FOURTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

S8-17 -CRM-0251

- versus -FOR: Violation of Section 3(e),Republic Act No. 3019

ALFREDO O. ESTRERACAYETANO T. PACANA IVMA. CHIRALI C. RESPONSORIZAL C. RAMOSPATRICK S. SAGUNJOSEFINO G. SANCHEZPEDRO R. GONZALES,

Accused.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,S8-17 -CRM-0252

- versus -FOR: Violation of Section 3(g),Republic Act No. 3019

ALFREDO O. ESTRERACAYETANO T. PACANA IV,PEDRO R. GONZALES,

Accused.PRESENT:Quiroz, J., ChairpersonCruz, J.Jacinto, J.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xRESOLUTION

Before the Court is accused Alfredo O. Estrera, Cayetano T. Pacana IV,Rizal C. Ramos, Ma. Chirali C. Responso, and Patrick S. Sagun's MOTION TOQUASH dated March 13, 2017.1

The accused raised three grounds in support of their Motion: one, that thefacts charged do not constitute an offense; two, that the criminal action or liabilityhad been extinguished; and, lastly, with respect to accused Estrera only, on theground of death of the accused. Further, in their SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY filedon May 23, 2017,2in response to the prosecution's SUPPLEMENTALCOMMENT/OPPOSITION dated May 2, 2017,3 the accused raised violation oftheir constitutional right to speedy determination of their cases.

Records, Volume Ill, pp. 193- 370.Records, Volume Ill, pp. 389- 423.Records, Volume Ill, pp. 381- 388.

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Also on record is the COMMENT/OPPOSITION of the prosecution datedMarch 20, 2017 and the accused's REPLY (TO THE COMMENT/OPPOSITIONOF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN DATED 20 MARCH 2017) dated April 11, 2017. The proceduralissue raised therein having been rendered moot and academic by the issuanceof the Order of the Court dated April 20, 2017, the matter on the alleged lack ofcompliance to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court will no longer bediscussed in the resolution of the present motion.

Additionally, as some of the grounds raised by the accused would requirethe review of the timeline of this case, the following chronological antecedent isprovided hereunder:

On June 5, 2000, the Philippine Postal Corporation, Regional OfficeNo. X of Cagayan de Oro City (PhiIPost-10) entered into a contract forthe PhilPost Survey and Titling Project with Engineer Pedro RGonzales.

Sometime July 11, 2000 to September 5, 2000, an auditorial reviewof the contract was endeavored by the Commission on Audit, RegionalOffice No. 10 (COA-RO. X). It was, however, temporarily held inabeyance pending submission by PhilPost-10 of the documentsrequired by the COA-RO. X.

While the auditorial review was pending, the state auditor reviewingthe case was re-assigned and State Auditor IV Avelino M. Cabarierostook over.

On March 13, 2001, Auditor Cabarieros submitted his findings anddenied auditorial certification as he found the contract void ab initio.

On April 16, 2001, the respondents filed an appeal. A supplement tosaid appeal was also filed on May 21, 2001.

On October 15, 2001, Auditor Cabaneros submitted a Memorandumto the Director of COA-RO. X, recommending the institution ofadministrative and criminal charges against the erring public officials

nd Engr. Gonzales.

On November 5, 2001, COA-R.O. X Director IV Jaime P. Naranjoforwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB-MIN) theSpecial Audit Report of Cabarieros, including all the documentspertinent thereto."

On August 8, 2002, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer(GIPO) 1IEline S. Esparagoza issued a Joint Order recommending thedismissal of the criminal and administrative complaints against therespondents on the basis of prematuritv."

On August 21, 2002, the August 8, 2002 Joint Order was elevated tothe Central Office for the approval of the former Acting OmbudspersonMargarito P. Gervacio, Jr.

Records, Volume I, p. 11.Records, Volume 11, pp. 134 - 138.

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Sometime in 2014, after considering the Evaluation Report datedJune 30, 2014, Ombudsperson Conchita Carpio-Morales referredback the cases to OMB-MIN for the conduct of preliminaryinvestigation and administrative adjudication.

On December 22, 2014, GIPO I Marianne M. Macayra and GIPO IRosemil B. Bariaqa issued a Resolution recommending the filing of theappropriate Informations against respondents Estrera, Pacana,Responso, Ramos, Sagun and Gonzales for Violation of Section 3(e)of Republic Act No. 3019 and against Estrera, Pacana and Gonzalesfor Violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019.

The December 22,2014 Resolution was approved by the Ombudsmanon July 23, 2015.

Respondent Estrera filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" datedSeptember 28, 2015 and received by registered mail on September29, 2015 questioning the lapse of 13 years since the case wasrecommended for dismissal by its former handling prosecutor, amongothers.

On February 11, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Orderdenying Estrera's motion, pointing out that the recommendation of theformer handling prosecutor as contained in the August 8, 2002 JointOrder was not approved by then Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, Jr., orhis predecessor, and, therefore, had not attained finality. The Office ofthe Ombudsman also explained that the review of therecommendation contained in the June 30, 2014 Evaluation Reportwas a valid exercise of the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The February 11, 2016 Order was approved by OmbudspersonConch ita Carpio-Morales on March 11, 2016.

Accordingly, on February 13, 2017, Informations for Violation ofSections 3(e) and 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed againstherein accused.

We now resolve.

That the Facts ChargedDo Not Constitute AnOffense

The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may besustained on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e, thatthe facts charged do not constitute an offense, is whether the facts, as alleged, ifhypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense asdefined by the law.

In S8-17-CRM-0251, the People charged the accused with violation ofSection 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Violation of Section 3(e) requires theconcurrence of the following elements: one, that the accused is a public officerdischarging administrative, judicial or official functions, or a private person

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charged in conspiracy with the public officers; two, that the public officer, in thedischarge of his functions, acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith orgross inexcusable negligence, and, thre~, that such action of the public officerresulted to undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave anyprivate party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.

In SB-17-CRM-0252, the People charged the accused with violation ofSection 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Violation of Section 3(g) requires theconcurrence of the following elements: one, that the accused is a public officer;two that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government,aneJ'. three, that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestlydisadvantageous to the government.

A look into the Information in SB-17-CRM-0251 reveals that it specificallyalleges all the essential elements constituting violation of Section 3(e) ofRepublic Act No. 3019: that on or about June 18, 1999, at Cagayan de Oro City,the accused public officers, all of the PhilPost-10 and members of the RegionalTask Force on the Survey and Titling of Donated Lots (Regional Task Force) andthe Pre/Post Qualification, Bid and Award Committee (PBAC), while in theperformance of their official functions and committing the offense in relation totheir public offices, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusablenegligence, conspired with each other and with accused private contractorGeodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales in willfully and criminally (a) disregardingthe rules on government procurement under Presidential Decree No. 1594 andawarding the contract for the PhilPost Survey and Titling Project to accusedGeodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales, and (b) paying the sum of P511 ,999.20to accused Geodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales despite his failure to complywith the Obligations set forth in the contract, thereby causing undue injury to thegovernment in the said amount, to the satisfaction of the requirements of the law.

Similarly, the Information in SB-17-CRM-0252 specifically alleged that on orabout June 18, 1999 and November 3, 2000, at Cagayan de Oro City, accusedpublic officers Estrera, being then the Regional Director, and Pacana, being thenthe Director for Operations and concurrent Chief of the Legal Affairs Section IV,both of the PhilPost-1 0, in conspiracy with accused private contractor GeodeticEngineer Pedro R. Gonzales, willfully and unlawfully entered into a contract inbehalf of the government for the PhilPost Survey and Titling Project under termsthat are grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, withaccused Pedro R. Gonzales being paid P511 ,999.20 despite his failure to complyw' h the obligations set forth in the contract, to the damage and prejudice of thegovernment, thereby establishing all the essential elements constituting violationof Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Thus, contrary to the assertion of the accused, the Court finds the hereinInformations to be sufficient iD form, in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 110,6as well as in substance, as the prosecution was able to establish all the elementsof the offenses for which the accused are charged herein.

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint of information is sufficient if it states the name ofthe accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of asconstituting the offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense;and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense if committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint orinformation.

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That the Criminal ActionHad Been Extinguished

The accused-movants and the prosecution agree that the reckoning date ofprescription is August 8, 2002, the date of the issuance of the Joint Orderrecommending the dismissal of the administrative and criminal complaintsagainst the accused. However, the accused-movants are claiming that the periodof prescription is ten (10) years and that, therefore, the crime had prescribed onAugust 8, 2012. The prosecution, on the other hand, claims that the period ofprescription is fifteen (15) years; that the Office of the Ombudsman had untilAugust 8, 2017 to formally charge the accused; and that the Informations, havingbeen filed on February 13, 2017, the period to do so has not yet lapsed.

The prosecution is correct that the period of prescription is fifteen (15)years, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended by BatasPambansa Big. 195.7 However, both the prosecution and the defense aremistaken in contending that the reckoning date is August 8, 2002. In this regard,Section 2 of Republic Act No. 3326 is instructive, to wit:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission ofthe violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from thediscovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for itsinvestigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are institutedagainst the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedingsare dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Applying the above provision, prescription commenced to run from October15, 2001, the date of discovery of the violation of the law, and was tolled onNovember 5, 2001 upon the institution of proceedings before OMB-MIN.

As a general rule, prescription commences to run from the date of thecommission of the offense. However, following the blameless ignorance doctrine,in cases where the commission of the violation be not known at the time, as anexception to the general rule, the law provides that the prescriptive period beginsto run from the date of discovery. Thus, in the 2011 case of Presidential Ad HocF. -Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,8 the Supreme Court enanc made the following elucidation, viz-

The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimescommitted under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by ActNo. 3326,9[28] Section 2 of which provides that:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of thecommission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not knownat the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicialproceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are institutedagainst the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if theproceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting doublejeopardy.

Sec. 11. Prescription of offenses. - All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in fifteen years.G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011, 648 SeRA 586.

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Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day thecrime is committed. That an aggrieved person entitled to an action has noknowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to thisrule is the blameless ignorance doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of ActNo. 3326. Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations runs only upondiscovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause ofaction. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute oflimitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonablemeans of knowing the existence of a cause of action. It was in thisaccord that the Court confronted the question on the running of theprescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone ofour 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee onBehest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent caseswhich Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground ofprescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation ofthe special law was not known at the time of its commission, theprescription_begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery ofthe unlawful...D.atureof the constitutive act or acts.

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crimewhich is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When thecomplaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence,prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctlydiscussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee onBehest Loans, that it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrievedparty, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSARevolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy amonginvolved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans. In yet anotherpronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committeeon Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that duringthe Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality ofthese transactions.

(citations omitted) (emphasis and italics in the original) (underliningsupplied)

In Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,10 the Supreme Court hadalso clarified that the institution of proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsmanto s the prescriptive period and made the following pronouncement, to wit:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted byjustices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicialproceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule atthe time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace forpreliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when thefunction of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses wasvested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, asshown in the cases of u.s. v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that theprescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice

10G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, 571 SeRA 549.

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of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of thecomplaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against theaccused. These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Paraoand Parao that the first step taken in the investigation or examination ofoffenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends theprescription of the offense. Subsequently, in People v. O/arte, we held thatthe filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely forpurposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if thecourt where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on themerits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information isfiled may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations alreadyrepresent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, andhence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, whichinvolved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which areboth special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period isinterrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminaryinvestigation against the accused. In the more recent case ofSecurities and Exchange Commission v. Interport ResourcesCorporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of theinvestigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commissionon violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, isequivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ incriminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive,thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec.2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" inthe old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby theinvestigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has becomethe exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings"should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when itrefers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kindof investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person whichmay ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to tollprescription.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtainvindication on account of delays that are not under his control. A clearexample would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidaviton 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. Helikewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on thedismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the properchannels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitionerfiled his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregateperiod of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyondpetitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecutionof the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because ofthe DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights andactively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarilyfurther simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the

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accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigatingagencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner'sfiling of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for theprosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptiveperiod for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Big. 22.

(citations omitted) (italics in the original) (emphasis supplied)

Only 21 days have elapsed at the time the COA-RO. X instituted theproceedings before the OMB-MIN on November 5,2001 and, hence, prescriptionhas not yet set in.

Right to SpeedyDetermination of Cases

Whenever an accused invokes violation of the right to speedy determinationof cases, the Court will conduct a balancing test in view of the fact that, first,"speedy disposition of cases" is a rather relative and flexible concept, and,second, only delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive are prohibitedby the Constitution. For this reason, the Court takes into consideration theconduct of the both the prosecution and the defense, the length of delay, thereasons for such delay, the assertion or failure of the accused to assert suchright, and the prejudice caused by the delay."

Based on the tirneline of the preliminary investigation conducted by theOffice of the Ombudsman, from the filing of the complaints against the accusedon November 5, 2001, it took the said office until March 11, 2016, or 14 yearsand 4 months, to punctuate its preliminary investigation. This is not a caseattended by any complexity that would require the Office of the Ombudsmanalmost 15 years of its time and resources to investigate. As a matter of fact, itonly took nine (9) months for GIPO 11 Esparagoza, the officer who first handledthis case, to render a recommendation. The issue of inordinate delay had beenraised by accused Estrera before the Office of the Ombudsman in his Motion forReconsideration dated September 28, 2015. Aside from the fact that it wasperfunctorily brushed aside, the Office of the Ombudsman also did not squarelya ress the issue of delay in the conduct of its investigation. Neither did itespond to this issue when raised by the accused before this Court.

In sum, the Court finds that the delay attendant in this case to beunreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and that the criminal informations in SB-17-CRM-0251 and SB-17-CRM-0252 must be dismissed.

The Court notes the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R No. 18816512 andG.R No. 18906313 where it held that inordinate delay in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation effectively ousts the prosecution of its authority to filethe Information, a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(d) of Rule117 of the Rules of Court, and that the dismissal of the case in such a situation isin order.

11

12

13

Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991.People v. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third Division, et.al.People v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, et.a!.

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Finally, notwithstanding the ground raised for the dismissal of the casesagainst accused Estrera, considering that the ruling of this Court is based on theground of inordinate delay and thus necessarily redounds to the benefit of all theaccused, the Court finds no reason to further require the counsel for accusedEstrera to submit proof of the death of said accused.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash dated March13, 2017 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Informations are hereby orderedQUASHED and DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, September 20,2017.

;

WE CONCUR:

BAYA I . JACINTOAs cia e Justice