Human Nature and Virtue in Mencius and Xunzi: An Aristotelian Interpretation

Yu Jiyuan"

Given the substantial amount of ink that has been poured over the issue of human nature in Xunzi ~ and Mencius ~q~, it might appear to be reckless even to think that there is anything new to say about it .1 Nevertheless, moti- vated by the following three perplexities, I venture to revisit this age-old con- troversy. First, I note that, whereas the goodness and evilness of human nature has been such a dominant theme in Chinese philosophy, it does not excite much interest in Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. What does this con- trast suggest? Second, historically, Xunzi's challenge fails and this becomes one of the reasons that he was excluded from mainstream Confucianism after the Han Dynasty. Mencius, in contrast, comes to define the orthodoxy of Confu- cianism. Yet, in contemporary scholarship, the table is turned. Mencius' posi- tion has usually been thought to be naively optimistic and lacking empirical support. Xunzi's view, on the contrary, is thought to be realistic and close to the prevailing Western view that humans axe by nature egoistic. 2 If this is true, what is the philosophical value of Mencius' position in contemporary ethics?

* Associate Professor of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150; email: jyyu@acsu.buffalo.edu.

Dao:A ]0urna/9 r PhYos0phy December 2005, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 11-30. 9 2005 by Global Scholarly Publications. All fights reserved.

1 Some scholars have reached the conclusion that the issue itself might not be so important in our understanding of Xunzi and his relation with Mencius. I take it that this is par@ out of the frus- tration that no way out of the controversy appears on the horizon. For instance, L. H. Yearley remarks, "Whether Hsun Tzu's [Xtmz~ famous fomaula, 'human nature is evil', is a later interpo- lation, a rhetorical device to emphasise the difficulty of self-cultivation, or a conscious rectifica- tion of the term 'nature', that simple formula ought not to be overemphasized because it casts little light on either Hsun Tzu or on his relationship to Meneius" (Yearly 1980: 465). See also Hansen: 337. z For example, Donald Munro believes that "One reason why Mencius held that m,n's nature is good was his logical confusion of the ideal man with the actual man" (Munro: 72). A. C. Graham comments: "We are now almost morbidly aware of the difficulty of proving that apparently disin- texested actions do not have egoistic motives and that apparently instinctive reactions are not socially conditioned" (Graham: 29). Hansen has a good summary of the general scholarly view: "Typically, Western treatments of Mencius' psychological theory, drawing on traditional Western cynicism about human nature, regard Mencius' view as lacking any empirical support" (Hansen: 167).

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Third, while it is normal in the Warring States period that philosophers from different schools dispute each other, Xunzi takes Mencius, a feUow Confucian, as his target when he puts forth his thesis, in chapter 23 of the Xun~j, that hu- man nature is evil. How can this be explained? How is this Xunzi-Mencius de- bate rehted to the project that Confucius FL~ himself envisions?

My article is in four sections. I start, in Section I, with an introductory dis- cussion of the concept of x'ing '~ in Xunzi and Mencius, to show that Xunzi has an internal inconsistency in his philosophy, and that this inconsistency makes his rehtion with Mencius ambiguous. While commentators usually seek to find a solution to explain away this inconsistency, I try to understand how Xunzi is caught in this inconsistency. Section II compares Xunzi's criticism of Mencius with Mencius' actual defense of Confucius' da0 ~ to show that, in his explicit attack, Xunzi does not do justice to Mencius. I claim that Xunzi's difference from Mencius should be traced back to Xunzi's criticism of the general as- sumption in early Chinese philosophy that human da0 is imparted from Heaven (tian 5~) and is the embodiment of Heaven's daa. Section III argues that it is for developing an alternative defense of Confucius' dao, rather than for establishing an alternative theory of human nature, that Xunzi puts forth the thesis that human nature is evil. The dispute oyez the goodness or evilness of human na- ture between Mencius and Xunzi should be understood as one between two alternative defenses of Confucius' da0. In the final section, I introduce Aris- tode's view about the relation between human nature and ethics and use it as a mirror to assess the philosophical significance of the Mencius/Xunzi differ- ence. When Mencius is said to be naive and Xunzi more realistic, it is usually the Christian theory of original sin and/or Hobbes's theory, of natural state that are used as the referential framework(s). Aristotle, whose ethics does not start from the assumed dominant Western view that human beings are naturally ego- istic, is rarely mentioned in this context)Yet, in the light of Aristotle's ap- proach to ethics, we have a standpoint from which to appreciate the signifi- cance of Mencius' theory.

I. The Concept of X/ng~

With Mencius' thesis that human nature is good as his target, Xunzi claims that "Human nature is evil; any good in humans is acquired by conscious exertion" (Xun~ 23.1a). 4 By this, he does not mean that human nature is originally cor- rupted or that we are born with evil itself. Rather, his meaning is that we are born with unlimited sensuous and selfish desires that naturally urge us to satisfy them. Yet resources in the world are limited and cannot satisfy unlima'ted de-

3 There has been a debate regarding whether Aristotle's eudaimonism is egoistic or altruistic. However, even ff we rhi, k that his position is egoistic, he is advocating for the love of one's ra- tionality. That is a completely different issue from the question whether original human nature is selfish. 4 Unless otherwise indicated, translation of Xunzi is from John Knoblock.

Ytr Hlnnan Nature and V'mue in Mencius and XunTi 13

sires, s Therefore, evil, by which Xunzi means partiality, malice, perversity, and rebelliousness (23.3a), inevitably arises. Evil, then, is the result of the tension between limited goods in the world and unlimited human desires.

Mencius has no difficulty accepting the view that we have desires that lead to evil When he says that human nature is good, he does not mean that the whole of human nature is good. There are many aspects of x'ing that human beings share with other animals and that are neither good nor bad (see Mendus 7b24), and there are also xing of dog and xing of ox (6a3). For Mencins, x'ing includes such things as physical inclinations to eat certain types of food, to lis- ten to certain sounds, to feel aversion towards bad smells, etc. (7b24; 6a7). Fur- themaore, there is a natural hierarchy of values and importance among various parts of human beings: "He who nurtures the parts of smaller importance is a small man; he who nurtures the parts of greater importance is a great man" (6a14; see also 6a15).

However, for Mencius, human nature includes something else. In every- one's natural endowment, there is an organ called xin &, (heart/mind) that car- ties with it four inborn seeds to moral behaviour (duan ~).6 When properly cultivated, these four seeds will blossom as four major Confucian virtues (Men- dus 6a6). The heart of compassion, the sense of shame and disgust, the sense of compliance and respect, and the sense of right and wrong, are four innate seeds in human beings. They are not fused into us from outside and we do not have to learn or work in order to get them. In fact, we have them just as we have four limbs (Mendus 2a6). When these seeds grow and become mature, they turn into four virtues: benevolence (ten 4_7_), dutifulness (yi ~), observance of propriety (li ~), and wisdom (zhi ~). This is what he means by the goodness of human na- ture.

Apparently, Mencius is fully aware that human nature itself is a complex, in- dusive of elements that axe good, but also of elements that axe either morally neutral or have little moral value. This leads us to ask whether Mencius em- ploys the term xing in different ways. Etymologically, xqng is cognate in Chinese with sbeng fl~ (to be born): "The inborn is what is meant by 'nature' [sbeng zbi wei xing ~'~] ) (Mencius 6a3). 7 In this sense, xing corresponds to "nature," for the latter is cognate in Latin with nasci (to be born). It is in this root sense of xing that Mencius says that there are many :a'ngs that human beings share with other animals, and that there are also xing of dog and xing of ox. However, when Mencius claims that human xing is good, he refers only to one part of this complex, the part that is composed of the four seeds. As he states at Mendus 7a21: "That which an exemplary person follows as his nature [:a'ng], that is to say, benevolence, tightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart." Here xing is confined only to the four seeds, the flourishing of which makes a noble person ~/unz/~).

s "MI people desire and dislike the same things, but since desires are many and the things that satisfy them relatively few, this scarcity will necessarily lead to conflict" (Xun~i 10.1). 6 The Chinese term duan has also been translated as "roots," "sprouts," "beginnings," "stirrings," "germs," etc. 7 Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the Mendus is based on D. C. Lau.

14 Dao: A Journal of Corz~arauve Pbilowpby V. 1

For Mencius, the reason to single out this part from the complex of human nature is that it detemames a human being qua a human being and thus distin- guishes human beings from other animals. As he says: "Whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of fight and wrong is not human" (Mendus 2a6). If one completely casts away these seeds, he is not much differ- ent from the beasts (Mendus 6a8). If one preserves and develops these seeds, he becomes an exemplary person. Mencius further explicates that "Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distin- guishing feature, while the gentleman retains it" (Mendus 4b19). To say that the difference between man and the brutes is slight indicates that the greater por- tion of the human nature complex, that is, desires and appetites, is the same as animal nature. It is the four seeds that set us apart from other animals. Accord- ingly, in saying that x'ing is good, Mencius is referring to the unique characteris- tic of human beings, excluding the parts that human beings share with other animals.

To sum up, x'ing in Mencius has two senses: (1) whatever is inborn; and (2) the inborn human characteristic. When Mencius says that xing is good, he uses the second and narrow sense.

Let us then turn to see in what sense Xunzi uses the term x'ing. In his own definition: "What characterizes a man from birth is called his 'nature' [xing]. What is produced out of harmony of inborn nature, out of the sensibilities of the organ tallying as the senses respond to stimuli, and what from birth is ef- fordess arid spontaneous is called 'nature' [x/ng]" (Xun~ 22.1b). In this passage, x'ing covers what we have from birth and their tendencies, our senses and facul- ties, and anything else that we possess but do not need to work for. s In other words, it means all the features that a person is equipped with from birth. This amotmts to the first sense of xing in Mencius (what is inborn). The problem begins when we ask about the contents of "what is inborn." In explicating his thesis that human nature is evil, Xunzi appears to be saying that in our nature there are only different forms of appetitive desire. Other dements that do not naturally lead to evil, or elements that might even lead to good, do not seem to exist. This becomes explicit shortly afterward in his text. As he says, "This be- hag the case, it" we consider man as he is at birth and nothing else, then he lacks ritual and moral principles and is unaware of them.... This being the case, if we consider man as he is at birth and nothing else, then it is perversity and rebel- liousness that characterize him" (Xun~i 23.2b).

Yet, elsewhere, we find that Xunzi acknowledges that we have good things in our original human makeup or constitution. He claims that human beings have an inborn sense of y /~, "the sense of morality or justice" (in K_noblock's translation), which distinguishes human beings from other anim,ls (Xun~i 9.16a).

8 Xunzi uses this definition repeatedly: "As a general rule, 'inborn nature' embraces what is spon- taneous from Nature, what cannot be learned, and what requires no application to master" (23.1c). Again, "What ca~aot be gained by learning and cannot be mastered by application yet is found in man is properly termed 'inborn nature"' (ibid).

Ytr Human Nature and Virtue in Mencius and Xunzi IS

He holds that everyone in the street has the innate and natural faculty (zbi ~) to understand necessary ethical principles and the innate and natural ability (/u H) to practice them (Xun~ 23.5a). 9 He also says that men, because of their inner consti- tution, always respond appropriately to the virtue of others (Xun~' 3.8; for textual evidence, see Monro: 198). Accordingly, what is inborn is not just selfish sensu- ous desires, but also includes good traits, impulses, and abilities.

We thus see that, although Xunzi defines xing as "what is inborn," he uses the term in two inconsistent ways: (1) what is inborn is a mixture of good and bad elements; and (2) what is inborn includes only sensuous passions and de- sires. Xunzi's inconsistency makes his relation with Mencius unclear. When he seeks to refute Mencius' thesis that xing is good and replaces it with the thesis that xing is evil, he talks as if both of them had the same definition of x'ing. Yet, in his thesis, xing refers only to selfish passions and desires, whereas in Men- (flus' thesis, x'ing means special human characteristics. They do not mean the same thing by xing. When Xunzi ascribes to our nature some good traits and tendencies and takes human nature as a mix, Mencius does not have a problem in agreeing with him. l~ More important, although he does not deny that human beings have sensuous desires, Mencius concentrates on the good part of the complex of human nature. Xunzi does not directly face this special and most important sense of xing in Mencius.

At 9.16a, Xunzi says: "Fire and water possess vital breath but have no life. Plants and trees possess life, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have aware- ness, but lack a sense of morality and justice [yi ~]. Humans possess vital breath, life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of morality and justice [yt]. It is for this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world." In this pas- sage, vital breath (or energy), life, and awareness axe all mentioned as unlearned natural or inborn qualities. Since yi is introduced as a parallel to these natural features, the logic of the text requires that_y/must also be an unlearned natural or inborn quality, a quality that distinguishes human beings from other animals. Following Xunzi's definition of x/ng; it should belong to our xing. The passage, then, is inconsistent with his position that human nature is evil. Nivison, how- ever, suggests thaty/is meant in this passage not as a Confucian virtue, but as "innately an unfilled and undetemained capacity to think morally," or as "a bare capacity that has no positive content" (Nivison 1996a: 322, 324; see also Nivi- son 1996b: 213). This solution to Xunzi's inconsistency has been influential. I think it is right to say thaty/cannot mean a fully developed virtue here, and I also agree that it means a capacity. However, it is not clear that this capacity is morally bare or neutral. The notion of y/has been closely associated with Con- lucian ethical value, and it is also one of Mencius' four seeds. If.y/were just a neutral ability, it could be used both for moral and immoral ends. Yet, in

9 Knoblock translates :~hi ~ (literally "quafity") as "substance," andju ~, (literally "condition," "ability'~ as "resources." It is worth mentioning that B. Watson renders zhi as "essential facul- ties," andju as "potentiality ability" (Watson: 166-167). t0 This leads A. C. Graham to claim that "In the case of Hsun Tzu [Xtmzi] there is good reason to doubt whether the label he pinned on himself to distinguish himself from Mencius gives an ade- quate idea of his position" (1989: 248).

!6 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy V.1

Xunzi's own description, it is because of this sense of morality and justice (yt) that humans alone can form societies. "Why can man form a society? I say it is due to the division of society into classes. How can social divisions be trans- lated into behaviour? I say it is because of humans' sense of morality and justice [yt]" (Xun~ 9.16a). It appears thatfi is committed to social relation and order. This is hardly a bare capacity.

Also, when Xunzi claims that everyone in the street has the innate and natural faculty and ability, one could argue that these faculties and abilities are simply intel- lectual, and thus they are not in conflict with the thesis that human nature is evil Yet what Xtmzi says is that everyone has the innate and natural faculty to under- stand necessary ethical principles and the innate and natural ability to practice them. Clearly, natural faculty and ability lean toward morality, and are not just bare capacities. More importantly, even if we grant that yi is a bare capacity, it still does not explain away Xunzi's inconsistency. In saying that human nature is evil, Xunzi holds that our nature contains only the desires that lead to evil. Yet innate abilities and tendencies do not necessarily lead to evil. This should be sufficient to show that Xunzi is inconsistent. In my view, the inconsistency is intrinsic to Xunzi himself. Even Nivison, who has taken such great pains to reconcile Xunzi's positions, nevertheless acknowledges that, "[l]ike all of us, Xunzi must have developed with time; and like most of us, he had difficulties making completely consistent sense of his own position" (Nivison 2000: 186). What is important is for us to understand the reason for Xunzi to say, in con- trast to Mencius, that human nature is evil, and why he also ascribes a good aspect to our human nam.re. In other words, why is Xunzi caught in this incon- sistency?

II. Mencius and Confucius' Dao

It is interesting to note that when Xunzi says in chapter 23 that Mencius is wrong, he is not so much interested in directly dealing with Mencius' justifica- tion of the innate goodness of human nanlre, such as Mencius' criticism of a number of alternative positions and his positive proofs, including the influential Well and Child story. Rather, Xunzi focuses on what he understands as the consequeaac.e o f Mencius' position. In his view, Mencius' position renders Con- fucius' daa useless and the Confucian sage kings unnecessary.

Mcncius claims that man's nanlre is good. I say that is not so.... [C]an one truly take man's inborn nature to have as its essential characteristic correctness, accord with natural principles, peacefulness, and order? Were that the case, what use would there be for sage kings, and what need for ritual and moral principles? And even suppos- ing that there were sage kings and ritual and moral principles, what indeed could they add to correctness, natural principles, peace, and order! (Xunzi 23.3a)

According to this description, Mencius' view becomes a threat to, rather than a defence of, the Confucian tradition.

Is this a fair criticism? To answer this question, we need to trace back to see

Ytr Hlanan Nature and Vmue in Mencius and Xnnzi ! 7

why and how Mencius defends Confucius' da0. Mencius himself describes his mission in this way:

When the world declined and the Way [da0] fell into obscurity, heresies and violence again arose.... The words of YANG Zhu ~ and Modi ~ fill the empire. The teachings current in the empire are those of either the school os Yang or the school of Mo.... If the ways of Yang and Mo do not subside and the way of Confucius is not proclaimed, the people will be deceived by heresies and the path of morality [ten- y/U.m] will be blocked.... [T]herefore I am apprehensive. I wish to safeguard the way of the former sages against the onslaughts of Yang and Mo and to banish excessive views. (Mencius 3b9)

It is the goal of Confucius to find human dao. Confucius also believes that it is embedded in the traditional rituals and in the chssics that record the rituals. This position, according to Mencius, faces grave challenges from Mozi and YANG Zhu. Mozi contends that the da0 of Heaven should be detected from men's natural desires rather than from ancient classics. Since it is men's natural desire to seek benefit and avoid harm, the correct da0 is to maximize the amount of material goods of the state and to satisfy people's natural desires. Mozi thus rejects the ritually grounded traditionalism that Confucius holds and seeks to rephce it with his own utilit, rian position. YANG Zhu's position, in Mencius' report, is as follows: "YANG Zhu chooses egoism [wei wo ~, literally "for myself']. Even if one could benefit the Empire by pulling out one hair he would not do it" (Mendus 7a26). Following Graham's reconstruction, what YANG Zhu means is that our xing is the Heavenly endowed capacity of life force, so the correct da0 is to live out our natural life span. Since getting in- volved in political affairs carries the risk of being 1filled, one should stay away from governing, to say nothing about governing the whole empire.

Why are the challenges of Mozi and YANG Zhu so significant that Mencius has to treat them with such seriousness? The issue is related to the common framework that is shared by chssical Chinese philosophers before Xunzi. The s is that Heaven has its da0 and that everything's well-being depends on whether it exists or acts in accordance with the dao of Heaven. With the decline of the Zhou ~ Dynasty, the dao that the Zhou once claimed to possess was thought to be lost. The common goal of the classic Chinese philosophers, then, is to answer the question 'q~Chere is da0?" Each school claims that the human da0 it establishes is in accordance with the da0 of Heaven. If one can live in accordance with the human dao, one also embodies the da0 of Heaven, and leads a meaningfifl and authentic life. The manifestation of Heaven's da0 in human beings is called de ~., usually translated as "virtue." This dao-de concep- tual framework is at the core of pre-Xunzi Chinese ethics.

This is the framework within which Confucius works. He even thinks that it is a mandate of Heaven for him to discover and restore the da0. The Ana/eets uses a visitor to Confucius as the mouthpiece to express this mission. The visi- tor says to the disciples of Confucius: "The world has long been without the Way [da0]. Heaven is about to use your Master as the wooden tongue for a bell" (Anakcts 3.24). The opponent Mozi also claims that he is searching for the will

l g Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy V. 1

of Heaven: "Heaven wants righteousness and dislikes unrighteousness. There- fore, in leading the people in the world to engage in practicing righteousness, I should be doing what Heaven wants" (in Chan: 218). The Daodejing (~Rga~) states that "[t]o the dao of Heaven none is more kind than another. It is con- stanfly on the side of the good man" (ch. 79). Zhuangzi ~q~ also claims that da0 is everywhere and operates in all things (see Chan: 203). Different philosophical schools offer competing accounts of what da0 is, but they all share the assump- tion that human da0 must accord with the dao of Heaven, and they all believe that their own da0 is supported by Heaven.

From this background, we can see why the challenges of Mozi and YANG Zhu are serious. Each of them makes a seemingly convincing case that his dao conforms to the da0 of Heaven, whereas Confucius' dao of traditionalism is against human nature. This certainly puts Confucianism on the defensive. It is indeed true that Confucius' thinking had a weakness and hence was vulnerable to criticism. On the one hand, Confucius' belief holds to the da0-de conceptual scheme and therefore implies that we must have the root of de in our original nature that is from Heaven. Confucius thought that human de that manifests da0 is ten (humanness), and also believed that, in our nature, there is a part that forms the natural basis of re~ "Is ren really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here" (Analects 7.30). I take it to mean that we have a natural potential to become virtuous. On the other hand, Confucius claimed that the da0 should be found in traditional rituals. For him, the da0 did not prevail in the empire at his time because of the decline of the rituals and cultures of the Zhou (Analects 3.24; 16.2; 5.6). Based on the conviction that the Zhou rituals can restore order and achieve harmony for the world, Confucius claimed that pen (humanness) is "to return to # ~" (12.1). Yet there is no argument in the Analects to show how ren is intrinsically related to the muals. A bridge is needed here.

The Doctrine of the Mean (~) , one of the four books that form the core classics of Confucianism, introduces, in its opening passage, the term xing, and connects it to the notion of da0, both the da0 of Heaven and the da0 of humans O.e., de): "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature (x/ng 0. To follow our nature is called the way (dao). Cultivating the Way is called education. The way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can be separated from us is not the way" (ch.1). We have an endowed nature from Heaven. The unfold- ing process is a process of cultivation or education. Since the dao is inherent in us, it cannot be separated from us and must be a part of who we are. Clearly, this endowed nature cannot be the complex of our nature, and must be the part the unfolding of which is what the (human) dao is. The Doctrine of the Mean makes it clear that the virtue that we cultivate has a natural basis in our human nature. Here, the question of the cultivation of human dao (or de) becomes a question of the cultivation of xing. However, although The Doctrine of the Mean has stated that Heaven confers (good) human nature, it does not offer any ex- plicit argument for the existence of such a natural basis of dao, and does not say anything either as to how our nature is related to the rituals.

Mencius inherits the idea that the goodness of human nature is ordained by Heaven: "The heart-mind is what Heaven has given to us" (Mencius 6al 5). Now

Ytr Human Nature and V-trtue in Mencius and Xun~i 19

he faces the task of fining the gaps that the Analects and The Doctrine of the Mean left His strategy seems to be as follows. The crucial threat that Mozi and YANG Zhu pose is thek claim that Heaven's dao is on their side, whereas Con- lucian dao is against human nature. If Mencius could prove that our genuine nature is something other than seeking profits or preserving one's life, both Mozi and YANG Zhu's positions lose ground. If Mencius further proves that our genuine human nature is something the maturity of which leads to Confu- cian virtues, he demonstrates that Confucius' vision is in accordance with Heaven's da0. Accordingly, to fight against Mozi and YANG Zhu, Mencius de- veloped a view that Confucian value is inborn in human nature. The genuine human x4ng includes the seeds of the four virtues. Against YANG Zhu, Mencius suggested that :4hA is not life force, and to live out one's natural life span is not where the true da0 is. As he stated: "Life is what I want;y/is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would rather take2i than Fife" (Mendus 6al0). For human beings, there are things more important than life itself. It seems to me that this memorable remark is apparently directed at YANG Zhu. By inducting ~ (the tradi- tional rituals), or the sense to obey the 4, among the basic seeds, Mencius under- mines the Moist contrast between human nature and Confucian traditionalism. If the seed to obey # is inborn, then to follow Confucius' da0 is to follow one's genuine nature. Furt_hemnore, if there is a humanity that we must develop, the material consequence becomes something external insofar as human dao is con- cemed. This is why Mencius affirms that '~fflaat is the point of mentioning the word 'profit'? All that matters is that there should be ten-if" (Mendus lal). The use of the word "profit" suggests that Mozi is the real target here. Human goodness is not determined by consequential benefits, but by humanity itself.

The above discussion shows that Mencius' theory of human innate good- ness of x'ing is a significant contribution to Confucius' vision. He defends Con- fucius by building Confucian da0 in human natuze, and by providing a meta- physical and psychological basis for Confucian dao. His theory justifies that nature and virtue are consistent in Confucius' da0, and thus effectively responds to the challenges from Mozi and YANG Zhu. Furthermore, although we are endowed with innate moral seeds, the role of classics, the sages, and teachers are still important. We axe not born with full-blown goodness, but only with fragile sprouts. These seeds must be nurtured for persons to be good. Their growth needs an external envixonment and also requires inner self-cultvafion. One important aspect of self-cultivation is the constant learning of rituals and the classics that record them. Rituals and sages play important roles in the shap- ing of character. Since the learning of rituals is necessary for the seeds to grow properly, rituals are indispensable.

If this is the case, Xunzi cannot be fight in accusing Mencius of making sages and rituals useless. It appears that Xunzi not only misrepresented Mencius' notion of :~'n~ but also missed the point in ctiticising Mencius' defence of Confucius' da0. Yet how is it possible that he was so mistaken? Is there a deeper reason for him to attack Mencius in this way? In 23.1c, when Xurmi attacks Mencius for failing to explain that "ritual principles and moral duties are creations of the sages," he offers a reason. Mencius, asserts Xunzi, does not know the distinction between nature

20 Dao: A ]ournal of Comparative Philosophy V.1

and artifice (u,~" ~, in Knoblock's translation, "acquired nature' S. The distinction between nature and artifice is related to Xtmzi's general theory of the relation be- tween Heaven and mao_ Its introduction in this context indicates that Xunzi's criti- cism of Mencius presupposes a larger background.

Xunzi has a unique position in classical Chinese philosophy. As mentioned earlier, it had been a shared framework for Xunzi's predecessors that the cor- rect human da0 is what is dictated by Heaven and must embody the da0 of Heaven. Xunzi, however, seeks to break up this conceptual scheme. For him, Heaven, earth, and man form a triad and each has its own way. However, he does not think that they are connected in such a way that human da0 is what is dictated by Heaven. Heaven for Xunzi is just the natural world written with a capital letter and is a spontaneous process. "Heaven possesses a constant way" (Xun~j 17.3), but it does not prescribe what humans should do. Heaven is sim- ply indifferent towards human affairs: "It does not survive because of the ac- tions of a [sage-emperor] Yao ~; it does not perish because of the actions of a [wicked king] Jie ~" (Xun~ 17.1). What humans should do toward Heaven is to make good use of its natural resources (Xun~ 17.10).

Hence, contrary to the traditional assumption of the accordance between Heaven and man, Xunzi establishes a dichotomy between them. He even claimed that "If you understand the division between nature [Tian, Heaven] and mankind, then you can properly be called a 'Perfect Man'" (Xun~ 17.1). The distinction between nature and wei (artifice), roughly corresponding to the Greek dichotomy ofphusis and nomos, is a corollary to the dichotomy of Heaven and Man. By artifice, Xunzi means that "What must be learned before a man can do it and what he must apply himself to before he can master it yet is found in man" (23. lc). The da0 of Heaven belongs to the side of nature, whereas human da0, or morality, falls on the side of artifice, the product of human effort.

From this background, we can tell that Xunzi saw the challenges from YANG Zhu and Mozi in a rather different way than Mencius saw them. Mozi and YANG Zhu attack Confucius within the shared framework that the dao of man is also the da0 of Heaven, and both of them claim that their dao(s), not Confucius', are supported by Heaven. Mencius defended Confucius within this framework and sought to win back the authority of Heaven. Since, in Xunzi's judgment, Heaven is indifferent to human morality, he thought the challenges from Mozi and YANG Zhu were themselves groundless. Equally, he must have thought that Mencius' whole defence was misguided and his theory was also groundless. The separation of Heaven and man entails that we cannot have a Heavenly-imparted nature that would dispose us toward virtue.

III. Xunzi and Confucius' Dao

The above discussion provides a larger context for us to understand the real difference between Mencius and Xunzi. It also gives us a better understanding of the puzzling phenomenon that Xuazi chooses to ignore Mencius' argument. If Xunzi believed that Mencius' thesis about human nature is based on a wrong

Ytr Human Nature and V'tttue in Mencius and X.nzi 21

assumption, and since he had undermined this assumption, there is of course no need to bother with detailed arguments for the thesis. However, we have not yet had a direct answer to the question of why Xunzi put forth a thesis that human nature is evil and contrasted it to Mencius' theory of human nature. Indeed, a new question emerges. Confucius held the framework that human da0 embodies Heaven's da0, and he was even said to be following Heaven's man- date to find human dao. Given Xunzi's dichotomy of Heaven and man, Xunzi must have denied the natural basis of Confucius' da0 and his divine mission. How, then, can Xunzi still be a Confucian?

Xunzi's dichotomy of Heaven and man was, as is well known, influenced by the Daoist notion of Heaven and nature. In his famous "pipes-of-Heaven" meta- phor in chapter 2 of the Zhuang'r Zhuangzi likens each school's da0 to a pipe of Heaverz Heaven blows on all pipes and favours neither Confucianism nor Mo- isn~ From Heaven's point of view, says Zhuangzi, all da0s are equally natural Clearly, this inspired Xunzi to affirm that Heaven is neutral and does not provide specific moral guidance. However, although Daoists criticize all normative value systems, they still hold the assumption that the correct human da0 must accord with the da0 of Heaven. For Zhuangzi, since all da0s are equally possible and there is no ground to judge among them, the best way to live is to avoid being locked into one partial perspective. Instead, given the nature of the da0 of Heaven, we should be flexible, tolerant, and spontaneous: "Never follow one stubborn course of action and thus deviate from Tao" (see Chan: 206).

In contrast, Xunzi went beyond Daoism on two fronts. First, he severed the relation between human dao and Heaven's da0, and drew a sharp distinction between nature and artifice. Even though Heaven is spontaneous and morally neutral, it does not entail that human beings should be spontaneous as well What man does is different from what Heaven does. On this ground, Xunzi accused Zhumagzi of forgetting man: "Zhuang Zhou was blinded by nature and was in- sensible to men" (Xun~ 21.4). It is inevitable for human beings to be guided by some scheme of values. Second, Xunzi affirmed that, whereas all other conven- tional moral systems are biased, Confucius' ritual da0 is not. Xunzi says,

Confucius was humane, wise, and also free from obsession. This is why his study of methods that could produce order deserves to be considered equal to that of the Ancient Kings. One school achieved the universal Way, drew conclusions based upon it, and employed k, but did not become obsessed with what it has perfected and accumulated. Thus, the moral authority of Confucius was equal to that of the Duke of Zhou and his reputation was on an equal footing with that of the Three Kings. (Xun~i 21.4)

The Confucian sage-king's ritual da0 is the only correct da0 that human beings need. The traditional rituals make up the da0 of Confucianism and form the best way of life. Xunzi is a Confucian because of his deep faith in the role of traditional rituals: "A man without ritual will not live; an undertaking lacking ritual will not be completed; and a nation without ritual will not be tranquil" (Xun~j 2.2). Xunzi thus faced the task of justifying Confucius' da0 of traditional- isrrL The function of rituals lies in preserving order and social hamaony. In the

22 Dao: A Journal of Comparacive Philosophy V.1

Anakcts, the function of rituals is related heavily with harmony: "Of the things brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable" (Analects 1.12). Xunzi apparently followed this line of thinking and focused also on the point that the da0 of rituals is the only alternative to chaos and disorder. If the human world is inevitably chaotic before rituals are established, rituals are by all means indispen- sable. However, how can one prove that the human world is naturally chaotic?

I think that it is to make a case here that Xunzi introduced his thesis that hu- man nature is evil. He postulated the evilness of human nature in order to justify the value of the Confucian ritual dao. The beginning of chapter 23 indicates that this is his reasoning. In 23.1a, immediately after introducing and explamiug his thesis that human nature is evil, he draws a contrast between chaos and rituals: 'q2aus, it is necessary that man's nature undergoes the transfomaing influence of a teacher and the model and that he be guided by ritual and moral principles" (Xunz/23.1a). We are born with unlimited desires that naturally lead to chaos, and only ritual principles can channel these desires and create order. Then, in 23.1b, he repeats: "Now since human nature is evil, it must await the instructions of a teacher and the model before it can be put aright, and it must obtain ritual princi- ples and a sense of moral right before it can become orderly. ''11 Once again, ritual principles are necessary to correct the natural results of our inborn nature. Fur- thermore, in the same section, the evilness of human nature is used to explain why the sages created ritual principles: "In antiquity, the sage kings took man's nature to be evil, to be inclined to prejudice and prone to error, to be perverse and rebellious, and not to be upright or orderly. For this reason they invented ritual principles and precepts of moral du~' (Xun# 23.1b).

When Mencius argued that x'ing is good, he rejected three alternative posi- tions: (1) human nature is neither good nor bad; (2) human nature can become good or it can become bad; (3) some axe good by nature, and some are bad (Mendus 6a6). It is worth noting that Xunzi's thesis that human nature is evil is not mentioned. In my view, this suggests that Xmazi's thesis is not really a con- ventional view. It is a theoretical construction for Xunzi to defend the tradi- tionalism of Confucius. 12 Xunzi's defense strategy looks problematic. He is supposed to defend Confucius against other schools, given that there axe many daos other than the Confucian da0 of traditionalism. He should make a case that, given the evilness of human nature, the Confucian ritual dao is, in contrast to the daos of other schools, the best or the only remedy for the chaotic situa- tion in the world, and is uniquely effective in achieving and maintaining social order. Howver, Xunzi does not argue in this way in chapter 23. He does criti- cize numerous philosophers in chapters 6 and 21, but not for this purpose.

11 In 19.1a, the rituals are said to have the function of3~n ~, division, or in Knoblock's translation, to apportion things. It channels the desires of everyone by defining what a member of each social class is entitled to on the basis of the position and status of individuals and classes in society. i2 It is worth mentioning that D. Munro also thimks that the topic of the evilness of hnm~o nature is not Xunzi's main concern, but is derived from Xonzi's concern with "issues of chaos and pov- erty, and their causes and institutional remedies" (Mtmro: 193). For Munro, "Had developing a theory of human nature been his [Xtmzi's] interest, I doubt that Xunzi would have left in such a mess" (Munro: 198).

Yu: Hlrnan Nature and V'mue in Mencius and Xun~i 23

Indeed, the failure to recognize the value of ritual principles is also one of his main charges against philosophers of other schools.

The case that Xunzi makes, instead, is against Mencius, a fellow Confucian. His target in chapter 23 is Mencius' thesis that human nature is good. His criti- cism of Mencius focuses on the negative impact on the roles of sages and ritual principles. Mencius' theory is said to fail to explain the origin of ritual principles and to make sages and ritual principles useless. In 23.3b, he summzrires his difference with Mencius as follows: "Hence, ff the nature of man were good, then one could dispense with sage kings and put aside ritual and moral principles. But since the nature of man is evil, we must adhexe to the sage kings and esteem ritual and moral principles" (Xun~ 23.3b). In other words, whereas Mencius' de- fense does more damage than good for Confucius' ritual da0, Xunzi's theory of the evilness of human nature effectively justifies the value of it_

Given this, I would like to suggest that Xunzi's thesis, as a defence of Con- fucius' ritual da0, is more an internal matter of Confucianism. Xunzi, of course, defended Confucianism against other schools, but his theoretical postulation that human nature is evil is not to argue for the superiority of Confucianism over other schools. Rather, his goal is to compete with Mencius. Moreover, it is not so much about human nature per se, but serves to demonstrate that he him- self, not Mencius, is the true defender of Confucius' da0. It seems to me that chapter 23 is intended to be read by other Confucians rather than by philoso- phers of other schools. 13 Xunzi's thesis does grant a more essential role to sage- kings and their rituals. If human nature originally has seeds disposed toward vLrmes, as Mencius suggests, sages and rituals can only nurture and guide the development of these seeds. In Mencius' own words, "The sole concern of learning is to go after this strayed heart" (Mencius 6al 1). In Xunzi's case, ritual principles substantially alter original human nature and impose a value system upon it from outside. Yet, the important point is not that who assigns a bigger role to the ritual order of the sages. It is this: between Mencius and Xunzi, whose defense is more loyal to the original vision of Confucius?

Mencius believed that what he said is nothing more than an exposition of what is implied by Confucius. Right after his exposition of the four seeds, he states:

The Book of O&s says, Heaven produces the teeming masses, and where there is a thing there is a norm. If the people held on to their constant nature, they would be drawn to superior virtue. Confucius commented, "The author of this poem must have had knowledge of the way [dao]. Thus where there is a thing there is a norm, and because the people hold onto their constant nature they axe drawn to superior virtue." (Mendus 6a/6) 14

13 In chap. 6, Xtmzi lists Mencius as one of the twelve philosophers who he considers "cloak pernicious persuasions in beautiful language and present elegantly composed but treacherous doctrines and so create disorder and anarchy in the world" (6.1). Here he condemns Mencius by using almost the same language that Mencius uses to condemn Mozi and YANG Zhu. Xunzi's bitterness is apparent 14 Translation revised. In Lau's translation, only the first sentence ("the author of this poem must have had knowledge of the Way") is a quotation of Confucius. Yet in the Chinese original the

24 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy V.1

On the strength of this passage, Confucius is said to believe that human beings possess a constant nature that, if held on to, leads towards virtue. Furthemaore, in support of his azgument that human nature must have the heart-mind that contains the seeds of ten andyi, Mencius quotes the following saying of Confucius: "Confu- cius said, 'Hold on to it and it will rein,in; let go of it and it will disappear. One never knows the time it comes and goes, neither does one know the direction.' It is perhaps to the heart this refers" (Mendus 6a8). Again, Confucius is said to acknowl- edge that there is an original constant nature for people to preserve and develop.

Xunzi's thesis can also claim to have a root in Confucius. Confucius says: '~Fo subdue oneself and return to ritual is to practice humaneness" (Anakcts 12.1). What needs to be subdued in "oneself" Q~' E) must be sensuous desires. In a sense, Xunzi's thesis can be seen as a philosophical commenta U on Ana- lects 12.1. The commentary is creative, but hardly loyal to the original. It was not Confucius' view that the "self" has only boundless sensuous desires that inevi- tably lead to evil. The Chinese word that is translated as "subdue" is ke ~, which can be taken to "cultivate". Moreover, Confucius firmly believed that we have the potential to be virtuous. More importantly, Confucius shared the da0- de conceptual scheme, and even Hnims that "Heaven is the author of de that is in me" (Analects 7.22). Mencius sought to improve Confucius' da0 within the scheme of Confucius. In contrast, Xunzi abandoned this conceptual scheme in his dichotomy of Heaven and man. I believe that Confucius would much more appreciate Mencius' version. Xunzi developed some aspects of Confucius' da0, but abandoned others. Confucius would have taken issue with this, for he be- lieved that his da0 is unified (Analects 4.15).

It is well known that, although Xunzi fundamentally differed with Mencius on the issue of the goodness and badness of human nature and the relation between Heaven and man, he shared similar positions with Mencius on many other Confucian topics, such as the malleability of human nature; the possibility for everyone to perfect himself; the importance of self-cultivation; kingly gov- ernment; moral education; and the proper guidance of a true teacher; etc. (see, e.g., Graham 1989: 250; Goldin: 10-11). However, a puzzle naturally arises at this juncture. Since Xunzi rejected the metaphysical basis of Confucius and Mencius and started from such a radically opposite theoretical premise, how could he still hold these Confucian positions? Xunzi indeed faced some serious problems. First, he believed that eveuone has the same nature: "As a general rule, the nature men share is one and the same whether they be a Yao and Shun or a Jie and Robber Zhk The gentleman and the petty man share one and the same nature" (Xunx~ 23.4a). If this is the case, how do sages transform them- selves and become good before they create rituals to transform others? Xunzi was fully aware of this problem (see Xunzi 23.2a and 23.4a), but he failed to provide a sensible answer. Whether he could answer has been a matter of con- trove~sy (see Kline). The second is the problem of moral motivation. In Plato's Republic, Thrasymachus raises a question that becomes the central issue of Western moral philosophy: If morality or justice is other people's good, why

quotation includes the last sentence of this passage.

Yu: Human Nature and Virtue in Mend.us and Xunzi 25

should I be just? Now, since Xunzi starts from a similnr point that human na- ture is evil, we can apply Thrasymachus's question to him: If our original nature is evil, why should we follow ritual principles? In a classic paper, David B. Wong examines various interpretations of this issue and comes to the conclu- sion that, "[i]n view of the problems with either interpretation and in view of the fact that Xunzi gives no clear signal about the status of the desire to do good, it may well be that he was confused or ambivalent about the status of the desire. And if this is true, there will be no determinate answers from Xunzi about the nature of moral transformation" (Wong: 146). 15

I think Wong is fundamentally right in saying that Xunzi was confused. Here I would like to suggest a somewhat different way to look at Xunzi's con- fusion. In one peolliar argument, Xunzi infers as follows: one always desires what he lacks; we desire goodness; so human nature lacks goodness and is evik "It is plain that man's desiring to do good is the product of the fact that his nature is evil" (Xunzi 23.2b). If one's xing has an intrinsic desire for goodness, this can be taken as an internal basis for moral motivation. However, if our nature already has a natural desire for goodness, this contradicts Xunzi's view that in human nature there is only a love of profit and the desire to obtain it. Xtmzi must have already realized this problem when he raised the issue of how everyone in the street can be a sage (Xunzi 23.5a). His answer is that everyone in the street has the innate and natural faculty (.~bi ~) to understand necessary ethical principles and the innate and natural ability ~/u .~.) to practice them. He indeed grants a major role to the mind in the cultivation: "It is natural to our inborn nature to have desires, and the mind acts to control and moderate them" (Xunx~ 22.5a).

Xunzi, then, tried to provide an account of moral motivation and transfor- mation. Yet, in providing this account, he had to acknowledge that there are also some good elements in our nature. This is, I think, why Xunzi acknowl- edged that there are positive traits, inclinations, faculties, and abilities in our inborn nature. The problem is that, if we already have these good elements, he cannot hold his thesis that human nature is evil. To repeat: to show his superi- ority over Mencius in defending Confucius' dao, he claimed that human nature is evil. To maintain the Confucian position that everyone can be good, he had to put in a number of good elements in human nature. This is why Xunzi gets into a fundamental inconsistency in his philosophy.

IV. Thinking from Aristotle

To better understand the significance of the Mencius/Xunzi debate, I tend to turn to the first puzzle that I listed at the beginning of this article. I concentrate on Aristotle, with an aim of finding a mirror to appreciate the Mencius/Xunzi

is He proceeds to construe a creative interpretation of moral transformation on Xunzi's behalf, to the effect that "some raw materials in human nature that is amenable to being shaped toward a love of virtue and a delight in ritual" (Wong: 148).

26 Dan: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy V.1

debate. Although Atistode does not take as a major concern the goodness or badness of human nature, he has made remarks about this topic. A gathering of relevant remarks from his wfilings suggests that for Atistode our original na- ture contains good elements and bad elements. First, he claimed that there axe good elements in human nature. Human beings have some innate natural ten- dencies towards certain virtues, which axe called "natural virtue": "For each of us seems to possess his type of character to some extent by nature, since we axe just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, immediately from birth" (Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics [NE] VI.13; 1144b3-6; see also Eudemian Ethics 1229a21-30; 1234a30-31). 16 He also suggests that we have a natural sense of good and evil, of iust and unjust (Politics 1.2; 1253a16-18). Second, Afistode also believed that human beings naturally have bad elements:

For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the most dangerous, and he is equipped at bLrth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the worst ends. That is why, if he has no excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most B.tll of lust and gluttony. (Po~- tics 1.2; 1253a31-37)

Third, Aristotle maintained that moral virtues do not arise out of nature spon- taneously, but result from habit:

Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.... IN]one of the moral virtues arises in us by natuxe; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its na- ture.... Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. (_N-E, ft.1, 1103a 16-25)

This passage sounds as he is saying that human nature is neutxal. It seems that in a comparison between Aristotle and Confucianism, ff we

just pick out one or two passages, all sorts of conclusions seem possible. In the first view listed above, A.tistotle's natural virtues are similar to Mencius' four seeds; in the second position, Aristotle sounds like Xunzi who claims that hu- man nature is evil; and in the third view, Aristotle seems to echo Confucius' saying: "Men axe dose to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated practice" (Analects 17.2). However, Atistode's view is not so simple; neither axe the positions of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. For an effective comparison, we should examine how Aristotle himself thought his ethics is related to human nature. Once we follow this thinking, it is not difficult to see that, for Aristode, what is related to ethics, or what ethics must be based upon, is neither natural virtues, nor the bad parts, nor the neutrality of human nature. Rather, it is human function (ergon).

Aristotle believed that human beings have a function (ergon). "Function" is not a satisfactory translation of ergon, for it is heavily associated with an instrument or

16 A]I references to Anstode will be indicated with tide and standaxd page numbers thereafter. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Afistode ate based on Jonathan Barnes.

YLr H~'n~n Nature and V-mue in Mencius and X,n~ 27

something that can be used as an instrument, and hence easily invites an objection that human beings should not be thought to have a function (Hardie: 23). How- ever, the ergon of each thing, in its original sense, means, as Plato defines it, "what it alone can do or what it does better than anything else" (Republic 353a; cf. also 352e). In other words, it is the characteristic activity that a thing uniquely has or can perform. This is what Aristotle meant by ergon, and Aristotle identified human function as human rational activity (NE 1098a2-3).

Human function (ergon) must be a part of human nature (in Greek, pbusis). EtymologicaUy, the term comes from the verb pbut, "to grow" or "to beget." This parallels the Chinese term for "nature," that is, :r which, as mentioned earlier, is cognate with sheng, "to be born" or "to grow." In Aristotle, phusis, as many other key terms of philosophy, is "said in many ways." T. H. Irwin sum- marizes the use ofpbusis in the N-E: "(1) A thing's nature is its original constitu- tion or tendency apart from human intervention; hence it is contrasted with law and education .... (2) A thing's nature indicates its function and the final cause or end to which it tends" (Irwin 1999: 339). I think this is correct. Clearly, it is on the first sense Aristotle says that human nature is a complex of rational and non-rational parts, a mix of good and evil elements. Human function is a part of human nature in this general sense because it is contained in the original constitution of a human being. Rationality, or, more precisely, the potential for being rational, is a part of natural endowment and is an inborn feature for hu- man beings; it belongs to every normal member of the human species. Accord- ingty, we can say that, when Aristotle focused on human function, he focused on a narrow part of the human nature complex.

What, then, is the ground for Aristotle to single out human function from the human nature complex? For Aristotle, a thing's ergon also defines that thing: '"~nat a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can perform its function" (Meteorobeff IV.12; 390a10-12)37Accordiugly, to deter- mine what human function is is to locate the fundamental feature that determines a human being qua a human being, that is, humanity. Aristotle reaches his view by distinguishing human beings from other living things:

What then can this [human function] be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nu- trition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle. (NE 1097b33-1098a3)

Thus, rational activity is a human function because it is the fundamental feature that distinguishes a human being from other animals.

Let us further ask: What is the purpose for Aristotle to distinguish between two senses of human nature and identify humanity? Aristotle expresses explic- idy what his purpose is. To provide an understanding of what eudaimonia is, he

t7 This is repeated in the.Collowing passage: 'r are defined by their function and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they are homonymous" (Poh'tics 1.2; 1253a23-25).

28 Dao: A ]ournal of Comparative Philosophy V.1

says, we should "first ascertain the function of man" (NE 1.7; 1097a24-25). Following his position that human function is rational activity, he concludes that human good, that is, eudaimonia, is "activity of soul in conformity with vir- tue." Function (ergon) is related to aretg (virtue or excellence) because virtue is what makes one perform his function well. If its function is well performed, a thing must have achieved its virtue or excellence. Thus, "the virtue of man also will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him do his work well" (NE II.6; 1106a22-23). If we recall that eudaimonia in Greek originally means "living well" or "doing well," we can see clearly how crucial it is for A.r- istotle to identify htanan function or humanity. The function argument is the basis for his theory of virtue and his theory of happiness. Aristotle appeals to human function or humanity, because his ethics needs a metaphysical founda- tion in human nature.

We are now ready to show what Aristotle would have said about Mencius and Xunzi. Let us take Xunzi first. Xunzi distinguished between human beings and other things by ascribing to each a special feature. It is worthwhile recalling the following passage: "Fire and water possess vital breath but have no life. Plants and trees possess Me, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have aware- ness, but lack a sense of morality and justice [yt]. Humans possess vital breath, life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of morality and justice ~yt). It is for this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world" (Xunzi 9.16a). This passage is surprisingly similnr to NE 1097a33-1098a3 (quoted earlier) in which Afistode identifies human function by distinguishing human beings from other animals. However, whereas Aristode identifies human fianction or humanity in order to ground his theory of happiness on it, Xunzi, while knowing what dis- tinguishes humans from animals, chose not to pursue this line of thought. On the contrary, he based his ethics on the thesis that "human nature is evil." In other words, he starts from the aspect of human nature that human beings share with other animals. In A_ristode's view, Xunzi failed to appreciate the sig- nificance of humanity.

Aristotle would also have a problem with Xunzi's description of desires and emotions. For Xunzi, desires themselves are irrational and only lead to conflict. Desires form a part of human function in Aristotle. Aristotle's notion of human function as rationality, is broadly conceived; it includes the part of the soul that has a rational principle in itself, but also includes "the appetitive and in general the desiring element" (NE 1102b301). For Afistode, desires and emotions are irrational but "in a sense share [metecbousa] a rational principle" (NE 1102b13). This part "listens to and obeys" reason, and "this is the sense in which we speak of paying heed to one's father or one's friends." Furthemaore, "that the irrational dement is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation" (NE 1102b34-1103a1). Thus, the de- siting dement cannot initiate cogitation by itself; yet it can respond to and receive advice and order. For this reason, Aristotle claimed that this part should also be said to "have reason" (logon ecbein) (NE 1103a2) and it is a part of human function (ergon). This part has its excellent state, that is, virtue, called gtbi/eg aret6 ethical or moral virtue (also rendered as "excellence of character").

Ytr Hi,man Nature and V'tttue in Mencius and Xunzi 29

The corollary of the thesis that human nature is evil is "any good in humans is acquired by conscious exertion" (Xun~ 23.1a). For Xtmzi, the obtaining of virtue is likened to a warped piece of wood that requires steaming and bending to be straightened (Xun~ 23.1b). Aristotle would not approve this idea. He fully realized that virtue is hardly possible without a ground in human nature. Exter- nal effort can never form a habit contrary to a thing's nature: "For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move up- wards, not even if one tries to train it by tl~owing it up ten thousand times" (NE 1103a20-22). This can be used to explain why Xunzi had the problem of explaining moral transformation ff he insists on the evilness of human nature. Of course, as we know, Xunzi introduced some good elements in human na- ture, including a natural desire for the good and a theory of mind that can be fruitfully compared with Aristotle's theory of practical wisdom. In doing so, Xunzi is closer to Aristotle, but then he contradicts his view of the evilness of human nature.

As we come to Mencius, we find that Aristotle would find a kindred spirit Mencius also sought to identify humanity from the human nature complex. The rationale for him to isolate his na=ow sense of xing from the complex of human nature was that this good part distinguishes human beings from animals. This, as shown earlier, is precisely Aristotle's reason for singling out human function from the complex of human nature. More importantly, Mencius, like Aristotle, grounded his ethics on the goodness of human nature, that is, what distinguishes human be- ings from other animals. Although Mencius did not make an explicit statement, the theory of innate human goodness, judged from the role that it actually plays in Mencius' ethics, serves the same purpose as the function ~gument does in Aris- totle's ethics. For Mencius, ten, the Confucian notion of virtue, is what makes a man a man (Mendus 7a16). The theory ofxingis the basis for the theory of ren. The four seeds determine what a human being genuinely is. The person of t~n ~/un~), that is, the virtuous person or exemplary person, is the flail actn~liTation of these seeds: "An exemplary person differs from other men in that he retains his heazt" (Mencius 4b28; cf. 7al). Viewed in this way, Mencius' approach is as follows. To establish Confucius' da0, to determine what ren is and what makes a person of ren, we must appeal to what is distinctive of human beings, that is, the good nature of human beings. Needless to say, Aristotle had a different view from Mencius on what the special human characteristic is. He did not think that hmmnity is predis- posed toward certain special types of moral virtues. We leave it for another occa- sion to pursue the implications of their difference. For now, I should conclude that Mencius and Aristotle shared the same general approach to ground ethics on hu- manity. As Aristotle's human function argument provides the foundation for his eudaimonism, so does Mencius' theory of human innate goodness contribute to Confucian ethics, is

is I wish to thank HUANG Yong and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comnlcIlts.

30 Dao: A Journal of Compara#ve Philosophy V.1

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