Zimbabwe Special May 2007 New African Part 2

8/8/2019 Zimbabwe Special May 2007 New African Part 2

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May 2007 New AfricANn69

S p o n s o r e d s u p p l e m e n t

We will set out our agenda or interna-tional development in a White Paper to bepublished this week. The central thrust o

this will be the development o partnershipswith developing countries which are com-mitted to eradicate poverty, and have theirown proposals or achieving that, which weand other donors can support.

I very much hope that we will be able todevelop such a relationship with Zimbabwe.I understand that you aim shortly to publishyour own policies on economic managementand poverty reduction. I hope that we candiscuss them with you and identiy areaswhere we are best able to help. I mentionedthis in my letter o 31 August to Hon Her-bert Murarwa. I should make it clear that

we do not accept that Britain has a specialresponsibility to meet the costs o landpurchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new gov-ernment rom diverse backgrounds with-out links to ormer colonial interests. Myown origins are Irish, and as you know, we

were colonised, not colonisers.We do, however, recognise the very real

issues you ace over land reorm. We believethat land reorm could be an importantcomponent o a Zimbabwean programme

designed to eliminate poverty. We would beprepared to support a programme o landreorm that was part o a poverty eradica-tion strategy but not on any other basis. Iam told Britain provided a package oassistance or resettlement in the periodimmediately ollowing independence.This was, I gather, careully planned andimplemented, and met most o its targets.

Again, I am told there were discussions in1989 and 1996 to explore the possibility

o urther assistance. However, that is allin the past.

I we look to the present, a number ospecic issues are unresolved, including theway in which land would be acquired andcompensation paid. Clearly it would not helpthe poor o Zimbabwe i it was done in a waywhich undermined investor condence.

Other questions that would need tobe settled would be to ensure that the pro-cess was completely open and transparent,including the establishment o a proper landregister. Individual schemes would have to

be economically justied to ensure that theprocess helped the poor and or me the mostimportant issue is that any programme mustbe planned as part o a programme to con-tribute to the goal o eliminating poverty. Iwould need to consider detailed proposals onthese issues beore conrming urther Britishsupport or resettlement.

I am sure that a careully worked outprogramme o land reorm that was part oa programme o poverty eradication whichwe could support would also bring in otherdonors whose support would help ensure thata substantial land resettlement programme

such as you clearly desire could be under-taken successully. I is [sic] to do so, they toowill need to be involved rom the start.

It ollows rom this that a programmeo rapid land acquisition as you now seemto envisage would be impossible or us tosupport. I know that many o Zimbabwesriends share our concern about the damagewhich this might do to Zimbabwes agricul-tural output and its prospects o attractinginvestment. gNA

Clare ShortOne bad letter withlong-lasting consequencesOn 5 November 1997, Britains then secretary of state forinternational development, Clare Short, wrote what has

become one of the most defining landmarks in Zimbabwesrecent history her letter to Zimbabwes then minister ofagriculture and land, Kumbirai Kanga, repudiating Britainscolonial responsibility for land reform in Zimbabwe.Below is Clare Shorts letter in full.

Dear Minister, George Foulkes hasreported to me on the meetingwhich you and Hon John Nkomohad with Tony Lloyd and him[sel ]

during your recent visit. I know that Presi-dent Mugabe also discussed the land issuewith the prime minister briefy during theirmeeting. It may be helpul i I record wherematters now rest on the issue. At the Com-monwealth Heads o Government meet-ing [in Edinburgh], Tony Blair said that helooked orward to developing a new basisor relations with Commonwealth countriesounded upon our new governments poli-cies, not on the past.


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70nNew AfricAN May 2007

Baour: So ar we have heard only oneside o the story about the beating up oMorgan Tsvangiria and the other MDCleaders. What really happened on the day,and why did your oicers beat up theopposition leaders?Deputy Commissioner Matanga:First, Iwould want to welcome you to police head-quarters, and thank you or coming to listento our side o the story. I would like to believethat the Ministry o Inormation has given

you a broader picture o what is going onright now in the country, so I will connemysel to the specic issue you have raised.

There are quite a number o activitiesor events which occurred beore and since11 March. For example, in January andFebruary this year, MDC activists had pet-rol-bombed cars, mini-vans, public buses,and had attacked police stations and ocersand injured some o them. These are actso terrorism which the police were tryingto deal with beore the events o 11 Marchoccurred.

But o particular interest to you, rom

your question, is the day when the leadero the MDC anti-Senate action, MorganTsvangirai, was arrested. [Tsvangirais ac-tion was against entering candidates or lastyears Senate election, which led to a split othe MDC into two, one action the pro-Senate election is now headed by Pro ArthurMutambara].

On Sunday 11 March, at about 11am,the leaders o the two MDC actions wereseen inciting people to attend a rally which

had been banned by the police. We thendeployed our ocers to make sure that peaceand tranquillity prevailed, and that peoplewere not going to be disturbed by anyone.

It was in the Higheld area o the capi-tal, Harare. To be more specic, it was at theMichipisa police station where the oicerin charge was patrolling and carrying onhis responsibilities in the area with eightother ocers in a pick-up truck, when theyencountered a group o about 200 people.

Unortunately, there were ve-year-old chil-dren in ront o this big group and the policeound it diicult to encounter this groupbecause o the presence o these young chil-dren.

As a result o the MDC ocials incit-ing people to attend a banned rally at Zim-babwe Grounds in Highields, this groupo 200 people became very rowdy againstthe police. They attacked our oicers andseverely injured two o them.

Thereater, in reaction to this encoun-ter, the leader o the MDC pro-Senate ac-tion, Pro Arthur Mutambara, was arrested

along with some o his members and theywere detained at the Michipisa police station.Because Mutambara did not resist arrest andwas not violent towards the police, he wasnot assaulted, nobody touched him.

From the intelligence we got that morn-ing, Mr Tsvangirai was then phoned by oneo his own members telling him that he waslosing the limelight to Arthur Mutambarabecause Arthur had been arrested and wasalready in police cells, and that i he didnt

come, Arthur was going to take the glory andworld attention rom him.

So Mr Tsvangirai, not wanting to lose thelimelight to Mutambara, then drove straightto the Machipisa police station. When hegot to the main gate, he encountered the

police ocers manning the gate. There wasa group o ordinary people and MDC sup-porters standing outside the gate when MrTsvangirai arrived and demanded the releaseo Mutambara and others.

The police openly told him not to getinside the station as the people outside weretrying to overrun the station. Tsvangirai,deying the police admonitions, tried to orcehis way into the station. Thats when he wasbeaten up by our ocers.

ZimbabweThe police speak

Zimbabwes deputy commissioner of police (operations),Godwin T. Matanga, explains to Baffour Ankomahwhy his officers beat up Morgan Tsvangirai and otheropposition leaders on 11 March. It was in self-defence,because Tsvangirai and his group were trying to overrunthe Machipisa police station by force, says the deputycommissioner.

Constable Pretty Rushwaya, one of the twopolicewomen whose house was petrol-bombeby suspected MDC activists, receives attentioat the Parirenyatwa Hospital


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A bit later, Mr Lovemore Madhuku(leader o the National Constitutioal Aseem-bly NCA, which is allied to the opposition),also arrived and demanded the release o thesame group led by Mutambara. Again, Mad-huku was beaten up by the police. Thats whatI can say about the arrest o Mr Tsvangirai.

Baour: What happened to Sekai Hol-

land, one o the MDC emale ofcials, andthe others?Matanga: She was in the group goingaround the area mobilising people to attendthe banned rally. She was telling people todey the police oicers manning strategic

points in the area. She was telling themto disregard the police presence and proceedto the Zimbabwe Grounds and attend therally.

She incited the people who had gatheredaround Machipisa shopping centre, a largegroup o people, to come towards the policestation and overrun it. It was at this stage thatMorgan Tsvangirai arrived.

Tsvangirai was now at the gate, and SekaiHolland was still inciting people to attend

the rally. When our ocers tried to stop her,she came out o her vehicle and insulted theocers. This is what prompted the ocersto react against her and her group. They pro-voked our ocers. Initially, they were toldnot to enter Higheld, but to make a U-turn

and go back home. They reacted by insult-ing the police ocers, calling them all sortso names, denouncing the government andthreatening to drive past the roadblock.

In the process o apprehending them,Sekai Holland was manhandled and sheclaims that she was beaten. But she wasnt.She was only manhandled in the process obeing orcibly taken out o their vehicle intothe police vehicle, and taken away to theMachipisa police station.


MDc atvstsapproahed the polestaton from the bakand thre some petrolbombs nsde thehouse here three ofour female ofersere sleepng.



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Baour: Did she resist arrest, and isit the norm that you beat up people

you arrest?Matanga: I it is the norm wewould have beaten up ArthurMutambara and the otherswho were irst arrested. ButMutambara did not resist arrestand he was not violent. Fromthe inormation I got rom theground, the irst group didnot resist arrest. It was when

Tsvangirai arrived that thegroup became violent andwanted to overrun thepolice station.

And please let me saythis clearly: It has been saidthat our authorities here,meaning the government, orderedour ocers to beat these people up.This is not true! It was a spur-o-the-momentreaction, a spontaneous one, adopted by ourocers to deend themselves. There was nopre-planning or beating any people up. We

did not even know that Tsvangirai and hispeople would come to any police station andtry to overrun it.

No, it was a spontaneous reaction byour ocers on the scene in retaliation to thebehaviour o Tsvangirai and his group. It wasin sel-deence, our ocers were being over-run and they had to deend themselves.

Baour: Did they retaliate because two otheir colleagues had earlier been severelyinjured by this group o people?Matanga: This incident happened well aterthe two oicers had been injured. It hap-

pened because Mr Tsvangirai was trying toorce himsel into the police station.

Baour: Can I clear this up: You say it isnot the normal practice to beat up people

you arrest? So why did your ofcers beatup Tsvangirai and his group afterthey

were arrested?Matanga: No, we dont beat up people wearrest. Thats why Mutambara and his groupwere not beaten up when they were arrested.

But Tsvangirai and his group were violenttowards our ocers, they were trying to over-run the police station. I must tell you, roman aspiring president, I did not expect suchbehaviour rom Tsvangirai.

Baour:But Tsvangirai says he and hisgroup were beaten up in police custody.They say, afteryou arrested them, you putthem in your cells and your ofcers con-tinued to beat them in the cells.Matanga:That is not correct. The beatingtook place outside the police station, because

they were trying to overrun the police sta-tion. And Tsvangirai was never detained inpolice cells.

Baour: Sure, he wasnt!?Matanga: He was not!

Baour: So why did he say, in his article tothe British newspaper, The Independent,that your ofcers put him and his groupin cockroach inested cells where they

Top: Sergeant Smart Makurumure (left) andConstable Never Ndowa, were the two policeofficers who were attacked by MDC supporterson 11 March hours before the general fracas atthe Machipisa Police Station that saw Tsvangiraiand other opposition leaders beaten up. (Inset)Deputy Commissioner Godwin Matanga is incharge of police operations nationwide


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Baour: So the beating took place out-side?Matanga: Yes, it was outside. And it was as aresult o his own behaviour, trying to overrunthe station.

Baour: Ater this incident, and since 11March, some o your ofcers have beenpetrol-bombed by people you say areMDC activists? How do you know thatthey are MDC activists, and not Zanu PF

masquerading as MDC?Matanga: Yes, we know conclusively

that they are MDC activists. I will give youtwo copies o our report into these events.This is not manuactured inormation. Thisis the recording o events as they took placethroughout the country.

Regarding the bombing o our ocersat the Marimba police camp, it happenedabout 11.30pm on 12 March, a day aterTsvangirais event. It is now conrmed thatsome MDC activists approached the policestation rom the back, having cut the security

ence o the station. They got in, identiedthe house, and threw some petrol bombsinside the house where three o our emaleocers were sleeping.

It is now also conrmed that two o them Constables Moyo and Rushwaya werebadly burned, they received 25% and 20%burns respectively and are now on admis-sion at the Parirenyatwa Hospital. Neigh-bours had to rescue them because they weretrapped inside by the re. The third emaleconstable Makamba was miraculouslyonly slightly injured. I am reliably inormedthat i things go according to expectation,

the two constables would be out o hospitalin three months time.

These are acts o terrorism being perpe-trated by MDC activists. In the course o ourinvestigations, we have discovered explosives,detonators, pistols and the remains o petrolbombs picked up by our ballistic ocers.

Baour: So you are sure that they areMDC activists? But Tsvangirai has oreverbeen saying that his people do not engage

in violence, rather they are the ones whoare always sinned against by the police, thegovernment, and Zanu PF activists.Matanga:He would say that, wouldnt he?One o the leaders o the bombers who isnow in custody, Piniel Denga, ran on theticket o the MDC in a by-election. He ranor a parliamentary seat as an MDC candi-date in Mashonaland East in the Maronderaarea, and he was deeated. So we have positiveidentication.

And why do I qualiy these as acts o ter-rorism? I can assure you that on the rst daythere was a lot o conusion within policeranks regarding how these people were oper-ating. They were not the normal criminalswe had been arresting all along. These peoplehad received training to carry out these actso terrorism.

But two or three days inside the opera-tion, we came up with some inormationthat the main culprit was Piniel Denga. Wesubsequently arrested him with all this stu detonators, explosives, wires and the rest

in his fat, right in the central business areao Harare. We went into a specic fat andthese things were picked up.

We then linked what we got rom his fatwith the stu collected rom the scene o theprevious bombings. They had tried to bomba night train bound or Bulawayo with 730people in it. We tied up all these loose ends asa result o the discovery in his fat. In the pro-cess, we discovered that all the groups whichwere carrying out these acts o terrorism wereactually getting their supplies rom PinielDenga. He was the point man, the maindistributor who, ater each act o violence,

would make payments to the bombers.We are inormed that some o the bomb-

ers were paid in oreign currency. We nowknow that on the rst day o the operations,some o them were paid US$100 each, andsome were given Z$150,000 per head. Otherpayments were going to be made ater eachact o terrorism. Our investigations are stillgoing on and we are still picking up theseculprits.

Perhaps I should go back a little bit and


And please let mesay ths learly: ithas been sad that ourauthortes here, meanngthe government, orderedour ofers to beatthese people up. Ths snot true!


continued to beat them up?Matanga: [Laughs sarcastically]. No, no.That is not correct. He was not detained inpolice cells.

Baour: Did you see his article in TheIndependent?Matanga: Yes, I saw it, but it was not cor-rect.


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give you more context. Some ew monthsago, and this is now in the public domain,Tsvangirai and his people actually addressedrallies where they said they were in the processo orming up democratic resistance com-mittees or DRCs in all districts throughoutthe country. We now know the members othese DRCs by name. Their modus ope-randi is simple: a DRC ormed in Harare inthe north would go up to Bulawayo in thesouthwest and commit these acts o terrorism

and come back to Harare in order to avoidarrest by the police. In the same vein, a DRCestablished in Bulawayo will go to Mutare inthe east and commit acts o terrorism and goback to Bulawayo.

Our investigations have so ar clearlyrevealed that the majority o the memberso the DRCs were staying in Harvest House,the headquarters o the MDC in downtownHarare. We took time to carry out that oper-ation. We had made some checks on theirhouses and they were nowhere to be ound.

Baour: You are saying, Mr Commis-sioner, that these petrol bombers wereactually sleeping inside the headquarterso the MDC?Matanga: They were not only sleepinginside there, they spent all their time there,and would be deployed in the night byPiniel Denga to go and carry out these acts oterrorism. And this is very much conrmedinormation.

And when we nally stormed HarvestHouse on 28 March 2007, we arrested about10 or 11 o them on the spot, the main DRCmembers, and they are in custody right now.

Our investigations are still going on, we arestill picking up some o them. We now have35 o them in custody. The rest are at large,not sleeping in their homes.

Baour: When you stormed HarvestHouse, it was reported worldwide that

you had again arrested Morgan Tsvangirai.Why did you arrest him?Matanga: We didnt arrest him. What actu-ally happened was this: Mr Tsvangirai hap-

pened to be in Harvest House when westormed it. Unortunately he had lockedhimsel up in his oce. There was a lot oresistance by the DRC members against ourocers when they tried to open the doors.They didnt want us to know that Tsvangirai

was in the building. In act, ater some time,Tsvangirai actually came out on his own. Heunlocked his door and presented himsel tothe police. And he allowed our oicers tocarry out the arrests o the DRC members wehad come or. We took them away, and MrTsvangirai was let behind at Harvest House.He was not arrested.

Baour:So you didnt take him away. Youare sure?

Matanga: O course I am sure! He was notarrested.

Baour:So why did the Western newsagencies, the BBC, CNNand the others

report that you had arrested him againand taken him away, on the same day thatthe SADC summit was beginning inTanzania?

Matanga: Well, you are the journalist,you should know. All I can say is that MrTsvangirai was not arrested on that day. I heis an honest man, he will conrm that he wasnot arrested and taken away. You see, I amnot a journalist, but rom my understandingo these things, as our minister o inorma-tion indicated on CNNthe other day, thisis all manuactured inormation against ourcountry Zimbabwe, its not the truth o what

happened on that particular day.

Baour: In your investigations, have youpicked up any oreign links to these bomb-ers. There have been press reports claimingthat there are external links to what is hap-pening. Is that true?Matanga: What I can say or now is thatrom day one, some Western ambassadorsaccredited to Zimbabwe were actually mov-ing around with Mr Tsvangirais group. We

in the ourse of ournvestgatons, ehave dsoveredexplosves, detonators,

pstols and the remansof petrol bombs pkedup by our ballstofers.

Right: The police call a press conference inHarare to announce the exhibits seized frommembers of the MDCs Democratic ResistanceCommittees (DRCs) who had been on an orgyof petrol-bombing and other violence since thebeginning of February 2007


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actually have photos o them. They had beento Machipisa, Marlborough, Borrowdale,Avondale and Southerton police stations, andalso at Avenues Clinic, in their CD-markedvehicles, bringing ood to Tsvangirai and hispeople. The ambassadors themselves werecarrying the ood; they did not send theirdrivers, they themselves carried the ood andbrought them to Tsvangirais group in theclinic and police cells.

So it was clear that they were actually

behind the scenes, i not behind the wholething. They also attended in ull orce thehearing in the Rotten Row magistrates courtin Harare [when Tsvangirai and his groupwere brought to court]. You dont need tobe a rocket scientist to understand what thatmeans.

Baour:Have you interviewed Tsvangiraiabout why his partys headquarters wasbeing used to harbour petrol bombers?Matanga: On the day, to be air, we didntwant to trouble the man. Our ocers decided

that they would come back to him when hewas actually needed, or him to comment onwhy these people were being kept in HarvestHouse. We know where Tsvangirai lives. Wedidnt go to Harvest House to apprehendhim. We were there to arrest the suspects weknew were hiding in the building. Duringour investigations i it becomes necessary thatwe should interview Mr Tsvangirai, we willdo so. But on that day, there was no need totrouble him.

Regarding your earlier question o posi-tive identication and how we were sure thatthese suspects were MDC activists, let me

add that the arrests started o ater the ZanuPF oces in Mbare, Harare, had been pet-rol-bombed. A group o about eight peopleperpetrated the act. There were some peopleliving there and they tried to make a citizensarrest, but the bombers ran away ater scalingthe ence wall.

In the process o scaling over the wall,one o the suspects, identiied as AmosMusekiwa, an MDC DRC activist, droppedhis cellphone, a Nokia 1100, and his slippers.

The local people identied him with the helpo the slippers and the cellphone which hada number o messages stored in it connectedto the bombings. We are now in possessiono some good inormation as a result o thatcellphone.

Baour:An impression has been createdthat Mutambaras action o the MDCis not violent and that all the violence is

coming rom Tsvangirais action. Can youconfrm it?Matanga:We want to believe it, too. But olate, we have noted with a lot o interest thatMutambara and Tsvangirai are now holdingor addressing rallies together, including theNCA leader, Lovemore Madhuku. So, eventhough they say Mutambaras pro-Senate ac-tion is not violent, when they team up andhold a rally together and something happens,you cant say then his action was innocent

and Tsvangirais action was responsible. Atthe end o the day, we would lump themtogether. So I cant say Mutambaras actionis not violent. They pretend not to be, butwho knows?

Baour: So, what is the whole aim othese bombings and what you call acts oterrorism to get the government out opower?Matanga:Our understanding, in the police

orce, is that Mr Tsvangirai has ailed to makeit through the normal democratic process,so maybe to please his masters, he wants touse violence to achieve what he couldnt getthrough the ballot box. Remember this is notthe rst time they are doing this some timeago he advocated or a nal push to kickout the government but never succeeded.

And this time around, he wants to attackthe state security orces, and it is our beliethat he wants us to over-react so the interna-tional community will condemn us and thegovernment. But to the credit o our ocers,

we have not taken the bait and over-reacted,despite the provocations. We know that thecurrent spate o MDC violence is clearlymeant to undermine the authority o the gov-ernment and at the same time blackmail it inthe eyes o the international community.

Remember when Tsvangirai was beatenup by our ocers on 11 March, it was clearlyin sel-deence. They used minimal orce todeend themselves and their station whichwas being overrun by Tsvangirai and hisgroup. It may have been too harsh on him,but we maintain that our ocers used mini-mal orce to deend themselves and their

station.

Baour:You make a good point when yousay, the tactic is to provoke the police toelicit an over-reaction, which will thenbe condemned and blamed or sure onPresident Mugabe by the internationalcommunity, as they have blamed him or

what happened on 11 March. And this iswhy your ofcers have to be very careulwhen they react to such situations.

One of the leaders of thebombers ho s no nustody, Pnel Denga, ranon the tket of the MDc n

a by-eleton.



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Matanga: I agree with you. From whatweve heard so ar, it is quite clear that theMDCs Western sponsors had believed thatbecause o the current economic diculties,the police are rustrated and they would sup-port Mr Tsvangirai in whatever he did. Yes,there are economic problems in the country,but our orces will not succumb to such acheap ploy. We do have problems and thegovernment is trying to address them. Butdespite the problems, we will carry on our

duties as mandated by the constitution oZimbabwe.

Baour; According to the MDC, the policeare quick to react when it is the MDC

which is perceived to be in the wrong, anddo nothing, or at best very little, when itis Zanu PF or the government sinningagainst the MDC.Matanga:I you go back into our records,you will ind that when people commitcrimes they could be Zanu PF, MDC orthe government we have arrested, and pros-

ecuted, them. Let me give you one example.The other day we arrested a Zanu PF provin-cial ocial at the airport trying to smugglediamonds out o the country, and he is rightnow in remand custody. So what are theytalking about?

In act during the elections, we arrestedmore Zanu PF members o parliament, notjust ordinary Zanu PF members, and theywere brought beore the courts.

Baour: So what do you say then to theallegation that the police are being usedby the president and his government to

perpetuate themselves in power?Matanga: I think it is a chicken and eggsituation. We are here to maintain law andorder, and obviously the head o state is MrMugabe and one o his jobs as head o stateis to see that law and order prevails. But Ican say that we have received no directiverom him to beat up or arrest anyone. Evenour own home aairs minister under whomwe directly serve, has not given us any suchorder. Our ocers only arrest people when

they commit crimes.

Baour: Talking about law and order, wasthe government justifed to place a tem-

porary ban on rallies in certain areas othe capital?Matanga:Yes, under the Public Orderand Security Act, there is a section whichempowers our regulatory authorities whohappen to be our ocers commanding thepolice districts in the country to ban suchrallies when they see t. They are very muchempowered to do so under the Act. Theydont even need to ask permission rom thecommissioner o police, the home aairs

minister or the president. Thats why youveheard that the ocer in charge o Chitung-wisa district had imposed a ban, and inHarare south, the ocer there also imposeda ban. It was in reaction to the violence thathad been going on in recent months.

Baour: You mean the ban can be imposedlocally by the commanding oicersthere?Matanga: Yes. And o late, the oicer inChitungwisa has seen it to lit the ban,and people are now allowed to hold ralliesagain. Interestingly, when he lited the ban,

Mutambaras action o the MDC thendecided to cancel a rally they had scheduledwhen the ban was in orce. Interesting, isntit? When there was a ban, they threatened tohold the rally come rain or shine. The policethen lited the ban, and they said no, we arenow not going to hold the rally ater all.

Baour: So you are saying there was a jus-tifable ear by the police that these ralliesmight lead to violence?

what i an say for nos that from dayone, some westernambassadors aredted

to Zmbabe ereatually movng aroundth Mr Tsvangrasgroup. we atually havephotos of them.

Torn shirt: Police constable Never Chimusiin hospital after he and his colleagues werebeaten up by MDC supporters on 11 March


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BBC eyewitnessWe foughtthe policeOn Tuesday 13 March 2007, the BBCpublished thefollowing eyewitness account on its website. According

to theBBC

, a 32-year-old man, John (not his real name)spoke to its correspondents from a secret location inthe Zimbabwean capital, Harare, about the fracas thatensued between the police and the MDC leaders andtheir supporters on 11 March. Here are excerpts:

T

here were about 60 o us rom thearea where I live and we joined up

to head to where the rally was goingto be held. The police were alreadythere when we arrived and were trying to stopthe rally rom going ahead.

By the time Tsvangirai arrived, therewere more than 1,000 o us youths, all sing-ing. When he came, he just started litinghis arms and everyone was celebrating to seethe leader alive. That was when the troublestarted because he wanted to talk to us andthey were trying to separate him rom us.

The situation was getting heated Tsvangirai and the police were arguing,

and we were carrying on singing and

shouting, louder and louder. All inall, there were only about 30 police

and [we] were more than 1,000 . We weretoo many or them.

They couldnt control what was happen-ing. They started throwing tear gas. Some othem took Tsvangirai and the MDC ocialsthat were with him and orced them in theirvehicles. They drove away in two pick-upsand a white Toyota deender.

A lot o people started feeing rom the

tear gas but some o us stayed and sang, indeance. We started ghting back. We threwstones at them, and when they began rushingtowards us, we started ghting with thembecause we wanted our reedom and wewanted our leader to be released.

They knew they couldnt win and sostarted shooting at us. One o us was killed.They shot my riend Git Tandare dead.When we realised that one o us had beenkilled, everything became worse. We went

on the rampage and we did not even ear orour lives. There was a lot o action and as wethrew punches, we cried in Shona: Ngatir-wirei rusununguko (lets ght back or ourreedom).

When they [the police] realised thatsomeone had been shot, they tried to runrom the scene. They had pick-ups but notall o them made it back in time beore theydrove o. About six or eight o them were let

with us. As they ran, some o them droppedtheir batons so we picked up their discardedsticks and used them to beat their let-behindcolleagues. The police were badly beaten.

One o our youth leaders started calm-

ing the situation. He knew that i we carriedon like we were we were so angry thatwe would kill them. I that happened, thetrouble would be too bad. We let the policeon the side o the road and ran away. It wasabout one oclock in the aternoon. We wereall told to disperse because we were araidthat more police were going to come.

They [police] say they did not expecttrouble on Sunday, but they are the ones whostarted the trouble. They shot one o us. gNA

Frontline policing: A line-up of Zimbabwes riotpolice gets ready for crowd control. On 11 March,as the BBCeyewitness testifies, the police werehugely outnumbered by the MDC supporters

There as a lot of atonand as e thre punhes,e red n Shona:Ngatirwirei rusununguko(lets ght bak forour freedom).


10/18


The MDC National Executive Com-mittee met on Saturday 31 March2007, ollowed by the NationalCouncil on 1 April. The National

Council considered the current national cri-sis. This press conerence is pursuant to thediscussions and resolutions o the NationalCouncil the MDCs supreme decision-

making organ in between congresses.On the SADC summit in Tanzania: The

MDC places a lot o signicance in the deci-sions o the SADC heads o states emergencysummit. The act that the regional body metspecically to discuss Zimbabwe is in itsel anacknowledgement o the Zimbabwean crisisand an acceptance that the despot RobertMugabe has ailed to run the aairs o ournation.

More importantly, the SADC emergency

summit clearly recognised that the ongoingeconomic and political crisis is both unsus-tainable and a threat to regional stability.This is unprecedented.

The SADC position is urther reinorcedby the bold decision to appoint PresidentThabo Mbeki o South Arica as the media-tor with a view to acilitating a resolution o

the crisis through dialogue between Zanu PFand the democratic orces.

This is a triumph o regional sovereignty.This is a victory or the people o Zimbabwe,and Aricans in general. The MDC applaudsthese resolutions o the SADC emergencysummit and condemns the attempt by thedictatorship to underplay SADC eorts bydeclaring the summit a victory or the disas-trous Mugabe policies that have brought su-ering to the people.

Hell, no! It was neither a victory nor anexcellent meeting or Robert Mugabe. It wasa devastating blow to the ugly ace o ZanuPF. There has been movement in attitudesand opinions among Aricans with respectto Zimbabwe.

Aricans no longer accept Mugabesgrandstanding as a liberation hero, reedom

ghter, land revolutionary, anti-imperialistand champion o Arican rights. They nowaccept him or what he is. A despot who hasbecome a negation o the values and prin-ciples o the liberation war, a dictator whobrutalises Aricans and denies them basichuman rights and economic opportunities.

So what is it that the people o Zimba-bwe want? It is our submission that at thecore o the Zimbabwean crisis are issues ogovernance and legitimacy. Our country is

Arthur MutambaraSADC summitis a victory for thepeople of Zimbabwe

Prof Arthur G. O. Mutambara,(pictured) leader of the otherfaction of the oppositionMDC, called a pressconference in Harare on 2April to react to the decisionsof the SADC summit inTanzania. We publish belowhis full statement.


11/18

ruled by a corrupt, incompetent, criminal,and brutal kleptocracy, which has retainedpower through raudulent elections.

We do not want any urther polls in ourcountry under the current constitutional andelectoral ramework. We want a new people-driven democratic constitution, electoral lawreorms and legislative changes that allow orthe holding o ree and air elections.

Furthermore, we want this new demo-cratic and electoral dispensation to take root

in our country now, thus creating conditionsconducive or ree and air elections. It is ourdemand that the rst plebiscite under theseconditions should be internationally super-vised. We will respect any government thatis produced by these processes.

Beyond resolving the challenge o illegiti-macy, the people o Zimbabwe can then dealwith issues o economic recovery, stabilisa-tion, transormation and growth.

We want Zimbabwe to be a globally com-petitive economy in terms o GDP, per capitaincome, business growth, exports, FDI [or-

eign direct investment], worker conditions,wages, and entrepreneurship. Our visionis that o Zimbabwe as the leading Aricandemocracy, characterised by people-centredsocial development and economic growth.

How are we going to achieve what wewant? In order to establish levelling o thepolitical playing eld in Zimbabwe, throughthe reorms we seek, there is need or a broadalliance o all democratic orces.

Civil society organisations and politicalparties must work together to restore democ-racy and reedom in Zimbabwe. Events o thepast month have demonstrated the capacity

o Zimbabweans to execute unity o actionand purpose.

As a party, we resolve to continue withthe spirit o cooperation in pursuit o the re-democratisation o Zimbabwe, beginningwith the achievement o national consensuson a new constitution ollowed by agreementon a new electoral dispensation which willensure that the next elections are palpablyree and air.

We will continue with our deiance

campaign to press the Zanu PF governmenttowards an all-inclusive dialogue around thechanges we seek. We will continue to deyPOSA, AIPPA, and the illegitimate govern-ment o Robert Mugabe. [POSA stands orPublic Order and Security Act, and AIPPAAccess to Inormation and Protection o PrivacyAct]. It is critical to maintain and leveragethe momentum that has gathered againstRobert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. All demo-cratic orces must close ranks, carry out joint

actions o deance against unjust laws andthe illegitimate regime, and also support eachother in their independent institutional ini-

tiatives and actions.It is in this context that the MDC unre-

servedly supports the national stayawayplanned by the Zimbabwe Congress o TradeUnions on 3-4 April 2007. We ully endorsethis revolutionary conrontation with theregime and call upon all Zimbabweans torally behind the trade union movement to

make the stayaway a success.When the conditions or ree and air

elections have been achieved, the MDCbelieves it is critical or the democratic orcesto ensure that every vote counts against ZanuPF. It is essential that opposition parties donot compete against each other in elections.

There is need to galvanise and energisethe entire national electorate by presenting aunited ront against Zanu PF. We believe ina single candidate philosophy and principle

in all elections (presidential, parliamentary,senate, council, etc).

Consequently, the MDC resolves tocontinue dialogue and seek agreement withother opposition parties in order to establisha possible election coalition ramework andcandidate selection methodology.

It is our submission that national interestshould take precedence over narrow and sel-ish interests. The democratic orces shouldnot allow Zanu PF to reinvent, regenerate,

and succeed itsel. I this happens, it willmean Zanu PF rule or another 20-30 years.This must be stopped by any means necessary.

The old adage has never been moreapplicable; united we stand, divided we all.An all-inclusive and cohesive united ront oalldemocratic orces is essential to give ourcountry a resh start. Our nation needs theinjection o a new value system, a dierentpolitical culture, and redemptive institu-tional rameworks. Our economy demandscreative technocratic solutions and capacitythat these Zanu PF morons are incapable o

providing.We will be masters o our destiny. Wewill not allow the dictator to determine theuture o our country. We will step up to theplate and ree ourselves. We will embark onan economic journey.

With our strength in natural resources,physical inrastructure, and human capital,Zimbabwe is destined or greatness. What weneed is to stand up to the Zanu PF cowardlydictatorship which has turned our nationinto an unashamedly criminal state.

The transormation o the police into acriminal, sadistic, brutal orce is worse than

anything we ever saw under the [Ian] Smithregime. We will stand united as a people aswe conront the regime in the process oreclaiming our sovereignty, reedoms, liber-ties and dignity.

It is our generational mandate. We willnot be ound wanting. We will deeat theseZanu PF morons and cowards. We owe it toourselves, to uture generations and to pos-terity to stand rm.

The struggle continues. gNA


The SADc emergenysummt learlyreognsed that theongong eonom andpoltal rss s bothunsustanable and a

threat to regonal stablty.Ths s unpreedented.



12/18


Moments ater Morgan Tsvangi-rai walked out o the nationalexecutive meeting on 12 Octo-ber 2005 [at which the MDC

split into two], I proposed that the remain-ing members o the management committee

meet with him urgently to convey our con-tinued support or him as MDC leader andour desire to accommodate his concerns.

During October, November and Decem-ber [2005], I met with and wrote to MDCnational executive members in both actionsurging them to rerain rom making the vitri-olic statements that so badly exacerbated thetensions between the two camps.

For example, on 12 November, I metwith Tsvangirai in Bulawayo and urged

David ColtartWhy I cannot join Tsvangirais faction

Last year, David Coltart (pictured), a former Rhodesian policeofficer and now the MDCs white MP for Bulawayo South,wrote a piece for the website, NewZimbabwe.com, explainingwhy he could not join Morgan Tsvangirais faction of theMDC. His major reason: Tsvangirais faction has a propensity

for violence and has not taken any action to discipline itsmembers who had used violence in the past. In fact, ithad rehired members who were expelled or suspendedfor using violence against fellow MDC members. Coltartspiece undermines Tsvangirais recent claims that he doesntbelieve in violence and has on many occasions restrained[his] supporters from being violent.


13/18

him to rein in those in his camp mak-ing divisive and infammatory statements.On 19 November, I met with GibsonSibanda, Git Chimanikire and Job Sikhala.I urged Sibanda, likewise, to rein in thosein his camp and I challenged Chimanikireand Sikhala regarding some o the statementsmade by them.

I repeatedly wrote and spoke to EddieCross during October, November andDecember about some o his newsletters

which in my opinion exacerbated tensionsbetween the two actions.

Believing that the unresolved intra-party violence was one o the main stum-bling blocks to reconciliation, I put orwardproposals to both Tsvangirai and Sibanda inNovember and December 2005 as to howthat issue could be dealt with.

When it became apparent to me in Jan-uary, or reasons I will elaborate on below,that those proposals would not be accepted,I accepted that reconciliation was unlikely. I,however, made a ew urther attempts to rec-

oncile. I met Tsvangirai and a ew leaders ohis action in Bulawayo on 27 January 2006and urged those leaders who were responsibleor making divisive statements to stop.

I met with other leaders in both actionsin January and early February 2006, but bymid-February, it was clear that both actionswere determined to go ahead with theirrespective congresses and that the holdingo separate congresses would end any hopeo reconciliation.

Accordingly, on 20 February, I wroteidentical letters to both Tsvangirai andSibanda advising them that I would attend

neither o the congresses and would not seekoce in either action.

I oered to assist with others to medi-ate a settlement between the two actions.In doing so, I did not oer to arbitrate (inother words, I did not suggest that I be givenany power to decide nally on the variouscontentious issues).

I concluded by recognising that bothleaders would have to await their respec-tive congresses and the election o respective

national executives beore responding to myoer. I also said that once the mediation pro-cess was over, I would then have to decide onmy own political uture.

Both letters were hand delivered. On 29March 2006, I received a letter rom [Proes-sor Arthur] Mutambaras action acceptingmy oer to mediate. Having not heard romthe Tsvangirai action, I spoke and wrote toseveral national executive members o theTsvangirai action to ask them whether the

issue had been discussed.Eventually on 2 May 2006, I received

a letter rom Tendai Biti, in his capacity assecretary general o the Tsvangirai action,rejecting my oer to mediate. I can but spec-ulate why my oer was rejected.

One o the reasons given by Tendai Bitiwas that I was not neutral, something I read-ily concede and indeed made mention o inmy original letters to Tsvangirai and Sibanda.I pointed out that no one is genuinely neutral,and I am no dierent, but some have to at least

try to mediate i litigation is to be avoided.Other national executive members o the

Tsvangirai action I have spoken to, state thatthey ound themselves in a Catch 22 situa-tion. I they agreed to mediate, that wouldundermine their claim that there is in actno division and thereore no need or anamicable divorce (with the corollary that theMutambara action is not a action at all butjust a small renegade breakaway group), andyet i they turned me down on those grounds

it would appear petty in the minds o MDCsupporters who are generally distressed by thedivisions and who would like the dispute tobe resolved amicably.

Poltal volene

The reasons or the split in the MDC arenumerous and complex. It has becomea deeply emotive issue and many are soentrenched in their positions that they havestopped listening. Accordingly, it will serve

no purpose to enumerate or analyse all thereasons or the split.

I will simply deal with what is or mepersonally the key issue, namely, our com-mitment to non-violence in waging thisbattle against tyranny. I reiterate that thereare many other important issues involvedbut our approach to this particular issue ispivotal or me.

I have had the misortune o experiencingtwo civil wars in Zimbabwe. As a teenager, Isaw the horrors o war rsthand during theliberation struggle. As a young lawyer, I had

to represent many victims o the Gukura-hundi and my wie, a physiotherapist, hadto treat many o the injured.

These experiences made me vow that Iwould do all in my power to prevent urtherconlict in Zimbabwe. Those experiencestaught me to be very sceptical o elderly poli-ticians who are very happy to sacrice thelives o gullible and impressionable youthsto achieve their own political ends.

Zimbabwe is aficted with a disease akinto alcoholism, namely, endemic violence. Forwell over 150 years, leaders o this beauti-ul country bounded by the Zambezi and

Limpopo have used violence to achieve theirpolitical objectives.

Violence was used by Lobengula to sup-press the Shona. Violence was used to colo-nise and the threat o violence was used tomaintain white minority rule. Violence wasused to overthrow the white minority. Andsince independence, violence has been usedto crush legitimate political opposition.

The use o violence has been com-pounded by another phenomenon namely,



The sustaned and longterm use of volene nZmbabe les at thevery ore of many of the

problems our naton faestoday. we are ndeedafted by a very serousdsease and need help.


14/18


a culture o impunity. Those responsible oruse o violence have never been brought tobook. Not only is there a long history oviolence being used successully to achieve

political objectives, but also those who havecommitted horrendous crimes have pros-pered through their actions.

As a result, the use o violence is nowdeeply imbedded in our national psyche.Political violence is accepted as the norm.[But] political violence is not the norm indemocratic societies. It may be the norm intyrannical states. It may have been used inthe ormative stages o democracies. But it isnow anathema in democracies.

There is also no doubt that the use oviolence inhibits economic development andcreates a whole barrage o social problems,

including domestic violence. The sustainedand long term use o violence in Zimbabwelies at the very core o many o the problemsour nation aces today. We are indeed afictedby a very serious disease and need help.

What then attracted me to the MDCwas the commitment to breaking this cycleo violence by using non-violent means toachieve its political objectives. I was alsoimpressed by its commitment to end impu-nity in Zimbabwe.

Whilst there has always been a vigor-ous debate within the MDC about whethertyranny could be ended solely through theuse o non-violent methods, there was alwaysa broad consensus that this was the onlycourse open to us i we were to act in thelong term national interest.

It goes without saying that there was asimilar consensus regarding the intra-party

operations o the MDC. For me this was aclear-cut battle between the MDC commit-ted to non-violence and Zanu PF, a party thatboasted o having degrees in violence.

Accordingly the attempt by some MDCyouths to murder the MDC director o secu-rity, Peter Guhu, on 28 September 2004 inHarvest House [the MDC headquarters indowntown Harare] was deeply shockingbecause it breached a undamental tenet owhat we stood or.

Even worse were the subsequent rev-elations made at the enquiry into the Guhuincident that senior ranking MDC ocialsand employees were either involved or sym-

pathetic to the youths.No action was taken against any o thoseresponsible or this violence and in thatinaction we saw or the rst time a cultureo impunity developing within the MDCitsel, which in some respects was the worstthing o all.

Young men oten have a predispositiontowards violence, that happens the worldover and Zimbabwe is no dierent. Whatcontrols that predisposition is the mannerin which it is handled by leaders. I it is notdealt with, a culture o impunity developsand violence perpetuates itsel.

That is precisely what happened. Thoseresponsible or the September 2004 vio-lence were not immediately disciplined andit came as no surprise when the same youthswere used to seriously assault the MDC stamembers in mid-May 2005.

A urther enquiry was held and its reportwas presented to the national council meetingheld on 25 June 2005. It was resolved thatone member o sta ound responsible ordirecting the youths be expelled. The youths

Young men oftenhave a predspostontoards volene...what ontrolsthat predspostons the manner nhh t s handledby leaders.

MDC leaders, including Arthur Mutambara(in beret) and Tendai Biti, leave HararesRotten Row Court on 13 March


15/18

themselves had already been expelled in lateMay by the management committee and theexpulsion o the youths was conrmed.

That was undoubtedly progress butregrettably it was clear rom the evidence thatother senior members o the MDC and stamembers were also involved or sympathetictowards the youths.

Beore a ull debate about their ate couldbe held, the meeting was ended much to thedissatisaction o many, including mysel.

I was so concerned about their ailure toget to the bottom o the violence that I pre-pared a statement that was tabled at the nextmeeting o the national executive, held on 15July 2005. Parts o it bear repeating:

The MDCs commitment to non-violence,demonstrated so powerully in the last six years,has earned us deep respect rom within Zim-babwe and internationally. It has ensured thatwe command the moral high ground. It has alsobeen our most powerul weapon against ZanuPF as we have been determined not to ightthem on ground they are amiliar with.

The attempted murder o the directoro security last year and the assaults on loyalmembers o sta in May constitute the most seri-ous assault on the credibility o the MDC sinceit was established in September 1999. Theseactions have already seriously undermined thecredibility o the MDC.

I believe that our commitment to non-violence is so undamental that extraordinarymeasures need to be taken in dealing withthis scourge. I we do not send out a clear andunequivocal message to Zimbabweans in gen-eral and in particular to our own members andsta that violence will not be tolerated, then we

will simply reduce the standing o the MDC tothat o our opposition, Zanu PF.

I reiterated my belie that the investiga-tion had been incomplete and that urtherinvestigations and disciplinary action wasneeded. Regrettably, none o my recommen-dations were adopted.

The party accordingly lurched orwardtowards the Senate [election] issue with thesevery serious issues remaining unresolved andwhilst, as I have stated above, there are many

dierent reasons or why the MDC split on12 October 2005, ew seem to appreciate theproound infuence these issues had on thedecision taken that day.

The situation was compounded by theact that in the national executive meetingheld on 12 October 2005, it emerged thatsome o the same people suspected o beingbehind the September 2004 and May 2005violence (but not disciplined) were also orga-nising teams to intimidate provincial com-

mittees to vote against participation in theSenate [elections].

For example, Manicaland, a provinceinclined against participation, came with adelegation instructed to vote or participa-tion in direct reaction to the intimidatorytactics. To that extent, the vote to participatein the senatorial elections had very little to dowith the elections per se and more to do withthe philosophy o the MDC.

It was with this in mind that I suggestedto Morgan Tsvangirai when I met him on 12November that an independent commission

o enquiry into violence be established.I suggested that the Harare lawyer, Inno-cent Chagonda, and the retired judge, Wash-ington Sansole, be appointed to investigateand report on all the allegations o intra-partyviolence, including allegations made by thosein the so-called anti-Senate camp againstthose in the pro-Senate camp.

Tsvangirai promised to consider the sug-gestion. It was particularly poignant that onthe very evening ater I discussed the issuewith Tsvangirai, a supporter o the Tsvangiraiaction, Bekithemba Nyathi, was seriouslyinjured by youths rom the so-called pro-Sen-

ate action. The incident made it all the moreimperative that the issue be rmly addressedand that violence be completely rooted out.

I pursued the suggestion over the nextew weeks and discussed it with GibsonSibanda as well. On 8 December 2005,I received a call rom Innocent Chagondaadvising that he was phoning on behal oTsvangirai to advise that he (Chagonda) eltthat he could not be on the commission butthat Tsvangirai wanted me to chair it.

I replied in writing the same day and sug-gested the ollowing terms be applied:

1. The commission shall investigate thecircumstances, causes and participants oall intra-party violence aficting the MDCthroughout the country with eect rom 1October 2004 (I was under the impressionthen that Peter Guhu had been assaulted inOctober 2004) up until 31 December 2005.

2. The commission shall have the rightto subpoena any witnesses and all members

o the party shall cooperate with the commis-sion, and i they do not cooperate, that actionin itsel will result in disciplinary actionagainst the person concerned (we cannot havethe situation that prevailed last year when akey witness reused to appear obviouslyevery person has the right to reuse in terms oZimbabwes laws but i they do so then theyrender themselves liable to party discipline).

3. The commission shall report on its nd-ings to the national council and shall makerecommendations to the national council.

4. The national council shall make the nd-

ings public within one week o the productiono the report, ailing which the commissionshall have the right to make the same public.

5. In cases where the report inds thata member has been involved in violent actsdirectly or indirectly or has been respon-sible or organising the same, the nationalcouncil shall immediately reer the case tothe disciplinary committee and request thechairperson o the disciplinary committeeto suspend the member in terms o Section9 o the Disciplinary Code o Conduct pend-ing the appearance o the member beore thedisciplinary committee.

6. The commission shall be comprised o(at your suggestion) mysel as chair and (atyour suggestion) Washington Sansole andBeatrice Mietwa, and i needs be, decisionsregarding ndings o act and recommenda-tions shall be by majority vote.

7. The commission shall endeavour tocomplete its work beore the partys congressand any person ound, prima acie, to beinvolved in violence shall be banned romcontesting or oce at the congress.




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In the same letter, I advised that I haddiscussed the matter with Gibson Sibandawho had agreed to the suggestion in prin-ciple. I pointed out that the suggestionwould only work i both actions sup-ported the initiative and said that Ihoped it could get under way early inthe New Year.

Having not heard back rom InnocentChagonda, I wrote to him again on 8 Janu-ary 2006, asking to hear rom him urgently.

A ew days later, I was phoned by a seniornational executive member in the Tsvangiraiaction to say that my proposal was a deadletter. It was explained to me that MorganTsvangirai was no longer interested in pursu-ing the suggestion.

I subsequently had a private meeting withTsvangirai on 12 January 2006 and it wasclear in that meeting that he was not inter-ested in pursuing the proposal any urther.

It was also then clear to me that reconcili-ation was impossible and rom that momenton, I changed tack and promoted the con-

cept o an amicable divorce between the twoactions.The two actions congresses have now

come and gone. I have, o course, hoped thatirrespective o my eorts, the violence issuewould be addressed by both actions.

I had hoped that the mediation processitsel would yield an agreement that wouldprevent inter-actional violence. Accordingly,I have taken the rejection o the eort to medi-ate by the Tsvangirai action as an indicationthat there is still no desire to tackle this disease.

In addition, I have become increasinglydismayed by the ollowing:

1. The senior member o sta dismissedby the national council in its June 2005 meet-ing has been re-employed by the Tsvangiraiaction.

2. The youths responsible or the vio-lence in Harvest House in September 2004and May 2005 [who were] expelled rom theparty by the management committee (andendorsed by the national council) have beenre-employed by the Tsvangirai action.

3. At least one o these youths was

involved in the unlawul hijacking o a vehi-cle in the lawul possession o the Mutambaraaction in March 2006. It appears as i nointernal disciplinary action has been taken

against this youth.4. The senior members o the nationalexecutive and MPs implicated in the HarvestHouse violence were all elected to the nationalexecutive and some are on the new manage-ment committee o the Tsvangirai action.

5. Senior members o sta implicatedin the Harvest House violence have retainedtheir positions.

6. Tsvangirai action chairman o HarareProvince, Morgan Femai, was quoted in thepress as having told a rally in Muakoze on 2April 2006 that: Beore we remove Zanu PF,we will stamp them (the Mutambara action)

out. No statement rebutting this policy hasbeen issued by the leadership o the Tsvan-girai action.

7. The Tsvangirai actions winning can-didate in Budiriro is one o the very peoplesuspended by the MDC national council inJune [2005] or two years on the accusationo being involved in the Harvest House vio-lence.

8. The Budiriro by-election has beenmarked by violence and illegal activity,

including the tearing down o the Mutam-bara action candidates posters.

Lp-serve

In the last ew weeks, leaders within theTsvangirai action, including MorganTsvangirai himsel, have spoken about theircommitment to non-violence. That is obvi-ously a step in the right direction but merestatements do not impress me. Even ZanuPF leaders have spoken about their beliein non-violence recently. In this regard, thepledge that Martin Luther King drated in1963 is relevant.

All those involved in non-violent civildisobedience activities in Alabama wererequired to rerain rom the violence o thest, tongue and heart. It is the last injunc-

tion that is all important, or it is easy orleaders themselves not to be involved inviolent activities and to convey the pretenceo a commitment to non-violence in theirspeeches.

Zimbabwes history is littered with exam-ples o leaders who have preached non-violencewhilst at the same time have organised actionsbehind closed doors. This gets to the very nubo my concerns or it appears to me that theTsvangirai action has shown no inclination

it appears to me that the Tsvangra faton has shonno nlnaton to deal th ths aner. indeed f anythng,t ould appear the only onern of leadershp of thatfaton s not to be openly assoated th volene.

Police constables Noriet Tichareva and NeverChimusi narrate their ordeal at the hands of MDCsupporters on 11 March


17/18


whatsoever to deal with this cancer.Indeed i anything, it would appear that

the only concern o leadership o that actionis not to be openly associated with violence.All the evidence, as set out above, points to aninclination merely to pay lip-service to the prin-ciple o non-violence and to ensure that all thoseresponsible or violent acts in the past are ree touse similar tactics in the uture.

In contrast, it seems to me that theMutambara action is prepared to root out

the problem. It is willing to set up an inde-pendent enquiry to investigate and addressall incidents o intra-party violence and wasprepared to engage in mediation. It has notsought to protect the youths responsible orthe assault on Bekithemba Nyathi, all owhom are now acing criminal charges.

From the evidence beore me, it seemsthat the Mutambara action has not pursueda violent or unlawul course since its con-gress. In stating this, I am not suggesting thatthe Mutambara action is made up o saints.There is no such thing in politics. But it does

appear to me that it is at least prepared toconront the problem.Some may consider my concern about

violence as trivial. Some have argued thatbecause we are conronting an evil regime, remust be used against re. Others have arguedthat non-violent techniques were appropri-ate when [Mahatma] Gandhi tackled Britishcolonialists in India and when Martin LutherKing challenged racism in the USA, but thatthese techniques are wholly inappropriate inconronting a violent Zanu PF regime.

I have been criticised or being nave orout o touch with reality. In any event, say

others, the most important task is to removethe regime and the issue o violence can beaddressed once the main task has been com-pleted.

The same people argue that one shouldthereore back the action that has the mostsupport irrespective o the techniques theyuse. In essence, their argument is that the endjusties the means.

I beg to dier or a number o reasons.


Firstly, I think the ailure to deal with vio-lence within our own ranks now is o para-mount importance or the uture o Zimba-bwe. I we perpetuate violence and impunityagainst ourselves, how will we ever addressthis problem nationally?

And i it is not addressed nationally, thenare we not going to ensure that this cycle oviolence and impunity is perpetuated?

Edmund Burke once wrote: The use oorce alone is but temporary. It may subdue

or a moment, but it does not remove thenecessity o subduing again, and a nationis not governed which is to be perpetuallyconquered.

I we are going to change Zimbabwe intoa modern, successul, democratic state, we

simply have to break this cycle o violencenow. We will nd that i we do not stampout violence in our ranks now, it will comeback to haunt us.

I we do not prevent leaders with violentinclinations rom gaining high oce within

the opposition, they will naturally assume infu-ential positions in government and once theyhave done so, they will then have access to allthe levers o national governmental power aar more rightening prospect.

Given their nature, which is there or all tosee, there is no doubt that they will continue touse the violent methods they employed in opposi-tion, in government.

Ironically, that is precisely the Zimba-

bwean experience o the last 26 years but wedo not appear to have learnt a thing.

Secondly, we must realise that we are anation in denial regarding the extent o theproblem. We are a bit like an alcoholic. Wedo not recognise this deault mode o resort-ing to violence as a disease.

We have become so accustomed to vio-lence being used as an acceptable politicalweapon that we have lost sight o the act thatthe democratic world has moved on and that

such methods are anathema elsewhere.By a silent and insidious process o osmo-

sis, we have absorbed this disease and tragi-cally we do not understand the extent o theproblem.

We are so consumed by the Zimbabweancatastrophe that we do not understand whywe need to take bold and decisive measures toheal this afiction in our own ranks.

I have no doubt that our ailure to nipthis problem in the bud is the single big-gest cause o the MDC split. I we do notdeal with it now, then our political woes will

continue.Thirdly, non-violent methods are themost eective in tackling this regime. It iswrong to think that non-violence and civildisobedience/mass action are incompatibleor that anyone who believes in non-violenceopposes mass action.

On the contrary, peaceul mass action isthe very thing that the Zanu PF regime earsthe most. But you cannot expect leaders witha predilection or violence to organise peaceulmass action successully.

I youths are undisciplined and given reereign in dealing with internal party issues,

then it is inevitable that they will use similarmethods in conronting this regime.

However, i leaders have instilled disci-pline in their subordinates, they can havecondence that any demonstrations they leadwill not degenerate into violence.

I suspect that one o the reasons MorganTsvangirai, and other MDC leaders rom bothactions or that matter, have not led protestmarches yet is because they may have little

Zmbabes hstorys lttered thexamples of leadersho have preahed

non-volene hlst atthe same tme haveorgansed atons behndlosed doors.


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condence in the discipline o their ollowers.The problem now is that these methods

may have become deeply ingrained and inthe 100 or so days let in this short wintero discontent, it will be dicult to change

those ways.Fourthly, the method most eared by theregime is non-violence or the simple reasonthat they have no answer to it. The regimesclaim to have degrees in violence is no idleboast. This is the very territory they are mostcomortable in.

Their gratuitous acts o violence in thelast six years have not just been designed tointimidate. They have also been designed toprovoke the opposition into a physical ght.The regime desperately needs a pretext to useall the power at its disposal.

In addition, the regime desperately needs

a scapegoat or a diversion because it has noanswer to the economic problems it has cre-ated or itsel. It simply does not wash withthe public or these woes to be blamed onsanctions or drought. But i the nation wereto descend into a bloodbath, it will have awonderul diversion which it will i massaction is not careully organised by peoplewho have a deep-rooted commitment to andunderstanding o non-violent techniques.

Leadership is ultimately about taking

responsibility or the welare o others. Goodleaders have a responsibility to ensure thatthe people who repose aith in them are notunnecessarily endangered.

I a political leader is privy to inorma-tion that can harm his or her ollowers (whichinormation those ollowers do not have),then that leader has a responsibility to warnthose ollowers o the potential danger.

Leaders must not simply listen to whatpeople at the grassroots are thinking andollow what they want to do willy-nilly.

Whilst leaders must obviously respectthe goodwill and wishes o their sup-porters, i they know that the belies otheir supporters are based on alsehoods,misconceptions or propaganda, lead-ers have an obligation to warn people.

Leaders cannot just act like lemmingsand hurtle over the cli with their support-

ers simply because the majority o people aredoing that. I leaders know that an organisa-tion their supporters have placed so muchaith in has serious faws, then they have aduty to warn people o those faws.

I leaders do not, then they ail the verypeople whose welare they are responsibleor. It is in this context that I have decided thatI would do a disservice to the people who haveelected me and put so much aith in me i I wereto join a action o the MDC which I ear doesnot appreciate the gravity o the problem causedby its ailure to root out violence.

I am not swayed by mere numbers; i Iwere, I would have joined Zanu PF a longtime ago. I am not swayed by the undeni-able act that the Mutambara action o theMDC has a mountain to climb i it is ever torule Zimbabwe. What I am swayed by is the

responsibility I have to the people who longor a new beginning and an end to the longand desolate nightmare o ascist rule.

Until leaders take a principled stand tobreak the cycle o violence and impunity inZimbabwe, no meaningul and long termsolutions will be ound to the crisis Zimba-bwe nds itsel in today.gNA

(This article was rst published bynewzimbabwe.com, and last updated on11 September 2006)

Our falure to npths problem n thebud s the snglebggest ause ofthe MDc splt. if edo not deal th tno, then our poltaloes ll ontnue.

Suspected MDC petrol-bombers arrive in court

Documents

Zimbabwe Special May 2007 New African Part 2