ummary

a. UJ DROLLERY 16, also known by ZIPPER desi gnato_ V-14530, was a medicalquack (no license) who appeared in Vienna ca. 1944 or 1951, and be:-Lan treatingSoviet military personnel for VD. Recruited by CIC (Major Peter Chambers),he was droped in early 1949, because of endagered security, and moved outof Vienna. MAVA-1221, 29 April 1948, lists the foregoing, and adds that thesefacts and additional information were passed by a Bulgarian agent C__to the Bulgarian IS, so that this service (and, perhaps, the SRIS) were awareof the status of V-14530 at least as early as Apri1,1948. Soon after OICdropped him, Detachment 35 picked him up on behalf of their projects MaLPHISand MOLINE. Detachment 35 dropped him in 1951 for a number of indiscretions,and a refusal to submit to operational control. (According to our records,Detachment 35 dropped him in "early 1951." V-14530 claims, however, that hewas not dropped until he became seriously ill, and was hospitalized at heend of November, 1951.)

b. In Julyi1951, V-14530 was approached by the SRIS in Vienna, and bar.mid-August, 1951, he had begun to report to the SRIS everything he knew aboutthe AIS„ both American case officers (thirteen in all, CIC and Detachment 35;one subsequently- KUBARK, but soon dropped) and AIS agents. (One POL.' memolists ninety-eight persons, all with direct or indirect IS ties, known toV-14530. It is a reasonably safe assumption that he listed nearly all of thesefor the SES. He also listed all information known to himl uhich was con-siderable, on an MOB operation.)

c. During a period of hospitalization in Salzburg for TB, November,1951, to April, 1952, V-14530 was recruited by a sub-agency leader (V-14501)of ZIPPER's UM organization. ZIPPER did run traces with us, and as a conse-quence CI_ .7.3 (at that time at KUBARK headquarters) stronglyadvised against recruitment, even sua;esting that V-14530 could well be anSRIS agent. The agent was recruited despite this warning, and began to providethe SRIS with all information on zIrm which became available to him.

d. For somewhat obscure reasons, 'V-14530 confessed to V-14501 on17 July 1953, after two years of doubling for the Soviets, that he was anSRIS agent. UM nevertheless decided to attempt to double V-14530 back as,ainstthe SRIS. The record makes it acar thatl from this point on, V-1453P toldeach service most of whet he knew about the other. nma apparently believesthat V-14530 withheld from the SS the vital fact that he had revealed toZIPPER his status as an SRIS agent, a contention g' yen weight by the Sovietarrest of the agent in November or fecember, 1953. On the other hand,analysis of SRIS informazion which V-111530 supplied ZIPPER, indicates someinaccuracies. •

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

noblasalfled and Approved for Releaseby tbo CentralAce AgencyDbtb: a_o-c,45

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b):(2)(A) Privacy [7](2)(B) Methods/Sources(2)(G) Foreign Relations El

e. According to _3 the SRIS case officer of V-14530 becamesuspicious, ca. September, 1953, that his D/A was actually working againsthim. The SRIS arrested the agent in late November or. early December, 1953,and turned him over to the Bularians.

•2. Supplementary Information

a. The information provided by V-14530 about the sais is ,a curiousmixture of truth and falsehood. It appears, however, that the 1) .111k of theinformation submitted on this subject by V-14530 was true and significant.

(1) He correctly describes his case officer, whom we knowto have been Vladimir PRIaTEOV, MVD Vienna, and also

provides a good deal of supplementary inforuttion which is accurate atall checkable points (type of vehicle; hobbies; language skills.) Onthe other hand, his description of the lieutenant colonel whom he des-cribes as the Kommandant in Urfahr (actually, Col. fau srziovcm atthat time) is wholly wrong. (It remains possible thaw he saw the manwhom he described, and was mistaken only in the position which heassigned him.)

(2) He submitted to ZIPPER an S/W pad furnished htm by ae SRIS.

(3) On the othor hand, some operational details reported byV-14530 seem incredible. For example, after entering the UrfahrKomendatura openly, he is disguised with dark glasses and another man'shat (on another occasion with dark ):I sses and false moustache) beforebeing driven to a nearby safe house. Yetl at the conclusion of thismeeting, his case officer, for no discernible reason, drives him throu„hUrrahr streets, undisguised, for ten minutes before letting him out atthe busiest corner in Urfahr - this in a Soviet plated vehicle.

(4) Yet, when the license number of this car, and other Platesreported by V-14530, were checked by VOE, they were found to be knownSRIS plates.

(5) Similarly, V-14530 told ZIPPER that his Soviet case officerintended to place another highly trained SRIS officer in touch with anold Viennese friend of V-14530, one Lilly XilaENICA, a former (AIS)letter-drop for V-14530. icazacKA would then inform V-111530 by letterthat she was in touch with a Soviet of who was willing to defect.V-14530 was to show the letter to his HIM cae officer, sate thathe knew the officer concerned and knew him to be anti-communist, butrefuse to become involved himself, thereby forcing ZIPPER to reve,1 anew operative, from whom the Soviet officer would draw ZIPPER ID's.el however, remembers only that V-14530 denounced one EmiliaKREVENKA to the SRIS as an A'S agent.

MKTOPAZ analysis (EGTA 702556, 27 November 1953) Of a sheet from this, pad snowed it to be a. nieViously unknown SAT system wh*ch' umay be:classified as being of high, security.!'

(6) Again, V-11 1530 reported that at the nineteenth meeting, heldin •Urfahr, his case officer proposed Weyer as the site of the twentiethraee ang. Although, (once again,) the possibility of simple error exists.,there is also a possibility of fabrication here. Even on a de.,ailedmap, Weyer looks as though it were in the Soviet Zone, whereas, inactuality it is in the 1%i-tier:icon Zone.

b. UJ DROLLERY 16 is complicated by the fact that three other yenadinitted, truly or falsely, that they were SRIS agents.

(1) The most important of these is Ferdinand SCIL"!.EFFER,dentscher„ born 3 August, 1924, in Rumania. Like V-14530, SCHAEFFE'Rhad an involved IS history. SCHAEFFER told V-14530 that he (SCH./U-117ER)had been recruited o Petru COlTSTANTIYESCU (a professional peddler, whoonce had ZIPPER. ties, and who was working for the -PIS at this time) in1949. He Was sent to France for training in preparation for commitmentin Rumania l - was adjudged unsuitable, and was hired as a Safe-housekeeper at the school. (Subsequently, some students at this school wereamong FIS agents air-dropped into Rumania, and there arrested and tried.POE suggests SCHAEFFER e s possible complicity, althoulth subsequent inter-rogation and LCFLUTTE;R fa.ilted to substantiate this suspicion.) Atan unknown time prior to 1949, ZIPTM had recruited SCHAEFFER, but droppedhim in January of that year for a security breach and suspected theft.CMISTANTIITESCU picked him up soon thereafter, as did as. The latterorganization dropped him (reason unstated) on 1 March 1950. CONSTOTINESCUappears to have dropped SCH.AaT'ER in late 1952. ;:ccording to his onstatement to V-1)4530, SCHAEFFER was recruited by the SR.IS in Vienna inlate October, 1952, as the result of a chance meeting with an SRISrecruiter. (Comment: SCHAEFFER seems to have been an unscrupulous liarand may well have been recruited by the Soviets ion::: before this date.)At some point in 1953, SCHAMTER went to C_IC and volunteered the infor-mation that he was an SRIS agent, but was so blatant in his attemptsto wring money out of this admission, that CIC considered him merelya swindler and drop;ed all contact with him on 17 August 1953, afterforcing him to sign a pledge (which he promptly ignored) to stay out ofIS work. On 28-29 August 1953, SCHAEFFER admitted his SRIS , tie toV-14530 and, by his account, made it clear that he was dedi.ng, with thesame case officers who were directing V-1/1.530. The 1a ter had initiallyestablished contact with SCHAEFFER in a Salzburg DP camp about June,1953, on SRIS orders. These orders were that V-1)4530 should representhimself as an ASS agent to SCHAEFFER, recruit 'aim for the AIS; and thentry to get ZIPPER to buy him. In addition V-14530 was directed . to Inakeinquiries of SCHAEFFER re one Otto IlEINZTLANIT (who, subsequent eventssuggested, was probably) like SCHAEFFER, already :in the employ of theSRIS at this time.) When SCITAEFFER admitted his SRIS tie to V-114530,he added that he had told only the Soviets about Eril'INZFL1.1A11 and, there-fore, had reason now to suspect that V-14530 was, himself, a Soviet agent.

ii

a. This involved picture is made yet more coaplex by the fact thatV-14530 promptly reported the above to the SKS, being indignant that theyhad blown him to another agent. The SRIS case officer, according to V-14530,thereupon admitted that SCHAEFFER. was a Soviet agent, (Comment: Such anadmission seems somewhat improbablpl ) but reassured V-14530 by adding thatSCHAEFFER had been deceived as to v-14530 t s true affiliations, because theSKS had informed him (SCHAEFFER) that V-14530 had Lamed about FEINZELILTINfrom the AIS and that the AIS had learned about him through a leak in the SRIS.(Comment: Such a "reassurance" is obviously absurd. Had the Soviet caseofficer actually told both V-14530 and SCHAEFFER that the .IS had a penetra-tion of this type into the SRIS, both agents would have had no choice$ butto eschew all SRIS contact from that point on.)

b. V-14530 alleges that he met SCHAEFFER aaain on 8 September 1953,and that the latter added yet anoLher element of confusion to the case byreporting that he had met an old friend, one Anton STEFAN, on 6 Septemberxand that STEFAN had confessed to SCHAEFFER that he (STEFAN) was an SRIS agentiSTEFAN alleged that he was directed from Floridsdorf/Vienna. (SCH.4E75'ER,like V-14530, was directed from Vienna and Noedling.) SWAN had, thereupon,tried to recruit SCHAEFFER on behalf of the SRIS: Later, however, SCHAEFFERwas confronted with STE.LeAN in CIC offices and concluded that STEFAN was aCIO provocation agent.

c. Despite the fact that the can was, by now, overflowing with worms,UM decided ,to recruit SCHAEFFER, (already dropped once by ZIPPER for poorSecurity and theft) and li-14530 accordingly directed SCHAEFFER to fill out a

id45d. V-,14530aarrested by the Soviets on or about 28 November 1953.

SCHAEFFER was interrogated and LCFLUTTERed by KTEARK personnel between 20and 31 December 1953. The results tend to demonstrate that SCHAEFFER (likeV-14530) was indeed a Soviet agent and that he (like V-14530) had, in effect,told the SRIS everything he knew. Finally, checkable information about theSRIS which SCHAEFFER provided ZI2PEP.x proves largely accurate but is also,for the most part, a duplication of information provided by V-14530.

e. After this interrogations SCHAEFFER was turned over to the French(see para. 2b (1), above) and sentenced by them to fifteen years at hardlabor.

f. In addition to SCHAEFFER and STEFAN, one Otto NAT appears withinthe UJ DROLLERYx 16 frameworkas a self-confessed sills agent or, moreaccurately phrased, as a self-claimed KPOe courier to the SRIS ' in Urfahr andMoedling. NAT made this "admission" to V-14530 (and subsequently to V-14501)on 4 October 1953. His reasons for "confessing" are, like the motives ofV-14530, hSCIIAEFFER, and SIEFAY, extremely obscure. (He claimed that he hadlong wiged to harm the XPOe l although for years his livelihood had been de-pendent upon that party.) The story-to1( by NAI is so fantastic that it can,upon the face of it, safely be dismissed as blatent fabrication. NI- offeredto obtain and supply ZIPPER with KPOe intelligence and also to 'rake his

;111; his co-Yrrde:nce. PRtArTtcov "'AV 41sohe be . ils30

METcourier porches available for examination before deliveryy and to do this -despite his poverty - without recompense. On 17 Octobery V-111530 retortedthe MAI case fully to the EIS, and thereafter 1 ,iAi obviously avoided •allfurther contact with V-14530 or V-14501. (Comment: It is possible tha'ois merely a low-level swindler who noted that the constitutionally indiscreetV-14530 was an agent, and decided to try to milk him. It is also possible,however, that NAI was played into V-14530 and V-14501 by the SUS, V-1)4501refused, for a time, to consider the recruitment of Ferdinand SCEAEFYEa.PRIBYTKOV, blocked in this attempt to run a separate line into V-14501 1 mayhave decided to make another play without taking V-1453 of whom he waalready suspicious) by waiting to see whether V-1/630 would report ii I'sIIconfession." (V-14530 did so and the SRIS disclaimed any knowledge of NAI.)

Analysis and Commentary

a. It is felt that ZIPPIR ran this show rather poorly. UN becameinvolved in extremely complicated gambits and shadow-boxing, meanwhile losingsight of fundamentals. Examples follow.

(1) Neither V-14530 nor Ferdinand SCH:EFFER should have beenrecruited in the first place. Both had had a long and dubious IS recordbefore ZIPPER recruitment.

(2) Once V-14530 had admitted an SRIS tie, he should never havebeen given serious consideration for a D/A role. By the time that hehad made this revelation, he was already known to ZIPPER as being aprobable homosexual, a very heavy (probably compulsive) drinker, and aperson Whose emotional instability led him'to consPicuous extravagance.The only person for whom he shows much feeling during this case was hismother; and the fact tha .:, she was living in Bulgaria had given the SHISits initial hold on the agent, by his own statement. To top it all off,V-14530 was so seriously ill with tuberculosis that frequent hospitali-zation was necessary. In brief, there was no reason to feel that1T-14530 could stand the strain of a D/A o peration wit-out a split ofloyalties, and there was ample reason to feel that he co eld not.

(3) V-14530 reported that he was paid fairly generously NISoviet standards.) =PIM, reportingx mentions SRIS payments to the agentonly at the tenth, thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth,nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first meetings; but it is probablethat several other payments were made as well. The reported paymentswere, respectively, 1500, 2000, 1500, 1500, 2400, 4000, 1000, and 2000ANS. As in its 'other D/A cases, ZIPPER anparently made no' effort toapply the ,principle that a L/A must be paid only by the service forwhich he is actually working, and must turn over to that service allfunds paid him by the ol:i)osiion. -Failure to a pPly this 1.rinciple may.have been one of the reasons wily V-14530 worked 31 1oyally" for both sides.libreov • r, the net result Wr13 to give the agent far more m,ney than hecould wisely handle, and thus give him the opportunity (of which heavailed himself most thoroughly) to spend money coaspicuously.

b. It is also felt that„a:, a result of the above, the SR'S gained morefrom this case than did ZIP=. ZIPPER Lamed no identities (those mentionedhere derive from C: =7 and XUTZ.,i.PIVREDCAP in Austria,) aad could not evenbe sure of which component of the SaIS was on the other end of the line,(Identified later a7ain b: :j :-)11 the theory that he vas i.lrotecti%the security of V-1/4530, a theory which seems incredible in vie: of the factthat V-14530 had already confessed to penetrating the UM organization onsais orders, UM allowed a second SRIS agent, SCHAEFFER) into his family.heanwhile, the SRI3 had gained a wealth of valuable information, unfortuna-telyk concerned far more with the .IS than with ZIP-PLR. Finally, thistwo-wv flow was permitted before ZIPPER could assess the value of what itwas gebtin on the $).LIS (as we have 'Ioted, some of this information does notseem sound) and vithout reference to the fact that it could not c,,ntrol,even determine, the kind or amount of information which would be given theSR'S. The final Soviet arrest of V-14530, and the turning over of the agentto the Bulgarians, cannot be regarded as evidence that the Soviets h2d cometo realize that they were on the losing-side in this ball game. On thecontrary, it seems li ely that the S2IS realized that it had extractedeverything of significance that V-14530 could provide, and cold-bloodedlydecided to dispose of the agent before they themselves had been hurt.

4ED

SECRET 9 e

• • f

GV

Fall:

Ziel: Eindringen in den sowjetisohen ND

Quelle undBeschreibung: 33jaehriger Bulgare mit Bohren Spraohimant-

nissen (bulgarisoh, russimoh, serbo-krostimoh,tsoheohisoh, deutsqh, fraizoesisoh). Solt Mrs

1952 Mitarbeiter.

13ezah1ung: Monat110/15000 Schilling ainSehl Yushrungsspestaa.

Beginn: I li 1903

Meldungen un.Bewertung:

iltztubzitsizictezettealc

'Unterquelle undBeschreibung:

Stand bis 31.84953s tall entstand imTali 53 dadureh, dams14 530 gegenuebet Ma 14 501 das Gestaend-nis ablegte, dass er bereits seit aVaetsom-MAW 1952 fuer den sowjet. ND arbeite. Dieeimgehende Befragung des 14 530 laesst kei-nen Zweifel darueber, dass 14 530 fuer einesowjet. Dianststelle der Geganspionage ge-arbeitet hat und an diese alles verratenhat, was er ueber mestliohe ND und Angehoe-rige westlioher BD in Erfahrung bringan honn-te. Der Fall wfrd aussergemehnlioh grossenUmfang annehmen. 14 530 1st von isiner Reissmit Gegenauftraegen unsererseitsbereitsim August 53 zurueokgekehrt. Ns 1st eineReihe Feindagenten erkannt und eine grosseZahl von Personen, ueber die der Gegner in

Stand bi g 31.8.1953 (Forts. weetliche Diebstegen versuoht.Lit Vertretern *on25.50 werden forti.%u:Te4:ae7Ekxechungen:duroefuert, um

• die Interesson der inFragemenden Stollen Wahrzunehmen,bzw. aufeinander abZustimmenAuf die laufende Berichterotl-tung zum Pall KIK Vrird ver10.46:1.