Yudhoyono struggle for re-election

Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 1, pp. 146–155, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.1.146.

146

Marcus Mietzner is Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. Email: <[email protected]>.

INDONESIA IN 2008

Yudhoyono’s Struggle for Reelection

Marcus Mietzner

AbstractIndonesia in 2008 presented an apparent paradox: despite generally strong

political and economic performance indicators, the popularity of President

Yudhoyono’s government fl uctuated wildly. As campaigning for the 2009 elec-

tions began, Yudhoyono’s solid lead evaporated, although he recovered to-

ward the end of 2008. The opposition, however, remains divided.

Keywords: Indonesia, elections, economy, corruption, foreign policy

In 2008, developments in Indonesia were marked by sharp fl uctuations in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s popularity. As the country prepared for the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elec-tions, Yudhoyono fi rst squandered, then regained, the signifi cant lead over his opponents that he had enjoyed for much of his term. At fi rst glance, this remarkable instability of Yudhoyono’s popular support appears rather mysterious: the economy grew at rates last seen under long-time ruler Suharto between the 1970s and 1990s; the political and security situation remained stable; the process of democratic consolidation continued; and Indonesia made substantial progress in the fi ght against corruption, lifting the country 17 ranks in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Per-ception Index. A closer look at key sociopolitical sectors, however, reveals the roots of the electorate’s vacillating attitude toward Yudhoyono’s per-formance since 2004, and provides insights into electoral dynamics ahead of the 2009 polls.

INDONESIA IN 2008 147

Politics

To be sure, the levels of Yudhoyono’s popular support had begun to oscil-late much earlier than 2008. After registering unusually high popularity rates (between 65% and 80%) at the beginning of his term, the number of voters satisfi ed with his government had hovered around the 50% mark since early 2006. It was only in May 2008, however, that Yudhoyono sud-denly fell behind his predecessor and main competitor in the 2009 presiden-tial race, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Surveys undertaken at that time showed that 62% of respondents were not in favor of Yudhoyono’s reelection and that Megawati had opened a 10% lead over the incumbent president.1 Al-though Yudhoyono in October managed to reclaim the top spot in the polls, Megawati had nevertheless reestablished herself on the political map. This was a stunning comeback for Megawati, whose presidency between 2001 and 2004 had been widely viewed as a period of stagnation and unin-spiring leadership. Even members of her own party had been skeptical about the likely outcome of a fresh run for president in 2009, given that Mega-wati had consistently failed to acknowledge the reasons for her defeat in 2004.2 But the unsteadiness of Yudhoyono’s popular support provided an opening for Megawati, whose Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) is the only main party currently not represented in Yudhoyono’s Cabinet.

Most analyses of the ups and downs in Yudhoyono’s popularity ratings in 2008 have focused primarily on international and domestic fuel prices throughout the year.3 According to this explanation, the abrupt drop in Yudhoyono’s support in mid-2008 stemmed from the government’s deci-sion in May to cut fuel subsidies in response to increasing international oil prices. In the same vein, the majority of commentators attributed the re-covery of his support in October to the government’s provision of cash pay-ments to the poor in compensation for the increase, as well as later drops in fuel prices. Although domestic fuel costs certainly played a role in dam-aging or boosting Yudhoyono’s popularity, they were by no means the only factor. A number of political trends in Indonesian society and specifi c char-acteristics of Yudhoyono’s leadership were equally important.

Indeed, the main factor in Yudhoyono’s shaky popularity has been the common impression that the president is weak, indecisive, and increasingly defensive. Most signifi cantly, sustained public focus on former President

1. “Popularitas Megawati Mulai Ungguli Yudhoyono” [Megawati’s popularity begins to overtake Yudhoyono], Sinar Harapan, August 5, 2008.

2. Interview with a senior PDI-P offi cial, Jakarta, June 2008.3. See, for instance, “SBY Reclaims Popularity as Megawati Falls Behind: Survey,” Jakarta

Post, October 20, 2008.

148 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2009

Suharto when he fell ill and died in January 2008 reminded the electorate of the stark contrast between the latter’s iron-fi sted but effective rule and Yudhoyono’s hesitant, procrastinating––if more consultative––style of gov-ernance. Opinion polls taken around the time of Suharto’s extensive funeral processions demonstrated that 58% of Indonesians preferred their living conditions under his New Order to those under the post-authoritarian polity.4 While such surveys no doubt refl ected some nostalgia, they also pointed to longer-term patterns of discontent with post-Suharto political leadership in general and Yudhoyono’s presidency in particular. This grow-ing sentiment was exploited by Yudhoyono’s opponents, who portrayed the president as vague and ineffectual, obsessed more with his image than with policy.

Besides Megawati, several other fi gures in 2008 mobilized support for their respective presidential candidacies. Among them were at least three retired generals: Wiranto, the former armed forces commander; Prabowo Subianto, the ex-chief of the special reserve; and Sutiyoso, formerly com-mander and governor of Jakarta. As for civilians, former President Abdur-rahman Wahid threw his hat into the ring, as did the chairman of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), Sutrisno Bachir. Vice President and Golkar party chairman Jusuf Kalla seemed to shy away from running for president and instead appeared to be seeking another term as Yudhoyono’s deputy. However, many Golkar politicians unhappy with their reduced access to government resources under Yudhoyono have argued that the party should nominate its own candidate. One name mentioned in this context was Hamengkubuwono, the sultan of Yogyakarta, who has done consistently well in opinion polls. Some younger fi gures also declared their intention to become president––arguably the most prominent among them was political observer Rizal Mallarangeng, a close associate of Ab-durizal Bakrie, one of Indonesia’s richest entrepreneurs and also a mem-ber of Yudhoyono’s Cabinet.5 But although collectively these candidates have succeeded in damaging Yudhoyono’s popularity, none of them seems strong enough individually to win the upcoming ballot.

Though not faced with a united opposition, Yudhoyono undercut his own strength through his failure to present a clear political vision. On none of the substantive issues that dominated public debate in 2008 did he offer

4. Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Circle), “Reformasi Setelah 10 Tahun” [Reform after 10 years], Jakarta, May 2008, p. 6.

5. Mallarangeng withdrew his candidacy in November 2008 after Bakrie’s companies suf-fered severe losses in the rapidly spreading global fi nancial crisis. Other candidates were af-fected by the decline of the stock markets as well, but they did not immediately review the status of their campaigns.


a coherent and determined policy or personal view. When public discus-sions about the legal standing of the Muslim sect Ahmadiyah captured the headlines and eventually led to attacks on the group by radical Islamic mi-litias in June, Yudhoyono only vaguely called for calm and a non-violent approach.6 In fact, his government subsequently issued a decree that ap-peared to legitimize societal protests against Ahmadiyah, despite Indone-sia’s constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion. Similarly, Yudhoyono responded to calls in August for fresh amendments to the Constitution by simply suggesting the establishment of yet another working committee. In the same vein, when Islamic parties successfully pushed for the passage of a highly polarizing anti-pornography bill in October, the president chose to remain silent. Keen to avoid controversies and not alienate any of Indo-nesia’s diverse socioreligious constituencies, Yudhoyono has mostly acted as a moderator rather than as a decision maker. Intended to make him look modern and inclusive, this approach has instead consolidated his reputation as being hesitant and calculating.

Somewhat perplexingly, Yudhoyono even failed to take an unambiguous stance toward the anti-corruption campaign hailed by many as the hallmark and principal achievement of his government. Although the fi ght against corruption accelerated in 2008 with high-profi le arrests of parliamentari-ans, bureaucrats, and investigators (including the president’s brother-in-law, a former offi cial at the central bank), Yudhoyono has issued statements that were widely read as attempts to scale back the operations of the ex-traordinarily effective Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pem-berantasan Korupsi, KPK). Accommodating complaints from politicians about the intrusion of the KPK into their private and professional lives, Yudhoyono repeatedly expressed discomfort with the KPK’s tactics, which include sting operations and examinations of private bank accounts. Yu-dhoyono infuriated anti-corruption activists in April when he suggested that far from “trapping” corrupt politicians, the KPK should help them under-stand the law better.7 To many Indonesians, Yudhoyono’s reluctance to openly defend his government’s most popular policy was the ultimate con-fi rmation of the president’s inability to be tough and decisive.

Cornered by his critics and erratic popularity numbers, Yudhoyono has withdrawn into a largely defensive position. In contrast to his 2004 presi-dential campaign, which owed its success to his image as a skilled commu-nicator, the president in 2008 rarely gave interviews or substantive policy

6. “Yudhoyono’s Courage and Cowardice,” Economist, June 18, 2008.7. “Tak Ada Intervensi Politik Pada KPK” [There is no political intervention in the KPK],

Kompas, April 19, 2008.


addresses. Instead, he used formal speeches at state ceremonies to lament the diffi cult task he has to shoulder and the many insults he has to suffer in the name of freedom of speech. Appearing isolated and wallowing in self-pity, Yudhoyono seemed to ape Megawati in her last year in offi ce, when she once famously complained about her “headaches” while managing the country.8 In retrospect, it was this speech that marked the beginning of her fall from powerful incumbent to electoral loser. The Indonesian press sensed another such decisive moment when Yudhoyono in April lashed out against a district head who had fallen asleep during one of his speeches. The public responded with ridicule for Yudhoyono, while the censured district head became an overnight media star. Refl ecting a widespread sen-timent in the country, one commentator of the Jakarta Post remarked that “President Yudhoyono needs to ask himself, ‘Why do people fall asleep when I talk to them?’ Personally, I would guess, ‘They are sleeping because the President’s speeches are very boring’.”9

The Economy

There are many political reasons for the volatility of Yudhoyono’s popular support, but the single most important factor is economic. Initially, this may seem paradoxical, given that the economy performed exceptionally well in much of 2008. Although the escalating global fi nancial crisis is cer-tain to slow down economic development in the years ahead, the Indone-sian economy still grew by a very healthy 6.4% in the second quarter of 2008.10 Investment was up 12.8% in comparison to the previous year, with transport and communication recording the highest sectoral growth rates (39.9% and 36.7%, respectively). Exports were also higher than in 2007, increasing by 15.5% in the fi rst quarter and 16.1% in the second.11 Motor-cycle sales registered a growth of 44%, a clear indication that middle-income earners profi ted from the overall expansion of the economy.12 In the same vein, domestic car sales increased by around half to almost 300,000, turn-ing Indonesia into the largest car market in the Association of Southeast

8. “Megawati Pusing Menghadapi Urusan Negara” [Megawati has headaches when con-fronting state affairs], ibid., September 18, 2003.

9. Kornelius Purba, “Hello! Is Somebody There to Wake up the President?” Jakarta Post, April 15, 2008.

10. “RI Economy Expands 6.4 Percent in Q2,” ibid., August 14, 2008.11. I am indebted to Ross McLeod from the Australian National University for providing

this data. See also Ross McLeod, “Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 44:2 (August 2008), pp. 183–208.

12. Cyrillus Harinowo, “Economic Growth: The Rise of the Indonesian Middle Class,” Jakarta Post, September 16, 2008. The following data on per capita income are also taken from this article.


Asian Nations (ASEAN) in June and July 2008, ahead of Thailand and Ma-laysia. Average income per capita in 2008 was projected to reach around $2,400, up from $1,946 in 2007. According to estimates, this means that around 10% of Indonesia’s population, or 22.5 million people, earn ap-proximately $7,000 per capita. In addition, another 10% of Indonesians have an income of around $3,500. These fi gures suggest that Indonesia’s middle class is not only recovering from the effects of the 1997–98 eco-nomic crisis but is in fact growing.

However, whether poverty has also diminished as a consequence of eco-nomic growth remains a hotly debated issue between Yudhoyono and his political opponents, who have traded fi erce accusations of data manipula-tion. Based on the state’s offi cial fi gures, the number of poor Indonesians declined from 37.17 million in March 2007 to 34.96 million (or 15.4% of the population) by March 2008. According to Yudhoyono, this was the lowest level of poverty since 1998.13 But the president’s claim has been dis-puted by Wiranto and other presidential contenders, who point out that Indonesia’s benchmarks for defi ning poverty are signifi cantly lower than those applied internationally. The World Bank, for instance, defi nes pov-erty as living on $1.25 per day or less—which is around double the amount used by the Indonesian government. Similarly, Yudhoyono’s claim that unemployment numbers decreased from 10.55 million people in 2007 to 9.43 million in 2008 has been rejected by his challengers.14 Despite contro-versy over the accuracy of the numbers, however, there is little doubt that Indonesia’s macroeconomic conditions have improved signifi cantly under Yudhoyono’s rule since 2004.

It is ironic, then, that the economy has become the main source of dis-satisfaction with Yudhoyono’s presidency. Even before the fi nancial crisis in the United States began to cast clouds over Indonesia’s economic future in September 2008, an opinion poll showed that 79% of respondents were unhappy with Yudhoyono’s economic policies.15 The answer to this puz-zling discrepancy between strong economic data and poor popular sup-port lies partly in Indonesia’s relatively high infl ation. Most signifi cantly, the global rise in food prices led to a 26% increase in the cost of rice in 2008 compared to the previous year, although prices began to decline after an extraordinarily good harvest.16 The second trigger for Indonesia’s high

13. “President’s Speech Likened to Campaign,” ibid., August 16, 2008.14. “Number of Poor Falls by 2.21m, Says Statistics Body,” ibid., July 2, 2008. Indonesia’s

unemployment fi gures have always been unreliable because of the large informal sector and the absence of government institutions that provide services to the unemployed.

15. “Hasil Survei, Peluang Megawati Menguat” [Poll results: Megawati’s chances getting stronger], Harian Sore, August 8, 2008.

16. “Indonesia’s Infl ation Accelerates More Than Expected on Food,” Jakarta Post, Au-gust 27, 2008.


infl ation rates was the explosion of international oil prices in the fi rst half of 2008, which forced the government to further reduce gasoline subsidies in May.17 Consequently, consumer prices rose 17.9% in August and core infl ation (which excludes food and fuel prices) stood at 10.2%.18 As indi-cated earlier, the government was later able to lower domestic fuel prices, but the impact of this move on overall infl ation was not immediately clear and living costs have remained generally high. It should thus come as no surprise that many Indonesians still suspect that the benefi ts of economic growth are being eaten up by infl ation.

There has also been a more general feeling in Indonesian society that only a very tiny elite profi ts from the economic development promoted by Jakarta. In a poll of young voters organized by a non-governmental organi-zation in August, 76% of respondents stated that the government’s economic strategy “does not side with the people.”19 While there is little economic data supporting such an assumption, this sentiment is nevertheless widespread and has severely undermined Yudhoyono’s populist credentials.

International Relations

When Yudhoyono came to power, there had been strong expectations that he would raise Indonesia’s profi le in world politics. His interest in inter-national affairs, his polished English, and his global connections with pol-iticians and intellectuals provided him with a solid foundation from which to launch diplomatic initiatives and boost Indonesia’s reputation. Initially, he seemed to deliver. For example, he had a much-celebrated visit to Aus-tralia in 2005. But just as with his popularity in the domestic arena, his performance on the international stage became increasingly uneven from 2007 onward. That January, Yudhoyono cut short his attendance at a series of ASEAN summits in the Philippines, depriving Indonesia of the oppor-tunity to engage effectively with world leaders assembled there. In April, Yudhoyono unintentionally demonstrated Indonesia’s peripheral role in international affairs when he insisted on hosting a conference on confl ict resolution in Iraq, to which he invited a number of key political leaders from that country. None of these fi gures showed up, exposing the insuffi cient preparation and political weight of the Indonesian president. Undeterred

17. Yudhoyono had been reluctant to cut the subsidies, fearing that the rise in transporta-tion costs could undermine his reelection chances. But as pressure on the state budget mounted, his economic advisers convinced him that he had no other option. Interview with a presidential advisor, Jakarta, June 2008.

18. “Indonesia’s Infl ation Accelerates More Than Expected on Food.”19. “Pembangunan Kurang Akomodasi Kepentingan Rakyat” [Development does not

suffi ciently accommodate the people’s interests], Antara News, August 7, 2008.


by this disappointment, Yudhoyono then announced that he would mediate between the rival Fatah and Hamas factions in Palestine, but the planned “conference” on their confl ict never materialized.

This trend of ineffective diplomatic initiatives continued through 2008. Although Indonesia served as one of the non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in 2007 and 2008, the country was unable to substan-tially raise its international profi le. In part this was because Yudhoyono feared the domestic impact of possibly sensitive decisions taken in New York, making him even more cautious than usual. The Iran nuclear issue was a telling example. After Jakarta’s support of Resolution 1747 on sanc-tions for Iran in March 2007 earned the president a protest note from Parliament, Yudhoyono made sure that subsequent Indonesian decisions on the matter did not look like they simply copied the American and Eu-ropean positions. Therefore, when the Security Council issued another resolution in September 2008 that reconfi rmed the existing sanctions, Indo-nesia claimed it had successfully fought against the inclusion of additional threats against Iran, including military action.20 This notwithstanding the fact that China and Russia would have never allowed such a notion to be included anyway and that Indonesia would have been isolated in the Coun-cil had it abstained.

While Yudhoyono defended his strategy as the continuation of Indone-sia’s traditional “free and independent” foreign policy, his critics empha-sized that the president’s international initiatives often appeared to be poorly prepared and ultimately counterproductive. In ASEAN, for example, Yu-dhoyono had for some time given the impression that Indonesia favored a new charter that would signifi cantly alter the way the organization func-tioned. When the charter was fi nalized at the 13th ASEAN summit in Singa-pore in November 2007, however, Yudhoyono accepted a severely watered down version without putting up much resistance.21

Conversely, he took a very confrontational stance toward the EU, which in 2008 extended its ban on all Indonesian airlines because it still deemed them unfi t to enter European airspace. In protest, Yudhoyono declared that he would not visit Europe unless he was allowed to fl y on Indonesia’s state carrier, Garuda. The EU, however, insisted that it could not bend the rules because of such a threat. As a result, Yudhoyono canceled already planned trips to Europe in May and July, a move criticized as immature in both Europe and Indonesia. Finally, Yudhoyono also alienated Thailand

20. “RI Backs Revised UN Resolution against Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Jakarta Post, September 29, 2008.

21. For some of the criticisms of the charter, see Berry Desker, “Where the ASEAN Char-ter Comes up Short,” Straits Times, July 18, 2008.


in September by hosting informal “peace negotiations” to resolve the long-standing confl ict in the country’s Muslim south. This angered the Thai government, which publicly asserted that it had neither requested Indone-sia’s assistance nor sent delegates to the talks.22

Because of such blunders and the lack of a clear foreign policy blueprint, Indonesia’s role in international affairs in 2008 remained marginal. While respected in the West as a symbol of a consolidating Muslim democracy, Indonesia has not been able to translate this appreciation into concrete diplomatic weight.23 Consequently, Yudhoyono has failed to consolidate his unstable domestic popularity through high-profi le foreign policy initia-tives. This was despite the many international events Indonesia hosted in late 2007 and early 2008, ranging from the U.N. Climate Change Summit to a large U.N. conference on anti-corruption measures. In fact, some of these gatherings came back to haunt Yudhoyono domestically. During the climate change conference in Bali, for example, the president introduced an Indonesian research project called “Blue Energy” that could allegedly turn water into fuel. Celebrating this “invention” as a possible solution to the global oil crisis, Yudhoyono instructed one of his closest assistants to fi nance and supervise the project. In May, however, the “Blue Energy” program was unmasked as a hoax. The “inventor” ended up in prison, and Yudhoyono was widely criticized for naively supporting the initiative.24

Conclusion

Given Indonesia’s general political and economic stability in 2008, one should expect the incumbent president to dominate domestic politics and sail to victory in the upcoming elections. Instead, Yudhoyono’s pop-ular support has been exceedingly volatile. This article has pointed to several political, economic, and international factors that can explain Yu-dhoyono’s inability to make his electoral position unassailable. Despite the shakiness of his poll numbers, however, he remains the favorite for the 2009 elections. This is because of the weakness of his opponents, who have collectively launched an effective attack on the president but have had only limited success in presenting themselves as credible alternatives. In

22. “Govt ‘Not Party’ to Peace Talks,” Bangkok Post, September 22, 2008.23. In their assessment of Indonesian foreign policy, Andrew McIntyre and Douglas Ra-

mage have expressed a different view. According to their analysis, “Indonesia has shown new international confi dence and activism.” However, they also concede that “it would be too generous to describe Indonesia’s new posture as ‘deeply considered’ or ‘strategic’.” See An-drew McIntyre and Douglas Ramage, “Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country: Implications for Australia,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ASPI Strategy Paper, Canberra, May 2008, pp. 39–40.

24. “Yudhoyono ‘Taken in by Blue Energy Hoax’,” Straits Times, May 31, 2008.


2003, when Megawati’s popularity began to decline, it was Yudhoyono who emerged on the horizon to profi t from the incumbent’s crisis by offer-ing fresher, more-dynamic leadership. In 2008, no such “white knight” has come in sight. Megawati, for her part, will need to sway the electorate to forget her own troubled presidency. Similarly, most of the other candi-dates either carry lots of historical baggage or have no experience at all. Thus, in spite of the vacillating public support for his presidency in 2008, Yudhoyono may still come out on top in the 2009 race.

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Yudhoyono struggle for re-election