Didem Buhari, University of Edinburgh, Explaining Turkey's Failure to Comply with the European Union: a neoinstitutionalist perspective
INTRODUCTION
Turkey is an official European Union (EU) candidate since 1999. It started accession
negotiations in 2005 and enacted substantial reforms in order to align with the EU acquis.
However, negotiations were stalled by the EU in December 2006 due to Turkey’s failure to
comply in several policy areas. This research intends primarily to study cases where there is
significant domestic resistance to the EU reforms and understand why this resistance has
occurred. Accordingly, the research investigates the policy domains in which there are
pressures to comply with the EU requirements, Turkish domestic actors who resist these
pressures and the mechanisms through which the latter receive, translate and reject the EU
“messages”.
This research aims to investigate four recent instances, which constitute “hard cases” for
Turkey’s membership to the EU. Those are Turkey’s restrictions against the EU citizens’ right
to acquire land and work in Turkey, restrictions against Greek Cyprus and the Article 301
penalizing insult to “Turkishness” and Turkish institutions. In all of the proposed instances,
the magnitude and the essence of domestic resistance vary as well as the involved actors.
Although “national interest” argument is ubiquitous, its meaning is different in each case.
Following Neo-institutionalist literature, this paper introduces relevant concepts that might
explain the selected cases. Briefly, apart from the involved actors and the domestic political
organization, the domestic salience of norms and the clarity of the EU messages are advanced
as explanatory variables. Hence, not only material but also ideational factors should be
considered.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
Turkey is an official EU candidate since the EU Helsinki Council decision in 1999. It has
started accession negotiations in 2005 and enacted substantial reforms in a wide range of
policy domains in order to align with the EU. However, the negotiations have been stalled by
the EU in December 2006 due to Turkey’s failure to comply in several policy areas. This
research intends primarily to study cases where there has been significant domestic resistance
to Europeanization and understand why this resistance has occurred. Accordingly, it is crucial
to investigate the Turkish policy domains in which there are pressures to comply with the EU
requirements, Turkish domestic actors who resist these pressures and the mechanisms through
which the latter receive, translate and reject the EU “messages”. In this sense, the role of the
institutions in Turkey’s Europeanization process should be taken into consideration.
Among a wide range of choices, this study proposes to study four recent instances, which
constitute “critical cases” for –i.e. directly consequential upon- Turkey’s Europeanization
process. Those cases are officially reported by the European Commission in its regular
progress reports on Turkey (published annually since 1999). In all of the four proposed
instances, the magnitude of domestic resistance related to the number and the nature of the
involved actors vary.
The four cases of interest involve restrictions against foreigner’s right to land and to work in
Turkey, limitations towards freedom of expression and ban against Greek Cypriot transport to
Turkey. Due to time limitations, we have to limit ourselves by looking only at the foreigner’s
right to own land (FLO) in Turkey.
Resisting Foreigners’ Land Ownership and Europeanization
Since the inception of the Turkish Republic, there have been several legal limitations towards
foreigners’ land ownership in Turkey1. Briefly, according to Turkish legislation, foreign legal
persons’ right to land is totally restricted; villages and military zones are forbidden to foreign
acquisition; finally, the total surface of the land acquired by foreigners may not exceed 30 ha.
In mid-1980s a pro-liberal Turkish government amended the legislation twice in order to ease
1 See for example, the Protocol attached to the founding treaty of Lausanne (1923), Village Law No.442 (1924), Reciprocity Act No.1062 (1927), Land Registry Law No.2644 (1934), Military Forbidden Zones and Safety Areas Law No. 2565 (1981).
the restrictions.2 However, those amendments were quickly annulled by Turkish
Constitutional Court, which announced that land ownership is not merely an economic matter,
but a matter of national interest and sovereignty.3 Hence, restrictions towards foreigners have
been maintained. Up until the officialization of Turkey’s EU candidature, there has been no
development in this domain.
However in 2003, the pro-EU Turkish government decided to accelerate its reform process in
order to start accession negotiations with the EU and passed a law allowing both foreign real
and legal persons to acquire land even from villages. This law aimed at harmonizing Turkish
land market legislation with the EU principle of free movement of capital.4 Yet, upon the
request of the main opposition party, the Constitutional Court decided to annul the new law
based on the same arguments it had declared in 1980s.5
In Turkish Constitution, there are at least four provisions -Articles 6,7,8,9- prohibiting
delegation of sovereignty to an external entity6. Furthermore, the Preamble of Turkish
Constitution stipulates that “…no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to
Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its
state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms
and modernism of Atatürk and …secularism…;” Moreover, Constitutional Court justified its
restrictive stance by claiming that even the EU member states do not unanimously comply
with the free movement of capital. The Court’s reference to the EU member states, which
derogate from the EU is crucial in terms of demonstrating the impact of internal EU affairs on
the Turkish domestic actors.
The opposition parties have successfully sought to mobilize segments of Turkish society
against the liberalization of Turkish land market. Arguments are mainly based on socio-
economic problems, protracted sovereignty disputes with Greece, historical memories on
Turkish national independence war against European forces and, anti-zionist and xenophobic
2 Law No. 3029 (dated 21 June 1984) and Law No. 3278 (dated 22 April 1986).3 Court Decision No. 1984/14 and Decision No. 1986/24.4 Law No. 4916 (dated 3 July 2003).5 Court Decision No. 2005/14.6 Baslar 2005.
sentiments. What is interesting is to observe that the opinions of leftist and rightist segments
of Turkish society converge around the same arguments regarding this issue. For example, a
prominent leading member of a leftist party (and wife of the former Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit) opposed the new land law because she believes this would lead to the mass purchases
of land by Israelis.7 The pro-Islamists attack the law on the same ground.8
A prominent journalist published a map of Turkey showing the current numbers related to
foreign acquisition of land and entitled it “invasion map”.9 A former high-rank civil servant
from Turkish Land Registry argued in his book that lifting restrictions towards foreigners was
equal to treachery to the nation.10 The same argument was endorsed in a written public report
by a non-governmental organization, namely the Turkish Chamber of Survey and Cadastre
Engineers.11
Finally, the main suspicion gaining ground in Turkish society is that the Europeanization
process might undermine the territorial integrity of Turkish Republic. Some scholars call this
suspicion “Sevres Syndrome”, i.e. historical paranoia named after the aborted Treaty of
Sevres in 1920 intending to dismember the Ottoman Empire.12 However, even the Turkish
President of the time stated its concerns over the issue and aligned with the opposition.13
Accordingly, regarding public opinion, a large pro-status quo bloc has emerged embracing
even an unholy alliance among the most extreme ideological opponents. Resonating
arguments are mainly:
7 Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet, “Rahsan Ecevit: South Eastern Turkey might be another Palestine”, 14 June 2006, available online at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/06/14/guncel/axgun01.html (in Turkish). The Israeli ambassador to Turkey falsified Ecevit’s accusations with a public statement. 8 Several articles from newspaper Yenicag and several pro-islamist web sites (eg. http://hanifislam.com/Siyon-izm/IsraillinGozu_GAPta.htm) Pro-islamist segments believe that Zionists claim territory from the south eastern Anatolia based on the “Promised Land” in the Old Testament.9 Can Dundar, “We found the invasion map that scares Rahsan Ecevit: The majority of (land) buyers are Greek!” in Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet, 10 July 2006, available online at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/07/10/yazar/dundar.html (in Turkish).10 Orhan Ozkaya, Yabanciya Toprak Satisi (Foreigners’ Land Purchases), 2005, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. 11 “Turkey's territories in the claws of Neoliberalism” by the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects - Chamber of Survey and Cadastre Engineers, September 2006, Ankara. (in Turkish) available online at http://www.hkmo.org.tr/resimler/ekler/090409688550f3c_ek.pdf12 See Oran 2005.13 “Sezer (President) is concerned about foreigners’ land purchases”, Turkish daily newspaper Radikal, 27 March 2007, available online at http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=216705 (in Turkish).
(Economic disparity)- Due to the difference between purchasing powers, the majority
of Turkish land might be bought by foreigners and Turkish farmers might remain land-
less (See the report of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects - Chamber
of Survey and Cadastre Engineers, 2006).
Emotional link to “motherland” could also contribute to the opposition.
(National security)- Thinking retrospectively, there is a fear that Europeans (particu-
larly Greek nationals) are willing to invade Turkey as they did in 1920s. This time not
militarily but in a peaceful way, by buying Turkish land (Dundar in Milliyet 10 July
2006).
The popular reaction was such that Turkish Presidency and several Turkish universities
launched researches on the current status of foreigner’s acquisition of land in Turkey. The
Turkish General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre has even introduced a new chapter
in its official website in order to answer public questions on FLO. Yet, in contrast to the high
sensitivity in public opinion, official statistics report that foreigners’ land ownership in
Turkey is negligible.14
Concerning the stance of the governing party over the issue, it is hard to draw a
comprehensive analysis. This is partly because the party won a landslide victory in 2002
elections right after its foundation. Moreover, the top officials of the party have been
previously known for their strong opposition to the EU membership. Yet, currently it is
plausible to claim that the main agenda of the government has been based on the
harmonization of Turkish law with the acquis communautaire. However, the attempted
reform in the foreigner’s land ownership issue has been interpreted as revolutionary and faced
institutional resistance from Presidency, several political parties and Turkish Constitutional
Court. Thus, in order to avoid a backlash from the society, the government decided to follow
the established restrictive attitude. Accordingly, the current law maintains the limitations
towards foreigners.15 Nevertheless, the government claims that the FLO issue is exploited by
the opposition and adopts two types of arguments bolstering the FLO. First, the party officials
claim that liberalization would be in the interest of Turkish society by attracting foreign
investment and secondly, relying on the official statistics, they reject the concern that there
14 See the official statistics from the Turkish General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre.15 See the Act Pertaining to the Amendment to the Land Registry Act No. 5444 (dated 29 December 2005).
will be massive amount of FLO.16 However, they fail to appease those who believe that
reciprocity is impossible between Turkish citizens and the EU citizens in land ownership
issue, the gap between Turkish citizens’ purchasing power and the EU average is very high.
Hence it would be uneven for Turkish people to let Europeans buy land in Turkey. Moreover,
the EU policy of issuing limitations on the free movement of Turkish people in the EU even
after Turkey becomes a member might create another obstacle for Turkish citizens to buy land
in other EU countries.
On the other hand, the EU urges for Turkish compliance in FLO. The EU Commission
Reports on Turkey states that Turkish legislation restricting EU citizens’ land ownership has
to be abrogated for the functioning of the internal market. However, the EU is also aware of
the sensitivity of the issue. The same problem has been experienced very intensely during the
negotiations with the new member states.17 Particularly, in Poland the harmonization process
has been controversial due to Poland’s historical land ownership problems with Germany.18
Based on economic needs, several new members have been entitled the right to derogate for a
limited time period regarding second homes, forestry and agricultural land. However, the EU
does not accept arguments based on national security because this would reverse the character
of the Union.19 Hence, the Commission and the ECJ forced Greece to halt its security-related
restrictions against EU citizens’ right to own land from border zones, islands and coastal
regions.20
Finally, during the campaigns for the Turkish general elections held in July 2007, several
political parties put the FLO issue on their campaign agenda and defended arguments against
harmonization with the EU law. However, the pro-EU government won another landslide vic-
tory and established itself as a single government again. The FLO issue has not yet been dealt
with. In order to analyze the case of interest, we propose to use a theoretical framework
mainly derived from neo-institutionalist literature.
16 “Foreigner’s Land Ownership issue is exploited”, press statement from governing party media relations, avail-able online at http://www.haberler.com/yabancilara-toprak-satisi-istismar-ediliyor-haberi/ (in Turkish).17 See Tesser 2004.18 See Wood 2004.19 Hilson 2008.20 See the Commission vs. Hellenic Republic Case 305/87 in ECJ.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Neo-institutionalism is a promising theoretical framework for its analytical openness and its
place bridging highly abstract general theories with the theoretical approaches limited to ex-
plaining stable causal mechanisms. According to George&Bennett, Neo-institutionalism is be-
neficial for researchers investigating a process because it also suggests considering interven-
ing variables such as institutions rather than merely focusing on the initial and final stages of
a phenomenon21.
In summary, neo-institutionalism criticizes the mainstream decision-theoretic approaches on
the grounds that “Political phenomena could not be reduced to the aggregate consequences of
intentional individual behaviour. The organization of political life makes a difference”22.
Similarly, Peter Hall in his book entitled “Governing the Economy” concludes that “The
range of customary policy instruments at hand and the kind of societal resistance to be
expected in the face of a given policy vary according to organizational differences that affect
the perceived costs and benefits of policy in many issue areas”23. Briefly, according to neo-
institutionalism, institutions, defined generally as formal and informal rules and regulations,
have an effect on political preferences24. However, the main variants of neo institutionalisms -
Rational choice and sociological institutionalisms- disagree on the extent of this institutional
effect. This is mainly an ontological dispute over state interests and identity. According to
rational choice institutionalism, states have pre-conceived interests that are exogenous to any
international interaction. Hence a policy might be accepted by a state when it is perceived as
beneficial to its established interests. However, sociological institutionalists reject such an
instrumental review of state interests. Including sociological factors such as culture and
identity to the debate, they defend that state interests are socially constructed and might be
altered not necessarily out of strategic cost-benefit calculations. In other words, policies might
be adopted not only for their benefits but also for their appropriateness concerning the identity
of the state25.
In Turkey’s relations with the EU, neo-institutionalism might thus explain two different
developments. First, the rational choice approach suggests to investigate the number and 21 George&Bennett 2005, p.7. 22 March&Olsen, 1984. 23 Hall 1986.24 See March&Olsen 1989, and Hall&Taylor 1996.25 Aspinwall&Schneider 2001.
relative power of the political actors involved in the case of interest. In his book “Veto
Players: How Political Institutions Work”, George Tsebelis gives an explicit example of
rational institutionalist work26. In our case, veto players, defined as political actors whose
assent is necessary for a change in the status quo, include Turkish Constitutional Court,
Presidency, and opposition parties. Studying the powers ascribed to them might help us to
explain change and continuities regarding EU reforms in Turkey. However, this approach
might also be criticized of excluding socialization and the impact of external actors such as
transnational advocacy networks and epistemic communities in persuading and teaching
domestic agents to adopt new policies27.
In their works, Finnemore, Sikkink and Keck are claim that transnational actors influence the
domestic perceptions and lead to policy changes not only because they are beneficial but also
because they are appropriate28. Besides them, Checkel develops sociological institutionalist
literature with his researches on the domestic agency in receiving and interpreting these
messages transmitted by external actors29. In this sense, it is crucial to scrutinize the
interaction process between external “messages” and the domestic arena that receives and
translates them. This is particularly necessary when there is a significant “misfit” between the
external norms and domestic normative structure. Similarly, Finnemore&Sikkink emphasize
the role of mediators in this process, called “norm entrepreneurs” or “meaning managers”30.
Those mediators should render the external “messages” more meaningful in the domestic
context in order to persuade the domestic actors to adopt them.
Finally, Stanford School of sociological institutionalism known by John Meyer, reminds the
impact of world rate of policy adoption in the state decision to adopt a new policy31. In this
sense, the more a policy is adopted at world stage, the more it is likely to be adopted by the
state in question (here, Turkey). Finally, following the rationalist and sociological
institutionalist literature, we propose to consider at least 5 variables that might explain the
state of the domestic resistance to the EU reforms in the FLO domain.
26 Tsebelis 2002.27 See Alderson 2001.28Finnemore 1993, Keck&Sikkink 1998, p.217-221.29 Checkel 2001. 30 Finnemore&Sikkink 1998.31 Meyer et al. 1997.
DISCUSSION: VARIABLES DERIVED FROM NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM
The rational choice institutionalism suggests that the main veto player would explain the
scope of domestic resistance to the EU policies. In this case, Constitutional Court is the main
veto player and it is officially ascribed the right to annul parliamentary reforms. Hence, this
institution and the ideology of the persons which are engaged in it are very important to
determine the scope and content of the resistance to the EU reforms.
We might also consider 4 other variables derived from sociological institutionalist literature,
namely the presence of significant internal and external pro-reform actors, the world rate of
policy adoption and finally the internal cohesion of the EU.
Preliminary Table on the specific variables in the selected case on Turkey-EU relations
Proposed Variables Land ownership
Main Veto Player Constitutional Court
Significant Internal pro-reform actors Liberal academics and politicians
Significant External pro-reform actors (other
than the EU)
IMF
World rate of policy adoption Low
Internal Cohesion of the EU at chosen policy
level
Contested
There are pro-liberal internal pro-reform actors trying to challenge the established system.
Those actors are mainly academics and politicians who claim that the meaning of “national
sovereignty” has shifted towards a post-Westphalian paradigm. In other words, a restrictive
attitude in land ownership is no more useful and adequate for a modern state. If Turkey is a
European country, it must then liberalize its land market (eg. Baskin Oran). However, their
argument might be weakened by the Constitutional Court’s statement highlighting that within
the EU there is no consensus on this policy area (although it is not a completely fair point).
Moreover, except the EU, there are no significant external pro-reform actors who might
persuade Turkey to change its established policies. The IMF might be stated as an exemplary
institution suggesting liberalization in FLO. However, its suggestions focused on merely
economic wellbeing and cost-benefit calculus neglects the sociological dimension of the
subject. Land is not merely a “real estate” for Turkish people. It is the “motherland” which
refer to Turkish national identity and survival. Finally, the world rate of policy adoption
regarding FLO is low since many states restrict FLO rights32. If it was higher, it would be
more likely for Turkey to be persuaded.
To conclude, those stated variables are certainly not the only variables that trigger Turkish
domestic resistance to the EU reforms. This work in progress aims at discovering new
variables deduced from rational choice and sociological institutionalism and compare their
explanatory power regarding Turkey-EU relations. The main argument is that rationalist
modelling of the selected case should be improved with new variables deduced from
sociological institutionalist literature that highlights the role of ideational factors.
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