Bringing National Character Back in:

Notes on Israeli Existential Anxiety

Gad Yair

Working Paper CSGP 12/2

Trent University, Canada

www.trentu.ca/globalpolitics

"To become aware of the peculiarities of the habitus of one's own nation requires a

specific effort of self-distancing" .

Israeli society and politics often appall diplomats and foreign observers. Commentators

are bewildered by what seems to be Israeli aggression, irrationality and stubbornness.

Some foreign commentators suggest, indeed, that Israeli actions are blatant, excessive

and even paranoid. Examples of such astounding Israeli behavior are offered by

expanding settlements in response to international pressure or by evading UN fact-

finding missions. Other occasions for such perceptions are apparent in Israeli criticisms

against the UN and the USA, not to mention its lesser supporters outside the Middle East.

No less astounding are Israeli critiques and political actions against Nobel laureates like

Günter Grass, José Saramago, and even more surprising against Jewish peace

prizewinner Elie Wiesel.

Israelis, in contrast, view these actions as fitting the Israeli cultural psyche. True,

some admire the apparent oddities, others criticize them. Either way, most Israelis

understand the cultural logic behind these seemingly odd actions. This paper explains

these apparent oddities by showing that beneath the virile and aggressive character of the

Israelis lies a persistent and endemic existential fear of annihilation. It does so by an

empirical study of the cultural constitution of the Israeli national character and explains

its core – existential anxiety and a sense of impending annihilation – using a cultural

sociology of trauma and collective identity.

The attempt to describe the Israeli "national character" might be rejected offhand

as politically incorrect and scientifically defunct. As Kuipers admitted in analyzing the

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Dutch national habitus, "the notion of ‘national character’ is not entirely pleasant" .

Furthermore, the pursuit of "the deep cultural codes" of the Israeli national character

might likewise be criticized as an exercise in essentialism . Moreover, some scholars

might evaluate the inquiry into the Israeli national character as a simplistic and

stereotypical exercise in cultural reductionism . Granting those probable criticisms, this

paper begs to differ.

By differing, the present paper will salvage the concept of "national character"

from the clutches of political correctness and psychological reductionism while providing

keys for understanding Israeli culture and politics. Following recent studies of the

German, Dutch, Danish, Austrian and the British national character , it suggests that

sociology would be greatly vitalized by bringing back the study of national character and

culture and personality . Broadening on this re-emerging paradigm , I provide a specific

case study of the Israeli habitus while exposing the benefits of a cultural analysis of

national trauma, collective identity and character.

The paper sets off by describing the rise and fall of the idea of "national

character" in sociology. It then reviews recent analyses of trauma by cultural sociologists.

This developing field provides an original rendition of the interplay between culture,

trauma and national character and will thus be the springboard for the Israeli case. The

paper continues with an elaborate empirical analysis of the Israeli national character. The

empirical study uses interviews with and observations by Israeli and international

students. Those are complemented with interviews and questionnaires for wider

audiences. Using a synthetic approach, the analyses expose a central cultural code of the

Israeli national character, namely existential anxiety. The evidence suggests that attempts

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to understand Israeli society and politics would profit from engaging with cultural trauma

and national character.

The Rise and Fall of "National Character" in Sociology

The study of national character engaged the leading anthropologists of the twentieth

century. Ruth Benedict led this promising path through her study of the Japanese national

character . Her ground-breaking study was soon followed by other studies of the

character of the American , Russian and German national characters . The sense was that

the social sciences hold the key for understanding global issues. Indeed, only forty years

ago DeVos suggested that “considerations of national character are having considerable

influence in augmenting theoretical approaches in economics and political science” . Don

Martindale buttressed this position in reflecting on the idea of national character,

suggesting that “Sociologists could, potentially, contribute much to the understanding of

nationalism, the parochialism of our age, and the traits men display as they confront one

another across national boundaries” . At the time, the potential for the anthropology and

the sociology of national character seemed immense .

By the 1970s, however, the sociological study of national character was almost

wiped out. There is little doubt that the sociological concept of “national character” and

the kindred one in anthropology, “culture and personality” have fallen into disciplinary

disrepute. A president of the American Anthropological Association, E. Adamson Hoebel

said, already in 1967, that “In the brief span of less than two decades, anthropological

involvement in the systematic study of national character has waxed to a high pitch of

enthusiasm and waned to a tiny ripple of continuing interest” . Daniel Bell reiterated this

assessment in his blurb on Alex Inkeles’ book on national character, saying that “The

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field of ‘national character’ has risen and fallen over the years.” The demise of “national

character” in sociology and anthropology was already heralded by Spiro in 1972, saying

that “having succeeded in legitimizing the use of personality concepts by anthropology, it

might be argued that [national character study's] original mission has come to an end” .

Reflecting this fall into disrepute, recently published dictionaries of sociology

have either abstained from engaging with those concepts or referenced them whilst

acknowledging that “culture-and-personality studies have little currency in contemporary

anthropology and sociology” . Similar ignorance is apparent in re cent major surveys of

the discipline of sociology .

One major reason for the decline of studies of national character was the

dominance of a psychoanalytic approach that also animated the school of “culture and

personality” in anthropology. Psychiatrists, sociologists and anthropologists used to

derive national character from child-rearing practices. Examples of this approach were

given by attempts to reduce adult obedience to domineering father-child relations in

Germany or to attribute the effects of child swaddling to the tendency to revolt in Russia.

Over the long haul, these seemingly powerful instruments proved to be ineffective. As

Martindale said, while the study of national character is of immense importance, it was “a

radical error to derive national character from family structure, toilet training, child care,

etc.” .

Another explanation for the demise of studies of national character refers to the

traumatic burden that such explanations carried after National Socialism. As Elias said in

writing about the German national character, "The hypersensitivity towards anything that

recalls National Socialist doctrine results in the problem of 'national character' being

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largely shrouded in silence" . This post-traumatic stance reflects a post-WWII reaction

against the psychological characterization of populations. For example, the authors of a

major study of national character, appearing in Science in 2005, argue that “national

character also has a much darker side. When stereotypes of national or ethnic groups are

unfavorable, they can lead to prejudice, discrimination, or persecution, of which history

and the world today are full of tragic examples” . Another article reminded the readers

that “claims that perceived differences in national character reflect genetic differences

between ethnic or cultural groups” are false and that “that mistaken belief has served as

the basis for discrimination, intergroup conflict, and, in some tragic cases, genocide” .

While sociologists and anthropologists have shunned the idea of national

character, scholars in other fields seem to have thrived on it. Geert Hofstede – a Dutch

comparative analyst of business – launched one of the most influential paradigms in the

study of culture and national character at the very time that sociologists decided to

abandon it. According to Hofstede, cultural values constitute “mental programs” or

“software of the mind” – discrete elements which direct family patterns, education

systems, legislative codes, and even political systems . Hofstede’s theory uses the concept

of habitus like Bourdieu and Elias do . He suggests that the “mental software” that

cultures constitute is “usually unconscious conditioning which leaves individuals

considerable freedom to think, feel, and act but within the constraints of what his or her

social environment offers in terms of possible thoughts, feelings, and actions” .

Similarly, work by comparative psychologists and other professors of business

shows that the idea of national character is indeed alive and kicking . For example, Terry

Clark suggested that market analysts should pay close attention to national variations in

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tastes and preferences ; Langlois suggested that corporate codes of ethics reflect national

idiosyncrasies ; and Smith suggested that response rates in international surveys should

be interpreted through national communication styles . A recent publication in Science

(2005) has indeed brought the idea of national character into the limelight, inviting

corroboration and critique .

Cultural Trauma and the Israeli National Character

As Kuipers suggested recently (2012), sociologists should ask "through which processes

do people in a country become alike? Under what conditions does such a national

ground-tone in behaviour, institutions and standards emerge?" (p. 6). Several prominent

scholars have begun providing answers for this important question by studying the role of

national trauma in creating collective identities . The evolving comparative study of

trauma and collective identity in different settings might indeed constitute a breakthrough

in the study of national character . Trauma, suggest those studies, is a critical historical

event that stands at the basis of national culture and collective identity. It is a past long-

forgotten – or a fabricated past that creates fictional histories with similar effects – that

sends expressions through people's actions even centuries after the historical (or

fabricated) event.

New studies have mapped the role of trauma in different countries and minority

groups . They show that contemporary actions emanate from critical historical events that

continue directing thoughts and actions even generations after the traumatic event. Elias –

for example – suggested that in order to understand the German national character one

has to realize the catastrophe of the Thirty Years War and the experience of repeated

defeats to foreign powers . This ancient traumatic past, he suggested, has clear signs in

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contemporary German national character traits like humiliation and idealism. As

collective memory proponents suggested, indeed, "Origin, rise, and fall are remembered

and commemorated [by nations] because they are believed to conspicuously affect the

subsequent experience of a people" . Overall, studies of traumatic constitutive moments

suggest that contemporary cultural phenomena are often unconscious post-traumatic

reactions to a group’s troubled or victimized past.

Israeli culture and national character provide a good example of this past-that-

structures-the-present effect of national trauma. Prior studies of Israeli culture have

indeed suggested that Israeli culture is constituted by trauma, whether ancient or recent,

historical or mythical . Some scholars direct attention to the role that the Holocaust plays

in constituting Israeli culture and identity . Others expose the ways in which values and

ideals in contemporary Israel are constituted by Biblical roots . Yet other scholars point to

the centrality of post-trauma or to the role of perpetrator trauma on the Israeli national

psyche. Few of those studies, however, use those depictions to interpret the unique

underlying habitus of the Israeli national character. The present endeavor surpasses those

prior contributions by extending Elias’ work on the theme of a national habitus. It does so

by using the notion of cultural trauma to depict the major code that constitutes the Israeli

habitus or national character, namely existential anxiety.

Methods

Strategy: The present study extends prior work in utilizing the methodological advantage

achieved when applying a foreign point of view to study local cultural values and

practices . It broadens this approach into a dialectical process involving the conjunction

between foreign and local perspectives. Specifically, the study uses the perspective of

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international students while complementing their perspective with that offered by local

Israeli students. The dialectical move between emic and etic perspectives provides

insights that neither approach could have provided. Actually, the present endeavor

follows on the dictum of sociologist Norbert Elias, who said that:

"The central question is how the fortunes of a nation over the centuries

become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members. Sociologists

face a task here which distantly recalls the task which Freud tackled. He

attempted to show the connection between the outcome of the conflict-ridden

channeling of drives in a person's development and his or her resulting

habitus. But there are also analogous connections between a people's long-

term fortunes and experiences and their social habitus at any subsequent

time…it is a matter of bringing back into consciousness, quite often in the

face of strong resistance, things which have been forgotten. In the one as in

the other, such an undertaking requires self-distancing, and may, if

successful, contribute to the loosening of rigid models of behavior" .

Sample: Evidence for this study was gathered by different means. Ninety foreign and

Israeli students provided ten weekly observations, each about varied facets of

“Israeliness” - bringing the number of available observations to almost eight hundred.

Those students also conducted three in-depth interviews with Israeli and non-Israeli

respondents. About two hundred useable interviews were brought to the workbench (see

Appendix 1 for a sample interview protocol). Furthermore, graduates of the Rothberg

International School – many of whom spent a year or two in Israel and were back in their

home countries – responded to online questionnaires. Thirty such detailed questionnaires

were used in the present analysis.

Interpretation: The present paper extends a synthetic methodological approach.

Specifically, I use observations, interviews and questionnaires to analyze the varied

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levels of Israeli existential anxiety while situating them in a broader discursive

framework – collating information from different external spheres: cultural, political, as

well as from media and art. By synthesizing those domains and types of evidence, I bring

into focus the varied yet consistent themes of Israeli existential anxiety and the way they

appear in the Israeli national character. This synthetic approach helps increase the

validity of the argument.

Generalizability: The present paper describes the Israeli national character. However,

not all Israeli citizens are Israeli by culture. I show that a traumatic Zionist cultural

narrative constitutes the Israeli national character, but not all Israeli citizens share this

habitus. Indeed, Israeli Palestinians have a different trauma and cultural story of

constitution. Similarly, ultra-Orthodox Jews living in Israel have their own cultural

narrative about the past, present and future. Therefore, we can only generalize the

findings below to those Israelis who share in the Zionist worldview.

Results

Pogroms, Holocaust, Missiles and Terror: The Israeli Existential Anxiety

The Israeli habitus is constituted by existential anxiety. Israelis are constantly reminded

of their possible annihilation and they repeatedly refer to past attempts to exterminate the

Jews. As one interviewee said, "We always feel like we have to defend ourselves, even if

we don't. We always feel like somebody is after us." This typical fear is latently present

on a daily basis. However, in times of crisis – manufactured or real – it climbs to uneasy

heights. Either way, this existential fear colors the worldview of Israelis, who seem to be

living in a constant state of emergency . This Israeli existential anxiety is apparent in

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small daily events. One Israeli student, for example, reported a casual conversation over

the dinner table.

We were sitting with a couple of Israeli friends now living in the USA. Both

couples are professionals and well off. As the evening winded down, a

delusional conversation ensued: 'When anti-Semitism strikes you in the USA,

we will send you airborne evacuation missions', we said. 'No', they retorted,

'when atomic missiles are launched against Israel, we will open the gates for

you in America.' Although we all seem to have a great future, we all entertain

the thought that a total apocalypse is about to take place."

Such conversations are the tip of an anxious iceberg. Israelis casually ask themselves how

long Israel will survive in the Middle East. They often reply to themselves: “Less than a

generation”, or “In 40 years we are out.” As a 35 year-old interviewee suggested, indeed,

"It feels uncertain – not safe, not sure what’s going to happen. It’s like a movie that you

don’t know the ending. It’s exciting, but I keep my mind open all the time, especially

about where to live. I’m open to leave, I’m open to stay. You don’t know if it’s for a long

time, if it’s going to finish soon. So it’s definitely not certain. I don’t feel that it’s certain

for Israel to exist, to continue, so it’s definitely challenging." This sense of imminent

danger and annihilation is indeed common . An American student who took a job in an

Israeli political organization provided another example for this recurrent Israeli table talk:

One day after work, a few of my co-workers came to my house and we (once

again) started “talking politics”. The topic of debate was whether or not Israel

is in existential danger. The debate that followed was a heated one. We went

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around the room asking each person whether or not he/she believed that Israel

will exist in 100 years. The surprising result was an even split.

The Israelis are fully aware, then, of their fear. However, they are also aware of its

consequences. As one interviewee said, "I think a victim can turn into an aggressor. And

it’s part of many Israelis; this is what happened to them in their collective historical

experience. If we shall not be strong, if we shall not be aggressive, we will be killed.

They will want us out of here; we have nowhere to go; this is why we have to be strong.

The experience is that you either devour or you will be devoured." Israelis, indeed, use

their existential fear for interpreting their society. One student, for example, explained

Israeli voluntaristic behaviors by reference to existential anxiety.

The feeling here is that our existence is contingent, that there's a possibility

that we shall not survive the next attack and that we will be wiped off the

map, that nothing here is safe or stable. This is why we need an army, this is

why we have to keep it strong, so it can protect us in times of need. Because

the anxiety is so strong, there's a sense that each one of us has to take care of

the army. We are not sure that the Israeli state is strong enough without our

helping hand, so we voluntarily help as much as we can.

There are many faces to the Israeli existential anxiety. In the following analyses I

separate it into four distinct levels: The mythological, the historical, the realistic, and the

level of political illegitimacy. I detail below the various ways in which each level creates,

reproduces and strengthens the cultural code that constitutes the Israeli national character.

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The Mythological Basis

The Israelis associate their personal lives with the long mythological or historical chain

of the Jewish predicament. They have this chain in mind when they use it to draw

existential conclusions about their personal circumstances or about Israel's geo-political

standing. International students mentioned their surprise at hearing Israelis expressing

doubts about the future existence of Israel, and they were shocked by their authentic

suspicion that their time in the Middle East is elapsing. As one Israeli respondent said in

an interview,

The Israeli is a victim. He is a victim of the circumstances that made him an

Israeli. Israel was created following the Holocaust, following the history that

preceded it. The Israelis are educated on those visions and they are taught that

they can never escape this, can never ignore, and can never live without being

aware of the constant threat against their existence. You are constantly

walking with the thought that someone might hurt you, that Israel can be

wiped out with an atom bomb.

Israelis often retell themselves their long history of attempted annihilation by

dispersion or murder. The Israeli calendar is in fact strewn with holidays and memorials

that remind them of their apocalyptic history. Such constant and repetitive reminders

reconstitute the mythological basis for their anxiety. Every Passover the Israelis recount

the biblical story of exile and the attempted annihilation of the Israelites in Egypt,

reminding themselves why the state of Israel is the only antidote against ant-Semitism

and programs of annihilation. This yearly event is complemented by stories of the

destruction of Jerusalem and exile to Babylon and Rome. School books complement this

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mythological strip of exile with stories about expulsion from Britain and Spain and about

pogroms in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the mythological past is ever present in the

Israeli habitus. Moreover, this past always speaks about persecution, exile and pogroms.

As an 28 year old interviewee said, "Because of the history, because of the Holocaust and

the Inquisition and everything...Israelis, and Jewish people, really see themselves as

outsiders, people who are different from the Nations. We always feel like we have to

defend ourselves, even if we don’t. We always feel like somebody is after us."

Another interviewee added that "You are constantly told ‘beware of this, beware of

that…’ You always know that the ancient Egyptians and the Holocaust, true, they chased

us and they still chase us the world over, and somewhere you feel that now you have a

state that you can feel relaxed in, and say 'I feel good', but I don't know…it's like we

always want to suffer." Indeed, the Zionist story about the mythological Jewish

predicament and the necessity of a strong Jewish state is ever present in the Israeli

consciousness. As another interviewee said, "The Holocaust unites people in that people

realize that there are people out there who don’t like Jews…this was after the Inquisition,

the pogroms in Russia, going back to Egypt. I think Jews have always known that they

are foreigners." This kind of historical consciousness is part of the Israeli national

character, embodying a vision of the past, the present and the future . Another reflexive

student was accurate in describing this mythological chain of persecution as the reason

for the Israeli existential anxiety:

This is holidays' season. We had Purim and then Passover; during the coming

week we will weep in the Holocaust Memorial Day, then we shall stand

upright remembering the dead in war and then we shall rejoice on

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Independence Day. There is always risk in those holidays. There is no dull

moment in the Jewish state – we live under the decree of emergency hour,

and this is a long, a very long hour. It began in the origins of time; it would

end at its end. In Purim the Persians attempted to kill us Jews; on Passover,

many years before, those were the Egyptians; The Holocaust – our friends the

Germans; Day of Remembrance – mostly the Arabs. And on Independence

Day we celebrate the existence of Israel against all odds and in defiance of

many countries in the world. Thousands of years of persecution are

compressed into six weeks, like a hammer that bangs our heads every year,

joining our blood to the mythological streams of Jewish blood.

Israeli political leaders often reference this Zionist mythological or historical

perspective; lay people do so just as well. For example, in 2010 the Israeli president

Shimon Peres criticized England, saying that "in England there has always been

something deeply pro-Arab - of course, not among all Englishmen - and anti-Israeli, in

the establishment…They abstained in the [pro-Zionist] 1947 UN partition

resolution...They maintained an arms embargo against us in the 1950s...They always

worked against us" (The Telegraph, 31 July 2010). In this statement president Peres was

giving voice to the widespread Israeli fear of being chronically haunted by world anti-

Semitism; of failing to get the legitimacy it so keenly seeks.

One respondent was very clear in explaining this mythological traumatic position.

As he said, "It all relates to the psychoanalysis of the Jewish people and its leaders. The

Holocaust syndrome, the existential anxiety…This existential anxiety drives the whole

thing. It feeds values that 'we will take care of our own' or that 'we shall not be dependent

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on others' and 'no one will tell us what to do' and ‘we shall attack and destroy’ and things

like that." Yair Lapid, a former leading journalist and would be politician, wrote in his

column that "Every Israeli…knows that our existence is fragile. Our houses, malls, the

roads we paved…are but a thin camouflage net that covers our persistent anxiety from

those seeking to kill us" (Yediot A'haronot, April 9, 2010). As an old interviewee

suggested, history "provides the Israelis the thought that they have to be good, because if

we fail to be good they will eat us up. We will be annihilated."

When confronting obstacles or threats, Israelis often say: "We overcame Pharaoh;

we shall overcome this challenge too." In some holidays, like Passover, they say the short

version: "They tried to kill us, they failed, let's eat." In using those statements the Israelis

make a clear connection with their mythic past. "Not our mythological forefathers

overcame Pharaoh," they say, "rather we did. We are part of the myth; we shall now

extend its relevance." This cultural sense of assuredness – of being able to rise to

historical or personal challenges – covers up a deeper anxiety, namely that in the

upcoming trial they might actually not rise to the challenge; that a pogrom, exile or

annihilation is actually in store; that next time they might not get to eat.

History: The Centrality of the Holocaust

Notwithstanding its singularity in world history, the Holocaust is often tied to or

mentioned in conjunction with the mythical catastrophic past of the Jewish people. It is

often presented as one piece in the long chain of anti-Semitism and pogroms perpetrated

against the Jews in exile. Gideon Hausner, Eichmann's prosecutor in 1961, provided the

paradigmatic Zionist narrative in his opening statement of the trial:

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The book of Israel's history is soaked with suffering and tears. The

commandment "In blood shall you live" accompanies our nation as of its

appearance in world history. Pharaoh in Egypt decided to torture the Israelites

in suffering and to throw their first-borns to the Nile. Haman ordered to

annihilate, kill or crush them; Khmelnytsky massacred the masses;

Petliura perpetrated pogroms against them. But throughout the bloody trail of

this people…not one man perpetrated to do what Hitler's regime of evil has

done and Eichmann executed with the arm aiming to annihilate the Jewish

people.

The centrality of the Holocaust in the Israeli habitus reflects its centrality in the

identity of the State of Israel as a Jewish nation. The Israeli state uses the Holocaust for

external and internal legitimacy. It recurrently uses Yad Vashem – the central memorial

for the Holocaust – to explain to foreign diplomats why Zionism is the only tenable

solution for the Jewish predicament. There is a national Memorial Day for the Holocaust

with national ceremonies accompanying a nationwide day of mourning where all

entertainment establishments are closed for 24 hours. During the day a siren goes off in

the streets and all Israelis stand still for two minutes - the country comes to a complete

standstill. These state-administered practices remind the Israelis of the presence of the

Holocaust and bring back into consciousness fear of its recurrence.

Consequently, most Israelis see the Holocaust as the central core of their habitus. It

is an interpretive schema they use for understanding their personal lives or the state of

their nation . Prior studies have in fact suggested that Israelis see the Holocaust as a

trauma that explains their personal lives (e.g., being gay as a result of having no father).

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They often think of themselves as post-traumatic victims, even though most do not have

direct family connections with Holocaust victims . The Holocaust looms large as an

endangering risk, proof of the eternal hate of the nations. The Holocaust is also seen as

the justification for a strong Israeli standing. One adult interviewee suggested, for

example, that "The Holocaust exists in the psyche of every Israeli; it constitutes the genes

of the Jewish Israelis."

Our findings show that Israelis also read contemporary events through the lens of

the Holocaust; and that they also see the Holocaust as a decisive link in the long historical

chain of anti-Semitism. This makes the Holocaust a primary cultural factor in driving the

Israeli fear of annihilation and their assessment that such an event might actually happen

once more. As one interviewee suggested, "I think the long shadow of the Holocaust

hovers above the Israelis. On average, the Israelis think that all the world's countries are

against them…everything here is affected by experience of exile." Another interviewee

suggested that the central core of the Israeli identity is "The Holocaust syndrome or you

can translate that to existential anxiety. It's the symptom of the former. The Holocaust

syndrome is the deep thing here. That it shall not happen to us again, and the anxiety is its

form of expression." Another interviewee affirmed that "Definitely, the traumas are part

of what defines us. Many live here in fear that soon we will not exist. It creates

aggression, exclusiveness, hostility. But sometimes it unifies – especially around

justifiable wars." He added that a visit to Poland made him realize that he will always be

a stranger and that Israel is, indeed, the only place for him. Another respondent suggested

that the Israeli habitus is constituted around a sense of "Shared fate, that if we shall not

have a state we shall not survive either. You can always see the Holocaust in that and

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things like that…let's win all together, because if we are not in it together then nobody

here will exist."

Moreover, the Holocaust is present in daily conversations and Israelis will often

refer to Hitler or Auschwitz while speaking. Examples of such family discussions were

provided by several people who described a game their families play around the dinner

table, namely the A-B-C of the Holocaust. "A is Auschwitz, B is B-Zyklon, C is

Chelmno" can be one version, and there are many variations of it.

Furthermore, when asked about the moments where they felt proud, interviewees

often referenced the Holocaust. As one of them suggested, "I felt proud when we visited

the concentration camps in Poland. It gives pride and shows our strength. Look where we

arrived from. When you are there you feel proud and powerful [for being Israeli]." As an

Irish immigrant to Israel said, "Yes, the Holocaust has definite consequences here. The

Israeli stress on family life, the longing for continuation, which is quite rare in the first

world, seems to me to be the result of trauma…It also creates this tendency to blame non-

Jews who criticize Israel as anti-Semites."

The Realistic Level: Terror and Iran

The Israeli existential anxiety has deep mythological and historical roots but it also feeds

on ever-mounting threats to its security. Israelis are often reminded of calls to annihilate

them – whether in Iranian or Neo-Nazi circles. Periods of suicide terror leave their mark

for years, so does shelling from Gaza and rocket campaigns from Lebanon. These ever-

conscious risks are accompanied by sub-conscious messages that preparation for war

sends. The presence of gas masks at home, construction of bullet-proof rooms in each

house, security checks in central bus stations, restaurants and cafés, and yearly war drills

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for the civil population, all send a latent message that terror and possible annihilation are

imminent. Interviewees were asked if they were concerned about Iran and the seemingly

imminent threat it poses. One respondent admitted that “yes, Iran is scary. I don’t think

they’ll have a nuclear bomb tomorrow, and I don’t think about it all the time, but when I

do…yes, of course it’s scary.” Another interviewee had a slightly different response,

saying that “yes, I’m a little worried, but mostly not. There’s a theoretical threat, not too

much, but it could happen. I’m not really afraid for myself, but I am worried for the state

of Israel and its existence.”

Though imminent, the threats against Israel are understood through the biblical

saying that every generation faces the risk of annihilation. As an American student said,

"War is seemingly around every corner…and yet it seems easy enough to ignore if you do

not quietly appreciate the guards and off-duty soldiers that are present in the streets, pubs,

universities, buses etc." His peer added that because of their position in the Middle East,

the "Israelis know they can’t let their guard down." An Israeli student provided another

original interpretation for this realistic existential anxiety in reading a recent war-

preparation flier:

This is how I read this flier. We live here in clear, immediate and permanent

danger. Every moment is emergency time. The siren never stops here. This is

why we have to be prepared. Prepare for missiles, prepare to die. The time to

prepare is between a millisecond and three minutes. This is the time frame for

life in emergency, which is now, our present time…live the moment and take

4 liters of water, food (best are cans or snacks), emergency lighting, radio

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(with batteries), emergency kit, list of telephone numbers (to call and say

goodbye) and a few games for passing the time.

As of the first Gulf War, the Israelis live with gas masks at home and a shelter from

rockets. The army constantly reminds civilians that Iran plans to attack and annihilate

Israel. In addition, the IDF sends civilians the messages that “It’s better to be safe than

sorry” and that “One should be ready just in case.” Constant emergency precautions

create fears that are only partly numbed by extraordinary security measures. As one

American student suggested, "People are pretty obsessed with news about politics and

what relates to security and security-issues."

Visitors, indeed, sense that Israelis are obsessed with security. "Israel is obsessed

with security," said one interviewee. "Sometimes I thought I could understand why and

sometimes I tried hard to understand," she added. Her colleague admitted that "I think the

Israeli ‘obsession’ with security is justified, because you never know what is going to

happen with terrorism." Other respondents argued, however, that the Israelis exaggerate

their concerns with security. "The Israelis," wrote a French student, "are schizophrenic:

They know that Israel might not be here in the future, but they behave as though

everything is fine." Some observers pointed to concrete concerns with terror, while others

thought that this obsession is overblown by past traumas. As another interviewee

suggested,

Israelis are obsessed in some ways with security - the roads are very secure

and the checkpoints, but it seems ridiculous to have security going into every

bus station and university and mall when the guards don't even check your

bag…on the one hand they are justifiably militaristic and paranoid about

20

Islamic terror attacks, and racist towards Arabs, but on the other hand they

seem much more open-minded than Americans or Australians for example,

probably because they are right in the middle of everything and they just have

to live with it.

Israelis would often admit to being afraid of being blown up in buses, developing

expertise in choosing seats that minimize the effects of an impending blast. Visible

memorial places and commemoration sites provide reminders of terror attacks. Such

reminders accompany visible security measures – culminating in a sense that one is

always in a state of exception, in a regime of risk. As an American student observed,

"There also seem to be a lot of civilians carrying weapons for whatever reason. I can’t

count the number of times I’ve seen someone walking across campus or kicking a soccer

ball in the park with a pistol sticking out of the back of his shirt." Another American

student provided the following testimony about the existential fear of a young Israeli girl

she tutors.

I was hanging out with a fifth grade Israeli girl who I mentor. Some students

walked by collecting money for charity. The girl I was with was excited to

tell me that when she is in the seventh grade she will get to collect money for

charity too. She said that she will go door to door asking people to donate

money. But then she commented that she would never go door to door in an

Arab neighborhood. She said she would be too scared. I asked her why she

would be so scared. She looked at me like I was stupid and said in a very

matter of fact manner: "Because the Arabs want to kill us".

21

There are many contemporary threats to Israel's security, indeed – Iran's

declarations to annihilate Israel with atomic weapons, the Hezbollah's threat to rocket

Israel and the repeated attempts of Hamas groups to launch suicide terrorists.

Notwithstanding their differences, they all fit into the historical categories that Israelis

use to differentiate between 'us' and 'them', between Jews and gentiles, between those

who support Israel and those against. Concretely, the Israelis categorize Ahmadinejad

with Hitler, Haman and Pharaoh, reflecting their cultural division between their

victimized selves and their perpetrators. But in using these cultural categories they also

adopt the moral of the biblical story, namely that the gentiles were always against the

Jews, and hence that they are now against the Israelis.

This fear of the biblical "Amalek" repeats in daily conversations about the

reappearance of anti-Semitism and hate against Israel. The cultural trauma of the Israelis

makes them highly vigilant in tracking down signs of anti-Semitism the world over. For

example, after the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Yad Vashem in Israel, the chairman of

the institute, Avner Shalev, remarked that "What I felt was missing is a direct reference to

anti-Semitism…I am not sure why that element was missing, especially given the rising

signs of anti-Semitism in the world." Shalev's explicit comment is mild given its latent

Israeli intent, namely that the Pope served in the Nazi army, and by ignoring the Israeli

perspective proved to have remained an anti-Semite. Many Israelis have expressed

similar ideas in talkbacks and other public media. This case is but an example of a

consistent Israeli watchful eye for anti-Semites.

Another example was provided by Günter Grass's poem, published in 2012,

criticizing Israel for being the true danger for world peace (rather than Iran). This event

22

generated a storm of reactions that adopted the "anti-Semite" narrative. Israelis

proclaimed that Grass had come out of the closet as a true hater of Israel. Another

example was provided by Norwegian "peace sociologist" Joan Galtung who was recently

relegated into the same cultural drawer of "neo-Nazis and anti-Semites" after announcing

that "six Jewish companies own 96% of the world's media," and that this is reason to

consult "the protocols of the elders of Zion." Galtung’s proclamation that "This bond

between Judaism and American Christianity is the key problem today" for peace in the

Middle East was reason for another stormy yet frightened Israeli reaction. Such cases are

proof for the Israelis that the ghosts of anti-Semitism are alive and kicking; that they

should therefore fear European peace offers because those are conceived as the

"continuation of Jewish annihilation by peaceful means."

The constant Israeli suspicion toward the world was depicted by The Economist in

its portrayal of Israel as locked by a "siege mentality" (June 3rd, 2010). This depiction

echoes the famous Masada myth (described below) that the Israelis often envision as their

existential predicament . Indeed, Israelis will often explain their anxiety by referencing

the geo-political standing of Israel: A small nation of 5.5 million Jews surrounded by 22

Moslem countries with 300 million hostile Arabs. The Israelis refer to the Masada myth –

the Jews committing collective suicide in response to the Roman occupation – to promise

themselves that "it will never happen again." This existential fear and the cultural scheme

they use to bifurcate between "friend-or-foe" have clear repercussions. As the Economist

suggested, "Israel is caught in a vicious circle. The more its hawks think the outside

world will always hate it, the more it tends to shoot opponents first and ask questions

later, and the more it finds that the world is indeed full of enemies" (ibid). While this

23

might be true, the Economist failed to appreciate that the Israelis perceive themselves –

not Hamas' Gaza – as the true besieged country. The Israelis view events like the flotilla

convoy as one more proof point for their Masada lesson. Indeed, this Israeli cultural code

resurfaces when pro-Palestinian supporters try arriving in the region; the Israelis also

reproduced it whilst seeing the Arab spring turning into Moslem fundamentalism. Their

existential anxiety colors their vision dark. Consequently they surround their worldview

with a metaphoric hostile barbwire.

This suspicion of an ever-cloudy and dangerous world is accompanied by an Israeli

unwillingness to listen to others or heed to their suggestions. This cultural tendency is

seen in private arenas just as in political ones. For example, a student suggested that "The

[Israeli] perception of ‘goyim’ (non-Jews) – especially in discussions about things like

the Holocaust and the Palestinian conflict – [is odd]. If you do not clearly identify

yourself as a Jew or as an Israeli, your Israeli counterpart will often not want to listen to

your arguments at all." This egocentric posture reflects a deep cultural suspicion vis-à-vis

non-Israelis.

The siege syndrome has political manifestations too, notable being the Israeli

refusal to pay attention to the Goldstone report (after the Gaza campaign of 2010) and the

consistent Israeli defiance of UN missions and committees. In reacting to a recent UN

attempt to send a fact-finding mission to the occupied territories, the Israeli foreign

ministry graphically announced that “If anyone from the council calls us, we just won’t

answer the phone” (The Times of Israel, March 26 2012). This passionate position hides

the more decisive factor of existential fear.

24

The Israeli existential anxiety is pumped up in non-military areas as well. The

government has launched a massive campaign for saving water under the title "Israel is

Drying Out." The highly successful campaign aimed to convince Israelis that they have to

limit water use in order to halt deforestation – and it was presented as having the same

strategic importance as Israel's geo-political standing in the Middle East. Indeed, in 2009

the campaign won the "most loved" commercial by the Israeli public. This fear of drying

out repeats over the last decades with a collective public concern for the drying up of

Lake Galilee, often conceived of as the green springboard of the Zionist movement. The

Israelis equate the level of water in the lake as their existential clock – as it goes down,

they say, our time here dries up.

The Never Ending Story: Strategic Non-Legitimacy

The fourth facet of Israeli existential anxiety reflects chronic sentiments of

Israel’s illegitimacy. The Moslem world is unwilling to accept a Jewish state in the

Middle East, and most countries express criticism against it. Israelis often experience

anxiety that the Zionist state will not survive in the Middle East for the long haul. They

are afraid that anti-Semitism will eventually challenge their very existence. Such was the

case when the UN equated Zionism with racism, and those are the feelings when British

academics call to ban Israelis or forbid them from entering the UK. Repeated calls to ban

Israeli products or artistic performance remind Israelis that their future is akin to ice in

warming climate. UN-led resolutions like the one adopted in Durban or fact-finding

missions like Goldstone's committee strengthens the sense of siege and the fear that,

politically and diplomatically, Israel is on its own.

25

As a result, Israelis are preoccupied with gaining legitimacy or with being

accepted by the world. As one respondent suggested, "This syndrome reflects the

weakness of exile. We are waiting for the approval of others…A Jewish state that came

into being for protecting Jews always needs the consent of the rest of the world, cause

otherwise it has no legitimacy. We want them to acknowledge that this is a Jewish state,

otherwise there's no point for how we look."

The sense of repeated withdrawal of sympathy exacerbates this feeling of being

rejected and illegitimate. Israeli scientists find that notwithstanding availability of

funding for Arab-Israeli collaboration, cooperative projects are rejected by Palestinian

scientists. The latter also boycott Israeli publications even in matters that refer to the

Middle East or to the conflict. These institutionalized attempts to make Israel disappear

are also apparent on interpersonal levels. A colleague reported that her husband, an

Israeli living in Canada, made friends with a Palestinian student.

He had befriended a Palestinian guy early in the semester, but when the guy

found out (after about 3 months of sitting and working together) that Josh was

from Israel, he disappeared. He never sat next to him again; he never spoke to

him again. It is the reinforcement of this idea; you as an Israeli person aren't

legitimate. But also how Josh kind of seeks to befriend Arabs in Canada and

say, 'hey I am a person, I am real, we Israelis are ok, accept me, be my

friend... but then if you don't who cares, I am not surprised...'

Discussion

The present study follows on the heels of a few attempts to re-open – after decades of

suppression – academic studies of national character . It has shown the utility of the idea

26

of national character in giving meaning to one of the world’s most puzzling nations,

namely Israel.

Four levels feed the Israeli existential anxiety. First is the mythological past, the

biblical messages that parents, kindergartens, schools and the army drill into the Israeli

habitus. The Zionist narrative strengthens a mythic perception according to which the

Jews were always persecuted and – without a strong Zionist state – they are likely to be

persecuted in the future too. Hence, Israelis are taught to feel that they were entrusted

with the task of guarding against this mythic fate from returning. This mythological level

can be called anxiety-from-afar. It constitutes trauma from a second-hand source, but it is

very effective in generating expectations for annihilation and, hence, anxiety.

The second factor to constitute Israeli existential anxiety is epitomized by the

Holocaust. Israelis are familiar with survivors or were introduced to testimonies in

concentration camps . They are knowledgeable about the horrors and are taught the

strategic lessons that emanate from the Holocaust. Though they would often mention

prior historical pogroms, the Holocaust is the major historical event that Israelis use in

thinking about the Jewish predicament and the Zionist Israeli solution.

The third and immediate source of existential anxiety results from Israel's objective

geo-political situation and its non-secure borders. The presence of terror and repeated

attempts to rocket Israel create anxiety and trauma . Israelis can tell of “walking with

eyes in the back” (fearing being stabbed) or of canceling business trips due to fear for

their families (as a catastrophe might happen once on tour). The presence of risk is

always imminent, and Israelis are not shy to admit that they experience existential fear on

a daily basis.

27

The strategic source of anxiety springs from Israel's failure to obtain international

legitimacy . Repeated calls to boycott Israel and recurrent attempts to arrest Israeli

generals join a more diffuse sense that in the absence of legitimacy, Israel's time is

running out. Some Israelis also reckon that their country fails to meet its own moral

standards and hence that Israel's legitimacy is truly in jeopardy. Aware of this

conundrum, Israelis often poke fun at themselves in pointing out that the only supporter

of Israel in the UN is Micronesia. The sense that the Zionist state might not survive

reminds Israelis of other ‘final solutions’ that have been suggested for the Jewish

question.

These four levels penetrate and feed each other. Contemporary risks – notably the

Iranian promise to annihilate Israel – are interpreted through all levels: The mythic (‘they

were always against us’), the historical (‘here is Holocaust 2’) and the strategic (‘they

want us out of here’). The Zionist narrative has a ready-made explanation for the Israeli

predicament, and Israelis use this traumatic narrative in responding to external threats.

They often react in aggressive and paranoid ways (‘siege mentality’), but the inner driver

of those behaviors is existential fear. Though it is often repressed, existential anxiety is

the basic code that constitutes the Israeli national character.

Based on a unique empirical study that combines emic and etic perspectives, I have

exposed the extent to which existential anxiety dominates the Israeli national character.

While casual observers see aggression, boldness, and even paranoid suspicions against

others, the present study has shown that those typical stances are driven by a culturally-

constituted traumatic fear that creates a sense of constant danger.

28

Unique glimpses into this pervasive character are offered by the Israeli cultural scene.

During the past decade, artists have celebrated Israel’s deepest anxieties. For example, a

leading Israeli theater played Ghetto, Holocaust and Fiddler on the Roof – all explicitly

referencing the mythological and historical roots of Israeli existential anxiety. Israeli

cinema had no lesser box office and global successes with movies like Waltz with Bashir,

Beaufort, and Lebanon. All three provide renditions of the Israeli trauma incurred by war

in Lebanon. Their box-office success in Israel testifies to their successful and intimate

dialogue with the Israeli cultural psyche. Furthermore, television talk shows and

comedies continually speak to the Israeli existential anxiety. I conclude this paper by

alluding to a recent satirical presentation of "The State of the Nation" show, ending its

fourth season in 2012 with a fitting message:

In the bomb we will all die together

Lying down peaceful and smiling

Even if we hated each other tremendously

In the bomb we will all die together

All Israel – a common grave

29

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