YPC Parliament Performance Report · 2015-01-28 · We received our registration certificate No. 147 from the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor in December 2005. YPC is the 2010

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Evaluating Parliament Performance in the Transitional Period: November 2011-December 2013

YPC Parliament Performance Report

2 YPC Parliament Performance Report


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Funding: This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)

© 2014 Yemen Polling Center. All rights reserved.

5th Floor, Qatar National Bank Building, Alzubairi St., Sanaa, YemenP.O Box: 5782

Phone: 00967-1-505647Fax: 00967-1-505648

Email: [email protected]

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Table of ConTenTs

List of Acronyms

Institutional Background

Background of the Authors

Report Objectives

Political Context: The Yemeni Parliament and the “Arab Spring”

The Yemeni Parliament in the Transitional Period

Parliament and Transitional Justice

Functions of Parliament

Representation Function

Representativeness of the Yemeni Parliament Addressing Popular Grievances The Southern Issue The Sa›da Issue Security Electricity Education

Accountability to the Constituency

Dialogue with the Electorate

Corruption

Attendance

Oversight Function

Government Oversight

Budget Oversight

Parliamentary Discussions and Decisions on the Budget

Legislative Function

Deliberations of Draft Laws

Media Draft Laws (Examples)

Parliament Transparency

Public Access to Sessions

Parliament-Media Relations

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lisT of aCRonYms

COCA Central Organization of Control and Auditing

CSO Civil Society Organization

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GPC General People’s Congress

IDP Internally Displaced People

IMF International Monetary Fund

JMP Joint Meeting Parties

KVA Kilo Volt Amps

MEPI Middle East Partnership Initiative

MoCS Ministry of Civil Services

MoD Ministry of Defense

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoI Ministry of Interior

MP Member of Parliament

MVA Mega Volt Amps

NDC National Dialogue Conference

NDI National Democratic Institute

NED National Endowment for Democracy

NSO National Security Organization

PARC Pan-Arab Research Center

PSO Political Security Organization

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UNDP United Nations Development Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WB World Bank

WTO World Trade Organization

YPC Yemen Polling Center

YPW Yemen Parliament Watch

YemenPAC Yemen Parliamentarians Against Corruption

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insTiTuTional baCkgRound

The Yemen Polling Center (YPC) is an independent non-Governmental organization, providing the highest quality social science research services. YPC was established in 2004 as the first and only polling center in Yemen. We received our registration certificate No. 147 from the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor in December 2005. YPC is the 2010 recipient of the Best Partner in the Middle East and North Africa award from Gallup International. We design and implement opinion polls, household and other surveys, and provide other services which fulfill research needs of national and international institutions, non-profit organizations, corporations, government agencies, and professional associations.

YPC conducts public attitude surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews, demographic studies, and market research employing both quantitative and qualitative methods for development projects, international organizations and foundations, publications, business groups, banks, and other stakeholders. As a member of both the World Association for Public Opinion Research and the American Association for Public Opinion Research, YPC remains committed to excellence in all aspects of social science.

Since its inception YPC has conducted dozens of qualitative and quantitative research projects on a multitude of issues ranging from satellite television and radio consumption patterns and consumer attitudes, to human rights, women’s rights, and political reform issues, to corruption, public health, and other governance related studies, among others.

In addition to numerous successfully completed public opinion surveys and research projects, YPC has implemented several economic surveys and qualitative studies covering all governorates in Yemen. We have surveyed nearly 100,000 Yemeni citizens in face-to-face interviews.

YPC has a dedicated, well-experienced and qualified team. In addition, the Center cooperates with dozens of experts, consultants and university professors within Yemen and abroad when need be. Our experience, as well as our personnel and technical resources allow us to conduct surveys of any size throughout all of Yemen’s governorates while adhering to the most stringent international standards in data quality. Furthermore, Yemen is a religious and conservative society in which male-female interactions are quite limited. As such, around half of our enumerators are female, are able to conduct interviews with women respondents.

YPC has wide experience in implementing internationally funded projects. It has cooperated, and thus far conducted, dozens of projects with numerous international institutions including the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Pan-Arab Research Center (PARC), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ministry of Local Administration, among others.



baCkgRound of The auThoRs

Mareike Transfeld heads the research department at the Yemen Polling Center (YPC), where she also manages the Yemen Parliament Watch project (www.ypwatch.org). She is co-editor of Muftah’s Yemen and Gulf countries pages, and is currently a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. She has previously held internships at the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy in Yemen. She holds a Master’s degree in Politics with minors in Islamic Studies and Contemporary History from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany.

Contact: [email protected]

Anwar Al-Taj holds a BA in Journalism from Sana’a University where he specialized in Publication and Television Journalism. In addition he completed courses in Online Journalism and Publication, and TV Production. Anwar regularly reports on Parliamentary issues and events for the Yemen Parliament Watch. He is also a member of the Yemen Association of Parliamentary Journalists, which is part of the Yemeni Journalist Syndicate.


Kamal Haidara holds a BA in Political Science from Sana’a University. Since 2012 Kamal has been working as a researcher for the Yemen Polling Center, where he specializes in qualitative research. He particularly specialized in focus group discussions on political and social topics. Above that, Kamal is a human rights activist and publishes regularly in Yemeni media.


Kamal Moqbil holds a Bachelor degree in Sociology, and had previously worked at the Central Statistical Organization before he joined the YPC team. Kamal is the Head of Field Work and has extensive experience in monitoring and quality control, designing research projects, and instruments in addition to analyzing and training fieldwork teams.


Aiman al-Eryani holds a degree in Economics and Philosophy from Dalhousie University, Canada, and is the Contracts Coordinator and Research Analyst at YPC. His main interests lie in econometrics, macroeconomics, international development, and strategic behavior. At YPC, he is in charge of client coordination, as well as the design of research methodologies. He has been involved in a number of projects, including a survey on the Yemeni elite’s perception of decentralization as well as the population’s perceptions of the United Nations.


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Abdulsalam al-Rubaidi is YPC’s Arabic editor-in-chief. He is currently a senior researcher for the project “Framing the Yemeni Revolution” co-implemented with the University of Bonn. Abdulsalam has gathered previous experience in academic writing, editing and translation as a freelance researcher and lecturer at Sana’a University. He is on the editorial board of Muqrabat magazine and has published and translated several articles on modernism and post-modernism in literature. In 2012, he published a book on modern Arabic poetry. Abdulsalam holds an M.A in modern Arabic literature from Sana’a University and his research interests are modern Arabic literature, Sufism, and Islamic movements.




RepoRt objectives

The Yemen Parliament Watch (YPW) is a project implemented by YPC and financed by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Its purpose is to enhance the capacity of the Yemeni Parliament by providing a central hub of information and data for its members. Furthermore, the same information is made available to concerned civil society organizations (CSOs), journalists, and the public. The ultimate goal of this project is to support the Parliament and develop a communication channel between members of Parliament (MPs), voters, and citizens in general.

One of the components of the YPW project is regular evaluations of the Parliament’s performance. The following performance report is the fifth of its kind and the period between November 2011 and December 2013. It is a critical assessment of what the Parliament has accomplished in this period. By analyzing and exposing the activities of the Parliament, it is the goal of this report to enhance the institution’s role in a democratic system. Furthermore, the report provides citizens, CSOs, and media outlets with information on Parliamentary procedures. Data presented in this report was collected by the YPW either during parliamentary sessions and is available on the project website or through in-depth interviews with members of Parliament or parliamentary staff.

All performance reports published in the framework of the YPW project are available for download on www.ypwatch.org.

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political context: the Yemeni paRliament and the “aRab spRing”

The period under scrutiny in this report (November 2011 – December 2013) makes up a large part of Yemen’s transitional period initiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement. This agreement brought about a transfer of power after eleven months of popular protest in 2011. The so-called ‘Youth Revolution’ disrupted the country’s already precarious political, economic and social stability. The main issues that led to the 2011 protests were rampant corruption, high levels of unemployment and pervasive poverty. The failure of state institutions to respond to the demands of the people and serve their interests fed into a widespread dissatisfaction with the government.

In the years prior to the 2011 protests, this dissatisfaction was evident in extra-parliamentary opposition movements, such as the southern separatists and the Houthis. Additionally, instances of conflict among the political parties were increasing. A significant point of strife between the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and the opposition parties, otherwise known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), was electoral reform. Since the conclusion of the 2006 presidential elections, the JMP had been consistently demanding the reform of the electoral system. However, the government failed to take adequate measures in these areas in a participatory and transparent manner.

Parliament has been an essential arena for opposition parties to contest the GPC. The parliamentary elections, which were originally scheduled to be held in April 2009, were used by the JMP to pressure the GPC to implement the desired electoral reforms. Even so, the government began the election preparation process without taking into consideration the reform demands made by the JMP. In return, the opposition boycotted parliamentary sessions and mobilized a countrywide boycott of the voter registration process in 2008. In February of 2009, an agreement was reached between the two blocs. Known as the ‘Twenty-third of February Agreement’, it stipulated the postponement of the elections for two years and that the electoral system should be reformed in the meantime. In order to resolve the ongoing conflicts with southern separatists and the Houthis in the north, a national dialogue was mandated.

Given the requirements of the supreme national interest and the necessity of holding fair, free, and secure parliamentary elections in a proper political climate in which all political parties take part, the following signers support the necessity of taking constitutional procedures needed to amend the article (65) of the constitution to allow extending the Parliament’s term two extra years.

Due to the lack of sufficient time to make the needed reforms, the following steps should be undertaken: First, providing the opportunity to political parties and civil society organizations to discuss the constitutional amendments needed to develop the political and electoral systems including the party-list proportional representation system. Secondly, allowing the political parties represented in the Parliament to complete the discussion of topics which were not agreed on during the amendment preparation of the election law and including the agreed points in the law. Thirdly, reconstruction of the Supreme Commission for Election and Referendum (SCER) according to the law articles. (Saba News Agency)



Both the reforms and the national dialogue were never implemented. Instead, the GPC-dominated Parliament continued to pass reforms without considering the demands of the opposition. In December 2010, Parliament agreed to a constitutional amendment that abolished the limit of presidential terms. This would have allowed then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh to stay in office for life. This decision caused an escalation in political conflict. The JMP mobilized its members from all over the country in protest. In early 2011, the protests began to spread throughout the country.

With protests in the capital of Sana’a the opposition was able to pressure then-President Saleh into making concessions and offering wide-reaching reforms on February 2, 2011. Initially, the opposition parties accepted the reform offers and stopped calling for protests. In the meantime, inspired by the events of the so-called “Arab Spring,” students and human rights activists had begun to protest on the streets demanding the fall of the Saleh regime. Consequently, in late February the JMP withdrew its acceptance of Saleh’s reform offers and joined the popular and non-partisan protests on the street demanding the resignation of the president. This shift was due to the increase in the use of government violence against civilian protesters.

As the political crisis unfolded, Parliament did not have an effective role in trying to find a solution. Following the events of the so-called ‘Friday of Dignity’, when over fifty protesters were killed by armed men at ‘Change Square’ in Sana’a, the GPC dominated Parliament granted President Saleh’s request for a thirty day state of emergency. It then suspended all of its activities in May 2011. Only in November 2011, Parliament resumed its activities after the GPC and the JMP came to an agreement.

The agreement between the political parties came in the shape of a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On November 23, 2011 former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with the GPC and the JMP, signed the so-called GCC initiative. This led to a transitional process with the goal to re-stabilize the country politically, socially and economically.

President Saleh’s signature on the initiative was his formal resignation. It provided that the president would transfer his powers to the vice president, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. One of the GPC’s conditions for signing to the initiative was that both the GPC and JMP would agree to Hadi as consensus candidate for the presidential elections. Furthermore, the initiative mandated that the vice president was to call for early presidential elections within three months of its signing.

In December 2011, one month after the signing of the GCC Initiative, a transitional government was formed. It was equally composed of GPC and JMP members. Three months later, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi was elected in nationwide elections without competition. Parliamentary elections are stipulated to be held after the completion of the transitional period. Thus, Parliament still remains unchanged in terms of its composition for the time of the transitional period. The GPC still holds the majority of seats, and thus dominates the institution.

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the Yemeni paRliament in the tRansitional peRiod

The current Parliament was elected in April 2003. Constitutionally, the term of its members is to be limited to six years. However, the political crisis between the GPC and the JMP prevented elections from being held in 2009. Based on Article 65 (see box) of the Yemeni constitution, the aforementioned ‘February 23’ agreement extended the term to April 2011.

The term of Parliament is six calendar years starting from the date of its first session. The President of the Republic shall call for new parliamentary elections at least sixty (60) days before Parliament concludes its term. If in extraordinary circumstances elections cannot be held, the existing Parliament shall continue to function until such circumstances are over and elections are duly held. (Article 65, Constitution)

After the two year extension expired, the emergence of popular protests and lack of political and social stability prevented elections from being held in 2011. Thus, Parliament’s legitimacy was strained both constitutionally and in the eyes of the people. Yet it continued its sessions in 2011, while protests against Saleh were increasing on the streets. On March 23, 2011, Parliament approved a state of emergency, which was requested by then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh after more than 50 protesters were killed at the protest square in Sana’a. It then suspended all of its activities in May 2011.

After the signing of the GCC initiative, its implementation mechanism defined the role of Parliament during the transition period. The GCC initiative was from then on the legal basis of Parliament in its composition of 2003. Rather than taking decisions based on an absolute majority vote, as stipulated in Article 72 of the constitution, Article 8 of the GCC initiative mandated the following:

All decisions of Parliament shall be taken by consensus. If consensus on any given topic cannot be reached, the speaker of Parliament shall refer the matter for decision by the vice president in the first phase, or the president in the second phase. That decision shall be binding for the two parties. (Article 8, GCC Initiative’s Implementation Mechanism).

The document further states in Article 9 that the Parliament has to approve the legislations that are required to implement the GCC initiative.

The two parties shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Parliament adopts the legislation and other laws necessary for the full implementation of commitments in respect of the guarantees set forth in the GCC initiative and this mechanism (Article 9, GCC Initiative’s Implementation Mechanism).



After Parliament resumed its activities in November 2011, it discussed various issues relating to the political crisis. As mandated by the GCC initiative, Parliament took decisions to enable the initiative’s implementation. On January 21, 2012 Parliament confirmed Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi as the sole candidate for the presidential elections held in February 2012. On the same day, Parliament granted then-President Saleh full immunity from prosecution as it was stipulated in the GCC agreement. The immunity clause of the initiative was one of the main factors that motivated Saleh to sign the deal in November 2011. In this regard, Parliament fulfilled the task, which it was given by the GCC initiative.

It must be noted however, that with few exceptions (see below) Parliament did not play a crucial role in the transitional period. This is not only due to its restricted constitutional powers, but also because the discussions taking place in the institution are not relevant in regard to the major challenges the country is facing. The session agendas focus mainly on minor and sometimes on local issues, whereas the discussion’s outcomes rarely have a political impact. In fact, the speaker of Parliament had told MPs “not to read newspapers” as the topics discussed in Parliament are unrelated to the transition and politics discussed in the media.

According to the GCC initiative, issues relating to the transition were to be discussed by the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). The national dialogue was mandated by the GCC initiative to resolve the ongoing internal conflicts, including the southern and the Houthi conflicts, as well as to define the future basis of the Yemeni state. The NDC began in March 2013 with nine working groups (Southern Issue, Saada Issue, Transitional Justice, State-Building, Good Governance, Military/Security, Special Entities, Rights/Freedoms and Development) discussing the various topics. With the onset of the NDC the role of Parliament became increasingly unclear. As the NDC was to discuss legislative questions regarding the future state, decisions taken by Parliament not only lack legitimacy because of the institution’s general lack thereof, but also because the future state was to be based on the outcomes of the NDC.

In late 2013, a debate was sparked over the role of Parliament. The GPC and Islah, who have the largest representation in Parliament, with the support of the Salafi al-Rashad opposed the notion of resolving Parliament and argued that the political forces should move on with drafting the new constitution and preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections. However, smaller parties with little representation in Parliament supported the idea to resolve Parliament. These parties include the YSP, the al-Haq party, the Nasserites and the Building and Development party. According to these parties both Parliament and the Shura Council should be replaced by a constituent composed of NDC delegates. The objective of this constituent body would be to monitor the post-dialogue transitional period and follow up the implementation of its outcomes.

All parties eventually reached an agreement in the NDC that all institutions should remain as they are, but that the Shura Council would be enlarged and that a new committee would be formed to oversee the implementation of the NDC outcomes. Hence, rather than resolving Parliament, on December 23, 2013, its term was extended for another two years with the approval of the NDC.

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paRliament and tRansitional justice

The Law of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation has been one of the political sticking points in Yemen. Transitional justice, which refers to judicial and non-judicial measures to address legacies of human rights abuses, was a demand raised by the oppositional protesters and families of victims of government violence. By seeking truth and accountability, transitional justice does not only provide recognition of the rights of victims, but it contributes to civic trust and the rule of law1. There were two major obstacles to transitional justice in Yemen. On the one hand, the immunity law mandated by the GCC initiative, and on the other hand, the old elites who the initiative kept in power. The elites were responsible for a gross of human rights abuses at various times of Yemen’s history. There was no real interest among them to seek real transitional justice. The immunity law did not only grant complete immunity from legal and judicial prosecution to Saleh, but also to the officials who have worked under him. International human rights organizations have criticized the immunity clause in the GCC agreement as contradicting international conventions.2

However, the immunity law mandated a law in regards to national reconciliation and transitional justice. The drafts of the law have so far not met international criteria for transitional justice.

The first draft of the transitional justice law was presented by the Ministry of Legal Affairs to the president in mid-2012. Before referring the law to Parliament for deliberation on the January 6, 2013, President Hadi amended the law. The amendments to the law reflect the controversy the law has caused in the Yemeni debate. Not only did the political parties in Parliament have different viewpoints regarding the draft, but activists, rights-based organizations and families of victims also expressed opposing views. According to the Minister of Legal Affairs (JMP), “the difference is over the contents of the draft, the time period it covers and issues related to institutional reform and truth- seeking.”3

Civil society actors viewed the draft law as a tool to protect those who have committed violations, most of whom belong to the political parties that signed the GCC initiative. According to these opponents, such propositions will discriminate victims and deny their sufferings.

The period this law covers is the core point of dispute among political parties. The bill transferred to President Hadi by the JMP led Ministry of Legal Affairs stipulated a period from 1990 to 2012. Amendments to the law made by Hadi restricted the period to events in 2011 only. In Parliament, the JMP rejected this draft law, arguing that it worked in favor of the GPC, which insisted to restrict the timeframe to the events related to the 2011 protests. The JMP and civil society forces, however, demanded that the law include violations committed before the 2011 uprising.

1 “What Is Transitional Justice?,” International Center for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.2 “Yemen Transition Tainted by ‘immunity’ Deal | Amnesty International,” Amnesty International, November 24, 2011, http://www.

amnesty.org/en/news/yemen-transition-tainted-%E2%80%98immunity%E2%80%99-deal-2011-11-24.3 AlAhale.net, July 6, 2012“[Ar:] Why Saleh and His Family Refuse the Transitional Justice Law?!],” AlAhale.net, July 6, 2012, http://

alahale.net/article/3632.



Another major difference between the political parties was regarding the name of the law, as well as its definition of transitional justice. The original draft was titled Law of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation, while the second draft was titled Law of National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice. While the first placed emphasis on transitional justice, the second emphasized reconciliation. The crucial difference between the two is regarding accountability and truth-seeking. The first draft defined transitional justice as:

restorative justice, none judiciary, for the detection of truth and reparation to victims and preserving national memory and preventing the recurrence of serious violations of human rights in the future.4

The draft presented to Parliament defined transitional justice as:

a set of measures and procedures to be taken to combat human rights violations through the period specified in the law for reparation of victims and preventing human rights violations in the future.5

The first draft was not accepted among civil society and victims of violations as it does not provide accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and does not address the reform of state institutions. The second draft was not accepted by civil society as it does not comply with the minimal standards of transitional justice and merely addresses compensation of victims. Because Parliament did not agree on the law, but referred it to various parliamentary committees for review, it is currently being redrafted to include the recommendations of the Transitional Justice working group of the NDC, which also discussed the law between March 2013 and January 2014. It is unlikely that the current Parliament will pass a law demanding genuine transitional justice through truth-seeking and accountability.

4 “Yemeni-Draft-Transitional-Justice-Law.pdf,” Peace and Justice Initiative. http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Yemeni-draft-Transitional-Justice-Law.pdf.

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Functions oF paRliament

Representation Function

Given the Parliament’s function to represent the will of the people, an important criterion of a democratic Parliament is that it should be representative of its people in terms of its composition. This means that the decisions parliamentarians make and the positions they represent within discussions should reflect popular will. Unrepresentative Parliaments are unable to accurately reflect popular will and opinion on important issues discussed. A democratic Parliament should also be representative of social diversity in terms of gender, language, religion, ethnicity or other politically significant characteristics to prevent social groups from feeling disadvantaged or excluded from the political process. To a large extent a representative composition of the Parliament can be guaranteed by free and fair elections. However, the type of electoral system has an impact on the representativeness of Parliament.

Nominally, the Yemeni Parliament’s bylaws ensure Parliament’s representativeness. Article 4 of the Yemeni constitution declares

The people of Yemen are the possessor and the source of power, which they exercise directly through public referendums and elections, or indirectly through the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, as well as through elected local councils.

According to article 3 of the Parliament’s bylaws

the House consists of 301 members, who shall be elected in a secret, free and equal vote directly by the people. The Republic shall be divided into constituencies equal in number of population with a variation of not more than 5% plus or minus. Each constituency shall elect a member to the House of Representatives.

Further, article 8 of the bylaws reads:

A Member of the House represents all the people, cares for the public interest without any condition or restriction on his/her being a representative.

And article 75 declares that

A member of the House of Representatives represents the whole nation, guards the public interest and his representation may not be subjected to any restriction or special condition



Representativeness of the Yemeni Parliament

The Yemeni Parliament as elected in 2003 is composed of 301 directly elected members. The GPC holds 238 seats, Islah 46, the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) eight, the Nasserists three and the Baath party two seats. Four seats are filled by independents. There is only one female parliamentarian represented in the 2003 Parliament.

The electoral system in place in 2003 was a first-past-the-post system. This system is based on single candidate districts, where voters vote for candidates rather than parties. The winning candidate is the one who gains the greatest number of votes, even if the number of votes does not represent an absolute majority. A disadvantage of this system is that if a large number of candidates run in a single district, the votes are split amongst the candidates, resulting in the possibility of candidates having won the post with a minimal number of votes. Particularly in the south, the votes for the opposition were split in the 2003 elections, which was an advantage for the GPC candidates.

Particularly the GPC was able to make large gains since the first parliamentary elections held in 1993 (145 seats in 1993 and 226 seats in 1997). Since the 1997 parliamentary elections, the GPC has had sufficient numbers in Parliament to make amendments to the constitution without consultation with the opposition parties.6

In 2003, the party continued to dominate elections. According to a report published by the National Democratic Institute (NDI),

“the ruling party received 76 percent of the seats, but only 58 percent of the popular vote. Islah received 15 percent of the seats, but 22.5 percent of the popular vote. The YSP received two percent of the seats and five percent of the popular vote. Had Yemen had a list or proportional representation system rather than a “first past the post” system the opposition would hold close to 1/3 of the seats in parliament.”7

Accordingly, the elections did not produce a representative composition of Parliament. In terms of social diversity, the Yemeni Parliament is also not representative. Half of the Yemeni population is female, yet only one female candidate was elected to Parliament in 2003.

6 “Election Day Observations.» National Democratic Institute. p. 27, https://www.ndi.org/files/Parl%20Elections%20Yemen%20part3.pdf.

7 Ibid

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Given the conservative social context of Yemen, a low representation of women in Parliament does not come as a surprise. However, there is a certain degree of popular support from women in politics. According to YPC research, 42.2% of men and 52% of women approved a quota of at least 30% for women in Parliament and government.

Another group not represented in the Yemeni Parliament are the marginalized, also referred to as the Akhdam or Muhamasheen. While they are themselves not represented in Parliament, their interests are also not represented by mainstream political parties. The marginalized represent a social group, which is distinguished on the basis of their darker skin color. They are viewed to be at the bottom of the social ladder in Yemen. There are no accurate estimates of how large the marginalized population is in Yemen.

Beyond its actual representativeness, the Parliament has lost its legitimacy within the population as the elections have been frequently postponed since 2009 (see above). With the emergence of the 2011 popular protests, it became evermore apparent that the Parliament in its current composition does not represent the will of the people. This becomes especially clear when looking at the demands of independent youth movement, the southern separatist movement, as well as the Houthi movement. Motivated by the widespread corruption, poverty and high unemployment, as well as distinct regional grievances, these movements turned against the established elites in Sanaa. While Parliament was not directly addressed by the popular protests, a general distrust towards political parties also resulted in a distrust towards Parliament. According to a survey conducted by YPC in 2010, only 12.3 percent of citizens have total confidence in political parties in comparison to 47.9 % of citizens who do not have confidence in political parties at all. 31.8 % of the population does not know which parties are represented in Parliament. Further, a YPC survey conducted in 2012 on youth activism revealed that 90% of youth activists do not believe Parliament respects democracy. 62.6 % believe political parties do not respect democracy.

The state-building working group of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) has issued a number of recommendations, which will ensure a more representative composition of Parliament in future. The NDC outcomes stipulate to replace the first-past-the-post system with a representational system. Rather than electing individuals, voters will then vote for parties. Likewise, the outcomes recommend a 30% quota for women in elected legislative councils.

Addressing Popular Grievances

To fulfill its function of popular representation, Parliament should debate issues that are of concern to the public. The current economic situation is by far Yemeni citizens’ greatest concern. In 2012, YPC conducted a survey to determine what the Yemeni public perceives as the most pressing issues the government should address. The weak economic environment, including high rates of poverty, unemployment, and high prices, was selected by the majority of Yemenis interviewed in 2012 (54.3% of respondents). This has been the main source of concern for the people in Yemen since 2010. Following the economic situation, the political crisis was identified as second source of concern (9.2% of respondents), closely followed by the current security situation (8.9%) and the provision of public services (8.6%).

A 2012 YPC survey conducted amongst youth activists revealed that 25.5 % of youth activists believe the government’s priority should be the economy and public services. 19.7 % believe



the government should focus on security and the restructuring of the security sector. Other priorities are the southern issue with 13.1 %, education with 8.8 % and unemployment and youths with 6.6 %.

The issues the Yemeni Parliament focused on the most during the reporting period is the security situation as well as service provision, particularly electricity (see below). The economic situation, including unemployment and poverty, as well as education were neglected. The following is a review of Parliament’s debates about the southern and Sa’da issues, as well as security, electricity and education.

The Southern Issue

The southern issue is one of the most challenging issues that Yemen is facing. It refers to the southern secessionist movement, commonly known as al-Hirak, which first began as a protest movement in 2007. Fueled by the general political and economic marginalization of the formerly independent south, the protest movement gained momentum and was regularly confronted with government repression. Since 2009, the movement has been in parts calling for an independent state in southern Yemen. Representatives of the southern movement participated in the NDC. However, they did not represent the entire movement. Al-Hirak still relies on protest to pursue their goals and rejects the outcomes of the NDC. Even though its relevance has increased sharply during the 2011 uprising, especially as calls for secession have steadily grown louder, it was not a priority to Parliament during the reporting period.

On January 01, 2013, MP Abdullah al-Khulaqi (GPC) from the southern governorate of al-Lahj raised the southern issue spontaneously in a session that was not designated to the issue. He argued that the GCC initiative does not serve the south and only serves the north. He pointed out that nothing has been done for the forcibly retired soldiers from the south and those who were harmed in the 1994 civil war. He stated that the initiative only solves the problems between the parties in Sana’a.

Some MPs sympathized with MP al-Khulaqi and discussed the issue. Abdullah al-U’daini (Islah) supported the statements made by the previous speaker and said that his party agrees to giving the southerners their rights but not to the expense of unity, as separation was a “red line.” MP Abdulaziz Jubari (defected from the GPC after the Friday of Dignity, March 18, 2011) stated that the brothers of the southern governorates should feel that real change has occurred in the country.

In cases the southern issue was brought up in Parliament, the topic was not scheduled. For this reason, Parliament discussions on the south do not result in any kinds of measures or decisions. Parliamentarians do not normally openly speak out against the southern issue, but the common opinion is that the southern issue should be solved, while preserving unity.

Some opposition towards the south was expressed in the form of a question posed by MP Mohammed Sharda (GPC). He asked what the criteria were for the appointment of southern officers, who replaced northerners in the armed forces. Ultimately, this question expressed criticism towards the ongoing restructuring of the military and the appointment of southerners into the armed forces. He further asked for the reasons, which prevent the government from solving the problems of currently retired northern officers.

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Another session brought up the need to create a committee that would persuade Ali Salim al-Beidh, vice president of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, to participate in the GCC mandated NDC. At the time, the southern movement refused to participate in the NDC as it perceived the process to be dominated by the north. Instead, the southern movement demanded a north-south issue dialogue. The committee demanded by parliamentarians was never established however.

In most cases, the southern issue was merely discussed from a security perspective. For instance, Ja’bal Tu’aiman (Islah) asked the Minister of Interior about security procedures taken against southerners who are looting and attacking the shops of northerners in southern governorates. Similarly, on December 17, 2013, after the Hadhramout Tribal Federation (HTF) issued an ultimatum to the government to withdraw all its troops from the governorate, parliamentarians warned against attacks targeting northerners in south Yemen.

Thus, it can be concluded that Parliament did not address at all the main demands of the southern movement, which include the resolution of land disputes, the question of forcibly retired officers and bureaucrats as well as the release of political prisoners. While the NDC was tasked to find solutions to the southern issue, Parliament could have played a more conducive role and pressure the government to address southern grievances and ensure full representation of the southern movement in the political process. Given the importance of the southern issue, Parliament paid too little attention to the south, while perceiving the issue as a security problem only.

The Sa’da Issue

The Sa’da issue was likewise not a priority to Parliament. Since 2004, the Houthis in the northern governorate of Sa’da battled the central government in six rounds of wars. The movement is motivated by their demand for political participation, economic development as well as the defense of their Zaidi religious tradition. The Houthis generally represent Zaidism, a branch of Shi’a Islam, which in practice is closely related to Sunni Islam. Sa’da represents the heart of Zaidi Islam. Often the Houthis are accused of wanting to reestablish the Zaidi Imamate, which ruled northern Yemen prior to the republican revolution of 1962. The movement goes back to the 1990s, when the two parliamentarians, Yahia al-Houthi and Abdulkarim Jadban, co-founded the “Believing Youth” in Sa’da. This group represents the core of the movement, which is today referred to as Ansar Allah or the Houthi movement. The parliamentary immunity of Yahia al-Houthi has been revoked three times since.

The Houthi movement grew in strength after the 2011 uprising and was able to expand its territorial control beyond the borders of Sa’da, leading to violent clashes in the governorates of al-Jawf, Hajja and Amran. With the conflict escalating and a plethora of actors being dragged into the battles, the conflict developed sectarian and tribal dimensions. The ideological and political antagonism between the Houthis and Islah fueld the battles. Islah adheres to Sunni Islam, although it merges a variety of schools of thoughts, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism. The Houthi movement also participated in the NDC, but continues to use violence as a strategy to pursue their goals.

On December 25, 2012, Hussain al-Aswadi (GPC) raised the Sa’da issue in a session that was not designated for the topic. He asked the government to force the Hotuhi movement to



comply with the principles of the nation, the constitution and the law, as well as to put down their arms. Abdulkarim Jadban (an MP from Saada who defected from the GPC after the Friday of Dignity, March 18, 2011) defended the Houthi movement, stating that Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the current leader of the movement, is a patriotic man who created a national resistance movement. He added that the movement can’t be ignored and that it is one of the main actors behind the “Youth Revolution” of 2011. Abdulaziz Jubari (defected from the GPC after the Friday of Dignity, March 18, 2011) replied to Jadban, stating that the Houthis are an agent of Iran and with his statements is insulting the current president and the transitional government. Jadban in turn suggested that Jubari could potentially be an agent of America, as the Americans are occupying Yemen. When the debate became more heated, the deputy speaker of Parliament concluded the session to avoid a further escalation.

Besides Jadban, an overall majority of the present parliamentarians agreed with the statement made by al-Aswadi, and support the notion that the Houthis should be forced under the authority of the state. In general, Parliament opposes the Houthi movement. Similar as is the case with the southern issue, the Houthi issue is mostly raised from the security perspective. Parliament, for instance, discussed the deteriorating security in the governorates Amran, and Ibb after conflicts with the Houthi movement. President Hadi was requested by Parliament to intervene immediately in order to stop the conflict. In the same breath, Parliament emphasized the government’s duty to put an end to the conflict, arrest those responsible for destabilizing security, and establish stability in all governorates.

In late 2013, confrontations between Houthis and Salafis escalated in Dammaj. Dammaj is home to a Salafi theological school, which was established in the 1980s. The local Zaidi population and particularly the Houthi movement perceives the presence of the school in Sa’da, the heartland of the Zaidi tradition, as a threat to their identity. This has repeatedly led to antagonisms and conflict between the two sides. Since 2011, the Houthis frequently laid siege on the village. By the end of 2013, violence escalated with wide repercussions in Yemeni society, as sympathies to either of the two sides developed on the basis of religious sects.

In December 2013, Parliament requested its speaker to issue a letter to the government, instructing it to take action and stop the conflict in Sa’da. In the letter, the government was tasked to establish military checkpoints and remove checkpoints, which were established by the Houthis and Salafis. The Security and Defense Committee was tasked with overseeing the issue. At the same time, Parliament formed a special committee which was to conduct field visits to Dammaj together with a presidential committee in order to assess the situation and draft a report.

Even though the report was written, it was frozen after a request made on behalf of President Hadi. He invalidated the parliamentary committee on the grounds that a presidential committee had already been formed, The head of the parliamentary committee was moved to the presidential committee and since then refused to provide any information on the investigation to the media. This was never done officially however. Some MPs were under the impression that the report contained critical information that the presidency of the parliament prevented from being publicized.

Without the knowledge of the parliamentarians, the presidency of Parliament issued a statement regarding Dammaj. The statement called for a ceasefire between the Houthis and Salafis, while demanding the Houthis to lift their siege on Dammaj. The statement also called on the Houthis

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and Salafis to send delegations to the capital to meet with the presidential and parliamentary committees in order to find solutions and end the conflict. The statement put responsibility of the ongoing conflict on the leader of the Houthi movement Abdulmalik al-Houthi and the Salafi leader Yahia al-Hajoori. Parliament retracted this statement after several MPs requested that the report by the parliamentary committee tasked with visiting the area must be presented to Parliament before any statements can be made. The report was never released however.

In conclusion, Parliament did not address the problems driving the Houthi movement. In general, Parliament’s approach to Sa’da is short sighted, as the problems are viewed as temporary.

Security

Security is one of the issues Parliament devotes most of its time to. The security situation in Yemen deteriorated dramatically during the reporting period, with conflicts increasing in northern and southern Yemen, whereas smaller security incidents such as assassinations and attacks on military checkpoints became a common phenomenon. Most security topics discussed in Parliament relate to the Houthi movement or al-Hirak (see above). Other security related issues include terrorism and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the spread of arms, kidnapping, assassinations and the general security.

In regard to terrorism, Parliament has repeatedly condemned any violent acts emanating from terrorist groups. On December 15, 2013, Parliament condemned the attack on the al-Urdhi hospital within the compound of the Ministry of Defense. The attack occurred on December 5, 2013, when armed gunmen stormed the compound, killed 56 and injured 176 people. Parliament demanded the results of the investigation into the attack to be released to the public and a quick apprehension of the attackers. After a video of the attack had been released on public television on December 11, 2013, the public reacted strongly to the incident. The public particularly demanded the Minister of Interior to be replaced.

In the reporting period, Parliament was particularly outspoken against the use of UAVs and drone strikes. After a drone strike hit a wedding caravan on December, 15, 2013, killing 12 and leaving several others injured in al-Baydha, Parliament decided to ban US UAVs from Yemeni airspace and advised the Yemeni security authorities to fulfil their duty in pursuing terrorists and providing security for Yemeni citizens. Parliament also requested a report from the government on the violation of Yemeni sovereignty by US aircrafts. Since drone strikes have increasingly led to civilian victims, opposition against the UAVs has grown amongst the Yemeni population.

Other security related incidents Parliament discussed include kidnappings, attacks and assassinations directed against politicians or members of the NDC. One such incident that was heavily debated was the attack by state security authorities against MP Ahmed Saif Hashid. A letter was sent to the Minister of Interior demanding the suspects behind the attack to be brought forth within four days. Certain MPs have threatened that if suspects are not brought forth before May 18, 2013 confidence would be lifted from the minister. Other issues included a letter sent to the Minister of Interior and the Attorney General demanding to investigate the killing of two young men, Hassan Jaafar Aman and Khaled Mohammed al-Khatib, as they were passing by the wedding of a relative of Ali Abed Rabbo al-Awadhi, a member of the



NDC. The case caused public uproar as al-Awadhi is a well-known tribal leader and was not persecuted for the killing of the two men.

Further, Parliament discussed the assassination of MP Abdulkarim Jadban, the representative of the 267th district in Sa’da governorate. Parliament demanded the cabinet of ministers and the heads of the various security agencies to submit to Parliament a detailed report on the security situation as well as the assassination of Jadban and all measures taken by the government in relation to the case. Because the cabinet did not attend the session that was allocated to this discussion (November 28, 2013), MPs have put forth a number of proposals, including the withdrawal of confidence from the interior and defense ministers and the dismissal of the heads of the security agencies concerned. Not all MPs agreed to this suggestion. Consequently, as according to the GCC initiative all decisions taken by Parliament must be through consensus, the issue was referred to the President.

Parliament handled most security incidents by forming special committees tasked with investigation. In some cases, the committees were formed, in others not. However, no real investigation of security incidents have been made.

Electricity

In the transitional period, the issue of electricity provision has become a matter of public opinion. With frequent attacks on power lines and power cuts throughout the country, discontent amongst the population grew. The government came to be judged based on the quality of electricity provision.

On March 26, 2013, the Committee of Public Services presented a report about the debts various government institutions owe to the Ministry of Electricity. The report revealed that governmental institutions as well as citizens did not pay their electricity bills, which amount to 46 billion YER. The debt is distributed amongst different governorates, with Sana’a, Aden and al-Hodeidah being the greatest debtors. More than 100 governmental institutions are indebted to the government, with a total amount of 29 billion YER, this includes the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Public Work and Roads and the Ministry of Health. The report also revealed that the representative of the Ministry of Electricity who attended the meetings of the parliamentary committee apologized for not being able to provide a list of influential people, who have not paid their electricity bills. The committee asked the representative to provide the list within two weeks, but the list was never provided.

On November 12, 2012, MP Abdulkarim Jadban (an MP from Saada who defected from the GPC after the Friday of Dignity, March 18, 2011) sent an inquiry to the Ministry of Electricity concerning financial and administrative inconsistencies within the ministry. This question comes in the context of political polarization and fears that political parties are taking advantage of their positions within the bureaucracy. In the inquiry, details concerning companies and individuals who have received contracts with the ministry, and who at the same time are politically affiliated with the minister were provided. Because the ministry provided no proper answer, Jadban demanded an investigation into the issue. Consequently, on May 16, 2013 the minister of electricity attended parliament and rejected all claims made by Jadban. The responses of the minister were then referred to the Public Services Committee to examine the information and provide a detailed report to Parliament. Up to date, no report has been written.

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In a report discussed in December 2012, Parliament recommended to the government to cancel contracts with Korean providers of electricity generators and instead invest into a local power station, with the capacity to cover the needs of Yemen. Parliament demanded it’s implementation within six months. As it was never implemented, a second report, which was discussed on September 23, 2013, stated that the contracts violate the bidding law, because the contracts are not transparent and did not go through the appropriate legal channels. Whenever Parliament asked the minister of electricity to attend sessions to discuss this report, he ignored the inquiry.

In the reporting period, the discussions above were the most important discussions Parliament had in regard to the issue of electricity provision. Particularly MP Jadban showed great concern over corruption in the electricity sector, and Parliament produced relevant reports on the matter. However, the discussions that were held had no feasible results.

Education

In regard to education, the most heavily debated issue was that of the higher university law. The amendments debated would ultimately determine the procedures of how the presidents of universities would be selected. The government brought forth an amendment to the higher education law 13 of 2010, which would allow the election of rectors, deputy rectors, secretary generals, assistant secretary generals, deans and their deputies, as well as heads of departments by varsity teaching staff based on specific criteria, including qualifications and seniority. After the GPC shrugged off amendments to some articles of the law, the JMP announced in early May of 2013 that they would boycott parliamentary sessions in protest over what they described as illegal procedures unilaterally taken by the speaker of Parliament and some members of his parliamentary bloc in violation of the Legislature’s Rule of Procedure, as well as the principle of national consensus.

The GPC legislators unanimously voted to send the bill back to the government. The JMP dismissed this vote as a violation of the national consensus enshrined in the GCC initiative, as well as an indication of the GPC’s desire to retain corrupt officials running public universities. The GPC lawmakers argued that the election of administrators would turn universities into arenas for political rivalry. The two parties kept trading accusations of disrupting parliamentary business and of breaking the GCC mediated agreement. This sparked a spat between the GPC and the speaker of Parliament on the one hand, and the government, represented by the Minister of Legal Affairs, as well as the JMP on the other.

During the JMP’s boycott, Parliament continued to pass laws. This caused a further escalation of the conflict. The Minister of Legal Affairs, Mohammed al-Mikhlafi, who himself belongs to a JMP party, had consequently sent a letter to the Prime Minister challenging several laws and deals which were passed by Parliament during the JMP’s boycott. He argued that with the JMP’s boycott, the decisions of Parliament are not legitimate given that too few MPs attended the sessions. The Minister had also refused to appear in Parliament to discuss draft laws, which were scheduled to be deliberated in the session agenda.

The speaker of Parliament understood this as an insult to Parliament. During a session held with 70 MPs in attendance (as per the parliamentary observatory’s count), the mostly GPC legislators declared the JMP’s boycott as unwarranted, and not affecting the legitimacy of



sessions attended by a quorum of parliamentarians from various blocs. Consequently, pressing ahead with their procedures against the Minister, GPC legislators and independents demanded the Prime Minister to suspend Al-Mikhlafi and charging him with breaching the constitution and law, challenging the legitimacy of Parliament, and misleading the public. The minister in turn understood the GPC’s attacks against him as attempts to prevent consensus from being reached thus breaching the regulations of the GCC initiative.

By May 30, the JMP parliamentary blocs announced they were ending their boycott of Parliament, underlining that they are coming back to the chamber in response to a call from President Hadi. The JMP’s move came after Hadi held an extraordinary meeting with members of both the cabinet and Parliament. At the meeting, the President urged the JMP to return to the legislature and exercise their functions in line with the GCC initiative.

When assessing this debate, it becomes clear that the members of Parliament merely had political considerations in mind. Neither the quality of education, nor the introduction of democratic principles played a role.

Accountability to the Constituency

A basic requirement of parliamentarians in a democracy is that they are accountable to the electorate. This entails that parliamentarians provide an account of their actions to their electorates through dialogue. This can also include a voting record available to the public and the possibility for the public to interrogate parliamentarians about their actions. The regular assessment of their public standing through opinion surveys can contribute to the accountability of parliamentarians. This allows parliamentarians to understand how the electorate perceives them and their performance.

Likewise parliamentarians must adhere to standards of performance and integrity in the conduct of their office. This also includes transparency in regards to financial transactions (corruption) and regular attendance. While the electorate can sanction parliamentarians vertically in the long-term through non-reappointment through the electoral process, a responsible body authorized to sanction parliamentarians in an event of misconduct should exist to take immediate measures. This body acting on behalf of the public should enforce a code of conduct horizontally. Sanctions in case of regular absences may include the publication of an attendance/absence list, forfeiture of part of a member’s salary, temporary suspension or the forfeiture of the parliamentary mandate.8

The parliament’s bylaws nominally guarantee that Parliament represents public interests. It is worth noting that according to a 2010 YPC survey, 81.4 % of parliamentarians consider it important to involve the public in the decision making process. 15.1 % found it not important at all, while 3.5 percent stated the involvement of the public was sometimes important. However, there are no clear provisions in the constitution or the Parliament’s bylaws, which mandate parliamentarians to report on their activities and voting behavior to the electorate or how to seek the opinion of the electorate.

8 David Beetham, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2006), p.95, http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf.

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Regarding the code of conduct for parliamentarians and the possibilities of sanctioning violations, the constitution and the bylaws also provide no clear instructions. Article 5 of the Yemeni constitution stipulates that

misuse of governmental posts and public funds for the special interest of a specific party or organization is not permitted.

In 2006, the government passed the anti-corruption law, which applies to all civil servants including parliamentarians.9 However, the bylaws establishing parliamentary immunity grant parliamentarians protection from prosecution and to a certain degree protection from public scrutiny.

Article 81: A member of the House of Representatives shall not be held responsible for facts he comes across or matters he raises in the House or any of its committees, or for his voting pattern in open or closed meetings. This does not apply to cases of slander or defamation by members.

Article 82: A member of the House of Representatives may not be subject to procedures of investigation, inspection, arrest, imprisonment, or punishment except with the permission of the House of Representatives save in the case his being caught in the act, and in such a case, the House shall be notified forthwith. The House shall make sure of the rectitude of the procedures followed in such cases. If the House is in recess, permission shall be sought from the Presidency Board of the House, and the House of Representatives shall be notified at the first meeting following the procedures taken.

Article 84: The membership of a member of the House of Representatives may not be nullified unless any of the membership conditions stipulated in this Constitution cease to apply, or if the member commits a grave violation of the membership duties according to the specifications of the internal regulations/ by-law of the House.

The concept of parliamentary immunity originates from the Westminister system, which is widespread in the commonwealth countries. The need for parliamentary immunity arose from the circumstance that parliamentarians often found themselves subjected to pressure and intimidation from governments and from powerful forces within society. Consequently, the right of parliamentarians to free speech is especially protected through parliamentary ‚privilige‘ or ‚non-accountability‘. These provisions protect parliamentarians from prosecution for opinions they have expressed and votes they have cast. Parliamentary immunity is interpreted differently from country to country. According to the Westminister system, the protection only covers activities related to legislation. In the United States, representatives are legally liable for all non-legislative acts, regardless of whether they have been performed inside or outside of the chamber.10

9 “Anti-Corruption Law No ( 39 ) for 2006,” Htb.gov.ye, n.d., http://www.htb.gov.ye/userfiles/file/Laws%20and%20regulations/Anti-corruption%20Law%20No%20(%2039%20)%20for%202006(E).pdf.

10 “Invitation to a Discussion on Defending the Rights of Parliamentarians” [Invitation Brochure] (The British Group Inter-Parliamentary Union & the Human Rights All-Party Parliamentary Group, 2012), http://pelorous.totallyplc.com/media_manager/public/155/Human%20Rights%20discussion%20brochure.pdf.



However, parliamentary immunity can also be abused and can under circumstances protect parliamentarians from prosecution even if gross violations have been committed.

Dialogue with the Electorate

Every parliamentarian has a different relationship with his/her electorate. Some of them meet with their constituencies in open Qat sessions, while others do not. In many cases, individuals from the electoral district will come to Sana’a to communicate with their representative. The representative does not necessarily go to the districts, however. The channels between the parliamentarians and the electorate are not formalized. The relationship to the electorate depends on the popular perception of parliamentarians. Often, parliamentarians are viewed to have the ability to bring development projects to the electoral districts. This is a topic often discussed with parliamentarians. Many parliamentarians are tribal sheikhs or other influential figures within their electoral district. Therefore, their role within their districts includes the resolution and arbitration of conflicts, but also social and economic development through development projects. Likewise, there are many parliamentarians who are disconnected from their electoral district because they are based in Sana’a and have lost the trust of the electorate.

The YPW has the goal to strengthen the relationship between the parliamentarians and the electorate. Through its website and Facebook page, it provides the opportunity to citizens to pose questions to parliamentarians. However, few questions are posed. The questions YPW has received include greetings to parliamentarians, accusations or grievances regarding land disputes, electricity provision or the need for development projects. When YPW presents the questions to parliamentarians by phone, the call is usually ignored. In the few cases an answer was provided, it was posted on the website by YPW.

The reason for the little questions asked may be the limited legitimacy the Parliament has amongst the people. Generally, since the frequent postponement of the elections, the population does not take Parliament seriously. While having been preoccupied with providing information to the media, YPW sees the strengthening and improvement of this communication channel as an important priority in the future.

Corruption

Yemen ranks 167 out of 177 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Index.11 Parliamentarians in Yemen are no exception in regards to corruption. MPs have in the past used their position as legislators to make personal gain. Corruption and other behavior on part of parliamentarians violating the code of conduct is not addressed by Parliament however. Further, parliamentary immunity is generally not questioned except in political cases (for e.g. Yahia al-Houthi).

A group within the Yemeni Parliament referred to as “Yemen Parliamentarians against Corruption” (YemenPac) was formed to investigate into cases of corruption. In an interview with YPW, the Executive Director of YemenPac, AbdulMuez Dabwan, noted that corruption during the transitional period is rampant and unrestrained. According to him, the increase in corruption is due to the absence of accountability during the transitional period.

11 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 - Results,” Transparency.org, 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.

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In fact, the period served the various political factions to reposition themselves as well as take care of their deals and finances, while high-ranking politicians acted as they pleased within their ministry or governorate. He referred to the transitional period as the worst period Yemen has gone through. All politicians speak of moving forward with the GCC initiative, while turning a blind eye to the corruption spreading in their institutions. There are no institutions calling for accountability and there have been no incidences in which a case of corruption was disclosed and those responsible were held accountable. He states that parliamentarians are part of a corruption network and have advantages in trading deals and other business activities.

Attendance

The attendance of parliamentarians in sessions is generally very low. More than half of the MPs are present at the beginning of sessions, but most do not stay in the hall for the session itself. Therefore, when a session is launched there is no quorum. A quorum is the minimum number of members necessary to conduct the parliamentary business. The Parliament’s bylaws define the quorum to be 50% plus one, which in the current parliament means 151 MPs. Formal records distributed by Parliament’s General Secretariat state that all sessions reached quorum. However, monitoring reports published by the YPW reveal that attendance during the reporting period never exceeded eighty MPs, a figure that is clearly below quorum.

The General Secretariat explained its figures by stating that attendance, and therefore quorum, is considered on the basis of a list of signatures rather than the actual presence of MPs in a session. A consequence of this practice is that a large number of MPs come to Parliament and sign their names on the attendance list, only to then leave without attending the session. This common procedure clearly violates article 83 of the Yemeni constitution, which states that sessions are only valid if more than half of the MPs attend them, while decisions can only be ratified with an absolute majority of the attending MPs. The failure to reach quorum in most of the parliamentary sessions suggests that parliamentary decisions lack legitimacy.

The reasons for the numerous absences vary from individual to individual. While some MPs have their own companies, are tribal leaders or merchants and are thus concerned with other business, others do not attend for medical reasons. However, other members remain absent from sessions for political reasons, which also relate to the transitional period and uncertainty of the Parliament’s powers and role. In the transitional period, Parliament’s powers are restricted due to the regulations of the GCC initiative, which stipulates that all decisions must be taken by consensus of the various political parties. The heads of the parliamentary blocs of Islah and the YSP, respectively Abdulrahman Bafadhal and Aidaroos al-Naqeeb, have not attended any sessions during the reporting period.

Parliamentarians who do attend sessions despite the Parliament’s limited role in the transition period may do so out of personal conviction, because their political party or political backers see an importance in the MPs attendance or because of the 7,000 YER they receive for each session they attend. The problem of attendance is not discussed in Parliament and frequently absent MPs are not sanctioned.



OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

The oversight function of parliament is crucial and is one of the institution’s main tasks. No democratic government can be without transparency and accountability. The duty to ensure both falls into the responsibilities of Parliament. Parliament ensures that government policies and its actions are not only efficient but also respond to the needs of the public. This is done through Parliament’s oversight function. The Inter-Parliamentary Union defines parliamentary oversight as the following:

- To detect and prevent, arbitrary behavior, or unconstitutional conduct on part of the government and public agencies. At the core of this function is the protection of the rights and liberties of citizens;

- To hold the government to account in respect of how the taxpayers’ money is used. It detects waste within the machinery of government and public agencies. Thus it can improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government operations;

- To ensure that policies accounced by the government and authorized by parliament are actually delivered. This function inclused monitoring the achievement of goals set by legislation and the government’s own programmes; and

- To improve the transparency of government operations and enhance public trust in the government, which is itself a condition of effective policy delivery.12

Tools available to Parliament to oversee the government are to ask the government for information, ask the government for public clarification of policy, obtain information from sources outside of the government or express views to the government and the public. Lastly, Parliament can remove the office holders of the executive branch if they are no longer performing their proper function. In many Parliaments, committees are used for the oversight function. This can happen in the form of permanent or ad hoc committees.

The oversight function of the Yemeni Parliament is defined by constitutional articles 93 to 95.

Article 93a: The House of Representatives has the right to present instructions and recommendations to the government regarding general issues. If the government failed to execute these instructions and recommendations it has to justify such action to the House.

Article 93b: If the House of Representatives is not convinced with the justifications, it has the right to directly initiate the procedures of withdrawing confidence from one of the Prime Minister’s Deputies or from any of the concerned ministers. The request for withdrawing confidence may not be presented to the Parliament but by a quarter of the Members of Parliament after holding an interrogation. The House may not make a decision on the request before seven days since the day of presenting it. The decision of withdrawing confidence shall be approved with the majority number of the House.

Article 94: At least twenty per cent of the members of the House may move a motion to discuss a public issue, request explanation of government policies and exchange views concerning that issue.

12 Hironori Yamamoto, Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2007), p.9-10, http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/oversight08-e.pdf.

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Article 95: Upon a request signed by at least ten of its members, the House of Representatives may create a special committee or instruct one of its fact- finding committees to investigate any issue which is contrary to public interest or to investigate the actions of any ministry, government agency, board, public/mixed sector’s corporations, or local councils. To carry out such investigations, the committee may gather proof and hold hearings by seeking testimony from any party/person it deems necessary. All executive and special authorities shall comply by laying all information or documentation they possess at the disposal of the relevant committee.

Government Oversight

Parliament fulfills its oversight function through its twenty committees. Each committee is responsible for considering legislations and activities of one or more ministries. The committees send letters to ministries requesting information in order to monitor activities and identify violations. Committees also call upon ministers or other officials to attend the committee’s meetings to discuss any relevant matters. In addition, committees deliver reports and recommendations to the government.

In the transitional period, Parliament’s oversight function deteriorated due to the principle of consensus, which was enshrined in the GCC initiative. All decisions taken by Parliament must therefore rest on a compromise between the parliamentary blocs. However, this often led to the paralysis of the institution and undermined Parliament’s oversight capacities. Further, Parliament does not follow up on the implementation of its recommendations to the government. Parliamentarians complain and express their disappointment of discussing and proposing issues that are not taken into account by the government and are not followed up.

One remarkable case of fulfilling its oversight function was in regard to the issue of energy contracts and debts to the Public Electricity Corporation, where parliamentary committees identified clear cases of corruption. Even though Parliament was active in investigating the issue and submitting numerous reports with clear recommendations to the government, government institutions have not yet responded to the recommendations and inquiries made on part of Parliament. On the one hand, this shows that Parliament can play a positive role in regard to issues that are close to the people’s interest, electricity provision being an important one. But it also shows that Parliament on the other hand is not able to force the government to act on parliamentary recommendations. To improve the Parliament’s oversight function, bills and recommendations passed by Parliament and their implementation should be studied. Further, a coordination committee tasked with following up the implementation of laws should be formed.

Budget Oversight

Among the basic functions and requirements of a democratic Parliament is the allocation of funds to the executive branch of government.13 Parliament plays an important role in fiscal policy in both taxation and expenditure, seeing as it is both a legislative and an oversight body.

13 Inter-Parliamentary Union and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. A guide to parliamentary practice: A handbook. Inter-Parliamentary Union and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2003). Pg. 6 <http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/unesco_en.pdf>



This entails that Parliament must oversee all processes related to the budget, including the drafting of the budget, its expenditure, and ultimately the auditing of the final accounts.14

The Yemeni constitution is clear in the role of Parliament with regards to the budget and final accounts. It states in article 61 that Parliament must “[..] approve government budgets and final accounts”. Article 87 also states:

The proposed general budget shall be submitted to the House of Representatives [sic] at least two months before the beginning of the fiscal year. A vote shall be taken on each part of the budget. It shall be enacted by a law. The House [sic] may not change the proposed budget without the approval of the government. No allocation of revenue for a specific purpose may be authorized except by a law. If the budget law is not enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year, the previous year’s budget shall be followed until the new budget is approved.

The final accounts of the Government’s annual budget shall be submitted to The House of Representatives [sic] within a period that does not exceed nine months from the end of the fiscal year. Voting on the Bill shall be made on a section by section basis and shall be approved by an enactment of law. Also the annual report of the organization concerned with the auditing and control of government accounts shall be submitted to Parliament, together with its comments thereon. The House [sic] has the right to ask the Organization to submit any supplementary documents or reports.

Furthermore, Article 90 states:

That is, the budget must be submitted to Parliament two months before the fiscal year (the fiscal year starts January 1) to be approved on a section-by-section basis, and the final accounts must be submitted no more than 9 months after the end of the fiscal year (December 31).

Article 34 states that the Financial Affairs Committee is formed with the responsibility of overseeing all aspects of the government’s fiscal policy, including the government budget. Article 52 states that they are to oversee the proper implementation of the budget and making sure that the government follows the recommendations presented by Parliament on the budget. Furthermore, Article 52 also states that the Financial Affairs Committee is tasked with following-up with the government to present its final accounts, and then presenting a report to Parliament with its assessment of the final accounts.

Article 135 states that Parliament can request the attendance of any minister for questioning regarding the government’s conduct. Furthermore, Articles 135 & 140 state that Parliamentarians can direct questions to the relevant minister within their area of work in Parliament (ex. members of the Education Committee can direct questions to the Minister of Education) in both written and oral form which are noted in the minutes of the session. In addition, article 140 states that ministers must answer directed questions, and in the case of written questions, have one week to submit an answer to Parliament. Article 116 guarantees that the minutes of

14 Beetham, David. Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: a Guide to Good Practice. Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2006). Pg.11 <http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf>

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each parliamentary session are to be published after these sessions are held.

However, Article 142 makes an exception with questions regarding the budget: “The previous procedures of the questions shall not be applied to the questions directed to the prime minister or a minister while discussing the budget…”.This means that questions regarding the budget cannot be submitted to ministers in written form, meaning that they would not leave a paper trail which can be easily examined.

When questioned about this gap in transparency, Nabil Abdul-Rab15, Editor-in-Chief of the Parliament’s website, stated that the process related to drafting and approving the budget is not transparent because neither the budget nor its report are published in newspapers or websites. It is just read before official media outlets. That is, the process is not accessible to the general public. Citizens, civil society organizations or the media are not participating in the process. The sessions of the subcommittees are accessed only by official media outlets, which cover the process superficially and provide general information only.

Since these meetings are covered by the state media, in which the questions can only be directed orally, the amount of information reaching the public is effectively controlled by the government. This renders any type transparency and accountability regarding the government budget impossible. Therefore, parliamentary procedures regarding the government budget cannot meet criteria of transparency, accessibility, and accountability. Furthermore, without these criteria one cannot judge whether Parliament is representative of the people’s will and effective with regards to the budget.

These failures with regards to transparency have also led to shortcomings in Parliament’s role as an effective oversight entity. Abdul-Rab states that Parliament rarely influences government budgetary decisions, and any recommendations made by parliamentarians are ultimately ignored as the budget is always passed after undeclared negotiations.16These include extreme irregularities with regards to submission, by government, of the final accounts. The government has shown continual failure to submit final accounts by their constitutionally mandated due dates (9 months after the end of the fiscal year) 17

. Furthermore, Parliament has itself been unable to correctly review the final accounts, and even completely failing to review and discuss the 200818

final accounts until the end of 201219.

This brings forward many questions regarding Parliament’s legitimacy as it has failed in all criteria of a functioning democratic Parliament. Parliament, as an instrument of the People, and as a catalyst for transparency, must make information easily available to the public. It is also an instrument of the People in holding the government accountable for its actions.

The issue of transparency must be amended by allowing all media to attend sessions and meetings with regards to the budget.

There must also be changes to procedures regarding the sessions and meetings on the state

15 Abdul-Rab, Nabil. Interview (unformatted). Interview conducted by Anwar Al-Taj for Yemen Parliament Watch, January 4, 2014.16 Ibid17 Yemen Parliament Watch. «Forming Committee to Investigate Final Accounts». October 16, 2010. <http://www.ypwatch.org/news.

php?go=show_news&id=160#.U5atpiiMGZE>18 Ibid19 MotamarNet. «Parliament Continues to Discuss 2008 Final Accounts». September 12, 2012 <http://www.almotamar.net/news/101907.

htm>



budget allowing for written questions and full written reports to be made public. If procedures and discussions are not made public, Parliament and government cannot be held accountable for shortcomings and failures. Making the procedures more transparent will also make the government more accountable to Parliament, bolstering its legitimacy. Undeclared meetings and secret negotiations must be made illegal, and government must be held accountable when the recommendations of parliamentarians are not considered. Government must be held accountable for failing to submit final accounts. Parliament must also be held accountable for failing to pressure government to fulfill its duty. When the government fails to submit final accounts, cases must be brought to the Judiciary, as inability to provide accountability for expenditure is effectively a case of corruption.

PARLIAMEnTARY DISCuSSIOnS AnD DECISIOnS On THE BuDGET

The following is an overview of the parliamentary discussion on the budget. Two government memos were audited. In the first memo the government informed MPs that it was not able to present the 2013 public budget on time. In the second memo the finance minister requested a session in order to audit the financial statement of the 2012 public budget.

Even though the government was supposed to present the 2012 budget before November 2011, it did so five months late (April 2012). The 2013 budget was presented in late December 2012, even though it should have been presented a month earlier. The general discussion of the budget is not time-consuming. The special committee tasked with reviewing the budget only needs ten days to present its report. Auditing the committee report is done in two parliamentary sessions, while the general discussion takes one or two sessions. The 2012 public budget, however, was discussed in six parliamentary sessions. The budget was presented by the government in one session. It was then referred to a special committee for reconsideration. The special committee’s report was audited in two sessions, while an additional two sessions were reserved for debating the budget and its report. One of these sessions was suspended due to sharp disagreements between certain MPs and members of the government. The last session was allocated for voting and approval.

The 2013 public budget was discussed in five sessions. In two of them a report of the special committee was audited. In one session the budget was discussed, and in one session it was voted on and approved. The committee began by forming several teams, each studying a specific topic within the budget draft. When the committee presented its report it neither mentioned the number of sessions it held, or whether sessions were attended by all members of the committee or its various teams. It did not mention information related to their attendance (there are a number of parliamentarians who are regularly absent, particularly in the past year). In this regard, it is important to find a clear mechanism under which the committee operates while ensuring that the report is prepared by all of its members.

In the budgets presented to Parliament during the last two years, parliamentarian disagreements centered on a limited number of points. Some were about procedural questions such as the objection of GPC members to discussing the budget without the minister of finance being present. Other disagreements were caused by the political crisis’ that Yemen was witnessing. For example, during the discussion of the 2013 budget there were differences over the allocations to approximately 200,000 individuals, who joined the security and military services during the 2011 crisis. The increased recruitment came as a result of divisions the military apparatus was

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experiencing. Each segment recruited soldiers in anticipation of an impending armed conflict.

Financial allocations to tribal leaders were another controversial topic. For example, on April 9, 2012, some parliamentarians demanded that these appropriations should be suspended. Their argument was rooted in the idea that the continuation of transfers to tribal sheikhs would violate the GCC initiative. The government did not responded positively to this demand and continued with their payments.

Discussions of the state budget quickly evolved into sharp differences among parliamentarians. These differences reflected the already existing political divisions between the parties during the transitional stage. The main parliamentary blocs stuck firmly to their separate positions and did not compromise. Though the current government is equally composed of both the GPC and JMP ministers, during this time the political attitudes of parliamentarians changed according to the party affiliations of the ministers who were summoned to Parliament. It became clear that MPs opposed the ministers and MPs of other political parties purely out of principle (in contrast to their genuine political convictions). The GCC initiative included a mechanism for instances like these. It stated that Parliament should refer controversial topics to the president to resolve the issue. In this case, this mechanism facilitated a decision, even without the president having to intervene. One day after the threat to present the issue to the president was made, parliament approved the budget.

Despite the intensity of the debate on the budget, the budgets of 2012 and 2013 were both approved without amendments. Their approval, despite the sharp differences between the political parties, reflected the restrictions placed on Parliament by the constitution which states that Parliament cannot make amendments to the budget without the government’s approval. While the government vowed to commit to the recommendations made by the committee that was initially tasked with studying the budget, there were no guarantees that these recommendations would indeed be considered or implemented.

Within the framework of a discussion about the public budget of 2012 and 2013, military expenditures were also evaluated. A special committee was tasked with the job of studying the 2013 draft budget. In their report they noted a few points of criticism related to the military and security balance sheets. The report criticized the increase of expenditures by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). In total the increase of expenditures amounted to 45% of their entire budget. The increase was caused by the increase of employee salaries. The committee therefore recommended the recruiting of personnel to the security apparatus, which sharply increased in 2011 to stop.

It should further be pointed out that since the constitutional amendments of 2011, Parliament’s supervisory role of the security sector has been obstructed. As Parliament cannot make amendments to the state budget, it uncritically approves expenditures made on behalf of the defense and security apparatuses. Because the security apparatus (with the exception of the internal security forces under the MoI) is not subordinate to the executive authority, it has not been subjected to parliamentary oversight. Essentially, it is regarded as being above accountability.20

20 al-Mikhlafi, Mohamed Ahmed Ali & al-Rahabi, Abdul Kafi Sharaf al-Din (2012): Reform of the security sector in Yemen. Arab Reform Initiative (Arab Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform), S. 9.



As Parliament’s oversight role is a vital cornerstone of democracy, and in order to achieve good governance practices, it is important for parliamentarians to demand legislation that enables them to oversee the security sector and hold security agencies accountable. Therefore, based on the results of the NDC as formulated in the Recommendation 8 of Section 2 (Legal Decisions and Guidelines) of the final report of the NDC Committee on Army and Security, the constitutional amendments made in 2011 should not be included in the new constitution.

LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

Besides the representation function, the legislative function is the Parliament’s main purpose. As being the legislative, Parliament is one of the three branches of government next to the executive and the judicial branches. Therefore, Parliament is tasked with passing laws and supervising their implementation.

According to constitutional article 62

the House of Representatives is the legislative authority of the state. It shall enact laws, sanction general state policy and the socio-economic plan, and approve government budgets and final accounts. It shall also direct and monitor the activities of the Executive Authority as stipulated in this constitution.

Further, article 85 of the constitution stipulates that “a member of the House of Representatives and the government have the right to propose bills for laws, and their amendments.” However, exceptions apply in case of fiscal laws which may only be proposed by the government or by at least 20% of house representatives.

Moreover Article 92 of the constitution stipulates the Parliament to ratify

international political and economic treaties and conventions of a general nature, of whatsoever form or level, and in particular those connected to defense, alliance, truce, peace or border alterations, and those, which involve financial commitments on the state or for which their execution needs the enactment of a law.

Further, constitutional article 87 states that

the House of Representatives shall approve comprehensive social and economic development plans. A law shall be enacted to stipulate the process of the preparation of such plans, their submission to the House and the approval thereof.

The legislative procedures of Parliament are defined by the bylaws and the constitution. In case a draft law is brought forth by the government, it is first discussed by Parliament in

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principle and then referred to a specialized committee. This committee reviews the draft and presents a report to parliament. Parliament then deliberates the draft based on the committee’s report. As stipulated in article 99 of the Yemeni constitution, draft laws are voted on article by article. The draft law as a whole is voted on in next session. As a final step, the law is sent to the president.

In case an MP puts forth a draft law, the process is similar with one major difference. Before it is discussed by Parliament or any parliamentary committee, the draft law is sent to the constitutional committee. The constitutional committee reviews the draft and provides a report to Parliament. Often the committee recommends Parliament to reconsider the draft law and unlike it is the case with draft laws suggested by the government, rejected drafts of MPs are not presented a second time in the same session.

Further, according to article 101 of the constitution, the president has the right to

request a review of any bill which is approved by the House. Based on a reasoned decision, he must then return the bill to the House of Representatives within thirty days of its submission. If he does not return the bill to the House within this period, or if the requested review is not heeded the Bill is then approved once again by the majority of the House, it shall be considered a law, and the President shall issue it within two weeks. If the President does not issue the law, it comes into effect under the power of the Constitution, and is at once, published in the Official Gazette and come into operation two weeks later.

Article 102 of the constitution stipulates that

all laws are published in the official gazette, and are announced within two weeks of issuance, and shall come into force within thirty days of their publication. This period may be shortened or extended by specific provision in the law.



DELIBERATIOnS OF DRAFT LAwS

Media and Press Law drafts

An alternative Press and Publication draft law was drafted and approved after being reviewed by the Yemeni Journalist’s Syndicate as well as some civil society organizations, lawyers and parliamentarians.21 The new law was drafted to liberate the press and break many of the shackles that constrained journalists’ freedoms in the past. It also works to better organize press activities in the country.

The bill raises the ceiling of freedoms that journalists enjoy, cancelling laws that allow for the imprisonment of journalists currently applied under the Press and Publications law of 1990. It also reduces other punishments to their least level, setting the most severe punitive action against a journalist to be a financial fee that does not exceed a fourth of the journalist’s salary. It also sets the fine for a newspaper at a maximum of 10% of the newspaper’s initial capital. Most importantly, the draft law shifts the licensing responsibility to the Ministry of Commerce where now a newspaper would register as a capital investment and be liberated from the fetters of the Ministry of Information.

Draft laws can only be presented to Parliament by either the government or a parliamentarian and in this case MP AbdulMuez Dabwan who participated in drafting the law brought it to Parliament on the October 10, 2010. The bill was subsequently sent to the Constitutional Committee, which amended 10% of its content before it was sent to the Parliament’s Media Committee.

For a long time now however, the bill has been repeatedly postponed, first because it came in late 2010 on the heel of the popular uprisings of 2011, which resulted in the suspension of Parliament until 2012. The second reason is due to the Ministry of Information, which seems to have intervened and hindered the bill several times.

In one instance, the Ministry of Information justified its request for a delay by saying that the law should be discussed within the Media Committee first, but even after the Media Committee delivered its report in September 2013 the ministry continued to hinder the discussion of the law despite there being some acceptance and consent in the Parliament about the new draft law. Each time the bill is put for discussion the Ministry of Information has asked for a delay to enable them to provide some notes and comments, but then neither notes nor comments are provided. The ministry considers that the law will confiscate its powers and censorship roles in the future.

At this time in 2013, Parliament resumed discussion of the audiovisual media law draft, which was drafted by a group of lawyers, journalists and parliamentarians from YemenPAC and presented by MP Abdu Mohammed Alhuthiefi. The draft law stipulates the establishment of an independent body for audiovisual media, which would be responsible for controlling and managing broadcast media activities in the future and which would replace the current jurisdictions of the ministries of Information and of Telecommunication.

Former minister of Information Al Amrani requested a delay for this bill and asked that it be sent to a special committee in order to assess its compatibility with the outcomes of the NDC.

21 Interview with MP Abdulmuaeez Dabwan ,by YPC

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Interestingly, the NDC outcomes recommend the abolishment of the Ministry of Information and the creation of a supreme media board. GPC members opposed this bill as they considered that it specifically targets their media outlets that are broadcasted from Yemen, namely Yemen Today and Azal. Now both press and publications and media law drafts are postponed due to the hinder of Minister of Information and some GPC members. They called for incorporating of both laws in one comprehensive law called Media law, which will include electronic websites. Once the law is drafted, it will be discussed.

The Audiovisual Media Law Draft

In the absence of any laws controlling private audiovisual media broadcasting in Yemen, and as several unlicensed media outlets have sprouted especially after the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, this law draft stipulates the establishment of an independent body to regulate audiovisual media broadcasting.22 Furthermore, this law comes to institutionally liberate audiovisual media from the fetters of state monopoly.23 The bill was drafted in December 20, 2012 by a team composed of several academics and journalists, a lawyer, a broadcasting technician, and a representative of CSOs under the supervision of YemenPAC.24

The law stipulates that media outlets register as corporations in the Ministry of Trade and Industry according to the applicable trading laws. The law also states that audiovisual media is free and not subject to any intervention and that this freedom is practiced within the framework of the constitution, provisions of this law, as well as international conventions that Yemen has ratified. A noteworthy aspect of the law is the non-existence of harsh punitive measures that allow for the imprisonment of licensed individuals and journalists— such as those in the current Press and Publications law (see next section), which is also under discussion. Instead, punishment in the new law is restricted to financial fines that don’t exceed 1,000,000 YR (~$5000).25

However, the bill retains a few restrictive clauses that require license applicants to at least have a university degree. It also stipulates the appointment of a general manager with a degree as well as at least 5 years experience in the media field.26 The bill also requires that licensed individuals have a clear criminal record and reserves the right to revoke a license in case the individual is convicted of a criminal offence.27 Moreover, license fees have not been specified yet. In light of these considerations it is yet to be seen how this law will actually uphold independent freedom of expression.

The bill was raised to Parliament on May 4, 2014 by MP Abdu Mohammed Al-Huthiefi but the Ministry of Information requested that the law be discussed after completing the implementation of the NDC’s outcomes, asserting that it is not appropriate to discuss the law given that the NDC’s outcomes require the abolishment of the Ministry of Information and its replacement with a new media board.28 Nevertheless, Parliament ignored this request and

22 “[Ar:] ‘Yemen: Radio and Television Channels Operate Unlicensed!’” [AR:]France 24, June 5, 201423 MP,Abdumueez Dabwan, Executive director of YemenPAC24 Ibid25 “[Ar:]Parliament Watch Publishes the Text of the Audiovisual Law Project” YPW, December 3, 2014, http://www.ypwatch.org/

news626.html.26 Ibid27 Ibid28 Anwar Al Taj, “[Ar:] Parliament Begins Discussing the Audivisual Media Law Project and Government Requests Postponement.,”

YPW, May 4, 2014, http://www.ypwatch.org/news651.html.



ruled to postpone the law to the following session.29

The session’s discussions were quite revealing and demonstrated that many MPs had difficulties distinguishing between the purpose of the contested Audiovisual Law and the Press and Publications law governing the print and electronic press. The head of the GPC bloc Sultan Al Barakani for instance called for a more comprehensive law to regulate media in general, including electronic newspapers and describing them as “rowdy, unorganized, and the problem of problems in this country.”30 This urged many MPs to reassert that the purpose of the bill is strictly to govern radio and television broadcasts, explaining that electronic newspapers are governed by the Press and Publications Law of 1990. Nevertheless the head of the GPC bloc continued to push for revamping the law to include all media, citing the fact that the Press law is 24 years old and is completely out of date, and declaring that his bloc will not vote for the law until it becomes more comprehensive.31

Though Parliament continued to discuss the bill the next day, government failed to show up and more confusion ensued regarding the duplication of responsibilities between the jurisdiction of this new independent regulatory authority that the law proposes and the Ministry of Information which according to the NDC is yet to be dissolved and replaced by a new media board.32 In the heat of these discussions, Parliament appointed a special committee to include a transitional clause at the end of the bill spelling out how the law can stay in effect until a new constitution is drafted and the expected media board is established.33 Discussion of the law has been delayed since.

PARLIAMENT TRANSPARENCY

A democratic Parliament should be open and transparent. This means it should be physically open to the public. Since not every individual can actually visit the Parliament, it is the duty of the institution to provide free access to media and to take measures to inform the public directly. In general, there is mutual distrust between media and Parliaments. Journalists often criticize the restrictions on access to proceedings and the laws which restrict what they can publically report. Parliamentarians on the other hand criticize the media for holding parliamentarians in low esteem due to what they see as a one-sided portrayal of their work. Regardless of the distrust, both sides depend on each other. Through cooperation, both sides can make gains in seeking to find ways in which Parliament is presented to the public. The public is interested in maximum openness of the institution in order to be effectively informed about the activities of their representatives. Access to information of Parliament may also include the work that is being done in committees. According to the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU), many Parliaments are now opening up the work of committees to the public and media. While parliamentarians often fear that publicity will lead to the proceedings to become more partisan, that witnesses will be less forthright in their evidence, or that parliamentarians will use the occasion for grandstanding, this provides the media with an opportunity to receive a more rounded picture of the work of parliamentarians and thus contributes to the improvement of reporting.

29 Ibid30 Al Taj, “[Ar:] Parliament Begins Discussing the Audivisual Media Law Project and Government Requests Postponement.”31 Ibid32 Al Taj, Anwar, “[Ar:]{Disagreement Over Establishment of the Audiovisual Media Authority Law and Government Fails to Attend,”

YPW, May 5, 2014, http://www.ypwatch.org/news652.html.33 Ibid

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According to article 7a of the parliamentary bylaws,

sittings of the House shall be open to the public and proceedings of parliamentary sittings shall be published or broadcast by different media. Speeches by any Member of the House shall not be deleted and any member shall not be stopped or prevented from talking unless he/she himself/herself or the House accepts this. But, when a Member of the House’s talk harms the dignity of persons and reputation of institutions or damages the national interest, the Presidium shall have the right to direct deletion of his/her speech.

Further, article 7b stipulates that

the House may hold secret meetings upon the request of its Speaker, the President of the Republic, the Government, or upon the request of at least twenty of its members. The House shall then decide whether the discussion of the subject shall be conducted openly or in closed (secret) sittings.

Public Access to Sessions

All parliamentary sessions are recorded on video. However, the sessions are not broadcast live. Usually, the sessions are broadcast on Yemen TV in the evenings, but are edited. This contradicts article 7a of the parliamentary bylaws. Minutes that are prepared of the sessions are read inside the Parliament’s hall. The soft copies of the notes, which are published on the Parliament’s website, do not include all the details of the sessions. Articles 113 to 116 of the Parliament’s bylaws regulate the writing of the sessions’ records.

Article (113): Two records are written of every session. The first is a summarized report and the other one includes all procedures of the session, topics, debates, decisions, names of MPs who comment.

Article (114): A copy of the detailed record is submitted to every parliamentary committee and five copies are filed in the Parliament’s library. Every MP has the right to have a copy of the record. If any MP requests to make amendments to the record, the amendment should be presented to parliament. When parliament issues a decision to approve the amendment, it is indicated in the session’s record.

Article (115): Before the first record is approved, it is permitted to any parliamentarian who attended the session to request adding or revoking provisions. It is not allowed to any parliamentarian to request a discussion of the record. The record is filed in the parliament’s archives. Unless parliamentarians refuse it, the record can be completely or partially published in the Official Gazette with the approval of the parliament speaker.

Article (116): Following every session, a summary of its record is prepared for publishing. The brief includes topics, which were raised in parliament, as well as the decisions taken.



PARLIAMEnT-MEDIA RELATIOnS

Due to closed-door policies imposed by the government since the mid-1990s, the relations between media and Parliament have deteriorated. Journalists increasingly criticize the relations between the media and Parliament, stating that they are hindered in performing their duty to report on the institution’s activities. These obstacles do not only hinder journalists from covering parliamentary sessions, but also obstruct work with the various bodies within the institution, including the Presidency, General Secretariat, and Parliament’s permanent and special committees.

The challenges that the journalists face when reporting on Parliament are in part the result of procedural disorder, the administrative structures of the institution as well as Parliament’s bylaws. There are certain gaps within the internal regulations relating to media, the dissemination of information, transparency and good governance, which negatively affect the relations between media and Parliament. On June 16, 2012, Parliament passed the Right to Information law, which was subsequently signed by President Hadi on July 1, 2012. Despite this law, significant challenges remain for journalists to obtain relevant information.

Journalists specialized in the affairs of Parliament are often unable to access relevant information, such as session minutes, schedules, and reports presented to Parliament by permanent or special committees. Because there is no regulation that stipulates how reports, session minutes, or schedules are to be made available to the public, journalists often resort to addressing Parliamentarians directly to ask for copies of reports. This has proven to be inefficient, as parliamentarians often refuse to give out the reports. This is the result of the lack of an explicit provision within Parliament’s bylaws that regulate the relationship between Parliament and journalists. There is a clear need to define rules of procedures of how information should be made available to the public, for instance through a specialized management system which disseminates reports, session minutes and schedules on a daily basis.

The Parliament’s Secretariat does not invite journalists to report on Parliament activities and make information available to citizens. Although the Parliament’s regulations stipulates that information should be provided to voters through different media outlets, the Secretariat of Parliament does not facilitate journalists in their work by making information about its activities available. Because of the lack of communication between the Parliament’s Secretariat and the media, journalists only focus on Parliament’s general sessions. Journalists are not invited to hearings of the permanent and special committees. This contradicts § 57 of the Parliament’s bylaws.

Any committee of Parliament is allowed to hold sessions, which citizens, journalists, specialists or any other people are allowed to attend to be briefed on specific topics or any issues debated.

There have been cases when journalists were hindered from reporting on general sessions under the pretext of not having permission to enter the Parliament’s premises. This obstacle is the result of § 87 of the Parliament’s bylaws, which stipulates that only those individuals can enter the premises of Parliament, who have been granted permission by the Parliament’s Presidency.

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§ 85 of the Parliament’s bylaws restricts the attendance of closed sessions. When Parliament holds a secret session, only MPs and those who have permission are allowed to attend the session. Moreover, Parliament decides whether the minutes of a particular session are written and published. The session’s speaker selects the note taker who is tasked with taking the minutes. Those who are not members of Parliament or do not have permission to attend the session, are not allowed to view the minutes. If the reasons behind a session’s secrecy are no longer valid, it can be determined an open session and minutes can be made available.

There have been cases when the Parliament’s presidency interfered with the media, especially when the legitimacy of sessions is questioned in press articles. An example for this practice is related to the attendance of Parliamentarians in the general sessions. The actual attendance numbers of sessions often contradict the numbers mentioned in official reports. When journalists report the actual number of attendees, they are often pressured by the Parliament’s presidency. Journalists are also pressured to modify the contents of their articles. This is a clear breach of the freedom of press, which is guaranteed by the constitution. Article 41 of Yemen’s constitution states that

Every citizen has the right to participate in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the country. The state shall guarantee freedom of thought and expression of opinion in speech, writing and photography within the limits of the law.

Continuity of these practices will not only lead to self-censorship on part of journalists, but also to a loss of credibility.

Equipment such as cameras, recorders, laptops and cell phones are not allowed to be brought into the premises of the Parliament. In certain cases the guards tend to confiscate documenting tools. It is noted that Parliament’s presidency during the transitional period has tended to reduce its censorship on journalists as a result to the revolutionary climate in the country. Recently, a special area inside the Parliament’s plenary hall has been allotted to journalists and other guests. This has been understood by the journalists as a positive, yet minor, step towards a more transparent relationship with the Parliament.

Although Parliament has its own electronic website, which is supposed to make information accessible to journalists and all citizens, its content is dissatisfactory. The Parliament’s electronic website is very important to sustain its institutional work and enhance strong relations between Parliament and citizens. However, the website is not being administered properly with information being incomplete. Its contents do not meet the demands of journalists and other citizens.

The distrust towards the media on part of MPs is the result of their political socialization within the Yemeni political environment. The two sides distrust each other because of the lack of transparency on part of Parliament and the lack of professionalism on part of journalists. This distrust and fear negatively affects journalists’ ability to access information, and reflects on the quality of press coverage and transmission of information to the public. Because of the lack of information and the poor press coverage of Parliament and its activities, the citizen’s participation in legislative decision-making remains virtually absent.



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Documents

YPC Parliament Performance Report · 2015-01-28 · We received our registration certificate No. 147 from the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor in December 2005. YPC is the 2010