his helicopter
10
and threatening ground forces than in the numbers of civilians slain. 1 had it just the
other way around in my mind" (Hersh, Cover-Up 134).
When being interviewed by the Army's formal investigation into My Lai, the
Peers Commission, General Young recalled his meeting with Major Watke and
Lieutenant Colonel Holladay quite differently than the two officers had reported.
General Young testified that he came away from the meeting with absolutely no
knowledge of any murders. "1 gained the impression that civilians were [caught] in a
crossfire between the friendly forces and the enemy forces." Young claimed the only
confrontation he was told about was that of Thompson and the ground troops (Hersh,
Cover-Up 133-134).
The version of the March 17, 1968 meeting between Young, Holladay. and Watke
that General Young relayed to the Peers Commission is questionable, given General
Young's actions after the meeting. On March 17, 1968 General Young began an
investigation into the problematic operation. Young flew by helicopter to Landing Zone
Dotti to interview the men of Charlie Company. By the time Young arrived at the
landing zone, much of the area to the east was shrouded in the smoke from Bravo and
Charlie Company's operations. Altogether, at least six hamlets had been burned along
the South China Sea coast near My Lai. Young acknowledged later to the Peers Panel
that he probably did fly over the operational area that afternoon but claimed he did not
recall seeing the smoke and destruction on the ground (Hersh, Cover-Up 139).
Once on the ground at Landing Zone Dotti, Young received an extensive briefing
on the previous day's mission. Major Calhoun testified to the Peers Panel that he told the
I I
general that sixty-nine civilians had been killed. Calhoun told the general that he thought
the preparatory artillery fire that had been used to clear the landing zone and the
surrounding area possibly killed them. At that time. Young asked the major no direct
questions about the mission and did not question anything he had just been told (Hersh.
Cover-Up 139).
Although the general gave no indication of it at the time of his briefing, whatever
he had been told must have troubled him. Lieutenant Colonel Trexler, the division
intelligence chief, recalled that sometime on March 17, or perhaps the next day, he was
flying with General Young when they had a conversation about the incident. Trexler
recalled that, " . . .the people had gone beyond what he conceived was proper conduct. . .
Units had indiscriminately burned hootches, burned villages. . .1 think maybe that he did
discuss the value of retaining Task Force Barker" (Hersh, Cover-Up 140).
The results of General Young's visit were immediate. That afternoon after
Young's visit. Task Force Barker ordered its two companies in the field to completely
stop burning Vietnamese hamlets. From that moment on, the operation suddenly became
a "mercy mission" (Hersh, Cover-Up 141). Medical teams were immediately flown into
the area to inspect and treat the civilians who had been picked up by TF Barker's two
companies during their two-day operation of terror. This change to pacification efforts
amazed the G.I.'s of the task force who had gotten used to the old policies of search and
destroy.
General Young's intervention did yield some positive results, such as the medical
teams; however, no larger investigation emerged. Even though the chaos was stopped.
12
this visit did nothing to alert the "upper brass" in the army that something was terribly
wrong. In fact, after his briefing Young ordered Colonel Henderson, Major Watke,
Lieutenant Colonel Barker, and Lieutenant Colonel Holladay to attend a meeting with
him the next morning at task force headquarters. On March 18, General Young, Colonel
Henderson, Lieutenant Colonels Barker and Holladay, and Major Watke met at nine
o'clock in the morning. General Young started off the meeting by saying, "We are the
only five that know about this." Major Watke then told his story for the third time. Later
Holladay told the Peers Commission that the message from General Young was clear:
there was to be no unnecessary talking about either the meeting or the complaints that
had brought about the meeting (Hersh, Cover-Up 147-148).
Despite Thompson's After-Action report, both Thompson's and Father Creswell's
formal complaints. Major Watke and Lieutenant Colonel Holladay" s meeting with
General Young, and General Young's subsequent intervention, the events at My Lai (4)
remained just another statistic until April, 1969 when an ex-G.l. named Ronald
Riddenhour wrote letters to the Pentagon, the White Hou.se, and other government offices
describing the murders at My Lai (4). Although not physically present at My Lai (4) on
March 16, 1968, Riddenhour was told about the brutal operation in passing conversation
by several G.I.'s who had been there. Riddenhour's numerous letters reawakened the
incident and led to formal investigations that, within four months, uncovered most of the
facts about the massacre. If it were not for Riddenhour's persistence in writing authority
after authority about the incident, the My Lai Massacre could very well have never been
uncovered (Hersh, MY LAI 104-110).
13
CHAPTER III
FRAMING MY LAI
The operation that took place on March 16, 1968 in and around My Lai (4) led to
numerous investigations. The first of these inquiries were the early inquires by Colonel
Henderson of the 11"' Brigade and of Brigadier General Young of the Americal Division
Headquarters. Later, the Army opened criminal investigations of the operation and its
apparent cover-up because of Ronald Riddenhour's persistent letters and Task Force
Barker's official report on My Lai that stated that only three weapons were captured from
128 killed NLF troops. Outside of the military, groups like Vietnam Veterans Against
the War (VVAW) held investigations into atrocities committed by the United States
military in Vietnam. The Winter Soldiers investigation, held by VVAW, examined
issues like war crimes, racism, and military policy in Vietnam.
Criminal Investigation and the Peers Panel
Following Riddenhour's letters and the public interest they stirred, the Criminal
Invesdgation Division (CID) of the Army, headed by Colonel Henry H. Tufts, began a
criminal investigation of the My Lai Massacre. As the CID began interviewing members
of Charlie Company to determine what happened on the ground at My Lai, it became
obvious to investigators and their superiors that the My Lai Massacre had been covered
up by officers of the Americal Division and the 11'*' Brigade (Hersh, Cover-Up 228).
14
With public outrage mounting, the Secretary of the Army and other military
policy makers decided an inquiry into the cover-up was necessary. A series of meetings
were held in the Pentagon to discuss ways of stopping the growing criticism from the
American press and public over what seemed to be an obvious cover-up of the My Lai
Massacre. A group that included Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, General
Counsel Robert E. Jordan, 111, Vice Chief of Staff Bruce Palmer, and Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Z. Henkin suggested that some kind of inquiry into
the cover-up was needed. It was decided by this Pentagon group to not entrust the
inquiry to Colonel Tuft's CID office because the men they were interrogating would
outrank his investigators (Hersh, Cover-Up 229).
Instead, in December of 1969, the Army announced to the American public that a
panel had been created to learn the facts behind the My Lai Massacre. The panel was
officially called "The Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations
into the My Lai Incident" and was unofficially known as the Peers Panel after its director.
Lieutenant General William Peers, who was picked by the army because of his tough,
blunt reputation. The Peers Panel was designed to investigate why the atrocity had not
been properly reported, but it also had the power to charge a suspect with a crime, if the
need arose. Although the military supported Peers' appointment completely, officials in
the State Department at the time had reservations because of the insensitivity to the
problems of civilians General Peers had shown during his 1968 command of the 4' U.S.
Division in Vietnam. However. Peers' appointment stood and the panel began work
immediately. General Peers handpicked the rest of the panel, which included Colonel
15
William Wilson of the Inspector General's office and two private New York attorneys.
Robert MacCrate and Jerome K. Walsh, Jr. (Hersh, Cover-Up 228-230).
The growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War in the late sixties and early
seventies made the issue of investigating American war crimes especially delicate. The
appointment of General Samuel Koster, the former commander of the Americal Division,
to the prestigious title of Superintendent of West Point made the investigations even more
sensitive. The press coverage of the panel was, therefore, very limited. Army officials
told the press that the panel's proceedings would be closed to the public but that
individual witnesses would be free to tell the press whatever they chose (Hersh, MY LAI
4 172-174).
There were .some limits that the Peers Panel had to deal with when investigating
the army's actions at My Lai (4). The most important of these limits to General Peers
and his staff was that, because the panel was just an inquiry and not a criminal
investigation, it could not subpoena witnesses or compel them to appear or testify.
Perhaps because of this major handicap, the panel took on a very aggressive and
confrontational style with those witnesses who did appear. For example, Peers himself
clashed severely with 11"' Brigade combat correspondent Jay Roberts. However, some
witnesses did not respond to this aggressive style (Hersh, MY LAI 4 175). These
witnesses had other reasons that compelled them to testify to the panel, including fear,
shame, and a desire to help the Army investigate. Another key aspect of the panel's
invesfigation that led many G.I.'s as well as ex-G.I.'s to testify was that many of the men
were awed by the presence of a colonel or a general. This awe led some of the men
16
having a "less than perfect" understanding of their rights to refuse to appear or testify.
Another power used by the Peers Panel that many witnesses did not fully understand
when giving their accounts of what happened was the power to press charges. Because of
this lack of understanding, many witnesses went into the interview thinking it was a
relatively casual atmosphere and came out with a criminal charge (Hersh, MY LAI 4
175-176).
The panel started its investigation by interviewing the commanding officers of the
11' Brigade and Americal Division in Peers' office deep in the basement of the
Pentagon. Next, the panel moved on to interrogating the men of Charlie Company about
the actual happenings in My Lai (4) on March 16. Later, the panel branched out and
interviewed members of the other two companies that made up Task Force Barker, Alpha
and Bravo. All in all, the Peers Panel interviewed 390 witnesses and compiled over
20,000 pages of witness' testimony (Hersh, MY LAI 4 174-178).
The Peers Panel and CID investigations focused heavily on Ernest Medina and
William Calley. Testimony from the members of Charlie Company showed how Calley
had ordered soldiers to kill civilians and had killed quite a few himself, but the men of
Charlie Company could not come to a clear consensus about Medina's role in the
atrocity. Harry Stanley testified that during the briefing the night before the operation,
Medina "ordered us to 'kill everything in the village." Charles West remembered Medina
said that when Charlie Company left the area "nothing would be walking, growing, or
crawling." However, others remembered it differently. Gregory Olsen was sure Medina
did not order the killing of women and children. "He never at any time said, 'Slaughter
17
the people'." Ron Grzesik agreed. He heard Medina tell the men "to go in and destroy
the village; to make it uninhabitable," but did not remember Medina ordering the men to
kill the inhabitants (Hersh, MY LAI 4 40-42).
Despite the lengthy investigations by the CID and the Peers Panel, the military
never gave an official explanation for the My Lai Massacre. However, the way the
military handled the formal charges against both the men of Charlie Company accused of
murder and the officers accused of covering-up the incident suggests that the military saw
My Lai as an aberration. Two separate sets of formal charges were brought against
twenty-six men. The first group of men was charged with either murder or assault with
the intent to commit murder. The second group of men was charged with the cover-up
that followed the operation in the field at My Lai (4).
Three officers and nine enlisted men were charged with murder or assault with the
intent to commit murder for their acfions in the hamlet of My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968.
Of these initial twelve men, the military courts only found one. Lieutenant William
Calley, guilty. All of the others were either acquitted or had the charges against them
dropped. Murder charges were dropped before trial at Fort McPherson against Sergeant
Esequiel Torres, Corporal Kenneth Schiel, Specialist Fourth Class William Doherty,
Specialist Robert W. T'Souvas, Private Max D. Hutson, and Private Gerald A. Smith. An
assault charge was also dismissed against Sergeant Kenneth L. Hodges (Hersh, Cover-Up
255). Five men were tried before the military courts and four were acquitted. Captain
Eugene Kotouc was acquitted of a maiming charge at Fort McPherson (his earlier assault
charges had already been dropped), and Sergeants Charles E. Hutto and David Mitchell
were acquitted of assault with the intent to kill charges. Captain Ernest Medina, the
commander of Charlie Company and the man who, by some accounts. ga\e the orders to
kill everyone in My Lai (4), was found not guilty on September 22. 1971 of premeditated
murder, involuntary manslaughter, and two counts of assault after his August 1971 trial at
Fort McPherson (Hersh, Cover-Up 255).
The only man to be found guilty of murder. Lieutenant William Calley. was
brought to trial at Fort Benning Georgia. Unlike the secrecy that shrouded the Peers
Panel Invesfigation, Galley's trial was well publicized throughout the country, creating a
division among many Americans. A substantial portion of the adult population believed
that either Calley was simply a scapegoat for a much larger problem or that his actions in
My Lai (4) were completely justified. Another portion of the population abhorred
Lieutenant Galley's actions and thought he should be punished to the maximum extent of
the law (Hersh, MY LAI 4 151-170). Even though Calley was found guilty of the murder
of at least 109 Vietnamese civilians, he served only three years under confinement, most
of which was house arrest with visitation rights for his girlfriend of the time. Most likely
due to the tremendous backlash the American public unleashed after Galley's conviction
and sentencing to life in prison. President Richard Nixon granted William Calley a full
pardon after only three years of his sentence had been served (Gershen 116-127).
The second group indicted for their role in the incident at My Lai (4) were the
fourteen officers charged with the cover-up of the massacre. These fourteen officers'
charges were reviewed by the commanding general of the P' Army, Lieutenant General
Jonathon O. Seaman, a West Point graduate and a former division commander in
Vietnam. General Seaman's assignment in these cases was to decide whether or not the
evidence against each officer warranted an Article 32 hearing, the military equivalent to a
grand jury hearing (Hersh, Cover-Up 256).
Despite conflicting testimony. Seaman dismissed all charges against General
Young, Colonel Parson, and Major McKnight on June 23, 1970. In these three cases.
Seaman reasoned that the evidence did not support the charges. On July 28, 1970,
General Seaman dismissed the cover-up charges against two other officers, Colonel
Robert Luper and Captain Kenneth Boatman, and he announced that seven of the
remaining officers would face Article 32 hearings. Of the seven who were to face the
next stage of hearings. General Koster, Colonel Henderson, Lieutenant Colonels William
Guinn and David Gavin, Majors Charles Calhoun and Frederic Watke, and Captain
Dennis Johnson, only one would be tried by a general court-martial (Hersh, Cover-Up
259).
On January 6, 1971, General Seaman dismissed charges "because of insufficient
evidence" against Guinn, Gavin, Calhoun, and Watke. Twenty-two days later he also
dropped the charges "in the interest of justice" against General Koster. At the time of
this announcement, there was practically no public indignation over the Army's decision
to drop charges against the most senior officer involved in the My Lai Massacre. Most of
the American press treated the story as a one-day piece. Only one Congressman, Samuel
S. Stratton, challenged the decision to drop the charges against Koster, calling it a "grave
miscarriage of military justice." Congressman Stratton argued that dropping the charges
20
against the top officer responsible in this situation would once again raise the question of
a "military whitewash." (Hersh, Cover-Up 260-263).
On February 26, 1971 General Seaman announced that Colonel Oran Henderson
would be tried by a general court-martial for his role in the cover-up of My Lai.
Although he had been the officer who tried to order Medina to return to My Lai and
investigate. Colonel Henderson never reported the massacre to his superiors. Thus
Henderson became the only officer out of the original fourteen to be charged that was
required to face a court-martial. Colonel Henderson's trial became mired in technical
disputes regarding the validity of the colonel's testimony before the Peer's Panel. On
December 17, 1971, Henderson was found not guilty of the cover-up charges (Hersh,
Cover-Up 265-267).
After the investigations and trials were over, the military examined the Law of
War (LOW) training provided to soldiers in training? unfortunately, there was no clear-
cut answer that would deter war crimes of the magnitude of My Lai in the future.
Changing the military's policy of teaching LOW was very difficult. LOW was already
taught on a semi-annual basis. All recruits and officer candidates received an hour or two
of LOW instruction in training. Dr. Gary Solis, a law professor with expertise in U.S.
war crimes at West Point, poses the question: Where could the military take their LOW
training from there?
But what was there to do? Increase the hours? Make a higher-ranking officer give the instruction? It was already required, there was already DOD [Department of Defense] and DA [Department of the Army] orders on the subject, as well as (in Vietnam) MACV and subordinate orders. There wasn't much more to be done. (Solis, Personal Communication)
21
Directly after My Lai, the only change the military made was to increase the
emphasis on LOW training. "Major General Bill Suter. former Acting JAG of the Army.
now Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, told me that after My Lai, the Army taught LOW
'day and night'. But there were no changes per se" (Solis. Personal Communication).
Solis went on to explain that the primary difference between before and after My Lai was
that afterwards, the Army, at least for a while, emphasized LOW instruction more in
training.
The military did make some changes to their LOW policies soon after the My Lai
incident and later in the 1990's; however, very little change was actually implemented
(Solis, Son Thang 58). In 1996, the military brought up the issue of LOW training again.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01, dated 12 August 1996,
"Implementafion of the DOD Law of War Program" was published; however. Dr. Solis
pointed out that this merely republished an instruction (DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD
Law of War Program," 10 July 1979) that, in one form or another, had been in force for
years. Secondly, and more significantly, 18 U.S. Code 2442, the War Crimes Act of
1996, was enacted. This act provided for the punishment of U.S. civilians who violate
the LOW. "This was a glaring gap in our accountability system, because soldiers how
were discharged before their LOW crimes were discovered, as one My Lai suspect was,
were not triable by any legal authority" (Solis, Personal Communication).
22
VVAW and the Winter Soldiers Investigation
On April 15, 1967, six Vietnam veterans met at an anti-war demonstration in New
York and formed an organization to protest the Vietnam War. Vietnam Veterans Against
the War (VVAW) grew quickly in size and importance, becoming one of the leading
groups of the ami-war movement of the 1960's and 1970's. The group played an
important role in the movement by providing speakers, running newspaper ads.
publishing its own newspaper, and organizing demonstrations (Lembcke 57).
The VVAW was organized to voice the growing opposition, among servicemen
and women returning from Vietnam, to the still-raging war in Indochina, and grew
rapidly to a membership of over 30,000 throughout the United States as well as active
duty GIs stationed in Vietnam. Through ongoing actions and grassroots organization,
VVAW worked to expose an ugly side to US involvement in Southeast
(http://www.prairienet.org/vvaw/main.html/whoweare.html).
In late January and early February of 1971 VVAW convened the "Winter
Soldiers Investigation" in Detroit, Michigan. The investigation, which was conducted a
few months before Galley's criminal trial, consisted of multiple panels leading
discussions of atrocities committed by U.S. troops against the Vietnamese people.
Between January 31 and February 2, 1971 more than one hundred veterans presented
testimony to the press and the public on atrocities they either personally took part in or
witnessed. In his opening statement, William Crandell explained the origins of the term,
"Winter Soldier." The term was taken from Thomas Paine, who had dubbed the soldiers
who, in the winter of 1776, shrunk from the crisis facing the country "summer soldiers"
23
and "sunshine patriots." The term implied that the veterans speaking out against what
they had experienced in Vietnam were true patriots because they were trying to expose
something they felt was wrong (Lembcke 58).
The purpose of the Winter Soldiers Investigation was to show the public a side of
the war in Vietnam that was not reported in the American press. Veterans hoped their
testimony would enlighten people concerning the atrocities committed by American
troops against Vietnamese civilians. They were determined to show that American
involvement in cruelty, torture, and unwarranted killings was commonplace in Vietnam.
By doing this they also hoped to close the gap between the American soldiers who were
viewed in America as good, and Vietnamese people who were generally viewed by the
American public as evil and subhuman. The atrocities described by the veterans at the
Winter Soldiers Investigation ranged from general cruelty to out-right murder (Winter
Soldiers Investigation).
In his opening statement on the first day of the Winter Soldiers Investigation,
William Crandell described how VVAW interpreted the My Lai Massacre:
We intend to demonstrate that My Lai was no unusual occurrence, other than, perhaps, the number of victims killed all in one place, all at one time, all by one platoon of us. We intend to show that the policies of Americal Division, which inevitably resulted in My Lai, were the policies of other Army and Marine Divisions as well. We intend to show that war crimes in Vietnam did not start in March 1968, or in the village of Son My or with one Lieutenant William Calley. (Winter Soldiers Investigation, P' Marine Division 1-3)
With hundreds of testimonials of cruelty, torture, and attempted genocide, the Winter
Soldiers Investigation took a large step towards proving just that.
Throughout the Winter Soldiers Investigation, ex-G.I.s recalled how American
soldiers treated Vietnamese civilians and prisoners cruelly. James Duffy, of the Army's
1' Air Cavalry Division, was one of many veterans to describe the atrocities he both took
part in and witnessed while in Vietnam. At the investigation, Duffy described how
Vietnamese children would often beg for food from the American G.I.'s. Duffy
explained how the soldiers would discard the C-ration cans they did not like and then
give the expectant children cans full of extremely poisonous helicopter hydraulic fluid
(Winter Soldiers Investigation, l" Air Cavalry Division, Part II, 6). SP/4 Sam Schorr, of
the Eighty-sixth Combat Engineers Division, described how men from his unit would
throw full C-ration cans at the heads of begging children from a passing truck. Schorr
explained how many times he saw a can hit a child and split his head open, dropping the
child to the ground (Lembcke 59-60).
Rusty Sachs, a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 medivac pilot,
described throwing prisoners out of helicopters as "a big game." Sachs told how
prisoners would be blindfolded, bound at their hands and feet, and forced into the fetal
position. Upon landing, rather than allowing the prisoners to walk off the aircraft, the
American soldiers would throw them out. The men would mark how far each prisoner
was thrown and have little contests to see who could throw their prisoner the farthest
(Winter Soldiers Investigation, T' Marine Division, Part II, 3-4).
Sergeant Scott Camile of the T' Marine Division also described American
cruelty he witnessed while stationed in Vietnam. Camile recounted how he saw a
Vietnamese woman who had been shot by an American sniper asking American troops
25
for water. The soldiers ripped off her clothes, stabbed her in both breasts, then spread her
legs and shoved an entrenching tool up her vagina before finally killing her (, Winter
Soldiers Investigation, T' Marine Division, Part II, 6).
Anthony Palosaari of the Americal Division, 198'̂ Infantry Brigade, told
the audience at the Winter Soldiers Investigation of the murder of Vietnamese civilians.
During an operation in a Vietnamese village, a group of American soldiers approached a
small "hootch" with a bunker. The G.I.'s yelled down into the bunker in Vietnamese, "Is
anyone there?" Simultaneously, while yelling this, they dropped a grenade into the
bunker. Later, Palosaari looked into the bunker and saw what was left of a little boy, a
little girl, and old woman (Winter Soldiers Investigation, Americal Division, Part I 2).
Another veteran, John Beitzel witnessed the same kind of atrocities. As a Sergeant in the
Americal Division, 11'^ Brigade, Beitzel claimed he had witnessed the mutilation of
bodies, torture of prisoners, and many other forms of cruelty and murder. Beitzel
claimed that throwing grenades into civilian bunkers to obtain higher body counts was
common practice in his company. Beitzel told how once they threw a white phosphorous
grenade into a bunker and their victim stumbled out burned and screaming (Winter
Soldiers Investigation, Americal Division, Part I 2-3). Another Americal Division
soldier, SP/4 Gary Keyes, testified how men in his company routinely used the civilian
fishermen they saw for target practice. "They swung their 50-calibers around and they
just shot the shit out of them, for no reason, I guess" (Winter Soldiers Investigation,
Americal Division, Part I 6).
26
Unlike the CID and Peers Panel investigations, the Winter Soldiers Investigation
suggested that atrocities were common, even Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the
American military. When describing the throwing of prisoners from helicopters.
Lieutenant Rusty Sachs conveyed the general feeling of many who testified at the Winter
Soldiers Investigation. "The general attitude of the officers was, 'Well, there's somebody
senior to me here and 1 guess if this wasn't SOP he'd be doing something to stop it,' and
since nobody senior ever did anything to stop it, the policy was promulgated and
everybody assumed that this was what was right" (Winter Soldiers Investigation, T'
Marine Division, Part II 4). James Duffy also described this attitude. "This was common
policy. Kill anything you want to kill, any fime you want to kill it, just don't get caught"
(Winter Soldiers Investigation, 1̂ ' Air Cavalry Division, Part II 6).
Unfortunately, the Winter Soldiers Investigation was virtually ignored by the
American press. Numerous people, including many members of the press, did not
believe that the veterans who testified at the Winter Soldiers Investigation were really
veterans (Lembcke 62). Moreover, the press tended to ignore many of the actions the
veterans took in the anfi-war movement of the sixdes and seventies. The press either
ignored or called the veterans "phonies" when two thousand Vietnam veterans converged
on Washington D.C. in April 1971 to protest. In numerous newspaper articles, the
veterans' authenticity was questioned and, in some cases, so was their manhood.
Echoing these statements, on May 14, Vice President Agnew said, "I don't know how to
describe them, but I heard one of them say to the other: 'If you're captured by the enemy.
27
give only your name, age, and the telephone number of your hairdresser'" (Lembcke 98-
99).
The main assessment of the veterans who testified at the Winter Soldiers
Investigations was that atrocities such as My Lai were examples of how U.S. policy was
routinely aimed at destroying Vietnamese civilians. The men who testified at the Winter
Soldiers Investigations saw the My Lai Massacre as a logical extension of U.S. policy in
Vietnam.
Aside from the Winter Soldiers Investigation, the anti-war position articulated by
the VVAW first pointed to other related atrocities that occurred in Vietnam to show My
Lai was not an aberration, but an extension of policy. At the same time that Charlie
Company was destroying My Lai (4), Bravo Company, also of Task Force Barker,
assaulted the nearby hamlet of My Khe (4). The soldiers of Bravo Company killed
civilians, burned homes, and killed livestock in My Khe (4) in much the same fashion
that the men of Charlie Company destroyed My Lai (4). Survivors of the attack told
army investigators that the G.I.'s killed at least ninety civilians; however, one ex-G.l.,
who was personally keeping count that day, remembered 155 civilians had been killed
(Hersh, Cover-Up 9-25). In 1965, in the village of Son Thang, a unit of Marines killed
about thirty civilians and burned their village down (Solis, Son Thang 4-14). These
events are examples of what some ex-G.I.'s, like many of those who testified at the
Winter Soldiers Investigation, claim happened all the time in Vietnam. Colonel Oran
Henderson, one of those who was charged with covering-up the events at My Lai,
28
explained this idea to reporters covering his court-martial. "Every unit of brigade size
has its My Lai hidden someplace" (Zinn, 479).
The veterans of the VVAW felt that, although few massacres of the magnitude of
My Lai were publicized, this was not the point. These veterans felt that there was
evidence that the everyday actions of the military created a general pattern of brutality.
An example of this concept would be the bombing campaigns the U.S. conducted against
both North and South Vietnam. New varieties of bombs were dropped by the U.S.
military in Vietnam that were devastatingly cruel in many anti-war protestors' eyes. For
example, cluster bombs that released 180,000 fleshettes, "daisy-cutters" that cut
everything in their path down to a few inches, and napalm and white phosphorous that
burned everything they touched were all seen as exceedingly cruel by VVAW veterans
(Young 191).
From this viewpoint, the My Lai Massacre was not an aberration, but a result of a
general policy of brutality and cruelty. The VVAW argued that atrocities such as My Lai
were inevitable.
29
CHAPTER IV
ASSESSMENT
Why the Massacre Happened
Nothing about the Vietnam War can be viewed as simply "black and white".
There are many different issues that must be addressed in an explanation of the My Lai
Massacre. Scholars such as Seymour Hersh, Marilyn Young, and Neil Sheehan point to
terms such as "search and destroy" and "free fire zone," Charlie Company's history, and
the lowering of officer standards in order to explain why My Lai happened. What
occurred in My Lai was an extreme extension of the way the U.S. fought the Vietnam
War. The magnitude of the incident definitely makes it an aberration; however, the
policies of the military and attitudes of many of the soldiers made an atrocity like My Lai
virtually inevitable.
The orders given to the men who fought in Vietnam could have had a hand in the
chaos that ensued. "Search and Destroy", a very ambiguous term, had a different
meaning for almost every soldier who heard it. Lawrence LaCroix, a private in Charlie
Company, explained that he thought the "search and destroy" order meant to destroy
anything that offers resistance; he elaborated that if a 99 year old man or even a small
child was a threat then they would be shot (LaCroix File, Vietnam Archive). Other
members of Charlie Company understood Medina's order to "search and destroy" as a
revenge mission for all the men the company had recently lost to booby traps and mines
(Hersh, MY LAI 4 40-42).
30
The term, "Free Fire Zone," is another designation that might have led to the
numerous civilian deaths in My Lai (4) on March 16, 1968. An area was designated as a
"Free Fire Zone" when it was determined to have an especially strong presence of NLF.
After the civilians had been warned and forced to move out, the area was opened to
unrestricted hostility from the American and ARVN forces. Any civilians still in the area
after this warning were considered to be either NLF or NLF supporters. The primary
problem with this concept is that many times civilians stayed in the area regardless of
their political conviction and were thus subjected to unrestricted fire from American
soldiers. Vietnamese civilians often felt like they had the right to stay on their ancestral
lands and were put in great danger for this decision. According to U.S. Army policy,
populated towns and villages cleared of all civilians before being designated a "free-fire
zone," and anyone left inside a village designated a "free-fire zone" was there at their
own risk. Therefore, many of the men of Charlie Company did not expect to encounter
civilians, only the enemy NLF.
The history of Charlie Company itself illustrates another problem, that of poor
training and inexperience. The men of Charlie Company were inexperienced and most
were fresh out of the draft while the officers were young and untested. In training, the
men of Charlie Company were considered by their superiors to be a bad company
because, overall, the men lacked discipline and were slow to learn. Once in combat in
Vietnam, casualties from minefields, booby traps, and snipers devastated the company.
These invisible enemies made frustration rise in the men of Charlie Company until a
31
release was inevitable. That frustration was released on the inhabitants of My Lai
(Gershen 94-109).
The lowering of officer standards in the U.S. military during the Vietnam War
also helps explain why My Lai happened. At the beginning of the war, the military was
able to pick its officers from a long list of candidates. This depth gave the military the
ability to only select the best applicants to become officers. However, after a few years
of heavy casualties, the military was forced to lower its requirements for becoming an
officer in order to maintain the needed number of officers. Officer standards were also
lowered because many educated young men were able to avoid the draft by attending
college or through political connections. Lieutenant William Calley, a college dropout
with litUe to no leadership skills was a perfect example of these lower standards. Military
analysts claim that Calley would have been denied had his application been reviewed a
few years earlier. Companies with poor leadership, as many argued My Lai to be, were
more susceptible to breakdowns in order, such as the My Lai Massacre.
Neal Sheehan, a reporter and critic of the Vietnam War, sums up why atrocities
such as the My Lai Massacre happened in his book, A Bright Shining Lie, by describing
how U.S. policy made it easier for American troops to kill Vietnamese people with little
or no thought.
The value of Vietnamese life was systematically cheapened in [the American soldier's] mind. Further brutalized by the cycle of meaningless violence that was Westmoreland's war of attrition, and full of hatred because his comrades were so often killed and wounded by mines and booby traps set by local guerrillas and the peasants that helped them, he naturally came to see all Vietnamese of the countryside as vermin to be exterminated. The massacre at Son My was inevitable. The military leaders of the United States, and the civilian leaders who permitted the
32
generals to wage war as they did, had made the massacre inevitable. (Sheehan 689-690)
Why the Cover-Up Happened
There are many different possible explanations tor the cover-up of the events that
unfolded at the small hamlet on March 16, 1968. The two broadest reasons have to do
with the political climate of the 60's and early 70's in Vietnam and the United States as
well as the policies with which the U.S. military promoted its officers. First of all, the
embarrassment and exposure brought about by the Tet Offensive of 1968 led President
Johnson to look for an "honorable" way out of Vietnam. Back in the United States and
the antiwar movement was growing more vocal. These overall conditions made it
important to high-ranking military officials that the war effort seem as positive and
successful as possible. A negative event, such as what eventually leaked out of My Lai.
was to be avoided because of the terrible publicity it could bring the U.S. government and
military. Secondly, career officers in the U.S. Army were very hesitant to report a
potenfial war crime because it would effectively halt promotion (Olsen and Roberts 113).
There was, in effect, a double standard that told officers to report offenses such as My
Lai, but at the same time to never report an incident that would bring bad press to the
military.
More specifically, the policies of the Americal Division and the 11'̂ Brigade help
explain the cover-up of the incident that occurred at My Lai (4). Of these, the Americal's
policies were the most vague but also the most far-reaching. The Americal Division
followed the same broad policies of the rest of Westmoreland's Army in 1968 Vietnam:
33
"body count" and "kill rafio." Both of the these policies stated that the way to win the
war in Vietnam was to fight a war of attrition, making sure that the number of enemy
killed was always substantially higher than the number of Americans killed. These
military-wide policies, in turn, led the Americal Division to "look the other way" when
civilians were killed because it raised the body count and made the kill ratio more
favorable for the American war effort. Lieutenant Colonel Warren J. Lucas, the Americal
Division Provost Marshal (chief law enforcement officer) was responsible for
investigating all crime related to the Americal Division. He later claimed in an interview
that murder was never one of the war crimes he investigated. Lucas explained that he
might investigate the mistreatment of civilians or perhaps an unwarranted village
burning, but never any murders. Lucas said he would hear rumors of murder from the
field but the officer in charge of the operation would declare them "a combat action"
before any investigation could take place. This policy of choosing a high body count
over conducting war crimes investigations for murder was instrumental in what would
happen after My Lai (Hersh, Cover-Up 34-35). As commander of the Americal Division,
Major General Samuel Koster could have court-martialed some violators of international
law for their crimes. This might have successfully limited the number of such violations;
however, it also would have signaled to Americal Division's superiors that such
infractions of law did occur.
The officers of the 11' Brigade followed the same type of policies as their
superiors from Americal Division headquarters. The commander of the 11"' Brigade,
Colonel Henderson, emphasized body count over all else. Competition for enemy kills
34
was constant among the battalions and companies of the 11"' Brigade. Because of this
heavy competition and the fru.strafion of trying to disfinguish civilians from guerrillas, the
murder of civilians was common throughout all battalions of the brigade (Hersh. Cover-
Up 46). "We killed people just for the sake of killing," said William Bezanson, who
served in the Brigade at the time of My Lai. "Guys would come out waving a pass and
we'd just waste them" (Hersh, Cover-Up 37). Filing a formal complaint again.st war
crimes such as these would have been difficult because of how accepted the actions were
for the 11' Brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Herbert, who emerged in public in
1971 for filing charges against his superior officers for alleged war crimes, compared the
filing of a formal war crime charge to ". . .one of the gunmen calling up the head of the
Mafia and saying, 'Hey, tomorrow lets all go to the police'" (Hersh, Cover-Up 35-40).
Both the My Lai Massacre and the cover-up that followed were extreme, but they
were not aberrations. American policies, training, attitudes, and morals all led to
atrocities such as My Lai. My Lai's extreme nature garnered it massive amounts of
attention and public debate, but it was only an extreme example of what many G.I.'s and
military analysts claim happened everyday in Vietnam. "In U.S. infantry units in South
Vietnam, such acts were not unusual. Generals will deny it, colonels and majors may
doubt it, but any captain or lieutenant and any enlisted infantryman who was there will
confirm it. That's just the way it was, not in the best led units, but in most" (Solis. Son
Thang 13-14).
35
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Solis, Gary D. Son Thang. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997
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37