1

XX

ELENACAGNOLIFIECCONI

ARISTOTLEONTHEAFFECTIVEPOWERSOFCOLOURANDPICTURES

Penultimatedraftpleasecitefrompublishedversion

ABSTRACTAristotlersquosworksonnaturalscienceshowthathewasawareoftheaffectivepowersofcolourAtDean421a13forexamplehewritesthathard-eyedanimalscanonlydiscriminatebetweenfrighteningand non-frightening colours In the Nicomachean Ethics furthermore colours are the source ofpleasuresanddelightThesepleasuresunlikethepleasuresoftouchandtasteneithercorruptusnormakeuswiserAristotlersquosviewsontheaffectivepowersofcoloursraiseaquestionaboutthelimitsheseemstoplaceon theaffectivepowersofpicturesatDean427b15-24wherehe implies thatpicturesdonot affect us immediately In thispaper I examine the contrast betweenthe affectivepowersofcolourandtheaffectivepowersofpicturesIarguethatcolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaininthemselvesandgenerateemotionsincidentallySimilarlypicturescanpleaseusoraffectusinthemselvesandincidentallyInlightofthisaccountIsuggestthatonaplausiblereadingofDean427b15-24theaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsarenotimmediatebecausetheyrequire an intervening cause inorder tobe effectiveThe representationsofpicturesandstatuesaffectuseitherwiththemediationofdeceptionorwiththemediationofinterpretation

1Introduction

Between 1966 and 1970 Barnett Newman produced four abstract paintings entitled

WhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueThepaintingsgaverisetostrongemotionalreactionsin

thosewhofirstsawtheminstillingangerratherthanfearforthemostpartbecausethey

broketheconventionsofwhatcouldcountaslsquoartrsquoWhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueIIIis

impressiveinsizemeasuring224by544cmItfeaturesastripofblueontheleftsideofthe

canvasandastripofyellowonitsrightsideTherestofthepaintingisuniformlyredThe

intensereactionspromptedbyviewingthispaintingreachedtheirzenithwhenitwasthe

objectofaknifeattackin1986aneventthatledtoaninfamouslyunsatisfactoryrestoration

2

thatforsomequalifiedasasecondattack1WhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueIIIIIIandIV

arenotfigurativeyettheymovethosewholookattheminpartbecausetheychallengetheir

assumptionsandbeliefsaboutcolourandartInthispapermyfocusisonAristotlersquosviews

ontheaffectivepowersofcolours innatureand inart I arguethatAristotledevelopeda

sophisticatedaccountof theaffectivepowersofcolourHeobviouslydidnotenvisagethe

possibilityofcolourinartmovingandangeringthespectatorsinthewayNewmanrsquosworks

didHoweverhediscussedthewayinwhichcoloursinnaturecanbeaffectiveinthemselves

andincidentallyInadditionhediscussedtheaffectivepowersofcoloursinartefactsinaway

thatsuggestsaninterestingdifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcoloursinthemselves

andasconstitutiveofamimeticrepresentation

InhisethicalworksAristotlearguesthatwecanbepleasedbycolourperceptionAtDe

an421a8-15hesuggeststhatcertainanimalsmayonlydiscriminatedifferencesincolours

onthebasisofwhetherornotthesecoloursgiverisetofearInthispaperIstartfromthese

passages in order to reconstruct the relationship between colours and affections like

pleasureandtheemotionsIarguethatforAristotleseeingaspecificcolourcanpleaseus

both in itself and incidentally ie because the vision gives rise to a pleasant memory

perceptionorthoughtHencewecanrejoiceinthevisionofashadeofredinitselforbecause

itremindsusofabeautifulsunset Inadditionacertaincolourcangiverise toemotions

incidentallyashadeofvioletcanbefear-inducingbecauseweassociateitwithafearsome

stormysea

InthesecondsectionIarguethatthisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursinnature

raises somequestions forAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof colours invisual art

Aristotleimpliesthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately(Dean427a22-24)whichcanbe

takentosuggestthatwhilecolouraffectsusinnatureitisnotaffectiveaspartofapictorial

orsculpturalrepresentationThisviewishoweverimplausibleifcolourscanbeaffectivein

themselves then pictures should be affective simply because of their colouration

Furthermore pictures seem to affect us incidentally These theses are defended in the

Aristoteliancorpusforexampleinthediscussionofthelinkbetweenpleasureandpictures

atPoet1448b5-19InlightofthisandothertextsinthePoeticsIarguethatforAristotlea

1TheincidentisnarratedwonderfullybyMARS(2019)

3

picturecanmoveus incidentallybecause itremindsusofsomethingorsomeonethatwe

missApicturecanalsoaffectusinitselfforexamplebecauseofitscolouration

InthethirdsectionIarguethatAristotlersquosthesisthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately

may still be coherent with the account I reconstruct His view might be that the

representational content of a picture moves us through the mediation of deception the

mediation of interpretation or the mediation of association On this view we are not

immediatelyaffectedbyascarydepictionofacentaurbecauseinordertobefearfulofitwe

needtobedeceivedbyittolookatitinlightofitsculturalcontextortoassociateitwith

somethingwefindscary

Mystudyoftheaffectivepowersofcolourscanhelpustointerprettheaffectivepowersof

picturesinDeanimaAristotlersquosviewonthesemattersisnotfullyspelledoutbutitcanbe

madecoherentinawaythatsuggestsdifferentnuancesinthelinkbetweencolourvisionthe

visualartsandtheemotionsOnmyinterpretationAristotledoesnotquestiontheaffective

powerofrepresentationalcontentofpicturesbuthetakesittobemediatedbytheobserverrsquos

psychologicalcondition

IfthisiscorrectforAristotlethereisadifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcolours

in nature and art compared to the affective powers of pictures as mimetic objects This

differenceisamatterofimmediacyunderstoodastheabsenceofinterveningcausesColours

can affect us immediately both in nature and as part of artistic representations Thus

picturesaffectusimmediatelybecauseoftheircolouringorexecutionAsmimeticobjects

however pictures affect us through the mediation of interpretation deception or

associationAtfirstsighttheimmediateaffectivepowersofcoloursmayseemsurprisingas

a counterpart to themediated affective powers ofmimetic pictorial representationsWe

normallyassume thatemotions requireasophisticated intentional contentwhich ismost

effectivelyandimmediatelyconveyedbyrepresentationalormimeticartwepityOedipus

because a play represents his cursed fate However as the case of music shows

representations are not necessary to transmit pleasure pain or other affections Music

especiallyifitisnotaccompaniedbywordscaninspirefearwithoutrepresentingsomething

as fearsome Hence by bringing together Aristotlersquos remarks on the affective powers of

coloursvisualartandmusicwecanreconstructamorenuancedviewOnthisviewthecase

ofsimplecoloursandcolouredpicturesisparalleltothecaseofsimplesoundsandcomplex

4

melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex

melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational

contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby

virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation

orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry

2AffectiveColours

AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in

relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe

pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing

ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2

Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle

thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe

sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis

notanintemperateperson

FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither

please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with

somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle

explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and

soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe

liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-

23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise

notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth

2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind

5

Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing

andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy

beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe

sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and

pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto

whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat

we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-

440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe

seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe

samelines(Sens440b18-23)4

These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour

discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour

cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that

involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud

1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This

recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake

pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective

inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they

follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic

1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5

Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe

thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention

anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens

436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe

sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese

sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe

especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-

preservation

4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)

6

TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours

cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength

InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe

contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof

smell

ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6

Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan

inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings

savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar

to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them

discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot

The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These

animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink

betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings

either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-

fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn

the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive

greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen

6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

2

thatforsomequalifiedasasecondattack1WhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueIIIIIIandIV

arenotfigurativeyettheymovethosewholookattheminpartbecausetheychallengetheir

assumptionsandbeliefsaboutcolourandartInthispapermyfocusisonAristotlersquosviews

ontheaffectivepowersofcolours innatureand inart I arguethatAristotledevelopeda

sophisticatedaccountof theaffectivepowersofcolourHeobviouslydidnotenvisagethe

possibilityofcolourinartmovingandangeringthespectatorsinthewayNewmanrsquosworks

didHoweverhediscussedthewayinwhichcoloursinnaturecanbeaffectiveinthemselves

andincidentallyInadditionhediscussedtheaffectivepowersofcoloursinartefactsinaway

thatsuggestsaninterestingdifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcoloursinthemselves

andasconstitutiveofamimeticrepresentation

InhisethicalworksAristotlearguesthatwecanbepleasedbycolourperceptionAtDe

an421a8-15hesuggeststhatcertainanimalsmayonlydiscriminatedifferencesincolours

onthebasisofwhetherornotthesecoloursgiverisetofearInthispaperIstartfromthese

passages in order to reconstruct the relationship between colours and affections like

pleasureandtheemotionsIarguethatforAristotleseeingaspecificcolourcanpleaseus

both in itself and incidentally ie because the vision gives rise to a pleasant memory

perceptionorthoughtHencewecanrejoiceinthevisionofashadeofredinitselforbecause

itremindsusofabeautifulsunset Inadditionacertaincolourcangiverise toemotions

incidentallyashadeofvioletcanbefear-inducingbecauseweassociateitwithafearsome

stormysea

InthesecondsectionIarguethatthisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursinnature

raises somequestions forAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof colours invisual art

Aristotleimpliesthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately(Dean427a22-24)whichcanbe

takentosuggestthatwhilecolouraffectsusinnatureitisnotaffectiveaspartofapictorial

orsculpturalrepresentationThisviewishoweverimplausibleifcolourscanbeaffectivein

themselves then pictures should be affective simply because of their colouration

Furthermore pictures seem to affect us incidentally These theses are defended in the

Aristoteliancorpusforexampleinthediscussionofthelinkbetweenpleasureandpictures

atPoet1448b5-19InlightofthisandothertextsinthePoeticsIarguethatforAristotlea

1TheincidentisnarratedwonderfullybyMARS(2019)

3

picturecanmoveus incidentallybecause itremindsusofsomethingorsomeonethatwe

missApicturecanalsoaffectusinitselfforexamplebecauseofitscolouration

InthethirdsectionIarguethatAristotlersquosthesisthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately

may still be coherent with the account I reconstruct His view might be that the

representational content of a picture moves us through the mediation of deception the

mediation of interpretation or the mediation of association On this view we are not

immediatelyaffectedbyascarydepictionofacentaurbecauseinordertobefearfulofitwe

needtobedeceivedbyittolookatitinlightofitsculturalcontextortoassociateitwith

somethingwefindscary

Mystudyoftheaffectivepowersofcolourscanhelpustointerprettheaffectivepowersof

picturesinDeanimaAristotlersquosviewonthesemattersisnotfullyspelledoutbutitcanbe

madecoherentinawaythatsuggestsdifferentnuancesinthelinkbetweencolourvisionthe

visualartsandtheemotionsOnmyinterpretationAristotledoesnotquestiontheaffective

powerofrepresentationalcontentofpicturesbuthetakesittobemediatedbytheobserverrsquos

psychologicalcondition

IfthisiscorrectforAristotlethereisadifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcolours

in nature and art compared to the affective powers of pictures as mimetic objects This

differenceisamatterofimmediacyunderstoodastheabsenceofinterveningcausesColours

can affect us immediately both in nature and as part of artistic representations Thus

picturesaffectusimmediatelybecauseoftheircolouringorexecutionAsmimeticobjects

however pictures affect us through the mediation of interpretation deception or

associationAtfirstsighttheimmediateaffectivepowersofcoloursmayseemsurprisingas

a counterpart to themediated affective powers ofmimetic pictorial representationsWe

normallyassume thatemotions requireasophisticated intentional contentwhich ismost

effectivelyandimmediatelyconveyedbyrepresentationalormimeticartwepityOedipus

because a play represents his cursed fate However as the case of music shows

representations are not necessary to transmit pleasure pain or other affections Music

especiallyifitisnotaccompaniedbywordscaninspirefearwithoutrepresentingsomething

as fearsome Hence by bringing together Aristotlersquos remarks on the affective powers of

coloursvisualartandmusicwecanreconstructamorenuancedviewOnthisviewthecase

ofsimplecoloursandcolouredpicturesisparalleltothecaseofsimplesoundsandcomplex

4

melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex

melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational

contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby

virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation

orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry

2AffectiveColours

AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in

relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe

pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing

ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2

Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle

thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe

sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis

notanintemperateperson

FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither

please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with

somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle

explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and

soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe

liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-

23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise

notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth

2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind

5

Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing

andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy

beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe

sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and

pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto

whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat

we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-

440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe

seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe

samelines(Sens440b18-23)4

These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour

discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour

cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that

involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud

1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This

recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake

pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective

inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they

follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic

1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5

Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe

thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention

anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens

436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe

sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese

sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe

especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-

preservation

4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)

6

TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours

cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength

InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe

contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof

smell

ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6

Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan

inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings

savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar

to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them

discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot

The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These

animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink

betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings

either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-

fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn

the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive

greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen

6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

3

picturecanmoveus incidentallybecause itremindsusofsomethingorsomeonethatwe

missApicturecanalsoaffectusinitselfforexamplebecauseofitscolouration

InthethirdsectionIarguethatAristotlersquosthesisthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately

may still be coherent with the account I reconstruct His view might be that the

representational content of a picture moves us through the mediation of deception the

mediation of interpretation or the mediation of association On this view we are not

immediatelyaffectedbyascarydepictionofacentaurbecauseinordertobefearfulofitwe

needtobedeceivedbyittolookatitinlightofitsculturalcontextortoassociateitwith

somethingwefindscary

Mystudyoftheaffectivepowersofcolourscanhelpustointerprettheaffectivepowersof

picturesinDeanimaAristotlersquosviewonthesemattersisnotfullyspelledoutbutitcanbe

madecoherentinawaythatsuggestsdifferentnuancesinthelinkbetweencolourvisionthe

visualartsandtheemotionsOnmyinterpretationAristotledoesnotquestiontheaffective

powerofrepresentationalcontentofpicturesbuthetakesittobemediatedbytheobserverrsquos

psychologicalcondition

IfthisiscorrectforAristotlethereisadifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcolours

in nature and art compared to the affective powers of pictures as mimetic objects This

differenceisamatterofimmediacyunderstoodastheabsenceofinterveningcausesColours

can affect us immediately both in nature and as part of artistic representations Thus

picturesaffectusimmediatelybecauseoftheircolouringorexecutionAsmimeticobjects

however pictures affect us through the mediation of interpretation deception or

associationAtfirstsighttheimmediateaffectivepowersofcoloursmayseemsurprisingas

a counterpart to themediated affective powers ofmimetic pictorial representationsWe

normallyassume thatemotions requireasophisticated intentional contentwhich ismost

effectivelyandimmediatelyconveyedbyrepresentationalormimeticartwepityOedipus

because a play represents his cursed fate However as the case of music shows

representations are not necessary to transmit pleasure pain or other affections Music

especiallyifitisnotaccompaniedbywordscaninspirefearwithoutrepresentingsomething

as fearsome Hence by bringing together Aristotlersquos remarks on the affective powers of

coloursvisualartandmusicwecanreconstructamorenuancedviewOnthisviewthecase

ofsimplecoloursandcolouredpicturesisparalleltothecaseofsimplesoundsandcomplex

4

melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex

melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational

contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby

virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation

orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry

2AffectiveColours

AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in

relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe

pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing

ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2

Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle

thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe

sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis

notanintemperateperson

FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither

please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with

somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle

explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and

soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe

liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-

23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise

notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth

2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind

5

Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing

andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy

beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe

sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and

pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto

whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat

we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-

440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe

seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe

samelines(Sens440b18-23)4

These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour

discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour

cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that

involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud

1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This

recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake

pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective

inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they

follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic

1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5

Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe

thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention

anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens

436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe

sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese

sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe

especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-

preservation

4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)

6

TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours

cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength

InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe

contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof

smell

ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6

Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan

inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings

savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar

to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them

discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot

The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These

animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink

betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings

either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-

fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn

the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive

greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen

6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

4

melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex

melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational

contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby

virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation

orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry

2AffectiveColours

AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in

relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe

pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing

ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2

Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle

thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe

sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis

notanintemperateperson

FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither

please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with

somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle

explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and

soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe

liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-

23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise

notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth

2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind

5

Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing

andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy

beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe

sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and

pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto

whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat

we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-

440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe

seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe

samelines(Sens440b18-23)4

These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour

discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour

cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that

involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud

1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This

recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake

pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective

inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they

follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic

1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5

Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe

thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention

anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens

436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe

sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese

sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe

especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-

preservation

4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)

6

TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours

cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength

InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe

contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof

smell

ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6

Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan

inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings

savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar

to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them

discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot

The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These

animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink

betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings

either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-

fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn

the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive

greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen

6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

5

Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing

andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy

beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe

sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and

pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto

whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat

we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-

440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe

seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe

samelines(Sens440b18-23)4

These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour

discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour

cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that

involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud

1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This

recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake

pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective

inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they

follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic

1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5

Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe

thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention

anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens

436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe

sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese

sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe

especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-

preservation

4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)

6

TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours

cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength

InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe

contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof

smell

ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6

Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan

inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings

savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar

to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them

discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot

The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These

animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink

betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings

either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-

fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn

the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive

greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen

6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

6

TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours

cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength

InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe

contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof

smell

ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6

Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan

inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings

savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar

to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them

discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot

The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These

animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink

betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings

either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-

fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn

the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive

greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen

6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

7

andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind

fearfullikeapredator8

Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on

colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally

iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese

remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that

humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe

candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings

thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and

avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception

ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise

anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus

todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit

remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe

irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects

likeflowers

Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof

certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However

Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan

findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso

capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of

perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from

seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its

8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

8

brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour

isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant

(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand

lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves

and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25

differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white

andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite

has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory

thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion

levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits

brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different

levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas

painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10

IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein

itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue

oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause

theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike

thestormyseaapredatororasunset11

10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

9

3AffectivePictures

IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain

andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan

beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect

us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3

however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an

importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe

affectivepowersofphantasia

For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past

perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof

phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms

untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take

phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto

appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand

pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers

ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13

12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

10

Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter

isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus

immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina

different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at

audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture

Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome

haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan

bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved

unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered

overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho

is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly

someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle

describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish

peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living

animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare

notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove

towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem

Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16

Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures

deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of

picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown

writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks

Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot

takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome

canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De

14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

11

motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases

itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat

phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe

desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the

phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia

gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as

recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof

weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe

basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou

rationallyendorse19

OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert

unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview

thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions

cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda

detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina

play

17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

12

ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20

Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby

whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved

bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware

thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe

samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre

playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy

FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat

viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves

even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our

engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto

beingslikeus23

ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24

20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

13

Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact

thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic

pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25

Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and

technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic

objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe

pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking

at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an

645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)

Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure

thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis

passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic

object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed

acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning

thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe

familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen

CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe

takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps

thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From

thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand

whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal

lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis

something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition

independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant

This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our

pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning

25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

14

(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire

something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its

subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in

contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or

identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa

generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes

beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations

ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf

thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe

dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine

perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto

picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe

connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour

previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves

grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of

Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe

basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof

vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof

universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31

This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in

pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that

characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative

techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic

objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof

28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

15

the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical

structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the

representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons

aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance

ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan

pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor

becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in

themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect

wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability

togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare

closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good

indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers

Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof

pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its

representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures

are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their

representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours

canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence

Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof

coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease

usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves

uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall

Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey

remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)

4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects

Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook

atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound

in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the

educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

16

thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof

character

ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32

In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor

shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe

marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures

Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause

theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan

indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners

emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus

orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake

adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand

notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat

theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe

whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns

ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot

manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures

32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

17

andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight

bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe

subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits

Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the

workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For

exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe

painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters

(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso

astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions

and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to

hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates

persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor

examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant

lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter

whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview

finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish

complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare

signalledbybright(charypos)eyes

Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources

IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness

andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater

describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes

Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas

nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36

Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat

theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch

34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

18

about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive

paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof

theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage

centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand

humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur

AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter

toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto

thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying

soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan

upcomingbattle

Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright

suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby

relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe

viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto

beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs

tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the

vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37

Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms

likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground

assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven

whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on

thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring

interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut

accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex

plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga

tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe

37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

19

plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust

representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits

emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos

identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)

Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart

formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich

servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare

immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave

aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-

24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures

or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us

immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal

orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These

interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative

explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity

andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe

picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)

Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia

A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its

affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates

IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen

accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear

definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture

evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains

isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore

the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle

39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

20

describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories

andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil

arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely

tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)

Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis

accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar

offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident

individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth

inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers

Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil

destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate

oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh

1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances

orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople

orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare

abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)

ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot

only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background

conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these

emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits

affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some

interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia

asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However

thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental

phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh

1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541

40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

21

The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but

whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean

Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less

shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful

whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird

pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin

awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction

ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked

whetherornotitisafriend

ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42

Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere

desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis

ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish

as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference

(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin

boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated

atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation

buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven

reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa

morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning

Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause

it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as

further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia

42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

22

differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould

failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences

andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the

same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the

affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that

intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some

interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey

believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand

phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective

powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing

affective

Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof

coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally

Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature

and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the

representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto

anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem

whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething

wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects

makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai

5Conclusion

InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind

acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy

interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform

acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither

in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear

incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase

44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

23

theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir

representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand

executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot

affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily

contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned

withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe

thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception

or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An

appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be

Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45

Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours

istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures

Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts

andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust

asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures

however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational

contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin

virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem

orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort

on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us

immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto

their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to

affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46

45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

24

Workscited

BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)

SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil

36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS

GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion

EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK

GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46

213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic

andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric

PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG

RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY

(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG

MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva

NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90

IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

25

KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from

lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR

88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of

Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy

(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)

EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)

AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA

TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8

REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM

SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23

mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300

mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274

SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277

SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265

SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-

144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis

MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302

SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-

19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics

(Princeton)73-97

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

26

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

27

DISCUSSION

AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs

quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi

la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote

mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find

fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves

like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not

mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat

coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause

weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith

intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-

human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit

DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight

excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose

workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor

youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin

mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the

paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe

K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as

ἠθικός

ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet

1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof

PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand

Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

28

exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind

aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus

HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar

ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol

1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat

the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents

morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters

K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and

soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless

affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance

ofart

ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein

sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives

riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless

affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately

affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton

theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours

and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question

concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo

large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the

importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits

currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto

virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother

purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian

traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot

obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso

applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that

poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

29

issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount

thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers

MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting

elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient

andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and

I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an

intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic

theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan

interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue

oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral

termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle

as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to

clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator

learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin

causingtragicemotions

E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive

componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare

unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth

Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate

ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances

orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive

rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is

doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand

itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor

itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe

Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto

be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of

theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook

atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions

30

30