Yap - Paras vs. Paras

7/29/2019 Yap - Paras vs. Paras

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A.C. No. 5333 October 18, 2000ROSA YAP PARAS vs. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS

THIRD DIVISION[A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000.]

(A.C. No. CBD 371)ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS,respondent.

Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

A disbarment case was filed by Rosa Y. Paras against her husband, Atty. Justode Jesus Paras, charging the latter for forging her signatures in the bank in loandocuments and for immorality for siring a child with another woman. After the partiessubmitted their pleadings and other pieces of evidence, the Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found respondent guilty as charged and recommended hissuspension from the practice of law.

The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendations of the CBD,finding the evidence against the respondent overwhelming. Continued possession ofgood moral character is essential to remain in the practice of law. Disbarment, however,should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,could accomplish the desired end.

SYLLABUS1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW;

REQUIRES CONTINUED POSSESSION OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER; CASE ATBAR. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a conditionprecedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essentialfor remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs.Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below themoral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired adaughter with a woman other than his wife. IaSCTE

2. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; DECREED ONLY IN A SERIOUS CASE OFMISCONDUCT. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and characterof the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs.Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreedwhere any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the enddesired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).

D E C I S I O NMELO, J p:

This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant Rosa YapParas against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tiradesand barbs in their copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting remarks, and insults ateach other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband withdishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and intimidation, andimmorality for siring a child with another woman. Respondent denied the allegations,contending that his wife, in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of hisshare in their multi-million peso conjugal assets.

The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were married onMay 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children. They have vast sugarlands and other

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businesses. Respondent was a Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor intheir town for 2 terms during the administration of President Aquino. Complainant is abusinesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart, when due to "marital strainthat has developed through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live withhis mother and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice.

Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of their marriage, whichcase is still pending in court.

The complaint charged:DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD. . . respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of complainant bycounterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely making it appear that complainant wasthe applicant for said loans. Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated theproceeds of the loans.. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal propertiesbelonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of complainant.

GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT ANDCONCUBINAGERespondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as hemaintained an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimatechild with her while married to complainant.

UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONALCONDUCTRespondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to frighten, harass andintimidate all those who take a position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by

unethically filing complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies toobstruct justice.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions initiatedagainst him, respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail allthe proceedings.(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a Special Powerof Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan authorizing him "to borrowmoney and apply for and secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from theBais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)(2) On the Charge of Forgery:That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that "the questionedsignatures (referring to the alleged forged signatures of complainant) and the standardsample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the sameperson. . ."(Annex "B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wifefiled against him a string of cases for falsification of public documents because heintends to disinherit his children and bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugalproperties to his own mother.(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D.Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the conjugal assets. He cites thedismissal of the complaint for concubinage filed against him by his wife before the CityProsecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence.Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are solicitous andhospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and her daughter, CyndeeRose (named after his own deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house

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and giving them some financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary inhis law office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting her pregnant.(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are legitimatecourses of action done by an embattled lawyer."

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesinvestigated the complaint against respondent, summarizing the causes of action asfollows:(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal assets; and(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching(for) siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant, and, abandonmentof his own family.(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)

No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit theirrespective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of evidence attached to their

pleadings.

Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and recommended:(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months on thefirst charge; and(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law on the secondcharge.(ibid., p. 57)

The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent forfalsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and for

concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the filing of an administrative case fordisbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is requiredfor conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence isnecessary.

The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned signatures(referring to the signatures appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage,etc.) and the standard sample signatures of respondent were written by one and thesame person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras that herhusband forged her signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but hisdenial was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving.

In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on theuncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's children and three othereyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a betterappreciation of their statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, butpresently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn hereby depose and say:1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the College of Nursing,Silliman University.2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My father has leftthe family home in Bindoy and now lives at his mother's house at San Jose Ext.,Dumaguete City.3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn Ching. Theyhave a child named Cyndee Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University HospitalMedical Center on July 19, 1990.4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda whenthey practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When shebecame pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision,Dumaguete City.

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5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in MaayongTubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father spend time there often with Jocelyn and theirchild.6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years, and almostevery time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my

father's law office, and one time, she was washing my father's clothes.7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at San JoseExtension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was there at the time, and when Ilooked at Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my father's daughterwith Jocelyn.8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now deceased).9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and child's clothesin my father's room.10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to her or bealone with her, but she would deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hidingsomething from me." p. 109, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made several visits tomy father at his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he hadmoved after he left our home in Bindoy;2. That these visits were made on different times and different days of the week;3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living at my father'splace. This woman is now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my father's house is thatduring my visits, whether during office hours or after office hours, I would meet her atmy father's place, not his office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as

skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was generallyunkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one occasion, I even saw her, washingmy father's clothes as well as a small child's clothing; and she conducted herself aroundthe house in the manner of someone who lived there; cIHDaE5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living with my fatherfrom Josie Vailoces, who was then a working student living at my father's place;6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my father and Ms.Jocelyn Ching were living together as husband and wife at my father's place in adeposition taken in connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City,Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of thedeposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of this case. For emphasis,photocopies of the pertinent portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is heretoattached as Annexes "A" and "A-1". p. 111, Records

Respondent's son has this to say:"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, butpresently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose andsay:1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School, Dumaguete City.2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a lawyer.3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his mother's house inSan Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not giving us support any more.4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my allowance ofP50.00 a week. I would go to their house at San Jose Extension and personally ask himfor it.5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose Extensionfor my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if myfather was around. Josephus said my father was in his room.

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6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked, I entered theroom without knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman.He was only wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly gave meP100.00 and I left immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed.

8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's house in San JoseExtension. Every time I went to see my father, she was also there.9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she was myfather's "kabit" or concubine.10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father." p. 112, Records

Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is the damagingstatement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was respondent's secretary whenrespondent was mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows:"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident of Malaga,Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in accordance with law, do herebydepose and state that:

1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during hisincumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter'srecommendation and intercession, I was later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the sametown from December 1986 to January 1987.2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I became hispersonal aide and performed various chores for the same. As his personal aide, Istayed in the same house and room with the latter.3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt attracted tomy lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter toa dinner date at Chin Loong Restaurant.4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn Ching, the latter,

Justo J. Paras and myself then had dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on severaloccasions, always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitationswere always accepted by the latter.6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and Ma.Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more intimate with each other.7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening on a Friday, Iaccompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front of the Silliman University MedicalCenter, where he said he was going to meet someone.8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediatelyboarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. Thelatter then requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching)to Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them outside theroom, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said room.10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which the two of thememerged from the room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of theDumaguete City Cockpit.12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place and always on aFriday.13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working for Justo Paras."pp. 56-57, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for a job, havingbeen jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend, Bernard Dejillowas staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying aroom at the second floor of the said house which he shared with me.

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3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job hunting, I metJusto J. Paras. Having not seen each other for some time, we talked for a while,discussing matters about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. EDACSa4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I was staying,to which I answered that I was staying at the aforementioned house. He then requested

me to find out if there was an available room at the said house which he could rent withMa. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo aboutthe matter.5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend Bernard Dejillo aboutthe matter, to which the latter signified his approval. He told me that a room at the firstfloor of the same house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A.Ching.6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard Dejillo's approvalof his request.7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching moved in to theroom she had rented at the first floor of the house I was also staying at.

8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the house and stayovernight. When he came at night Justo J. Paras and I would converse and whileconversing, drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join inour conversation.9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching wouldenter the room rented and sleep there, while I would also go upstairs to my room.10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out of said roomand depart from the house.11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased after about one(1) month when they transferred to another house.12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental some time in

June 1989.13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I went to the houseof Justo J. Paras to consult him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son.When I arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no onethere.14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I proceeded to theresthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not there but the personin charge of the said resthouse informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house atBarangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave medirections so that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able to locate thehouse of Justo J. Paras.17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was home whileknocking on the door.18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon seeing the latter,I asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She then let me in the house and told me to sitdown and wait for a while. She then proceeded to a room.19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room and sat downnear me. I noticed that the latter had just woke up from a nap.20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and sometime later,Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl, about three (3) yearsold, walking around the sala, whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughterof Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching.22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see him at thisoffice at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss thematter some more.23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.

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24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit dated 22 July 1993."pp. 58-60, Records(Ibid., pp. 44-52)

The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the deposition of

two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former repairman of the Paras'household, and, Josie Vailoces, a working student and former ward of the Paras' family,who both gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between respondent andJocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while doingrepair works in the Paras' household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rosepractically living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the otherhand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver money to Ms. Chingfor the payment of the hospital bill after she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces wasalso asked by respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate after thelatter was baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in saidbaptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains

why the latter is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex "1", Rollo)The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by theevidentiary record.

ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATIONOF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATUREThe handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on thesignatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-a-vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loandocuments, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the followingresults:

CONCLUSION:1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS werewritten by one and the same person.2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS werenot written by one and the same person.(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, italics ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged thesignatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no otherconclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paraswere authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the samplesignatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loanfrom the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presenceof the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from thebanks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan documents?The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and onbehalf of the principal using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITYAND CONCUBINAGEThe evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit statements of hischildren and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed theacts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayedfrom the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras whererespondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his namingthe child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn

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Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation thatrespondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimatechild.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition

precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essentialfor remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs.Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below themoral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired adaughter with a woman other than his wife. However, the power to disbar must beexercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriouslyaffects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as amember of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998).Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporarysuspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129[1998]).

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practiceof law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bankdocuments and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practiceof law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties tobe served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's recordas an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesand on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.SO ORDERED.Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION[A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005.]

ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.R E S O L U T I O N

GARCIA, J p:Before us is this verified Petition 1 filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the disbarmentof her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit, malpractice,grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment 2 to the Petition.

In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999, 3 the Court referred the case to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated13 January 2004 4 of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on BarDiscipline, which Report reads in part, as follows:

"Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de JesusParas-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna allsurnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent tosell parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to theirmother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the heirsof Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein. prLL

Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power ofAttorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor ofAurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, NegrosOriental which was with the respondent's full knowledge since he was residing at the

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house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had been inpossession of the subject real property up to the present.

Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to thefact that a free patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondent's name

and upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainantwas able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to theNotice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; overthe aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap;Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed byLedesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signedby respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer oath;Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approvaldated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a FreePatent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.

Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by therespondent without her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit, machinationsand falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed bythe respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal ofhis oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional Responsibility.Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over realproperties which had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and nowstill under the control and possession of complainant's natural family, a fact respondentallegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full knowledge in successfullycausing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprivedthe rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to

pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.xxx xxx xxxIn his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the

owner of the properties and considering that the properties were applied for free patenttitling during their marital union prior to its breakage, complainant was likewise acommunal owner thereof and as such was also complaining against herself.

Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified asforested zone in Matobato were declared and reclassified into public agricultural lands,then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based onactual or known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a publicannouncement that the lands were available for private ownership thru Free Patent

Application available only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos.

Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native ornatural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an

American citizen; complainant and her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply forfree patent over said questioned properties for the reason that respondent had alreadyoccupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner thereof; andcould easily align his right to the property which had been identified in the public surveyas "Heirs of Vicente Paras", otherwise the questioned properties allegedly according tothe Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural born Filipinos.

Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over thecommunal property of him and the complainant as well as those purchased by himincluding the portion whose occupancy of a public land was purchased by Aurora D.Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of them were notqualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free patent; none ofthem being a natural born Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from agratuitous grant of public land from the government.

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Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant theproperties was hatched and executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D.Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the properties from being given by thegovernment to some other qualified persons. He allegedly applied for issuance of freepatent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of the properties in the

concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the government.

Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much lessAmerican citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made any prior demand for the return of thequestioned properties; nor filed a complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law;nor filed an administrative remedy before the DENR for the cancellation andreversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any action in anycivil court for either quieting of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery ofownership or whatever.

Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether

or not complainant or her family were qualified to become grantee of a governmentgratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will decidethat complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were within the ambit of the termnatural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to them rightfullybelong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and that he cannever be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such cession, respondent allegedthat he will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.

Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of allconjugal/communal properties including the herein questioned properties for after he leftthe conjugal home in 1988 possession of all these properties, real and personal were

until now with the complainant and her biological family.

Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit."

Complainant subsequently filed a Reply 5 to respondent's Comment, thereinrefuting respondent's claims that he was used as a "dummy" since complainant and hersiblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their names. Complainant furtheralleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be an officer of the court becauseof his falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the subject real propertysince 1985 when in fact he did not and was never in occupation/possession thereof.

On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order 6noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the instant case for hearing. Severalhearings 7 were conducted wherein complainant presented all her witnesses togetherwith their respective affidavits and supporting documents, 8 which were all subjected tocross-examination by the respondent. Likewise, respondent presented his Counter-

Affidavit 9 and supporting documents.

Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Reportand made a recommendation, as follows:

"From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in havingapplied for free patent over lands owned by another over which he had no actualphysical possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously transferred inthe name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice lawin violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. cSATDC"It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper disciplinaryaction pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.

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"Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for thesuspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a period ofthree (3) months from receipt hereof.

"It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras

is a registered member be furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the saidsuspension for proper enforcement."

Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004, 10 the IBP Board ofGovernors adopted the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but modified thelatter's recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be suspended fromthe practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

The case is now before us for confirmation.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should besanctioned. We find, however, that the recommended penalty is not commensurate tothe gravity of the wrong perpetrated.

The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold theintegrity and dignity of the legal profession 11 as the bar should always maintain a highstandard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its members.By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing hisduties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 12 To this end, nothingshould be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in anydegree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and

integrity of the legal profession. 13

In Marcelo v. Javier, 14 we held:"It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with

conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior andcan only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of thecourt after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading anyconstitutional privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by aproceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold alicense or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must beunderstood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove fromthe profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with theduties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect thepublic and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish theattorney.

"An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of hisduties as an attorney and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated inSection 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as tocover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. It isa settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for disciplinary action is notexclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those specificallyprovided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for anymisconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to bewanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy tocontinue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privilegesand to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conductwhich tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorableopinion of the public."

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Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the Stateupon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualificationsrequired by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements isthe observance of honesty and candor.

And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera, 16 we ruled:"Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorablemembership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the higheststandard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in theirrelations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. Theyare bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to thebest of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and theirclients. . . ."

In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyer'soath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each

lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of theland and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent hasbeen deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and anofficer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over theproperties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by hismother to complainant's sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment thathe filed before this Court when he alleged that the said properties were public landunder the Forestal Zone "when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap someportions of entire occupancy of the Parases". 17 Moreover, respondent committeddeceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when hemanifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the

said lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession andoccupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no less by respondent's ownstatements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.

Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as"natural born citizens", this Court holds that the instant case is not the proper forum toaddress such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the Investigating Commissioner,"[i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violationof the Code of Professional Responsibility". Likewise, any other action which the partiesmay make against each other has no material bearing in this case. For, it must beremembered that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen, 18 held:"Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present

are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not anddoes not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by theCourt into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in nosense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutortherein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primaryobjective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still afit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinarypowers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuationsas an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legalprofession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the professionof members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to beentrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . ."

The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably revealrespondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures

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of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioningsanction from this Court.

At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C.No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus

Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension from the practice of law forsix (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents andother related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice of law on thecharges of immorality and abandonment of his own family.

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondent'sprior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a six (6) month and one (1) yearsuspension from the practice of law, his deplorable behavior in the present case whichgrossly degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehoodin violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court

Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will resultin the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the BarConfidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for theirinformation and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of respondent asattorney.SO ORDERED. DCcHISPanganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.Footnotes

1. Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 3-9.2. Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 266-273.3. Rollo, Vol. I at p. 346.4. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 618-626.5. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 1-5.6. Rollo, Vol. II at p. 11.7. Hearings were conducted on 15 October 1999, 12 November 1999, 16

December 1999 and 27 January 2000.8. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 32-223.9. Rollo, Vol. II at pp. 259-296.

10. Rollo, Vol. II at p. 617.11. Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility.12. Agpalo, R.E., Legal Ethics, [1989 ed.], 87.13. Abragan v. Rodriguez, 429 Phil 607 [2002]; Maligsa v. Cabanting, 338 SCRA 912[1997]; and Fernandez v. Grecia, 223 SCRA 425 [1993].14. 214 SCRA 1 [1992], citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 NY 465, 60 ALR851 [1928]; Ledesma v. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 [1974]; Tajan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154[1974]; Ex parte Wall, 107 US 265, 27 L ed 522, 2 S Ct 569; Quingwa v. Puno, 19SCRA 439 [1967]; Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304 [1975]; Diaz v. Gerong, 141 SCRA46 [1986]; In re Pelaez, 44 Phil 567 [1923]; Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136SCRA 112 [1985]; Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 166 SCRA728 [1988]; and Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil 586 [1956].15. Sebastian v. Calis, 344 SCRA 1 [1999] and Sabayle v. Tandayag, 158 SCRA497 [1988].16. 398 SCRA 1 [2003] with note: The Code of Professional Responsibility requiresin Canon 10 that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court"; Canon 8,"a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards hisprofessional colleagues . . ."; and Canon 15, "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairnessand loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client."

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17. Paragraph 5 (b) of respondent's Comment dated 03 December 1998, Rollo, Vol. Iat p. 268.18. 31 SCRA 562 [1970].

A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007ROSA YAP-PARAS vs. JUSTO PARASSPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4947. June 7, 2007.]ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O NGARCIA, J p:

For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment 1 dated April 11, 2005,filed by herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras,

for the latter's alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted upon him by theCourt. The motion alleges:4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of lawand in fact filed pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that thealleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the running ofthe period to appeal, and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, therespondent be declared in contempt of court and be disbarred.

Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition 2 praying

for the disbarment of her estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging

acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation ofoath as a lawyer committed by the latter.

On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution 3 finding Atty. Paras guiltyof committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from thepractice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of the sameor similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18,2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005. 4

During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, allegingthereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued bythe Court with his continued practice of law.

In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005, 5 denying for lack of meritAtty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, to wit:

Administrative Case No. 4947 ( Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Actingon the respondent's motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolutionof February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one(1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.The Court further Resolves to NOTE:(a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion forreconsideration with leave of Court; HSIDTE(b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of themotion for reconsideration; and

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(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005,praying that respondent be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and toREQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-

movant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment.

After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Courta Manifestation, 6 stating that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) yearsuspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received thedenial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.

It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contemptand/or Disbarment, the Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court forsuch failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.

Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure toTimely File Required Comment 7 was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations inpetitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that hehad never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught orviolate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the RevisedRules of Court.

Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to anerring lawyer disbarment or to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with

this Court's resolutions.

In a number of cases, 8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that thepurpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a meansof livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from members ofthe bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and nobleprofession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is tosafeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who,as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty.Paras violated the Court's suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himselftook the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one-year suspension from lawpractice. 9

It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of theSupreme Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one mayimpute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially by the bar or thelawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that aresolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it becomplied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 10 Court orders are to be respectednot because the justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because ofthe respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of thegovernment. This is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government oflaws and not of men. 11

Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fellshort, of his obligation to follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of theHonorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to hisdeteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary angiogram and

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bypass graft. 12 He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrownessamidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order.

Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in theinstant case, as well petitioner-movant's counsels, to avoid further squabbles and

unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination of therecords reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras andpetitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases betweenthem. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations betweenattorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathyfrom this Court. 13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor andcivility. 14

All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction forAtty. Paras' failure to promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanctionin the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a disciplinary

case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect thedispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct orinefficiency of officers of the court. 15

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED.However, Atty. Justo Paras is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe therespect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Court's resolution, withWARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition ofthe same act.SO ORDERED.Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., is on official leave.Footnotes1. Rollo, pp. 1062-1065.2. Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 3-9.3. Id. at pp. 1000-1009.4. Id. at pp. 1021-1028.5 Id. at p. 1132.6. Id. at pp. 1139-1141.7. Id. at pp. 1165-1173.8. Geeslin v. Navarro, Adm. Case No. 2033 and 2148, May 9, 1990, 185 SCRA

230; citing Diaz v. Gerong, Adm. Case No. 2439, January 16, 1986, 141 SCRA 46 andDaroy, et al. v. Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304 and MarianoY. Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Elena Embang, G.R. No. 158971,

August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154.9. Rollo, p. 1136.

10. Ong v. Grijaldo, Adm. Case No. 4724, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 1 and Guerrerov. Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 591.11. Luis N. De Leon v. Joey Y. Torres, 99 Phil. 462.12. Rollo, p. 1166.13. Asa vs. Castillo, Adm. Case No. 6501, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 309.14. Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility.15. Gamilla v. Marino, Jr., Adm. Case No. 4763, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 308.

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