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Yvan Guichaoua
MICROCON workshop June-July 2011
Group formation, identities and mobilisation – Findings and policy implications
Project’s organisation
Project leader Prof. Frances Stewart – Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford
Research team Ingunn Bjørkhaug (FAFO), Morten Bøås (FAFO), Carlos Bozzoli (DIW), Tilman Brück (DIW), Yvan Guichaoua (University of Oxford), Anne Hatløy (FAFO), Frances Stewart (University of Oxford), Mark Taylor (FAFO)
Countries Colombia, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Ukraine
Objectives • This Work Package aims to further current understanding of collective violence grounded in individual perception of identities and interactions • The Work Package focuses on key questions about who the actors of conflict are and why they choose to join in violent activities Focus on activists and perpetrators of violence
Methods Mostly qualitative (interviews with low-level combatants, leaders, NGO representatives etc.; archival search…). Exception: Ukraine survey
A fast-growing research field
Dominant analytical framework when the project started: greed models, flawed in many respects Role of natural resources dependence has been reconsidered A-historical (no interaction with the state) Absence micro-foundations (‘loose molecules’ assumption) Need to know what armed groups are empirically made of
Weinstein’s more sophisticated account Micro-level approach Opportunists vs activists The central role of finance Still a very top-down, static approach, not fully valid empirically
Present research trends (inc. MICROCON) In depth case studies, individual surveys, refinement of the
Horizontal Inequalities’ approach more complex yet more empirically accurate approaches
Articulating MICROCON’s findings
A major caveat: violence is a special kind of conflict Users of force become prominent (veterans and sportsmen) Rules of the game and dynamics are different
Armed groups consolidate through a matching process First movers: entrepreneurs of violence Rank-and-file: multiple logics of participation
Emerging research topic: armed groups’ behaviours
What do Entrepreneurs of violence do?
Collective action puzzle: attracting (the right) followers
Identity production: the cognitive dimension of violent enlistment Top-down or bottom-up? Which identities work? Religion v ethnicity Performative repertoires? (Does Radio Mille
Collines produce killers?)
Brokerage between violent actors Horizontal networks (loyalty trading) and peer
effects Vertical (clientelistic) networks: Côte d’Ivoire
Young Patriots, electoral violence in Nigeria
Mapping out (non rival) logics of individual participation
Irregular armed groups stem from the percolation of heterogeneous logics
Armed groups’ behaviours
Armed groups are places where behavioural norms are produced through explicit training, collective learning and violent socialisation. Reasons why people stay in groups differ from the ones which made them join
A great variety of outcomes Entrenchment in no war / no peace types of governance Violent radicalisation / sectarian drifts Political normalisation (e.g. today’s RENAMO) Annihilation through repressive means Factionalisation Criminalisation ‘Zombification’ / hijacking...
What shapes armed groups’ trajectories? Internal match or mismatch Interactions with civilians: civilians are not bystanders Interactions with state actors
Some conclusions
Huge heterogeneity of causes, trajectories and outcomes
Collective violence is fundamentally an interactive process. States actions shape trajectories of irregular armed groups before, during and after violent conflicts. Groups’ evolution depend on outside influences There is room for intervention
Tailored to address local demands (e.g. Liberia) Timely (e.g. Niger)
Remaining challenges
Improving our understanding of heterogeneity
From a policy perspective. Integrating the micro and the macro. How can micro-level initiatives succeed in absence of macro-level will to make things change?
Nigeria’s dirty electoral politics A Swiss initiative in Northern Mali