Yogacara in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century Rnying Ma Scholar Rong Zom Chos Kyi Bzang Po

8/10/2019 Yogacara in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century Rnying Ma Scholar Rong Zom Chos Kyi Bzang Po

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Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century

Rnying ma Scholar Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po

Orna A

LMOGI

1. Introduction

The doxographical affiliation of Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (b. 11 thcent., hence-forth Rong zom pa) has been until recently an unresolved issue. He has often beenthought to be a Yogcra-Mdhyamika (mainly because he does not make anyreference to Prsagika-Madhyamaka), but in a study focusing on his discourses on

various conceptions of Buddhahood I was able to demonstrate that he is clearly tobe identified as a proponent of Sarvadharmpratihnavda or the "strand whichmaintains that all phenomena have no substratum whatsoever" (i.e., as opposedto Myopamdvayavda or the "strand which maintains that [phenomena] areone, inasmuch as they are like illusions") and not of Yogcra-Madhyamaka. 1Inbrief, Rong zom pa belonged to a Madhyamaka tradition that maintained that phe-nomena have no substratum whatsoever and which at the same time propagatedthe indivisibility of the two truths (or modes of reality). This is, however, not to saythat he did not avail himself of Yogcra theories. On the contrary, he discussesthe Yogcra school (employing also other appellations such as Cittamtra (semstsam), Vijnavda (rnam par shes par smra ba), Vijaptimtravda (rnam par rig

pa tsam du smra ba), and Vijnamtravda (rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba))on several occasions, and his writings are permeated with ideas and notions typicalof and in fact central to this school, which latter fact probably contributed tomodern scholars' false identification of him as a Yogcra-Mdhyamika. Nonethe-less, as an advocate of both Madhyamaka and Rdzogs chen, Rong zom pa presup-

poses Yogcra theories but goes beyond them to establish the view that he

I would like to thank Mr. Philip Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) for proof-reading my English.

1During the last phase of Buddhism in India, strongly permeated by Tantric concepts,one finds the division of Madhyamaka into Myopamdvayavda and Sarvadharm-pratihnavda. According to this division, all Madhyamaka traditions that in one way oranother relied on Yogcra theories of knowledge were considered Myopamdvayavda,while only those strands of Madhyamaka that appeared not to have relied on any of thetheories of knowledge of Yogcra were considered to have embraced Sarvadharm-pratihnavda. See ALMOGI (2009:39-42), where this division of Madhyamaka is briefly

touched upon, and ibid. 226-232, where Rong zom pa's Madhyamaka affiliation that is,his identification as a Sarvadharmpratihnavdin is discussed. For a lengthy discussionof the identification of these two subdivisions and their congruence with other schemes ofsubdividing Madhyamaka known from Tibetan doxographies and other sources, seeALMOGI2010.


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(gnas: pratih, pada), and objects of engagement (spyod yul: gocara).5Therefore, whatever is conceptualized and known in the form of phe-nomena is the mind itself. That is, the mind itself [appears] as supposedobjects (yul: viaya) on account of residual impressions, and the [sup-posed] objects of the mind are said to be [the result of] residual impres-sions, because those that appear as supposed objects are [the result of]the ripening of residual impressions. Moreover, when the residual im-pressions that is, [those that give rise to] the current [forms of] mind('jug pa'i rnam par shes pa: pravttivijna, i.e., the five sense perceptionsand the mental perception) and [their] mind-associates (sems las byungba: caitta) that have accumulated in the fundamental [mind] (kun gzhi['i rnam par shes pa]: laya[vijna]) become strong and potent, the fun-damental mind itself ripens [as] the essence of the result, and so appearsas bodies, abodes, and objects of engagement. These very appearancesfunction as the dominant conditions (bdag po'i rkyen: adhipatipratyaya)and also as the objective conditions (dmigs pa'i rkyen: lambanapratyaya)of the current [forms of] mind. The ensuing (rgyu mthun pa: niyanda)residual impressions, which have been implanted by the current [forms of]mind themselves, function as the causal conditions (rgyu'i rkyen: hetupra-tyaya).

In short, unlike the non-Buddhist [systems], none of the [variousYogcra] systems seeks a cause elsewhere, such as vara, a self (bdag:tman), or primal matter (rang bzhin: prakti). [The various Yogcrasystems] are similar inasmuch as [all of them] maintain that karmic [seeds]accumulated by cognition itself sprout within this very [cognition], andone's abodes and objects of engagement, too, come about [in this sameway]. Thus there are no additional major points of disagreement (rtsodsgo) [among them].

In his discussion of Yogcra in the Grub mtha'i brjed byang, Rong zom pa focuseson the efforts on the part of its followers to portray their view as what is called theMiddle Way (dbu ma'i lam: madhyam pratipad). It is contended that Yogcraavoids both the extreme of admitting true existence in regard to external objects, as

is done by the rvakas, and the extreme of negating the true existence of mind,as is done by the Mdhyamikas. It is argued that if mind were non-existent, strivingfor Buddhahood would be pointless. The objectsubject dichotomy is explained asthe error, on the part of the mental continuum, of taking one part of itself to be agrasped object and another part to be a grasping subject. In reality, boththe grasped and the grasper are conceptual constructs. It is further argued that thegrasped, being a mental construct, appears to be manifold, while the grasper, beingthe underlying component of conceptualization, appears to be single. Assumingthat the grasper and grasped must be of a similar nature in order for cognition tobe possible, it is further argued that if external objects were to exist apart fromone's mind, that is, if they were to consist of atoms of matter rather than momentsof mind, they could not be perceived by the mind. In conclusion, the assertion isrepeated that a mental element exists on the ultimate level as a continuous chain of

5For references to the notion that the external world consists of bodies, abodes, andobjects (the latter is also referred to as [the sensation or objects of] enjoyment (longs spyod:bhoga/artha)), see ALMOGI(2009:248, n. 33).


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Yogcra in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century 1333

moments at the level of sentient beings as (ordinary) mind and at the level of theNoble Ones as gnosis:6

The tradition of Vijnamtravda: [It] maintains the existence of mindon the absolute level, [postulating] the mind-only [theory]. [According tothis tradition,] one should avoid the false imputation (sgro 'dogs pa:adhyropa/samropa) in regard to objects which [in fact] are completely(yong gis) non-existent as [done by] the rvakas, and the depreciation(bskur pa 'debs pa: apavda) that on the absolute level even the mind isnon-existent, [as asserted] by the great Madhyamaka.7If mind were notto exist on the absolute level, there would be no basis for the accumula-tion of beneficial resources (bsod nams: puya), and striving for [the at-tainment of] release (thar pa: moka) would be superfluous. Thus, regar-ding mind, at the level of sentient beings mind merely exists as momen-tary cognition. [Whatever] appears [in the here and] now as objects is[nothing but] mind. [Mind, in turn, constitutes of] the conceptually con-structed that is, one grasped (gzung ba: grhya) "part" (cha: bhga/aa) of the mind that has been from beginningless time erroneouslytaken to be an object and one grasped "part" [of it] that has been erro-neously taken to be the [subjective] mind and [of] what is called concep-

tual constructions [involving] residual impressions (bag chags tsam la bagchags su rtog pa zhes bya), which are nothing but residual impressions. Asto the [perceived] object, therefore, although [it] has developed frommind, [it] appears as inanimate matter; as to the mind, because [it] is themain component (dngos gzhi) of [all] cognition, it appears as knowledge(rig pa). Because the object is conceptually constructed, [it] appears to bemanifold; because the mind is the main component of conceptualization,it appears to be single. Because objects are manifested ( 'phrul pa) bycognition, a connection exists [between the manifold objects and the sin-gle subject]. If objects were to exist as [something consisting of] minuteatoms (rdul phra rab: paramu) outside one's own mental continuum,cognition of them would not be possible since there would be no [objectsubject] connection [between them], for the two cognition and inanima-

te matter are generically dissimilar. Further, only single minute atoms,not manifold appearances, would be possible. Therefore, [external] ob-jects do not exist. Through failure to cognize [the true nature of] mind,[the mind] appears [to one] in the form of objects. Mind exists at the ul-timate level. If it were to be non-existent, this would result in the short-coming that striving for [the attainment of] release would be superfluous,and thus the statement that [mind] is non-existent is not tenable either.By means of this logical reasoning, [it can be established that] at the levelof sentient beings, mind exists in a mere momentary form, [but at thesame time] in a permanent one, given the continuity8of the fundamental

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Grub mtha'i brjed byang(A, fols. 325b4-326b1; B, p. 2014-24).7The term "great Madhyamaka" here is clearly to be interpreted as simply a referenceto Madhyamaka in general, the adjective "great" being used in a non-restrictive sense.

8Permanency (rtag pa: nityat) as an expression of continuity (rgyun: prabandha) isone of three kinds of permanency, alongside permanency as an expression of constancy or


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mind; while at the level of the Noble Ones, [it similarly] exists in a meremomentary form, [but at the same time] in a permanent one, given thecontinuity of gnosis. In this way, having eliminated the extremes of bothexistence and nonexistence, [the proponents of the Yogcra system]maintain that they are the ones who abide in the Middle Way, and thus[their system is] called Cittamtra-Madhyamaka.9

3. Rong zom pa's Presentation of the Subdivisions of YogcraRong pa Me dpung (ca. 11th/12thcent.), in his list of Rong zom pa's writings titledRje dharma bha dras mdzad pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs kyi tho yig, records underthe category "works on the foundation of the truth (bden gzhi)" a work solely de-

voted to theories of knowledge that focuses on the two main opposing stancesregarding the existence of images.10Such a work, however, has unfortunately not

yet surfaced. On several occasions, nonetheless, Rong zom pa discusses Yogcrain detail in terms of the subdivisions of it that have resulted from different theoriesof knowledge, giving us a pretty systematic overview of these subdivisions. I havealready indirectly dealt with the issue elsewhere in the context of analyzing Rongzom pa's presentation of Yogcra-Madhyamaka, where I discussed at length

various branches of Yogcra and their respective theories of knowledge, includinga clarification of the terms involved and the philosophical stance of the individual

subdivisions, with particular attention to the question surrounding the existence ofgnosis at the stage of a buddha.11Here I shall therefore merely present a summaryof my findings, before providing a translation of a passage in which Rong zom padirectly discusses the subdivisions of Yogcra. I have pointed out that Rong zompa's way of subdividing Yogcra raises doubts regarding the assumption that thesubclassification into Skravda versus Nirkravda (also Ankravda) andthat into *Satykravda versus *Alkkravda are equivalent an assumptionthat has been widespread among modern scholars.12Rong zom pa considers Sk-ravda and Nirkravda to be the two main subdivisions, with *Satykravdaand *Alkkravda being further subdivisions of Skravda. I have also notedthat later Tibetan scholars have often presented a somewhat different scheme in

which *Satykravda and *Alkkravda are considered the two main subdivi-sions, while *Samala-Alkkravda and *Nirmala-Alkkravda are regarded as

two further subdivisions of *Alkkravda. Following a discussion of the theories

uninterruptedness (mi chad pa: asrasana) and permanency by nature (rang bzhin: pra-kti). For more on this distinction, see ALMOGI(2009:329-330, n. 109).

9 The Buddhist tradition in general seeks to avoid extremes, thus propagating thepursuit of what is referred to as the Middle Way. It seems, however, that as a reaction tothe Mdhyamikas, who, as the name of their school clearly suggests, claim to be the onlytrue followers of the Middle Way, the followers of the other Buddhist schools felt perhaps agreater need to emphasize that their traditions, too, represented the Middle Way. Onegood example is the so-called Vijpti-Madhyamaka tradition represented by Ratnkara-nti, on which see SEYFORT RUEGG(1981:122-124).

10ALMOGI(1997:248; Appendix A, 6.1.2.4): Rnam bcas rnam med.11

See ALMOGI(2009:34 & 142-159), where, in addition to Rong zom pa's own presen-tation being analyzed, several passages on the issue from both Indian and Tibetan sourcesare cited, and references to relevant secondary literature are provided as well.

12 For the Tibetan and English rendering of the names of the Yogcra subschoolsmentioned in this passage, see the summary of Rong zom pas scheme below.


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of knowledge of each of these branches, I demonstrated that what Rong zom pacalls *Alkkravda has been referred to by later Tibetan scholars as *Samala-

Alkkravda, and what he calls Nirkravda has been referred to by these samescholars as *Nirmala-Alkkravda. One of the main points discussed by Rongzom pa in this connection is the impact these theories of knowledge have on howthe various subdivisions of Yogcra (and hence also those of Yogcra-Madhyamaka, which are his main concern) conceive Buddhahood. Of the two sub-

divisions of Skravda (which maintains the existence of images), *Satykravda(which maintains the existence of true images) asserts that just as the variousimages of the external world (i.e., bodies, abodes, and objects) that appear at thelevel of ordinary sentient beings are truly existent in the manner they appear, sotoo are the images of pure phenomena at the level of a buddha (i.e., buddha-Bodies and pure fields along with their embellishments). Consequently, accordingto this branch, both the images of pure phenomena and the pure mundane gnosisthat cognizes them exist at the stage of a buddha. *Alkkravda (which maintainsthe existence of false images) holds that although images of the external worldappear at the level of sentient beings they do not exist in the manner they appear.Consequently, according to this branch, although images of pure phenomena at thestage of a buddhaappear they are not true, and thus the pure mundane gnosis thatcognizes them exists only conventionally, it being non-conceptual gnosis alone that

truly exists. According to the Nirkravda (which maintains the non-existence ofimages), even at the level of sentient beings, the mind, being devoid of the objectsubject dichotomy, is characterized by luminosity, and dual appearances simplyarise due to residual impressions. Consequently, according to this branch neitherimages of pure phenomena nor pure mundane gnosis to cognize them exists at thestage of a buddha, and thus only non-conceptual gnosis exists.13

I have also pointed out that Rong zom pa acknowledges the fact that thesebranches could be subdivided further. One of the interesting allusions to such fur-ther subdivisions is no doubt his mention of the distinction among the followers ofSkravda between those who maintain the existence of an "original" ( 'dra gzhi)and those who do not. These are subdivisions that had resulted from a dispute on

whether an image has an original, or an "objective support," from which it arises.Unfortunately, Rong zom pa mentions these sub-branches only in passing. In any

case, he makes it clear that these supposed originals, too, are again nothing butappearances born of the mind itself a deeper layer of steady images from whichthe various perceived images develop. This point has been reinforced by LambertSCHMITHAUSEN (2005) in his recent discussion of the view lately expressed by anumber of modern scholars that Yogcra does not completely reject the existenceof external objects. Analyzing the Chinese sources in questions (primarily Xun-zng's Chng wish ln , T1585), he demonstrates that these originals,far from being external entities, are rather mental factors developed (parima) bythe mind. In the case of sense perceptions, these originals are commonly said to beimages of matter found in one's own layavijna. As pointed out by SCHMIT-HAUSEN, there was lack of agreement regarding the originals of the layavijna.

13Significantly, while these stances of the subdivisions of Yogcra apply to the abso-lute level, the controversy regarding the existence of gnosis at the stage of a buddhaamongthe Mdhyamikas all of whom agree in postulating the absolute as freedom from mani-foldness, not allotting any special status to mind refers to the conventional level.


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According to the more widely accepted view, however, these are images groundedin other beings' layavijna.

14

Rong zom pa's scheme of the subdivisions of Yogcra can be thus summarizedas follows:15

(1) Skravda (rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba), "those who maintainthe existence of images"

(1.1) *Satykravda (rnam pa bden par smra ba), "those who main-tain [the existence of] true images"

(1.1.1) rNam pa 'dra gzhi yod par smra ba, "those who maintain

that images (rnam pa: kra) have an 'original'"(1.1.2) [rNam pa] 'dra gzhi med par smra ba, "those who main-

tain that images (rnam pa: kra) have no 'original'"() etc.

(1.2) *Alkkravda (rnam pa brdzun par smra ba), "those whomaintain [the existence of] false images" [= *Samala-Alk-

kravda, "those who maintain [the existence of] false images

[and a cognition that] is accompanied by stains"]

(1.2.1) rNam pa 'dra gzhi yod par smra ba, "those who maintainthat images (rnam pa: kra) have an 'original'"

(1.2.2) [rNam pa] 'dra gzhi med par smra ba, "those who main-

tain that images (rnam pa: kra) have no 'original'"() etc.

(2) Nirkravda (rnam pa med par smra ba), "those who maintain thenon-existence of images" [= *Nirmala-Alkkravda, "those who

maintain [the existence of] false images [and a cognition that] is with-

out stains"]

The following is a passage from Rong zom pa's Lta ba'i brjed byang in which heprovides a systematic presentation of the subdivisions of Yogcra in the context of

discussing the views (lta ba: darana) of the various doxographical systems:16

Vijaptimtravda is [divided into] two [branches], namely, (1) Skra-

vda and (2) Nirkravda. (1) Skravda has two further subdivisions

(nang gses kyi bye brag), namely, (1.1) *Satykravda and (1.2) *Alk-kravda. These [latter two] in turn are known to have numerous factions

representing inner disagreements (nang mi mthun par smra ba), such as(1.1.1 & 1.2.1) those who maintain that images (rnam pa: kra) have an"original" ('dra gzhi) versus (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) those who maintain that[images] have no "original." But given that [the various factions] can be

14For more on this, see SCHMITHAUSEN(2005).15

Note that Rong zom pa also alludes on several occasions to two other subdivisions ofYogcra, namely, (a) "Bodhisattvas who postulate a set of eight [vijnas]" (byang chubsems dpa' tshogs brgyad du smra ba) and (b) "Bodhisattvas who postulate one [vijna]"(byang chub sems dpa' gcig pur smra ba, or simply,gcig pur smra ba).

16Lta ba'i brjed byang(A, fols. 150b4-151b6; B, pp. 1516-1624).


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simply subsumed under the [above-mentioned categories], I shall explainonly these:

Of these, (1) as regards Skravda, the word krais taken here inthe sense of "duplicate" ('dra snang). And thus (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) those[among them] who maintain the existence of an "original" ('dra gzhi)[consider] the arising of a cognition that resembles the original [to be] a"duplicate," while (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) [those who maintain that] there is nooriginal consider the appearing [of an image in such a way] as if [an origi-nal] existed though [such an original] does not exist at all [to be a]"duplicate."

[All of the subdivisions] are collectively designated Skravda,which maintains that external objects (phyi rol gyi don: bhyrtha) areindeed non-existent, and yet cognition itself is divided into objective andsubjective images, as if [external objects] were existent. Of these [subdivi-sions], (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) those who postulate that an original exists maintainthat although no external objects exist separate from cognition, steadyappearances (snang ba brtan pa) of the mind itself in the form of externalobjects do exist. [These] function as originals, and so all cognitions ariseas their images. (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) Those who maintain that there is no origi-nal say that there is no second layer to appearances in [the form of] ex-

ternal sense-bases (skye mched: yatana), and that it is cognition itselfthat appears as though [external] objects were existent.Of these, (1.1) *Satykravda states: All [things] that appear as

bodies, abodes, and objects of engagement are of the essence of the minditself, and therefore [they] are completely true, [that is,] in line with how[they] appear. Just as [these appearances] at the level of sentient beingsare true, so also all [appearances of buddha]-Bodies and arrays of[buddha]-fields [along with their embellishments] at the stage of abuddha are true.

(1.2) *Alkkravda states: At the level of sentient beings concep-tualizations, which arise in the form of the grasped (gzung ba: grhya)and the grasper ('dzin pa: grhaka), are existent. These are, however, [in-stances of] false imagination (yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa:

abhtaparikalpa). In reality, [the mind] is empty of both [the grasped andthe grasper, and] exists as merely [having] the characteristic of self-cognition (rang rig pa: svasavitti/svasavedana). At the level of theAwakened Ones, pure mundane gnosis (dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes: ud-dhalaukikajna) is merely present in the mode of conventional truth (orreality), whereas the correct gnosis (yang dag pa'i ye shes: samyagjna)is nothing but momentary non-conceptual gnosis (rnam par mi rtog pa'iye shes: nirvikalpajna).17

(2) Nirkravda states: Even at the level of every sentient being, themind (sems: citta) and mind-associates (sems las byung ba: caitta) havenever arisen [in the form of] objective and subjective images, not even forone moment, and thus [mind] merely exists as [something having] thecharacteristics of luminosity (gsal ba: praka) [and] self-cognition. Asfor the seeming appearance in [the form of] object and subject, [it] can be

17For a discussion of uddhalaukikajna and nirvikalpajna, see ALMOGI(2009:163-171).


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expressed neither as the mind itself nor as [something] other [than themind], and thus [it] is referred to as "[the result of] residual impressions(bag chags: vsan) relating to [the mind] itself," "objectsubject [dicho-tomy]," or "the Imagined" (kun brtags: parikalpita). That which can beexpressed in terms of neither X itself nor anything other [than X] cannotbe truly existent (rdzas su yod pa: dravyasat), and thus is simply nominal(btags pa tsam: prajaptimtra). Even at the level of the Noble Ones,there is nothing that has been improved upon (bogs dbyung du med pa)[that supersedes] this very nature [of the mind]. But the difference is that[the mental continuum at this level] has become free from the seeminglyexistent adventitious (glo bur ba: gantuka) residual impressions. There-fore, [they] do not maintain [the existence] of pure mundane gnosis at thelevel of the Noble Ones either.

4. Rong zom pa's Discussion of Specific Yogcra Theories

4.1. The Three Natures Theory

Rong pa Me dpung, in his list of Rong zom pa's writings, specifies, again under thecategory "works on the foundation of the truth (bden gzhi)," a work solely devotedto the theory of the Three Natures, that is, the Imagined, Dependent, and Per-

fect.18

This work, however, has not survived either. In any case, Rong zom pa availshimself of the Three Natures theory, as he does of other theories associated withYogcra, on numerous occasions in his writings. In his Grub mtha'i brjed byang,he treats the Three Natures systematically under ten points, including definitionsof each of the Natures and their correlation with other Buddhist theories andconcepts:19

The Three Natures are the Imagined (kun [tu]brtags [pa]: parikalpita),Dependent (gzhan dbang: paratantra), and Perfect (yongs su grub pa:parinipanna). The following is stated in the authoritative scriptures:20

The Imagined is under the influence of imagination.Imagination is the Dependent.

The Perfectis of two types,The Unchangeable and the Infallible.

18ALMOGI(1997:248; Appendix A, 6.1.2.3): Sems tsam gyi ngo bo nyid gsum pa.19Grub mtha'i brjed byang(A, fols. 346a6-348b3; B, pp. 2243-22611).20The third and fourth lines are a citation of Madhyntavibhga3.11cd (Q5522.45b6;

D4021.42b2; Z, vol. 70, p. 90710-11), also cited in the Blo gsal grub mtha'. For references tocritical editions and discussions of the text, see MIMAKI(1982:118, n. 344). I have not beenable to locate the source of the first two lines. Compare, however, the following verse fromAsvabhva's Mahynasagrahopanibandhana(Q5552.270b3; D4051.221a1-2; Z, vol. 76, pp.

57721-5782): rnam par rtog pas brtags pa'i don[Q add. no]// kun tu [D du] brtags pa'i ngo bonyid// rnam par rtog pa gzhan gyi dbang// de yi stong nyid yongs su grub//. The verse is citedtwice with slight variation in the Blo gsal grub mtha', where it is once attributed to theMadhyntavibhgaand once to the Mahynasagraha. For references and a discussion ofthese citations, see MIMAKI(1982:116, n. 337 & 119, n. 346).


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The [Three Natures] will be taught under ten points: (1) what are the ac-tual things (dngos [gzhi])21denoted by [each of] the Three Natures, (2)etymology, (3) subdivisions, (4) assignment [of the Three Natures] to thestages (sa: bhmi), (5) correlation [of the Three Natures] with the threeBodies (sku: kya), (6) subsuming [the Three Natures] under [the con-cept of] representation-only (rnam par rig pa tsam: vijptimtra), (7)subsuming all phenomena under the Three Natures, (8) [the ThreeNatures in terms of] three kinds of existence, (9) [the Three Natures interms of] three kinds of non-existence, and (10) [the Three Natures asbeing free from] identicalness and dissimilarity.

(1) What are the actual things referred to by [each of] the ThreeNatures? The Imagined refers to the objectsubject [dichotomy]; the De-pendent refers to the conceptual thoughts constituting the minds andmind-associates within the three realms [of existence];22and the Perfectdenotes true reality, which is empti[ness].

(2) Etymology: Why is the Imagined called [so]? The grasped andgrasper appear on account of error within the Dependent: the Depend-ent, not having recognized that [these] are its own manifestations, imag-ines that the grasped and grasper exist apart from the Dependent. There-fore, the Imagined is called [so]. Why is the Dependent called [so]? The

minds and mind-associates within the three realms [of existence] are notcapable of arising on their own but are produced by other causes andconditions. Therefore, the Dependent is called [so]. Why is the Perfectcalled [so]? True reality (chos nyid: dharmat), which is emptiness thatis, the Dependent [in the sense of] the bearer of properties (chos can:dharmin) being empty of the objectsubject dichotomy never turns intomarks [consisting in appearances] (mtshan ma: nimitta) or entities (dngospo: vastu) [that result from] conceptualization.

(3) Subdivisions: The Imagined is of two [types], namely, the Per-ceptible-imagined {such as the objects of each of the [five sense] faculties} and theImperceptible-imagined {such as sky flowers}. The Dependent is also of two[types], namely, the Dependent that stands in relation [to something else]{such as the unconditioned ('dus ma byas: asaskta) in relation to the conditioned ( 'dus

byas: saskta)}and the Dependent that is generated {such as objects and facul-ties generated by seeds, water, and manure}. The Perfect, too, is of two [types],namely, the Unchangeable Perfect {referring to the true reality of phenomena}and the Infallible Perfect {referring to correct gnosis}23.24

(4) Assignment [of the Three Natures] to the stages: The Imaginedis the object of engagement [of the mind] of ordinary beings; the De-

21My reading of dngosas dngos gzhi is based on the reading of the passage, translatedbelow, that elaborates on this point.

22This is in agreement with the definition of vikalpain the Vinicayasagra. For therelevant passage, see KRAMER(2005:69, Tibetan text, & 101, German translation). See alsoALMOGI(2009:170), where Madhyntavibhga1.8ab, in which the same idea is conveyed, is

cited and translated.23Referring, that is, in an ontological sense, to nyat, and in an epistemological senseto nirvikalpajna, respectively.

24For a detailed presentation of these subdivisions, including further references to pri-mary and secondary sources, see CARSTENS(2006:176-182).


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pendent is the object of engagement of pure mundane [gnosis]; the Per-fect is the object of engagement of non-conceptual [gnosis]. How doesone know this? It is stated in the authoritative scriptures:25

Those [things] which arise dependentlyAre by nature non-existent.Those [things] which are by nature non-existent never arise.The Dependent Nature, which arises on account of conditions[But] without conceptualization[And] which is in all respects inexplicable,Is the object of engagement of pure mundane [gnosis].The Perfect Nature, that which is utter emptiness[And is characterized] by the nature of permanency,Is the object of engagement of non-conceptual gnosis.

(5) Correlation [of the Three Natures] with the three Bodies: ThePerfect is the dharmakya, because [it] is composed of the dharmadhtuand gnosis. The Dependent is the sabhogakya, because [it] appears to(ngo gang = ngo ga)26[one during] samdhi. The Imagined is the nir-makya, because things which are non-existent are imagined to be exi-

stent.27

25Of the three following stanzas, the first is a citation from the Sgaramatiparipcch-stra, where it reads slightly differently (S134.69a1; D152.48a4): rten cing 'brel par gangbyung ba// de dag gang la'ang rang bzhin med// gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gangdu'ang 'byung ba med//. The verse seems to have been quite popular and is cited, with slightvariation, in several other works, including ntarakita's Madhyamaklakravtti(Q5284.70a6-7; D3884.72a5-6; Z, vol. 62, p. 94516-19: de lta bas na blo gros rgya mtshos bstan pa las 'diskad gsung te/ gang dag rten cing 'brel byung ba// de dag dngos nyid ci yang min// gang dagngo bo nyid med pas// de dag gang du 'byung ba med// ce'o//); Kamalala's Madhyamak-loka (Q5287.227b7-8; D3887.206b1; Z, vol. 62, pp. 129220-12932: 'phags pa blo gros rgyamtsho bstan pa las kyang/ gang dag rten nas byung de dag// ngo bo nyid kyis ci yang med//gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gang du'ang 'byung ba med// ces gsungs so// );Bhviveka's Prajpradpamlamadhyamakavtti (Q5253.130b7; D3853.107a1-2; Z, vol. 57,p. 106512-14: de bzhin du/ gang dag brten nas skye ba ni// de dag dngos nyid gang yang med//gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gar yang 'byung mi 'gyur// zhes bya ba dang/ );Vidykaraprabha's Madhyamakanayasra (Q5293.54b6-7; D3893.48b2; Z, vol. 63, p. 1254-6:gang dag rten cing 'brel te byung[Q 'byung]// de dag ngo bo nyid 'ga' 'ang[Q 'ga'ang] med//gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gang du'ang 'byung ba med// ); and Gro lung pa'sBstan rim chen po(fol. 424a7: blo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa las kyang/ gang dag brten nas'byung de dag// ngo bo nyid kyis ci yang med// gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa// de dag gangdu 'byung ba med ces so// ). The last two stanzas have been cited by Sthiramati in hisMadhyntavibhgak (Q5534.32a7; D4032.200a2-3; Z, vol. 71, pp. 5214-5): brtags min rkyenlas skyes pa dang// rnam pa kun tu brjod med pa// gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid//'jig rtendag pa'i [D pa yi] spyod yul lo// ; ibid. (Q5534.32a8-b1; D4032.200a3-4; Z, vol. 71, p. 5218-9):

brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis te// shin tu stong nyid gang yin pa// yongs su grub pa'i ngo boste//mi rtog ye shes spyod yul lo//.26On the word ngo gang/ga, see ALMOGI(2009:259, n. 58 & 398, n. 53).27The correlation of the Three Natures with the three Bodies set forth here and the

assignment of the Three Natures to the stages (and by implication their correlation with


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(6) Subsuming [the Three Natures] under [the concept of] repre-sentation-only: The error of the mind is the Dependent, [that is,] the mi-staking [of one part of itself] for an object. The main component (dngosgzhi) of the mind is the Imagined, [which consists in] the objectsubjectdichotomy. As for the true reality of the mind, so it is the Perfect.

(7) Subsuming all phenomena under the Three Natures: Pheno-mena [can] be both outer and inner, both conditioned and unconditioned,[and partake of] both pollution (kun nas nyon mongs pa: saklea, i.e.,sasra) and purification (rnam par byang ba: vyavadna, i.e., nirva).They can be subsumed under five [categories], namely, name (ming:nman), marks [consisting in appearances] (rgyu mtshan: nimitta), con-ceptual thought (rnam par rtog pa: vikalpa), true reality (de bzhin nyid:tathat), [and] correct gnosis (yang dag pa'i ye shes: samyagjna).28These five can be subsumed under the Three Natures as follows: Name issubsumed under the Imagined; marks [consisting in appearances] andconceptual thought are both subsumed under the Dependent; [and] truereality and correct gnosis are both subsumed under the Perfect. Or [al-ternatively]: all imputations [that is, considering] non-existent [things]to be existent are subsumed under the Imagined; all phenomena thatare comprehended in [the categories of] causes and conditions are sub-

sumed under the Dependent; true reality, which is neither non-existentlike the Imagined nor produced by causes and conditions like the De-pendent, is subsumed under the Perfect.

(8) [The Three Natures in terms of] three [kinds of] existence: TheImagined is conventionally existent (tha snyad du yod[pa], that is, nomi-nally existent (btags par yod pa: prajaptisat)); the Dependent is trulyexistent (rdzas su yod [pa]: dravyasat); the Perfect is existent as true rea-lity (chos nyid: dharmat).

(9) [The Three Natures in terms of] three [kinds of] non-existence:The Imagined is non-existent in terms of [having an own]-nature; the

the stages gnoseological features) presented in the previous point are clearly in line withthe correlation between the three Bodies and the four (or five) gnoses advanced in variousBuddhist works. Often the dharmakya is associated with the mirror-like gnosis (dara-jna: me long lta bu'i ye shes), the sabhogakyawith the gnosis of equality (samatjna:mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes) and the discerning gnosis (pratyavekaajna: so sor rtog pa'iye shes), and the nirmakyawith the gnosis of performing [beneficial] activities (ktynu-hnajna: bya ba sgrub pa'i ye shes). In some traditions, however, the dharmakya isequated with the purified dharmadhtu, while the svasabhogakya comprises the fourgnoses (theparasabhogakyaand the nirmakyabeing merely physical manifestations).For a discussion of this issue, including citations of and references to primary and secon-dary sources, see ALMOGI(2009:68, 167-168, n. 86), and also ibid., p. 115, where a passagefrom Ratnkaranti's Guavat in which the three Bodies are accommodated within thefive-gnosis scheme is cited. See also ibid., p. 326, where a passage from Ngamitra'sKya-

trayvatramukhais cited in which (v. 66) a correlation between the three Bodies and theThree Natures (on the basis of three processes attributed to non-conceptual gnosis) seemsto be affirmed.

28These five categories are the so-called five vastus found in some Yogcra works. Onthe five-vastutheory as expounded in the Vinicayasagra, see KRAMER(2005).


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Dependent is non-existent inasmuch as it cannot arise on its own; the

Perfect is non-existent [as] an entity on the absolute level.

(10) The teaching that [the Three Natures are free from] identical-

ness and dissimilarity: The Imagined is a non-existent phenomenon [and

thus one cannot talk here in terms of identicalness and dissimilarity]; the

[remaining] two, the Dependent and Perfect, it is taught, are free from

identicalness and dissimilarity. Objection: Provided [these two] were

identical, if one considers the Dependent as the dominant one (gzhandbang brtsan par byas na) [of the two], it would logically follow that abuddha is impossible. If the Perfect is considered the dominant one, itwould logically follow that sentient beings are impossible. A response to

this: [The two] are free from identicalness and dissimilarity. When the

Dependent is not free from the Imagined, [the two] are not identical;

when [the Dependent] is free from the Imagined, [which consists in] the

objectsubject dichotomy, [the two] are not dissimilar either. This is sta-

ted in the authoritative sources:29

Dependent conceptual thoughts

Are conceptual thoughts that are causally conditioned.

The Perfect exists prior to it (i.e., the Dependent).

[The Dependent is] that which has always been non-existent.Therefore it (i.e., the Perfect) is neither different from

Nor identical with the Dependent.

4 2 The Yogcra View on

le

s

Another central point discussed by Rong zom pa is how the various Buddhistsystems view the true nature of intellectual-emotional defilements (nyon mongs pa:klea). In his Theg tshul, he seeks to prove, by employing the respective philoso-phical views of each of the systems, that in fact according to all of them (and bytheir own philosophical standards) no defilements truly exist that need to be eli-minated. As for Yogcra, he argues that if, as maintained by its advocates, mind isin reality devoid of the objectsubject dichotomy and thus is merely characterizedby self-cognition, then defilements, which are considered to be rooted in error,

would stand in contradiction to mind. To elucidate his argument he employs twoanalogies, each containing three elements in correspondence to the Three Natures.Firstly, he draws an analogy between gold, earth, and the earth element and,respectively, the Perfect (termed "the [true] characteristic of the Dependent"), theImagined (termed "the objectsubject dichotomy"), and the Dependent. He arguesthat just as perceiving gold as earth is erroneous, whereas perceiving it as gold iscorrect, so too considering the true characteristic of the Dependent (in other words,the Perfect) as the Imagined is erroneous, whereas considering it as the Perfect iscorrect. Moreover, just as the earth element includes both earth and gold, so the

29This is a citation of Triik 21-22ab (Q5556.3a2-3; D4055.2b5; Z, vol. 77, p. 58-11).The first line reads there, however, differently: gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid// ; the third

line reads la snga ma poinstead of our las snga mar grub. The first four lines are also citedin the Yogcra chapter of the Blo gsal grub mtha' in two separate citations of two lineseach. For references to critical editions and discussions of the text, see MIMAKI(1982:118,

nn. 342 & 345). Our first line may be the result of confusion with another verse (cf. above, n.

20).


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Dependent includes both the Imagined and the Perfect. Finally he argues that, thisbeing the case, the Dependent cannot be truly existent as both the Imagined andthe Perfect. In order to illustrate this point, he draws another analogy, this timebetween a firebrand, fire-wheel, and illumination and, respectively, the Perfect, theImagined, and the Dependent. He begins in a similar fashion, stating that percei-

ving a firebrand as a fire-wheel is erroneous, whereas perceiving it as a firebrand iscorrect, and that illumination applies to both the fire-wheel and firebrand. Then he

continues with the argument that since it does apply to both, if one of the latterwere to be truly existent it would follow that illumination, too, would be trulyexistent, and that too as something having the characteristics of the one that is trulyexistent. And since there is no doubt that the wheel, being merely the result of acontinuous turning of the firebrand, is not truly existent, illumination is clearly ofthe nature of the firebrand alone. Similarly, if one considers the Perfect to be trulyexistent and the Dependent to partake of both the Imagined and the Perfect, asunder the Yogcra system, then even when dual appearances (i.e., the Imagined)arise, the Dependent is of the nature of the Perfect, and thus also for Yogcrathere is nothing that truly exists as defilement that needs to be eliminated:30

[An explanation of why there are no truly existing intellectual-emotionaldefilements to be eliminated] according to the Yogcra system: As re-

gards the characteristic of the minds and mind-associates within the threerealms [of existence] that constitute false imagination, the philosophicaltenet [of Yogcra] maintains that [in reality sasric minds and mind-associates] are neither objects (gzung ba: grhya) of anything, nor do theygrasp anything as an object (i.e., they are not the subject ( 'dzin pa: grha-ka) of anything), and that [they] are merely characterized by self-cog-nition devoid of the [objectsubject] dichotomy. In such a case, [the non-dual characteristic of self-cognition] would stand in contradiction to thecharacteristic of intellectual-emotional defilements, because defilementshave the characteristic of arising [as a result of] an erroneous [view oftheir related] objects (yul la skye ba phyin ci log pa'i rnam pa can).31Thefollowing [propositions] are known among the [Yogcra] tenets: "Whenthere is gold in the interior of the earth, the three earth, gold, and the

earth element are observed. Of these, perceiving gold as earth is erro-neous perception; perceiving [it] as gold is correct perception; the earthelement, for its part, belongs to both [earth and gold]. In the same way,perceiving the [true] characteristic of the Dependent (i.e., the Perfect) asobjectsubject dichotomy (i.e., the Imagined) is erroneous perception;perceiving [it] as the Perfect is correct perception; the Dependent, how-ever, belongs to both [the Imagined and the Perfect]." In [this case,] one[can]not find the real existence of both components (cha gnyis kyi rdzas)in the Dependent. It is as in the following [example]: In a fire-wheel,three [things] a firebrand ('gal dum: ulmuka), a wheel, and illumina-tion are observed. So it is like saying: "Perceiving a firebrand as a wheel

30

Theg tshul(A, fols. 5a4-6a4; B, pp. 42017-42118).31Rong zom pa seems to suggest that kleas are by definition "erroneous" (phyin ci log)both in terms of "occurrence/arising" (skye ba) and "perception" (mthong ba). That is to say,kleas arise and evolve on account of false views, so that epistemically they can never bevalid cognitions.


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is erroneous perception; perceiving [it] as a firebrand is correct percep-tion; illumination, for its part, belongs to both [the wheel and the fire-brand]." In such [a case], if both the firebrand and the wheel were trulyexistent, illumination, which belongs to both components, could also beheld to be [truly] existent. However, suppose the wheel were truly exis-tent but not the firebrand; then illumination would have the characteri-stic of the wheel, not that of the other. The same [logic] is applicable tosupposing that the firebrand is truly existent but the wheel not. In thatcase, then, at the time when a wheel appears, a firebrand is an object thatis turned around (gnon pa, lit. "pressed") successively (rim gyis), and thusthe wheel is totally non-existent. Therefore, illumination is nothing butthe firebrand itself, and thus does not [truly] partake of both [the wheeland the firebrand]. Similar is the case if both [the Imagined and the Per-fect] were truly existent: Supposing the Perfect to be truly existent andsupposing imagination (i.e., the Dependent) to include both [the Ima-gined and the Perfect], [as is indeed maintained by Yogcra,] at the timeof dual appearances [the Dependent] would be characterized by self-cognition (i.e., the Perfect). Since [it is] not at all [possible that] both [theImagined and the Perfect] are [truly] existent, imagination (i.e., the De-pendent) [can]not exist [as] both [the Imagined and the Perfect]. And

hence, [again by Yogcra standards,] no truly [existing] entity [thatneeds] to be eliminated is found in defilements.

4 3 How Yogcra Refutes Other Systems and Establishes Its Own

In the third chapter of his Theg tshul, Rong zom pa seeks to demonstrate how theBuddhist understanding of illusionism culminates in the Rdzogs chen understan-ding of it. He explains that all Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical proposi-tions take appearances (snang ba) as the premise (gzhi), the issue at debate be-tween various philosophical systems being what the actual characteristics (mtshannyid) of phenomena might be. According to him, each system seeks to refute otherphilosophical tenets (gzhan gi grub mtha') and establish its own philosophicaltenets (rang gi grub mtha') by an application of the fourfold modes of negation andaffirmation (dgag sgrub bzhi'i tshul), namely, by affirming (sgrub pa) what is

"being" (yin pa) and "existent" (yod pa), and negating what is "not being" (ma yin pa)and "non-existent" (med pa). The key questions in this regard are "what [the actualcharacteristic of phenomena] is" (ji ltar yin pa) and "how [they] exist" (ji ltar yod

pa). Anything that is believed to be superimposed (kun tu brtags pa) on "appear-ance" by other systems is refuted by employing both non-affirming negation (med

par dgag pa: prasajyapratiedha) and affirming negation (ma yin pa dgag pa: pary-udsa). A non-affirming negation, however, merely repudiates ('gegs par byed)philosophical views believed to be conceptually constructed by others (gzhan gyiskun tu brtags pa), whereas an affirming negation, in addition, establishes (sgrub

par byed) what one believes to be a bona fide (rang gi mtshan nyid pa) view.Importantly, each system is said to establish its own view by resorting to evidenceprovided by direct perception (mngon sum: pratyaka) and non-perception (midmigs pa: anupalabdhi).32The Yogcra system is said to negate the rvakas'philosophical view and establish its own view as follows:33

32The method of establishing one's philosophical system by resorting to evidence fur-nished by perception and non-perception is also employed in the Lta phreng 'grel pa (A,


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The Yogcra system [seeks to negate the rvakas' philosophicalview and establish its own view as follows]: With regard to those [things]which appear as external and internal entities, the rvakas maintain thatexternal objects that have particular characteristics (rang gi mtshan nyidpa: svalakaa) truly exist, that is, independently of cognition and as[something] characterized by the capability of being grasped, and thatcognition (i.e., an internal phenomenon), too, truly exists as [something]characterized by the capability of grasping. This [position of the rva-kas] is refuted [by Yogcra] by means of a non-affirming negation (medpar dgag pa: prasajyapratiedha), that is, [by showing these things] to beconceptually constructed and thus totally non-existent (gtan med). [TheYogcra's own position is established by an affirming negation, as fol-lows]: [Instances of] false imagination which are neither of these (de mayin pa) (i.e., neither graspable external objects nor a grasping subject)[but] which [nonetheless] have the characteristic of appearing to be dual,although [they] are non-dual, and which arise on account of causes andconditions do not stand in contradiction to the general [means of verifi-cation such as] direct perception (mngon sum: pratyaka) and non-per-ception (mi dmigs pa: anupalabdhi). Are not minds and mind-associates[by nature] direct perception, that is, self-cognition? Is not a direct per-

ception a correct cognition? Thus, what other logical reasoning does oneneed to authenticate a correct cognition? What second correct cognitionthat could exceed [it] in power and be able to challenge [it] exists? Thus[the Yogcra system] establishes that [a cognition free from the objectsubject dichotomy] is true and truly existent (rdzas su yod pa dang yin pa)on the absolute level.

Further, [the Yogcra views] based on [its] subdivisions:(1) *Satykravda maintains that [images] truly exist on the abso-

lute level in the manner [they] appear.(2) *Alkkravda maintains [the following]: It is true that there is

the arising of false imagination accompanied by appearances of objectiveand subjective images. This, however, is conventional truth. In reality,[only] that which is characterized by self-cognition and is devoid of both

[objective and subjective images] is truly existent on the absolute level.(3) Nirkravda maintains [the following]: None of the minds and

mind-associates within the three realms ever arises, not even for a mo-ment, as [something] accompanied by objective and subjective images. Asfor dual appearances, [they] are [the result of] residual impressions thatcan be expressed neither as the mind itself nor as [something] other [thanthe mind]. This very [duality] is what is called the Imagined. Therefore,all obscurations (sgrib pa: varaa) [those] consisting in defilements(nyon mongs pa: klea) and so forth are [the result of] adventitious re-sidual impressions, and thus are characterized by the Imagined. As forthe nature of mind, even at the level of sentient beings [it] exists as [some-thing] having the nature of luminosity [and] self-cognition, and even at

fols. 230a6-231b3; B, pp. 31012-3121), although there it seems to be applied only to the non-Buddhist systems. Perception and non-perception are understood there to be "seeing"(mthong ba) and "not seeing" (ma mthong ba), respectively.

33Theg tshul(A, fols. 44a4-45a4; B, pp. 46324-4652).


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the level of the Noble Ones there is nothing that improves upon (bogsdbyung du med pa) it, and thus [it] exists as [something] having the natu-re of a gnosis free from images. The slight difference [between them] isthat at the level of sentient beings [the mental continuum], being obscu-red by adventitious residual impressions, is experienced as obscure,[while] at the level of the Noble Ones [it] is experienced as luminous.

To conclude (mtha' bsdus na), all [the subdivisions of Yogcra]maintain that non-conceptual gnosis devoid of the [objectsubject]dichotomy and true reality are truly existent on the absolute level.

5 Rong zom pa's Presentation of Yogcra in

Relation to Other Systems

In his Lta phreng 'grel pa, Rong zom pa first discusses the non-Buddhist systems,and then the differences between the various Buddhist systems in terms of their (1)

view (lta ba: di), (2) path (lam: mrga) or practice (sgom pa: bhvan), and (3)result ('bras bu: phala). Under the rubric "Vehicle of Characteristics" (mtshan nyidkyi theg pa: *lakaayna), he first discusses the systems of the rvaka saints (i.e.,arhats),pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas with regard to these three points, andthen goes on to briefly discuss further points of disagreement, including the (4)object of engagement (spyod yul), (5) means of liberation (rnam par grol ba'i sgo),

(6) power of concentration (ting nge 'dzin gyi mthu), (7) strength of insight (shesrab kyi stobs), (8) elimination of obscurations (sgrib pa spangs pa), (9) awakeningcharacterized by knowing [that the obscurations to be eliminated have reached thestate of] exhaustion (or: cessation) and non-arising (zad pa dang mi skye ba shes

pa'i mtshan nyid byang chub), (10) establishing of the ultimate (don dam pa rnampar 'jog pa), (11) attachment (mngon par zhen pa), (12) non-attachment (yongs suma zhen pa), and (13) elimination of the two extremes (mtha' gnyis bsal ba).

In his explanation of the system of the bodhisattvas, he differentiates betweenYogcra and Madhyamaka only in the case of the four last points (10-13).

According to him, the differences regarding these points boil down to the following:for Yogcra the ultimate is self-cognition while for Madhyamaka it is manifold-lessness; the former is attached to mind, the latter to the conventional truth; theformer is detached from the objectsubject dichotomy, the latter from the absolute;

the former eliminates the two extremes by bringing to bear the concept of theThree Natures, the latter that of the two truths. Below I shall translate the passagedealing with the last four points (omitting the portions having to do with thesystems of the rvaka saints andpratyekabuddhas):34

Furthermore, as regards differences concerning how the ultimate isestablished, attachment, and so forth, Mahyna is of two types, namely,Yogcra and Madhyamaka.

(10) As regards differences in establishing the ultimate, Yogcramaintains that the ultimate is that which is characterized by self-cognitiondevoid of the objectsubject dichotomy. The Mdhyamikas maintain thatthe ultimate is true reality, [the state where] all manifoldness has come torest.

(11) As regards differences concerning attachment, Yogcra isattached to the characteristic of one's own mind that appears [due to] the

34Lta phreng 'grel pa (A, fols. 245a5-246a2; B, p. 3272-22).


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"waves" of the fundamental mind. The Mdhyamikas are attached to theobject of engagement, that is, the conventional truth characterized byimpurity.

(12) As regards differences concerning non-attachment, Yogcrais not attached to the objectsubject [dichotomy]. Madhyamaka is not at-tached to the ultimate.

(13) As regards differences concerning the elimination of the two ex-tremes, Yogcra eliminates the two extremes by means of [the con-cept of] the Three Natures, and Madhyamaka eliminates them by meansof [the concept of] the two truths.

In the following passage, Rong zom pa summarizes the standpoints of the variousBuddhist systems in general. In the case of Yogcra, he once again presents the

views of its various subdivisions, namely, Nirkravda and Skravda, the latterbeing further subdivided into *Satykravda and *Alkkravda. Here he parti-cularly focuses on their view concerning the differences between the level of ordi-nary beings and the stage of a buddhaas regards epistemological processes, andnotes the resulting differences in their conception of Buddhahood. It is pointed outthat according to Nirkravda non-conceptual gnosis alone exists at the stage of abuddha, whereas according to *Satykravda the images of pure phenomena,

such as buddha Bodies, are real, thus implying the existence of both non-con-ceptual and pure mundane gnosis at the stage of a buddha, while according to*Alkkravda, although pure mundane gnosis seems to be operative at the stageof a buddha, it is not real. The question surrounding the existence of gnosis at thestage of a buddhathat resulted from the various epistemological views of the pro-ponents of Yogcra in turn led to heated debates among the Mdhyamikas,particularly in connection with the problem of explaining the manner in which abuddhaacts in the world for the sake of living beings, since they, as opposed to theproponents of Yogcra, do not assign any special status to mind. I shall not gohere into this issue for, as pointed out above, I have already discussed it elsewherein detail. In brief, it can be said that while the proponents of Yogcra-Madhya-maka followed the views each of his own preferred Yogcra subdivision that is,for their postulation of the conventional level and not the ultimate one the

Mdhyamikas who did not follow any of the Yogcra theories of knowledgerejected the existence of any mental element at the stage of a buddha.As regards Madhyamaka, Rong zom pa refers to two subdivisions, namely,

Yogcra-Madhyamaka and Sautrntika-Madhyamaka, both of which have beensubsumed by later Tibetan doxographers under Svtantrika-Madhyamaka. Here,as throughout his entire collected writings, Rong zom pa does not refer to Prsa-gika-Madhyamaka. Remarking that these two subdivisions, being in agreement asregards the absolute level, merely differ in their postulation of the conventionallevel, he points out that Sautrntika-Madhyamaka follows the Sautrntika's notionof dependent arising (rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba: prattyasamutpda), that is, aspertaining to internal phenomena and external phenomena:35

(1) The approach (sgo) of Yogcra is of two types, namely, (1.1) S-kravda and (1.2) Nirkravda.

35Lta phreng 'grel pa(A, fols. 246a5-247a3; B, pp. 3286-3294).


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Orna ALMOGI1348

Of these, (1.2) Nirkravda maintains [the following]: At the levelof sentient beings, mind (blo) arises as [something] devoid of images, theappearances which arise in [the form of] objective and subjective im-ages being [simply the result of] residual impressions, which can be ex-pressed neither as the mind itself nor as [something] other [than themind]. At the stage of a buddha(sangs rgyas kyi sa: buddhabhmi), theresidual impressions having been cleansed, non-conceptual gnosis aloneexists. As for how [a buddha can] act for the sake of living beings, [he]acts spontaneously without conceptualizing, like a wish-fulfilling tree anda precious wish-fulfilling gem, in virtue of previous resolutions.

(1.1) Skravda, in turn, has two [subdivisions], namely, (1.1.1) *Sa-tykravda and (1.1.2) *Alkkravda (bden pa ma yin par smra ba =rdzun par smra ba).

Of these, (1.1.1) *Satykravda maintains [the following]: Althoughno external objects exist, the appearance of mind in the form of images ofbodies, abodes, and objects of engagement do exist on the ultimate level.As for the appearance of the great gnosis free from attachment to theobjectsubject [dichotomy] in the form of images of Bodies and embel-lishments of [buddha]-fields (i.e., fields along with their embellishments)at the stage of a buddha, [they,] too, exist on the ultimate level.

(1.1.2) *Alkkravda maintains [the following]: Although cogni-tions that appear in the form of objective and subjective images arise atthe level of sentient beings, [these cognitions] are not true as such. Al-though there is pure mundane gnosis which knows the totality of sen-tient beings (sems can gyi khams: sattvadhtu), [their] negative propensi-ties (bag la nyal ba: anuaya), and the like at the stage of a buddha, [thisgnosis] is not true as such either. On the ultimate level, non-conceptualgnosis alone, characterized by momentariness, [can] be established.

(2) Madhyamaka, too, is of two [subdivisions], namely, (2.1) Yog-cra-Madhyamaka and (2.2) Sautrntika-Madhyamaka. The two have nodifferences regarding [their] view of the ultimate, merely differing on ac-count of [their divergent postulations regarding] the conventional, [con-cerning which they] are in agreement with Yogcra and the Sautrntika

of the rvakas, [respectively]. Accordingly, the Sautrntika-Mdhyami-kas claim, as regards the dependent continuum (gzhan dbang gi rgyud)[of phenomena], that there are two continua, in line with the dependentarising (rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba: prattyasamutpda) of internal [phe-nomena] and the dependent arising of external [phenomena].

In his Lta ba'i brjed byang, Rong zom pa proceeds to refute the philosophical viewof the rvakas and the views held by the proponents of Yogcra and Madhya-maka by using their own logical reasoning. His refutation of Madhyamaka shouldbe understood to be targeting by implication those Mdhyamikas who propagatethe two-truth/reality model, in contradistinction to those who propagate theindivisibility of the two truths/realities, which latter being the position preferred byRong zom pa himself. The same logical reasoning used by the rvakas to negatethe existence of the person, he states, could be employed for negating the exi-stence propounded by them of external phenomena. Similarly, in the case ofYogcra, the same logical reasoning employed by its proponents to negate theexistence of minute atoms as the ultimate units of matter can be employed for


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negating moments (of minds) propounded by Yogcra as the ultimate units oftime. In order to strengthen the argument that such ultimate units of time cannotbe attested through any direct valid cognition but merely by inference, he cites apassage attributed by him to the Bhadraplaparipcchin which the air element iscited as an example of something that cannot be proven through direct validcognition but only through inference, on the basis of its whistling sound and thelike. With that, he drives home the point that the mental element cannot be proven

through direct valid cognition either, but merely through inference on the basis ofits mental activities. He then concludes by stating that if cognition can only beinferred, how much more so the ultimate units of time as being moments of themind. As for Madhyamaka, Rong zom pa argues that the same logical reasoningapplied by it to establish true reality as manifoldlessness undermines their claimthat phenomena exist on the correct conventional level:36

In short, [the same logical reasoning employed] by the rvakas to decon-struct [the notion of] a single and permanent Self of the person [is capa-ble of] deconstructing the [notion of real] characteristics of phenomena[propounded] by [the rvakas] themselves. [The same logical reasoningemployed] by Cittamtra to prove the inconsistency in [proposing theexistence of indivisible] fractions of minute atoms (rdul phra rab: para-

mu) of external objects [is capable of] proving the inconsistency in[proposing the existence of] images and temporal fractions of the mindsand mind-associates, [propounded] by [Cittamtra] itself. Even if [theCittamtra system] objects by saying that minute atoms [in the sense of]bearers of properties (chos can: dharmin) are not attested through any[direct valid] cognition, [it can be equally said that] the ultimate units oftime, the moments of mind (sems kyi dus kyi mtha'i skad cig ma), [main-tained by Cittamtra] itself, are not verifiable through any [direct valid]cognition either. Even the "agitation" of the mental element (rnam parshes pa'i khams: vijnadhtu) is merely an object of inference (rjes sudpag pa: anumna), [and] how much more so moments [of minds], whichare the ultimate units of time! The following has been stated in the Bha-draplaparipcch, in the context of the young Mahauadha's enquiry:37

36Lta ba'i brjed byang(A, fols. 159b5-160b3; B, p. 261-22).37I have not been able to locate an identical passage in the Bhadraplaparipcch. The

same idea, however, is expressed in various ways in the stra, and it seems that the passageprovided here by Rong zom pa is not an exact citation but rather a rendering of the idea init on the basis of several passages from it. See, for example, ibid. (S11.39.138b1-4; D83.74b1-3): bzang skyong dper na rlung gi khams gzugs can ma

yin pa'ang

[D yin pa yin yang] bstan

du yod cing gzung du yod pa dag las gzugs su snang ngo// de la bstan du yod pa ni shing 'gulzhing g.yo ba dang/ sgra skad 'ur 'ur po'i sgra 'byin pa dang/ grang ba dang/ dro ba'i reg pa'i[S pas] tshor ba skyed pa yin yang/ de la rkang lag dang mig dang/ gdong dmigs par mi 'gyurte/ sngo bsangs dang dkar ba zhes kha dog lhag par mi dmigs so// bzang skyong de bzhin durnam par shes pa'i khams 'di'ang [D yang]gzugs su mi [D om.] dmigs shing gzugs su snang

bar mi 'gyur te/ khyod kyis rgyu'i bye brag dag gis rnam par shes pa'i khams rtogs par bya'o//;ibid. (S11.39.147a5-6; D83.80b4-5): ji ltar rlung gi khams kyis shing g.yo ba dang/ grang badang/ tsha ba'i reg pa len pa'i rkyen byed pa las rlung gi khams shes par 'gyur ba de[S om.]bzhin du rnam par shes pa'i khams 'di'ang [D 'di yang] gzugs can ma yin te/ ; and ibid.(S11.39.143b4-5; D83.78a2-3): dper na sa bon gyi khams sa gzhi la btab na/ khams bzhi po dag


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Orna ALMOGI1350

O Mahauadha, the air element is inferable through [its] whist-ling sound, the movement of plants, the rising of sandstorms,and the movement of bodies. And yet the air element can beneither seen nor cognized. Similarly, the mental element, too, isinferred, from recollection (dran pa: smti), sensation (tshor ba:vedan), and volitional impulses (sems pa: cetan). And yet themental element can be neither seen nor cognized.

If cognition itself [can] be [merely] inferred from [its] mind-associates,how much more so its moments, which are the ultimate units of time!Therefore, the two minute atoms, which are the ultimate units of matter(gzugs kyi mtha'), and moments [of mind], which are the ultimate units oftime (dus kyi mtha') are similar inasmuch as both can be invalidated bylogical reasoning.

Likewise, [the same proposition of] Madhyamaka that phenomenacannot withstand [the test of] logical reasoning [employed to] establishthe absolute (yang dag par sgrub pa'i rigs pa),38and this same reasoning,[employed by it] to establish freedom from all manifoldness, would un-dermine [its] own proposition that [phenomena] are truly existent on thecorrect conventional level (yang dag pa'i kun rdzob: tathyasavti). [The

truth] is as follows: It cannot be proven that two mutually exclusive pro-perties can truly be of equal strength in one phenomenal entity. Their notbeing equal implies that one of them is an object of delusion, and sincewhat is delusive is not what it seems to be, it does not have an own-nature(bdag nyid thob pa: tmalbha).39Thus the term "truly [existent]" is notapplicable to what cannot be grasped in this manner (i.e., to what doesnot have an own-nature).

sdud par byed pa de bzhin du rnam par shes pa'i khams 'di'ang [D 'di yang]dran pa rab tu'dzin cing tshor ba yongs su 'dzin te/ . The first passage is cited in the Carymelpaka-pradpa, which, however, names the source as a certain Vijnasakrntistra (Rnam parshes pa 'pho ba'i mdo). The Sanskrit text runs as follows (Carymelpaka-pradpa, p. 4511-16): yathokta vijnasakrntistre tadyath bhadraple vyudhtur arp anidarano-pdnd rp sadyate tatra darana vkaspandanasamudra-aravarabhasataata-janitanirghoa toasparajanitaved na csya karacaraanaya-navaktropalabdhir bhava-ti na ca vardhikyenopalakate ymo v gauro veti/ evam eva bhadraple aya vijna-dhtur na rpeopalakate na rpvabh samgacchati kraa-vieais tv aya vijnadh-tur avagantavya iti/. The Tibetan text is similar to the text provided above, with only slightvariation (ibid., p. 2443-12).

38The term yang dag par sgrub pa'i rigs pahere is clearly another formulation of themore familiar don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pa, that is, "logical reasoning that analyzesthe absolute."

39

On the term bdag nyid thob pa: tmalbha, lit.,"obtaining (i.e., possessing) an own-nature" (i.e., "having come into existence"), which is central to Rong zom pa's philosophicalview, see ALMOGI(2009:256-258, n. 56), where various renderings of the term into Tibetanare given and a passage from Rong zom pa's Mnyam sbyor 'grel paand another from hisTheg tshul, in which he expands upon the term, are cited and translated.


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6. Concluding Remarks

In the above, I have attempted to highlight some of the main points in Rong zompa's exposition of Yogcra and to some lesser extent the manner in which heexploits Yogcra theories for advancing his own philosophical view, which I haveidentified as being that of Sarvadharmpratihnavda. Further, Rong zom pa'sinclusivistic approach could be once again demonstrated, that is, his way of "up-lifting" what is considered by him to be "lower" systems of provisional meaning to

the level of what is considered by him the correct view of definitive meaning, byemploying their own logical reasoning to show that in fact they, too, hold the cor-rect view. This is particularly obvious in his presentation of their understanding ofdefilements. Moreover, one of the most illuminating aspects in his treatment ofYogcra is his eye-opening presentation of its subdivisions, which not only contra-dicts how these subdivisions have been commonly understood by most modernscholars, but is unique within the Tibetan tradition as well. It is therefore hopedthat it will contribute somewhat to our future investigation of related topics, parti-cularly ones put forward by influential proponents of Yogcra-Madhyamaka.Here I would merely like to reiterate, as has become clear in my earlier study of the

various conceptions of Buddhahood, that Rong zom pa's nuanced presentation ofthe Yogcra subdivisions has been instrumental in refining our understanding ofthe epistemological background of the different views concerning Buddhahood

held by proponents of Yogcra, Yogcra-Madhyamaka, and Tantra alike. Acomprehensive study of the role Yogcra theories played in Rong zom pa's philo-sophical and doctrinal view is, however, yet to be undertaken, and as alluded toabove, such a study must take into account his understanding of the Rdzogs chenphilosophy as well.

Appendix

A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Texts

The following pages contain a critical edition of the Tibetan texts from Rong zompa's works cited and translated in this paper. For this purpose, two complete ver-sions of Rong zom pa's collected works have been drawn upon, both of which arebased on the original Shr seng two-volume edition edited by Mi pham Rnam rgyalrgya mtsho (1846-1912) at the beginning of the twentieth century and on the addi-

tional third volume that was compiled sometime later:

A = the three-volume xylographic edition prepared by Mkhar legssprul sku Padma kun grol (1916-1984) in Khams, apparently inthe early 1980s,

B = the two-volume set published in Chengdu, Sichuan, in 1999.

Since both are copies of the same edition, the text does not display major variants.As I have already pointed out elsewhere, while the modern Chengdu edition seemsto present readings closer to the original Shr seng edition, Padma kun grol tookthe liberty to introduce changes to his xylographic edition, albeit mostly minor ones,such as modernization of orthography, bountiful employment of the punctuationsign shad(e.g., / after the particles nior after lhag bcasparticles, // after final par-ticles at the end of citations, // // instead of //), and the like. 40For that reason, I

40For more details regarding these two versions of Rong zom pa's collected writings,see ALMOGI(2009:363-366).


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Orna ALMOGI1352

commonly follow the orthography and punctuation of the modern Chengdu edition,unless what is found in the xylograph edition is clearly preferable (this particularlyconcerns faulty employment of shad, obvious typographical errors, and the like).Variants in punctuation and orthography have not been recorded; most of theseconcern the archaic employment of reversed vowel sign i(transliterated below as ),da dragsuffix, palatalized m, deviation from "sadhirules" in the employment ofla donparticles (e.g., duvs. tu), and the like.41The few cases in which I emended

punctuation have, however, been recorded. Glosses found in the cited texts aretyped in smaller script and enclosed within braces. In the edition below, they areinserted immediately following the word they refer to. Texts cited from the Bka''gyur are provided references to both the Stog (S) and Sde dge (D) editions, andthose from the Bstan 'gyur, to both Peking (Q) and Sde dge (D), along with thelocation in the modern Bstan gyur dpe sdur ma(Z).

Text cited in 2

Lta ba'i brjed byang A, fol. 152a

4

-b

5

; B, pp. 17

10

-18

3

):

kha cig {sems tsam pa/} ni las kyi bag chags sems kyi rgyud la bsags pa ni bden na/ denyid kyi phyir bag chags kyi 'bras bu yang sems kyi rgyud nyid la smin par rigs te/42dper na zhing la sa bon btab pa 'bras bu ri'i rtse mo la smin pa ga la srid/ de bas na

las kyi bag chags sems kyi rgyud la bsags shing smin pa'i sems de nyid lus dang gnasdang spyod yul ltar rnam par smin pa yin no// de bas na ji srid du chos su brtagsshing grags pa thams cad sems nyid gyur pa yin no zhe'o// de la yang bag chags kyidbang gis sems nyid yul lta bu zhes pa dang/ yul lta bur snang ba de kho na bagchags smin pa yin pas/ sems kyi yul bag chags yin no zhes pa dang/ gzhan yang 'jugpa'i rnam par shes pa sems las byung ba dang bcas pa'i bag chags kun gzhi la bsagspa dbang du gyur cing mthur gyur pa na/ kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa nyid 'bras bu'ingo bo rnam par smin pa ste/ de nyid lus dang gnas dang spyod yul du snang ba yinno// snang ba de nyid kyis 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa'i bdag po'i rkyen dang43dmigspa'i rkyen yang byed do// 'jug pa'i rnam shes rang gis bzhag pa'i rgyu mthun pa'i bagchags kyis rgyu'i rkyen byed do zer ro//

bsdus na gzhung 'di dag kun phyi rol pa ltar dbang phyug dang/ bdag dang/ rangbzhin la sogs pa rgyu gzhan du mi tshol te/ rnam par shes pa rang gis bsags pa'i las

rang la skye/ rang gi gnas dang spyod yul kyang grub par 'dod par 'dra bas/ lhag parrtsod sgo chen po med do//

rub mtha'i brjed byang A, fols. 325b

4

-326b

1

; B, p. 201

4-24

):

rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba'i lugs ni/ sems tsam gyis sems don dam par yodpar 'dod de/ nyan thos ltar yul yong gis med pa la sgro 'dogs pa dang/ dbu ma chenpos sems kyang don dam par med do zhes bskur pa 44'debs pa spang dgos te/ sems

41Such old spellings are particularly frequent in the Lta phreng 'grel paand Theg tshul.In the case of the former, Mi pham explicitly states in his catalog to Rong zom pa'scollected writings that he left the archaic style as it was in order to preserve an example ofsuch texts; in the case of the latter, he made changes only when needed for the sake of a

better understanding, but otherwise left the text, including old spellings, unchanged. SeeALMOGI(1997:112 & 115).42|] conj., om. AB43dang] A, dang yang B44pa] A, ba B


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don dam par med pa zhig na ni/ bsod nams bsags pa'i gzhi med/ thar pa45sgrub pa'idon med pas/ sems ni sems can gyi dus na/ sems shes pa skad cig ma tsam du yoddo// da ltar yul du snang ba 'di sems yin te/ thog ma med pa'i dus nas sems gzung bacha gcig yul du 'khrul/ gzung ba cha gcig sems su 'khrul pa 46rtog pas brtags47padang/ bag chags tsam la bag chags su rtog pa zhes bya'o// des na yul ni shes pa lasgyur pa yin kyang bem48 por snang/ sems ni shes pa'i dngos gzhi yin pas rig parsnang/ yul ni rtog pas brtags pa yin pas tha dad par snang/ sems ni rtog pa'i dngos

gzhi yin pas gcig par snang/ yul rnams kyang shes pas 'phrul pa yin pas 'brel pa yod/yul rdul phra rab rang rgyud du logs shig na yod par gyur na ni/ shes pa dang bem49po gnyis rigs mi mthun pas/ 'brel ba med pa'i phyir de shes par yang mi rung ngo//

yang rdul phra rab gcig las tha dad par snang bar mi 'gyur ro// de bas na yul meddo// sems rtogs pa nyams nas yul du snang ngo// sems don dam par yod do// med nathar pa bsgrub pa don med pa'i skyon du 'gyur bas/ med ces par yang mi rung ste/gtan tshigs de bas na sems kyang sems can gyi dus na kun gzhi rgyun gyi rtag paskad cig ma tsam du yod la/ 'phags pa'i dus na ye shes rgyun gyi rtag pa skad cig matsam du yod do// de ltar yod med gnyis kyi mtha' bsal nas/ dbu ma'i lam la gnas pabdag cag yin te/ sems tsam dbu ma zhes 'dod pa'o//

Text Cited in 3

Lta ba'i brjed byang

A, fols. 150b

4

-151b

6

; B, pp. 15

16

-16

24

):rnam par rig pa tsam du smra ba la gnyis te/ (1) rnam pa dang bcas par smra badang/ (2) rnam pa med par smra ba'o// rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba la yang/nang gses kyi bye brag rnam pa gnyis te/ (1.1) rnam pa bden par smra ba dang/ (1.2)rnam pa brdzun par smra ba'o// de dag la yang (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) rnam pa 'dra gzhi yodpar smra ba dang/ (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) 'dra gzhi med par smra ba la sogs pa nang mimthun par smra ba du ma grags mod kyi/ mdo 'di dag tsam du 'dus pas 'di dag tsambshad do//

de la (1) rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba zhes bya ba ni/ rnam pa'i sgra ni 'dir'dra snang la bya ste/ de yang (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) 'dra gzhi yod par 'dod pa rnams ni/ 'dragzhi dang 'dra ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba 'dra snang ste/ (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) 'dra gzhimed pa ni50gtan med kyang yod pa dang51 'dra bar snang ba la 'dra snang zhesbya'o52//

bsdus nas rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba zhes bya ba phyi rol gyi don medkyang yod pa dang 'dra bar rnam par shes pa nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam pardbye ba yod do zhes 'dod do// de la yang (1.1.1 & 1.2.1) 'dra gzhi yod par 'dod 53pani rnam par shes pa las gud na phyi rol gyi don med kyang/ sems nyid phyi rol gyidon lta bur snang ba brtan pa zhig yod de/ des 'dra gzhi byas nas rnam par shes pathams cad de'i rnam par skye'o zhe'o// (1.1.2 & 1.2.2) 'dra gzhi med par smra ba ni

45pa] B, par A46pa] A, ba B47brtags] A, brtag B48bem] B, bems A; both readings, however, are possible.49bem] B, bems A50

ni] conj., na AB51pa dang] conj., pas AB. Compare the following sentence, where a similar phrase isfound.

52bya'o] A, bya' B53'dod] B, 'ded A, apparently due to damage to the wooden block.


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Orna ALMOGI1354

phyi'i skye mched du snang ba'i rim pa gnyis pa med de/ rnam par shes pa nyid donyod par snang ba lta bu'o zhe'o//

de la (1.1) rnam pa bden par smra ba ni/ lus dang gnas dang spyod yul du snangba thams cad sems nyid kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir/ ji ltar snang ba de bzhin du yangdag par bden pa ste/ sems can gyi dus na'ang de bzhin du bden pa nyid yin la/ sangsrgyas kyi sa la yang sku dang zhing gi bkod pa thams cad de bzhin du yang dag parbden pa yin no zhe'o//

(1.2) rnam pa rdzun par smra ba ni/ sems can gyi dus na yang gzung 'dzin duskye ba'i rtog pa ni yod pa yin la/ de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa ste/yang dag par na gnyis pos stong pa/ rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid tsam du yod la/ sangsrgyas pa'i dus na yang/ dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i tshultsam mnga' ste/ 'on kyang yang dag pa'i ye shes ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skadcig ma tsam mo//

(2) rnam pa med par smra ba ni/ sems can kun gyi dus na yang sems dang semslas byung ba gzung 'dzin gyi rnam pa skad cig54tsam yang skye ma myong ste/ gsalba rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid tsam du gnas so// yul dang yul can du snang ba snyambyed pa 'di ni/ sems dang de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa ste/ de nyid la bagchags zhes bya/ gzung 'dzin zhes bya/ kun brtags zhes bya'o// gang de nyid danggzhan du brjod du med pa ni rdzas su yod par mi rung ste/ btags pa tsam mo//55'phags pa'i dus na yang ngo bo nyid de las bogs dbyung du med de/ 'on kyang khyad

par ni glo56

bur ba'i bag chags yod pa snyam byed pa57

de dang bral ba'o zhe'o// debas na 'phags pa'i dus na'ang dag pa 'dzin rten pa'i ye shes mi 'dod do//

Text Cited in 4.1

rub mtha'i brjed byang A, fols. 346a

6

-348b

3

; B, pp. 224

3

-226

11

):

mtshan nyid gsum ni kun brtags dang/ gzhan dbang dang/ yongs su grub pa'o// deyang lung las kyang/

kun tu brtags pa rtog58pa'i dbang//rnam par rtog59pa gzhan gyi dbang//'gyur med phyin ci ma log pa'i//

yongs su grub pa rnam pa gnyis//

zhes 'byung/ de la yang don bcus bstan te/ (1) mtshan nyid gsum dngos gang la byaba dang/ (2) nges pa'i tshig dang/ (3) dbye ba dang/ (4) sa bgo ba dang/ (5) skugsum la sbyar ba dang/ (6) rnam par rig pa tsam la bsdu ba dang/ (7) chos thamscad mtshan nyid gsum du bsdu ba dang/ (8) yod pa gsum zhes bya ba dang/ (9) medpa gsum zhes bya ba dang/ (10) gcig pa dang/ tha dad par bstan pa'o//

(1) dngos gzhi gang la bya zhe na/ kun brtags ni gzung 'dzin la bya/ gzhan dbangni khams gsum gyi sems dang sems las byung ba'i rnam par rtog pa la bya/ yongs sugrub pa ni stong pa'i chos nyid la bya/

54cig] A, gcig B. It appears thatA, too, originally readgcig,which was later corrected tocig, since there is a space of approximately one letter beforecig.

55

//] conj., / A, om. B56glo] conj., blo AB57add. / AB58rtog] conj., brtags AB59rtog] conj., brtags AB


26/35


(2) nges pa'i tshig ni/ ci'i phyir kun brtags zhes bya zhe na/ gzhan dbang la 'khrulnas/ gzung ba dang/ 'dzin par snang la/ gzhan dbang rang snang bar ma shes nas/gzung 'dzin gzhan dbang las logs na yod par brtags pa'i phyir/ kun brtags shesbya'o// ci'i phyir gzhan dbang zhes bya zhe na/ khams gsum gyi sems dang sems lasbyung ba rang skye mi nus kyi/ rgyu dang rkyen gzhan gyis bskyed pa'i phyir gzhandbang zhes bya'o// ci'i phyir yongs su grub pa zhes bya zhe na/ gzhan dbang chos cande la gzung 'dzin cha gnyis kyis stong pa'i stong pa nyid kyi chos nyid ni rtog pa'i

mtshan ma dang dngos por nam yang mi 'gyur ba'i phyir yongs su grub pa zhesbya'o//(3) dbye na ni/ kun brtags pa la yang gnyis te/ snang ba'i kun brtags pa dang {yul

so so'i dbang po}/ mi snang ba'i kun brtags pa'o {nam mkha'i me tog lta bu}// gzhan dbang layang gnyis te/ ltos pa'i gzhan dbang dang/ {'dus byas la ltos nas 'dus ma byas yod pa lta bu}bskyed pa'i gzhan dbang ngo {yul dang dbang po sa bon dang chu lud kyis bskyed pa lta bu}//60

yongs su grub pa la yang gnyis te/ mi 'gyur bar yongs su grub pa dang {chos rnams kyichos nyid la bya/}/ phyin ci ma log par yongs61su grub pa'o {yang dag pa'i ye shes la bya/}//

(4) sa bgos pa ni/ kun brtags ni so so'i skye bo'i spyod yul dang gzhan dbang nidag pa 'jig rten pa'i spyod yul/ yongs su grub pa ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i spyod yullo// cis mngon zhe na/ lung las/

gang gis rten cing 'brel bar 'byung//

de dag ngo bo nyid kyis med//gang dag ngo bo nyid med pa//nam du yang ni mi skye'o//rtog med rkyen las skye ba ni//rnam pa kun tu brjod med pa//gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid//'jig rten dag pa'i spyod yul lo//rtag pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis de//shin tu stong nyid gang yin pa//

yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid//mi rtog ye shes spyod yul lo//

zhes 'byung/

(5) sku gsum dang sbyar ba ni/ yongs su grub pa ni dbyings dang ye shes yin paschos kyi sku'o// gzhan dbang ni ting nge 'dzin gyi ngo gang la snang bas/ longs spyodrdzogs pa'i sku'o// kun brtags ni med pa rnams yod par brtags pas sprul pa'i sku'o//

(6) rnam par rig pa tsam du bsdu na/ sems kyi 'khrul pa62ni gzhan dbang yul du'khrul pa yin/ sems kyi dngos gzhi ni kun brtags gzung 'dzin yin/ sems kyi chos nyidni yongs su grub pa yin no//

(7) chos thams cad mtshan nyid gsum du bsdu na/ chos phyi nang gnyis/ 'dusbyas dang 'dus ma byas gnyis/ kun nas nyon mongs pa dang/ rnam par byang ba'o//de yang lngar bsdu ste/ ming dang/ rgyu mtshan dang/ rnam par rtog pa dang/ debzhin nyid dang/ yang dag pa'i ye shes so// lnga po de mtshan nyid gsum du bsduste/ ming ni kun brtags su bsdu'o// rgyu mtshan dang/ rnam par rtog pa gnyis nigzhan dbang du bsdu'o// de bzhin nyid dang yang dag pa'i ye shes gnyis ni yongs sugrub par bsdu'o// yang na gang dag med pa las yod par sgro btags pa thams cad kun

60//] conj., // // A, / B61yongs] A, yungs B, obviously a typographical error.62pa] A, ba B


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Orna ALMOGI1356

brtags su bsdu'o// chos gang rgyu rkyen gyis bsdus pa thams cad gzhan dbang dubsdu'o// chos nyid kun brtags ltar med pa yang ma yin/ gzhan dbang ltar rgyu rkyengyis bskyed pa yang ma yin pa ni yongs su grub par bsdu'o//

(8) yod pa gsum zhes bya ba ni/ kun brtags tha snyad du yod/ gzhan dbang rdzassu yod/ yongs su grub pa chos nyid du yod do//

(9) med pa gsum zhes bya ba ni/ kun brtags mtshan nyid kyis med/ gzhan dbangrang skye mi nus pas med/ yongs su grub pa don dam par dngos po med do//63

(10) gcig dang tha dad pa

64

las grol bar bstan pa ni/ kun brtags ni med pa'i chosyin/ gzhan dbang dang yongs su grub pa gnyis gcig pa dang tha dad pa65las grol barbstan to// rgol ba na re/ gcig na gzhan dbang brtsan par byas na/ sangs rgyas mi sridpar rigs so// yongs su grub pa brtsan par byas na/ sems can mi srid pa'i rigs so// zhespa la/ lan du gcig dang tha dad pa las grol te/ gzhan dbang kun brtags dang ma bralba'i dus na/ gcig pa yang ma yin la/ kun brtags gzung 'dzin gnyis kyis stong pa'i dusna/ tha dad pa yang ma yin te/ lung las kyang/

rnam par rtog pa gzhan gyi dbang//rnam rtog yin te rkyen las byung//grub ni de las snga mar grub//rtag tu med par gyur pa gang//de phyir de nyid gzhan dbang las//

gzhan min gzhan ma yin pa'ang min//zhes 'byung ngo//

Text Cite

Documents

Yogacara in the Writings of the Eleventh-Century Rnying Ma Scholar Rong Zom Chos Kyi Bzang Po