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© 2014 INDEPENDENT ACADEMIC RESEARCH STUDIES

Published in YVJ, May 2014 http://youthvoicejournal.com/

© IARS 2014 -ISBN (online): 978-0-85865-267-1

Patrick English

Young People and Europe: Quantitatively researching Euroscepticism in Europe’s

youth.

Biography

I am a current Masters level student at the University of Sheffield, studying for an MA in

Politics with Research Methods. I am specialising in political participation, migration

politics, and quantitative methods. I hold a BA honours degree in Politics and Philosophy

from the same institution. I have previously published work on media engagement strategy.

Abstract

The next round of European elections are due to take place in May 2014, against the

backdrop of support for the European Union (EU) at its lowest ever point according to

Eurobarometer data. Eurosceptic discourse is dominant in much of the media across Europe,

and prominent Eurosceptics claim that Euroscepticism is now the prevailing attitude towards

Europe among the populations of EU member states. This study focuses on Euroscepticism

and young people in Europe. Using quantitative methods, this paper finds that Euroscepticism

is not at all prominent in young people, and also that young people are the least Eurosceptic

of all age groups, consistently disagreeing with key Eurosceptic positions and attitudes.

Despite the sustained Eurosceptic discourse and rhetoric which dominates much political

discussion in Europe, Euroscepticism is not a popular belief held by, or representative of the

views and attitudes, of Europe’s young.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to GESIS for providing access to Eurobarometer data, without which this study

would not be possible. I am also thankful to Professor Graham Harrison for his feedback and

recommendations on the final draft of this paper, and to Dr. Maria Grasso for her feedback

and continued support and guidance in my learning and practicing of quantitative methods.

Research Outline

The next round of European elections are due to take place in May 2014, against the

backdrop of the most recent Eurobarometer data showing that support for the European

Union (EU) among citizens Europe is at its lowest ever point (see Standard Eurobarometer

2012). European election time serves as a perfect opportunity for Eurosceptics parties and

politicians to take centre stage in the political agenda, to ascertain votes, and the realisation of

their political agendas (Sitter 2002). Eurosceptic rhetoric is dominant in media sources across

Europe, particularly those traditionally of a right wing or centre-right back ground (De

Vreese 2007, Schuck and De Vreese 2006, Statham & Koopmans 2009), typifying a large

increase in discursive Euroscepticism in the public domain in recent years. Taggart and

Szczerbiak (2002) concluded that support for Eurosceptic parties is now entrenched and

engrained into European politics. To define Euroscepticism is not entirely easy as it is broad

in both nature and origins, but perhaps a simple definition of it is “outright opposition to the

EU” (Taggart 2003: p363). This can be directed at the institution itself, or frequently at the

Union’s central policy of greater integration between its member-states. Weβels (2007: p300-

4) argues that there are three kinds of Euroscepticism, but that the dominant group are those

who oppose European integration and other key EU principles, and who wish to see a

reduction in or complete elimination of the institution that is the EU. When I refer to

‘Eurosceptics’ or ‘Euroscepticism’ from herein, I am referring to this ‘strong’ position – as

opposed to those who might describe themselves as ‘Eurosceptic reformists’. Today, the

dominant Eurosceptic discourse in the media claims that Euroscepticism is now the most

prominent attitude towards the EU across all of Europe – including in its young persons (see

De Vreese 2007). This research will aim to address whether Euroscepticism really is the most

prominent position on the EU among Europe’s young people.

This research will study the young people of Europe’s opinions on the EU as a unique aspect

of public opinion. Public opinion is important to study when analysing any political claims,

and Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, and De Vreese (2000: p242) wrote that “Public opinion

towards the European Union (EU) is at the heart of political, popular and academic debates

regarding the present state and future of European integration”. Academics have long studied

Euroscepticism among populations, and arrived at varying conclusions as to its origins,

causes, and proponents. Taggart (2003) focuses on “new populist parties” which are directing

and sustaining Eurosceptic discourse, while De Vreese (2007) states that in particular the

media have their part to play in ‘fuelling’ cynicism and scepticism towards the EU. McLaren

(2002) argues that in general people are ‘hostile’ towards the EU in large part because of their

‘perceptions of threats posed by other cultures’, and Weβels (2007) finds similarly that most

Eurosceptics oppose European integration – a key EU policy. Whilst there may be academic

disagreement about the finer details, it is clear from the literature that Euroscepticism is an

important and growing issue in European political discourse. Indeed, Sitter (2002: p5) writes

that “Euroscepticism has come to play a remarkable role in European party politics”. This

research paper will use quantitative analysis on a large, cross-national dataset to measure

levels of Euroscepticism in young people in order to determine if Euroscepticism is 1) the

most prominent attitudes toward the EU among Europe’s young people, and 2) if thus the

Eurosceptic discourse is representative of the majority of young people in Europe.

According to Boomgaarden et al. (2011: p243) there have been problems in academic

research into Euroscepticism to date, specifically regarding the “conceptual and empirical

clarification” of ‘EU support’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. Their claim is that conceptually the

terms are often too narrowly measured and too broadly used: “Euroscepticism – narrowly

defined as opposition towards a specific policy or integration effort – may be just one facet of

public opinion towards the EU” (Boomgaarden et al. 2011: p242). Thus, rather than focusing

on one specific aspect of attitudes towards the EU, this research will study three attitudes, or

opinions, towards the EU so as to build a broad picture of how the people of Europe view the

EU. There are three different attitudes towards the EU in general which were measured

recorded in the Eurobarometer 78, the seventy-eighth edition of the Europe wide social and

political attitudes survey which shall be used as the data-set for this inquiry: 1) perceived

‘image’ of the EU, 2) general ‘trust’ in the EU, and 3) views on the future of the EU and the

respondents' respective states within it.

Measuring these three different attitudes towards the EU among young people as recorded in

a European wide survey will give us a good understanding of precisely how Eurosceptic

young people are – indeed if at all. However, this is not a measure or study of pro-European

attitudes or discourses. Boomgaarden et al. (2011: p258) argue that it is an error to

understand support of, or for, the EU as simply the reverse of Euroscepticism - that it is very

possible for a person to be sceptical of certain EU policies or goals, but not define themselves

as sceptical towards the Union itself and in fact support it, and indeed vice-versa. Therefore I

am careful to argue that a three-fold understanding of attitudes and opinions towards the EU

will be a large enough measure of Euroscepticism, but not that the reverse of this will equate

to a measure of EU support. Thus I argue that if a person indicates that they have a negative

image of the EU, do not trust the EU, and are pessimistic about its future, then we have good

grounds to label them as a Eurosceptic. If a person holds the exact opposite – a positive

image of the EU, trust in the EU, and optimism about its future – I argue that there is a strong

case to label them as not Eurosceptic, but perhaps not as supporters of the EU. For example:

if it is shown that young people across Europe in general have a more positive image of the

EU than other age groups, are more likely to trust the EU, have more positive views on the

future of the EU, and approve highly (or at least highest) of their country’s relationship with

the EU, then this will suggest that they cannot be said to be, in general, a Eurosceptic age

group.

While much work has been done investigating Euroscepticism, and the growth of, in the

general population, there is little work specifically on young people (hereafter defined as

those aged 15-24) and their attitudes towards the European Union. Studies have shown that

young people are the least likely age group to turn out to a European election (Schmitt and

Mannheimer 2006), but low electoral turnout among young people is not specific to European

elections – it is indicative of an overall trend of low turnout among young people in all

elections across Europe (Matilla 2003: p451, also see generally Fieldhouse, Tranmer, and

Russell 2007). Young people’s low turnout rate to European elections does not indicate any

particular graft between young people and the EU that is different towards the usually noted

distance between younger generations and political general in general. Lastly, reasons for a

voter not turning out in any given election are not necessarily to do with scepticism or

negative attitudes towards the institutions and or processes which that election concerns (see

Schmitt and Mannheimer 2006). Thus, we cannot infer attitudes towards the EU from

observations of low voter turnout.

Some studies do offer some potential insight into young people and their attitudes towards the

EU. Henn and Foard (2012) argued that despite their low propensity to vote, and generally

negative attitudes towards politicians, young people are generally positive about politics in a

more general sense – giving the example of 'the democratic process’. Most interestingly, Fox

(2013: p1) argues that “The British Election Survey for 2010” shows “only 22% of 18-24

year olds could be called Eurosceptics”. Further, Fox (2013: p2) found that “young people

have become less likely than their elders to be Eurosceptics since 1980”.

Hypotheses and Methodology

Following the arguments made from Fox (2013) and Henn and Foard (2005), two hypotheses

were drawn to be investigated from the data:

a) Euroscepticism will not be the prominent view on Europe among young people in

Europe, and

b) Young people will prove to be the least Eurosceptic age group in Europe.

To test the hypotheses, the research quantitatively investigated three public attitudes towards

the EU as recorded in the Eurobarometer 78 study and coded in a data-set available online

from the GESIS Eurobarometer data service. The Eurobarometer 78 was dedicated to

studying public opinion in Europe on a wide range of issues, including the EU itself. Young

people are those aged 15-24, and all other age groups which appear in this study are defined

according to the 6-split-up age variable in the Eurobarometer 78. As outlined above, three

different attitudes towards the EU have been investigated: 1) perceived 'image' of the EU , 2)

general 'trust' in the EU, and 3) perceptions of the future of the EU and the future of the

respondents' respective states within it. The Eurobarometer 78 is a cross-national survey

commissioned and produced by the EU in November 2012. The study surveyed nearly 33,000

people from across the 27 member states of the EU and a number of other geographically

European countries and territories. The responses from each individual in the study have been

coded in the form of a statistical dataset, which was accessed and downloaded through

GESIS online resources.

The following questions have been selected and recoded from the Eurobarometer responses

dataset for this research. Question A12 of the Eurobarometer 78 asked respondents “In

general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly

negative, or very negative image?” Answering options offered to respondents of this question

were: ‘Very positive’, ‘positive’, 'neutral', ‘negative’, and ‘Very negative’. There was also an

‘I don’t know’ option. In the dataset of results, each response to the question has been coded

from 1 to 6, from 1 being ‘Very positive’ to 5 being ‘Very negative’, with 3 representing

‘neutral’ and 6 as ‘I don’t know’. A new dummy variable for use in the later regression

analyses (dummy variables recode all responses into either 0 or 1) was created, which

recoded the responses into ‘Negative’ and ‘Not negative’ images of the EU. Responses 4 and

5 were coded into 1 for ‘Negative response’, while options 1, 2, 3, and 6 were coded to 0

representing ‘Not negative’.

Public trust in an institution is a vital part of general public attitudes towards said institution

(Rudolph and Evans 2005: p60, also see Hay 2007 ch.1). Question A11 part 8 was as follows:

‘Tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust the EU’. Questions A11 parts 5, 6, and 7

asked the same of political parties, national government, and national parliaments

respectively. Possible responses were 1 ‘Tend to trust’, 2 ‘Tend not to trust’, or 3 ‘I don’t

know’. A new dummy variable was created to recode 1 as respondents who selected answer 1

to the original question, and thus indicated ‘Trust’, while responses 2 and 3 were recoded into

0, labelled ‘Did not indicate trust’. Figure C displays the percentage of young people who

responded that they tended to trust each of the four types of political institution.

Respondents from the Eurobarometer 78 study were asked in question QA23 “Would you say

that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the

future of the EU?” Possible responses ranged from ‘Very positive’, coded as 1 in the data set,

to ‘Very negative’, coded as 4. Once again, ‘I don’t know’ responses were recorded as a 5. A

new dummy variable was created from these responses, which records 1 as a ‘Positive’

response to question QA23, and 3 through to 5 as a ‘Not positive’ response. This question

was not asked of respondents from countries not in the EU or not a candidate state, and thus

the number of observations for this variable drops to just over 26,500 individuals.

Question QA20a part 11 asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the following

statement: “(Our Country) could face a better future outside the EU”. Again, for obvious

reasons this question was only asked in countries which are currently members of the EU,

and so the total number of observations in the data is once again 26.662. Possible responses

ranged from ‘Agree strongly, coded as 1 in the data set, to ‘Disagree strongly’, coded as 4.

Once again, ‘I don’t know’ responses were recorded as a 5. A new dummy variable was

created from these responses, which recoded 3 and 4 as into 1 for ‘Disagreed’, and 1 through

to 3 into 0 a ‘Did not disagree’ response.

This research paper will make use of logistic regressions; a Logistic regression shows the

likelihood, in the form of an odds ratio, that a young person will have a negative image of the

EU, relative to all other age groups. An odds ratio is the log of the odds within a variable that

any given individual case from a particular type will display a certain characteristic, relative

to all other cases not of that individual’s type. In this regression, the given individual cases

are young people, the characteristic is a negative image of the EU, and the odds ratio is

relative to people of all other ages. Some figures displaying regressions are split into two

regression models – A and B – which represent the regression ran without added variables

which should be controlled for (A), and then with the addition of such variables (B).

Variables must be added to regression analyses to check for potential prior antecedent factors,

and only prior antecedent factors, which might explain or reduce the significance of the

effects observed in initial regressions (Miller and Shanks 1996). Prior antecedent variables

are those which could take effect on the characteristic that one is observing, before the

variable used in the original regression; for example, if investigating propensity to vote

among union members, it would be necessary to control for age, sex, and other factors such

as political interest, which would come into effect on one’s propensity to vote before being a

union member would. In this case, the effect of age is being investigated against another

characteristic, and the only variables in a cross-national dataset which would be considered

prior antecedent variables would be sex and country of respondent. Controlling for these

variables after the initial regression investigating the effect of just age on likelihood to have a

negative image of the EU allows us to investigate how much of the effect we are observing is

potentially explained by a respondent’s sex, and what country they occupy (for instance it

might be that women in this dataset were more negative about the EU than men, or that a

particular country was highly sceptical of the EU and is thus affecting the results).

Results

The Standard Eurobarometer 78 studied approximately 1,000 people from 34 countries and

territories in geographical Europe, asking questions on a broad range of topics affecting

Europeans. Each of their responses to the questions chosen above forms the data which has

been analysed in this research.

Figure A – Bar Graph displaying percentage of each age group responding that they had a

negative image of the EU.

Age group

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

% o

f a

ge

gro

up

ind

ica

ting

ne

ga

tive

im

ag

e

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure A shows the percentage of each age group who indicated that they had a negative

image of the EU. It shows that young people have the lowest such percentage of respondents

– indeed the percentage of young people who indicated that they had a negative image of the

EU was just under 20%, some way off the highest recorded percentage of negative responses,

which was 32% of 55-64 year olds.

Figure B – Odds ratios of a young person having a negative image of the EU, relative to all

other age groups

Variables

A

Negative Image of EU

B

Negative Image of EU

Young People 0.61*** 0.62***

Sex 0.95*

Country 0.98***

Constant 0.40*** 0.59***

Pseudo R2

0.4% 1%

Source: Eurobarometer 78. 32,731 total observations.

Reference Category: Individuals of all other ages (25+)

P values: <0.001 = *** (highly significant), 0.001 = **, <0.005 = *, zero stars = >0.005 (not significant)

Figure B shows a regression analysis ran on the data, which tells us statistically precisely how

much lower a young person is likely to be to have a negative image of the EU compared to

someone of any other age, according to the data. Figure B suggests that a young person is less

likely to have a negative image of the EU than people of all other ages. Underneath the table

are the Pseudo R2

scores for each model. The Pseudo R2

test, like the Chi2 test, is ran

simultaneously with the regression analysis, and informs us as to the percentage of the

variance in the results which can be explained simply by the factors (variables) which we are

using in the model. The scores are low, but this is to be expected of models using just one and

three variables respectively on a dataset of tens of thousands.

Figure C – Bar Graph displaying percentage of young people indicating trust in various

institutions.

Eur

opea

n Union

Nat

iona

l Gov

ernm

ent

Nat

iona

l Par

liam

ent

Nat

iona

l Par

ties

% o

f yo

ung

pe

op

le ind

ica

ting

tru

st in

institu

tio

ns

0

10

20

30

40

50

% of age group indicating trust in their national parliament

0 10 20 30 40 50

Ag

e g

roup

15-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

% of age group indicating trust in their national political parties

0 10 20 30 40 50

15-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

Figure C shows the graphical representation of trust in the EU by age group. According to the

responses, the EU is by far the most trusted of the four political institutions among young

people with over 10 percentiles between it and the next most trusted institution – national

parliaments. Nearly half of all young people asked in the study responded that they ‘tend to

trust’ the EU.

Figure D – Percentages of each age group that indicated trust in various institutions

% of age group indicating trust in their national governments

0 10 20 30 40 50

15-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

% of age group indicating trust in the EU

0 10 20 30 40 50

Ag

e g

roup

15-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

Source: Eurobarometer 78. 32,731 total observations

Figure D shows the percentage of each age group who indicated that they ‘tend to trust’ the

EU, their national governments and parliaments, and their national political parties. Here we

can clearly see that as well as trusting the EU highest of all four institutions, a significantly

higher percentage of young people trust the EU than any other age group. Crucially, this is

not true of any of the other three political institutions listed, so it is not the case that young

people are simply more trusting in general of political institutions – there is specific and

significantly higher levels of trust in the EU among young people.

Figure E – Odds ratios of young people trusting the EU relative to all other age groups

Variables

A

Trust in EU

B

Trust in EU

Young People 1.47*** 1.43***

Sex 0.86***

Country 1.01***

Constant 0.56*** 0.58***

Pseudo R2

0.3% 0.7%

Source: Eurobarometer 78.1. 32,731 total observations.

Reference Category: Individuals of all other ages (25+)

P values: <0.001 = *** (highly significant), 0.001 = **, <0.005 = *, zero stars = >0.005 (not significant)

Figure E displays Logistic regression results using the data on trust. Using the age group

dummy variable for young people, the odds ratios displayed are those of a young person to

indicate that they tend to trust the EU, relative to respondents of all other ages. The results

indicate that young people are around 1.5 times more likely to indicate they trust the EU than

people of all other ages.

Figure F shows the percentages of each age group who expressed positive attitudes towards

the general future prospects of the EU. We can see from Figure F that the percentage of

young people indicating that they were optimistic about the future of the EU is significantly

Age Groups

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

% W

ho indic

ate

d t

hey w

ere

optim

istic a

bout

the E

U's

futu

re

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Figure F – Bar Graph displaying percentage age groups indicating they were optimistic about

the future of the EU.

Source: Eurobarometer 78. 26,662 total observations

higher than that of all other age groups; over 60% of young people asked in the study

responded that they saw a positive future for the EU.

Figure G – Logistic Regression displaying likelihood of young people to be optimistic about

the future of the EU, relative to all other age groups.

Variables

A

Optimistic Future EU

B

Optimistic Future EU

Young People 1.55*** 1.54***

Sex 0.93*

Country 1.01***

Constant 1.00*** 0.98

Pseudo R2

0.3% 0.5%

Source: Eurobarometer 78. 26,662 total observations.

Reference Category: Individuals of all other ages (25+)

P values: <0.001 = *** (highly significant), 0.001 = **, <0.005 = *, zero stars = >0.005 (not significant)

Figure G displays Logistic regression results using the data on the future of the EU. Using the

age group dummy variable for young people, the odds ratios displayed are those of a young

person to indicate that they were optimistic about the future of the EU, relative to respondents

of all other ages. The results indicate that young people are over 1.5 times more likely to be

optimistic about the future of the EU than people of all other ages.

Figure H represents that proportion of each age group who disagreed with the statement

“(Our Country) could face a better future outside the EU”. It shows that while young people

recording the highest percentage of respondents who disagreed with the assertion that their

country would have a better future outside of the EU, the differences between the age groups

were not statistically significant. Whilst this means we cannot suggest that young people are

significantly more likely to disagree with their country leaving the EU than other age groups,

we can it is still the case that over 60% of the respondents believed their country would not

be better off outside the EU. Seeing as the results were not statistically significant between

each age group, a regression analyses on the responses from this question has not been ran.

Figure H – Bar graph displaying the percentages of each age group who disagreed with the

suggestion that their state would have a better future outside the EU.

Age Groups

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

% W

ho d

isagre

ed t

hat

their s

tate

would

have

abett

er

futu

re o

uts

ide t

he E

U

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Source: Eurobarometer 78. Chi2 Pr = <0.001 (highly statistically significant differences) 26,662 total observations

-

Discussion

Less than 20% of young people studied indicated that they had a negative image of the EU,

and a young person in the study is just over half as likely to have such an image of the EU

than a person of any other age. This suggests that both the majority of young people in

Europe do not have a negative image of the EU, and are much less likely than any other

generation to hold one. Typically, Euroscepitcs will have a negative image of the EU, and

thus these findings suggest that in this sense young people in Europe are not even remotely

prominently Eurosceptic.

Nearly 50% of young people in the study indicated that they ‘tend to trust’ the EU, and on

average nearly twice as many young people indicated that they trusted the EU than their

national governments, parliament, and political parties. Also, a young person from the study

was nearly twice as likely to ‘tend to trust’ the EU than a person of any other age. This

suggests that far from being Eurosceptic and mistrusting the EU, it is mostly the case that

young people in Europe tend to trust the EU. Indeed, this finding is consistent with

arguments in the literature that surpra-national bodies tend to be more trusted than national

governments (see Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Lastly, over 60% of young people studied in the

survey suggested that they were optimistic about the future of the EU, and were over 1.5

times more likely to hold such a belief than a person of any other age group in the study.

Further, over 60% of young people asked disagreed that their respective state would face a

better future outside the EU than within it. These findings suggest once more that the

majority of young people are not Eurosceptic.

In each case studied, young people consistently failed to indicate high levels of Eurosceptic

attitudes in their responses, and Eurosceptic attitudes were far from the majority in any case.

This has been demonstrated in both graphical and regression form in the results. Each of the

Model B analyses in the regression, where controlling variables were added, did not display

significantly altered odds ratios – in other words the addition of the controlling variables did

not make a significant change to the results observed in any case where a regression analysis

was used. This means that the effect of being a young person on having attitudes towards the

EU that we observe in the Model A of each part is a real effect.

However, there are limitations to the data and the results. Questions regarding the future of

the EU were not asked of respondents from countries not in the EU or not a candidate state,

and thus the number of observations for these variables drops to just over 26,500 individuals.

This means that while the sample size is still more than apt, we can only generalise these

particular findings to young people from states within the EU, and not Europe wide. Future

studies could look to include more areas where Eurosepticism which I was not able to for a

lack of time. Lastly, some readers may take issue with my coding of ‘I don’t know’ responses

as ‘Not negative’, but I stress that my understanding of ‘Not negative’ is not equitable to

‘Positive’, but quite simply as a response that was not an expression of a negative attitude. ‘I

don’t know’ is neither a positive or negative response, so to class it as ‘Not negative’ is

wholly appropriate. The same reasoning applies for my coding of ‘Neutral’ responses as ‘Not

negative’, and will be used in all other questions in the study which offer ‘I don’t know’ as a

possible response. It must be stressed that this coding method must be kept in mind when

reading the following figures and results, as for example if a figure displayed that 45% of an

age group’s respondents held a certain opinion, it would not be correct to assume that the

remaining 55% held the reverse of that opinion, as potential ‘I don’t know’ or ‘neutral’

responses would make up a portion of that remaining percentage, depending on the question.

It would only be correct to state that the remaining 55% did not hold that particular opinion.

Whilst the above is a perfectly viable manoeuvre, it is indeed the case that rather than

analysing actual reported Euroscepticism, a number of inferences and assumptions are being

made to define Euroscepticism on the part of this research.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of this study suggest that both hypothesis a)

Euroscepticism will not be prominent among young people in Europe, and b) young people

will prove to be the least Eurosceptic age group in Europe, are correct. The findings in this

paper suggest that Euroscepticism is not at all prominent in young people, and also that

young people are the least Eurosceptic age group, consistently showing to disagree with key

Eurosceptic positions and attitudes. Thus, I argue that despite the sustained Eurosceptic

discourse which dominates European media and political discussions, Euroscepticism is not

at all prominent among the young people of Europe and thus Eurosceptic who claim that

Euroscepticism is rife among the population of Europe are not speaking the truth in terms of

Europe’s young people. Euroscepticism is not prominent and not popular belief among

European young persons, and thus suggests the Eurosceptic discourse among both

Eurosceptic parties and vast swaths of mainstream media in Europe is not reflective of the

views of the majority Europe’s young.

Thee findings of this paper should be an important note for academics, researchers, and

writers concerned with or studying the subject of Euroscepticism. Future research in this field

should look to investigate why it might be that young people are comparatively much less

Eurosceptic than their elders; perhaps there are cultural and social attitudes which may

underpin young people’s likelihood to be less Eurosceptic. Young people’s comparatively

greater positivity, and lesser scepticism, for the EU cannot possibly be linked with a

propensity to vote, as it has been shown on numerous occasions that young people are less

likely to vote than any other age group (Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991). Further, other

studies have suggested that young people are less politically interested than their elders

(Fieldhouse et al 2007), suggesting that a negative correlation between political interest and

Euroscepticism would not be a plausible assertion. Studies following could focus on the kinds

of social and political attitudes which are typical of those more likely to be comfortable with

‘other cultures’, to which McLaren (2002) suggests hostility towards is intrinsically linked

with Euroscepticism. Those looking to develop knowledge on the relationship between

Europe’s young people and the EU should look to test here for potential explanation.

Bibliography

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