A Radical Right-Wing Failure in Canada:
The People's Party in the 2019 Federal Election
By
Charles R. Buck
A Thesis
Presented to
The University of Guelph
In partial fulfillment of requirements for
the degree of
Bachelor of Arts
In
Political Science
Guelph, Ontario, Canada
© Charles R. Buck, December, 2019
ABSTRACT
A Radical Right-Wing Failure in Canada:
The People's Party in the 2019 Federal Election
Charles R. Buck Advisor:
University of Guelph, 2019 Dr. Edward Koning
This thesis is an investigation into why Maxime Bernier’s People’s Party of Canada
(PPC), a radical right-wing party (RRP), failed to succeed in the 2019 Canadian federal election.
Canada has not witnessed the electoral breakthrough of such a party. I argue the failure of the
PPC was the result of a mixture of supply- and demand-side variables including the electoral
system, grand governing coalitions, national traditions, the stabilization of immigrant inflows,
and the softening of anti-immigrant sentiment. Other, more favourable conditions for the PPC,
including strong party organization and leadership, extensive media coverage, and increasing
support for populist and moderate authoritarian sentiment, may have been necessary, but were
not sufficient alone to allow for an RRP breakthrough. RRPs are unlikely to succeed in Canada
as long as particular institutional constraints continue to exist, the immigration rate remains
predictable, and Canadians continue to hold favourable views towards immigrants.
iii
Acknowledgements
A number of individuals were essential to the successful completion of this work. I’d like to
humbly offer my thanks to them.
First, I’d like to thank Dr. Edward Koning for his supervision over this project. His support,
guidance, and feedback were invaluable to its success. Throughout this entire process, Dr.
Koning stimulated my intellectual growth through the many discussions, memos, and comments
he provided me. His limitless availability, openness to academic inquiry, superb mastery of
research methods, and expert knowledge of anti-immigrant parties contributed immensely to the
success of this project. It has been a wonderful experience working with Dr. Koning and I am
grateful that he afforded me that opportunity.
Second, I’d like to thank Dr. Tamara Small for reading this thesis and challenging me during the
defence. Her feedback was fair and thoughtful, and her in-depth knowledge of Canadian politics
made her well suited to assess the quality of this work.
Third, I am extremely grateful to the University of Guelph and the individuals and groups
attached to it. From Writing Services to Accessibility Services to the McLaughlin Library to the
Department of Political Science as a whole, I could not ask for a better learning environment or a
more professional and knowledgeable staff.
Lastly, my family has been indispensable to the success of this paper. I’d like to thank my
grandparents Oma and Grandpa, Aunts Cathy and Margie, and my sisters Sophie and Emma, for
showing such an interest in my work and providing me with such excellent feedback. Most of all,
I’d like to thank my parents, Cathy, Dad, and Mom, for their unending support of me. Without
the many discussions we have had about politics and current events, to the outstanding editing
help they have provided in this work and every other work I have written, I would be half the
man I am today.
iv
Table of Content
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
Table of Content iv
1. Introduction 1
2. What Makes a Party Radical Right-Wing? 4
3. Literature Review 6
3.1 Country-level Socio-economic Hypotheses 10
3.2 Country-level Socio-political Hypotheses 13
3.3 Intra-party Hypotheses 18
3.4 Individual-level Demographic Hypotheses 19
3.5 Individual-level Attitudinal Hypotheses 22
4. Hypotheses 25
5. Methodology 28
6. The Context of the 2019 Canadian Election 31
7. The People’s Party of Canada 36
7.1 Radicalism 36
7.2 Nativism 38
7.3 Authoritarianism 40
7.4 Populism 44
7.5 RRP Subtype 46
8. Fertile Ground for RRP Success? 48
8.1 Immigration Levels 49
8.2 Media Coverage of the PPC and Immigration Issues 53
8.3 Anti-immigrant, Populism, and Authoritarian Public Opinion 56
9. Conclusion 63
10. Works Cited 70
1
1. Introduction
The electoral support of radical right-wing parties (RRPs) has risen dramatically over the
last few decades.1 This trend is particularly acute in Western Europe. So far, Canada has been
one of the few industrialized liberal democracies that has not seen the establishment of a
successful RRP.2 Following his resignation from the Conservative Party of Canada, Maxime
Bernier formed the People’s Party of Canada (PPC), a party that seems to resemble an RRP.
Many spectators, media outlets, and government bodies took this fledgling party seriously, such
as the Leaders’ Debates Commission, who invited Bernier to debate the other five leaders of
Canada’s major parties. The party nominated candidates in 93% of Canada’s ridings and set up
electoral district associations in all but one of them (Elections Canada 2019; PPC: Our
Candidates 2019). The party also boasted of its tens of thousands of party members and its well
over a million dollars in fundraising (Bernier 2019a: 6; Bernier 2019d: 2; Taghva 2019). Yet, the
PPC performed poorly in 2019, winning zero seats and taking only 1.64% of the popular vote. Is
the PPC an RRP? Why did it fail in Canada’s 2019 election, in contrast to so many RRPs in
Europe, and despite the anticipation of so many political observers? My research has attempted
to answer these questions by investigating the viability of RRPs in Canada in general, and
Bernier’s People’s Party and its failure in the 2019 federal election in particular.
1 For example, see Adams 2017: 17-41 for a good overview of this trend.
2 There is some disagreement over whether the Reform Party of Canada and the Canadian
Reform Conservative Alliance qualified as RRPs. However, most academics seem to agree that
they are better described as right-wing parties that ran on mild anti-multicultural, anti-immigrant,
and populist platforms (see Dobbin 1991: 135-136, 168-170; Flanagan 2009: x, 15, 32-33, 68-69,
125, 197-199; Gidengil et al. 2001: 509; Gordon et al. 2019: 4; Koning 2019: 62, 136-139;
Nevitte et al. 1998; Norris 2005: 70-71; Trebilcock 2018: 843)
2
This paper has found that the PPC is an RRP, of a neo-liberal xenophobic kind, and its
failure in 2019 is the result of a combination of historical supply-side barriers and contemporary
demand-side trends. At first, the failure of the PPC may seem surprising given the number of
factors that worked in its favour. These included a robust party organization and leadership, the
PPC’s non-extreme, albeit neo-liberal ideology, extensive media coverage, and increasing
support for populist and moderate authoritarian views. Yet, a peculiar blend of circumstances
amounted to a resounding defeat of the PPC. Canada’s electoral system, lack of grand governing
coalitions, and national traditions were part of that blend, and all posed significant entrenched
supply-side challenges to this new, aspiring RRP. The single-member-plurality voting system
ensured that even a substantial vote total, hundreds of thousands of votes larger than any minor
party, would be inefficiently translated into seats. Bernier’s personal loss of the riding of Beauce
makes this factor all the more relevant to the PPC’s failure. The absence of grand governing
coalitions in Canada’s federal government, now and in the past, also contributed to the PPC’s
failure by undermining its populist credentials. Canada’s adversarial two-and-a-half-party
system, with frequent switches from Liberal to Conservative governments and vice versa,
weakened the PPC’s claim as the only true alternative. The national traditions of Canada were
also disadvantageous to the PPC’s prospects. The PPC’s xenophobic platform fits uneasily with
Canada’s emphasis on tolerance, diversity, internationalism, and immigration. Significantly, the
lack of far-right groups in Canada and the suppression of their messages have resulted in little
congruence between the PPC and Canadian political culture as well.
Turning to contemporary demand-side variables, the immigration rate, the change in that
rate, and anti-immigrant sentiment have all amounted to decreasing demand for the PPC in 2019.
In recent years, immigration to Canada has slowly increased. Yet, as a proportion of the total
3
Canadian population, immigration levels have not been particularly high, at least relative to
historical standards. Furthermore, the change in immigration has remained stable. Generations
ago, the immigration rate fluctuated wildly from year to year, dramatically increasing and
decreasing in short periods of time. Since the late 1980s, these changes have levelled off and the
substantial jumps or drops in the rate no longer occur. Finally, anti-immigrant sentiment in
Canada has softened since the 1990s. Canadians are now more pro-immigrant than they were
several decades ago. As a result of these trends, 2019 has seen little demand for the nativist
ideology of the PPC. In summary, the PPC failed in 2019 because of a mixture of both
institutionalized characteristics of the Canadian political process, stymying the supply of the
PPC, and modern shifts concerning immigration, dampening the demand for the PPC.
This project and its results have filled a geographical and empirical gap in the literature
by performing a contemporary and systematic study of variables that could explain the failure of
the PPC in Canada. I have done this by first, establishing what an RRP is and outlining the four
core components that make up its ideology. Next, the expansive body of research into RRP
success is discussed and used to compare the experiences of European RRPs with that of the
PPC. From that review, a series of hypotheses were formulated and methodologies to test them
were devised, which, once tested, helped explain the PPC’s failure. A general overview of the
Canadian context in 2019 is presented as well as an examination of the more stable variables that
affect RRP success and that make up that context. The PPC’s platform is studied qualitatively to
determine whether it is an RRP and what ideological subtype it belongs to. A quantitative
analysis, exploring whether the conditions in Canada in 2019 were ripe for RRP success,
finalizes the analysis. These last three sections showed that many variables both helped and
4
hindered the PPC. Holistically, these variables combined to prevent the PPC from breaking
through in Canada.
2. What Makes a Party Radical Right-Wing?
Despite a plethora of research into the topic, scholars do not seem to agree on a consistent
label or definition to describe RRPs.3 RRPs differ on a great many issues, such as the role of
government in the economy or in the private lives of individuals. Many of them also have
evolving or vague ideologies which makes it all the more difficult to pinpoint them on the
ideological spectrum (Kestila and Soderlund 2007: 558; Rovny and Polk 2019: 2-3).4 Despite
this diversity and elasticity, RRPs are usually characterized by four central principles: radicalism,
nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.
The first and most integral of these is radicalism, defined by Mudde (2010: 2) as
opposition to liberal democracy. Rydgren (2007: 243) states that, although new RRPs do not
usually openly oppose democracy in principle, they do aggressively attack how it is currently
practiced, especially regarding existing power structures and the protection of minorities. As a
result, although only some RRPs (such as neo-Nazi or neo-fascist variants) are extremist in that
3 These parties have been variously labelled a wide variety of terms. For this investigation, I will
consistently label this party family as radical right-wing.
4 In recent years many of these parties have changed their platforms in four directions. Anti-
Semitism has often been replaced by hostility towards Muslims. Some RRPs have emphasized
women’s rights, individualism, and liberty in contrast to their authoritarian roots (Muis and
Immerzeel 2017: 916). Adherence to biological racism, the belief that ethnic or racial groups are
unequal and should not co-exist with one another, has recently been often moderated and
replaced by a more nuanced cultural racism, the belief that cultures are ostensibly equal but
incompatible with one another (Arzheimer 2018: 147; Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 916). Finally,
since the 1990s, many of these parties have shifted away from neo-liberal policies towards
welfare chauvinism, trade protectionism, and increased state intervention (De Lange 2007;
Golder 2016: 479; Rovny and Polk 2019; Rooduijn 2015).
5
they want to overthrow the existing system entirely, all RRPs are at least radical because they
advocate a fundamental change to the existing liberal democratic state and its long-standing and
entrenched policies. The change RRPs promote is usually connected to some idealized past (Betz
1998; Carter 2005; Carter 2018; Givens 2005; Hainsworth 2000; Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2002;
Rydgren 2018).
Nativism, the second component of an RRP’s ideological makeup, is rooted in a belief
that natives of a nation are innately superior and should be given more rights and benefits than
immigrants, and anyone else considered ‘the other.’ Nativists see outside elements as inherently
threatening to local cultures and traditions and hence object to protections of non-natives.
Nativist sentiment is, therefore, often manifested in an aversion to immigrants, refugees, racial
minorities, and international organizations (Betz 1998; Carter 2018; Gordon et al. 2019; Givens
2005; Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 2002; Mudde 2010; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; O’Malley 2008;
Rooduijn 2015).
Third, RRPs tend to promote an authoritarian agenda that emphasizes order, tradition,
retribution, and conformity. Consequently, many RRPs take a strict ‘law-and-order’ approach to
criminality and defer to authority within a rigid hierarchy. Fundamentally, what makes RRPs
right-wing is their authoritarian belief that humans are naturally unequal and that some are better
suited to lead than others. RRP’s take a range of positions regarding equality on socio-economic
matters (Rovny 2013), some advocating right-libertarianism, economically anti-egalitarian for
all, while others favour welfare chauvinism, economically egalitarian for some. However, all
RRPs share anti-egalitarian beliefs within the socio-cultural dimension because they all rank
cultures hierarchically (Carter 2018; Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 2002; Mudde 2010; Muis and
Immerzeel 2017; O’Malley 2008; Rooduijn 2015; Rydgren 2018).
6
Populism is the fourth common characteristic of RRPs. Populists dichotomize society
into two groups: a pure and honest majority, and a powerful corrupt elite. They harness this
division by attacking the elite, which is composed, according to them, of traditional parties,
multinational corporations, bankers, academics, the mainstream media, government bureaucracy,
supranational entities, and cosmopolitan professionals. Hence, RRPs are highly skeptical of
organizations or individuals perceived to be associated with these groups. RRPs advocate the
ceding of power from these elite groups to the people through a variety of mechanisms, such as
majority rule, direct democracy, constitutional reform, the weakening of the courts and the rule
of law, and the ending of corporate subsidies (Betz 1998; Givens 2005; Hainsworth 2000; Lacey
2019; Mudde 2004; Mupdde 2010; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; O’Malley 2008; Rooduijn 2015;
Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2018).
3. Literature Review
The existing literature concerned with the electoral success of RRPs is vast. The
following review of this literature discusses five sets of explanations: country-level socio-
economic, country-level socio-political, intra-party, individual-level demographic, and
individual-level attitudinal hypotheses. Table 1 summarizes a review of 79 of some of the most
cited and recent journal articles and books in the literature on RRP success. While not
comprehensive, this table provides a broad overview of the key variables that are usually
investigated in studies of RRP success.
Table 1: Review of scholarly findings on RRP success
Hypothesis Supportive findings Unsupportive findings
Country-level socio-economic hypotheses
7
Higher unemployment
levels increase RRP
support
Arzheimer (2009), Funke et al. (2016),
Georgiadou et al. (2018), Jackman and
Volpert (1996), Lubbers and Scheepers
(2000), Rooduijn (2015)
Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Amengay and
Stockemer (2019), Arzheimer and Carter
(2006), Coffe et al. (2007), Givens (2005),
Golder (2016), Kestila and Soderlund (2007),
Knigge (1998), Lubbers and Coenders (2017),
Lubbers et al. (2002), Rydgren (2007),
Stockemer (2017a), Stockemer (2017b)
Higher levels of
immigration and
asylum seekers
increase RRP support
Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer (2018), Davis
and Deole (2017), Dinas et al. (2019),
Georgiadou et al. (2018), Kestila and
Soderlund (2007), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et
al. (2002), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000),
Rooduijn (2015), Rydgren (2007)
Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Amengay and
Stockemer (2019), Coffe et al. (2007), De Vos
and Deurloo (1999), Givens (2005), Goerres et
al. (2018), Kitschelt and McGann (1995),
Stockemer (2017b)
Higher levels of crime
increase RRP support
Amengay and Stockemer (2019) Coffe et al. (2007)
Country-level socio-political hypotheses
The presence of an
electoral niche
increases RRP support
Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015), Arzheimer
and Carter (2006), Backes and Mudde
(2000), Bustikova (2014), Carter (2005),
Kestila and Soderlund (2007), Kitschelt
(2007), Kitschelt and McGann (1995),
Loxbo (2014), Rooduijn (2015), Ryan
(2016), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007),
Startin (2014)
Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Amengay and
Stockemer (2019), Arzheimer and Carter
(2006), Down and Han (2019), Ignazi (1992),
Lubbers et al. (2002), O’Malley (2008), Muis
and Immerzeel (2017)
Higher turnout
increases RRP support
Amengay and Stockemer (2019), Kestila and
Soderlund (2007)
Electoral volatility
increases RRP support
Betz (1994), Rydgren (2002), Van Der Meer
et al. (2012)
Permissive electoral
systems increase RRP
support
Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015), Amengay
and Stockemer (2019), Arzheimer (2018),
Backes and Mudde (2000), Gordon et al.
(2019), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Kestila
and Soderlund (2007), Kriesi et al. (2006)
Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Arzheimer and
Carter (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Givens
(2005), Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Muis and
Immerzeel (2017), Rydgren (2007)
National traditions
favourable to RRPs
increase RRP support
Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Art (2008),
Backes and Mudde (2000), Startin (2014)
Muis and Immerzeel (2017)
8
Media coverage of
RRPs and their issues
increase RRP support
Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer (2018),
Backes and Mudde (2000), Berning et al.
(2019), Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart
(2007), Muis and Immerzeel (2017), Murphy
and Devine (2018), Kriesi et al. (2006),
Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007), Rydgren
(2018), Spies (2013), Startin (2014)
Intra-party hypotheses
More moderate RRP
platform increases
RRP support
Arzheimer (2018), Carter (2005), Golder
(2016), Lubbers et al. (2002), Muis and
Immerzeel (2017), Rooduijn (2015),
Rydgren (2002)
Mudde (2002)
Better organization
and leadership
increase RRP support
Art (2008), Carter (2005), Cutts et al. (2017),
Ellinas (2014), Koning (n.d.), Loxbo and
Bolin (2016), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mudde
(2010), Muis and Immerzeel (2017),
Rooduijn (2015), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren
(2007), Startin (2014)
Arzheimer (2018)
Previous success
increases RRP support
Amengay and Stockemer (2019), Koning
(n.d.)
Individual-level demographic hypotheses
Economically insecure
individuals are more
likely to support RRPs
Arzheimer (2009), Cochrane and Nevitte
(2007); Ellinas (2014), Georgiadou et al.
(2018), Han (2016), Hooghe and Marks
(2018), Im et al. (2019), Kates and Tucker
(2019), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Minkenberg (2000), Rooduijn (2015)
Amengay and Stockemer (2019), Goerres et al.
(2018), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jackman and Volpert
(1996), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Nevitte
et al. (1998), Rydgren (2007), Stockemer et al.
(2018), Turnbull-Dugarte (2019)
Male individuals are
more likely to support
RRPs
Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Berning
(2019), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Givens
(2005), Goerres et al. (2018), Kitschelt and
McGann (1995), Lubbers and Coenders
(2017), Lubbers et al. (2002), Nevitte et al.
(1998), Rydgren (2007), Stockemer et al.
(2018)
Oesch (2008)
Young individuals are
more likely to support
RRPs
Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Berning
(2019), Arzheimer and Carter (2006),
Lubbers and Coenders (2017), Lubbers et al.
(2002), Muis and Immerzeel (2017)
Givens (2005), Goerres et al. (2018), Jackman
and Volpert (1996), Lubbers and Scheepers
(2000), Oesch (2008), Stockemer et al. (2018)
9
Manual labourers are
more likely to support
RRPs
Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter
(2006), Betz (1994), Givens (2005),
Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Lubbers and
Coenders (2017), Lubbers et al. (2002),
Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Minkenberg
(2000), Rydgren (2007)
Arzheimer and Berning (2019), Ellinas (2014),
Goerres et al. (2018), Jackman and Volpert
(1996), Oesch (2008), Stockemer et al. (2018)
Less educated
individuals are more
likely to support RRPs
Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Berning
(2019), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Betz
(1994), Kitschelt and McGann (1995),
Lubbers et al. (2002), Lubbers and
Scheepers (2000), Nevitte et al. (1998),
Rydgren (2007)
Givens (2005), Goerres et al. (2018), Jackman
and Volpert (1996), Muis and Immerzeel
(2017), Stockemer (2017b), Stockemer et al.
(2018)
Individual-level attitudinal hypotheses
Less support for
diversity, immigrants,
and minorities
increase RRP support
Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Arzheimer
(2008), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer
(2018), Arzheimer and Berning (2019),
Bélanger and Aarts (2006), Betz (1994),
Daigle et al. (2019), Davis et al. (2019),
Gidron and Hall (2019), Goerres et al.
(2018), Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2019),
Ignazi (1992), Ivarsflaten (2005), Ivarsflaten
(2008), Lubbers and Coenders (2017),
Lubbers et al. (2002), Minkenberg (2000),
Muis and Immerzeel (2017), Nevitte et al.
(1998), Rooduijn (2015), Rovny and Polk
(2019), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007),
Rydgren (2008), Van Der Brug et al. (2005),
Zhirkov (2014)
Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Oesch (2018),
Stockemer et al. (2018), Turnbull-Dugarte
(2019)
Less trust/satisfaction
towards democracy,
mainstream parties,
politicians,
international
organizations, and
society increase RRP
support
Arzheimer (2009), Bélanger and Aarts
(2006), Berning and Ziller (2017), Betz
(1994), Ellinas (2014), Gidengil (2001),
Gidron and Hall (2019), Goerres et al.
(2018), Ignazi (1992), Ivarsflaten (2005),
Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers
and Coenders (2017), Lubbers et al. (2002),
Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Minkenberg
(2000), Nevitte et al. (1998), Rooduijn
(2015), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007),
Zhirkov (2014)
Arzheimer (2008), Ivarsflaten (2008), Muis and
Immerzeel (2017), Oesch (2018), Stockemer et
al. (2018), Turnbull-Dugarte (2019)
Social isolation
increases RRP support
Coffe et al. (2007) Arzheimer (2018), Lubbers and Scheepers
(2000), Muis and Immerzeel (2017), Rydgren
(2007), Zhirkov (2014)
10
Individuals who
support more
authoritarian views
are more likely to
support RRPs
Ignazi (1992), Lubbers and Coenders (2017),
Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Muis and
Immerzeel (2017), Nevitte et al. (1998),
Rooduijn (2015)
Kitschelt and McGann (1995)
Individuals who
support right-wing
economic preferences
are more likely to
support RRPs
Goerres et al. (2018), Zhirkov (2014) Arzheimer (2008), Arzheimer and Berning
(2019), Ivarsflaten (2008), Kitschelt and
McGann (1995), Kriesi et al. (2006),
Minkenberg (2000), Nevitte et al. (1998),
Rovny (2013), Rovny and Polk (2019)
3.1 Country-level Socio-economic Hypotheses
First, many researchers have investigated the effect that large-scale, country-wide, socio-
economic variables have on RRP support. Using the so-called ethnic competition and
modernization losers/relative deprivation theses, some theorists argue that unemployment
increases RRP support. As unemployment increases, it heightens competition between
immigrants and natives over scarce resources. During times of economic recessions, immigrants
will be seen as competition by those looking for work in an environment with increasingly sparse
job prospects and public resources (Goerres et al. 2018: 253). Driven by frustration and
insecurity, the unemployed will vote for RRPs in the hopes of undoing economic transformations
that increased both structural unemployment and cross-border mobility (Lubbers and Scheepers
2000: 65-66). Long-lasting economic crises and high unemployment may also delegitimize and
destabilize the existing party system, providing opportunities for RRP growth. However, while a
few studies lend support for this claim (Arzheimer 2009; Funke et al. 2016; Georgiadou et al.
2018; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Rooduijn 2015), the majority of
studies find either no relationship or a negative one (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Amengay and
Stockemer 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Coffe et al. 2007; Givens 2005; Golder 2016;
Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Knigge 1998; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002;
11
Rydgren 2007; Stockemer 2017a; Stockemer 2017b). One possible reason for this is that voters
may return to more experienced and established parties during times of economic hardship
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 434-435). Golder (2016) also rejects this hypothesis because
economic crises increase the salience of socio-economic issues that weakens RRPs and divides
their voting base (488). Finally, Stockemer (2017a) finds that economic crises must be
accompanied by political ones if they are to benefit RRPs. In the same vein, Lubbers and
Scheepers (2000) find rising unemployment, in combination with increased immigration,
increases RRP support but that the rate of unemployment alone has a negative effect (82-83).
Another widely studied variable is the level of immigration and the intake of asylum
seekers. The ethnic competition thesis states that competition for resources will be greatest in
areas with high numbers of immigrants. Increasing heterogeneity through high rates of
immigration will heighten xenophobic fears and result in increased feelings of ethno-national
identity in the native population. In contrast, the contact theory argues that higher rates of
immigration will lead to greater levels of contact between natives and foreign-born individuals,
and that this contact will develop understanding and goodwill between the two and subsequently
decrease xenophobia. The literature is decidedly mixed. Several studies support the ethnic
competition thesis (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer 2018; Davis and Deole 2017; Dinas et al. 2019;
Georgiadou et al. 2018; Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers
and Scheepers 2000; Rooduijn 2015; Rydgren 2007) while several others support the contact
theory (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Givens 2015; Goerres et al.
2018; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Stockemer 2017b).
A closer look at measurements helps explain these mixed results. While some theorists
use the proportion of newcomers in their analysis of RRP success (for example Lubbers et al.
12
2002), others have looked at the rate of immigration (for example Georgiadou et al. 2018). The
majority of studies that support the ethnic competition thesis use the immigration rate to
operationalize this variable. Indeed, existing literature seems to suggest that a sudden increase in
migration accompanied by extensive media coverage can bolster the support of xenophobia and
RRPs considerably (Georgiadou et al. 2018; Hopkins 2010; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;
Rydgren 2018).
Another aspect of measurement that helps us understand these mixed findings is the
origin of immigrants. Indeed, immigrants that are distinct from the majority population on
religious and ethnic grounds receive more criticism from RRP supporters (Georres et al. 2018:
251; Rydgren 2008: 745-746). Researchers that distinguish between non-Western and Western
migrants supported the ethnic competition thesis (Coffe et al. 2007; De Vos and Deurloo 1999;
Dinas et al. 2019; Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Lubbers et al. 2002). For example, both De Vos
and Deurloo (1999) and Coffe et al. (2007) found that increases in immigration from Maghreb
countries or Turkey increased RRP support while immigration from other countries had no
effect.
A final hypothesis is that crime increases RRP support. Crime and social deviance,
especially when perpetrated by immigrants, are blamed by RRPs on the weakness of mainstream
parties and the evils of open borders. Therefore, it is argued that crime increases the demand for
RRPs - a claim which finds supportive (Amengay and Stockemer 2019) and unsupportive (Coffe
et al. 2007) results in the literature. Overall, a review of the literature finds either unsupportive
(unemployment levels) or mixed (immigration and asylum seekers and crime) results regarding
country-level, socio-economic hypotheses of RRP support.
13
3.2 Country-level Socio-political Hypotheses
A second set of hypotheses many researchers have investigated are country-level, socio-
political hypotheses that concern the political opportunity structure. First, many have argued that
RRPs do better in the presence of an electoral niche within the party system. An opening to
RRPs can develop when parties opposite to RRPs on the ideological spectrum, ethno-liberal
parties, receive concessions by governing coalitions. When members of these parties are elected
and subsequently advance minority interests, RRPs have an opportunity to position themselves
as alternatives to this “politically correct,” pluralistic “elite.” Similarly, RRPs can take advantage
of electoral space when a grand governing coalition of establishment parties forms, especially
one whose prime objective is to keep an insurgent RRP out of power. Voters will then more
likely see the RRP as the only true alternative to the “corrupt,” “arrogant” elite. A third opening
of an electoral niche occurs when mainstream parties converge ideologically to the centre of the
political spectrum, especially when these parties converge on issues salient to RRP voters. When
mainstream parties agree on issues such as immigration or multiculturalism, RRPs should be able
to more easily mobilize those voters who disagree with those positions. Issue convergence also
legitimizes and reinforces populist sentiments from RRPs as established parties become one and
the same in the minds of voters and RRPs become the only “true” alternative.
Virtually all existing studies, including Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Bustikova (2014),
Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Muis and Immerzeel (2017), and Rydgren (2007), find support for
the explanations regarding the presence of an ethno-liberal party or grand governing coalition.
Regarding ideological convergence, however, the results are mixed, with some supporting this
hypothesis (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015; Backes and Mudde 2000; Carter 2005; Kestila and
Soderlund 2007; Kitschelt 2007; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Loxbo 2014; O’Malley 2008;
14
Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015; Ryan 2016; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Startin
2014), a similar number contradicting it (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Amengay and Stockemer
2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Down and Han 2019; Ignazi 1992; Lubbers et al. 2002), and a
few finding mixed results (O’Malley 2008; Muis and Immerzeel 2017).
One reason for this inconsistent result is that convergence of different issues has different
effects. RRPs may benefit primarily from convergence in the socio-cultural dimension, socio-
economic issues having limited effect. This is because RRPs give priority to socio-cultural issues
and primarily mobilize their supporters through those issues (Mudde 2010; Rovny 2013; Rovny
and Polk 2019; Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2018). A competing explanation is that socio-economic
convergence makes issues within its dimension less salient to voters. The effect of this is to
encourage voting based instead on socio-cultural or intra-party considerations (Coffe et al. 2007:
153; Golder 2016: 486-487; Kitschelt 2007: 1185) that benefit RRPs (Coffe et al. 2007; Rovney
2013; Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2018). Conversely, a lack of consensus within the mainstream
may benefit RRPs. The reasoning here is that RRPs can easily depict a divided mainstream as
weak and fractured and present themselves as a strong and decisive alternative (Arzheimer and
Carter 2006). However, the shifting of issue space may only benefit RRPs when mainstream
parties converge to oppose their policy positions (Muis and Immerzeel 2017). Conversely,
attempts to debilitate RRPs by accommodating their stances might backfire by legitimizing their
positions, hence making them appear more electable (Down and Han 2019: 2; Eatwell 2000:
423; Golder 2016: 487; Jackman and Volpert 1996: 503-504).
A second variable in this category is electoral turnout. Some theorists argue that RRPs
get much of their support from protest voters and those dissatisfied with the system, groups
prone towards voter apathy (Kestila and Soderlund 2007: 561). As a result, higher turnout should
15
benefit RRPs more than other parties. Though rarely tested, there is little support for this
hypothesis (Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Kestila and Soderlund 2007).
Third, some theorists expect RRPs to do better under conditions of high electoral
volatility. RRPs are generally new parties or those that present themselves as fresh alternatives to
the established parties. Logically, the less loyal voters are to particular parties, the more likely
RRPs will succeed. Several studies find support for this argument (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2002;
Van Der Meer et al. 2012).
Fourth, many political scientists have examined how the mechanisms of the electoral
system influence RRP support. Many have argued that the electoral system matters, in particular,
because RRPs do better in more proportional systems. High thresholds may discourage potential
voters of RRPs because small, more fringe parties are unlikely to overcome such a barrier.
Likewise, the larger the district magnitude is, the easier it should be for RRPs to gain seats. Both
of these characteristics of the electoral system affect RRP’s chances because they both determine
how votes are translated into seats and, additionally, induce a psychological effect in the minds
of voters by determining whether a vote is “wasted” or not. Many studies support the proposition
that more permissive electoral systems help RRPs by more effectively converting their votes into
seats (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Givens 2005; Gordon et al. 2019; Muis and Immerzeel 2017;
Rydgren 2007). However, the majority of studies also do not find that those systems increase
RRP vote totals (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer 2018; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Givens 2005;
Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Rydgren 2007). Other studies do find
an effect (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015; Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Backes and Mudde
2000; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Kriesi et al. 2006). An
explanation for this is that RRP voters simply do not care or do not know about the consequences
16
of their country’s electoral system and, therefore, do not suffer the anticipated negative
psychological effect (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Another explanation is that many RRPs are
already well established, so their supporters no longer fear wasting votes on them (Golder 2016:
486).
A fifth explanation considers the unique history and political culture of the country in
question. According to the National Tradition thesis, the RRPs that can portray themselves in a
narrative consistent with national traditions while disavowing fascism or Nazism are far more
likely to succeed than those that run counter to the history and political culture of the country
(Startin 2014: 284). Similarly, RRPs in countries with a legacy of an active far-right subculture,
that can integrate that subculture’s movements and organizations into their own, benefit from
increased organizational strength (Art 2008). Some also argue that countries with a history of
successful multicultural policies, immigration policies, and robust hate speech laws will both
reduce the demand for RRPs and, in the case of hate speech laws, stifle their messaging. Some
theorists show support for the argument that history and political culture matter regarding the
success of RRPs (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Art 2008; Backes and Mudde 2000; Startin 2014),
while Muis and Immerzeel (2017) find mixed results. Ambrose and Mudde (2015), through a
qualitative analysis of the history of the far-right, immigration policies, and state repression in
Canada, conclude that Canada’s national traditions have something to do with the lack of a
successful RRP there. Startin (2014) compares the differing experiences of the British National
Party in the United Kingdom and the National Front (now known as the National Rally) in
France. He finds that the latter’s success is partly the result of tapping into national traditions
such as Gaullism, republicanism, and secularism. The former’s failure, in contrast, is partly
caused by its conflict with Britain’s national traditions of tolerance, deference to authority, and
17
anti-fascism. Muis and Immerzeel (2017) find inconclusive results, but find that oppressive
strategies can bolster RRP support by increasing their populist credentials and making them
appear as martyrs to their cause.
A final explanation concerns the particular media context. The mass media play an
essential role, acting as gatekeepers and taking part in agenda-setting, framing, and priming of
political issues. The media can make issues important to RRPs, such as immigration, more
salient to the voting public by increasing its coverage. Analogously, diminished focus on socio-
economic issues should deplete salience of issues unfavourable to RRPs (Rovny 2013; Rydgren
2002; Rydgren 2018). Moreover, by covering RRPs and their leaders, the media legitimizes them
and also makes them more visible to the electorate. This is especially true now, given that
sensational controversies, especially ones with a personal dimension to them, are becoming
increasingly defined as newsworthy (Golder 2016; Muis and Immerzeel 2017). This trend
uniquely bolsters RRP media coverage because those parties are both seen as more controversial
by journalists and also usually grant their leaders a conspicuous central role (Golder 2016: 488;
Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 914; Rydgren 2018). All research examined here indicates that a
media which covers RRPs, both by making certain issues more salient and by increasing the
legitimacy and visibility of RRPs, helps RRPs succeed (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer 2018;
Backes and Mudde 2000; Berning 2019; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Muis and
Immerzeel 2017; Murphy and Devine 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007;
Rydgren 2018; Spies 2013; Startin 2014). Altogether, a review of the literature shows either
unsupportive (turnout and electoral permissiveness), mixed (electoral niches), scarcely studied
(national traditions and electoral volatility), or supportive results (media) of country-level socio-
political explanations.
18
3.3 Intra-party Hypotheses
The third category of variables addresses internal party characteristics. First, many
hypothesize that those RRPs with a more moderate ideology are more acceptable to a larger
proportion of the electorate, which is largely hostile to neo-fascism. Put another way, the
platform of RRPs requires some degree of respectability if it is to be accepted by a large segment
of the population. For example, Carter (2005) found that RRPs that were either only culturally
racist or not racist at all and that demanded reform within the existing system rather than the
wholesale destruction of it performed stronger electorally than other RRPs. Most of the
examined studies indicated support for this theory (Arzheimer 2018; Carter 2005; Golder 2016;
Lubbers et al. 2002; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015).5
The second explanation in this category involves leadership and organization. In terms of
leadership, a capable and attractive leader is especially vital for RRPs for at least two reasons.
First, RRPs tend towards infighting and factionalism (Art 2008: 424; Arzheimer and Berning
2019: 8). A strong leader, able to unite various groups and maintain harmony is an invaluable
asset to this party family. Second, many RRPs are so heavily leader-centric that they cease to
exist or rapidly decline following the resignation or death of their leader (Carter 2005: 65; Van
Holsteyn 2018). As with all parties, successful RRPs also require a vanguard of loyal supporters
and activists who make up the grassroots. These party members provide manpower and financial
resources. Another section of the party organization is the quality of the candidates themselves.
Those candidates that demonstrate competence, status, and education are not only more
successful but also provide stability (Loxbo and Bolin 2016: 174). A robust and centralized party
5 Some older studies contest this conventional wisdom, but they tend to be based on very small
samples - see, for example, Cas Mudde’s 2002 comparison of five RRPs in Germany, Belgium,
and the Netherlands.
19
membership, in addition to a high degree of party discipline and a talented candidate pool, both
legitimizes the RRP in the eyes of the electorate and also streamlines messaging and strategy.
The literature seems to largely support the idea that leadership and organization are essential to
RRP success (Art 2008; Carter 2005; Cutts et al. 2017; Ellinas 2014; Koning n.d.; Loxbo and
Bolin 2016; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2010; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015;
Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Startin 2014). At the same time, it is worth paying attention to Kai
Arzheimer’s (2018) warning that many of these studies suffer from problems of endogeneity
because activists tend to join those parties that already have a reasonable prospect of success in
the first place (152).
A final variable within this category is an RRP's electoral record. Participation in
numerous elections by RRPs likely improves party organization, leads to more favourable terrain
for them by increasing the attention paid to anti-immigrant issues, and nurtures credibility of
their ideas in the minds of the electorate (Koning n.d.: 12). When a supposedly fringe party does
well at the polls, its ideas become more acceptable and its place in the political system as an
established force becomes cemented. Although rarely studied, a few scholars find support for
this hypothesis (Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Koning n.d.). In conclusion, a review of the
literature shows either supportive (ideology, leadership, and organization) or scarcely-studied
(previous success) intra-party explanations.
3.4 Individual-level Demographic Hypotheses
Another facet for explanations regarding RRP success is the individual-level
demographic characteristics of voters. Some scholars propose that economically insecure
individuals who are the losers of globalization and those in desperate financial positions will see
immigrants, trade agreements, and internationalism as a threat to their financial well-being. As a
20
result, these individuals are more favourable to the anti-immigrant and anti-globalist rhetoric of
RRPs (Rydgren 2007; Stockemer et al. 2018: 575). A number of studies found that individuals
who experienced financial insecurity had a higher likelihood of supporting RRPs (Arzheimer
2009; Cochrane and Nevitte 2007; Ellinas 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Han 2016; Hooghe and
Marks 2018; Im et al. 2019; Kates and Tucker 2019; Lubbers et al. 2002; Minkenberg 2000;
Rooduijn 2015; Kriesi et al. 2006) but others did not (Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Goerres et
al. 2018; Ivarsflaten 2008; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Nevitte et al. 1998; Stockemer et al. 2018;
Turnbull-Dugarte 2019), while Rydgren (2007) and Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) found mixed
results.
Being male was found to increase the likelihood of supporting RRPs by many studies
(Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Givens 2005;
Goerres et al. 2018; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al.
2002; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rydgren 2007; Stockemer et al. 2018) with only one finding no effect
(Oesch 2008). The reasons why this pattern exists include that many RRPs hold anti-feminist
positions and are dominated by men who are generally more right-wing and more frustrated than
women (Stockemer et al. 2018: 578).
Regarding age, several studies found being young increased the likelihood of supporting
RRPs (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Lubbers and
Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002; Muis and Immerzeel 2017) while six studies found no effect
(Givens 2005; Goerres et al. 2018; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;
Oesch 2008; Stockemer et al. 2018). A positive correlation between youth and RRP support is
likely the result of the declining prospects of owning a home and having a stable, well-paying
job. Young people are also more politically fluid than older people (Stockemer et al. 2018: 576).
21
Some studies found that age and RRP support were U-shaped in that both younger and older
individuals were more likely to support RRPs (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). This may be
because both younger and older individuals are less likely to have social ties or to participate
politically and more likely to rely on social assistance (Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 421).
Being a manual labourer or being part of the working class was also found to increase the
likelihood of supporting RRPs by a similar number of studies (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and
Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Givens 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017;
Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Minkenberg 2000; Rydgren 2007). Six studies
found no effect on RRPs by this characteristic (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Ellinas 2014;
Goerres et al. 2018; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Oesch 2008; Stockemer et al. 2018). Members
of the working class or those in low-wage occupations such as manual labourers are more likely
to be negatively affected by the forces of globalization. These forces cause the outsourcing of
jobs, automation, and demand for high-skill professions. Blue-collar workers will see immigrants
as a threat in this hostile and increasingly restrictive environment. Additionally, those in the
working class are more likely to rely upon government welfare and may want to protect those
programs and services from other ethnic groups (Stockemer et al. 2018: 575; Goerres et al. 2018:
250).
Finally, many studies found that being less educated increased the likelihood of
supporting RRPs (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006;
Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;
Nevitte et al. 1998; Rydgren 2007) while others did not (Givens 2005; Goerres et al. 2018;
Jackman and Volpert 1996; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Stockemer 2017b; Stockemer et al.
2018). Individuals with less education are more likely to be economically vulnerable. They,
22
along with ethnic minorities and immigrants make up a large portion of the lower socio-
economic strata. As a result, they see those groups as more of a threat while higher educated
individuals do not (Hello et al. 2006). Furthermore, they are generally less tolerant of other
cultures and are more likely to hold prejudicial views towards outsiders (Stockemer et al. 2018:
577). Finally, less educated individuals tend to be more authoritarian, making them more
amenable to RRP views (Hello et al. 2006). On the whole, individual-level demographic
explanations show that males, youth, manual labourers and members of the working class, and
those with low education levels are most likely to be attracted to RRPs while economic
insecurity received mixed support in the literature.
3.5 Individual-level Attitudinal Hypotheses
The final class of explanations examined are individual-level attitudinal hypotheses, that
draw attention to the positions and opinions that influence voters’ decisions to support RRPs. It
is important to note that many scholars doubt whether individual-level, demand-side variables
help explain RRP success in the aggregate. In much of Europe, the demand is already
widespread. What really determines successes and failures, according to these scholars, is the
ability of these parties to supply this omnipresent demand to the electorate (Carter 2005; Givens
2005; Mudde 2010). Nonetheless, it is likely these variables increase the appetite for RRPs and
at least play some role in explaining their success.
The first of these are attitudes towards diversity, immigrants, and minorities. Some
scholars believe individuals hold negative views towards immigration because of the crisis of
identity that has encapsulated the postmodern nation-state. Globalization, international
organizations, multiculturalism, and mass migration have threatened the integrity of the nation-
state with which individuals identify (Lubbers and Coenders 2017: 100). In response to this loss
23
of national identity, people turn to nationalism, popular xenophobia, racism, and ethno-pluralism
(Rydgren 2007: 251). A vast majority of research supports this reasoning (Ambrose and Mudde
2015; Arzheimer 2008; Arzheimer 2018; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Bélanger and Aarts
2006; Betz 1994; Daigle et al. 2019; Davis et al. 2019; Gidron and Hall 2019; Goerres et al.
2018; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019; Ignazi 1992; Ivarsflaten 2005; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lubbers
and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002; Minkenberg 2000; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Nevitte
et al. 1998; Rooduijn 2015; Rovny and Polk 2019; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2008;
Van Der Brug et al. 2005; Zhirkov 2014). A few studies find no link (Kitschelt and McGann
1995; Oesch 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019), while Stockemer et al. (2018) finds mixed results.
One potential caveat is that nationalistic attitudes do not always correlate with out-group hostility
(Lubbers and Coenders 2017: 101). This is especially significant in Canada (see Section 6
below), a country whose nationalism usually takes the form of a civic as opposed to an ethnic
kind (Breton 1988; Johnston et al. 2010; Igartua 1992).
Another commonly tested variable in this subcategory is whether those holding less trust
and satisfaction towards democracy, mainstream parties, politicians, international organizations,
and societies are more likely to support RRPs. This strand argues that political discontent has
created a voter base open to anti-establishment and anti-system messages (Rydgren 2007: 251).
Those dissatisfied with and distrustful of the political system, and the society it operates in
should be more attracted to the populist message espoused by RRPs. A substantial number of
studies support this explanation (Arzheimer 2009; Bélanger and Aarts 2006; Berning and Ziller
2017; Betz 1994; Ellinas 2014; Gidengil 2001; Gidron and Hall 2019; Goerres et al. 2018; Ignazi
1992; Ivarsflaten 2005; Knigge 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et
al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Minkenberg 2000; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rooduijn 2105;
24
Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Zhirkov 2014). There are also a few studies that do not find a link
between distrust/dissatisfaction and RRP support (Arzheimer 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Muis and
Immerzeel 2017; Oesch 2018; Stockemer et al. 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). This
contradiction in the literature is the result of at least three factors. One is the complex
relationship between belief and action (Rydgren 2007: 251-252). Voting preferences are not
often consistent or clearcut. This is demonstrated in qualitative research that shows that
dissatisfied or disconnected individuals must also realize there is an RRP that they can trust and
vote for. Dissatisfaction or distrust may be an important aspect of RRP support, but it is not
sufficient alone to explain voting behaviour (Stockemer et al. 2018: 583-584). Second, Zhirkov
(2014: 294) argues that RRP voters are satisfied with their country’s current political and
economic institutions but are distrustful of the politicians and parties that are supposed to protect
them. Third, some individuals are dissatisfied with the political system because of the success of
RRPs themselves (Rooduijn et al. 2016).
A third possibility for RRP electoral breakthroughs is the level of social isolation within
the populace. According to the Social Disintegration Thesis, the decline of groups leads to a loss
of belonging. Those experiencing this loss are attracted to the nativist rhetoric of RRPs because it
provides them with a new group, the nation, to identify with (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000: 67-
68; Zhirkov 2014: 288). Therefore, those individuals experiencing social alienation are more
likely to favour RRPs. However, the majority of studies find no support (Arzheimer 2018;
Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rydgren 2007; Zhirkov 2014). Coffe et
al. 2007 is the only one who finds supportive results.
The fourth explanation for RRP support is authoritarianism. As with nativism, if
authoritarianism is an important element of an RRP’s ideology, then individuals who hold
25
similarly authoritarian views are more likely to vote for RRPs because RRPs are more in line
with their ideological convictions. While Kitschelt and McGann (1995) find conflicting results,
most studies support this hypothesis (Ignazi 1992; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers and
Scheepers 2000; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rooduijn 2015).
The last hypothesis that has attracted much scholarly attention involves support for right-
wing economic policies. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argued that the “winning formula” for
RRPs was a neo-liberal approach to economics. However, the vast majority of studies show that
individuals who hold neo-liberal beliefs are not more likely to support RRPs (Arzheimer 2008;
Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Ivarsflaten 2008; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006;
Minkenberg 2000; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rovny 2013; Rovny and Polk 2019), with only two
studies (Goerres et al. 2018; Zhirkov 2014) supporting the claim. In fact, more recent studies
show that successful RRPs are now increasingly taking centrist or leftist socio-economic
positions (Golder 2016; De Lange 2007; Rooduijn 2015; Rovny and Polk 2019). On the whole,
the literature reveals either supportive (support for immigrants, distrust/dissatisfaction in society
and politics, and authoritarian views) or unsupported (social isolation and support for right-wing
economics) explanations for individual-level attitudinal hypotheses.
4. Hypotheses
From this literature review, the various findings will be condensed into four sets of
hypotheses. These hypotheses, if met, demonstrate not only that Bernier’s PPC is an RRP but
also that his party had a reasonable chance to do well in 2019. The first set of hypotheses cover
whether the PPC is an RRP with the core ideological convictions of radicalism, nativism,
authoritarianism, and populism. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
26
Hypothesis 1a: the People’s Party of Canada is radical.
Hypothesis 1b: the People’s Party of Canada is nativist.
Hypothesis 1c: the People’s Party of Canada is authoritarian.
Hypothesis 1d: the People’s Party of Canada is populist.
This analysis will enable me to establish whether the PPC classifies as an RRP, and more
generally, how extreme its platform is. I will then test several hypotheses that will attempt to
gauge whether conditions in Canada are favourable to RRPs electorally. The literature review
conducted above generates several empirically testable implications. The first of these is:
Hypothesis 2: the rate of immigration to Canada has increased.
The literature on this subject suggests that sudden increases in the rate of immigration, combined
with intense media coverage of immigration, bolster support for RRPs. This brings me to the
third testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: the People’s Party of Canada and its leader are prominently covered by
the media.
Hypothesis 3b: immigration is prominently covered by the media.
The literature review shows that prominent coverage of RRPs and the issues they care about
increase the salience of RRP issues and contributes to RRP success at the polls. A final set of
hypotheses involves the attitudes of Canadian voters:
Hypothesis 4a: an increasing number of Canadians oppose diversity, immigrants, and
minorities.
Hypothesis 4b: an increasing number of Canadians are distrustful/dissatisfied with
democracy, mainstream parties, politicians, international organizations, and society.
Hypothesis 4c: an increasing number of Canadians hold authoritarian views.
27
The literature review shows that individuals who hold nativist, populist, and authoritarian views
are more likely to support RRPs.
Many of the explanations put forward in the literature review will not be investigated.
There are several reasons for this. First, many of the hypotheses show no or little support in the
existing literature. Explanations concerning unemployment levels, ideological convergence,
turnout, electoral systems, social isolation, and support for right-wing economic preferences
were not supported by most research included in Table 1. Other hypotheses are too preliminary
and/or rarely tested for there to be any definitive judgement regarding their effect on RRPs.
Explanations concerning crime rates, turnout, electoral volatility, national traditions, previous
success, and social isolation are either novel, sparingly tested, or both. Third, some variables are
tested at the individual level and will, therefore, not help to determine how well the PPC did in
the 2019 federal election. Therefore, no individual-level demographic hypotheses will be
included in this study.
Finally, many explanations for RRP success will not be tested systematically in spite of
their importance to RRP success. These explanations will only be discussed superficially for two
reasons. First, the research question involves determining whether changes over time in Canada
have allowed the PPC to have a chance to succeed in 2019. Therefore, variables that have
remained stable in Canada over time and/or are unlikely to change will not be particularly
helpful to this study. For this reason, I will not test the explanations concerning grand governing
coalitions, ethno-liberal parties, permissive electoral systems, national traditions, intra-party
leadership, or any of the individual-level demographic hypotheses. Second, the PPC is a new
party that only came into existence in September of 2018. Because of this, the PPC only
nominated 314 out of 338 candidates and the majority of them do not have a Twitter page,
28
Facebook page, or website (PPC: Our Candidates 2019). Those that do often do not clearly state
their educational backgrounds nor have they proven their competence or charisma. It is outside
the scope of this paper to investigate such an exploratory variable.
5. Methodology
To test these four hypotheses, I used a variety of methods and sources. To investigate H1,
I performed a qualitative reading of the party platform and major speeches and statements of the
PPC on its website.6 This textual reading determined whether the PPC is radical, nativist,
authoritarian, and populist and can, therefore, be appropriately labelled an RRP. It is radical if it
vigorously attacks democracy or the way it currently operates and advocates fundamental change
to the existing system. It is nativist if it disparages immigrants, non-native elements, minority
rights, and international organizations and if its policies allocate more rights to native-born
citizens. It is authoritarian if it promotes tough-on-crime measures, traditional values, anti-
egalitarianism, respects national symbols and authority, and if it degrades the media, the
judiciary, and government institutions. Finally, it is populist if its platform admonishes a corrupt
elite and champions the will of the people. To determine how moderate the PPC is within the
RRP family, I used Carter’s (2005) typology of RRPs. She places RRPs into five different camps
based on 1) the importance they place on the issue of immigration, 2) their racial views, and 3)
their attitude towards democracy (Carter 2005: 28). Based on these three characteristics, all
RRPs can be placed into neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal
6 This is because supporters of RRPs tend to be skeptical of the mainstream media and academics
given their populist attitudes. So, I wanted to judge the PPC’s ideology using its own words and
the words of its leader rather than relying on journal or newspaper articles that would have been
seen as illegitimate repositories of PPC ideology by RRP supporters.
29
xenophobic, and neo-liberal populist subsets (Carter 2005). I, therefore, qualitatively analyzed
the PPC’s positions on these three characteristics and attempted to place it into one of the five
RRP subsets.
To investigate H2, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of the number and
proportion of foreign-born individuals in Canada and the proportion of them that came from
Western and non-Western regions. This analysis relied on data from Statistics Canada on the
number of immigrants since 1881 (Government of Canada 2017a) and the number of immigrants
from each continent since 1971 (Government of Canada 2017b). This allowed me to measure the
percentage of foreign-born in the Canadian population, the annual rate of change in that
percentage, and the proportion of immigrants coming to Canada from non-Western regions.
To investigate H3a and H3b, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of the
media coverage involving the PPC, its leader, and immigration. For H3a, I gathered monthly
counts of Canadian newspaper articles from the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, and the
National Post containing the terms “People’s Party of Canada,” “People’s Party,” or “Maxime
Bernier” from October 2018, when polling for the PPC began, to October 2019 through the
research tool Factiva. This same news article search was done for Canada’s other major national
parties including the Liberal, Conservative, New Democratic, and Green parties. I then compared
the coverage of these parties with their average monthly support in Nanos opinion polls. To
investigate H3b, I searched for newspaper articles from the three outlets listed above containing
the terms migratio*, immigratio*, migran*, immigran*, refug*, or asylum from 1997 (the date at
which data for all three newspapers begins on Factiva) to October 2019 and compared that
number to the total article count for the three newspapers.
30
To investigate H4, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of a variety of survey
data. To test H4a, I used survey data from fifteen waves of Environics Institute’s Focus Canada
survey from 1993 to 2019. The survey uses probability sampling to reach a representative sample
of Canadian adults. I analyzed three questions posed consistently throughout the waves: 1) there
is too much immigration in Canada, 2) most people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees,
and 3) too many immigrants do not adopt Canadian values.
To test H4b, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of survey data. This survey
data came from six waves of the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s AmericasBarometer
survey for Canada which covers 2006 to 2016/17. It is a periodic public opinion survey that uses
probability methods to ensure a nationally representative sample. I analyzed seven questions
asked consistently throughout the six waves: 1) how trustworthy the people living in the
community are, 2) how trustworthy the justice system is, 3) how trustworthy the political parties
are, 4) how trustworthy the Supreme Court is, 5) how trustworthy Parliament is, 6) whether
politicians are corrupt, and finally, 7) whether they are satisfied with how democracy functions
in Canada. One limitation of this analysis is that the six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey
are not the same. Some questions are worded slightly differently, while others include different
response categories. To ensure consistency, I have examined each wave to make sure the
questions are similar and to determine which responses correlate with distrust/dissatisfaction.
Lastly, question 6) was not asked in 2016/17 so only data from 2006 to 2014 will be included for
that question.
To investigate H4c, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of survey data. I
used six waves of the AmericansBarometer survey from the years 2006 to 2016/17. I analyzed
five questions or propositions posed throughout the six waves including: 1) sometimes there is
31
justification for the Prime Minister to shut down Parliament, 2) sometimes there is justification
for the Prime Minister to shut down the Supreme Court, 3) democracy is better than any other
form of government, 4) how much should people support the political system of Canada, and
finally, 5) whether they trust the political institutions of Canada. As with H4b, an important
comment is that not all questions were posed in the same way or included the same responses in
each of the waves. To limit this consistency problem, I have examined each wave to ensure
uniformity in questions and matching responses with authoritarian sentiment. Additionally,
question 2) was not asked in 2016/17 so only data from 2006 to 2014 will be included for that
question.
6. The Context of the 2019 Canadian Election
Before delving into the specificities of the 2019 election, it is worth considering some of
the more stable characteristics of the Canadian political system that act as opportunities and
barriers for RRPs that will not be systematically studied. Intra-party leadership and organization
within the PPC are opportunities, while the electoral system, a lack of grand governing
coalitions, and Canada’s national traditions act as barriers to the PPC’s success.
Prior to discussing these opportunities and barriers, a short chronology of how the PPC
came about is necessary. The 2017 Conservative leadership contest saw Maxime Bernier, a
Member of Parliament (MP) from Beauce,7 Quebec, place a close second, winning 49.05% of the
points in the last round. Following disagreements with his Conservative colleagues, Bernier was
demoted from his role as critic of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada by
7 Bernier’s father, Gilles Bernier, was a longtime MP from Beauce as well, representing the
riding from 1984 to 1997, first as a Progressive Conservative and later as an independent.
32
his rival and newly minted Conservative leader Andrew Scheer on June 12, 2018 (The Canadian
Press 2018a). Conflict continued on August 12 when Bernier posted six controversial tweets
concerning the state of multiculturalism and diversity in Canada. The tweets were widely
attacked, including by Bernier’s Conservative colleagues (The Canadian Press 2018b). On
August 23, Bernier held a press conference in which he announced his departure from the
Conservatives and his intention to form a new party based on the principles of freedom,
responsibility, fairness, and respect. His reasons for doing so were that the Conservative Party
was “too intellectually and morally corrupt to be reformed” and that under Scheer’s leadership,
the party had “all but abandoned its core conservative principles” (Bernier 2018a). By September
14, Bernier unveiled his new party, the People’s Party of Canada (Bernier 2018b). The PPC’s
first real test was contesting the 2019 Canadian federal election. Bernier faced embattled first-
term Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of the Liberals, his old rival Andrew Scheer of the
Conservatives, the first Sikh leader of a national party, Jagmeet Singh of the New Democrats,
longtime leader of the Greens Elizabeth May, and freshly elected leader Yves-François Blanchet
of the separatist Bloc Quebecois. None of these leaders, except May, were particularly well-liked
(Grenier 2019).
Like some of the leaders he faced in 2019, Bernier is an experienced and well-known
politician. As a result, this new party’s intra-party leadership and organization should act as
favourable forces for its success. Bernier received a Bachelor of Commerce and Law Degree, is a
member of the Quebec Bar, worked for several financial institutions, and served as Executive
Vice-President of the Montreal Economic Institute. The people of Beauce elected him in 2006,
and soon after he joined Cabinet as Minister of Industry. He also served as Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Minister of State for Small Business and Tourism (Maxime Bernier - Our Leader
33
n.d.). Due to his libertarian leanings and maverick nature, Bernier has been often referred to as
“Mad Max” or the “Albertan from Quebec” (Clark and Yakabuski 2008; CTV News 2017;
Bernier 2018c). In addition to Bernier’s personal qualities, the PPC appears to be relatively well
organized. In all but one riding, the PPC has an electoral district association (Elections Canada
2019). The party claims about 40,000 members (Bernier 2019a: 6; Bernier 2019d: 2). Finally,
314 out of 338 candidates were nominated under the PPC banner for the 2019 election (PPC: Our
Candidates 2019). Overall, Bernier’s experience, distinctiveness, and name recognition, together
with a strong party membership able to establish electoral district associations and field hundreds
of candidates, should have benefited the PPC in the 2019 election.
On the other hand, three characteristics of the Canadian political system pose significant
barriers to the success of any RRP in general and Bernier’s PPC in particular. The first of these is
Canada’s electoral system. The PPC’s first contested election took place under the single-
member-plurality system, commonly referred to as first-past-the-post (FPTP). FPTP is unlikely
to benefit small or relatively new parties such as the Greens or the PPC because their votes will
be inefficiently translated into seats (Barnes et al. 2016). In a purely proportional system, without
thresholds or small district magnitudes, the PPC’s almost 300,000 votes would have translated
into two seats. Correspondingly, FPTP did pose a barrier to the PPC’s ability to gain seats in
2019.
The absence of grand governing coalitions in Canada is another barrier that negatively
affects the PPC’s success. The existence of a grand governing coalition was found in the
literature to increase RRP support. However, notwithstanding the various provincial coalitions
that have formed throughout Canadian history,8 there has only been one instance of a federal
8 Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan have all had coalition governments in
the past (Hicks 2013).
34
coalition in Canada, which happened to come about due to extraordinary circumstances (Hicks
2013).9 Although coalitions have been contemplated since then,10 none of these proposals
materialized (Hicks 2013; Malcolmson et al. 2016: 46-47). Instead, the norm in Canada is for the
largest party in the legislature to form the government (Malcolmson et al. 2016: 45). The absence
of coalitions in Canada, in sum, makes it difficult for political newcomers to position themselves
as the alternative to mainstream parties.
The PPC faced another barrier by conflicting with Canadian history and political culture.
As will be demonstrated below and in Section 8.1, Canada has always relied on immigration for
population growth. Since the mid-twentieth century, Canada has increasingly emphasized
tolerance, diversity, and internationalism. The first permanent European settlers to this country,
led by Samuel de Champlain, were immigrants from France (Conrad 2012: 37). John A.
Macdonald, Canada’s first Prime Minister was born in Glasgow, Scotland (Conrad 2012: 6).
From the energetic work of Clifford Sifton under Laurier (Conrad 2012: 169-170) to Pierre
Trudeau’s advocacy of a multicultural society (Conrad 2012: 247; Trebilcock 2018: 840),
sequential governments encouraged successive waves of immigration to Canada. Since the
1960s, admissions have been colour-blind (Adams 2017: 63; Gordon et al. 2019: 3; Trebilcock
2018: 824). Moreover, as an outcome of the Seven Years’ War, francophones and anglophones
have had to live together in one bilingual and bicultural state. Canada has, therefore, long
understood the compromises required to live in a harmonious, pluralistic, and tolerant society. At
present, virtually all parties other than the PPC support immigration and multiculturalism in
9 As a result of World War I, Prime Minister Robert Bordon’s Conservatives and a collection of
pro-conscription Liberals campaigned and subsequently governed under a Unionist banner
(Conrad 2012: 198).
10 In both 1980 and 2008, the Liberals and New Democrats discussed forming a federal coalition
government (Hicks 2013).
35
Canada (Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 228; Gordon et al. 2019: 3-4; Trebilcock 2018: 824), and
they have all regularly elected immigrants and visible minorities (Adams 2017: 141). More
importantly, many scholars have shown that immigration is essential to Canadian national
identity, and that Canadian nationalism often takes a civic, pro-immigrant form rather than an
ethnic one (Breton 1988; Johnston et al. 2010; Igartua 1992). Canada’s foreign policy has tended
to favour internationalism over nationalism. As a result, Canada has played an important role on
the world stage, especially since Lester Pearson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis in 1956, as both
a peacemaker and as a conscientious middle power (Conrad 2012: 230-231).
A related point is that geographic isolation, the points system, and integration programs
for newcomers have taken some of the sting out of anti-immigrant appeal by making
immigration more selective, controlled, and orderly (Adams 2017: 40; Ambrose and Mudde
2015: 226; Trebilcock 2018: 834-835, 841). The points system has also resulted in an abundance
of highly-educated and employable immigrants in Canada who do not disproportionately rely on
welfare programs. This contrasts sharply with the experience of many European countries
(Adams 2017: 69-71; Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 226-227; Trebilcock 2018: 843).
The history of Canada’s far-right, similarly indicates a barrier for the PPC. Throughout
their history, far-right groups have been pushed to the fringes of the political discussion. They
are also normally rare, small, and ephemeral (Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 215-217). Today, only
a small number of active far-right groups exist in Canada. These include the Aryan Guard, Aryan
Nations, Blood & Honour, Combat 18, La Meute, and the Nationalist Party of Canada (Gordon
et al. 2019: 11; Parent and Ellis 2014: 7-8). Owing to a host of anti-discrimination, anti-hate
speech, and anti-hate crime laws, these groups have been widely suppressed (Ambrose and
Mudde 2015: 229-230). Because there is little historical grounding for far-right movements in
36
Canada, the PPC lacks an initial base of support from which to grow. Additionally, because of
Canada’s tight restrictions on extreme views and the far-right’s trivial presence, Canadians have
not been exposed to RRP messages as prominently as Europeans have. Because of Canada’s
liberal attitude towards immigrants, the obscure history of the far-right movement, and state
repression of far-right ideas, Canada’s political ecology is not likely to be favourable to RRPs
and their success.
7. The People’s Party of Canada
The first step in this analysis is to establish whether the PPC is an RRP and, if it is one,
what subtype it belongs to. Bernier himself has noted the similarities between the PPC and the
many RRPs experiencing success in other Western countries (Bernier 2019a: 5-7; Bernier 2019c:
2; Bernier 2019d: 1). A close examination of the party’s 2019 platform supports this comparison.
7.1 Radicalism
First, the PPC advocates fundamental change to the existing system, to such an extent
that it can be labelled a radical party. Its strategy for most policies it disagrees with is outright
abolition or significant reform over gradual, piecemeal change. Bernier wants to scrap supply
management, established in 1971, which he sees as wasteful, inefficient, and unfair to
consumers, and replace it with a “free, open, and fair system” (PPC: Supply Management
2019).11 He does not see climate change, a phenomenon accepted as real and urgent by all other
major parties and the vast majority of scientists (Cook et al. 2016), as a risk and will, therefore,
abolish any subsidies, taxes, or programs that attempt to mitigate it (PPC: Global Warming and
11 The PPC’s platform consists of 16 separate policy fields, each with its own entry. The platform
has no page numbers or single document. However, for simplicity I only include one reference
for the entire platform entitled “2019 Electoral Platform.”
37
Environment 2019). The PPC is highly critical of equalization payments, which it sees as
unfairly targeting wealthy provinces, seeing them as a “poverty” or “welfare trap” that
encourages dependency and underdevelopment in “have-not” provinces. The party proposes to
reform this system, entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982, to instead incentivize “pro-growth”
strategies and reduce reliance on federal monies (PPC: Equalization 2019). The PPC attacks
Canada’s cherished, decades’ old public healthcare system and Canada Health Act (Adams 2017:
7) for stifling innovation, being an undue burden on provincial budgets, and causing exorbitant
wait times. To correct this, the PPC suggests decentralization and privatization of healthcare
(Bernier 2018c; PPC: Health Care 2019). Foreign development aid, a policy in place since the
1950s, would be completely scrapped and ties to the “dysfunctional” United Nations (UN), an
organization of which Canada is an original signatory, would be cut as much as possible under a
PPC regime (PPC: Foreign Policy 2019). Canada Post, created in 1867, would be privatized and
the telecommunications and air travel sectors would be opened to foreign competition (Bernier
2018c). On indigenous policy, the PPC prefers to replace the “paternalistic” and “dependency-
inducing” Indian Act of 1876 and instead encourage self-reliance through both individual
property rights and natural resource and infrastructure projects (PPC: Aboriginal Issues 2019).
On taxation policy, the party wants to abolish the capital gains and carbon taxes, transfer the
Goods and Services Tax to the provinces, and significantly slash the corporate and personal
income tax rates (Bernier 2018c; PPC: Economy 2019; PPC: Global Warming and Environment
2019; PPC: Health Care 2019; PPC: Public Finance 2019). The PPC also wants to completely
upend gun control policy in Canada by replacing the Firearms Act and the licensing system
(PPC: Firearms 2019). Finally, the popular Multiculturalism Act of 1988 (Adams 2017: 7) would
38
be abolished, and immigration and asylum-seeking claims would be seriously curtailed (PPC:
Canadian Identity 2019; PPC: Immigration 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019).
Overall, in virtually every policy field, including those considered untouchable by other
parties because of their popularity or embeddedness within Canada, the PPC promises something
dramatically different than the status quo. Many of these changes would disregard Canada’s
current constitutional, international, and social commitments. Relative to other parties in Canada,
the PPC is certainly radical for its advocacy of sweeping and profound changes to the status quo.
Bernier admits as much when he calls the Conservatives centrists and identifies the PPC as the
only truly right-wing party (Bernier 2018c). Therefore, there is clear evidence the PPC is a
radical party.
7.2 Nativism
Second, the PPC’s views towards foreign policy, immigration, refugees, and
multiculturalism make it a nativist party. On foreign policy, Bernier is hostile to internationalism,
criticizing Trudeau for following a “corrosive globalist agenda” and Scheer for running “for the
Secretary General of the UN” (Bernier 2018c; Bernier 2019b). He describes the UN as a
dysfunctional agency where “abusers of human rights” hold the most influence and fears that it
will become a “powerful, quasi-judicial world government” that will infringe on the sovereignty
of Canada. Bernier wants to cut foreign aid, pull out of overseas conflicts, restrict Canada’s
presence in the UN, withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Global Compact
for Migration, and any other treaties, accords, or compacts that Bernier believes waste Canadian
dollars on poor African and Asian countries. Instead of “wasting” it on these international
concerns, Bernier wants to spend money on domestic priorities such as paying down the national
debt (Bernier 2018c; PPC: Foreign Policy 2019). Bernier is also displeased by the intrusion of
39
“American left-wing foundations” and “hostile foreign investors” in Canadian affairs,
specifically in relation to the oil and gas industry (PPC: Pipelines 2019). His sole goal on the
international stage is to focus on the security and prosperity of Canadians.
Moreover, Bernier is highly critical of refugees and immigrants, describing them as a
drag on the economy and an unsustainable disruption to Canadian culture and traditions. He
explicitly declares that the priority of Canada should be “to help Canadians instead” (Bernier
2019b). While, according to Bernier, only a small proportion of immigrants are chosen for the
education and skills they bring, he believes most work for lower wages, contribute less in taxes,
inflate housing prices, and threaten social cohesion, all the while taking advantage of
government services as much as other Canadians (Bernier 2019b; PPC: Immigration 2019).
Refugees, Bernier says, are commonly turned back because many of them are not really in
danger and are instead trying to exploit the system (PPC: Refugees 2019).
The PPC promises numerous reforms to remedy this alleged problem. In terms of
numbers, annual immigration would be cut from 350,000 to between 100,000 and 150,000, and
fewer refugees would be accepted. The points system would be changed to emphasize economic
migrants with the “right skills,” temporary migration would be limited, and face-to-face
interviews with every newcomer would be introduced to ensure that every immigrant knows
English or French and shares universal Western values. Family reunification for parents and
grand-parents and birth tourism would be banned (Bernier 2018c; Bernier 2019b; PPC:
Immigration 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019). The Multiculturalism Act would be repealed and
funding for multiculturalism would be eliminated. Private sponsorship of immigrants would also
be encouraged (PPC: Canadian Identity 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019). The emphasis would be on
the integration of immigrants by teaching Canada’s history and culture (Bernier 2018c).
40
Undocumented entrants would face more hurdles as key illegal border crossings would be fenced
off, undocumented migrants would be sent back, and Canada would ignore UN
recommendations on refugees and immigrants. The priority would be on persecuted groups,
particularly those in majority Muslim countries, who adhere to Western values rather than
“political Islam” (PPC: Foreign Policy 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019).
Instead of promoting the existing “cult of diversity” or “extreme multiculturalism” as
Bernier calls it, a PPC government’s central imperative would be to forge a common sense of
belonging and to preserve Western civilization and its values (PPC: Canadian Identity 2019). Not
all cultures are equally valuable according to the PPC, so it would preserve those superior
Western values that, the PPC argues, have made Canada one of the greatest countries in the
world (Bernier 2019b). Under Bernier, Canada’s unique regional identities would be nurtured
rather than being supplanted by enclaves of “foreign” cultures (Bernier 2019b). Overall, although
not explicitly biologically racist, the PPC supports implicit nativist policies concerning foreign
policy, immigrants, refugees, and multiculturalism. Therefore, the PPC is a nativist party.
7.3 Authoritarianism
Third, although the PPC holds some authoritarian stances, it does not clearly share all the
positions we usually associate with authoritarianism. The party does not revere national symbols
nor does it abhor a free press or the rule of law. Of the more authoritarian positions it does hold,
the party moderates explicit authoritarianism and does not afford those positions a conspicuous
role in its platform. Starting with its gun policy, the PPC shows itself to be a tough-on-crime
party. The party believes that lawful gun owners deserve “respect and fairness.” Therefore, the
PPC would not “violate gun owners’ property rights,” criminally prosecute them, or allow
“bureaucrats” in Ottawa to easily change gun regulations. Instead, the PPC would focus on
41
fighting crime and protecting public safety by deterring and punishing criminals, particularly
those who misuse firearms (PPC: Firearms 2019).
Furthermore, social conservative overtones are present within the PPC’s position on
freedom of speech and political correctness although Bernier explicitly stated his party will not
discuss “hot-button social issues” such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and euthanasia (Kapelos
and Major 2019). The PPC specifically cites the Trudeau government’s decision to bar anti-
abortion organizations from receiving summer jobs funding and forcing individuals to use
particular gender pronouns as examples of the broader erosion of freedom of speech. Although
the PPC is ostensibly neutral on the issues of abortion and transgenderism, it does have a
problem with attempts to silence those who oppose them. The PPC further attacks internet and
social media companies censoring politically incorrect messages, university faculty and
administrators stifling dissent, and government legislation denouncing Islamophobia as examples
of this trend. Instead, the party believes that the government must provide “for maximal
protection of freedom of expression and conscience even when speech is considered by some as
politically incorrect, offensive, or hateful.” Once in office, the PPC promises to limit the
definition of hate speech, repeal legislation that threatens free expression, and withhold federal
funding to those post-secondary institutions that allow censorship (PPC: Freedom of Expression
2019). It must be paradoxically said that the PPC’s position on free speech is in some ways the
opposite of authoritarianism. However, there is a subtle undercurrent of social conservatism
behind the party’s position on freedom of expression which could be construed as authoritarian.
As expected by its staunchly libertarian economic views, the PPC is decidedly anti-
egalitarian. On tax policy, brackets will be cut from five to two with those making up to
$100,000 a year paying a 15% tax rate and those making over that amount paying 25%. The
42
party will also abolish the capital gains tax and lower the corporate income tax rate from 15% to
10%. These measures will be paid for, according to the PPC, by slashing government spending
and being fiscally disciplined. The party will cut provincial and municipal programs to such a
degree that it even promises to balance the budget just two years into its mandate (PPC:
Economy 2019; PPC: Public Finance 2019). These neo-liberal policies demonstrate that the
PPC’s philosophy is staunchly capitalistic and anti-egalitarian.
In its policy on veterans, the PPC talks about respect for national symbols and authority.
The party supports the Canadian Armed Forces, seeing their history as a proud and honourable
one. These men and women, the PPC says, who risk life and limb deserve the funding,
equipment, and support they have been deprived of, such as providing them with lifetime
pensions (PPC: Veterans 2019). Most Canadians would support this statement in principle, as it
is reasonable and not particularly excessive. Moreover, the platform does not revere Canadian
national symbols such as the anthem or the flag. Nor does the party reveal a respect for, or even
mention, centralized government institutions such as the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy
Council Office. Instead, it broadly supports decentralization of Ottawa’s authority to the
provinces. Therefore, the platform provides poor evidence that the PPC reveres national symbols
or authority.
Outside of the platform, there is evidence the PPC reveres the nation and national
symbols. Many of the PPC’s candidates and supporters include the Canadian flag on their social
media accounts. PPC rallies begin with the singing of “O Canada.” Their campaign slogan for
2019 was “strong and free,” referring to the national anthem of Canada. The party’s official
anthem is entitled “Northern Sovereign” whose lyrics include:
43
We want to live patriotically, for everyone to be Canadian free, celebrating our country,
we want to proudly stand, our nation’s flag in hand…home is our country, because we
need to show who will stand, Canadians who love this land, it’s time to show that we
love our country. (Day 2019)
These examples illustrate that patriotic feelings permeate the PPC.
Despite all of these authoritarian stances, several important aspects of authoritarianism
are left out of the platform. Most importantly, the platform does not disparage the independent
media, judiciary, or government institutions. Although Bernier himself antagonizes the media
and the government in a populist way, he prefaces that criticism by saying that he will follow and
respect the Constitution of Canada which he cites throughout his platform (PPC: Aboriginal
Issues 2019; PPC: Equalization 2019; PPC: Health Care 2019; PPC: Internal Trade 2019; PPC:
Pipelines 2019). This commitment to upholding Canada’s constitutional architecture and the lack
of vitriol against journalists, judges, and government officials suggests the PPC is not in line
with an essential feature of authoritarianism.
In all, the PPC only partially satisfies the definition of an authoritarian party. On the one
side, the PPC promotes some law and order views, traditional values, and anti-egalitarianism. On
the other hand, none of these potentially authoritarian positions, with the exception of anti-
egalitarianism, are particularly extreme, and there is weak evidence the party reveres national
symbols and authority or that it loathes a free press, judiciary, or government. Of the sixteen
planks of the party platform, none have to do with explicitly authoritarian policies. Nowhere
does Bernier disparage the judiciary, Parliament, the rule of law, or any other institutions of
Canada’s system of government. The lack of these crucial characteristics means that the PPC is
44
not strongly authoritarian. Therefore, the PPC only partially satisfies the definition of an
authoritarian party.
7.4 Populism
The PPC’s strongest connection with the RRP programme is its populist outlook. The
name of the party, the People’s Party, signals its populist leaning. Throughout its platform, the
party dichotomizes society into the people and a small, privileged elite. When discussing supply
management, the PPC blames a small lobby group made up of only 10% of Canadian farms and
13,000 wealthy farmers for creating a “government-imposed cartel” that exists, according to
Bernier, at the expense of the 37 million Canadians who have to pay more for dairy, poultry, and
egg products (Bernier 2018a; Bernier 2018c; PPC: Supply Management 2019). Furthermore,
Bernier frames the issue of immigration through a populist lens. He believes that it is the
“political and intellectual elites” who are most in favour of mass immigration and that the
majority of Canadians agree with him. On that issue, Bernier insists that the other parties pander
to ethnic voting blocs rather than the Canadian people as a whole (Bernier 2019b). On climate
change, the party describes the current debate as “hijacked” by a few advocates of “big
government” who have used “crude propaganda techniques” to “ridicule and harass anyone who
expresses doubt.” These individuals “even manipulate school children, getting them to pressure
their parents and to demonstrate in the streets.” (PPC: Global Warming 2019). In a similar vein,
the PPC concludes that barriers to interprovincial trade are the result of local special interests
that pressure governments to restrict the free flow of goods by imposing monopolies and
regulations on them. To fight this influence, the PPC pledges to create a Minister of Internal
Trade to “counteract the influence of special interests” (PPC: Internal Trade 2019). On the issue
of corporate subsidies, the party promises it will never bail out huge companies like Bombardier,
45
Chrysler, or General Electric or participate in any other form of “corporate welfare” (Bernier
2018c). Bernier’s populist brand is also detected in the party’s firearms policy. It states that only
Parliament, not cabinet or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, may impose regulations on
firearms (PPC: Firearms 2019). This suggests that only the peoples’ representatives, not experts
or elites, would shape gun policy with the PPC in power. Broadly, Bernier speaks of a political
system beholden to elite groups at the expense of average people:
For too long, Canadian politics has been hijacked by interest groups, cartels, lobbies,
international organizations, corporate or union interests, and the interests of politicians
and bureaucrats in Ottawa who are disconnected from ordinary citizens…The Liberal
government is out-of-control and out-of-touch…We see it in the way the old parties try to
attract votes and support. Not by offering solutions that appeal to all Canadians. But by
pandering to various groups and dividing Canadians into little tribes that can be bought
with promises, privileges and taxpayers’ money. Nobody speaks for all Canadians.
Nobody speaks for the people. (Bernier 2018b)
Based on this evidence, the PPC exhibits all the characteristics of a populist party. From
supply management, immigration, and climate change to interprovincial trade, corporate welfare,
and firearms, populism is a consistent motif. Therefore, the PPC is a populist party. Putting the
PPC’s platform together, I can conclude that the party is an RRP because of its strong radical,
nativist, and populist views and its tepid authoritarian ones.
46
7.5 RRP Subtype
To determine what RRP subtype the PPC fits into, I used Carter’s (2005) typology.12 The
PPC best fits the category of a neo-liberal xenophobic RRP, a subtype that puts a strong
emphasis on fighting immigration, holds cultural racist views, and wants to reform the existing
order to make it more “democratic” and less dependent on state intervention. This subtype is also
more moderate than other RRPs such as neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, and authoritarian xenophobic
types.
First, the PPC places immigration and refugees at the centre of its agenda. Immigration
must be dramatically reduced to both ensure the proper functioning of society and that Canada’s
cherished and unique culture, values, and heritage are not undermined (Bernier 2019b; PPC:
Immigration 2019). Based on the discussion of H1b above, it is clear immigration is central to
the PPC’s ideology. Second, the PPC espouses cultural racism. Bernier explicitly believes in the
superiority of Western civilization and its values. He does not say this is because the West is
majority white but instead because it has a better culture that encourages:
Democracy, individual rights and freedoms…equality between men and women, equal
treatment of all citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation, the rule of
law, separation of state and religion, tolerance and pluralism, and loyalty to the wider
society instead of to one’s clan or tribe. (PPC: Canadian Identity 2019)
12 She identifies three divisions between RRPs: the importance attached to the issue of
immigration, the party’s views towards race, and its attitude towards democracy,
parliamentarism and pluralism (Carter 2005: 28)
47
These Western values have made Canada, according to Bernier, “one of the freest, most
dynamic, and most prosperous societies in the world.” For this reason, Bernier rejects the idea
that all values, social customs, and cultures are equally valuable (Bernier 2019b). Third, the PPC
advocates momentous reform of the existing system in a way that it believes would make Canada
more democratic and less reliant on the state. As the above discussion on populism demonstrates,
Bernier and his party see power concentrated in a few elite groups at the expense of the whole
body politic. To remedy this, substantial reforms are required, all of which would reduce the
influence of the state in the lives of Canadians. Based on the PPC’s views towards these three
divisions, I can conclude that the party is a neo-liberal xenophobic subtype of RRPs. To
summarize, based on a qualitative reading of the PPC’s platform and speeches posted on its
website, I have concluded that it is an RRP because it is radical, nativist, and populist, and holds
some authoritarian views. Using Carter’s (2005) typology, the PPC is of a neo-liberal
xenophobic RRP variety. The relevance of this positioning is twofold.
First, in conjunction with the literature review, I conclude that the PPC benefited from
having a more moderate RRP ideology. The party’s ideology should have shielded it from the
disdain that more extreme RRPs, such as neo-Nazi and neo-fascist ones, experience (Arzheimer
2018; Carter 2005; Golder 2016; Lubbers et al. 2002; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn
2015). As demonstrated below (see Section 8.3), Canadians are increasingly against extreme
authoritarian measures such as the dissolution of Parliament or the Supreme Court. These trends
give further impetus to this point.
Second, the PPC is neo-liberal on socio-economic issues. It is staunchly anti-egalitarian
and wants to reduce the size of government dramatically. Successful RRPs in Europe are
increasingly adopting more centrist or leftist economic positions (De Lange 2007; Golder 2016:
48
479; Rooduijn 2015; Rovny and Polk 2019). Rather than attacking the welfare state, such RRPs
as the National Rally in France or the Freedom Party in Austria now seek to defend it. The PPC’s
neo-liberalism may have compromised this programmatic appeal and undercut potential
working-class support that so many RRPs rely on as their base (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and
Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Givens 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017;
Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Minkenberg 2000; Rydgren 2007). The PPC’s
neo-liberal xenophobic disposition has, therefore, both helped, in terms of a more moderate
stance, and hindered, in terms of a neo-liberal stance on economic issues, the party’s fortunes in
the 2019 Canadian election.
8. Fertile Ground for RRP Success?
Now that it has been established that the PPC is a neo-liberal xenophobic RRP, did the
characteristics that help other RRPs also help it in Canada’s 2019 federal election? This section
will first review immigration levels, then turn to media coverage of both the issue of immigration
and the PPC, and finally investigate nativist, populist, and authoritarian public opinion in
Canada.
49
8.1 Immigration Levels
50
Figure 1 shows the immigration rate, calculated as the number of new annual migrants
per one thousand Canadians, to Canada over the last twenty years. Figure 2 presents that rate
51
from 1867 to 2021.13 Figure 3 displays the change in that rate from 1867 to 2021. Finally, Figure
4 shows the percentage of Western and non-Western immigrants in Canada from 1971 to 2031.
Two general observations can be made about these figures. First and most significantly, both the
rate of immigration and the change in that rate have gradually become more stable and
predictable since 1946. Before then, Canada’s immigration was characterized by periods of sharp
increases followed by similarly sharp declines. The best example of this pattern occurred
between 1900 and 1915 when Canada saw a dramatic increase to its immigration rate followed
by an equally dramatic decline. Although there has been instability since 1947, such volatility
has increasingly levelled out, especially since 1987. The second general observation is that by
1987 and continuing into the present day, the pattern identified above levelled off, resulting in
minimal changes to the immigration rate. When it has slowly risen or fallen, this change has not
been dramatic.
At the same time, two observations suggest favourable trends for the PPC. One of them is
that, in the last few decades, as Figure 1 shows, the immigration rate has increased by 50%. This
is due to the Trudeau government’s decision to increase the annual number of immigrants
accepted to 350,000 by 2021 (The Canadian Press 2018c). However, this uptick has occurred
gradually, as the rate of change over this period shows. Another observation is that, as Figure 4
demonstrates, a higher percentage of immigrants have originated from non-Western countries
since the second half of the twentieth century. It is, therefore, appropriate to note that the
immigrants coming to Canada are increasingly non-white, non-Christian, and non-Western. This
fact, according to the literature review, should have benefitted the PPC. Conversely, the
stigmatization of immigrants based on their assumed non-compatibility with Canadian culture is
13 Numbers for the years after 2019 are projections.
52
not a new idea. Many white, Christian, and Western immigrants have been ostracized as well.14
Figure 4’s significance is, therefore, debatable. Based on these statistics, the picture regarding
immigration is mixed. Although the rate of immigration and the change in that rate in
contemporary Canada has not increased significantly, a closer look at the data shows that, over
the last two decades, the total number of immigrants has grown substantially. Moreover,
although the last fifty years have seen a gradual increase in the proportion of non-Western
immigrants, otherizing newcomers, regardless of their race, religion, or place of origin, is no
novelty. Nevertheless, compared to historical levels, immigration is not strikingly higher.
Because of this, based on H2 alone, conditions are not better in 2019 than in previous years for
an RRP to succeed.
14 See for example Woodsworth (1909) who demonizes Mormons (65-71), Doukhobors (100-
101), Lithuanians (102), Slovaks (109), Ruthenians (109-112), Poles (114-115), the peoples of
the Balkans (122), Italians (133-134), the peoples of the Levant (138-139), the Chinese (144),
Indians (154), Japanese (154-155), Africans (158), and indigenous peoples (159-160). Also see
Stanger-Ross and Schmidtke (2019) and Conrad (2012: 117-119, 172-174).
53
8.2 Media Coverage of the PPC and Immigration Issues
54
Figures 5 and 6 display the degree of media coverage the PPC received as a proportion of
both their place in the polls and in relation to the other five main parties from October 2018 to
October 2019. Figure 7 charts the attention paid to the issue of immigration by the media from
1997 to 2019. Three principal observations can be made about these graphs. First, as Figures 5
and 6 show, the PPC benefited from a disproportionately high level of media coverage. In both
graphs, in every single month, the PPC received more attention from the media than one would
expect, given their place in the polls. The media paid more attention to the PPC, per 1% polling
average, than any of the mainstream parties. This phenomenon was particularly acute leading up
to, and during, the 2019 campaign period in the months of August, September, and October of
2019. Presumably, Canadians paid the most attention to political parties during this period. The
graphs show that between October of 2018 and June of 2019, the PPC only marginally benefited
from an overrepresentation of coverage in the media, while the last three months before the
election saw their coverage explode, both in the number of articles mentioning the PPC and
Bernier and as a percentage of total news articles covering the political parties. While the other
55
main parties saw only a twofold increase, starting during the last two months of the campaign,
the PPC benefited from coverage eleven times greater, and this trend started earlier, during the
final three months of the campaign. By October, for every 1% in the polls, the PPC received 249
more articles than the other major parties. Clearly, the PPC was given the coverage it required to
succeed as the coverage it received was significantly more than any other party relative to its
place in the polls.
Regarding Figure 7, although the frequency of coverage of immigration issues in the
media remained relatively stable between 1997 and 2013, there has been a gradual increase since
2008. This trend increased significantly between 2013 and 2017. Throughout Trudeau’s first
mandate, the media spent about twice as much time covering immigration as it did between 1997
and 2014. Although in recent years, coverage has decreased slightly, overall, the Canadian media
paid far more attention to immigration in the last few years than it did previously. In summary,
these three observations point towards a media that paid attention to the PPC and its issues in
2019. Relative to its level of estimated support and compared to other parties, the PPC has
received a disproportionate amount of attention by the media. Additionally, newspapers paid
more attention to immigration in 2019 than in the past. This should have made the anti-
immigrant message of the PPC more salient to the voting public. Therefore, by all standards,
2019 offered a media environment the PPC benefited from.
56
8.3 Anti-immigrant, Populism, and Authoritarian Public Opinion
Figure 8 illustrates respondents’ views concerning immigration from 1993 to 2019. Three
general observations stand out. First and most importantly, the data shows a rapid softening of
anti-immigrant sentiment between 1993 and 2003. For all three propositions, Canadians became
noticeably more pro-immigrant by the turn of the century. A closer look at the data15 shows this
drop in support for anti-immigrant positions was most acute for those who strongly held those
views. Those with milder anti-immigrant positions either dropped only slightly or moderately.
Second, and most relevant to this particular investigation, anti-immigrant sentiment has remained
relatively stable since 2003 for two of the questions asked. Although some amount of volatility
occurs, there does not seem to be a consistent or substantial change in the proportion of pro- or
15 This data is not shown but can be made available upon request.
57
anti-immigrant attitudes over the last two decades for those questions. In contrast, the assertion
that many people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees shows a slow decline all the way
to 2019. Third, expanded categories of these questions16 show that pro-immigrant sentiment has
intensified over the last few years. The proportion of respondents who strongly disagree that
many people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees has consistently increased since 2012
and has more than doubled from its pre-2015 levels. Since 2015, there is a steady increase in the
proportion of those who strongly disagree that too many immigrants do not adopt Canadian
values. By 2019, this proportion has more than doubled its 2012 levels. As a result, there is not
just a decrease in anti-immigrant sentiment over the years covered, but also a rising intensity in
pro-immigrant stances among Canadians throughout the last few years. Overall, the survey data
in Figure 8 show that a decreasing number of Canadians hold anti-immigrant sentiment. Not only
has opposition towards immigrants and refugees decreased and levelled off since 2003, but
additionally, the proportion of those who strongly support immigrants and refugees has increased
over the recent past as well. Therefore, 2019 was not more favourable to an RRP than
previously.
16 This data is not shown but can be made available upon request.
58
59
Moving on to populist sentiment, two general observations can be made regarding
Figures 9 and 10. First and most significantly, populist sentiment is more widespread now than it
was in 2006. Every line but one reveals a pattern whereby the proportion of those who are either
somewhat or very distrustful/dissatisfied rises from 2006 to 2010, then begins to fall again in
2014 and/or 2016/17. Despite this fall over the last few years, both Figures 9 and 10 show a
higher proportion of populist feelings in 2016/17 than in 2006. Second, in both figures, the
proportion of respondents who indicate that they are very trusting of/satisfied with Canada’s
political system and society saw a noticeable decrease between 2008 and 2010. Following this
drop, the proportion either remained stable or recovered slightly. Despite this stagnation or
recovery in recent years, enthusiasm for Canada’s political system and society has overall waned
between 2006 and 2016/17, and populist sentiment seems to have grown over this time period.
60
This suggests that the time for an RRP breakthrough seemed riper in 2019 than it did a little over
a decade ago.
61
Figures 11 and 12 reveal three general observations about authoritarian sentiment in
Canada. First, Figure 11 demonstrates that support for shutting down Parliament or the Supreme
Court was at its highest in the earlier waves of 2006 and 2008. Every subsequent survey since
then shows support for such extreme authoritarian actions is lower. Second, the proportion of
those who do not personally respect, personally support, or want others to support Canada’s
democracy and political system, as can be seen in Figure 12, has increased overall between 2006
and 2016/17. Authoritarian sentiment as illustrated in that graph is at its lowest levels of support
in 2006, rises between 2006 and 2010, peaks between 2010 and 2014, and declines following
that peak to 2016/17. Although there has been an easing of authoritarian sentiment in recent
years, it still seems more widespread now than it was in 2006. Third, among those who respect,
support, or want others to support Canada’s democracy and political system, there is a
62
moderating of views throughout the various waves. The 2006 and 2008 waves see the greatest
number of strong supporters of democracy and the political system while later waves see those
supporters moderate their positions. From these observations, Canadians hold mixed views about
authoritarianism. Support for more subtle authoritarian positions concerning democracy and
political institutions is higher now than it was in 2006 and Canadians are less enthusiastic
towards democracy and political institutions than they were in 2006. Still, Figure 11 illustrates
that the more extreme authoritarian measures of shutting down Parliament and the Supreme
Court are not as popular as they once were. From this mixed result, it appears an RRP would
have seen a modest increase in support in 2019 than in 2006 as long as it did not back extreme
authoritarian measures.
All in all, the findings are decidedly mixed. On the one hand, the proposition that an
increasing number of Canadians hold low support for diversity, immigrants, and minorities has
been rejected. There are fewer individuals now than there were previously who hold nativist
beliefs. On the other hand, the hypothesis that an increasing number of Canadians are
distrustful/dissatisfied with democracy, mainstream parties, politicians, international
organizations, and society is supported. This means there is more of a populist sentiment now in
Canada relative to 2006. Finally, the statement that an increasing number of Canadians hold
authoritarian views was supported. Therefore, authoritarian sentiment has risen in Canada since
2006. It is germane to note that individuals are not mobilized to vote for RRPs by these three
attitudes equally, with anti-immigrant attitudes being the most influential of the three (Arzheimer
2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rooduijn 2015). I, therefore, conclude that based on public opinion,
2019 did not offer a particularly opportune time for the PPC to succeed.
63
9. Conclusion
This work has attempted to contribute to the timely debate relating to the rise of RRPs
and Canada’s alleged exceptionalism in this regard.17 Unlike so many other Western countries,
Canada has thwarted radical right-wing overtures into the political system. Come election night
on October 21, 2019, the PPC lost its only seat and its vote total fell short of expectations, at a
minuscule 1.64%. Why did the PPC fail in its inaugural debut?
This paper, using survey data from the Focus Canada and AmericasBarometer studies,
alongside other quantitative data from Statistics Canada, Factiva, and Nanos Research, and a
qualitative reading of the PPC’s electoral platform and the context of the Canadian political
system in 2019, has found that 2019 was not a particularly auspicious year for an RRP to succeed
in Canada owing to a combination of historical supply-side barriers and contemporary demand-
side trends. Based on a qualitative reading of the PPC platform and speeches on its website, I
have concluded that the PPC is radical, nativist, mildly authoritarian, and populist and is,
therefore, a neo-liberal xenophobic RRP. This more moderate stance should have served as an
asset for the party, although its neo-liberal economic policies contrast with the growing welfare
chauvinist positions of many RRPs in Europe. Through a qualitative examination of the static
characteristics of the Canadian regime, I have found that Canada’s FPTP voting system, lack of
grand governing coalitions, and unique national traditions, acted as significant barriers of entry
for the PPC. These supply-side barriers nullified the PPC’s leadership, organizational, and
ideological advantages.
Based on a quantitative analysis of immigration rates, media coverage, and survey data, I
have also found that 2019 was not particularly conducive to RRP success in comparison with the
17 For example, see Liberty moves north: Canada’s example to the world (The Economist 2016).
64
past in terms of demand-side trends. While the media did prominently cover both the PPC and
immigration issues, and an increasing number of Canadians hold populist and moderately
authoritarian sentiments, the rate of immigration to Canada and the change in that rate have not
increased, and Canadians do not increasingly harbour anti-immigrant views. Anti-immigration is
the raison d’etre of most RRPs and usually plays a pivotal role in motivating RRP voters. Parties
can better exploit these sentiments when the change in the immigration rate has increased
rapidly. Crucially, and unfortunately for Bernier, this did not occur in Canada throughout the last
several decades.
Therefore, I suspect that the PPC failed because of a mixture of both supply-side
institutional barriers and, on the demand-side, a lack of growing support for anti-immigrant
policies in Canada. Interestingly, the PPC cannot place the blame on a lack of media attention.
They garnered significantly greater attention than their polling numbers warranted. Bernier was
also controversially invited to both the official French and English leaders’ debate. Hence,
Canadians were exposed to RRP views but were not swayed due to their lack of demand for such
opinions.
Based on these findings, the PPC or another RRP will fare far better in the future if a
number of conditions are reached: 1) the current FPTP voting system is replaced with one that
more proportionately translates votes into seats, 2) coalitions become more frequent between the
major parties, 3) the points system is repealed, 4) there is a growth in far-right movements, 5)
restrictive anti-hate laws are scrapped, 6) the PPC or its successor shifts towards more left-
leaning economic positions, 7) the rate of immigration dramatically increases, or 8) Canadians
begin to hold more anti-immigrant views. I suspect these conditions are not likely to be met in
the near future. The political will to reform Canada’s electoral system is lacking, as Prime
65
Minister Trudeau has reneged on his promise to replace the current FPTP system. There also
seems to be a lack of popular appetite for such a change as every provincial referendum on
electoral reform has failed.18 Trudeau has also emphatically ruled out forming a coalition
government (Harris 2019). A steady flow of immigrants, the points system, the lack of far-right
organizations, and laws concerning hate speech all seem to be deeply entrenched within
Canada’s political system. Finally, as Figure 8 demonstrates, Canadians seem to have become
more tolerant of immigrants, not less. As a result, I suspect RRP success in Canada will remain
difficult to achieve.
The value of this paper within the broader discussion of RRPs is threefold. First and most
obviously, investigating whether the conditions that have led to RRP success in Europe exist
here in Canada will help strategists, politicians, voters, political scientists, and others to
understand and predict the electoral fortunes of the PPC. This is especially pertinent now, given
that the RRP party family is the fastest-growing party group in Europe (Mudde 2007) and is
rapidly expanding its reach into other areas of the globe (Anderson 2019; Fleming and Aurelien
2018; Higuchi 2018; Leal 2017; Parker 2018; Perlinger and Pedahzur 2018).
Second, the vast majority of studies on the success (or lack thereof) of RRPs focus - for
understandable reasons - on Western European countries. There are only a few that study Eastern
Europe and the United States and even fewer that examine Canada (for Canada, see Adams
2017; Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Gordon et al. 2019; for Eastern Europe, see Bustikova 2014;
Dinas 2019; Shafir 2000; for the United States, see Cox and Durham 2000; Davis 2019;
Minkenberg 2000). The handful of Canadian studies related to RRP success are either qualitative
18 Since the early twentieth century, electoral reform has been attempted in Canada. More
recently, reform has been considered in the provinces of British Columbia, Prince Edward Island,
Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and federally but all attempts have failed (Barnes et al. 2016;
Tanguay 2009: 232-235).
66
in nature (Adams 2017; Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Ryan 2016; Trebilcock 2018), use outdated
datasets (Bilodeau et al. 2012; Gidengil et al. 2001; Nevitte et al. 1998), or do not systematically
examine a wide variety of variables that determine RRP success (Adams 2017; Ambrose and
Mudde 2015; Besco and Tolley 2018; Bilodeau et al. 2012; Gidengil et al. 2001; Gordon et al.
2019; Trebilcock 2018). Most of these studies focus on issues connected with RRPs but do not
categorically ask why RRPs have not emerged in Canada or whether they will in the future.19
This is surprising given that some authors suggest there is ample potential for RRP
growth in Canada (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Betz 1994: 22-23; Kitschelt 1995). Additionally,
several scholars argue that one weakness of the research into RRPs is an overemphasis on
countries where RRPs are already successful (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015: 39; Rydgren 2002:
28; Rydgren 2007: 257). Uncommon are studies that attempt to explain why RRPs are not
successful,20 though such studies could be equally enlightening by explaining how such parties
operate and the mechanisms through which they succeed (Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 217). This
study has, therefore, filled a geographical and empirical gap in the literature by providing a
novel, systematic analysis of RRP failure in Canada.
Third, concerning explanations of RRP success found in the literature review, this paper
shows that, although robust intra-party organization, charismatic leadership, a conducive media
environment, and increasing demand for populism and moderate authoritarianism may be
necessary conditions, they are not sufficient alone to warrant RRP success. As long as the
19 Besco and Tolley 2018 and Trebilcock 2018 write about the popularity of multiculturalism,
tolerance, and immigration in Canada, Bilodeau et al. 2012 look at sentiment towards immigrants
and racial minorities at the provincial level, while Gidengil et al. 2001 and Nevitte et al. 1998
investigate the Reform Party of Canada. Only Adams 2017, Ambrose and Mudde 2015, and
Gordon et al. 2019 address the lack of RRP success in Canada.
20 A few exceptions include Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015), Backes and Mudde (2000),
O’Malley (2008), Rydgren (2002), and Van Holsteyn and Mudde (2000).
67
barriers to entry are high enough and the demand is low enough, RRPs are unlikely to break
through even with such favourable conditions as those listed above. Therefore, this paper
contributes to the broader literature by showing that a variety of institutional constraints, stable
immigration inflows, and decreasing anti-immigrant sentiment are important factors in keeping
RRPs out of the corridors of power.
This study, although accomplishing the goals set out by being contemporary, systematic,
and focused on Canada, is not an exhaustive analysis of the PPC. There are several avenues for
future research that I believe could bring further clarity to the research question. First, this study
suffers from being purely longitudinal. A cross-sectional analysis, comparing Canada with all
other Western democracies, could better illuminate whether Canada stands out regarding the
variables that determine RRP success. For example, is anti-immigrant sentiment vastly higher in
countries with robust RRPs such as Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, and Austria compared to
Canada? Is Canada similar to other countries that lack RRPs such as Ireland and Iceland? A
second suggestion for future research is to perform a quantitative analysis of the PPC’s platform
and speeches, perhaps by using data from the Manifesto Project Database, once it becomes
available, to determine whether it corresponds with the conclusions of my qualitative analysis of
the PPC’s platform. This same data could also be used to measure whether Canadian parties have
converged ideologically in a way that would create a favourable electoral niche for an RRP.
Third, my analysis of media coverage of the PPC suffers from the fact that it does not distinguish
between positive and negative coverage. I suspect much of this coverage was negative,
especially in light of news stories that reported a consulting firm was hired to covertly discredit
the PPC shortly before the election (Bellemare and Rogers 2019; Yates et al. 2019). It would be
advantageous to test this claim, and to figure out what sort of contribution negative stories in the
68
press and on social media made to the PPC’s failure. Finally, as this research was conducted
during the 2019 election campaign, I could not take advantage of post-election data such as that
from the 2019 Canadian Election Study. It would be a promising approach for future research to
analyze data that takes actual PPC electoral results into account. All of these are promising
avenues for future research that would complement the findings in this thesis.
One thought as to why Bernier did not succeed is that he failed to establish a regional
base. Despite being called the “Albertan from Quebec,” Bernier is a francophone with a thick
Quebec accent. In Canada, a comparable cleavage to Euroscepticism in Europe is Western
alienation. As the complete wipeout of all Liberal seats in Alberta and Saskatchewan, the
vociferous reaction to a second Trudeau mandate in those provinces, and the formation of Wexit,
a movement whose central aim is to divorce the West from Canada, demonstrate, Western
alienation remains a powerful force in Canadian politics. Bernier did not exploit this cleavage, or
at least not in the same defining way that the Reform and Canadian Alliance parties did. The
premise of Western alienation would not be well served by the leadership of a Quebecois.
Additionally, since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, Quebecers by and large support
government intervention in stark contrast to Bernier’s neo-liberalism. More importantly, Quebec
nationalists, although nativist, tend not to be authoritarian or strongly populist, making them
distinct from regionalist radical right-wing movements elsewhere, such as in Flanders and
Padania (Blanchet and Medeiros 2019). In spite of this nativism, Quebec nationalists are far
more motivated by Quebec independence than issues of immigration. Because of the presence of
a sovereigntist party in the form of the Bloc Quebecois, these potential PPC voters have been
coaxed away (Gordon et al. 2019). These circumstances meant that Bernier was unable to
establish a regional base of support, so vital in the FPTP system (Gordon et al. 2019: 6), for his
69
nascent party in either Quebec or Western Canada. Perhaps as a way to shore up this weak spot,
Bernier, in his first major speech since his defeat, focused on regional alienation and the
centralizing tendencies of Ottawa. In it, Bernier promised to decentralize the federation to
counter this growing anger from the West (Bernier 2019e). Only time will tell whether the PPC’s
initial failure in breaking through will result in its expeditious demise or whether a stronger
emphasis on regional grievances in Quebec and Western Canada will allow it to grow in the
same way that national grievances have allowed RRPs in the European Union to.
A concluding thought is that the defeat of the PPC in 2019 should not encourage
complacency in the adversaries of the radical right. Even if the PPC disbands, others will rise, as
has happened already with Wexit Alberta, a party that, as a cursory reading of its platform
suggests, is even more right-wing than the PPC (Wexit Alberta: Platform 2019). The results
should not reassure Canadians that the radical right is incongruous with Canada. Many laypeople
and academics alike, most recently in Germany and Spain, have made that mistake by
underestimating and dismissing RRPs, to their peril. Canadians would do well to heed these
warnings. A sudden increase in immigration, the formation of a Liberal-New Democratic
coalition, or the reform of the current electoral system into one more proportional, although all
unlikely possibilities at present, could each lead to an RRP breakthrough in the future.
Progressives insist that the above changes would benefit Canada. They should be careful what
they wish for, as these changes would also have unintended consequences, such as precipitating
the rise of the radical right.
70
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