Yilmaz, I - MEJ 2002 Turkish Law

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Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic LawAuthor(s): Ihsan YilmazSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter, 2002), pp. 113-131Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329723Accessed: 19/02/2010 16:23

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Secular Law and he Emergence fUnofficial Turkish slamic Law

Ihsan Yilmaz

In secular Turkey, raditional slamic law has been officially replaced with asecular egal system. The article examines he ways in which ocal and unofficial

Islamic legal practices have been retained alongside secular law, despite theofficial position.

A postmodem egality is visible in Turkey, where the traditional Muslim aw wastotally but only officially abolished and replaced by transplanted ecular aws. Localand unofficial Turkish Muslim aws have resisted he unification nd assimilation ur-poses of the modem nation-state.1 eople have not abandoned heir ocal and religiouslaws and customs, whether egal modernity ecognizes them or not. Today, secularofficial and Muslim unofficial aws co-exist in the Turkish ocio-legal sphere.

Turkey was one of the very first Muslim countries hat encountered he modemWest and ts civilization and that attempted o respond o the challenges posed by theWestern power and civilization. The questions urrounding hese challenges, how torespond o them, preventing he collapse of the Ottoman State, modernization, ndtransplantation f Western nstitutions ave always been on the agenda of the Turkishintellectuals. The modernization ttempts n Turkey had already begun n the seven-teenth century when the Ottoman ulers became aware hat they were far behind he

European owers. Substantial iscussions over whether o import European echnol-ogy only, or to take all of the Western way of life, culture, aws, and so on preoccupiedthe public sphere or many decades. These endless discussions were cut short by the

Professor hsan Yilmaz s in the Law Department, chool of Oriental nd African Studies, University fLondon.

1. The notion "local" s more complex than earlier sharp distinctions between, for instance, theconcept of "great" nd "little" or "folk") raditions as a means of describing arge-scale civilizations

such as Islam. However, t must be emphasized hat the notion carries he misleading mplication ofsomething provincial, or an inferior and imperfect realization of a "genuine" or "high" culture ofreligious belief and practice, see Dale F. Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts," RichardC. Martin (ed), Islam in Local Contexts, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), 1-16, p. 2. Although thismisconceptualisation s sometimes the case, it cannot be generalized, ince the term "local" refers tothe concepts of culture, religion, and law which are not under he auspices of the state or the leadingelite whether t might be "genuine," "high," and "perfect" r not.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 56, NO. 1 WINTER 2002


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MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 115

have taken he place of corporate ights and responsibilities. ecular motives and ech-niques have superseded eligious sanctions and nspiration. Law-making nd applica-tion have become a professional area that operates n the name of central national

power. This central national power tolerates no rivals by means of law in its sover-eignty, since uniform aw is seen as a condition of progress oward modern nation-hood.

In modern egal systems, here has been a strong endency o replace raditionallocal laws with one uniform modern tate aw. Most governments eek to modernizetheir laws in addition o unification. The modernizing lite rejects the inherited, heold, and searches or a new way of life, new structures, nd new patterns of socialrelations. To them, customary aw exists when, and to the extent hat, state aw recog-nizes that t exists.

In modern hinking, t is widely believed hat raditional aw does not serve as aninstrument f change. Traditional aw is accused of keeping people from acting incompliance with the development ims of the state. In contrast, modern state law isbelieved to change societies. The ideological role of law is of central mportance nlegal modernity. Law is used as an instrument f social control, and as a mode oforganizing eliefs and values.3 According o instrumentalist entality, all egal goalsconsist of specific end results realizable at some particular moment n time."4 nstru-mentalists ake the social space between egislator and subject mplicitly as a norma-tive vacuum. n other words, they assume that the legislator s more or less autono-mous from the social context n which the rule s to have ts effects, the subjects of therule are atomistic ndividuals and the legislator's command s uninfluenced by thesocial medium.

At times, any group aspiring o state power attacks he old social order and at-tempts to use its own system of legal rules and principles irst. To this end, laws aresometimes ransplanted rom another ulture or other cultures by voluntary eception.In some other cases, laws are transplanted y involuntary mposition.5

A state can undertake he process of legal importation s a result of fundamental

3. David Sugarman, "Law, Economy And The State In England, 1750-1914: Some Major ssues,"David Sugarman ed) Legality, deology and the state, (London et al: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 233-235; Kalman Kulcsar, Modernization And Law, Theses And Thoughts, Budapest: Hungarian Acad-emy of Sciences, 1987), p. 64.

4. Robert S. Summers, "Naive Instrumentalism nd The Law," P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds)Law, morality, and society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 197.

5. On the issue of transplantation, ee also in detail Robert L Kidder, Connecting Law And Society,(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983); Kidder, "Towards An Integrated Theory Of Imposed Law",Sandra B. Burman and Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds) The Imposition Of Law, (New York: AcademicPress, 1979), pp. 289-306; Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press,1974); Watson, "Legal Transplants And Law Reform," The Law Quarterly Review, 1976, pp. 70-85;Watson, SocietyAnd Legal Change, Edinburgh: cottish Academic Press, 1977); Watson, Legal Trans-plants, 2nd ed, (Edinburgh: cottish Academic Press, 1993); Watson, "From Legal Transplants ToLegal Formats," The American Journal of Comparative Law, V. 43 N. 3, 1995, pp. 469-476; Watson,"Aspects Of Reception Of Law," The American Journal of Comparative Law, V. 44 N. 2, 1996, pp.335-351.


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revolution nd, under hat upheaval, may adamantly ttempt o establish a completelyclean and blank egal sheet. The elite of a given country may decide o transplant lawor a legal system entirely o procure he social transformation f society. To reach hisgoal, the elite can impose radically new patterns f behavior

y opting or transplantedlaw, using law to reconstruct ociety and ts social relations.However, ome problems merge during modernization: he lack of power be-

hind modernization rograms an cause failure; here may be a difference betweenreality and over-ambitious ims, insufficient knowledge of reality or ignorance of it,the lack of exploration f the possible consequences, and the neglect of social phe-nomena, cultural onditions, eligious and customary raditions. ometimes tate awcan be seen as unnecessary, voidable, and remediable y society. Laws do not workeffectively f they are not congruent with their social context. It is evident hat no law

can ultimately ompel action. All the law can do is "try o induce someone, by order orby persuasion r by suggestion, o a certain ourse of action."6It is also possible that there may be a number of competing norms n the coun-

tries that transplanted heir official law from abroad, usually from Western ountries.Shari'a and dharma can be given as examples of norms competing against he statelaw. They are deep-rooted raditions hat have developed approving legal postulates'among heir ollowers.7 Although hey may be regarded y orthodox urisprudence ssimple customs and practices, hese religious precepts and ethical mperatives nflu-ence both official and unofficial aw. To put it differently, ransplanted tate aw doesnot exist as a separate ystem but co-exists with unofficial aws peacefully or conflict-ingly. As a result, n some cases, a radical eform attempt n the legal arena may wellfall far short of bringing he assumed crucial ransformation.

A body of research hows limits to the capacity of law in transforming ociallife.8 Moore's semi-autonomous odel explains why new laws to direct change do notnecessarily produce he anticipated onsequences.9 To her, the social space betweenlegislator and subject s not a normative acuum. Although he state has the power ouse physical force, it does not mean that there are no other agencies and modes ofinducing ompliance.10 n other words, even though he formal egal institutions njoya kind of monopoly n terms of the legitimate use of power, here are some other ormsof effective coercion or effective inducement. Between the individual and politicalbody there are various nterposed ocial fields to which the individual belongs. These

6. Antony Allott, The Limits Of Law, (London: Butterworths,1980), p. 45-46.7. Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward A General Theory Through Japanese Legal Culture,

(Tokyo: Tokai UP, 1989), 125.8. See for example, Allott, The Limits Of Law, op.cit.

9 Sally Falk Moore, "Law and social change: The semi-autonomous ocial field as an appropriatesubject of study," V. 7 N. 4 Law and Society Review, 1973, pp. 719-746; see also Moore, Law AsProcess: An Anthropological Approach, London et al: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

10. See also in detail, Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology Of Law: A Comparative Theory, New Yorket al: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 193-232; Pospisil, "The structure f society and its multiple legalsystems," P. H. Gulliver ed) Cross-examinations: ssays in memory of Max Gluckman, Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1978), pp. 96-109.


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social fields have their own rules and the means of coercing or inducing compliance.In all culturally eterogeneous ommunities number f modes of normative rderingsco-exist with the official law. Local laws and customs are some of the major actors

that nfluence and impede he effectiveness of law in modern ocieties. These factorsare the sources of incoherence, multiple egal authorities nd interpretations, ocalinterests and ocal concerns. There s usually a continuous ompetition etween hesenormative ystems or the allegiance of those to whom they are addressed. This condi-tion is called 'dynamic egal pluralism' nd exists where cultural pluralism s a socialreality.

Dynamic egal pluralism s an attribute f a social field and not of "law" or of a"legal system." t is the presence n a social field of more than one legal order. Thewhole picture of law as it operates n society s composed of three evels: official aw,

unofficial aws, and legal postulates ince law must be understood s a cultural on-struct and as enduring deas, structures, rocesses, and practices written and unwrit-ten, formal and nformal, egalistic and ess legalistic, ocal and national). Law existsat every evel of society, sometimes as state aw, sometimes as norms or rules of con-duct and it is always nfused with cultural and historical meanings. Law is a processand s shaped by rules and a cultural ogic. In the condition of dynamic egal pluralism,unofficial and official laws continuously and dynamically nteract. The socio-legalsphere s not a normative acuum and the operation f law is under he influence oflegal postulates hat always exist in the socio-legal sphere, whatever egal modernityasserts.

TURKISH LEGAL MODERNITY ND SECULARIZATION F TURKISH LAW

Turkey as a unique experience n the whole Muslim world, as a country hat hascompletely ecularized ts legal system. The secularization movement n modern Tur-key has followed a Jacobinist nd militant ourse, very much ike the French experi-ence. Laicism has been perceived as an alternative eligion. Founders f the Republic

believed hat here was not enough ime to wait for the slow process of evolution. The

10. See also in detail, Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology Of Law: A Comparative Theory, (NewYork et al: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 193-232; Pospisil, "The structure f society and its multiplelegal systems," P. H. Gulliver ed) Cross-examinations: ssays in memory of Max Gluckman, Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1978), pp. 96-109.

11. I use the term "dynamic egal pluralism" o denote a condition of a socio-legal sphere wheredynamic interactions between official laws, unofficial laws and legal postulates and continuous re-construction and hybridization processes take place, see in detail Ihsan Yilmaz, Dynamic Legal Plu-ralism And The Reconstruction Of Unofficial Muslim Laws In England, Turkey And Pakistan, Lon-don: SOAS, 1999), chapter 2. For the literature n legal pluralism, ee John Griffiths, "What s legalpluralism?", ournal of Legal Pluralism, V. 24,1986, pp. 1-2, 8; Sally Engle Merry. "Legal Pluralism,"Law and Society Review, In: V. 22 N. 5, 1988, pp. 869-896; Masaji Chiba (1986) (ed) Asian Indig-enous Law In Interaction With Received Law. London. New York: Kegan Paul International; Chiba(1989) Legal Pluralism: Toward A General Theory Through Japanese Legal Culture. Tokyo: TokaiUP; June Starr, Law As Metaphor: From Islamic Courts To The Palace Of Justice, (New York: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1992), p. 174.


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Kemalist elite had conceived religion as a threat o their modernist movement andrevolutions. n this positivist eading f secularism, eligions hould tay n consciencesand places of worship and should not be mixed with material ife.12

Western aw had already been in the process of being received nto Turkey or aperiod of about one hundred ears before the Republic. The precedents or the intro-duction of Western-based ystems of law into Turkey have a history, xtending ven tothe Tanzimat f 1839.13 These were in addition o, and not a replacement f, the Mus-lim law. There was a dualist egal structure. Ottoman ureaucrats ngineered revolu-tion from above by creating parallel, ecular egal institutions t the national evel thatexisted alongside slamic ones in the later nineteenth entury Ottoman tate.

Although secularization f law had started ince the Tanzimat, egal provisionsbased on the Muslim aw were, more or less, still in effect. In the field of family law,

all earlier reforms, however extensive they seemed, had not affected the traditionalMuslim aw, which governed amily life. The laws of marriage, ivorce, nheritance,and custody of children or Muslims continued as before.

On October 25, 1917, the Ottoman Family Law was enacted. This was an eclec-tic law, which reflected and amalgamated he views of different uristic schools ofIslam. The law tried to give marriage a more official character by stating that theunilateral alaq (statement f divorce) n the presence of two witnesses did not sufficeto terminate marriage. The presence of a judge or a deputy was required y the law.Moreover, very marriage nd divorce had to be legally organized according o stateprocedures. The law also granted a wife two new grounds or divorce. For the firsttime age limits for marriage were set. The new law also allowed women, at the time ofbetrothal, o write nto the marriage ontract hat f the husband akes another wife, hermarriage would be immediately null and void.

Although he new Ottoman Family Law of 1917 marked ertain differences nthe rights of women, t did not break ree of the conceptual ules of Islamic amily aw.This did not happen until 1926.

The Kemalists made heir irst attempt o change he legal system by the appoint-

ment of special committees of the Ministry of Justice o prepare he framework or anew set of secular odes in 1924. However, he results of the reports howed he heavyinfluence of the traditional Muslim law in the proposed changes.'4 The project wasthus dropped and the government ecided to adopt the Swiss Civil Code, the ItalianCriminal Code, and the German Commercial Code. The European model was essen-tial according o the Minister of Justice of the time, Mahmud Es'ad Bozkurt:

. . . we are badly n want of a good scientific code. Why waste our time trying oproduce omething new when quite good codes are to be found ready made? The

12. Mardin, "Turkey: slam And Westernization," . 180.13. See for the origins of the secular law in Turkey, Mardin, "Some Explanatory Notes On The

Origins Of The Mecelle," The Muslim World, V. 51 N. 3, 1961, pp. 274-279.14. See, for details and comments in the press about the mentioned proposal, Nermin Abadan-

Unat (ed) Women n The Developing World: The Evidence From Turkey, Denver: University of Den-ver, 1986), pp. 130-131.


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only hing o do is to take a good ready-made ode o which good commentariesexist, and o translate hemwholesale.5

Concurring with Bozkurt, Ataturk nderlined he point that "it is our purpose o

create completely new laws and thus to tear up the very foundations f the old legalsystem".16 Indeed, "(t)he aim of this wholesale adoption was to use law as an instru-ment of modernization nd westernization".17 s a result, n attempting o build a newnational dentity or Turkey, he secular egal system became the very foundation fthe modern Turkish tate.

As marriage s a basic institution f society, t is not a coincidence hat familyformation would be the first target of legal penetration. he Turkish Constitution e-fers to the family as the basic institution of the society. It is considered hat if theinstitution f family is healthy, hen the society and the state will be healthy as well.Thus, by protecting nd regulating he family, he state protects and empowers tself.To that effect, the legal system imposes upon the state certain 'duties' towards hefamily. Article 41 of the Constitution uts that: "The state shall take... measures andestablish he necessary organisation o safeguard he peace and well-being of the fam-ily". The protection f mothers and children and family planning are especially statedas the duties of the state under he Turkish Constitution.

Thus, radical reforms were introduced n family law matters. The law of Islamwas abolished or matters of personal tatus n 1924. It was replaced by a civil code

taken from Swissmodels. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and Swiss Code of

Obligations n 1926 represented profound ttempt f change by the Kemalist lite inthe social life of Turkey.'8 he Civil Code differs undamentally rom the provisionsof the Muslim aw. Although, t was claimed that the potentialities nd possibilitiesinherent n and derivable rom he Muslim canonical aw had been taken nto consider-ation before enforcing he new code, the enactment f the Civil Code aimed o achievea complete separation etween religion and law. With this law, Islam was completelydisregarded. t was relegated o a matter of conscience hat was left solely to the pri-vate sphere. Citizens could be Muslims n their private ives, yet they could not claim

any room for Islam n the public arena.The elite for whom aw-making was the primary ool of social change rather han

the product f large-scale demands "attempted o present one consistent mage of jus-tice and one unified legal system. Islam fell under the control of the modern statethrough aicism, which ntended hat no Islamic competition ould again challenge hesecular state's monopoly over law'.'9 One system of nation-state aw framed by theConstitution f the state, entirely ecular, and one system of state courts administeredby the Ministry of Justice constitute he official egal system n the country. The Civil

15. Quoted n Starr, Law as Metaphor, p. 16.16. Quoted Starr, Law as Metaphor:17. M. B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 364.18. Adnan Guriz, "Sources of Turkish aw," Tugrul Ansay and Don Wallace, Jr (eds) Introduction

to Turkish Law, (The Hague et al: Kluwer Law International, 996), p. 9.19. Introduction o Turkish Law, p. 170.


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Code s applied n all parts of Turkey, nd all Turkish itizens and residents re subjectto it. The modern Turkish Constitution akes t for granted hat Islam n today's Turkeydoes not offer a competing egal sensibility o secular aw. From a theoretical erspec-

tive, then, religion as a source of law has been abolished, he positivist diom of statelaw has triumphed.

THE SOCIO-LEGAL HALLENGE O LEGAL MODERNITYAND THE CONSTRUCTION F THE TURKISH MUSLIM LAW

The state under he reins of the Kemalist lite assumed hat cultural hange couldbe imposed rom above through he force of law. One of the major expected changeswas the secularization f society. However, t is now recognized hat the place andinfluence of Islam n Turkish ocial life have not changed a great deal. Even thoughIslam has been officially removed rom public life, which was firmly based on thetheory and practice of the Ottoman State, it is still deeply rooted n the minds andhearts of the people. The Kemalist deology, which had national, ecular, and modernelements, could not fill the gap that Islam was supposed to have left.20 The state,through ts secular policies and programs f Westernization, as threatened he valuesystem of the Muslim people in the country without providing, at the same time, asatisfactory nd all-encompassing deological ramework hat could have mass appealand could have replaced slam. Local Islam survived despite all attempts f the state.2'Islam is pervasive n Turkish ociety, and this shows the failure of the Republicanelite's attempts f making religion a private belief.22

In the legal field, too, Islam still continues o influence people's ives. With thepassage of time, the expectation hat people would learn and follow only the official

20. Mardin, "Turkey: slam And Westernization," p. 180-181.21. Mardin, Religion And Social Change In Modern Turkey: The Case Of Bediuzzaman Said

Nursi, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),p.

229.22. A quick scan in Turkish dailies will show that tensions between the officials who enthusiasti-

cally aim to secularize he society from above and some people who retain heir neo-traditional urk-ish Muslim culture still continue, showing that he two sides have not yet given up, see in detail HakanYavuz, "The Assassination Of Collective Memory: The Case Of Turkey," The Muslim World, 1999,89:3-4, p. 195 and Yavuz, "Cleansing slam From The Public Sphere," Journal of International Af-fairs, Fall 2000. Head scarf issue at the Turkish universities is only one these tensions. A recentgovernment decree shows the state's social engineering desires by means of law has not yet waned.The decree states that "head-scarved arents shall not be allowed to enter school playground or pre-mises anymore while the National Anthem s chanted by schoolchildren," which is the usual nationalpractice at the beginning of the week on Monday mornings and at the end of the week on Fridayevenings, http://www.haberturk.com/look.asp?N d=16706; Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), April6, 2001. Only one week before the announcement f this decree took place, a head-teacher ot rid ofa traditionally ead-scarved arent rom the school playground, igorously commenting hat "if Ataturksaw you with that headscarf, what would he have said?" Nobody was able to denounce his remarks npublic. Yet it is an irony that more than 80 percent of women wear headscarves n 2001's Turkey,where democratic rhetoric s unintermittently mployed by everybody and also it is only ironic thatAtatuirk's mother and wife both always sported a headscarf!


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lex loci by entirely abandoning he Muslim law turned out to be untrue. n the late1990s, there were still conflicts between he official legal system and the local law.23

In the case of marriage, he attitude o the Code turns o one of outright onflict

between he official aw and Islamic rules or, more accurately, what the people regardas rules of Islamic aw.24There exist a number f fundamental ifferences etween hesecular civil law of Turkey and the unofficial Muslim local law. These differencesinclude he secularization f the marriage eremony. A legal marriage ad to be regis-tered with the civil authorities nd concluded n their presence. Religious ceremonywas made optional and carried no legal weight. A religious marriage without officialregistration as made a criminal offence. The adoption f the principle f monogamymeant hat polygamy was under no circumstances llowed and became a criminal of-fence. The secularization f divorce proceedings was another ey reform. The new law

gave both parties an equal right to sue for divorce. Talaq religious divorce) was nolonger recognized. Divorce could only be granted y an official court.

People n Turkey, fter he reception nd transplantation f the Swiss Civil Codehave had three alternatives: voiding he official law, following the Turkish tate awor following a combination f the requirements f the Muslim aw and Turkish aw.Evidence has shown that they preferred he third option. They have developed a newhybrid Turkish Muslim aw that amalgamates he rules of unofficial Muslim aw andof the state aw.25

Solemnization of Marriage and Nikah

Under the official law, only civil marriages erformed y authorized marriageofficers are allowed and recognized.26 rticle 16 of the Civil Code states that he for-malities of celebration ommence with the submission f the necessary documents ythe parties o the marriage ffice at the place where hey are residing at the time. Theauthorities tart nquiries o check whether mpediments o the marriage xist. Onlyafter the celebration f the civil marriage s a nikah or religious marriage ermitted.

Contrary cts by imams are punishable ffences.27 f a civil ceremony n a register's

23. Yilmaz, Dynamic Legal Pluralism, chapter 4; Tugrul Ansay, "Family Law", Tugrul Ansay andDon Wallace, Jr. (eds) Introduction o Turkish Law, (The Hague et al: Kluwer Law International,1996), p. 110.

24. In order o emphasize that point we use the term "local Muslim law," which covers the rulesthat the people consider Islamic, whether they are genuinely Islamic or not. See in detail for theselocal practices, Turkoz Erder (ed), Family In Turkish Society. Sociological And Legal Studies, (An-kara: Turkish Social Science Association, 1985); Hicri Fisek, "Introduction", rder (ed) Family inTurkish society. 287-298, see already earlier Paul Stirling, Turkish Village, London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1965).

25. See in detail Yilmaz, Dynamic Legal Pluralism, chapter 4. In the British context, Muslims

developed a parallel rule system, amalgamating he English law and unofficial Muslim laws, which iscalled Angrezi shariat by David Pearl and Werner F. Menski, Muslim Family Law, 3rd ed, (London:Sweet & Maxwell, 1998).

26. Article 174/4 of the Turkish Constitution.27. Article 108 of the Civil Code and Article 237/3 of the Criminal Code.


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office is followed by a religious one, the religious ceremony does not supersede orinvalidate he civil ceremony and s not registered s a marriage n any marriage egis-ter book. The men and women who perform a religious marriage eremony without

having made the legal marriage ontract are considered o be punishable.28On the other hand, "many Turkish itizens still prefer he informal r consensualmarriage, or nikah."29 ometimes hey marry with nikah only without registration,which is not recognized under the Civil Code. There are still some marriages per-formed by the imams without he prior official celebration.30 n rural ociety, he reli-gious ceremony s still regarded as valid in itself, and a civil marriage lone is notregarded s valid by the Muslim community.3'

An earlier tudy found n the 1970s that 35.4% of all marriages n Turkey werecivil, 49.2% were mixed civil-religious concluded n the presence of civil authoritiesand ater, an imam), and 15.0 percent were only religious and hence carried o officiallegal weight.32 Some 70 years after the transplantation f the Civil Code, the normsthat consider a child born only of non-religious civil) wedlock a 'bastard' re quitedominant, ince legitimacy n the eyes of society still rests solely on the nikah.33 n the1990s, it is an undeniable act that "many unmarried ouples, and the society they livein, believe that the religious ceremony provides enough evidence for the validity oftheir marriage."34

State Planning Organization's ata from the 1990s show that the importance fthe religious marriage n the eyes of the people still continues: n urban areas, he ratioof civil only marriages o all subsisting marriages s 13.59%, he figure for religiousonly marriages s 3,09%, the ratio of couples who employed both civil and religiousmarriage eremonies s 82.70%; n rural areas, the figures are 5.11%, 6.89%, and87.38% respectively.35

According o recent research onducted by the Directorate f Religious Affairs,

28. Tugrul Ansay et al (eds) The Turkish Criminal Code, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1965), p.85. For some cases which appeared before the court of Cassations, see Y4.C.D. 06/06/1983 E 983/

2664K

983/3310; Y4.C.D. 09.12.1986 E 986/9510 K 986/ 9813; Y4.C.D 28.04.1992 E. 992/2504 K.992/29. Abadan-Unat, Women n The Developing World, p. 172; Aydin Zevkliler, Medeni hukuk Civil

Law), (Istanbul: avas, 1995), p. 705; Belkis Kumbetoglu, "Aile, evlilik, nikah: Farklilasan avramlar"(Family, Marriage, Nikah: Changing Concepts), Toplum e Bilim, N. 73, 1997, p. 121.

30. Kumbetoglu, "Aile, Evlilik,"; Ansay, "Family aw", p. 113.31. Hooker, Legal Pluralism, p. 365; Nancy Tapper, "Changing Wedding Rituals in a Turkish

town", Turkish tudies, V. 9, 1985, pp. 305-306; Nuran Elmaci, "Polygamy: ok-esli evlilikler" Po-lygamy: Polygamous Marriages), Necla Arat (ed) Turkiye'de kadin olmak (To Be a Woman n Tur-key) (Istanbul: Say, 1994), p.109.

32. Timur, Tiirkiye'de aile yapisi (Family Structure n Turkey), Ankara: Hacettepe UniversityPress, 1971).

33. Birsen Talay, The Changes n Turkish amily Structure Between The Years 923-1935, (Istanbul:Bogaziqi University, 1994), p. 34; see already earlier, Balaman, "Family ormation," . 211.

34. Talay, Changes, a woman journalist n the eastern Turkey tates that everybody n the regionmarries by nikah, and official marriage s also common. Sabah Melodi, March 25, 1998.

35. State Planning Organizastion SPO), Turk aile aractirmasi (Turkish Family Research) (An-kara: DPT, 1992), p. 42, table 31.


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54.8% of the university outh n Turkey want nikah n addition o official registration.This number ncreases, as we have seen from he statistics, when t comes to marriage,so that most of them perform nikah due to a number of reasons, such as social and

parental ressure although ome of them (45.2% n the said research) would not nec-essarily desire so.36It is also clear from these data that Turkish people have learnt o combine the

official and unofficial marriages. ven n the village evel, the ratio of performing othmarriages s 87.38%. Religious only marriages till occur n substantial umbers, p-posing the wishes of the official law. Other evidence showing hat people have learntto combine he rules of the secular and religious aws is the decreasing ime intervalbetween the religious and secular marriages.37 eople have realized o a great extentthat marrying eligiously only has disadvantages, whilst having married ecularly n

addition o the religious marriage as substantial enefits especially for the womenconcerned.38 Research conducted by Hacettepe University n years 1988 and 1993also confirms he above-mentioned fficial research.39

The state's desire for uniform egal standards s opposed to the religious andcultural diversities f the people. As a matter f fact, as the empirical esearch hows,social reality s not responding ully to the desires of the secular aw. Even the stateaccepts his phenomenon. n a publication f the State Institute f Statistics, t is statedthat n spite of the legal prohibition:

... it is assumed hat religious marriages not accompanied y official mar-riages) often take place, especially n the Eastern nd Southeast parts of Anatolia.Therefore he number of marriages appears o be lower than they actually are,since religious marriages re not included n these statistics.i0

In sum, in accordance with the unofficial Turkish Muslim law, Muslims willmarry wice with several permutations o satisfy the competing demands of secularlaw and religious belief. There are five different patterns f solemnization f marriagein the Turkish context: Civil marriage, eligious marriage, both civil and religiousmarriages t the same time, civil first without olemnization or a period and then thereligious marriage, nd finally religious irst and after a while civil marriage.

36. See Hurriyet, 23 February 1998, p. 12.37. Nurettin Yildirak, Kay kadinlarinin osyo-ekonomik ve kiltiirel konumlari The Socio-eco-

nomic and Cultural Situation of Village Women) (Istanbul: Friedrich Ebert Vakfi, 1992), p. 22.38. See now in detail, Yilmaz, "Non-Recognition f Post-Modem Turkish Socio-Legal Reality and

Predicament f Women," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2001 (forthcoming). Similarly, nthe British context, the state's hesitation o recognize unofficial Muslim socio-legality has importantreflections n the public sphere at the expense of the Muslim minority, especially the women, see in

detail Yilmaz, "Muslim Law in Britain, Reflections n the Socio-Legal Sphere and Differential LegalTreatment," ournal of Muslim Minority Affairs, V. 20 N. 2, 2000; Ihsan Yilmaz, "The Question OfIncorporation Of Muslim Personal Law Into The English Law And Law As Chameleon," ournal ofMuslim Minority Affairs, V. 21 N. 2, 2001.

39. Hacettepe Universitesi Nuifus Etudleri Enstituisui, iirkiye niifus ve saflik arastirmasi TurkishPopulation and Health Research), Ankara: Ministry of Health and HUNEE, 1993).

40. State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey (DIE), Marriage Statistics,(Ankara: DIE, 1997), p. ix; see now, www.die.gov.tr.


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Having Polygamy

With regards o polygamy, here s an obvious conflict between classical Muslim

law in which a man is permitted o marry up to four wives at any one time and theofficial law of Turkey. Thus, a marriage n which either party s already married osomeone else will automatically e null and void according o the official law. TheCivil Code states that no person shall marry again unless he proves that the earliermarriage as been dissolved by death or by divorce or by a decree of nullity, and thata second marriage hall be declared nvalid by the court on the ground hat a personhad a spouse living at the time of marriage. n other words, the second marriage sabsolutely void, or void ab initio.i'

The parties knowingly ontracting uch a marriage re considered s having om-mitted a criminal offence under Article 237/5 of the Criminal Code that states: f theman s already married, e shall be punished by imprisonment or six months o threeyears. If the woman knowingly marries uch a man, she shall be given the same pun-ishment.42

However, polygamous marriages ave in no sense been eradicated n Turkey.43The polygamous ocal tradition till survives o a certain xtent,4 even though polyga-mous marriages re only exceptional s Turkish ociety has generally been a monoga-mous society. Although t varies from region to region, n the history of Turkey, he

ratio of polygamous marriages as already een minimal. According o recent esearch,already n 1885, the proportion f polygamous marriages o all subsisting marriages nIstanbul was only 2.5 1%. In 1907, the figure was 2.16%.

Social acceptance of succeeding wives is gained by performing nly "nikah".Numerous irst marriages re also religious only but not registered. A study based onsurvey research ound that approximately % of all marriages n Turkey were polyga-mous in the early 1970s.46 Estimates of the proportion f polygamous marriage nrural areas during he present entury ange between 10% and 2%. In the early 1980s,Sahinkaya, n Eastern Anatolia, ound he rate of polygamy to be about 4.4%.47 In the

late 1990s, the number of males who marry polygamously and defend that state of

41. Articles 93 and 112/1, 114, 115. Y.H.G.K. 26/3/1986, E. 2/751- K. 287; Y.2.H.D. 27/2/1986, E.1729- K.2054; Y2.H.D. 03/06/1990 194/2546.

42. Ansay et al, The Turkish Criminal Code, p. 86.43. Abadan-Unat, Women n the Developing World, p. 173; Kumbetoglu, "Aile, evlilik, nikah:

Farklilasan kavramlar," p. 121.44. Fatma Mansur Cosar, "Women n Turkish ociety," Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie (eds) Women

in the Muslim World, Cambridge, MA/ London: Harvard UP, 1978), pp. 124-140; Guriz, "Sources ofTurkish Law," p. 4; Kumbetoglu, "Aile, evlilik, nikah: Farklilasan kavramlar," p. 121.

45. Alan Duben and Cem Behar, Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family And Fertility, 1880-1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991); and the Turkish ranslation f the same, Duben and Behar,Istanbul haneleri: Evlilik, aile ve dogurganlik, 1880-1940, (Istanbul: letisim, 1996). 161.

46. Timur, Tiirkiye'de ile yapisi, , p. 93; see also Cosar, "Women n Turkish ociety",, p. 127.47. Rezan Sahinkaya, Diyarbakir li merkez koylerinde aile striiktiirii Diyarbakir County Vil-

lages Family Structure) Ankara Universitesi: Ziraat Fakuiltesi Yayinlari, 1983), p. 50.


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MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * 125

affair n public has been steadily ncreasing.48Nikah utilizes polygamy n a particular way. Some polygamists eported hat f

they had to divorce heir wives to remarry, hey could not have married, ince the issueof divorce s not perceived positively n the community.49 he two most common rea-sons given for these bigamous unions were the need for another emale helper and thesuspected terility of the first wife. In Turkish ociety, the most important round orlegitimizing divorce s the infertility of the wife. In field research, Basaran ound thatin rural areas people approve polygamy of a husband f he has no male child from hisfirst wife. 97.3 % of women and 80.4% of men agree that t is appropriate or a hus-band to have a second wife if he has no male offspring.50 n infertility ases, thus, asolution s sought not by divorce but rather y a polygamous marriage f the husbandto a widow or an unmarried woman. A third reason or polygamy according o some

research was the institution f the levirate or widow inheritance y married in of thedeceased. n these cases, polygamy s regarded s a social duty or a pious obligation.However, t must be emphasized hat there are many polygamists who had no suchexcuses or reasons prior o their second marriages ther than satisfying heir whimsand desires.

Polygamy or more generally urvival of the local law is not a rural phenomenonalthough most writers end to see it as such. Even n big cities and metropolitan reas,despite he smaller igures, dynamic Muslim egal pluralism s a reality. Sometimes, tis easier o continue a polygamous ife free from Gemeinschaft ressures n a crowded

metropolitan ity.5' A quick scan in newspapers will also show that polygamous mar-riages are not confined only to the rural and eastern parts of Turkey. n that context,one can see some people who polygamously married, n the urban areas as well. Forinstance, here are some politicians, businessmen, ingers, actors, members of Parlia-ments and even ministers f the Cabinet who are known as polygamists, despite whatthe legal system says.52

In the Turkish Muslim aw, there are at least four patterns f polygamy. Howeverthat figure can easily increase depending on the number of wives concerned. n the

48. Kumbetoglu, "Aile, evlilik, nikah: Farklilasan kavramlar," p. 121, 127.49. Elmaci, "Polygamy," . 109.50. Fatma Basaran, "Birden azla kadinla evlenmeye karsi vaziyet alislar" ("Positioning Against

Polygamy"), Behlul Dikecligil and Ahmet 1igdem (eds) Aile yazilari (Writings on Family), (Ankara:T. C. B. Aile Arastirma Kurumu Baskanligi, 1990), p. 187.

51. See Elmaci, "Polygamy," pp. 105; 10852. For a recent case about a minister of the Cabinet, as he then he was, a member of the then

ruling Welfare Party, which became a controversial ssue between European politicians and the Turk-ish politicians with regard o the human rights ssues in Turkey, ee The Independent, April 17, 1997,p. 14. For another case, regarding another ormer minister of the cabinet who is currently he chair-man of a very popular ootball club, see Hurriyet, November 7, 1997, p. 27. In another recent case,second wife of a polygamist businessman with nikah only claimed in the court that after her husbanddied he left only 3 companies o her, 23 to the first wife, but she claimed that that was injustice and shedeserved much more, applying or the annulment f the contract eft by the husband egarding nher-itance. Reported n Hurriyet, March 20, 1998, p. 43.


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first pattern, he man marries wo or more wives with only nikah without any registra-tion. In the second pattern, nly one of the women s a wife by civil ceremony. f, forinstance, he first marriage was civil, the second will be religious only. Significantly,

the first wife then becomes the legal mother of the children born to the second wife.Birth certificates and identification documents are arranged ccordingly.53 et it isquite possible that a second, third or fourth wife could be the official wife if the hus-band did not prefer o register he earlier marriage. n this third pattern, he husbandtakes his first wife without official marriage, which is a common practice n ruralareas, then he marries he second one both officially and unofficially. n the fourthpattern, he husband divorces his wife officially but does not pronounce alaq so thatshe is still his wife in Islam. Then, he marries another woman both officially andunofficially with nikah).S4 hus, t is made sure hat both children f the first wife andthe second wife are legitimate n the eyes of both Muslim aw and the official legalsystem. These scenarios can be adapted o the cases of the possible third or fourthwives with different permutations.

Prohibition f polygamy was a radical tep in the history of Turkey. Yet, as onecan easily conclude, this was neither a great revolution nor a big change, since thesociety was anyway more or less monogamous. The ratio of polygamous marriages, sstressed above, was already minimal. This ratio has continued o exist in spite of alllegal actions against t.

Divorce and Talaq

The divorce rate n Turkey has been relatively ow.55Thus, he case of talaq hasnot been a big issue in terms of numbers. People in Turkey enerally eact negativelyto the idea of divorce. It is conceived as an unpleasant xperience and it is usuallycondemned by families and friends. Even though n Muslim aw divorce can be ob-tained n a number of extra-judicial ways like talaq, in secular Turkish aw there ssolely one way of divorce, which is through decree granted by a court of civil juris-

diction on the ground hat he marriage as irretrievably roken down. The judge caneither declare he marriage oid, if the conditions or a valid marriage o not exist; or

53. Ali Riza Balaman, "Family Formation And Dissolution In Rural Areas", Erder ed) Family InTurkish ociety, Sociological And Legal Studies, p. 211; Elmaci, "Polygamy," . 109.

54. Religious scholars have been asked by people regarding his issue. Beser contends that if thehusband does not say "I divorced her" but writes it with no sincere ntention o divorce and then if thejudge decides to grant divorce, they are not Islamically divorced. If he pronounces he talaq, or "Idivorced you", then he can remarry her under the Muslim law, Faruk Beser, Fikih penceresindensosyal hayatimiz, V I (Our Social Life from Fiqh's Perspective)., Istanbul: Nun, 1993), p. 162.

55. The most detailed research on divorce in Turkey s Zwahlen'5 study which surveys the issuefrom ancient Turks o modem Turkish ociety Mary Zwahlen, Le divorce en Turquie: Contributionl'etude de la reception du code civil suisse, (Divorce in Turkey: Contribution o the Study of theReception of the Swiss Civil Code), (Geneve: Librarie Droz, 1981). Another detailed study on Turk-ish law yet to be published s H. P. Williams, The Role Of Adjudicatory Law In Divorce ProceedingsIn Turkey, Tufts: Tufts University, 1982), (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).


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MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * 127

grant an annulment; r decide to grant a divorce or separation. The Code had madedivorce by collusion or mutual consent difficult or many years.56 However, he newrevision n the Civil Code makes a divorce by mutual consent possible.57

In an earlier case, the Court of Cassation did not recognize a talaq, stating hatthere is only one type of dissolution of the marriage under he Civil Code. Muslimlaw's prohibition n the marriage fter hree alaqs between he couple was refused onthe ground hat here s no such rule in the Civil Code.58

On the other hand, since marriages re religious, divorces are also made by talaqto terminate he religious marriage, he nikah.59 Although statistical ecords do notinclude he number f dissolved nformal marriages, usbands till divorce heir wiveswith talaq and devout Muslim wives have to agree to the official divorce.60 However,this type of easy divorce s not an easy option n Turkish ociety where most marriages

are still arranged.6' ffectivity nd ntensity f the relationships etween amilies makeit impossible or an individual o reach a decision o divorce, o that ndividual esirescannot easily be put into effect.62 Yet it is evident hat with the waning of the institu-tion of the arranged marriages, alaqs could become easier. Also in urban reas, due tothe declining ntensity of social pressures nd rising ndividualism, ivorce would n-evitably become an easier option.

THE FUTURE OF POSTMODERN TURKISH LEGALITYAND TURKISH "DEMOCRACY"

Although the Turkish tate tried to abolish Muslim law by transplanting ewsecular and uniform aws, the result has been that Turkish Muslims have not aban-doned their ocal Muslim amily laws. The socio-legal reality of Muslim egal plural-ism stemming rom resistance f local Muslim aw has, for many years, been seen as arural phenomenon n Turkey. However, t is becoming clear that Muslim egal plural-ism is a reality of urban areas oo. The state and the elite expected hat by means ofeducation, members of society would learn he rules of the official legal system, and

they believed that with the increase of urbanization eople would give up their ocalcustoms and religious aws and would follow only the official aw.Nevertheless, he Turkish mpirical data have not confirmed his expectation.

Rather, Turkish eople have reconstructed heir unofficial eligious aws in spite of allthe claims of the secular egal system, particularly n the issues of marriage, mani-festly showing hat state aw has limits to shape he society. The Turkish xperience s

56. Article 150 of the Civil Code before revision.57. Ansay, "Family Law," p. 117.58. Y. H. G. K. 08. 06. 1968 E. 1966. 2-1487 K. 425 T.59. N. Serpil Altuntek, Van yoresinde akraba evliligi (Marriage of Close Kin in the Van Area)

(Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1993), p. 77.60. See in detail Yilmaz, The Dynamic Legal Pluralism, Chapter 4.61. Balaman, "Family ormation," . 214.62. Balaman, "Family Formation," p.215.


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instructive n the sense that t reminds us the possibilities and imitations f attemptingto reconstruct ociety by restructuring ts law.63 By developing a new Turkish Muslimlaw, these Turks have met the demands of both the secular Turkish egal system and

the unofficial Muslim aw. Since Turkish Muslims have reconciled hese conflictingpoints by employing Turkish Muslim aw rules, only a few cases have appeared eforethe courts. Even though we have only dealt with family law issues in this article, t isalso starkly observable n the Turkish ociety that in other fields such as business,finance, banking,' insurance, nd n all sorts of spheres of life, Muslim aw is referredto and obeyed by many people despite he non-recognition f the state.65

Even the state and the ruling elite are aware of the reality hat Turkey ontinuesto be a Muslim country, no matter what changes may have taken place in Turkey'sIslam, which shows the partial ailure of the Kemalist lite's instrumentalist se of lawto make religion a private belief. It is ironic that now some lobbyist groups, a Maoistparty, and some businessmen's ssociations demand hat he state's Directorate f Re-ligious Affairs must issue a fatwa which would prohibit he usage of US Dollars ndaily life and order mams o instruct he faithful during Friday ermons o deal withTurkish Lira instead of US Dollars in their daily affairs so that the recent financialseries of crises could be overcome.66 s a matter f fact, on the 3 lst of August 2001, in

63. Starr, Law as Metaphor, p. xli.

64. A recent survey has found that 14.1 of Turkish people opened accounts n interest-free slamicfinance institutions despite the non-existence of state guarantee or any losses as opposed to the casewith the mainstream banks, see, "Anar Anketi March 2001," www.anararastirma.com.tr. ame re-search has also shown that these people are of different political party affiliational background, notonly of so-called "Islamic" Virtue Party.

65. Fatwa books are bestsellers n Turkey. Moreover, many newspapers have atwa columns. Re-cently, the number of Turkish atwa sites on the inter-net has increased, see for example, the state'sDirectorate of Religious Affairs' atwa site, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinibilgiler/dinibil.html. lso,through various popular newsgroups and e-mail discussion ists, Turkish Muslims solicit informationabout what "Islam" ays about any particular roblem or issue. Contemporary nd frequently asked

issues in Turkey: working n Europe, madhhabs legal schools of Islam), using amplifier when read-ing azan (the call to prayer), Friday prayer and work, dar al-Islam, fasting and traveling by train,stock exchange, tax, halal meat, nikah, marrying a non-Muslim woman, talaq, court divorce, po-lygamy, nationalism, unemployment enefit, nflation, nterest, customs ax, bribery, depositing moneyat a bank n non-Muslim countries, selling alcohol in a non-Muslim country, gambling n dar al-harb(non-Muslim countries), sterilization, plastic surgery, using perfumes, abortion, jtihad (independentlegal reasoning), military service, organ transplantation, rayers salah) on bus, VAT, mortgage, Eu-ropean Union, golden tooth, alcohol in medication, eau de cologne, life insurance, eminism, fertilityclinics and so on, see Faruk Beser, Fetvalar fatwas), (Izmir: Nil, 1991); Ahmet Kurucan, Yeni birfikhiaci (A New Fiqh Perspective), Izmir: Isik, (1998), TDV, Gunumuz meselelerinefetvalar (Fatwas onContemporary roblems), Ankara: TDV, 1999), see also Yilmaz, "Muslim Legal Pluralism n Asr AlDarura, Surfers on the Inter-Madhhab-Net nd Neo-Ijtihad," Frank Vogel, Peri Bearman and RuudPeters (eds) , The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution and Progress (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2001), (forthcoming).

66. www.intemethaber.com/detay.php?d=3558: ww.medyakronik.com/guncel/28080103.htm;Kursat Bumin of Yeni Safak critically made fun of the state's move making reference o the article 24of the Turkish constitution which puts it that "No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion

Continued on Next Page


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the 85,000 or so mosques n all over Turkey where he state eels free to manipulate, fnot abuse, religion and officially non-recognized eligious aws in the name of "thespecial circumstances f the country," mams read the same text discouraging he us-

age of US Dollars, written and sent by the Directorate.The Turkish ase shows us again that legal pluralism s not only an issue fortraditional ocieties, but also a concern or contemporary nes, as virtually very soci-ety is multicultural. hus, dynamic egal pluralisms ave come into operation s ubiq-uitous phenomena f the post-modern ge.As a consequence f the interconnectednessof social orders, here s a mutually onstitutive elation between official aw and unof-ficial law(s). The socio-legal reality has repeatedly onfirmed general principle hatthere s an inseparable nd dynamic nterrelationship etween aw and culture, as lawis a cultural onstruct.67 he post-modern tage of legal development s one of hybrid

plurality ather han facile uniformity. An individual n the post-modern rena s sub-ject to more han one law and hese aws might, n some cases, be diametrically ppos-ing. However, hese individuals vercome his challenge by manipulating nd amal-gamating different ypes of normative rderings.

In this postmodern ondition, Turkish Muslims not only have challenged hepresumptions f Turkish egal modernity but have also shown that they can becomecitizens while at the same time retaining heir Muslim dentity. ndeed, advocates f aTurkish-Islam r an Anatolian-Sufism ut always an emphasis on Turkish modernityas an alternative o Saudi or Iranian ersions or images, underlining hat his moderatediscourse of Islam s not in contradiction ith the modern world.68 hey seek to definelaicism along more Anglo-Saxon ines and reinterpret slamic heology to respond omodern challenges, underscoring hat revelation and reason do not conflict; he stateshould be neutral n beliefs and faiths prevalent n the society; governance f the statecannot be based on the dominance f one religious radition.69 ndeed, a recent reportabout political slam n Turkey' ommissioned y a respected hink ank TESEV, heFoundation or Economic and Social Studies- hows that Turks end to be pious Mus-lims, but are attached o the secular system and tolerant of other beliefs. 46% of the

Continued rom Previous Pageor religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, or the purpose ofpersonal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, ocial, economic, politi-cal, and legal order of the State on religious tenets", http:Hlwww.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cag/Part2.htmwww.yenisafak.com.tr/kbumin.htmI n 8/28/2001.

67. Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law, Op. Cit, Chiba, Legal Pluralism, Clifford Geertz, Interpreta-tion Of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973); Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays In Inter-pretive Anthropology, New York: Basic Books, 1983); Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology Of Jus-tice: Law As Culture n Islamic Society, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989); Naim Gerber, State, Soci-ety And Law In Islam: Ottoman Law In Comparative Perspective, (New York: State University OfNew York Press, 1994).

68. See, for example, Yavuz, "Towards An Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement AndFethullah Giilen," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1999), 596-597

69. "Journalists And Writers Foundation: And The Third Abant Convention," Milliyet, July 24,2000.


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Documents

Yilmaz, I - MEJ 2002 Turkish Law