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8904 JOINT OPERATIONSAY17

Issues for Discussion Guide

All instructors are required to have read the CSCDEP Adjunct Faculty Academic Handbook during instructor certification. This document has been created for you as another tool to prepare for your seminar, whether it is onsite or online.

Each lesson includes various types of course materials: readings, audio segments, and viewings. Learners can access course material via Blackboard through the 8904 Seminar site.

After the learners have read, listened, and/or viewed the course material they take a short knowledge quiz in Blackboard covering the lesson. The learners then enter the collaboration phase when they discuss the “Issues for Discussion.” Onsite learners will go to their seminar location; online learners will go to the Discussion Board section of their Blackboard Seminar site. All learners will complete the final assessment after the final lesson.

To pass the course, learners must accumulate 80 points out of a possible 100. Learners are graded on the following: knowledge quiz performance (20 points), seminar contribution (40 points), and final exam (40 points). For a specific grading breakdown by lesson, please refer to your gradebook, located in your Blackboard 8904 Seminar site.

Grading rubrics are also provided on the 8904 Faculty Development site. Please use these as a guide to grade your learners’ seminar contribution and any written work.

Along with the educational objectives listed on the course site, the issues for discussion should be the focus of your seminars and any discussions that you facilitate. The sample “answers” to the issues for discussion are provided as a guide. Many of the issues for discussion do not have definitive answers. Even though applicable portions of required course material are cited as references, learner answers will also need to be based on cognitive reflection and experience.

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JOINT OPERATIONS ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION GUIDE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Lesson 1. Evolution of Jointness 3

Lesson 2. Service Warfare 12

Lesson 3. Combatant Commands 30

Lesson 4. Joint Force Organization 40

Lesson 5. Interorganizational Cooperation 57

Lesson 6. The Joint Operating Environment 74

Lesson 7. Joint Functions 87

Lesson 8. Higher-Level Staff Work 103

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LESSON 1: THE EVOLUTION OF JOINTNESS

Module 1

Describe the issues within DOD in the 1970s and 80s that led to calls for reform. Be sure to include how and why the dysfunction within the U.S. military establishment occurred.

The Kozloski article provides a brief overview of U.S. efforts to improve joint efforts from WWII on. Despite significant legislation after the war (NSA of 1947, amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958), the alliance between the Services and Congress was too powerful. The military departments retained a strong role in the operational chain of command and never really ceded authority to the unified commanders (explain to learners that “CINC’s” are now “CCDRs”).

The Toal paper (Koh Tang Island) provides very interesting examples of systemic problems of “non-jointness” at the strategic, operational and tactical levels:

Absence of centralized authority and direction in the planning of the operation;

Micromanagement by the JCS; Flawed coordination hindering intelligence dissemination; and Ineffective command lines.

The key question to ask when considering what transpired is, “would these deficiencies have existed if our current joint doctrine, processes, and mindset had existed then?”

Other military operations cited by Kozloski—USS Pueblo(’68), Beirut(’83), Grenada (’83)—also suffered from similar problems: poor military advice to civilian leadership, lack of unity of command, and inability of Services to operate effectively in a joint environment. Kozloski also highlights another major problem of the era: mismanaged acquisition and wasteful spending.

The fundamental problems in the DOD that Congress officially sought to address included the following:

1) An imbalance between Service and joint interests;2) Inadequate military advice to political leadership;3) Insufficiently trained military officers serving in joint duty assignments;4) Imbalance between the responsibility and authority of the unified

commanders;5) Confused and cumbersome operational chains of command;6) Ineffective strategic planning;


7) Ineffective mechanisms for supervising DOD agencies (DIA, DLA);8) Undefined roles of the Service secretaries;9) Unnecessary duplication in the military department HQs;10) Congressional micromanagement.

References: Building the Purple Ford; The Mayaguez Incident.

Compare and contrast the case made for distinct Service roles and missions in “Zone Defense” with Owens’s argument for redundancy in “Conformity Needs Competition.” Are the distinctions between Service functions sharp enough? In an age of declining resources, how much strategic pluralism can we afford?

The “Zone Defense” piece advocates that there are numerous missions within the DOD that are overlapped amongst various Services and foster excessive redundancy. It highlights Cyberspace, Unmanned Air Systems, and Security Cooperation activities as examples of areas where the DOD needs to provide the Services specific guidance on their authorities and responsibilities. The authors feel that sharp, enduring distinctions need to be established among the Services’ functions in such areas in order to preclude parochial redundancy and inefficiency.

This notion would seem to contrast somewhat with Owens’ concept of “Strategic Pluralism,” which calls for a wide variety of military forces and weapons to meet diverse potential threats. Strategic pluralism presupposes an uncertain security environment. It hedges against uncertainty by generating responses across the spectrum of conflict, building on existing capabilities of the Services to create a flexible and adaptable force structure. This greatly complicates planning by potential adversaries. The smaller the number of options a force structure can generate, the easier it is for an enemy to develop a low-cost counter.

Given the paucity of defense dollars, a strong case can be made for efficiency instead of redundant systems being spread across our Services. It could also be argued that the “Zone Defense” concept is not necessarily mutually exclusive with strategic pluralism. Rather, it emphasizes efficiencies across the Services, which could be possible while the DOD as a whole pursues varied capabilities that provide potential threats with diverse challenges. References: Zone Defense: A Case for Distinct Roles and Missions; Conformity Needs Competition.

Describe the positive and negative impacts the Goldwater-Nichols Act has had on the U.S. military establishment.

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LESSON 1

On pages 47-48 of Building the Purple Ford, Kozloski does a good job of synopsizing Jim Locher’s assessment of the GNA (Locher was a prominent congressional staffer who worked on the Act). Locher assigns a letter grade to each of the stated objectives of the GNA. “A”s are awarded to: improving military advice, placing clear responsibility on the CINCs, ensuring commensurate authority for the CINCs, and enhancing effectiveness of military operations. Strengthening civilian authority received a “B-“. Improving joint officer management got a “C+” and improving strategy making and contingency planning got a “C”. The very worst results were obtained in the areas of ‘obtaining more efficient use of resources’ and ‘defense management and administration’, which both received “D”s. On these last two subjects, you may want to ask your students about their thoughts on the efficiencies gained by consolidation of various U.S. military bases (e.g. McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; Lewis-McChord, WA; Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI). Granted, these consolidations occurred as a result of Congress’ Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts; but it is fair to ask: would these consolidations have happened as smoothly as they did if it weren’t for the joint environment fostered by the GNA?

Kozloski claims that the GNA eviscerated the idea of aggressive service advocacy, saying that now even minor instances of service advocacy are attacked as divisive. The act also spawned a series of ineffective joint processes in hopes of promoting efficient use of defense resources. Unfortunately, these processes substantially inhibit innovation. The systems we learned about in 8902—JCIDS, PPBE, acquisition process—are generally regarded as inefficient, resulting in decision making measured in years compared to weeks or months in the private sector. The Services are purported to be in charge of requirements for developing programs, but have various external actors influencing the process (lobbyists, congressional demographics, necessity for all systems to be completely joint).

As the Module 2 Overview mentions, many feel that defense strategy has shifted from the Services to the CCDRs while budgeting has remained the responsibility of the Services. By design, the GNA has separated defense strategy (CCDRs) from defense budget (Services). The accepted norms for political processes related to national defense policy exclude the individual Services from the obligations of thinking strategically as a joint force at the budget planning level. This problem seems evident in the lack of solid strategy for the past several decades. Ironically, this shortcoming has been largely masked due to the operational and tactical success of the U.S. military, which has been possible because of the improved interoperability between the Services brought about by the Act.

Another unintended consequence of the GNA, which strengthened the CJCS, has been a strengthening of the military’s political power. The military has

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become a political constituency that must be addressed in the Washington power equation. The professional military, with its allies and communities, has developed into a potent political force in American government.

Overall, there can be no doubt that the GNA has positively impacted the U.S. military’s ability to operate more seamlessly. Having grown up in the joint post-GNA military, some learners may have difficulty grasping the need for studying the history of jointness. It may be worthwhile to draw attention to the amount of resistance that the military applied to the passage and implementation of the GNA. As military professionals, we should reflect on our openness to embracing reform and our capacity to envision future environments.

Note: On the Bb seminar site, there is a relevant piece entitled Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress dated April 2016.

Reference: Building the Purple Ford; American Civil-Military Relations, by Duane E. Nix.

The Greenert article praises the virtues of joint interdependence. Use other readings to contrast this with criticisms of a blind adherence to “jointness”.

The Greenert Article—Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence—advocates for a “stronger network of organizational ties, better pairing of capabilities at the system component level, willingness to draw upon shared capabilities, and continuous information-sharing and coordination” among the Services. He offers special operations forces (SOF) as a good example of perfecting operational interdependence with “tight, deeply embedded interconnections at all levels among capability providers from all Services.”

In the Conformity Needs Competition article, Owens claims that there has been an abuse of jointness stemming from the use of the term to describe two contradictory concepts. The first is one of integration—effectively harnessing the capabilities of the different military Services. However, jointness has also been used to describe unification, which he claims is the opposite of integration. Unification refers to an approach whereby some capabilities are subordinated to a dominant capability and Service components are blended in an attempt to enable the dominant capability. This latter approach tends to subordinate the unique requirements of each of the Services to a compromised joint requirement, favoring the shorter term needs of the CCDRs.

The short Owens’ article on the end of jointness claims that the GNA may not be the real reason why the Services have worked so well together since the 1980s. Rather, ample defense funding since then has precluded rivalries and

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LESSON 1

competition for resources. It can be argued that the infusion of billions of dollars just over the past decades has actually moved the Services away from deeper integration and interdependence, as each Service has sought greater self-sufficiency rather than reliance on the capabilities of other Services. Whereas robust budgets permit and even encourage such independence, shrinking resources require capabilities to become more integrated. Of course, this short Owens’ piece is several years old. It remains to be seen if the Trump administration will make this discussion moot by re-investing heavily in defense.

In Building the Purple Ford, Kozloski cedes that cooperation and integration of capabilities on the battlefield are indeed desirable outcomes, but in fact joint management often yields collusion among military leaders, stifling initiative and proposals, and producing advice to civilian leadership based on the lowest common denominator. Sometimes it doesn’t make sense for Services to work together. Often, the different needs of the Services legitimately drive different approaches to the acquisition of military hardware.

Another way of assessing the effectiveness of jointness is to consider the difference between “multi-service” and joint. It is difficult to argue that the U.S. did not effectively employ the Army and Navy in a coordinated fashion prior to the GNA. Grant’s Vicksburg campaign is a fine example, as are the incredibly complex operations and campaigns of WWII. Whether or not “joint” requires a higher standard than “multi-service” is an open discussion item. You may want to have the learners look at the graphic portraying increased integration of U.S. forces over time on pg. 122 of Meese and Wilson, asking them if this continuum advocates the employment of joint interdependence in all circumstances, or are there times when Services should just do their thing on their own? You could also refer to the “Smart Interdependence” graphic on the second page of Greenert’s article and have learners explain it, which should drive similar discourse.

LtGen Flynn’s recorded brief on the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) offers insights into how much jointness is enough. In a discussion on the risks posed by implementing the CCJO, he states that interdependence is essentially about efficiency in the overall joint force and asks “if we become too interdependent, will we lose the adaptability to deal with complex and uncertain environments?” Reference: Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence; Conformity Needs Competition; Building the Purple Ford, p. 50; The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Culture, p. 122; Recorded briefing on CCJO Joint Force 2020 by LtGen Flynn.

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-Describe how the tactical dysfunctions in the Koh Tang Island and Desert One operations were a result of a lack of or improper “jointness”.

-What were the key elements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act?

-Why were the SecDef and the Services so opposed to addressing problems within the DOD?

-What is the “Purple Ford” that Kozloski refers to in his article?

-Discuss the difference between Strategic Monism vs. Strategic Pluralism. Which is better suited for the contemporary security environment.

-How much should we stress competition between and among the Services? What are the opportunity costs of doing so?

-What is the distinction between Owens’ concept of unification and his concept of integration?

-What did you think of LtGen Flynn’s observations on the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Joint Force 2020? Explain the elements of Globally Integrated Operations (mission command; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; global agility; partnering; flexibility in establishing joint forces; cross-domain synergy; use of flexible, low-signature capabilities; and increasingly discriminate methods to minimize unintended consequences). Will this concept be useful in guiding the development of our joint forces?

-In January 2012, President Obama announced that our military would focus on Asia-Pacific and incur a reduction of ground forces in favor of air and naval forces. Is this more a manifestation of Strategic Monism or Strategic Pluralism? Why?

Module 2

Explain how having two distinct branches of the chain of command reconciles with the principle of unity of command. Is this a contradiction? What are your thoughts on the appropriateness of this arrangement?

Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander, with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. It is the foundation for the trust, coordination, and teamwork that’s necessary for unified action; and requires clear delineation

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LESSON 1

of responsibilities among commanders—up, down, and laterally. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of effort is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans.

Generally, the combatant commanders plan and execute assigned missions, while the Military Departments recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands. (This does not necessarily preclude unity of command.) U.S. doctrine stresses the primacy of the combatant commander in regard to the operational realm. Said another way, the Military Departments are about institutional efficiency while the unified commands are about operational effectiveness.

Remember that the current organization is effected by (among other things) Service history, tradition, and, to a degree, parochialism. Over time, the U.S. system has been modified to meet changing requirements. One would think that it certainly would not look as it does if our nation were provided the opportunity to build a military establishment from scratch. Consider this: Would it be feasible for our military to surrender Service cultures and identities and field permanent joint forces?

This is a thinking question: students can be either for or against the current U.S. national command structure, as long as they support their answer.

Assess the need to foster joint culture in the military. Are the concepts of a joint culture and Service culture mutually exclusive? To what degree should our military’s institutions and processes be centralized?

Meese and Wilson highlight a need to combat excessive “tribalism” within the Services. They state that an essential component of effectively implementing changes in DOD is to understand the organizational structure and culture of the agencies involved, recognizing that those cultures can significantly influence decision making. Organizational culture matters, because, like institutions, cultures persist and they can impede needed change.

It can be argued that the military Services have largely resisted a bureaucratic, top-down implementation of joint operations. Many feel that the concept of joint operations in its current incarnation is not a synergistic combination of the various branches of the Services. Rather, they see the reality of “joint” as a fifth branch of service. In the “Roles and Missions” video, Bryan McGrath claims that it is counterproductive for our defense establishment to expect jointness as the overriding attribute expected from our Services as they develop strategy.

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The current requirement for joint officer credentialing is significant. Some argue that substantial savings could be realized in a joint officer development model that eliminates the requirement for all officers to complete joint duty before being selected to flag/general rank. One proposal advocates for separate career tracks aligned to either 1) technical operations; 2) joint, interagency, and multinational operations; or 3) general/hybrid operations. Only the officers on track for flag and general officer positions on joint staffs would need to maintain their joint qualifications.

One of the manifestations of the joint culture in place since the GNA was enacted has been a move towards greater centralization. In “Mabus and McCain Actually Agree… DoD is Broken”, Kozloski describes the so-called “Fourth Estate” within DoD: OSD, the Joint Staff, and defense agencies. These support entities have swelled in size while the military Services have had to modify their practices to support them (e.g., think about defense organizations for logistics, intelligence, information systems, and finance). The Fourth Estate’s approach to operations is to consolidate functions and provide one-size-fits-all solutions to military problems. Kozloski feels that this quest for uniformity and standardization across DoD is a terrible business practice which stifles initiative and creates vulnerabilities (such as the 2015 OPM data breaches). Keep in mind that this author (Kozloski)—per both this article and his longer piece earlier in the lesson—seems to be pretty down on Goldwater-Nichols reforms in general. Your sharper students who are tracking on who writes what should point this out.

A key point for students to grasp in this discussion on joint culture would be an appreciation for the right balance between cost/efficiency and Service autonomy.

References: Meese & Wilson, p. 135; Building the Purple Ford, p. 53; “Mabus and McCain Actually Agree…DoD is Broken”; “Revisiting the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces” video.Additional discussion questions:-Describe the two chains of command referred to and what their purpose is; provide an example of each.

-Is there an imbalance between the role of the JCS members as Service Chiefs and as Joint Chiefs?

-Would the establishment of a centralized, directive command in the uniformed portion of the DoD facilitate a more coherent, integrated, and holistic approach to transnational and borderless opponents?

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LESSON 1

What risks are posed with the creation of a General Staff supporting a CJCS with command authority? What problem is it trying to solve?

-What is the “Fourth Estate” within DoD that the short Kozloski piece refers to?-Is the joint officer professional development model mandated by the GNA being effectively employed by the Services (or is JPME and joint duty simply a block-checking process for star-hungry officers)?

-The Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (of February 2012) cites that we should make an effort to “drive jointness deeper, sooner in capability development, operational planning, and leader development.” What are the pros and cons of providing joint inculcation earlier in leaders’ careers?

-In the “Roles and Missions” video, what does LtGen Deptula mean by his claim that for our military to be properly joint requires the separateness of the Services? Do you agree?

-In the same video, Bryan McGrath offers that strategy development should emanate from the Service side of the dual chain of command more so than the operational side. Why?

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LESSON 2: SERVICE WARFARE

Faculty note: If you are going to divvy up the Services and have different students brief out to the group, a suggested menu of items they could cover in their presentation includes: 1) roles and missions;2) broad range of competencies;3) unique equipment and technologies;4) capabilities/limitations grouped by joint function;5) Service ethos/culture;6) emerging concepts/organizations.

Module 1

Describe the Multi-Domain Battle concept and its ramifications for both the Army and the joint force. Is this a valid concept with real utility or just another buzz phrase in pursuit of congressional funding?

The future operating environment will be different from that of the past. U.S. forces will likely confront sensor-rich militaries of peer states and proxies employing precision-guided munitions on highly lethal battlefields that can restrict joint force freedom of action. Adversaries will counter U.S. strengths such as air and maritime superiority, degrade key capabilities by limiting access to space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, and exploit perceived U.S. weaknesses. As a result, joint forces can no longer assume continuous superiority in any domain (air, land, sea, space, cyberspace).

As Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) is envisioned, joint commanders will use cross-domain fires, combined arms maneuver, and information warfare to enable the opening of successive and/or simultaneous windows in depth to allow maneuver to positions of relative advantage. The idea is to create windows of localized superiority across multiple domains. As adversaries contest joint forces in one area, forces will either fight through, endure enemy actions, or bypass these effects by rapidly moving to another area where a temporary window of advantage has been created.

The animating principle of MDB is enhancing cross-domain capabilities to offer more solutions to joint force commanders (e.g., army missiles engaging maritime targets, submarines shooting down airplanes). This will require the military Services to do more than just coordinate well with one another. The next level of jointness will be all Services not only receiving support or enablers from another domain, but also each having the ability to influence other domains more routinely. While the joint force currently can conduct

LESSON 2

some degree of cross-domain integration, it generally occurs at higher levels. MDB conceptualizes bringing jointness down to the tactical level allowing units to communicate and coordinate directly across the Services at the lowest levels.

The video of Gen. Perkins speaking about Multi-Domain Battle makes a good case for the why concepts are important, highlighting that concepts drive change while doctrine facilitates operations. Perkins draws a parallel between the nascent Multi-Domain Battle concept and the AirLand Battle concept of the 80s. He describes how AirLand Battle drove positive change in the Army leading to success in Operation DESERT STORM, specifically that this concept preceded comprehensive reform in doctrine, training, and procurement. Perkins advocates for a similar approach today with the Multi-Domain Battle concept driving various changes across doctrine, organization, training & education, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) for a new operating environment. We’re not currently organized, equipped or trained to do this, hence the need for a broad concept for planners and procurers to coalesce around and move towards a shared vision in a coherent fashion (via wargaming and experimentation). Concepts are the start of a long process that takes years before they come to fruition in the form of doctrine, organizations, and equipment, often in forms different than envisioned at the outset.

Reference: Perkins video and two items hung on Blackboard Seminar Site as additional materials: Pamphlet entitled “Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century”; Jan 2017 article entitled “Get Out of Your Lane: the End of Discrete Domains”.

Analyze the other employment concepts the Army is pursuing or may pursue (Regional Alignment, Advise-and Assist Brigades, Proponency by Componency) to remain relevant and effective in the current operating environment. Do these concepts support or detract from one another? How could these concepts affect the Army’s abilities in future joint operations?

In addition to Multi-Domain Battle, the readings address several employment concepts that Army leadership is pursuing or may pursue: Regional Alignment of Forces, Advise-and-Assist Brigades, and ‘Proponency by Componency’ (Active Army focusing on higher intensity conflict while the National Guard prepares for operations at lower end of conflict spectrum) .

Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) are defined as 1) those units assigned to or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained capabilities aligned with combatant commands and prepared by the Army for regional missions. They are drawn from the Total Force, which includes the

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Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. They consist of organizations and capabilities that are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting (or ready to support) combatant commands through reach-back capabilities from outside the area of responsibility. They conduct operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. RAF specifically addresses those requirements that are enduring in nature for the combatant commander, from “set-the-theater” to the most-likely contingencies. Accomplishing such regional missions requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where RAF are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others. Hence, much of the Army is and remains aligned by virtue of assignment or allocation to a combatant commander.

The Army claims that the RAF concept provides numerous benefits. Strategically, it offers the United States both influence in and access to host nations through enhanced trust and understanding facilitated by enduring engagements. Operationally, it enables better integration between conventional Army forces and special operating forces, as well as between the Army and interagency partners, specifically the Department of State and Country Teams. At the tactical level, RAF drives cultural and regional expertise and language awareness training, giving US forces an improved understanding of the operational environment. As a result, combatant commands receive units better prepared to work in specific theaters and better able to gain situational understanding when deployed anywhere, even to a region to which they are not aligned. It also fosters an expeditionary mindset for an Army that is more CONUS-based than ever, while also affording a greater degree of mission predictability and stability for soldiers and their families.

A significant feature of regional alignment is that more army forces will be assigned, allocated, and service-retained-CCDR-aligned than ever before for nonwartime missions. Every geographic CCDR will have at least one brigade and a division or corps HQs habitually aligned with it. I Corps is assigned to PACOM, III Corps is allocated to CENTCOM, and the XVIII Airborne Corps is Service-retained but aligned to the Global Response Force. Active component division HQs with their separate brigades will be habitually aligned to provide at least one joint force capable HQs to each CCDR. These division HQs provide an adjunct staff for the CCDR’s Army Service Component Command, developing relationships with host nations, allied partners, and U.S. country teams. The utility of RAF to CCDRs for steady state phase 0 operations is obvious (scalable forces that are familiar with the region and trained in security cooperation operations).

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LESSON 2

The advise-and-assist brigade concept is something that the Army Chief of Staff has expressed an interest in as a way of meeting overseas mission challenges and readiness demands. The idea is to build these types of units into army structure vice ripping the leadership out of regular standing units to conduct train, advise, and assist missions. Basically, units of NCOs and officers would be formed, ideally one for each of the five OCONUS CCMDs, so they could conduct these operations. This would seem prudent as the advise-and-assist role is in high demand and it also allows the U.S. a method to employ forces without many “boots on the ground.” Additionally, if there was a national emergency, these cadres could serve as a solid chain of command for new U.S. soldiers to form a unit around.

Given that advise-and-assist brigades were originally billed as a means to regenerate the force if necessary as the Army planned to draw down its end strength in coming years, it remains to be seen if they come to fruition due to the shift towards re-building the U.S. military brought on with the Trump administration.

The Proponency by Componency concept was proposed in a 2016 Army War College study. It advocates for divvying up primary responsibilities for the Army’s two core competencies—Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide-Area Security (WAS)—between the active Army component and the National Guard respectively. The logic is that while the Army has been heavily involved in WAS-like stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, other nations (particularly Russia) have improved their CAM capabilities. It is important that both WAS and CAM have proponents within the Army to improve capabilities while not forgetting lessons learned. Proponents can advocate for proper doctrine, training, and equipment required for their competency while acknowledging that they are not to be the sole executor of either competency. WAS involves skills that the active component does not generally practice: interacting with local governments, law enforcement, and managing civilian infrastructure. Additionally, the National Guard has many members whose civilian job directly translates to WAS missions.

The counter-argument for Proponency by Componency is that the Army has a bias against WAS-like missions and is just trying to hand them off to the National Guard. During an operation like IRAQI FREEDOM, it is not clear exactly when CAM forces should transition to WAS forces. In some settings, campaigns might need to actually commence with WAS operations. Additionally, most of the operations undertaken by the Army in the last century have been WAS operations. It is probably not realistic to have National Guard units shoulder the burden for all of these operations. National Guard soldiers would have difficulties making ends meet and they could be less desirable applicants for future employers. Furthermore, deployed National Guard units are unable to fulfill their primary responsibility—support of their home state.

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Your students may have varied opinions on the Army’s motives for embracing RAF, Advise-and Assist Brigades, or Proponency by Componency. Key discussion points include focus and opportunity cost. Can the Army do all of these things or do some of these concepts work against each other? How? Theoretically, the Army could have regionally aligned forces scattered around the globe conducting security cooperation while they are also available for crisis response operations. How would this leave the Army postured to conduct major combat operations?

In October of 2014, the Army released its latest operating concept—“Win in a Complex World.” It is organized around uncertainty, which Army leaders think will be the most constant element of future operations. It also stresses that the Army’s future leaders need to be able to think and act strategically as well as tactically and operationally. Theoretically, this operating concept would undergird any employment concept adopted by the force, as troops will need to be flexible and think beyond the immediacy of tactics no matter where they are operating along the range of military operations. You may be able to draw a parallel here to the USMC’s concept of Maneuver Warfare, an ethos that fosters initiative and thinking across the force.

Something else to keep in mind as you discuss employment of the Army. The U.S. Army has removed a lot of combat power from overseas bases to the Continental U.S. This is, in part, due to financial reasons. Think about all of the infrastructure costs associated with housing and educating families abroad as opposed to relying on rotational forces from the U.S. There are also political reasons for this shift of military capability from abroad. Members of congress, desperate to keep bases open in their districts as the military shrinks, have worked to close as many bases as possible overseas before taking a hit at home. Today, only two of more than 35 Army BCTs are permanently stationed overseas. There are no armored units permanently stationed in Europe or Korea. However, in early 2017, the Army established a rotational armored BCT in Europe which deploys elements in countries on Europe’s eastern flank (Poland and the Baltics).

References: “Regional Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual” from Parameters Autumn 2013; “Milley: Advise-andAssist Brigade Pilot to Take Shape in a few Years”; both War On the Rocks articles dealing with Proponency by Componency.

Additional discussion questions:

-What U.S. Army HQs do you feel has the most capability to C2 a joint force?

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LESSON 2

-What do division and corps HQs have in common? (They’re both modular HQs that generally don’t have any fixed formations of subordinate units).

-What’s the difference between the Army operating forces and their generating force? What comprises each?

-What are the characteristics of heavy, medium and light forces? What are their employment and deployment considerations, strengths and limitations?

-What are the primary formations of the Army at the operational and tactical level of war?

-What are the utility of airborne and air assault forces at the operational and strategic level?

-How should the Army impart regional expertise to a regionally aligned Army?

-How can the Army institutionalize the notion of ‘globally responsive and regionally engaged’?

-Is U.S. Army transformation appropriate for the most likely conflicts of the future? To what degree should it be optimized to provide a long term stabilizing presence? Should it instead emphasize the more demanding requirements of conventional higher intensity conflict?

-What are some of the challenges facing the U.S. Army today as it downsizes and shifts its focus from counterinsurgency to deterring regional aggression and improving crisis response capabilities? What core capabilities must the Army preserve in any reorganization or downsizing?

Module 2

Describe the capabilities that USAF forces bring to a JFC, and how these can be integrated into joint operations.

The Air Force supports global combatant commander (CCDR) requirements through a combination of assigned, attached (rotational), and mobility forces that may be forward deployed, transient, or operating from home station. The Air Force will form an air expeditionary task force (AETF) to support the joint force commander (JFC). The AETF is scalable in size and normally

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encompasses all USAF forces assigned or attached to the joint operation. Within the AETF will be air expeditionary wings, groups, and squadrons. The AETF will be task-organized to meet the needs of the JFC (think MAGTF).

A previous USAF Chief of Staff (Gen Mark Welsh) said that the USAF is “…the only Service that can provide a theater’s worth of air superiority, and we are the only Service with the command and control to do it. We are the only Service that brings global air mobility and… theater command and control, ballistic missile defense command and control, and air defense command and control for all combatant commanders. We have 35,000 Airmen involved in the ISR enterprise 7 days a week, 365 days a year… In addition, [we operate] two legs of the nuclear triad.”

This is essentially a good synopsis of what the Air Force touts as their core missions:

Air and space superiority; ISR; Rapid Global Mobility; Global strike; and C2

Included in these broad mission sets, the USAF builds capabilities for combatant commanders by performing the following functions: Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO) - to operate, maintain, and secure nuclear forces to achieve an assured capability to deter an adversary from taking action against vital US interests. In the event deterrence fails, the US should be able to appropriately respond with nuclear options.

Cyberspace Superiority - the operational advantage in, through, and from cyberspace to conduct operations at a given time and in a given domain without prohibitive interference.

Special Operations - operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.

Personal Recovery - the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. It is the ability of the U.S. government and its international partners to affect the recovery of isolated personnel across the ROMO and return those personnel to duty.

Agile Combat Support - the ability to field, protect, and sustain Air Force forces across the ROMO to achieve joint effects.

Building Partnerships - interacting with international airmen and other relevant actors to develop, guide, and sustain relationships for mutual benefit and security. It includes both foreign partners as well as domestic partners and emphasizes collaboration with foreign governments, militaries

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LESSON 2

and populations as well as US government departments, agencies, industry, and NGOs.

Nevertheless, the current political and budgetary environment continues to tax the Air Force significantly. Open-ended operations in the Middle East and elsewhere demand extensive amounts of sustained strategic lift, ISR, C2, and space/cyber monitoring. Additionally, modernization of the nation’s nuclear arsenal of dated Minuteman II ICBMs will be extremely expensive.

The module overview addresses that the Air Force Future Operating Concept highlights Operational Agility. Fulfillment of Operational Agility implies a shift in USAF acquisition priorities and future operations. The USAF of the future may have a high- and low-end capability mix that considers weapons and payloads as the high-end and aircraft as the low-end of the capability spectrum. This inversion from today’s acquisition priorities would result in an Air Force that could look dramatically different in the future. Instead of a limited number of technologically advanced fifth-generation aircraft, we would see highly skilled multi-domain operators fielding more diverse and numerous simple, modular, low-cost platforms carrying a wide variety of payloads from sensors to munitions. All these platforms would be integrated and interoperable across air, space and cyberspace through a reconfigured command and control network to create a single operational domain to accomplish the five core missions.

Reference: Module 2 Overview; “An Interview with Mark A. Welsh,” (JFQ 3rd Qtr 2014); Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America; and “USMC SIG Scouting Report for the week of 16 Nov 2015.”

Explain the ramifications of the Air Force resourcing itself for security cooperation efforts. Consider the impact across DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities). Be sure to address both national and Service perspectives.

As the Air and Space Power Journal article explains it, at the strategic level, security cooperation (SC) efforts:-enhance homeland security by enabling partner nations to counter threats

to U.S. interest;-reduce the chances that U.S. forces will have to be used to address future

crisis;-improves U.S. access to, interoperability with, and cooperation with partner

nations in future crisis;-enhances regional security and stability relevant to U.S. interests; and-helps the U.S. shape the global environment and increase its influence

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In short, SC enhances deterrence, demonstrates U.S. regional commitment, builds regional stability, offsets costs, increases capability and capacity, and ensures access.

Within the Air Force, an increased commitment to SC facilities:-the Air Force’s ability to respond to increasing requests from the combatant

commands to provide personnel to support aviation-related SC;-the leveraging of billions of dollars of U.S. government and partner nation

spending (State Department and DOD $ provided to partner nations as well as partner nation funds themselves are spent on Air Force equipment and training programs, e.g. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs);

-access to bases abroad facilitates numerous Air Force missions, to include space-based C2, ISR, and tanker staging;

-interoperability with other nation’s Air Forces in areas like integrated air and missile defense, which leads to reduced USAF footprints forward as other nation’s increase their capacities and capabilities;

-having a larger amount of general purpose force airmen involved in SC frees Air Force SOF for employment in more specialized missions.

Following quote from a Pacific Air Forces’ (PACAF) officer sums up efficacy of their security cooperation efforts: “Although PACAF is ready to respond and succeed in the face of crisis, it is far better to prevent them from occurring in the first place, establish cooperative arrangements ahead of time, and reduce misperceptions and miscalculations. The investment of theater security cooperation must take the long view to assure realization of these benefits.” The context for this quote was the successful participation of numerous Pacific nations in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in November of 2013. The Philippine Air Forces’ efforts in security force missions and medical evacuation and treatment were particularly effective. This required less expenditure of USAF resources than might have been expected.

However, dedicating resources to security cooperation is not without opportunity costs. When the Air Force is tailoring DOTMLPF to SC, it is generally not doing so for higher-end missions. How much less ready will airmen be to conduct air superiority or global mobility missions if they have been exerting considerable time and effort in helping others do them vice doing them themselves? Are finite resources better spent building an air training facility abroad for use by a foreign military or at a CONUS-based USAF base for use by our airmen?

Reference: “Aviation Security Cooperation: Advancing Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power in a Dynamic World.” PACAF officer quote from “To Enable and Sustain: PACAF TSC as a Line of Operation,” Jan-Feb 2015 Air & Space Power Journal.

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LESSON 2


-Modernization efforts that the USAF is focusing on include the F-35, KC-46 tanker, bomber fleet, and ICBM modernization. Do you agree that these are the right priorities for the USAF?

-Looking at Figure 1—U.S. Air Force Organization— in the Module 2 Overview, what do the different colors represent? (Blue – Service chain, forces at home station; Purple – deployed operating forces.) Where in this graphic do AEFs reside? (right side – blue). Where are AETFs depicted? (left side – purple).

-Describe the role of the Director for Air Mobility Forces (DIRMOB-FOR-Air).

-Describe the role of the Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR).

-Does the current threat environment justify the expense of fielding the F-22 Raptor?

-What is the role of the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF)?

-Is culture more important than doctrine in determining how a Ser-vice fights?

Module 3

How does the Coast Guard tie into the national defense? What are the Coast Guard’s capabilities in national defense?

GlossaryBy statute, the Coast Guard is an armed force, operating in the joint arena at any time and functioning as a specialized service under the Navy in time of war or when directed by the President. It also has command responsibilities for the U.S. Maritime Defense Zone, countering potential threats to American's coasts, ports, and inland waterways through numerous port-security, harbor-defense, and coastal-warfare operations and exercises.

The Coast Guard's national defense role to support U.S. military commanders is more explicitly outlined in a memorandum of agreement signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation in 1995. Four major national-defense missions were assigned to the Coast Guard. These missions--maritime intercept operations, deployed port operations/security and defense, peacetime engagement, and environmental defense operations--are essential military tasks assigned to the Coast Guard as a component of joint and combined forces in peacetime, crisis, and war.

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Outside of U.S. coastal waters, the Coast Guard assists foreign naval and maritime forces through training and joint operations. Many of the world’s maritime nations have forces that operate principally in the littoral seas and conduct missions that resemble those of the Coast Guard. And, because it has such a varied mix of assets and missions, the Coast Guard is a powerful role model that is in ever-increasing demand abroad. The service’s close working relations with these nations not only improve mutual cooperation during specific joint operations in which the Coast Guard is involved but also support U.S. diplomatic efforts in general: promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and trust between nations.

Specific USCG national defense capabilities are:

Maritime interception and interdiction – Most often associated with efforts to curb drug smuggling; the Coast Guard also conducts patrols and coordinates with other federal agencies and foreign countries to interdict undocumented migrants at sea.Military Environmental Response – Response to oil discharges or hazardous material releases that could disrupt military operations of the U.S. and allied forces.Port Operations Security and Defense – Operations conducted to ensure port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats, terrorist actions, and safety deficiencies that would be a threat to deployment of military resources.Theater Security Cooperation – All military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.Coastal Sea Control – Operations conducted to ensure the unimpeded use of designated offshore areas by U.S. and friendly forces and to deny the use of those areas by enemy forces.Rotary Wing Air Intercept – The use of helicopters to support national Air Defense. It includes alert, interception, communication, surveillance, and escort activities.Combating Terrorism – Operations to prevent and respond to terrorist acts. These may include anti-smuggling, migrant interdiction, counter-piracy, rule of law, counter-proliferation, and port security.Maritime Operational Threat Response Support – Support to the integrated national-level maritime command centers to achieve coordinated, unified, timely, and effective U.S. government planning for, and response to, the full range of maritime security threats.

Reference: http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/Defense.asp; USCG website.

Describe unique operational roles for the Coast Guard that are emerging at home and abroad.

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http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/Defense.asp

LESSON 2

Both the Seffers article and the Papp viewing provide examples of Coast Guard niche capabilities that are increasingly called upon. When USCG law enforcement detachments are aboard Navy ships, the Navy can use USCG personnel to conduct boarding of suspected pirate vessels as they are experts in evidence collection and building case packages for eventual prosecution. The USCG provides alternative security options via a softer, less threatening form of national power. They are a regulatory agency, an environmental agency, a law enforcement agency, and a maritime first responder.

As the nation's leading maritime agency in protecting the U.S. public from the drug threat, the Coast Guard plays a key role in implementing the President's national drug-control strategy. A tremendous number of assets are required to patrol the long coastlines of the United States and the even greater expanse of waters encompassing the maritime "transit zones" used by drug smugglers. This six-million-square-mile area, roughly the size of the continental United States itself, includes the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific.

The Coast Guard is the lead agency for the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws at sea, stressing sensitivity in dealing with undocumented migrants in all realms: mass migration, asylum/refugee requests, smuggling and repatriation. In its effort to increase U.S. security against undocumented migrations, the Coast Guard constantly monitors maritime transit zones, interdicting undocumented migrants, rescuing people from sinking or unsafe vessels, providing humanitarian assistance, and training nations to discourage undocumented migration into the United States.

Given the utility of USCG forces, their service is frequently requested by the combatant commanders. ADM Papp posits that the USCG may never again revert to Dept of Navy control as they did in both world wars because operational capabilities are now provided to CCDRs instead of the Dept of the Navy.

Reference: http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.aspPapp viewing, Seffers article.


-Explain the Coast Guard’s unique status as an armed Service. Differentiate between Title X (DOD) and Title XIV (USCG).

-What Coast Guard capabilities can be useful to a JTF commander?

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http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp


-Given that the USCG has many duties pertaining to their mission of protecting the U.S. shoreline, to what degree should USCG personnel be deployed internationally overseas?

Module 4

Analyze the capabilities and options Navy forces bring to a joint force commander, and how these can be integrated into joint operations.

U.S. Navy forces are organized, trained, equipped and employed to carry out naval missions under Navy command and control or as part of a joint force. The U.S. Navy is operationally organized along geographic lines with a Navy Component Commander assigned to each Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). Under the Navy Component Commander are numbered fleet commanders who are the primary operational-level Navy commanders within the respective GCC Areas of Responsibility (AORs). All Navy theater component and numbered fleet commanders are configured with a Maritime Operations Center (MOC) to provide command and control at the operational level to include execution of Joint Task Force and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander functions. Tactical level operations are conducted by Task Force (TF) and Task Group (TG) commanders under their respective numbered fleet commander.

TF and TG command and control organization is executed through the composite warfare commander (CWC) construct. The CWC is the senior commander within a TF/TG and his subordinate commanders are designated as the warfare commanders for each of the key warfare areas – air missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, strike warfare and information operations. Most U. S. Navy ships, submarines, and aircraft are “multi-mission” and as such are allocated among the various warfare commanders as the situation dictates.

Carrier Strike Groups with embarked airwings, as the naval forces’ preeminent strike capability, and amphibious task forces with embarked Marines, along with surface combatants, submarines, and Coast Guard cutters, provide flexible and sustainable options from the sea to the littoral in support of the following naval missions: defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The Navy organizes, trains, and equips naval forces to accomplish these missions through the five essential functions: all domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.

Specific capabilities of Navy forces include:

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LESSON 2

Serve as a JTF headquarters. Act as a functional or Service component. Provide maritime supremacy. Provide logistical support to the JTF. Establish forward presence and/or deterrence. Provide sealift capability. Can incorporate and utilize Coast Guard assets. Seize and defend advanced naval bases (forcible entry). Conduct land operations (as a functional commander using a

landing force). Provide surface, subsurface, air, and land forces. Provide persistent ISR, strike, and electronic warfare. Theater air missile defense. Sea Basing; to include C2 and afloat positioning of joint assets. Expeditionary, multi-tiered, sensor and weapon grids.

The Navy’s Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) provides the joint force many capabilities, to include EOD, AT/FP, diving and salvage, SEABEEs, and riverine operations, among others.

Perhaps most influential for a JFC, naval shipping assets represent a significant U.S. presence in a region without requiring “boots on the ground”. This allows for figurative (enduring) and literal (should the need arise) strength to be employed while denying anti-American elements with fodder to portray the U.S. as a heavy-handed, imperialist power.

Navy units are generally served up to a joint force under the auspices of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. (JFMCC).

Reference: Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Assess the efficacy of current U.S. naval strategy. Is the Navy adequately postured to address the threats of the contemporary operating environment?

In the 2007 version of A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century, the Navy espoused the need for an increased focus on capacity-building, humanitar-ian assistance, regional frameworks for improved maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain. Noting the utility of expeditionary land forces for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy sought ways to work with other Services. It published new concepts and formed new organizations – the Naval Expeditionary Com-bat Command (NECC), explained in the lesson overview, and the Navy Irreg-ular Warfare Office. Another result of this expeditionary focus was the con-cept of the Global Fleet Station (GFS). This concept focused primarily on shaping operations consistent with Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Theater

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Security Cooperation (TSC) plans, and maritime security leading to better governance. A GFS includes at least one vessel capable of serving as the main logistics and command and control center, and may include smaller vessels and helicopters for ship-to-shore transfers and other operations. Non-traditional vessels— such as hospital ships for humanitarian assistance (HA) missions—can be employed as part of GFS in order to enhance the building of strong partnerships. Each GFS provides tailored and adaptive ca-pability packages. Composition of a GFS package depends on Combatant Commander TSC and BPC requirements, the operating environment, and needs of the partner nations.

Some critics of the 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century claim that it was too broad and that it didn’t clearly articulate the purpose of the naval Services with sufficient detail to inform policy makers and direct naval Service staffs to greater levels of integration. Conversely, proponents pointed out that the strategy has done a lot of good with external audi-ences. By depicting the U.S. on the strategic defensive, the document coun-teracted widespread mistrust of U.S. motives in the wake of the Iraq inva-sion. This provided political top cover for foreign Naval Service chiefs to en-gage more openly with the U.S. The resultant international cooperation and information sharing has, in turn, allowed the U.S. Navy to keep sending its forces forward despite post-9/11 Congressional/administration concerns about keeping forces closer to home for homeland security.

Due to changes in threats since 2007, the 2015 strategy (of the same name) is a harder-edged document. It contains more references to combat power, the threat of anti-access technologies such as cheap missiles and the chal-lenges posed by nations such as China and Iran. It also lays out maritime priorities by region, with an emphasis on supporting the Asia-Pacific re-bal-ance but also highlighting key areas including the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. The 2015 strategy adds All-Domain Access to the list of core naval functions in response to the ubiquitous anti-access/area denial threat. The strategy also underscores fleet requirements for the USN-USMC team as well as for the Coast Guard, and includes plans for forward-deploying and operating ships, aircraft, and personnel in key regions. Unlike the Army, who has been closing bases overseas and bringing units home to CONUS, the Navy continues to increase overseas-ported vessels (from 20 in 2006 to about double that in 2015). Demand has grown by combatant commanders for naval forward presence in responding to crisis, deterring adversaries, building trust, creating allies and building partnership capacity. Many of these demands go unfilled by the Navy.

Other nations may be wary of the offensive tone of the 2015 strategy. While potential enemies may find it downright provocative, even friends and neu-trals may be very disappointed in the reduced emphasis given to general maritime security concerns that tend to be higher in their national priorities:

26

LESSON 2

illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, piracy, and other forms of crimi-nal activity. The 2015 strategy is about U.S. national security rather than the American contribution to the defense of the global maritime system.

Ask students what Farley means by the cost of cooperation (being more pa-tient with China, accepting less capable platforms in favor of a higher num-ber of cheaper ones). Does Farley advocate for or against incurring these costs? (for)

You can also ask students what Beardsley means when he ends his article by saying that the 2007 strategy had an external audience while the 2015 version has an internal message. They should be able to articulate that the Navy wants Congress to provide the resources to execute higher-end mis-sions against near-peer competitors.

Reference: From Cooperation to ‘Warfighting,’ New Strategy Marks Shift for Navy; A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century; Global Fleet Stations Con-cept; “Striking the Balance: US Navy Weighs Quality and Quantity to Stay Ahead”; “The New U.S. Maritime Strategy, Another View From Outside”.


-What is a type command?

-What is the mission and purpose of the U.S. Fleet Forces Com-mand?

-Discuss the assertion that the U.S. Navy is overly focused on technology and tactics while operational thinking and good staff work are largely absent.

-Some say that an aircraft carrier is a very expensive ($ billions per) way to get a limited number of aircraft to a remote location and is extremely vulnerable to modern cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles. Does their utility outweigh their cost and vulnerability?

-Is the Littoral Combat Ship the way of the future for the U.S. Navy? Should it be?

-What is “All-Domain Access?”

-Describe the three areas that Newson recommends for the Navy to adjust its operating strategy - (1) Spread out and increase adver-sary’s risk – disbursing offensive capability to each type of ship; 2) Em-brace scalability – pursue cheaper systems so high-end ones don’t get

27


tied down performing low-end missions; and 3) Clarify difficult tradeoffs with strategic intent – review mission requirement, pawn off some on other Services/agencies, reduce administrative overhead).

Module 5

Summarize how important Total Force—reserve and active—involvement is in ensuring success of joint operations across the range of military operations.

Open question. Key point that students should digest is the expanded utility of the Reserves and National Guard (NG) since 9/11. The Total Force continues to evolve not just as an augmenter of regular forces, but as a critical peer to them. These Total Force contributions provide capabilities across the range of military operations, from National Guard BCTs/Air National Guard squadrons serving in OEF to Reserve MP units performing defense support to civil authorities missions within CONUS.


-What are the political ramifications to activating the reserves/NG?

-Assess the DOTMLPF impacts of keeping the NG as part of the operational reserve versus as part of the strategic reserve?

-What do you think of the retired Air National Guard officer’s proposal in the Armed Forces Journal to merge the NG and reserve forces? (The two organizations were created at different times to meet separate and distinct needs, but conditions have evolved such that there is no distinction between the two with respect to federal service. Considerable duplications exist in manning and operating similar staffs and general officers. However, any efforts to rectify this situation would have to overcome significant practical and political challenges.)

-Do any of you have experience working with reserve/NG units? What were their strengths/weaknesses?

-To what degree should the Army and Air Force consider changing the Total Force mix to integrate reserve and NG forces into regular formations at lower levels?

-It should be realized that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), a joint activity of the Department of Defense, is (as of 31 Dec 2011) member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of the NGB is the senior uniformed NG officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans

28

LESSON 2

affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the SecDef through the CJCS on NG matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Sec and CoS of the Army, and the Sec and CoS of the Air Force on all NG issues. As NGB Chief, he serves as the department's official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General of the states. Proponents of this change cited the need for an immediately responsive NG in today’s missions within CONUS and deployed world-wide. Opponents highlighted that the Service Chiefs of the Army and Air Force were the single voice for their branches and that this change could undermine unity of effort. What do you think?

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LESSON 3: COMBATANT COMMANDS

Faculty note: If you are going to divvy up the CCMDs and have different students brief out to the group, a suggested menu of items they should include in their presentation includes: 1) physical area of responsibility,2) assigned mission,3) HQ location, 4) internal structure, 5) any assigned forces, 6) major issues within the region, and 7) involvement in recent/ongoing operations.

Module 1

Appraise the responsibilities of the geographic combatant commanders. Which are most important?

Based on the President’s Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Commanders, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, US Africa Command, and US Northern Command are each assigned a geographic AOR within which their missions are accomplished with assigned and/or attached forces. Forces under the direction of the President or SecDef may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the CCDRs concerned or as specifically directed by the President or SecDef. Some responsibilities of these GCCs are to:

(1) Detect, deter, and prevent attacks against the US, its territories and bases, and employ appropriate force should deterrence fail.(2) Carry out assigned missions and tasks, and plan for and execute military operations, as directed.(3) Assign tasks to and direct coordination among subordinate commands.(4) Maintain the security of and carry out force protection and personnel recovery responsibilities for the command, including assigned or attached commands, forces, and assets.(5) Plan, conduct, and assess security cooperation activities.(6) Plan and, as appropriate, conduct evacuation and protection of US citizens and nationals and designated other persons.(7) Provide US military representation to international and US national agencies unless otherwise directed.(8) Provide the single point of contact on military matters within the AOR.

The two GCCs whose AORs contain US soil have additional responsibilities.

LESSON 3

The Commander, USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is responsible for:(1) Providing support to civil authorities, as directed.(2) Providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management (CBRN CM) assistance and support to US and allied partner authorities, as directed, within US territories and protectorates and the USNORTHCOM AOR.(3) CDRUSNORTHCOM is also designated the Commander, US Element, NORAD, and will be designated Commander or Deputy Commander of NORAD. A binational command of the US and Canada, NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning the continental US, the air defense identification zone, and the air and maritime approaches. Through NORAD, the commander answers to both the US and Canadian governments.(4) Planning, organizing, and as directed, executing homeland defense (HD) operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR in concert with missions performed by Commander, NORAD.(5) Synchronizing planning for DOD efforts in support of the USG response to pandemic influenza.

The Commander, USPACOM, is responsible for:(1) Providing support to civil authorities, as directed.(2) Providing CBRN CM assistance and support to US and allied partner authorities, as directed, within US territories and protectorates and the USPACOM AOR.(3) Planning, organizing, and as directed, executing HD operations within the USPACOM AOR.(4) Synchronizing planning for DOD efforts in support of the USG response to pandemic influenza and infectious disease.

The video of the Cdr of USSOUTHCOM offers some unique insights into the challenges faced by GCCs as they manage the affairs of their AORs. What General Kelly describes is essentially a macro version of a steady theater counterinsurgency effort, with multiple nations, targeting globally networked cartels, criminal organizations, and narco-terrorists. He is attempting to provide governments in Southern Command region the partnership and support necessary to fight the drug trade and remain credible in the eyes of their citizens. This cannot be done through force as would normally be expected of a military commander, but through humanitarian aid, economic development, theater support coordination, and mil-to-mil engagement. Among the many interesting points he makes is the potential for a convergence of bad actors globally. The biggest challenge faced by the traffickers and cartels of South America is laundering all of the money they bring in. A fair number of Middle Easterners that live in South America have direct links to banks overseas. General Kelly believes that a lot of the drug cartels’ laundered money is funding international terrorist operations. Obviously, this presents many challenges for GCCs and other members of the U.S. government agencies worldwide. It will be interesting to watch how

31


Gen Kelly’s views as Commander, USSOUTHCOM translate over into his actions as Secretary of Homeland Security.

Reference: JP 1, Chapter III; “Leading at the Nexus of Development and Defense” video.

Analyze the functional combatant commands. Are they properly organized and resourced to effectively execute their missions?

The Commander, USSOCOM is an FCC who exercises COCOM of all assigned active component (AC) and mobilized reserve component (RC) SOF minus US Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) forces. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides US-based SOF to a GCC who exercises OPCON of attached SOF through a commander of a theater SO command (TSOC) or a joint SO task force (JSOTF) in a specific operational area or to prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, USC, Section 167, or those units or forces that have since been designated as SOF by SecDef, and they are those AC and RC forces of the Services specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support SO. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ a JTF as the supported commander. In addition to functions specified in Title 10, USC, Section 167, CDRUSSOCOM is responsible to:

(1) Serve as the SOF joint force provider.(2) Integrate and coordinate DOD MISO capabilities to enhance interoperability and support US Strategic Command’s IO responsibilities and other CCDRs’ MISO planning and execution.(3) Synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other CCDRs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint employment of SOF.(4) Synchronize planning for DOD combating WMD efforts in coordination with other CCDRs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies (Note: this duty recently migrated to USSOCOM from USSTRATCOM.)

The Commander, US Strategic Command, is an FCC who is responsible to:(1) Maintain primary responsibility among CCDRs to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.(2) Provide integrated global strike planning and C2 support of theater and national objectives and exercising C2 of selected missions as directed.(3) Synchronize planning for global missile defense in coordination with other CCDRs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies.

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LESSON 3

(4) Plan, integrate, and coordinate ISR in support of strategic and global operations.(5) Provide planning, training, and contingent electronic warfare support.(6) Provide in-depth analysis and precision targeting for selected networks and nodes.(7) Plan and conduct space operations.(8) Synchronize planning for cyberspace operations (NOTE: The National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 authorized USCYBERCOM to become an independent combatant command pending issues mainly related to splitting the Commander’s two hats—Commander of USSTRATCOM (with Title 10 defense authorities and responsibilities) and Director of the National Security Agency (with Title 50 intelligence authorities and responsibilities)).

Per an action officer at the Joint Staff J-5, in an effort to more evenly spread duties amongst the FCCs, the next version of the UCP is likely to include the following modifications to USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities:

-move USCYBERCOM out from under USSTRATCOM (making CYBERCOM its own combatant command)-divesting USSTRATCOM duties to other CCMDs:

*ISR to the Joint Staff*Missile Defense to USNORTHCOM*Counter WMD to USSOCOM (this mission has transitioned to SOCOM;

just needs to be codified in UCP)

The Commander, US Transportation Command, is an FCC who is responsible to:(1) Provide common-user and commercial air, land, and maritime transportation, terminal management, and aerial refueling to support global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces.(2) Serve as the mobility joint force provider.(3) Provide DOD global patient movement, in coordination with GCCs, through the Defense Transportation Network.(4) Serve as the Distribution Process Owner. Synchronize planning for global distribution operations in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate government departments and agencies.

NOTE: US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was an FCC that was dis-established in 2011. Its missions were largely assumed by the Joint Staff (and, to a lesser degree, by other CCmds and the Services).

Reference: JP1, pp. III- 9 to III-10


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-Would a GCC normally get involved in the court-martial of a Sailor in the naval component of his command? Why or why not?

-If a SOF direct action mission is to be performed in USSOUTHCOM’s AOR, which CCDR is ‘in charge’? How about for a Tomahawk missile strike from the Mediterranean against targets in Sudan? A B-2 mission launched from CONUS to Somalia? (Question that needs to be answered for these situations is “who is the mission being conducted for?” If national authorities are directing a SOF strike, then SOCOM will conduct and will (theoretically) coordinate with the GCC. If the GCC is requesting a SOF strike (that is beyond the capabilities of his attached SOF), then SOCOM will perform supporting role with the GCC being supported. Same sort of logic applies for other related questions. Namely, is the Functional Combatant Command operating at the direction of higher or in support of the GCC?-Among the functional CCDRs, who’re the force providers and what do they provide? (SOCOM – SOF; TRANSCOM – mobility; STRATCOM – ISR/strategic forces)-How does a functional combatant command with a global mission accomplish that mission in a geographic region that is assigned to another combatant commander?-There are currently no specified commands, though the concept remains in our doctrine. Do you believe that we’ll ever establish any specified command again? For what mission(s)?

Module 2

According to some of the readings, the design of the combatant commands should be drastically changed to better serve our national objectives. Evaluate these proposed modifications. What parts of them make sense? Which are incorrect or based on faulty assumptions?

While the interagency flavor of SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM seems to be increasingly relevant in today’s environment, some feel that these two commands exist largely to conduct training and humanitarian assistance functions and hence don’t rate the resources of a four star, stand-alone GCC.

Feickert’s Congressional Research Service report poses the question of new CCMDs for certain regions or functions (i.e. separate CCMDs for India or Central Asia and CYBERCOM being elevated from a sub-unified command to a full FCC). He also considers alternatives to the current CCMD model. A particularly interesting proposal involves replacing GCCs with civilian-led interagency organizations having regional responsibility for all aspects of

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U.S. foreign policy. The intent behind this sort of change is to reduce the military face of current U.S. structure. These joint interagency commands would be led by civilians with perhaps a military deputy and report to the President through the NSC. Unfortunately, the analysis of this proposal is not deep. Not mentioned is the fact that changes of this magnitude would come about only with a new National Security Act and revision to Title 10, the UCP, and various Presidential Decision Directives. This would all require the expenditure of a significant amount of political capital, among other resources. Nevertheless, the concept is worth consideration by our learners.

The Kozloski excerpt claims that the character of the GCCs militates against effective whole-of-government engagement programs that are so needed to address current threats: terrorism, narcotics smuggling, international criminal networks, etc. Kozloski goes on to highlight how the CCMDs have increasingly sucked up a substantial amount of officers operating in a joint capacity and proposes a re-structuring whereby the GCC HQs are replaced by beefed up Service led HQs. He also advocates for a review of FCC organization to realize efficiencies (notably, merge DLA with USTRANSCOM and relieve USSTRATCOM of some of its’ disparate functions by handing them off to a Service or the Joint Staff).

It should be stressed with students that GCCs integrate planning with FCCs into their (GCC) theater campaign plans. FCCs synchronize planning across CCMDs, Services, and defense agencies for their global campaign plans. The integration of functional missions into geographic campaigns is the long pole in the tent. There seems to be an increasing trend towards granting the FCCs more authorities in this arena (think SOCOM with SOF missions and CYBERCOM with cyber missions).

Related to this discussion of U.S. power around the globe is a concept advocated by Moises Naim in his book The End of Power. Naim offers that whether it pertains to a government, a military, corporation, or a church, power has become easier to acquire, harder to use, and easier to lose (e.g., the Arab Spring). Said another way, it’s a tough time to be a centralized bureaucracy (like the U.S. military). Reasons for this include the following: there are more people, corporations, computers, porous borders (allowing people, ideas, money, information, and goods & services to move easier), and a general change in values and expectations (i.e., authority figures like teachers and supervisors are less able to lead simply by directing, rather they must increasingly co-opt.) As the spread and proliferation of information has diffused power, size no longer equates to power. Reflecting on this notion should cause students to ponder the source(s) of U.S. power, generally increasing awareness on the limits of power. Reference: All readings of Requirement 2

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(NOTE: This discussion unavoidable delves into the interagency. Faculty should review lesson 5—Interorganizational Coordination—prior to this lesson so as to have a feel for what they intend to cover here in lesson 3 and what should be left for discussion in lesson 5).

Has the establishment of USAFRICOM been an effective use of U.S. resources that has generally advanced U.S. interests in the region?

Africa continues to see sweeping change through the progression of governance and economic development. However, this progress is fragile and does not equate to stability in this historically unstable region. The security environment of Africa is anything but secure; it’s characterized by a lack of controlled borders, vast ungoverned spaces, volatile social tensions, and inconsistent law enforcement. The potential for radical Islamic fundamentalism on the continent is substantial. Africa not only contains a larger Muslim population than the Middle East, but more importantly, the majority of the population suffers from poverty and a lack of education. Africa’s substantial number of failed states and its increasing importance as a source of natural resources and energy have made it a region of significant strategic import. The U.S.’s particular concerns in the region include: counterterrorism, containing armed conflicts and responding to humanitarian crises, retarding the spread of HIV/AIDS, reducing international crime, responding to growing Chinese influence, and securing natural resources.

The AFRICOM model was introduced by the U.S. in 2007 largely to counter perceptions that the DOD had become our country’s default tool for getting things done in the world. In addition to having a large contingent of personnel from other U.S. government agencies, the leadership at the top of AFRICOM was also structured to reflect an interagency perspective (e.g., Dep Cmdr for Civ-Mil Engagement). Interagency partners on the AFRICOM staff have been dispersed throughout the various staff sections instead of being cloistered in one office like some other CCMDs have chosen to do. Nevertheless, AFRICOM has faced interagency challenges in policy synchronization and day-to-day coordination. The Denn, Williams, and Johnson reading highlights two case studies on these challenges: policy synchronization – synchronizing AFRICOM’s countering violent extremism strategy with the DoS’s transnational organized crime strategy; and day-to-day coordination – the employment of regionally aligned forces and the 101st Airborne Divison’s response to the 2014 Ebola crisis. Challenges mentioned include:

-insufficient personnel from DoS aligned with DoD counterparts;-overlap of U.S. government defense missions, global health, and international affairs;

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-misaligned organizations pursuing separate and sometimes redundant policies and strategies in fighting violent extremism and transnational organized crime;-organizational culture challenges when integrating interagency partners at the tactical level.

While we generally don’t hear much about the involvement of the U.S. military in Africa (compared to, say, CENTCOM’s AOR), there is no doubt that AFRICOM is certainly contributing to substantial ‘Phase 0’ shaping work in the region, the positive results of which are not always readily apparent. Nevertheless, critics contend that AFRICOM is another example of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and that Africa will be “Iraqed” (that it will become a battleground of the U.S.’s power struggle, drawing enemies in and exacerbating the terrorism problem). Many perceive that the primary reasons for establishing AFRICOM are to hunt terrorists and secure access to oil. Some go so far as to claim that AFRICOM is an imperial organization in desperate search of a mission, given that its stated roles could be performed by traditional military assistance programs implemented by American embassies. Clearly, the U.S. must consult closely with the governments of African countries to highlight the mutually beneficial relationships enhanced by the existence of AFRICOM. It may be productive to have learners approach this discussion from perspectives other than that of U.S. military officers ((U.S. strategic leadership, African leaders, African militaries, African populace, NGOs, nations outside of Africa, etc.) as these will largely shape one’s assessment.

Related read - The following link is a five page article which is very critical of the U.S.’s military efforts in Africa – When U.S. Africa Command Evaluates Itself, the Results Are Grim. (You must be logged into Blackboard to access link)

In the SOCAFRICOM video, BGen Bolduc stresses the importance of institution building in the region. He claims that purely military efforts can only get you so far. He emphasizes that his military forces operate in a supporting role to military partners, country teams, and OGAs/NGOs.

The below excerpt from a May 2015 Stars and Stripes article entitled “Staging Sites Enable AFRICOM to Reach Hot Spots Within Four Hours” provides some operational insights that may be useful during seminar discussions:

In all, AFRICOM now has access to 11 cooperative security locations across Africa, some of which have been around for years. With only one major military base on the continent — Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti — smaller staging facilities help stretch AFRICOM’s reach. In the case of western Africa, the sites are spartan but strategically positioned near airfields that provide quick in-and-out access, Rodriguez said.

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https://cdet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/xid-1731586_1

https://cdet.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/xid-1731586_1


“It’s just an austere site. There’s nothing there but a couple of warehouses full of stuff,” Rodriguez said, referring to the sites in western Africa. “When people come down, they put up tents and that’s where they stay.”

The facility in Senegal was recently put to use during the military’s response to the Ebola crisis in western Africa.

A special task force of crisis-response Marines based in southern Europe maintains a rotating presence at the respective facilities, where they conduct periodic training missions with partner militaries, Rodriguez said. That means AFRICOM needs to catch signs of potential threats in the early stages to ensure the Marines have time to mobilize.

“When indicators warrant or when requested by the State Department, then we would move to one of those locations, and that will enable us to get closer and be able to respond,” he said. “The real challenge is the indicators of warning to be able to get their fast enough.”

While the East Africa Response Force, an Army unit positioned in Djibouti, can carry out quick-response missions around the Horn of Africa, Marines based out of Moron, Spain, deal with threats in northern and western Africa. When needed, they also make use of the U.S. Navy base in Sigonella, Italy, which puts troops in striking distance of countries such as Libya. In July, Marines launched from Sigonella to evacuate U.S. Embassy personnel as security conditions in Tripoli deteriorated.

The skeleton-style outposts in Senegal, Ghana and Gabon are aimed at putting U.S. forces closer to hot spots in the region, including Mali and Nigeria. Al-Qaida-aligned militants in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria show signs of striking out into neighboring states.

With the emergence of Islamic State militants in Libya and Boko Haram’s recent pledge of allegiance to the group, AFRICOM is monitoring the two militant organizations for signs of cooperation, which for now appear limited, Rodriguez said.

Reference: “Out of Synch”; AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New Combatant Command; Cdr, SOCAFRICOM video; “Staging Sites Enable AFRICOM to Reach Hot Spots Within Four Hours”


-What were some of the recommendations offered by the authors of “Out of Synch” to improve USAFRICOM interagency synchronization?

-Does globalization negate the need for regional focus and expertise (provided by the GCCs) or confirm it?

-What do you think of the following observation? By compartmentalizing the threat geographically, the U.S. is erroneously applying reductionism to combat a wicked problem.

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-Does the USSOCOM model provide an example for other Functional Component Commands with global responsibilities and capabilities? Or is USSOCOM in some way unique?

-Are SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, with their interagency focus, the way of the future for CCDRs, or are there some AORs that demand a military heavy approach?

-Retired Gen. Tony Zinni has been heard to say that our combatant command model needs improving. He claims that functional combatant commands should be the integrators between the providers (Service Chiefs) and the employers (GCCs). In order to do so effectively, he claims that new FCCs should be considered. For example, a joint intelligence command, joint logistics command, joint civil affairs command, etc. What do you think?

-Why did USCYBERCOM come online as a sub-unified combatant command instead of being a combatant command? Should it have been made a separate combatant command from inception? Why or why not?

-Should CCDRs have more influence in determining weapon system procurements (beyond the largely ineffective Integrated Priority List (IPL) process) or is their focus too short term?

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LESSON 4: JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATION

Module 1

Describe the common command relationships combatant commanders receive from the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, to control forces in their theater.

COCOM: Combatant command authority cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving: organizing and employing forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM authority is the law, as codified in Title 10 U.S. Code. Hence, it is legal term (whereas OPCON, TACON, and support relationships are purely doctrinal terms). Normally, COCOM authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

OPCON: Operational control is the authority to perform those command functions over subordinate forces involving: organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. In a sense, OPCON provides for “ownership” of the forces. It allows the commander to task both “what to do” and “how to employ.” It requires expertise in planning and employment. It remains the preferred command relationship over forces that the commander will continuously own and employ, and for which he and his staff have the expertise and capability to command and control.

TACON: Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands made available for tasking, which is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at, any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON is a subset of OPCON and also provides for “ownership” of the forces. It allows for local direction and control for accomplishment of a specific mission. Supporting commanders often provide forces TACON to a

LESSON 4

supported commander. While most normally attribute this forces-provided TACON to air sorties provided by the Navy or Marines TACON to the JFACC, another very effective use is the supporting commander horizontally providing ground or SOF forces TACON to a supported commander. Frequently, the supporting commander opts to directly provide the TACON authority based on his determination that it’s the best way to support integration at the point of action. This TACON is not directed from the higher commander in the form of a FRAGO, but rather provided horizontally between supporting to a supported commander. This TACON authority provides for unity of command, and agility, at the tip of the spear – at the point of action.

The TACON relationship can be a source of friction within a JTF if not adequately defined. It’s all a matter of perspective. The CCMD and gaining HQs often view it as a means to achieve unity of command by empowering the gaining commander (in this case the JTF CDR) to direct the TACON force within the overall parameters of the TACON authority (in essence “owning” the force for accomplishment of the mission). However, the providing (losing) command may view the delegation of TACON in a more minimalist perspective in which it retains primary direction, authority, and responsibility over the force. They see the TACON command relationship as a limiting relationship that authorizes the gaining JTF CDR to only exercise limited direction of the force – a more deconfliction-like viewpoint. The CCDR can resolve this potential disparity by clarifying the delegation of TACON authority. Some best practices include: the CCMD articulating overall intent for achieving unity of command through the use of the TACON relationship, specifying those missions for which the JTF CDR has authority to exercise TACON, specifying CONOP approval authorities, force protection responsibilities, operational reporting channels, directed deployment of liaison, limits to the parent HQ authority, and command venues by which to address misunderstanding or risk concerns.

SUPPORT: The supported/ing command relationship can be the most powerful command relationship in terms of gaining overmatching power. It provides the authority and basis for interdependence, and is often the most appropriate in today’s complex operational environment. This support relationship in essence makes the supporting commanders responsible for the success of the supported commander. They can’t simply provide some forces and walk away from the challenge. Rather, in consonance with the joint force commander’s guidance and intent, it requires them to stay involved with the supported commander and continue to aid and assist him as he conducts operations.

A helpful analogy for a supporting commander may be that of a contractor. A supported commander doesn’t have to worry about taking care of him, rather the supporting commander just shows up and contributes.

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The JFC can establish support relationships among all functional and service component commanders, such as for the coordination of operations in depth involving the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Within a joint force, the JFC may designate more than one supported commander simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support for different missions, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may be supported for a direct-action mission while simultaneously supporting a JFLCC for a raid. Similarly, a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) may be supported for a sea control mission while simultaneously supporting a JFACC to achieve air superiority over the operational area.

NOTE: The command relationship of support will be addressed in more detail in the next module.

In the video of MajGen Kennedy’s comments, he stresses that command and control matters. He says that “we never get this right” and that there is a lot of wisdom in thinking through command relationships by graphically depicting them in a wire diagram. Ask your students if they have insights into why “we never get this right.”

Reference: Module 1 Overview; Additional references: “Command Relationships” from JFQ issue 63, 4th Qtr 2011, pp. 153-5; Two separate Joint Staff J-7 Insights and Best Practices Focus Papers: Joint Operations (4th Ed.)(Mar 13), p.24; and Forming a JTF HQ (Sep 15), p. 8.

Analyze the following statement: the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each Service is equally represented.

Open question. Hopefully most students will disagree with this statement. While history offers some obvious operational examples of a failure to integrate (DESERT ONE, URGENT FURY) , current operations generally task organize with more of a proper emphasis on operational utility vice politics, bragging rights, or ‘rice bowls’. Main point for students to grasp would be that jointness for joints sake should be avoided. While personalities and Service cultures should always be considered, an objective assessment of capabilities provided by all potential forces is a necessity prior to commencing any operations.

Some things to highlight for students regarding justifying a JTF are GCC strategic calculus and regional engagement requirements: The establishment of a JTF HQ indicates commitment to a specific mission within an AOR. Events do not occur in isolation and the creation of a JTF, with the resultant commitment of forces and marshalling of resources across all

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elements of national power, will change the strategic landscape within the GCC’s AOR. The decision to stand-up a JTF is significant with potential long term ramifications; the JTF must be sustainable for the duration of the mission. This has force structure implications for the JTF HQ and the sourcing organizations.

Conversely, combatant command headquarters can be needlessly drawn into operational/tactical level issues. Establishing a JTF can serve to maintain an appropriate focus, freeing the CCDR to keep a broader AOR-wide perspective.

What are some of the considerations a JFC must take into account when deciding how to organize a joint force (by Service, by function, by mission capability package, etc.)?

Many factors come in to play when considering how to best organize a joint force—mission, command and control, resources, threat, sustainment, to name a few. The two traditional methods of organizing joint components is Service or by function.

Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. Conducting joint operations using Service components is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistics support for joint forces is provided through Service component commands .

Logistics remains a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements, or as otherwise directed by the combatant commander. In addition to logistics support arrangements, one component may support another with forces or operations in a variety of command relationships, as previously described.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same domain, or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Functional components are appropriate when (1) the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives; and (2) unity of command and unity of effort are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large and JFCs need to divide their attention between major operations or phases that are functionally dominated (and synchronize those operations), it may be useful

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to establish functionally oriented commanders who are responsible for the major operations.

Usually, joint forces have a combination of Service and functional components with different operational responsibilities. Joint forces that are organized with Service components still have special operations forces under a JFSOCC. JFCs normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC, based on his concept of operations.

The MacGregor article offers a non-doctrinal method of force organization. Essentially, the author proposes modifying joint forces to have fewer integrated C2 echelons with a faster decision cycle. He argues for several deputy commanders within a joint force — ISR, strike, maneuver, sustainment — transforming all Service forces into mission-focused force packages that can be assembled into larger joint operational forces. You should probe learners for their take on this construct.

Reference: Module 1 Overview; McGregor article.


-What is Service componency? What is functional componency? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each?

-What are the roles and responsibilities of a Service component commander with respect to the JFC? With respect to the subordinate JTF?

-What did you think of the MacGregor article on fundamentally changing how we organize our joint forces for operations? Is his proposal feasible? Why or why not?

-Regardless of how a CCDR organizes his forces, why must he always have Service components?

-Explain the responsibilities that a joint force functional component commander has to his joint force commander.

-Did the CCDR for OIF I organize his forces along functional or Service lines? (functional) How about the CCDR during operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM? (Service plus a JFACC). Why the difference? (maturation of joint functional construct)

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-What’s a critical difference between OPCON and TACON authorities? (with OPCON, can “fire” a subordinate commander and can establish subordinate commands)

-What command authority does a GCC exercise over assigned forces? (COCOM) Over attached forces? (OPCON or TACON)What command authority does a JTF commander exercise over assigned or attached forces? (OPCON or TACON)

-When might it be better to seek attachment of forces under a support relationship such as direct support as opposed to OPCON? What are the pros and cons of each authority? (During Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya, maritime forces, which retained other maritime missions within the EUCOM AOR, remained OPCON to EUCOM while providing DS to AFRICOM. DS of these forces gave AFRICOM and the JTF commander authority over the general direction of the supporting forces, providing for the necessary effects within the JOA while unburdening JTF-Odyssey Dawn from determining the tactics, methods, and procedures used. Also, all sustainment responsibilities remained with the supporting command. Point is that support relationships can provide capability of other units without any of the hassles of “ownership” that come with OPCON.)

-What are the three different levels of joint force commands? (CCDR, Sub-unified CCDR, JTF) Does a sub-unified commander exercise COCOM command authority? (no, OPCON. COCOM only exercised by a CCDR) Can a JFC be subordinated to another JFC? How? (Yes, a JTF reports to a CCDR) Are Joint Functional Component Commanders JFCs? (No! Only JFCs can conduct campaigns and only JFCs can create JTFs, so a component commander—even though he has the word ‘joint’ in front of his title—is not by definition a JFC)

-Who can designate a JTF? (SecDef, a CCDR, a sub-unified CCDR, or a CJTF; basically only the SecDef or a JFC)

-A JTF can be established on a geographic or functional basis. Can you provide examples of each? (Geo – CJTF-Horn of Africa, JTF-Guantanamo; Funct – NORTHCOM’s JTF-Civil Support).

-How is a JTF established and manned? What are the considerations for shifting responsibility from the CCDR to the CJTF?

-Have any of you had any experiences with the joint HQ augmentation entities - SJFHQ [CE], TRANSCOM’s JECC? Why are these organizations necessary? What capabilities do they bring? (Note that the geographic combatant command SJFHQs have been phased out).

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-The “Observations on the Long War” blog reading claims that the complexity of contemporary warfare requires well-trained and coordinated staffs capable of providing detailed planning and intelligence at all levels. Is this notion in conflict with MacGregor’s article, where the author advocates for reduced C2 overhead?

Module 2

In a supported/supporting relationship, explain the responsibilities of the establishing authority, supported commander, and the supporting commander.

Establishing Authority. The establishing authority is the common higher commander – he may be a Combatant Commander, a JTF commander, or even at the SecDef level in the case of certain counter-terror or USSTRATCOM activities. This higher commander defines the support command relationships among his subordinates in terms of who is supported and supporting, the respective degree of authority, and overall priorities–especially where there are limited resources supporting numerous operations (e.g. SOF and air). He is also the “referee,” the tie-breaker/adjudicator, when subordinates cannot work out the necessary balance of access to capabilities.

Best practices for establishing authorities include:- Give clear direction to subordinates in terms of priorities, acceptable risk, and intent to allow subordinates to work horizontally with each other in accomplishing tasks. This is critical and requires continuous, hands-on involvement in today’s environment of multiple ongoing missions with limited resources.- Set conditions for and demand crosstalk amongst supported and supporting commanders to build and reinforce the necessary horizontal personal relationships, and trust and confidence.- Challenge your subordinates to “self-regulate” their apportionment of capabilities to one another through horizontal crosstalk. This crosstalk amongst your components will allow them to arrive at the optimal apportionment of capabilities to accomplish both their assigned tasks and support the supported commanders.- Staying involved when necessary to arbitrate/resolving conflicting understanding of priorities.

Supported Commander. The supported commander is given access to supporting capabilities and has the authority to provide general direction, designate and prioritize missions, targets, or objectives, and other actions for

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LESSON 4

coordination and efficiency (to include requesting liaison and directing of reporting requirements).

Best practices for supported commanders include:- Identify needs to supporting commanders as a continuous, not one time, activity. - Request liaison from supporting commanders to help coherently integrate supporting capabilities in the operation.- Bring lack of support issues first to supporting commanders, and if necessary to establishing authority for resolution.- Recognize your accountability in developing your concept of operations and supported requirements taking into account potential risk and hardship to supporting commander forces.

Supporting Commander. The supporting commander is responsible to both ascertain and satisfy the needs of the supported commander within the priorities directed by the establishing authority.

Best practices for supporting commanders include:- Recognize your role in ensuring the success of the supported commander. Those believing and following through on the ‘one team, one fight’ mindset set the conditions for success. Share your assessment on potential risks, both to the mission and to your forces, with the supported commanders to assist in best accomplishing the mission with the minimum risk.- Understand and respect the authority of the supported commander. Recognize that your support to another supported commander may have a higher priority than even a mission your unit has been assigned.- Take time in ascertaining the supported commander’s requirements and understanding the overall priorities in apportioning your forces to accomplish both your assigned tasks and those of other supported commanders.- Send liaisons to supported commanders to assist them in planning and in ascertaining your requirements.- Establish appropriate command relationships to your subordinates to ensure you fulfill your supporting responsibilities. Ensure the support command relationship is delineated to the very lowest level by empowering your subordinates to work directly with their ‘supported’ counterparts.- Forces or capabilities can be provided in a Direct Support or even TACON relationship to a respective supported commander to ensure his success. We need to educate our leaders that this is okay and often preferred.

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Reference: Joint Operations (4th Ed.), pp. 24-26.

Discuss the considerations involved in determining combatant command level command relationships that best leverage cyber/space/special operations forces.

As pointed out in the CCJO excerpt, a greater use of functional or mission-based joint forces increases the likelihood that multiple commanders will operate in geographic proximity. Whether we’re talking about cyber, space forces, SOF, air assets, or other capabilities, lateral coordination is a distinguishing feature required by relevant evolving hybrid arrangements.

The challenge in integrating these types of forces is in effectively employing their capabilities without burdening or interfering with dynamic operations of the geographic combatant command.

The Digital Theaters article succinctly describes many of the attendant problems and offers suggestions for overcoming them by presenting four command and control arrangements used by different types of forces—space, global strike, SOF, electronic warfare—and offering them as models for use by cyber forces. These examples exhibit varying degrees of decentralized C2 and shifting authorities. The first model described is one of support, where USCYBERCOM is in support of a geographic combatant commander’s (GCCs) operations much like USSTRATCOM is currently in support of GCCs via its Joint Functional Component Commander for Space (JFCC-Space). The second model is one of TACON, where USCYBERCOM would transfer TACON of cyber forces to a supported combatant commander. This is akin to how USSTRATCOM employs its Joint Functional Component Command for global strike (JFCC-GS). The third example is an OPCON model, with USCYBERCOM attaching cyber forces OPCON to a CCDR, who then designates a Joint Force Cyber Component Commander (JFCCC) to exercise cyber C2 (much like how USSOCOM transfers OPCON of SOF to a CCDR, who exercises the authority by designating the TSOC commander as a Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC)). The use

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of a JFCCC was considered during the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warrior 14 Service-level war game. The idea was eventually discarded as it was too difficult to determine the appropriate manning, roles, missions, and responsibilities. The last example provided in the Digital Theaters article is the COCOM model, which involves assigning cyber forces to CCDRs so that they “own” organic cyber capability (similar to how they currently possess an organic electronic warfare capability).

A key point to remember in looking at these four examples is that as you read through them, the degree of authority and centralization for USCYBERCOM decreases. Said another way, as presented, they progressively decentralize C2 and shift authority to the combatant commanders (generally GCCs, but could technically be any CCDRs).

In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over cyber, space, or SOF units should:(1) Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.(2) Avoid frequent transfer of forces between commanders.(3) Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, andsupport the operations.(4) Integrate cyber, space, SOF early in the planning process.(5) Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.

The Joint Ops (4th Ed.) reading offers some good insights specifically on C2 of SOF:

At the GCC level, clarify command relationships between the JTFs and both national and theater SOF. Establish at a minimum a mutual support relationship together with delegating Coordinating Authority to battle space owner (BSOs) for operations in JOAs and AOs. Clarify TACON command relationship authorities between the JTFs and the Theater SOC.

At the JTF level, establish appropriate command relationships (typically mutual support) between SOF and tactical units. Develop horizontal linkages with SOF at all levels down to brigade combat team (BCT) level to ensure decentralized, tactical level integration with SOF. Direct the exchange of LNOs and delegate coordinating authority down to tactical level battlespace owners.

At battlespace owner level, request liaison elements from national and theater SOF HQs (i.e., the Theater SOC), and/or from any provided or attached SOF HQs to better integrate their capabilities. Ensure the liaison elements have planning, current operations information sharing, and intelligence liaison capabilities.

Provide JTF liaison elements to any national SOF HQs operating in the JTF JOA to facilitate information exchange.

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Some relevant insight into supported/supporting relationships pertaining to the use of SOF is offered in the following excerpt from A Common Perspective - The Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Newsletter 2nd Qtr FY2010:“…I asked my Israeli colleague for his views on the role of leadership in operations involving both conventional and SOF. He stated that in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) it is common for conventional units to be subordinated or directly support a spec ops unit, regardless of the rank of the commander…IDF SOF were well versed in employing conventional units as part of their ops…” This in contrast with U.S. forces, where “SOF is rarely the supported element in joint operations, and is more often than not seen as an enabler instead of the main effort, a fact somewhat inconsistent with the nature of hybrid threats. US conventional forces sometimes have a cultural difficulty supporting SOF. Also, SOF organizations, with very few exceptions, do not consistently train to be the supported command.” (pp. 20-21) Obviously, this quote is dated. If you have any students with SOF experience, you can ask them if they believe it is still relevant.

Keep in mind that in 2013, DOD changed their force assignment policy to better facilitate USSOCOM’s role as a functional CCMD with global responsibilities. All TSOCs and all SOF units are now assigned to USSOCOM (vice the GCCs). The GCCs will retain OPCON of these elements, but now USSOCOM should be able to better laterally synchronize and manage SOF between and among the GCCs.

Much of the logic involved in the above paragraphs on SOF also could pertain to cyber and space force employment as well. For all of these types of forces (cyber, space, SOF), the trick is to find the right balance between centralizing C2 at the FCC (USCYBERCOM, USSTRATCOM, or USSOCOM) and pushing C2 out to the other CCDRs. Demands for unity of effort, force responsiveness, force availability, organizational versatility, and security requirements are among the elements that must be considered. Command relationships should be fashioned to provide the necessary guidance given an uncertain, noncontiguous, and asymmetric operational environment without unnecessarily restricting the initiative and flexibility of subordinate commanders.

References: Digital Theaters: Decentralizing Cyber Command and Control, pp. 8-12; Joint Operations (4th Ed.), pp. 28-29; additional references: USSOCOM Global SOF Network 2020, p. 13; JP 3-05 Special Operations, Chapter 3.


-What is the role of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-Space)?

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LESSON 4

-What is a space coordinating authority?

-What entities do the following spec ops C2 nodes plug in to: SPEC OPS COMMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT (SOCCE)? (Cmdr of supported conventional force); SPEC OPS LIASION ELEMENT (SOLE)? (the JFACC).

-What interdependencies emerge in SOF/general purpose force (GPF) integrated operations when SOF is in the lead? How does it transition when the GPF assumes the lead?

-What’s an Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) and when is it utilized?

-Which CCDRs are global synchronizers? What do they do? (Assigned by the SecDef, a global synchronizer is the CCDR responsible for the alignment of specified planning and related activities of other CCMDs, Services, DOD agencies and activities, and as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies within an established, common framework to facilitate coordinated and decentralized execution across geographic and other boundaries. The global synchronizer’s role is to align and harmonize plans and recommend sequencing of actions to achieve the strategic end states and objectives of a global campaign plan. Synchronizers do not have command authority, but rather are responsible for coordinating planning efforts within certain areas of expertise. This construct is generally applicable when a CCDR is supported for planning, but not execution. Global synchronizers are oriented on aligning planning activities with the recognition that the SecDef (supported by the CJCS) will likely synchronize execution. Per the UCP, the global synchronizers are:

-USSOCOM for Global operations against terrorist networks and Counter-WMD (Counter WMD mission has recently transferred from USSTRATCOM);-USNORTHCOM for DOD efforts ISO USG response to pandemic influenza;-USSTRATCOM for Global missile defense and DoD Cyberspace operations.-USTRANSCOM for Global distribution.

(NOTE: A new UCP that may change some of the above responsibilities is expected to be promulgated in 2017.)

In the video segment by Col. Mangan, he explains that the synchronizer construct is necessary because certain missions (e.g., cyber, global strike) require a supporting command (FCCs) to encroach into certain tasks which are doctrinally solely in the realm of the supported GCC. To do this, they (the FCC) need more authority than that which comes with a traditional supporting relationship. The role of the global synchronizers continues to

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evolve, and the next version of the JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning should further codify their responsibilities and authorities.

It would be appropriate for you to tie in the discussion of global synchronizers with global campaign plans (from 8903) and the command authority of “Coordinating Authority” (from module 1 of this lesson). You can highlight how the synchronizers have planning responsibilities for global campaign plans, but don’t really have the authority to knock heads together. A layman’s take on coordinating authority is essentially that other parties don’t have to follow orders of the designated authority, but they all have to at least check in with him and keep him informed in order to facilitate unified action (as opposed to ‘direct liaison authorized’, which simply allows one party to talk directly with another).

Module 3

Explain the relationship between the different categories of force availability for planning and conducting joint operations.

The hierarchical relationship of force availability categories is:

Assignment – Forces available for normal operations; SecDef assigns forces via the Forces For Unified Command Memo, reflected in Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). Forces that are assigned permanently or for lengthy periods are typically placed under COCOM of the applicable CCDR. Forces that are provided on a temporary basis are typically attached vice assigned and placed under OPCON or TACON of the gaining command. THINK ASSIGNMENT – THIS FORCE IS ASSIGNED FOR STEADY STATE OPS. Or put more bluntly, your ASS belongs to me (the assigned force is owned by the assigned commander).

Apportionment – CJCS apportions forces available for planning by the combatant commands; GFMIG tables apportion forces. THINK APPORTIONMENT – WITH THE “Ps” STANDING FOR PLANNING OR FOR AVAILABLE ON PAPER.

Allocation – Temporary transfer of forces from one CCDR or Service Secretary to another for execution. SecDef specifies command relationship that the gaining command will exercise. Listed in Global Force Management Allocation Plan. THINK ALLOCATE – WITH THE “Ls” STANDING FOR FORCES TEMPORARILY LOANED FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES.

The “Advantages of Assigning Forces” article by Reed makes a case for having all operating forces with the DoD assigned to a combatant command. She explains how most forces based within CONUS in the past were assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). With the disestablishment of JFCOM

52

LESSON 4

in 2011, these forces reverted to their military departments (“Service-retained forces”). From the Services perspective, this facilitated them having a pool of forces to draw from to meet the rotational requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this convenience occurred more by happenstance than by design. Furthermore, from a more comprehensive DoD point of view, it does not distribute forces to the CCMDs in the most effective and holistic manner. The author claims that permanent assignment of operational forces to the various CCMDs would be a net positive for the following reasons:1) Theater-specific steady-state and contingency operations would be facilitated by improving forces’ knowledge, experience, and relationships within regions.2) Formalizing and enduring relationship between units and a CCMD would improve readiness of the overall force to meet specific contingencies (e.g., Service unit that may assume role of JTF HQs in an operation led by a CCMD).3) CCMDs would have a greater role in the PPBES cycle, with their planning horizons mirroring those of the Services in planning steady-state use of forces.4) Joint training would improve dramatically as CCMDs would have much more control over forces and resources. When discussing this with students, be sure to they grasp the distinctions between force availability categories (assignment, apportionment, allocation), documents/processes that establish categories (e.g. Forces For, GFMIG), and command relationships (e.g. COCOM, OPCON, TACON). Understanding these differences is critical to discerning the key relationships involved in force availability.

Reference: Module 3 Overview; Reed article.


-Why does LTC Reed advocate for assigning all operating forces to combatant commands?

-What’s the difference between the UCP (outlines CCDRs responsibilities and boundaries), the GEF (SECDEF’s overarching guidance to inform the JSCP; answers ‘What are our overall priorities and desired security outcomes?’), the JSCP ? (CJCS provides CCDRs their marching orders – what they must plan for; generally concerned with contingencies; answers “What are specific planning priorities and military tasks?”), the GFMIG (establishes processes for assignment, apportionment, and allocation of forces; answers ‘What forces are available?”;), and the GFMAP? (answers “Who gets priority of available rotational forces?”) The GFMIG is about adjusting assigned forces while the GFMAP is about adjusting rotational forces.

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-Per the UCP, what role do the three functional combatant commands play in the providing/managing of joint forces? (TRANSCOM – mobility forces; SOCOM – SOF; STRATCOM – ISR and strategic (nukes) forces).

Module 4

Explain the difference between an amphibious objective area and an area of operations?

Amphibious operations normally require a three-dimensional geographic area, within which is located the amphibious force’s objectives. The operational area must be of sufficient size to conduct the necessary sea, land, and air operations required to execute the mission of the amphibious force. JFCs may use boundaries to define areas of operations (AOs) for land and maritime forces. Within the designated operational area, the designated commander synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. The operational areas that may be assigned to an amphibious force in an order initiating the amphibious operation are an amphibious objective area (AOA), or an AO normally paired together with a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). NOTE: The HIDACZ is not addressed in this lesson’s reading.

An AOA is a geographical area (delineated for C2 purposes in the order initiating the amphibious operation), within which are the objectives to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission; and must provide sufficient area for conducting the necessary sea, air, and land operations.

An AO is an operational area defined by the JFC for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but they should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

A HIDACZ is airspace designated in an airspace control plan or order in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous, varied weapons and airspace users. A HIDACZ has defined dimensions, which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids.

The commander designated in the order initiating the amphibious operation is responsible for airspace control, defense of friendly forces, and direction and deconfliction of supporting arms. The order initiating the amphibious operation will also specify the degree of authority that the designated commander has over supporting forces entering the assigned geographic area. The designated commander will request the air control measures required for inclusion in the establishing directive (for a support relationship), or in the concept of operations to further ensure success of the mission.

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LESSON 4

Reference: Module 4 Overview, pp. 3-4; (more detail is found in JP 3-02 Amphib Ops, pp. II-9 – II-12.)

Appraise the need to divide the battlespace into different oper-ational areas? Why is it necessary?

Defining different operational areas allows commanders to coordinate, integrate, and deconflict actions across the range of military operations. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of the operation.

Operational areas should be large enough for commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Operational areas are the only area of battlespace that a commander is directly responsible for. They should be large enough to allow commanders to employ their organic, assigned, and supporting systems to the limits of their capabilities. The commander must be able to command and control all the forces within his operational area. He must be able to control the events and coordinate his subordinates’ actions. Finally, the commander must be able to strike and maneuver throughout the operational area.

You should ensure that you tie this discussion back to considerations for command relationships for functional forces (Module 2). Geography remains the logical basis for conducting many operations while others are functionally distinct. Our increasing use of functional or mission-based forces increases the likelihood that multiple commanders will operate in the same geographic area. How does this impact our structure, organization, and relationships for operations? Our learners should be able to articulate measures such as commanders operating on the same turf employing supporting-supported relations and hybrid arrangements stressing lateral coordination (Refer to sections on Battlespace Owners and Battlespace Geometry in the “Joint Operations (4th Ed.)” reading in Module 2).

Ensure your students understand the differences between a JOA and an AO. It’s not just that one refers to joint and one doesn’t. A JOA includes land, sea, and airspace; an AO only includes land and sea space (see second extra question below).

Reference: Module 4 Overview, p. 1


-What’s the difference between an area of responsibility (CCDR play ground, a joint operating area (JTF commander’s playground), an area of

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operations (component commander and below portion of land/sea), and an operational area (generic term)?

-If there are AOs designated for land and maritime components, why isn’t airspace automatically designated as an AO for the JFACC? (if control of airspace defaulted to air component, the land/sea components would have to get clearance to deliver fires/send ISR (among other things) over their own battlespace. AOs only contain land and sea space while the JOA contains air, land, and sea space, requiring the JFC to establish how use of airspace will be coordinated).

-What issues will shape or bound the size of the JOA? (Issues include: Number and types of friendly forces; number and types of enemy forces; mission; objectives; terrain; infrastructure [roads, airports, cities, etc.]; location of strategic, operational, and tactical targets; reach of friendly C2; supporting forces and capabilities available)

-When facing regional movements/partners/opponents that wash across multiple GCC boundaries, is the concept of a single ‘Battlespace Owner’ outdated and irrelevant? What are some options for maintaining unity of command while addressing borderless opponents and assisting regional partners?

-Why does SOF get to have their own operating areas? Is this necessary or does it serve to the detriment of the overall force?

-In the CENTCOM AOR, would you consider the area that ISAF/USFOR-A operates in to be a theater of war or a theater of operations?

-Differentiate between contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas. What factors go into determining which of these areas should be implemented in a JOA?

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LESSON 5: INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

Module 1

Within the U.S. government, what significant barriers to interagency coordination currently exist? Expound on why this is so.

The Stewart reading excerpt highlights that our federal government was constructed with built-in inefficiencies and posits that a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency is not the answer. This point is worth discussion with learners. The interagency system was designed 70 years ago for a different era when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by one department in overseas missions. At the time, major combat operations and nuclear deterrence were the principal forces of U.S. national security strategy. There are regulatory, legislative, budgetary, resource, and cultural impediments to effective interagency operations.

One key challenge in the current environment is that all U.S. government departments, not just the DOD, are facing budget pressure, and are thus looking for opportunities to scale back rather than ramp up their efforts. Another challenge may stem from the view that interagency roles and responsibilities remain imbalanced—that civilian agencies are under-resourced for the roles they would appropriately play, while DOD has been resourced to fill the gap. No such formal rebalancing has taken place, and it doesn’t seem that it will occur in the Trump administration. Congress shares much of the blame in this regard as they hold the purse strings. An elected official gets more votes by securing a base or big defense contract in their district than if they fund a nebulous interagency related effort that will transpire overseas in some third world country.

Agency participation in current interagency efforts—such as the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) and projects with a “lead agency”—is normally voluntary, and agencies sometimes choose not to participate. Unity of command is lacking. Agencies have other missions that compete with interagency cooperation. For instance, the CIA’s mission of intelligence analysis for national-level policymakers competes for funding and manpower with its mission of providing intelligence to warfighters. Responsibility for certain problems is diffused among agencies, with no central authority in place to oversee the effort.

Many civilian agencies do not plan as systematically or as rigorously as the military, making joint planning very difficult. One result of this disparity was


the lack of coordination between State and DOD planning for Iraq. Some observers advocate significant military officer augmentation to civilian agencies to organize their planning. Interagency staffs frequently suffer from a lack of personnel. Personnel for these staffs are not normally obtained by creating new jobs but by taking people out of their existing positions, undermining the effectiveness of their agency. Interagency staffing is particularly problematic in unsafe countries, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, for civilian agencies cannot require their personnel to serve in such places and the civilians who do go tend to stay put in safe areas. A country team—which is typically comprised of all agency personnel in a country who do not work for the combatant commander—does not always exist because the United States does not have embassies in every country, particularly those where conflict is likely. Across the board, information sharing is hampered by a lack of common information systems.

Civilian agencies are uncomfortable that much of America’s power is in the hands of the combatant commanders (who are seen by many as “pro-consuls”) and the DOD in general. The combatant commanders employ all elements of national power—encroaching into areas such as diplomacy, information operations, and reconstruction—which were previously the exclusive preserve of civilian agencies. Agencies are by nature averse to losing influence, and they tend to believe that the military lacks the necessary expertise to make well-informed decisions in these areas.

Even the current operating environment seems stacked against effective interagency operations. In the open-ended, low intensity conflict environment that our forces are operating in for now and the foreseeable future, each department/agency really only “owns” a small part of a larger complex challenge (which requires comprehensive “nation-building like” efforts). Additionally, interagency efforts to address trans-regional challenges are hampered by our tendency to look at problems regionally. Further compounding the seamless integration of USG instruments, the once clear line between domestic and foreign security threats has now almost completely dissolved in regard to counterterrorism, as well as other transnational issues like climate, immigration, and health.

Specific institutional barriers to cooperation include: -Disparate organizational cultures and visions: Differences between the planning and action-oriented military and the collaborative and longer-term thinking Department of State (DOS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, each with different missions, create friction. -Different levels of resources: As mentioned previously, the military’s budget and manpower pools are considerably larger than those of DOS, complicating partnering efforts and clouding responsibilities for areas where DOS had overall organizational primacy.

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LESSON 5

-Different lexicons: Differences in language and the absence of interagency “doctrine” complicates joint collaboration. -Security: There are differing abilities to deploy and operate in challenging security environments. -Training: Military training produces personnel with strong planning skills; civilian training and education focus on their respective tasks, not in collaboration with the military. -Washington bureaucracy: Bureaucratic entrepreneurs in the beltway know that if they can acquire statutory jurisdiction for a problem or issue, they will eventually acquire funding and hiring authority from Congress (summed up by the following algorithm of power: J = FTEs + $, where J is legal jurisdiction, FTEs are full-time employees, and $ is money). So what appear to be parochial turf battles over statutory jurisdiction are really about people and money.

Reference: lesson readings throughout. Additional references: Decade of War, Vol. I – Enduring Lessons From the Past Decade of Operations (JCOA, Joint Staff J-7): pp. 25-27; In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance (CRS report): pp. 7-8. Navigating the Labyrinth of the National Security Enterprise: pp. 332, 339-40, and 347.

Assess how the U.S. Government is faring in achieving interagency integration. Describe any changes that you feel are necessary to improve global interagency operations.

The State Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) made some strides towards improving interagency effectiveness (most notably, the creation of the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO)), but the funding to implement all of the QDDR’s initiatives has not been forthcoming. Additionally, the QDDR model of two parallel lead agencies—DOS for political/security related crises and USAID for HA/DR crises—did not go far enough towards creating an interagency apparatus that effectively brings together all of the relevant instruments of civilian power. The 2015 QDDR does not seem to have made much improvement in this area.

Better coordination and communication is required between currently stove-piped departments. The Project for National Security Reform is an effort to get approval of a new national security system that replaces many of the provisions of the original 1947 act and amends many Senate and House rules to provide sufficient support for and oversight of interagency activities. Departments and agencies, to include Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Transportation, Education, must be capable of deploying in support of national security operations. They need to foster an ethos and structure that sustains an embedded culture of continuous and adaptive operational planning.

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The Interorganizational Coordination (4th Ed.) reading does a great job at succinctly describing the USG framework for foreign operations. Learners should be able to articulate the basic organization of a U.S. embassy, particularly the roles of the DATT/SDO. Be sure to highlight how the DATT’s mission (reporting to DIA) differs from the SDOs focus on security cooperation. Also, have learners describe the ‘operational void’ between many of the strategic and tactical elements of the interagency. Harkening back to the command relationships described in lesson 4, you can highlight that while the departments of the USG generally try to coordinate the actions of other departments via what we in the DoD might describe as support relationships, they are not capable of doing so (S/CRS efforts in Iraq clearly demonstrate this).

The Carafano article summation lists five areas where the U.S. government needs to improve to fix the interagency: 1) establish federal interagency historians to codify lessons learned from our whole-of-government efforts; 2) develop a doctrinal common body of interagency knowledge and standard operational language (a playbook) rather than a rule book that details what interagency actors must do; 3) develop national security professionals through education, assignments, and accreditation; 4) adopt good operational structures for managing interagency activities; and 5) congress needs to set appropriately broad rules and properly fund interagency operations.

Gen. Jones’ piece, “All Elements of National Power”, highlights that at present, there is no mechanism in place to integrate activities of all USG departments and agencies. It proposes making interagency components the key integrators of national power to better manage foreign and defense policy execution. Key to this notion would be enhanced DOS capacity in terms of budget, manpower, training, equipment, and responsibilities. The connection between the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and DOS’s regional bureaus needs to be strengthened and the regional assistant secretaries need to be empowered to set the agenda in the region and commit resources. (Currently, they are essentially administrative groupings of countries by region). There should also be an ambassador-level civilian deputy with staff in each GCC to oversee security cooperation efforts and serve as the GCCs senior political advisor. Other recommendations include:

Establish an interagency qualification system (ala DOD’s Joint Officer qualification);

Change the title of GCCs to Unified Regional Commands (less hostile and implies more of a concerted effort);

Pursue allied and partner leadership to fill key billets at the GCC HQs; Re-draw the map so that DOD and DOS divide the world up into the

same regions;

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LESSON 5

Re-structure DOD/DOS in different ways to achieve a more effective interagency balance by either:

o Unifying DOD and DOS at the regional level, establishing an Interagency Regional Director to whom both a military and civilian deputy report to; or

o Co-locating the GCCs and DOS regional bureaus in theater (the bureaus are currently in Wash, DC); or

o Establishing a civilian deputy at each GCC who has coordination authority with all of the ambassadors in the region, increasing the coherence of interagency efforts throughout the AOR.

The Bowen article stresses the need for the development of an integrated office for planning, executing, and overseeing stabilization and reconstruction operations. This US Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) would unify the disparate duties now diffused across a variety of executive branch departments and establish crucial permanent links with the contracting community that is involved in stabilization and reconstruction environments.

A summary of interagency reforms offered by a Joint Staff publication (Decade of War, Vol. I – Enduring Lessons From the Past Decade of Operations) includes the following measures: -Develop senior-level support: Ensure senior leaders stress the necessity and value of interagency coordination at all levels of operations. -Properly resource the interagency: Prioritize budgets to appropriately resource the interagency to ensure a whole-of-government approach for contingencies. Continue to use DOD personnel to meet near-term requirements. -Operationalize the interagency: Develop policies for greater inclusion of interagency involvement in planning, training, and execution to increase interagency contributions, including expansion of their expeditionary capabilities.-Routinely test interagency integration: Plan for instances where interagency integration is critical, and evaluate policies, approaches, and information technologies to be used that address identified lessons and challenges. Ensure these lessons can be shared effectively with appropriate elements of the interagency. -Improve understanding of roles and responsibilities: Initiate DOD-wide programs (e.g., interagency exchange tours) to expose military and civilian personnel to a range of interagency organizations to better understand organizational cultures, equities, traditional roles, capabilities, and limitations. -Promote and improve interagency and NGO participation in training and education: Promote and improve incorporation of interagency partners into training and education to increase effectiveness of USG efforts and build

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relationships within the interagency. Key NGOs should also be invited to participate when appropriate.

Remember that students have a tendency to harp on the inadequacies of the other departments/agencies while holding DOD up as an example to be followed in terms of resources, planning capacity, embracing PME, etc. They should be reminded that while our military does excel at flexibility, schooling people, and cross-training, it comes at a high price. Other agencies cannot afford to hire professionals in a field and then employ them in other specialties. This sort of business model is unique to the DOD, and taxpayers likely want to keep it that way. Furthermore, as our national policy has drifted away from nation-building after less-than-optimal results in Iraq and Afghanistan, the impetus to “fix” the interagency seems to have cooled.

It is also worth noting that while the U.S. military has internalized “jointness” in a way other departments can only envy, this has not solved all of the problems of unique Service cultures scrambling for resources and mission relevance. Likewise, the DoD’s battle to hammer out a joint policy between the Services—represented by the Joint Staff—and the civilian leadership found in the OSD can be time consuming: moreover, since the 1986 GNA, the Pentagon has been allowed to come to the table with separate Joint Staff and OSD positions, which further complicates the integration of separate agency perspectives.

Another point to bring up is the difference in how USG departments are funded. While the military Services utilize the POM process to project funding for manpower and resources out to five years, other USG departments don’t enjoy a similar long-range process. The Department of State is relegated to planning only one year out. So they typically must identify and assign funding “now”, with no opportunity to deliberately plan and request money for future end strength, expertise, capabilities, and resources beyond a given FY.

References: Carafano; Myers; Bowen; Interorganizational Coordination (4th Ed.): pp. 9-11; Votel speech. Additional reference: Decade of War, Vol. I – Enduring Lessons From the Past Decade of Operations (JCOA, Joint Staff J-7): pp. 25-27.

How can a Joint Force Commander (JFC) and his staff facilitate successful interagency integration in the planning, organizing, and execution of joint operations? Consider past or present operational interagency challenges and JFCs’ attempts to mitigate them through organizational, cultural, and/or procedural means.

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LESSON 5

Many feel that a lack of unity of effort is the most significant impediment to operational-level interagency action today. Unity of effort requires accountability, which is only really achieved through unity of command. A successful model for unity of command in an interagency environment was the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program of the Vietnam War era (described in the Flavin reading). CORDS partnered civilian and military entities engaged in pacification of the rural areas of Vietnam. It enhanced security and local political and economic development and helped defeat the Vietcong insurgency. Significantly, CORDS unified the efforts of the pacification entities by establishing unity of command throughout the combined civil-military organization. It did so by placing one person in command and supporting him with appropriate civilian and military personnel under a consolidated staff directorate of the senior military headquarters in country, Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MAC-V). The partnership of a civilian CORDS deputy and the military commander at the MAC-V headquarters was replicated throughout subordinate echelons of command (i.e. Corps, Provincial, District). The Flavin article on Civil-Military teaming posits that while CORDS enjoyed success in its lane, it was not enough to make a real difference. The lack of host nation buy-in and substantial U.S. efforts outside of the control of CORDS doomed it to be less than strategically significant. Its local success is still worthy of study by military professionals though.

Flavin also describes the evolution of PRTs in Afghanistan. A PRT is a CMO organization that could help stabilize the operational environment in an unstable or unsecure province or locality through its combined, military, informational, and economic capabilities. Generally, PRTs help create conditions for development in areas that are so unstable that traditional developmental organizations (IGOs, NGOs) are inhibited from full operations. It combines representatives from DOS, DOD, USAID, and other interagency partners into a cohesive unit capable of conducting independent operations to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation government.Flavin’s main point is that PRTs are not effective interagency teams largely because there is no corresponding comprehensive approach at the operational level. Flavin also provides some criticism of the DOS and USAID and a presents cursory look at some tools that our learners may be familiar with from Afghanistan - the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and the District Stability Framework (DSF). While his take-away from his look at the cases of CORDS in Vietnam and PRTs in Afghanistan is mostly negative, he does cite some general best practices that facilitate interagency operations:

-identify the right leadership and the human resources for the team,-obtaining key authorities, agreements, and processes,-developing a shared understanding of the problem and vision of the goal,

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-obtaining/managing resources through appropriate structures and processes, -ensuring host nation ownership.

The Interorganizational Coordination (4th Ed.) reading cites several other contemporary organizations being utilized to coordinate interagency operations, to include coordination elements, centers, groups, and executive steering groups.

Some other interagency entities that are prevalent include the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), the joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), and the joint interagency task force (JIATF).

The JIACG is an interagency staff element that assists the combatant commander (CCDR) in interagency coordination. Composed of U.S. government (USG) civilian and military experts, members participate in planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments. The JIACG improves the ability of the geographic combatant commanders to reach out to the other agencies, improve their situational awareness about other departments, improve their ability to internally coordinate by reducing “stovepipes” within the command, and better manage operations for which they have the lead—for example, wars and humanitarian operations. The JIACG does not conduct operations, but rather serves organizational and advisory functions on a CCDR staff. The JIACG does not enjoy any inherent tasking authority over parent agencies represented. Furthermore, Departments and Agencies routinely detail members to a JIACG resulting in constant turnover.

The JCMOTF is a joint task force composed of CMO units from more than one Service. It provides support to the JFC in humanitarian or nation assistance operations or CMO concurrent with or subsequent to other joint operations. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. A JCMOTF normally is a joint force organization, similar in organization to a JTF or joint special operations task force and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission circumstances. It normally is subordinate to a JTF.

A JIATF is an interagency organization under a single military director that coordinates specific operations (i.e., counterdrug, counterterrorism, IW) at the operational and tactical level. The JIATF concept has been expanded at some combatant commands that previously established JIACGs as well as exported down to JTFs operating within the AOR of a GCC. The missions of the JIATF range from coordination of DOD detection and monitoring programs to counterdrug support to country teams around the globe. During OIF, a

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LESSON 5

JIATF was employed in Iraq as a means to enable a security line of operation to counter complex networked strategic threats.

A JIATF that is generally held up as an example of productive interagency coordination is USSOUTHCOM’s JIATF-South (JIATF-S). Over time JIATF-S has developed common tactics, techniques, and procedures across its components by bringing together various actors from different organizations, each accustomed to its own terminology and approach. JIATF-S has created a standing operating procedure (SOP) for the organization with common terminology and TTPs to be used by all its interagency team members. This SOP also clearly delineated existing authorities, rules of engagement (ROE), and restrictions that need to be considered in the interagency and multinational context. Similar efforts for the interagency could provide a foundation for unified effort in future operations. (At the same time, it should be remembered that JIATF-S is a special case. All participants have both a common mission (counter drug) and statutory authority to accomplish that mission—elements that are not always present in other interagency efforts.) In terms of organization, both JIATF-South and CJIATF-Syria (Syrian train and equip program) have “Directors”—not Commanders. Both have senior interagency partners designated as “Deputy Directors.” This promotes increased access/transparency across regions, but does not intrude nor violate the command/agency oversight of their respective activities.

The “Reflections of a CJTF-HOA Commander” article offers numerous examples of interorganizational coordination challenges and the CJTF’s attempts to mitigate them. Some of these include:

-Effectively assisting host nation security forces involves providing what they need (basic individual military skills training) in addition to what they want (night vision devices, helicopters, vehicles).

-Processes and regulations limit the ability of U.S. personnel to share information with host nation forces, underlying trust between partners. It is incumbent on U.S. personnel to constantly remember the implications and ramifications of these dynamics in all interpersonal relations.

-Even though CJTF-HOA is the battlespace owner and supported commander within East Africa, the Defense Attaches (DATTs) and Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) Chiefs across the JOA neither report to nor are rated by the CJTF-HOA Commander.

-DATTs and OSC Chiefs need to coordinate their Country Cooperation Plans to ensure there is a common understanding of the programs being proposed throughout East Africa along with their potential cross-border impacts.The excerpt of Brinkley’s War Front to Store Front was included in the readings to show a potential way forward in nations in need of development where U.S. interorganizational cooperation efforts are called upon. Brinkley had been recruited as a logistician to work on DoD contracting in Iraq in

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2006. He quickly made himself valuable to Multinational Corps-Iraq’s (MNCI’s) efforts by broadening his mandate and relentlessly recruiting Iraqi businesses to foster economic opportunities for Iraqis. Brinkley built his Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) from scratch. Tapping business associates in the U.S. and other countries, Brinkley restarted Iraqi factories, pulled cash that was fueling insurgents out of the economy, and helped re-start the banking system. He overcame ineffectual USAID efforts to train Iraqi bureaucrats with on-site consultations and certifications. He also worked around cumbersome Treasury Department bureaucracy and used business to shape Iraqi behavior in a positive way. His actions made enemies within various elements of the U.S. government, both in Iraq and in Washington. A key take-away from his book is that the failures in Iraq were largely due to bureaucracies—mainly the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), DoS, and USAID—not being flexible enough to sense Iraqi culture and provide the type of development needed. Of particular interest to military professionals, it should be noted that Brinkley had the full support of LtGen. Peter Chiarelli, then commander of MNCI. Subsequently, Brinkley’s work has also been lauded as very promising by then Gen. John Kelly, USMC, when he was the Commander of USSOUTHCOM. Reviews both for and against Brinkley’s TFBSO can be found in the Faculty Additional Materials section of Blackboard.Reference: Flavin article “Civil-Military Teaming: A Solution?” throughout; Interorganizational Coordination (4th Ed.): pp. 12-20; Grigsby, Sim, & Dabkowski throughout. Additional references: QDDR 2010; Decade of War, Vol. I – Enduring Lessons From the Past Decade of Operations (JCOA, Joint Staff J-7): pp. 25-27; and Brinkley’s War Front to Store Front.Additional discussion questions:

-Differentiate between interagency operations and interorganizational operations (interagency = U.S. government agencies; interorganizational = U.S. govt agencies, NGOs, IGOs, private sector, foreign govts and military).

-If U.S. policy and strategy is veering away from entangling nation-building efforts, do we (the U.S. military and civilian agencies) need to pursue interagency reform?

-While we seem to re-state a mantra of "no more ________" (Vietnams, Iraqs, Afghanistans), invariably we find ourselves in operations that involve at least some low-order nation-building efforts. Isn't it ironic (perhaps tragic) that the more our politicians and strategy documents veer away from nation-building commitments, the less chance there is that any real reform will positively impact U.S. interagency shortcomings?

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-Does interagency coordination differ at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to the extent that it requires different sets of controls and procedures?

-Is USAID a neutral foreign aid provider or a biased promoter of democracy and civil rights congruent with U.S. interests? How may perceptions related to this question impact USAID actions? Those of the host nation populace?

-What’s the difference between coordination and collaboration?

-What kind of outlook for a successful Goldwater-Nichols like interagency act does the Stewart reading paint? Do you agree?

-How big a deal is it that the key agencies/departments of the U.S. government carve the world up differently? (DOD’s AORs, DOS regional bureaus, and CIA regional groupings don’t align) What are the ramifications? Should this be changed? How hard would that be?

-What are the distinguishing characteristics of NGOs/IGOs? How are coordination and cooperation with NGOs/IGOs different than interagency coordination?

-Is it possible that some NGOs resent the U.S. military for intruding into their sphere in recent years as we have become more involved in humanitarian issues? Should they?

-A Dec 2015 MC Gazette article entitled “Going Beyond Joint” advocated for the creation of a new interagency officer qualification in the USMC (somewhat analogous to the joint officer qualification). This would entail officers seeking out billets where they would serve with other agencies/departments of the USG. To what degree would an effort like this address interagency challenges of the current operating environment?

Module 2

Which of the doctrinal command structures for multinational operations best describes the organization used by coalition forces in Afghanistan (depicted below)? Was this the best C2 structure given the mission and multinational environment? Why or why not?

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The purpose of this IFD is to get students to consider why reality is always more complex than generic doctrine. ISAF was essentially an example of an integrated command structure, with forces and staffs that were combined from the theater (ISAF) down into the tactical level (Regional Commands). A deeper discussion of this structure requires some awareness of the background of ISAF.

In 2001, ISAF, a UN-mandated international force, was created to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in re-building their country. In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, ending six-month rotations by various nations. This new leadership overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a headquarters every six months in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enabled small countries to play a strong role within a multinational headquarters.

In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorized the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of OEF, the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.

This was the start of continued ISAF expansion, with more PRTs and regions

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incrementally being placed under ISAF command over time. Eventually, all of the Regional Commands (RCs) and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLTs) operated under the control of ISAF.

Joint doctrine lists three basic command structures for multinational operations: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command.

An integrated command consists of a designated single commander, a staff composed of representatives from all member nations, and subordinate commands and staffs that are integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. Integrated commands, which facilitate a great degree of unity of effort, typically flow from solid alliances.

Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their own deployed forces. No single force commander is designated. This is the simplest structure to use in multinational operations. Coalition forces control operations through previously established and existing chains of command. Although often effective, this structure may also experience problems with the principle of unity of effort. By its very nature, the parallel command structure creates national stovepipes, which introduces additional friction within the multinational force.

Lead nation command is used when member nations are willing to sacrifice some degree of control in order for the multinational force to work in concert. Lead nation command typically manifests itself with the nation supplying the preponderance of forces and resources providing the commander for the force. Normally, the lead nation retains its organic command and control structure, while some degree of staff integration with subordinate forces also takes place.

Technically, ISAF would be classified as an integrated command structure as within it there were staffs of several nationalities and units from various nations. Some would argue that the ISAF effort was really a defacto U.S. lead nation enterprise.

Something to keep in mind regarding command and control structure is that it can vary depending on the different types of multinational operation. Deliberate planning environments and crisis action planning scenarios present different command and control challenges. Multinational deliberate planning (i.e., NATO Article V war plans and the Korean War plan) allow for significant planning time. The command and control issues are worked out in detail, well in advance, and tested and revised through a series of large exercises. In multinational operations requiring crisis action planning, planning time is reduced while uncertainty is increased, thus creating numerous command and control planning assumptions. Flexibility and

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adaptability during planning and execution is essential for command and control in these types of multinational operations.

Reference: Module 2 Overview, ISAF website; JP 3-16 Multinational Ops, chapter II.

Discuss the command authority considerations involved in U.S. forces being subordinated to a multinational commander. Conversely, how are these considerations different when a U.S. officer is the multinational force commander?

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command.

The President retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over U.S. forces. National Command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate U.S. participation in multinational operations at any time.

While the President cannot relinquish command authority, in some multinational environments it might be prudent or advantageous to place appropriate U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this decision, the President carefully considers such factors as mission size of the proposed U.S. force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. Normally, OPCON of U.S. forces is assigned only for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President and to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report to higher U.S. military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived as illegal under U.S. or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the President has agreed, U.S. commanders will first attempt a resolution with the appropriate foreign commander. If issues remain unresolved, the U.S. commanders refer the matters to higher U.S. authorities. It must be remembered that other MNF participants will normally exercise constraints similar to those described above over their own forces on behalf of their governments.

A recent example of a foreign officer commanding U.S. forces occurred in the CENTCOM AOR 2015-2016. A French commander, Rear Admiral Rene-Jean Crignola, was given operational control of a U.S. Carrier Strike Group (CTF-50) for strike operations over Iraq and Syria. Within the limits of OPCON, ADM Crignola could not change the mission of CTF-50 or deploy it outside the

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agreed upon operational area. Nor could he separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the CTF-50’s internal organization.

The article by British Sir Mike Jackson highlights many of the dynamics pertaining to relations between senior commanders in a multinational setting. As the head of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps during the multinational effort to liberate Kosovo from Serb forces in 1999, Jackson had a disagreement with his boss, American Gen. Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Students enjoy talking about the politics and the practicalities involved in this reading. The message of the article is that even a multinational force commander who is American needs to yield to international ground rules. Despite any disagreement Americans may feel with this, it is a position worthy of consideration by future multinational force commanders and staff.

Reference: Module 2 Overview; Multinational C2 of U.S. Forces; “My Clash With NATO Chief.”

How does participating in multinational rather than unilateral operations contribute to outcomes that help further U.S. national security interests. Differentiate between benefits at the policy/strategic level and those at the operational level.

From a policy standpoint, participation in multinational operations provides a degree of legitimacy that unilateral operations can’t match. At the operational or tactical level, multinational forces can provide niche capabilities that U.S. units may not be as proficient in (e.g., Canadians have considerable experience in peace-keeping ops; some European militaries possess extensive NBC capabilities).

Nevertheless, multinational operations present challenges related to language, culture, experience levels, interoperability problems affecting C2 and logistics, and varying degrees of commitment to the fight. As the Carter article points out, pre-conflict shaping is a critical element of managing these challenges. A former USEUCOM commander explained that “setting the theater” is a mission that consists of more than setting operational and logistics capabilities. Setting the theater also involves understanding the human terrain of another culture where face-to-face interaction provides the context.

There must be a continuous U.S. presence in a region beyond exercises. A continuous presence builds strong relationships and trust that produces greater actionable intelligence, commitments for basing and infrastructure, improved sustainment laydown, and coalition force commitments.

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The strategic affect of the commitment of a small U.S. force far outweighs its operational or tactical potential. A persistent U.S. military presence may enhance stability in a country, facilitate maintenance of territorial integrity (against both internal and external threats), and provide the U.S. an opportunity to pre-position forces.

At the operational and tactical level, steady state military engagements allow for a more methodological and long-term approach with multinational partners. This facilitates a comprehensive manner of engagement in terms of cultural considerations, training and education, and command and control and logistics interoperability. Beneficial relationships among key partners can be established on the ground floor vice on-the-fly during an operation.

Reference: “Future Conflicts: The Risks and Rewards of Coalition Operations”


- It seems as if a U.S. commander serving under a foreign led multinational command has two separate chains of command. Isn’t this confusing? Potentially dangerous? Doesn’t this construct violate the principle of unity of command?

- What types of operations might be more likely to be led by a multinational partner commander rather than a U.S. officer? (PK, Stab ops, disaster assist vice major combat). Why? (Niche capabilities of some foreign militaries and the lower stakes involved).

- Aren’t U.S. commanders (and Americans in general) ‘control freaks’? Is the reason that the U.S. tries to take over operations they’re involved in simply driven by an innate desire to get things done quickly and efficiently?

- Compare and contrast the primary command structures used in multinational operations (integrated, lead nation, parallel). What are some critical factors involved in selecting one over the others?

-Describe the notion of ‘Hand Shake Con’. Why is it necessary? Is there a better way to interact with multinational partners?

-Multinational operational environments can be very dynamic. Can you think of any examples where command relationships and task organization have not kept up with mission changes? (Coalition efforts in Somalia in 1992-3 were successful when the mission was to get food distributed (OPERATION RESTORE HOPE), but not when mission creep led to chasing down warlords (OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE).

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-What are some of the operational considerations that the commander and staff should think through during the planning and execution of multinational operations? (see JP 3-16 App A)

-Of all of the challenges prevalent in multinational operations, which is the most difficult? Command relationships? ROE? Setting clearly defined objectives? Intelligence sharing?

-Information sharing continues to be an issue when dealing with coalition partners. Do you have any experiences highlighting this problem? What are feasible answers to address it?

-Have you served as an LNO in multinational operations or seen one in action? What are some best practices or pitfalls to be avoided?

-Assess General Sir Michael Jackson’s perspective in dealing with a U.S. general as a MNF Commander. What were the dynamics involved in making this situation so contentious? (Address U.S. policy concerns and internal politics playing on General Clark as well as any differences in military style between countries and commanders.)

-Building partnership capacity is a term that has come into vogue over the last several years. Is the goal of partnering to save money? To meet a greater array of challenges? To influence regional and global rules and norms? How much can partnering achieve in any of these arenas?

-How exactly does building the capacity and capabilities of U.S. partners lead, through their actions, towards outcomes that help protect U.S. national security interests? What is the best way to assess those outcomes?

-We’ve addressed many challenges in dealing with a coalition. At what point is the benefit of having multinational partners not worth the cost?

-Below find an excellent quote from a former student (Canadian officer). He offers a great point that ties in both the interagency and multinational aspects of this lesson.

In my opinion, there is a significant “brightline” that must be drawn between interagency and multinational. Each nation must figure out how they are going to solve their interagency problems so that when we step off multinationally, we have our national team of teams firing on all cylinders. This should provide a better understanding, nationally, of how we define the problem and will set the conditions for bilateral and multinational successes. Too often, our respective national experts

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identify with their multinational opposites (mil to mil, DoS to Global Affairs Canada, USAID to Canadian International Development Agency, etc.) first and subsequently we may be making interagency issues more difficult based on our multinational coordination/collaboration success within our specialties.

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LESSON 6: THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Module 1

Is the U.S. military establishment (DoD, CCMDs, Services, etc.) adequately postured to operate effectively in the current security environment? Describe why or why not. Considerations could include joint/Service structure, culture, and/or authorities.

The 2015 USMC Security Environment Forecast Futures 2030-2045 claims that future will be characterized by increased complexity (state, non-state, hybrid, and proxy actors; simultaneity of conflict intensities in same operation/region; difficulty of defining success and achieving decisive outcomes); less destruction and fewer casualties (less interstate conflict and the proliferation of precision weapons); increased detachment (robotics, drones, state use of proxies); a reduced utility of force (as many regard the legitimacy of military force with skepticism); and an increased reliance on technology (which is increasingly available to state and non-state actors alike). As General Dunford mentions in his recorded talk, conflicts today are increasingly multi-domain (air, sea, land, space, cyber), multi-functional (IO, ballistic missile defense), and trans-regional. From this view, our Service organization and CCMD regional focus present seams for our adversaries to exploit.

In response to General Dunford’s concerns, the Joint Staff J-7 has published the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World (summarized in Lesson 6, Module 1 Overview and provided in total in Additional Materials). JOE 2035 was specifically designed to investigate the changing character of war and identify the implications of war’s evolving character for the joint force. It strikes a balance between a credible description of key trends that will redefine the future security environment and the innovative reimagining of how combinations of these trends might influence and shape the future of conflict and war. It concludes by describing a range of evolving missions that the future joint force might be required to conduct in response to the changing character of war. JOE 2035 does not attempt to predict the future or forecast specific scenarios, rather it emphasizes thinking through the most important conditions in a changing world. While JOE 2035 (and resultant Module 1 Overview) is not exciting reading, faculty should stress that JOE 2035 is a high-level think piece that is designed to initiate critical thoughts across all actors involved with DOTMLPF. It will orient a wide range of future strategy and force planning activities and provide an analytic basis for ongoing joint concept development.


This IFD is intentionally broad and could lead to many different aspects of joint military preparedness. Material from virtually any of 8904’s lessons may apply. Among other items to address, students should be reminded of the importance of authorities in this discussion, whether it be those set in statute by Congress or those specified by DoD policy. The U.S. government handles operations inside a declared war zone (e.g., Iraq circa 2003-11) very differently from those outside of one (e.g., Yemen). On one hand, the U.S. needs increased authorities (legal, economic, use of force, etc.) to operate more effectively in today’s murky Gray Zone. On the other hand, the ends don’t always justify the means when the CIA covertly employs contractors to kill in various countries largely unknown to the U.S. electorate (in operations which often involve U.S. troops). Get your students to understand and articulate this rub.

One more point to keep in mind as you guide students through this discussion – all is not lost. The readings paint a disconcerting picture of the security challenges that America faces. A natural inclination for many students is to push for dramatic overhaul of the U.S. military establishment. This tendency must be tempered with a realization of the logic of current military structure and authorities. While there is always room for improvement, an overly anxious approach could do more harm than good. Students must remain objectively critical of our national security apparatus and may advocate for massive reform, but they should not due so born from an overly pessimistic or frustrated mindset.

How does the doctrinal construct of the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) reconcile with the broader notion of the Gray Zone? Does ROMO provide the joint force with doctrinal concepts to succeed in Gray Zone conflicts?

JP1—Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S.—describes ROMO thusly on page I-14:

The military instrument of national power can be used in a wide variety of ways that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity. These various ways can be understood to occur across a continuum of conflict ranging from peace to war. Inside this continuum, it is useful from a strategic perspective to delineate the use of the military instrument of national power into three broad categories. Mindful that the operational level of warfare connects the tactical to the strategic, and operations and campaigns are themselves scalable, the US uses the construct of the ROMO to provide insight into the various broad usages of military power from a strategic perspective.

It may be useful for faculty to explain to students that ROMO appeared in joint doctrine shortly after the invasion of Iraq, replacing the previous

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construct of War/Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In this sense, ROMO represents a maturing of doctrine as it evolved from a binary choice—war or ops other than war—to a continuum.

To be sure, our toughest military challenges today also can be arrayed upon a continuum of conflict. From Chinese expansion in the South China Sea, to Russian aggression in the Ukraine, to Iranian activities across the Middle East, we are not at “war” as we traditionally define it. But we aren’t at peace either. These types of conflict lie in a “Gray Zone,” somewhere in between.The United States struggles to meet these challenges. They fall below the threshold for triggering a violent response, which of course is no coincidence. U.S. adversaries intend to operate in this gray space, where they can advance their objectives through coercion and intimidation, changing facts on the ground while exploiting the ambiguity of their actions to avoid triggering an overt U.S. military response.

But aside from both the ROMO and Gray Zone constructs representing continuums of conflict, they have critical distinctions. Whereas ROMO is a doctrinal concept which views the world through a military-centric lens, the Gray Zone is a broader notion involving more variables: political, diplomatic, informational, social, and sometimes historical. China argues sovereignty over the South China Sea with 2000 year old documents. Russia claims similar cultural and historical sovereignty over the Ukraine. Additionally, they both employ a high degree of ambiguity in pursuit of their objectives. Ambiguity is (arguably) the defining characteristic of Gray Zone conflict—about objectives, participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response. Perspective is also very important in the realm of the Gray Zone. China and Russia can argue and execute as if they are not in conflict while leveraging the advantages of an IO campaign against the west/U.S. We are then left with being required to explain our actions or inactions while they dictate the narrative.

One of the challenges of competing in Gray Zones is that the U.S. military is sub-optimized—conceptually and organizationally—to do so short of conflict. Our militaries’ dominant paradigm for allocating resources and granting authorities centers around operation plans (OPLANS), which generally address major conflict. To counter gray-zone tactics, combatant commanders need the right authorities, resources, and plans. But the fact that these may not lead to major combat operations actually throws a wrench in the way that the Pentagon plans. If counter-Gray Zone approaches work, they would secure U.S. objectives without resorting to major war. Yet even the term the U.S. military uses to refer to steady-state military “shaping” operations, “phase 0,” implies that they are the starting point for a larger multi-phase campaign.

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As covered in 8903 Operation Art, the U.S. military’s dominant paradigm for operations is a six-phase planning construct, consisting of phase 0 (shape), phase I (deter), phase II (seize initiative), phase III (dominate), phase IV (stabilize), and finally, phase V (enable civil authority). This implies a linear progression of conflict through a culminating phase (phase III) of major combat operations, and then a “post-conflict” period of stabilization and transition. Within this paradigm, the central decisive point is assumed to be phase III, and the bulk of the U.S. military’s attention for resourcing, modernizing, training, and allocating risk is found there. While we focus on preparation for the big fight, however, our adversaries are working to accomplish their objectives short of open conflict.

Joint Phasing Construct Gap (image is in file called ‘Gray Zone slides’ on Fac Dev site)

This paradigm is not particularly useful for the problems the United States faces today. General Dunford comments address the awkward fit between this model and what our adversaries are doing:

“We need to develop more effective methods to deal with what we’ve seen of Russian behavior in Georgia, the Crimea, and the Ukraine, or Iranian malign influence across the Middle East or Chinese behavior in the South and East China Sea.

Our traditional approach is either we’re at peace or at conflict. And I think that’s insufficient to deal with the actors that actually seek to advance their interests while avoiding our strengths. And as an aside, you know, I don’t find the current phasing construct for operational plans particularly useful right now. If you think about it, we bend authorities and capabilities according to where we think we are in a phase. And our adversaries, or potential adversaries, or our competitors, they don’t actually – they don’t actually find themselves limited by that same – by that same framework.

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And just as an example … we gathered all the combatant commanders together last fall. We said: Hey, in your area of responsibility, what phase is your adversary in? … and consistently the combatant commanders said: Well, I think our adversary is in phase 2, or our adversary is in phase 2 ½.

And what that means is the actions that they are taking on a day-to-day basis, whether it be in what’s been described as the “gray space” – I call it competition with a military dimension short of a phase 3 or traditional conflict, but the activities that they’re taking with regard to employment of cyber, unconventional capabilities, space capabilities, information operations are absolutely not associated with what we would call phase zero shaping.”

It might be useful for faculty to project the above phasing construct image in seminar and ask how it may be muddying the waters for planners addressing today’s challenges. Does it hamper effectiveness if leaders need to “bend authorities and capabilities according to where we think we are in a phase?” Shouldn’t a tool for thinking about conflict help facilitate understanding the conflict and crafting solutions vice be a box that planners must shoehorn their approaches into?

Ultimately, the Gray Zone is not just a military phenomena. The other elements of our government must understand it and participate in a coherent manner along with the DoD. The joint force can provide part of a U.S. response to a Gray Zone threat—SOF, Coast Guard, security cooperation activities, etc. But the nation as a whole must improve its capabilities in providing an integrated, whole-of-nation response—economic statecraft, financial sanctions, diplomatic leverage, public information campaigns, etc. Obviously, there are many challenges to overcome on this front. As the Gilsinan article points out, “…like Walmart, the tempting one-stop-shopping it [the DoD] offers has a devastating effect on smaller, more traditional enterprises—in this case the State Department and other civilian foreign policy agencies.”

A related note for your discussions on the Gray Zone: It should be remembered that the U.S. arguably used Gray Zone approaches during the Cold War, for instance, when it undermined governments in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, and other countries via many of the same tactics being employed by its adversaries today.


Have the realms of war and peace traditionally been kept distinct and now they are murky, or have they always been nebulous and we briefly thought they were clear in the post-WWII era?

How do we operate in a world where the old legal, moral, political, and operational frameworks limit us so? Do we just have to accept

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that we must cede some of the Gray Zone to more authoritarian adversaries (since they can effectively direct propaganda and both their private and public sectors without being hampered by individual rights and the rule of law)?

Given the threat posed by Gray Zone adversaries, do we need to fundamentally change the manner in which we recruit and man the joint force (e.g., serve, go to work at Google, return to service)? How does the private sector fit into this paradigm?

What does Rosa Brook’s say at the end of ‘We Have No Idea What War Is’ about ‘below the radar’ use of U.S. military force? Does she have a good point? Relate this to our discussion of the Gray Zone.

Module 2

Discriminate between homeland security and homeland defense. What are their similarities and differences? Are DOD roles appropriately established for each?

The difference is essentially a distinction between warfighting and law enforcement. In sum, the difference is captured by the distinct authorities and the types of forces that execute the missions pursuant to those authorities.

Homeland defense is defined as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President, and that direction is pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief. The President, under Article 2 of the Constitution, is the Commander in Chief. His authority as Commander in Chief is delegated in part to the Secretary of Defense. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the combatant commanders respond to the chain of command and specifically to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. By way of this military chain of command, military forces are deployed to achieve warfighting missions, including the missions within the NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] AORs [areas of responsibility].

By contrast, homeland security is defined as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Homeland security captures the broad set of statutory authorities that assign to various law enforcement agencies the requirement to defend the citizens of the United States against unlawful activities, including and most especially the activities of transnational terrorists. Those authorities are derived from congressional action, they are subject to the

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control of the President through the execution of his executive responsibilities, but they are distinct from the warfighting activities that take place under his authority as Commander in Chief. Looking at those two areas of responsibility, it’s clear that among the Cabinet officers, only the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for warfighting. The primary Cabinet officer assigned the bulk of those homeland security missions is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Working in conjunction with one another, exercising distinct but related authorities, the Secretary of Defense conducts warfighting to protect the American people, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security exercises law enforcement responsibilities to achieve the same result.

At the end of the day, the Secretary of Defense is the warfighter, and the Secretary of Homeland Security is one of the nation’s senior law enforcement officials, and, in combination, these two cabinet officers use their authorities to achieve the common purpose of protecting the American people. The DOD will typically assume a lead role in homeland defense missions and a support role in missions related to homeland security.

Reference: JFQ Issue 40, 1st quarter 2006, pp. 10-11.

Explain the considerations involved in the DOD committing forces to a Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) mission? Is the system efficient? Is it effective? Why or why not?

Although DOD forces can be employed for a variety of missions, the process to commit them follows a set procedure. There must be a request from a civilian federal agency for military assistance, which is then staffed through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the CCmds. In determining the need for DoD involvement, the following is a common set of evaluation criteria:

LEGALITY: Does the mission comply with the law? LETHALITY: Is there potential use of lethal force by or against DoD

forces? RISK: Are DoD forces in harm’s way? COST: What is the funding source, and what is the impact on DoD

budget? APPROPRIATENESS: Is the requested mission in the interest of DoD? READINESS: How does the mission impact the DoD’s ability to perform

its primary mission (i.e., operational missions, training impact, maintenance issues)?

Constitutionality and the American system of federalism are also factors. Whereas it may be most efficient to have a centralized authority solely in

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charge of an operation, Americans generally look unfavorably upon federal troops operating on their soil. Public perception is extremely important in DSCA operations.

Some think that this process takes too long. Moreover, in cases of catastrophic incidents, Presidential authority may direct DoD deployments before any requests from states or agencies reach DoD (lesson-learned from Hurricane Katrina). DoD currently recognizes that exigent circumstances may occur which make it impractical to go through the formal request for assistance process. In such cases, DoD allows commanders to exercise “Immediate Response.” Such authority allows the commander to use organic resources to prevent loss of life or immediate major destruction of property in response to requests from local authorities. Commanders exercising “Immediate Response” authority are required to notify their chain of command as soon as possible, and they are not supposed to provide assistance on an extended basis. Our students may be among the first responders to a domestic emergency or disaster, possibly employing assets pursuant to the immediate response authority authorized under DoDD 3025.18 before a larger federal response is arranged under the National Response Framework.

In 2013, during Hurricane Sandy, the Navy/USMC leaned forward by positioning the east coast amphibious squadron/MEU off of New Jersey without federal direction. This was not an instance whereby “Immediate Response” authority was used. Rather, it was just prudent reconnaissance and information gathering on the part of the USN/USMC. Ask your students to make this distinction and be sure they are aware of the implications of “Immediate Response” authority. A related issue to share with your learners is that of funding: if a Service pre-positions forces and an event which involves FEMA ensues, re-imbursement to the Service can occur. If forces are pre-positioned and no significant event subsequently transpires, the Service eats the cost.

While the National Response Framework and DSCA doctrine spell out relationships and authorities, these principally pertain to the federal and individual state level. During Hurricane Sandy, New Jersey was happy to receive and integrate federal DSCA, but New York’s reaction was more fragmented. New York City’s mayor had views on emergency management that were not necessarily aligned with those of the governor of the state. Key DSCA learning points for our learners:

DSCA-related arrangements vary from state to state (“If you’ve been to one state, you’ve been to one state.”)

Military chain of command is different from civilian notion of chain of coordination

Mayors don’t work for governors; cities/counties don’t work for the state.

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Other than a common threat, the only reason entities get along with each other is often that one is providing funding to the other.

Cooperation and information sharing (often under time-compressed conditions) is the name of the game.

Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) are not in charge of disaster response; governors are. FCOs coordinate federal resources provided to facilitate response.

Actually rebuilding communities is not necessarily the focus for military forces in a DSCA environment. Instead, stabilizing a crisis situation and facilitating the ability of local authorities and governments to provide services again is most important. Get the power on and gas stations, restaurants, and grocery stores open and things will take care of themselves.

Related to prior bullet, all supporting commanders must have a vision of what “victory” looks like so they know when to hand their mission over to local civilian authorities.

Reference: Multi-Service TTPs for DSCA and Integrating With the National Guard, p. 3; COL Williams’ brief

Appraise the role of the National Guard in domestic operations. Is their chain of command appropriate to address contemporary threats?

The various state guards are subordinate to their governors and can be called out on his or her authority for a variety of missions. Most National Guard units are conventional ground or air forces, although the National Guard has developed specialized CBRNE detection and analysis units called Civil Support Teams (CSTs). Through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs), guard units from one state can cross state borders to assist other states. As long as the guard units remain in a Title 32/state active duty status (i.e. not federalized), they can execute a range of law enforcement functions that Title 10 forces are specifically prohibited from executing. National Guard units will almost always be the first military forces on the scene, and will have their own command and control structure. Federal law now allows for a National Guard general officer to be simultaneously in a state active duty and a federal active duty status, giving him the authority to command both state and federal forces. This dual-status command arrangement has become the norm in DSCA operations. It allows for some military forces to serve in limited law enforcement capacities while also providing other military resources for more traditional Title X roles within the homeland. A key point is that the commander is dual hatted, not the forces. So military members on the scene within CONUS are either operating under Title 10 or Title 32, not both ).

The following graphic is available on the FacDev site under “Faculty

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Resources” for Lesson 6:

Reference: Multi-Service TTPs for DSCA and Integrating With the National Guard, pp. 2-3 and 7-10.


-Why should the average military officer care about domestic operations? Are you likely to serve in a billet that requires intimate knowledge of HD or DSCA? (Mid-grade officers will be the staff officers of units that could be tasked to support these types of missions. They could also be plucked from any assignment to serve as a liaison during an HD/DSCA event. In a room full of interagency, state, and local players during such a scenario, all eyes will turn to the one person in a federal military officer’s uniform for leadership. It is simply not an option for an officer to say, “I haven’t been trained for this!” Resident Command and Staff College has been teaching this material, to include a major national response exercise, since 2007. The operating forces increasingly engage in these types of operations. During the east coast hurricane season (Jun-Nov), II MEF maintains forces [SPMAGTF-DSCA] ready to provide C2, assault support, aid

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distribution, security, and other consequence management capabilities in support of domestic civil authorities).

-What effect does the American legal and constitutional framework have on the coordination of authorities at all levels of government? (it greatly hampers coordination by separating the domestic and international arenas. The 21st century has forever blurred the distinctions formerly recognized as the domestic-foreign policy divide and the law enforcement-security divide.)

-What is the intent behind the Posse Comitatus Act? Do you think American’s perceptions on this subject are changing? How and why?

- Describe the National Response Framework (NRF), highlighting any parallels between it and JOPES/APEX/military planning. (Both of these constructs provide a common framework for officials to work together. They offer a common language and way of understanding so people can more easily coordinate their efforts. Harkening back to 8903 to draw parallels, the National Response Framework (NRF) is essentially equivalent to a joint doctrinal publication/joint TTPs combined with a CONPLAN. The National Incident Management System is comparable to an SOP.)

-Which CCmds play large in domestic operations? (Obviously NORTHCOM does, and to a lesser extent PACOM. STRATCOM is responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations. It also conducts military space operations, information operations, computer network operations, and integrates DOD efforts in combating WMDs)

-Why is intelligence and information sharing between HD, HS, and DSCA entities hard? What could be done to improve this?

- Describe how USNORTHCOM is organized and assess their ability to respond to domestic events.

-What was a key take-away from the JTF-CS video on social media in DSCA? (The JTF-CS video on social media in DSCA brought up an interesting challenge during Hurricane Sandy. Through applications like texting and Twitter, the public was able to message political leaders and the media much more quickly than in the past. This put pressure on elected officials, first responders, and the military to act faster than they were accustomed to. The speaker advocated that we must embrace this new paradigm and choose speed over OPSEC/information assurance in communicating with first responders, local, state, interagency, and NGO partners so that we can satisfactorily deal with the expectations of the public.)

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-What are some critical distinctions between foreign HA/DR and DSCA? (legal Title 10 constraints under which the U.S. military operates at home, the functions of civilian organizations within the USG at home vs. abroad (e.g., FEMA vs. USAID), and the nuances of the relationships between federal, state, tribal, and local agencies.)

-Why did the Stafford Act come about? What does it do?

-Without notes, graphically depict on a whiteboard the relationships between the various offices/officials involved in the NIMS (JFO, PFO, FCO, SCO, and DCO). Do you fell this arrangement is somewhat convoluted? How could it be improved? (Remember that domestic politics and funding issues can trump operational efficiency in this environment).

-The NIMS distinguishes between command authority and coordination authority. What’s the difference?

-What are some of the key takeaways from the recorded lecture by COL Williams (FEMA Defense Coordinating Officer)?

DSCA is all about authorities. We (DOD) do not own any battlespace in DSCA environment. DOD response within the homeland comes about in one of two ways:

1) local commander’s discretion, or 2) Presidential directive. Importance of funding (which flows from authorities). Sooner or later,

someone is always going to want to account for how money was spent. Coin of the realm in the DSCA business is moving information, laterally

more so than vertically. DCO’s job is to build relationships so key players don’t meet for the

first time during a disaster. DCO/DCE is SecDef’s main link to the Primary Federal Agency in a

DSCA setting. All emergencies are local (and that—local authorities—is who should

get first crack at fixing things). DSCA operations work in supported/supporting relationships vice hard

control lines. The mission assignment process for DSCA is analogous to the request

for forces process for OCONUS operations. Pre-scripted mission assignments (MA’s) provide a menu of military

capabilities for civilian authorities to request by emergency support function (ESF). There are over 300 FEMA MA’s; DOD is involved in less than 30 of them.

DOD is always in a supporting role; usually have to settle for unity of effort vice unity of command.

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Dual status command (Titles 10 and 32) involves one commander employing both types of forces; not forces having both types of authorities. SecDef always retains command of federal forces.

DSCA events are fraught with politics

Another interesting video pertaining to domestic operations is a 2012 recorded lecture by Administrator Craig Fugate of FEMA. This video is not required viewing for the learners, but is available as additional material and is worth watching. Insights offered in the video include:

Complexity of establishing who’s in charge during an emergency 99% of the time, FEMA will be working for state governors Stafford Act Emergency Management Assistance Compact between states When does FEMA need DOD capabilities? Criticality of response speed – there’s a post-disaster tipping point

after which people no longer are likely to help their fellow victim neighbors and shift to taking care of themselves. If aid isn’t available before this point, the majority of the government assistance effort will need to focus on re-establishing and maintaining security.

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LESSON 7: JOINT FUNCTIONS CASE STUDIES

Module 1

How does the joint force integrate national- and theater-level intelligence capabilities to support operations?

The combatant command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) are the primary intelligence organizations providing support to joint forces at the operational and tactical levels. The JIOC fuses the in-theater capabilities of all Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Service, combat support agency, and combat command ISR assets into a central location for intelligence planning, collection management, tasking, analysis, and support. The intent of the JIOC concept is to seamlessly combine all intelligence functions, disciplines, and operations in a single organization, ensuring the availability of all sources of information from both combatant command ISR assets and national intelligence resources, and fully synchronizing and integrating intelligence with operation planning and execution. Although a particular JIOC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every RFI, it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations, both lower, higher, and laterally.

(1) Each combatant command structures its JIOC in accordance with the needs and guidance of the CCDR. The JIOC concept is intended to facilitate the agile management of all intelligence functions, disciplines, and operations according to the concept of “centralized planning–decentralized execution.” During non-crisis periods, JIOC personnel levels are normally maintained at a level required to perform essential functions, such as I&W, current intelligence, collection management, and general military intelligence production in the JIOC’s area of production responsibilities. During crises, the JIOC can be augmented with personnel from other theater intelligence organizations, other commands, Reserve Components, and national intelligence organizations according to the needs of the CCDR.

(2) The combatant command’s JIOC ensures that the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate commands are satisfied. Functions of the CCDR JIOC include, but are not limited to the following

Coordinating the intelligence effort of subordinate commands. Coordinating the theater collection plan and employment of

theater assigned and supporting sensors. Developing and maintaining data bases that support planning,

operations, and targeting. Validating battle damage assessment (BDA) from higher, lower,

and adjacent sources.

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Conducting ISR visualization and participating with J-3 in the dynamic management of ISR assets.

Submitting national collection requirements to the combatant command DNI representative.

Coordinating with J-3 to ensure intelligence is fully synchronized and integrated with operations.

Employing red teams to address the CCDR’s most pressing intelligence and operational issues from the adversary’s perspective.

Serving as the focal point for the intelligence campaign planning process.

At the request of a CCDR, the Joint Staff may deploy a national intelligence support team (NIST) to support a commander, JTF (CJTF) during a crisis or contingency operation. The NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA, or other IC agencies as required. The NIST mission is to provide a tailored, national-level, all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. The NIST is designated to provide a full range of intelligence support to a CJTF, from a single agency element with limited ultra-high frequency voice connectivity to a fully equipped team with the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) video-teleconferencing capabilities. NIST provides coordination with national intelligence agencies, analytical expertise, I&W, special assessments, targeting support, and access to national data bases, and facilitates RFI management.

During crises, joint forces may also garner support from the IC through the crisis intelligence federation process. Intelligence federation enables combatant commands to form support relationships with other theater JIOCs, Service intelligence centers, Reserve organizations, or other intelligence agencies to assist with the accomplishment of the joint force’s mission. These support relationships, called federated partnerships, are pre-planned agreements intended to provide a rapid, flexible, surge capability enabling personnel from throughout the IC to assist the combatant command while remaining at their normal duty stations. Federated support can be provided in specific functional areas directly related to the crisis, or by assuming temporary responsibility for noncrisis-related areas within the combatant command’s areas of responsibility (AOR), thereby freeing the supported command’s organic assets to refocus on crisis support.

Reference: Module 1 Overview, derived largely from Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence (2013): pp. III-6 to III-9.

Examine the intelligence- and fires-related challenges experienced by the coalition during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.

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What could have been done differently to preclude or mitigate these difficulties?

The excerpt from “Libya: Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) Executive Summary” contains many interesting topics related to the joint functions, multinational operations, joint force organization, and higher-level staff work. It is up to the adjunct faculty to determine how and when to integrate these subjects into seminar discussions. Specific intelligence and fires-related issues include the following:

Intelligence - When Qaddafi agreed to give up his nuclear weapons program in 2003, U.S. intelligence resources began to focus on other areas of higher priority, leaving a void in up-to-date intelligence on Libyan force strength and disposition. As a result, when the Libyan crisis unfolded in 2011, the coalition had very little accurate information on the Libyan order of battle.

Intelligence - Intelligence classification and dissemination was a real problem in the large coalition that was formed to support the UN resolution. The majority of the information was generally first classified with the standard stringent security classification from countries of origin. When it was realized this was too restrictive, classifications were then loosened slightly so as to be restricted to their country of origin and only a selected few (e.g., Five Eyes – U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand). The awareness of the intel community about the need to share products was limited and that restricted the capacity of the Coalition Task Force HQ to disseminate information to all coalition partners.

Intelligence/Fires – Although coalition actions significantly curtailed the loss of Libyan civilian lives, without forces on the ground or persistent ISR to confirm the effects of coalition actions, it was not possible to fully assess the success of the air/sea campaign to protect civilians.

Fires – Despite coalition success against strategic surface-to-air missile systems (SAMS), the existence of mobile SAMS and anti-aircraft artillery created an uncertain environment for coalition air forces. Without ground forces to help find and fix mobile targets, a significant amount of air assets were apportioned to dynamic searches and targeting.

Fires – Another challenge related to the lack of boots on the ground was that of protecting Libyan civilians while hostile regime forces were intermingled with them. The identification and the distinction of forces in very close quarters was a real challenge for coalition air forces.

Fires – Without ground forces, it was also very difficult to obtain accurate battle damage assessment (BDA). Tactical air and other ISR platforms had to be dedicated to conduct BDA. Additionally, given the inaccuracy of the

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assessment effort, multiple air assets were sometimes assigned to service targets that might have previously been neutralized.

Fires – There were fires challenges stemming from the various national caveats and unique Rules-of-Engagement (ROE) of each of the participating nations. Because of these limitations, different missions had to be assigned to different nations according to their ROE and caveats. Also, when a target of opportunity appeared, the particular resource required to prosecute it was not always available to support the strike.

Fires (effects) – The JTF experienced numerous challenges in planning and executing information operations (IO), as well as assessing its effects. The IO message approval process was lengthy and authorities for message development and distribution caused excessive delays.

Obviously, most of these challenges arose from the JTF’s exclusive reliance on air/sea assets. This is an example of policy/strategy setting the context for operational outcomes, with resultant risk being accepted by the JTF in accomplishment of its mission. From a tactical perspective, it would have been optimal to have troops on the ground. If conventional forces were not authorized, perhaps SOF could have been used. Barring that, CIA operatives might be employed. At a minimum, indigenous forces that are trained and equipped should be available (an argument for building partnership capacity). This discussion centers around the concept of risk. Ends, ways, and means must all be considered when determining acceptable levels of risk involved in potentially harming civilians or accomplishing less than desirable results in carrying out missile/bomb attacks.

Reference: OOD Exec Summary, pp. 10-14.

Appraise efforts to overcome command and control challenges that resulted from cross-combatant command seams, shared command roles, compressed timelines, and involvement of coalition partners during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.

The OOD JOA encompassed portions of three GCC AORs (AFRICOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM). Additionally, STRATCOM operated bombers in support of OOD from the U.S. All of these staffs, particularly that of EUCOM worked early to obtain basing and overflight rights from all potential bed-down sights. Due to proximity and capability, EUCOM also became the primary supporting command and de facto force provider to AFRICOM. The extensive use of supported/supporting command relationships between the CCDRs contributed significantly to effective C2. Within theater, CJCS authorized AFRICOM and EUCOM to hash out command relationships of transferred forces without having to gain SECDEF approval. Unfortunately, many staff

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members lacked a clear doctrinal understanding of the various command re-lationships, particularly OPCON, TACON, and DS. On page 24 of the OOD Ex-ecutive Summary, the advantages of EUCOM retaining OPCON while provid-ing naval forces in direct support and air assets TACON to AFRICOM are ex-plained.

The challenges posed by cross–combatant command operations and complex command relationships were in part overcome through the use of multi-hatted and or co-located commanders and associated staffs. ADM Locklear (Commander, JTF-OD) and his staff were the Navy component command (NAVEUR and NAVAF) for both EUCOM and AFRICOM and were collocated with US 6th Fleet at Naval Support Activity Naples. VADM Harris (JFMCC) was Commander, US 6th Fleet, which provided forces and orchestrated naval operations on a routine basis for EUCOM and, when required, AFRICOM. Both staffs, NAVEUR/NAVAF and 6th Fleet, worked closely on a daily basis and had recently completed an exercise with EUCOM (Austere Challenge 2011). Collocating the JTF and JFMCC onboard the USS Mount Whitney facilitated C2 but presented its own set of challenges. A sharing and or mixing of JTF and JFMCC staffs occurred, due in part to limited berthing available aboard the Mount Whitney, which increased coordination and communication between them. Some key leaders for the JTF were dual-hatted with equivalent roles in the JFMCC. Ultimately, much of the staff worked for both commands, which streamlined the staff but in some instances created confusion and increased work on individuals.

AFRICOM had undeveloped staff processes for the scale of operations encountered in OOD. There were no established procedures for handling Requests for Information (RFIs). Several elements within AFRICOM were receiving and responding to various RFIs from outside entities in parallel, without cross-leveling their efforts throughout the rest of the command. Additionally, AFRICOM strayed from the standard orders process and used an ad-hoc method of orders production and dissemination. It leaned heavily on the use of verbal orders, PowerPoint, Video Teleconference (VTC), telephone, and plain text e-mail for two reasons: the speed of the operation required rapid production of orders, and AFRICOM lacked of proficiency in formal written orders production. Although these workarounds proved timely, they lacked the detail, discipline, and written records needed to prevent inconsistencies and confusion at subordinate staffs. Use of VTC allowed for rapid communication and dissemination of orders among the Flag and General Officers but at times left staff officers in the dark about leadership intentions. Staffs lost track of what was being told to whom. Gaps in the orders process, whether in communication or production, were compensated for at the JTF level. The JTF and its functional commands operated from Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS) orders to stay ahead of the process. The JFMCC issued Daily Intentions Messages (DIMS) across the net to provide a sort of

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“cleanup.” Formal orders that were missing from AFRICOM were written at the JFMCC level to direct force movement and produce WARNORDs.

The OOD Executive Summary highlights many of the challenges pertaining to the C2 of the OOD coalition on pages 28-29. Among them are: information sharing, intelligence ‘releaseability’, limited satellite bandwidth, lack of a classified network capability, and interoperability of various systems.

In terms on C2 information systems, there are efforts underway that will hopefully improve interoperability and information sharing. The U.S. Mission Partner Environment (MPE) and the related NATO Federated Mission Network (FMN) intend to provide a basis for the rapid stand-up of coalition networks. Specifically within the MPE strategy, the U.S. is endeavoring to run Trusted Network Environments (TNEs) that are always operational and will have connections to many nations’ national C2 networks. Theoretically then, once an operation starts, the U.S. will be able to quickly create a community of interest (COI) that connects participating nations. The thought is that this may enable basic to medium C2 interoperability (i.e., Email, chat, web, maybe some COP services) on Day 0 of an operation. Similarly, within the 5-eyes & NATO communities, there are multi-national efforts to connect national networks, so the required connectivity is actually in place before a mission starts.

It must be remembered that C2 is, first and foremost, a human endeavor. C2 must be leader centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision-making at the lowest level possible. While material solutions, processes, and engineering can enable decision-making, C2 is not synonymous with network operations nor the employment of advanced technologies. Commanders must be skilled at crafting and articulating their intent, enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative and take advantage of fleeting opportunities in decentralized operations.

Reference: Libya: OOD Exec Summ, pp. 22-29.

Additional discussion questions:-Who comprises the U.S. intelligence community?-What is the role of the JIOC? The JISE?-A paraphrased thought on use of intelligence from an officer with OIF experience: When I was over in Iraq, our commander kept himself distant from all the different intelligence agencies. Instead of them all coming to him and “competing” for his attention and “selling” their agency, he had them all report to his S-2 and only his S-2 had direct access to him. It really helped the commander to have just one “go-to intell guy” that would filter everything and

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present him with what was valid, necessary, and needed at the appropriate time.

-Some joint forces utilize a joint effects coordination board (JECB vice JTCB) to encompass non-kinetic efforts under the same entity that coordinates lethal fires. Is this beneficial? Problematic?

-What is the purpose of the scheme for fires (formerly known as concept of fires)? How does it relate to the concept of operations (CONOPS)?

-What’s the difference between the joint targeting cycle and the joint air tasking cycle?

-Any aviators in the group care to walk us through the joint air tasking cycle in laymen’s terms? What do non-aviators need to know about this process?

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-How does operational logistics bridge the gap between tactical and strategic logistics?

-Where does a Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) come from and what does it do? An Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC)?

-What’s the difference between USTRANSCOM’s DDOC and a JDDOC? (former is TRANSCOM node while latter is organic to each supported CCDR).

-How much applicability does the business concept of ‘just-in-time’ inventory have (as opposed to establishing an ‘iron mountain’) for joint sustainment? At what point does effectiveness trump efficiency?

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-What are the ramifications of a JFC establishing a joint force logistics component command as opposed to retaining that function on his staff under the J-4?

-What’s the difference between movement and maneuver? (There is no DOD definition of what movement is. As a general rule of thumb, the J4 plans movement and the J3 plans maneuver. However, it can be argued that an operational movement can be seen as a strategic maneuver. The main attribute that distinguishes movement from maneuver is maneuver seeks to gain a position of advantage.)

-Any thoughts or key take-aways from LtGen Flynn’s comments on joint function (required viewing)? (Key questions he asks/issues for consideration:C2 – potential for use of handheld devices and ‘the cloud’;Intell – how do we deal with information overload/management?:Fires – how to integrate lethal/non-lethal, kinetic/non-kinetic, and cyber?;Mvmt & Mnvr – we need to get back to exercising operational and tactical maneuver;Sustainment – are we always going to be able to rely on local contractors?, energy requirements are the long pole in the tent for emerging equipment;Protection – the homeland will be part of future battlespace).

Module 2

Appraise the command structure used in Operation ANACONDA. Was unity of command achieved? How might it have been improved upon?

Operation ANACONDA points to the critical importance of unity of command. Despite the command authority of Task Force Mountain, lack of unity of command was an impediment at ANACONDA because so many different force components were being used: multiple SOF units, battalions from two Army divisions, and combat aircraft from various Services. The TF Mountain Commander did not have his own air component as the CFACC was retained at the theater (CENTCOM) level. Both the CFLCC and the CFACC were located in the Persian Gulf, directing operations from afar. Afghan forces only loosely fell under the TF Mountain Commander. The multi-headed command structure especially encountered problems after the original battle plan broke down and a new plan had to be created, thereby posing new and different missions for the participating forces. Operation ANACONDA also points to the importance of having an on-scene joint commander, rather than relying too extensively on distant command staffs that may lack a sufficient sense of local conditions.

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The challenges faced by Gen Franks and later Gen Hagenbeck with respect to unity of command for this operation are not surprising considering it was executed at a time when the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan was not yet fully mature. Nevertheless, the objective of Operation ANACONDA was deemed such a priority that it was commenced anyway.

The most immediate issue with respect to unity of command in Operation ANACONDA was the inappropriate mixture of conventional, SOF, and Afghan forces. Despite the fact that COL Mulholland was already the established (SOF) TF Commander and integrated with friendly Afghan troops as well as CIA operatives, MG Hagenbeck was granted command over the senior task force as he was a two-star general and this seemed appropriate. The resultant new command relationships drastically changed how the military forces had been operating the previous five months in Afghanistan. Operations changed from a geographically dispersed SOF centric force with decentralized planning of most ground operations at the JSOTF level, to a geographically concentrated large conventional ground force with operations requiring detailed functional component planning. These major changes along with the relatively short period of time between the publishing of the OPORD (Feb 20, 2002) and execution (planned D-day Feb 28, 2002; actual Mar 2, 2002) did not allow much time for the forces to adjust from how they had been conducting operations to how Operation ANACONDA would be executed. The integration of SOF with conventional forces detracted from the flexibility and adaptability that are core functions of SOF capabilities. SOF and conventional forces are best suited as enablers with separate units and clear divisions that were intentionally not achieved during Operation ANACONDA. In particular, TF 11 was working with Army Rangers and other units that remained outside of MG Hagenbeck’s command. Furthermore, integrated training had not been conducted and the air support for SOF was insufficient for use along the lines that conventional forces had become accustomed to in other operations.

Issues with air assets and air power were another major issue that made it nearly impossible to effectively achieve unity of command. As is often a potential problem in a land campaign, the CFACC and CAOC were not involved in initial planning for the operation. The suggestions made by the CFACC were rejected and there were a number of major air issues—to include integration of CAS operations and pre-emptive targeting—not taken into consideration by the land component. SOF also needed to go through the CFACC and CAOC for air support, whereas they were accustomed to designating their own air assets and targets.

Once Operation ANACONDA kicked off, it became painfully apparent that a CAS campaign would be essential to the operation. Fortunately, air assets from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were able to effectively respond and conduct the strikes necessary to support the friendly forces, but it was in

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a non-traditional role due to the lack of artillery and heavy mortars available to ground forces. Despite the effectiveness of the CAS strikes, command authority became an issue and permission for many strikes took much longer than desired. This was extremely frustrating for SOF, who were used to designated support. For the conventional forces, this command relationship between the CJTF and the CFACC made sense, although much of the ROEs and other issues could have been ironed out ahead of time to avoid delays.

Lastly, unity of command was significantly challenged by the use of coalition forces and the significant emphasis and role placed on Zia’s force, TF Hammer. Although the failure of the Afghan troops to carry out their attack into the valley could not have necessarily been predicted, it does highlight the importance of unity of effort, especially when dealing with coalition and multinational operations. After the fact, it became clear that Zia’s forces were not prepared for what they were to face in battle and subsequently left conventional U.S. forces vulnerable to enemy attacks. It begs the question as to whether or not the SOF teams who had been working with the Afghans were aware of pre-existing issues and had attempted to make any suggestions/contradictions to utilizing the locals for such an important role in this operation. Perhaps the issues WRT to the Afghan teams weren’t highlighted or effectively heard because of the existing challenges in the command structure.

Much of this discussion revolves around the integration and C2 of SOF and conventional forces (and, to a lesser degree, integration of coalition forces). Generally, U.S. forces have gotten better at this over the years of operations in OIF and OEF. Nevertheless, it still behooves military professionals to reflect on the sources of past challenges and think through the ensuing development of doctrine and TTPs.

Examine the intelligence- and fires-related challenges experienced by the coalition during Operation ANACONDA. What could have been done differently to preclude or mitigate these difficulties?

At ANACONDA, initial intelligence estimates underestimated the size, armaments, capabilities, and determination of enemy fighters. This error, however, did not occur because of any lack of effort to gather accurate intelligence. All available sources were used, including overhead reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and human intelligence. A concerted effort was made to integrate information from all sources. Even so, a significant error was made that left U.S. combat forces unaware of the major opposition that they would be confronting. Two lessons can be derived: the importance of making a concerted effort to develop a comprehensive picture of the enemy and the importance of having joint forces that can react quickly

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to erroneous intelligence estimates should they occur. A third lesson is obvious: Never underestimate the enemy.

Operation ANACONDA could not have been won without the intervention of air forces and the many CAS strikes that they performed. However, TF 11 (SOF) had differing priorities and authority to request and receive fire support from a variety of the same assets that also supported TF Mountain, such as AC-130 gunships. These competing command structures utilizing the same assets in the same operating area led to confusion and frustration. The experience suggests that joint air-ground planning is important for most battles, and especially those in which Army forces might not possess the organic firepower of artillery and mortars needed to provide fires against the enemy.

Operation ANACONDA also suggests that major CAS operations are best mounted not when they are improvised at the moment of an emergency on the ground, but instead planned in close concert with ground forces before battles are undertaken. The reason is that in order to launch major CAS operations, multiple assets must be assembled: command-and-control aircraft, strike aircraft, search-and-rescue aircraft, suppression of enemy defense (SEAD) aircraft, airborne FACs, ground based FACs with proper equipment, proper munitions, adequate stocks of fuels and spares, and maintenance assets. An enduring lesson of Operation ANACONDA is that whenever U.S. ground forces are maneuvering in close contact with the enemy, a major CAS effort might have to be launched, even if original battle plans do not envision it. While this may seem like common sense to Marines who are used to operating as a MAGTF, it is more complicated at the joint level.

It can also be argued that these intelligence and fires-related challenges were exacerbated by failing to attain unity of command and exercising the joint force together before commencing the operation (see previous Issue for Discussion).

Analyze factors related to the joint functions of protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment during Operation ANACONDA.

Protection – The buildup of U.S. forces in theater was constrained by the Bush administration’s desire to keep a low military profile in the region. This contributed to the ‘pick-up’ nature of what was to become TF Mountain, who then had to employ under-strength brigades from different divisions. Such policy limitations must be balanced with general force protection practices.

The U.S. light infantry forces employed at ANACONDA lacked the artillery, mortars, and armor that became important when the battle took a different

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course than originally anticipated. The enduring lesson is not that light infantry forces are incapable of winning battles, but that when dispersed operations are to be pursued, each component must possess the full set of weapons and capabilities needed to perform its mission, including in situations that are unexpectedly difficult. Additionally, SOF coordination is needed to ensure forces are adequately protected. The setbacks at Takur Ghar may have been less likely to occur if TF-11 had better coordinated its plans for SOF insertion and choice of landing zones with Task Force Mountain and other U.S. force elements.

Additionally, too much reliance was placed on Zia’s forces, which were assigned the critical role of acting as the hammer by entering the Shahikot Valley and directly confronting the enemy. Zia’s forces lacked the training, organization, and overall capability to carry out this role when intense combat unexpectedly began. In failing to execute their mission, they placed U.S. troops at much greater risk. The experience illustrates the importance of not assigning allied forces to roles and missions that they may not be able to perform.

Movement & Maneuver- The reliance on Zia’s Afghan forces to be the “hammer” for the operation proved to be a critical vulnerability. Hammer and anvil attacks have been standard military doctrine for many years, and often have proved successful. Modern information networks have made them increasingly feasible by permitting constant communications among widely dispersed units. But they also can be risky ventures because they split the attacking force into two or more parts, and expect them to launch coordinated attacks against an enemy that enjoys the advantage of its forces gathered in one place. When one part of the attacking force fails to perform its mission, the other part can be left outnumbered and vulnerable to the full wrath of the enemy. This was to be the case in ANACONDA, when Zia’s unexpected withdrawal left deployed U.S. infantry troops alone on the valley’s eastern slopes, vulnerable to concentrated enemy fires.

Sustainment- By late February 2002, U.S. airlift had been supplying conventional forces in Afghanistan for three months. These resupply flights routinely landed at Bagram Air Base, where the helicopters were based, and Kandahar airfield, where the main ground elements of TF Rakkasan were based. The plan for ANACONDA called for a dramatic increase in the level of U.S. activity in Afghanistan and hence a dramatic increase in the quantities of supplies consumed, particularly aviation fuel for the helicopters. Limited storage capacity, uncleared landmines around Bagram, and other challenges had prevented U.S. forces from accumulating large contingency stockpiles of fuel and other supplies. As a result, the supplies to support ANACONDA were amassed after the plan was published. The original OPORD was published on 20 February and the first airlift requests were submitted to the Combined Air Operations Center (COAC) three days later. This was only five days before

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the planned D-Day and seven days before the actual D-Day. The CAOC’s Air Mobility Division scrambled to get all of the supplies in place before D-Day. Though the lack of logistical foresight did not negatively impact the execution of ANACONDA, airlift requirements could have been identified earlier.

References for all three IFDs in this module were the Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan reading in the course materials and the Operation ANACONDA Case Study published by the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (found in the ‘Additional Materials’ of Lesson 7 on the 8904 Seminar Site in Blackboard).


-The reading refers to MG Hagenbeck’s command as CJTF Mountain. Was this unit really a joint force or more of an Army Task Force? (it seems that CJTF Mountain was more of an amalgamation of task forces than it was a true joint force. Most notably, MG Hagenbeck didn’t have his own joint force air component to execute what was to become a very dynamic CAS effort in support of his force.)

-Over the two weeks of fighting that followed D-Day for ANACONDA, many additional assets were brought to bear against the enemy (Air Force A-10s, USMC Cobras from the USS Bonhomme Richard, Army Apaches from Fort Campbell, USN aircraft from USS John F. Kennedy, USAF air C2 personnel reinforced TF Mountain Air Coordination Element). Would it have been prudent and feasible for MG Hagenbeck to delay the operation and request that these assets be on hand before initiating ANACONDA?

NOTE FOR FACULTY: A synopsis of key takeaways from the book Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda can be found under the ‘Additional Materials’ of Lesson 7 on the 8904 Faculty Site in Blackboard. This 1 ½ page document will provide you with useful material to lead seminar discussion.

Module 3

Compare and contrast the ‘command of teams’ and the ‘team of teams’ constructs, including references to MECE/non-MECE structure in your answer. How might either/both of these concepts facilitate mission command? While the reading pertains to special operations forces, is this discussion applicable to general purpose forces as well? Why or why not?

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The concept of a “command of teams” is indicative of a large organization that has a rigid hierarchy in which subordinate organizations profit from significant internal lateral/horizontal integration but external integration is limited to vertical integration with the higher headquarters. This “command of teams” supports highly effective, adaptive and impactful teams that can deal with unique and challenging problems. The lack of horizontal integration between teams makes the “command of teams” well suited for Mutually Exclusive Collectively Exhaustive (MECE) environments/problem sets. MECE represents an environment or problem set where aspects of the problem are distinct and boundaries are clearly delineated. “Command of teams” can work well in the MECE environment where a horizontally integrated team can attack a clearly defined part of the problem, integrating vertically with higher/lower headquarters, without concern for another (equally capable) team dealing with a separate mutually exclusive problem.

The “command of teams” sets the conditions for a centrally generated intent to be shared across the command. The capacity of the respective teams to exercise disciplined initiative while executing in a decentralized manner is supported by mutual trust between headquarters and the teams. This is a significant step towards mission command within the “command of teams”. However, the silos (even highly effective SOF silos) that exist in the “command of teams” can be a self-limiting factor with regards to mission command.

The concept of a “team of teams” builds upon the benefits afforded by the “command of teams” by creating an environment where all levels of the organization are integrated. The previously mentioned horizontally integrated teams are integrated vertically with headquarters as well as being effectively integrated with all other action partners (military, OGAs, allies, host nation, etc.). This change must be measured to ensure that the positive impacts of the team’s group dynamic are not lost by creating too many linkages with other teams. That said, enough linkages must be created and fostered between teams to ensure that trust grows as relationships are strengthened. Within a “team of teams”, the common purpose and shared vision that underpins each team allows trust to flourish and operations and activities to be executed in a decentralized but highly integrated manner. This level of mission command approaches the ideal, but requires that all actors involved are capable and trusting. Even then, perhaps the “team of teams” construct is not applicable in all environments. For example, many of the elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force are organized in a MECE (vice team of teams) construct in garrison to facilitate training and maintenance of like units. Even when deployed in an operational setting, large conventional forces may not be able to embrace all aspects of the “team of teams” mindset like small teams of experienced and well-educated SOF and intelligence experts can. You should encourage students to discuss varied opinions on this.

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Do you feel that the chess master/gardener metaphor is useful for the contemporary military leader across the range of military operations? Explain.

This is obviously an open-ended question for which there is no one right answer. The following comments are offered as fodder for discussion.A chess master has detailed knowledge of the capabilities of all of the pieces on both sides of a clearly delineated board. In contrast, the only aspect of the game which the military commander knows with any level of certainty is the capabilities of his own forces. His understanding of the opposing forces is informed by a myriad of intelligence, operational and experiential factors, but is not known with the certainty of chess. More importantly, the static and perpetually two dimensional environment presented by the chess board does a poor job of representing the contemporary operating environment. Hence, the chess master metaphor as articulated by Gen McChrystal loses some of its luster as a model worthy of study. Nevertheless, an aspect of chess which does provide a level of true metaphorical value across the range of military operations is the unpredictability of a human opponent. This unpredictability is often amplified when an opponent has not been trained with the same chess traditions, rules and conventions. As such, they are not influenced by the same biases. If we are to equate warfare to a game, then mastering the game technically and tactically has value. This potential value only exists if the military commander has the autonomy to compete with the adversary in the arena, chess or otherwise.

The summation of Gen McChrystal’s gardener metaphor—gardeners don’t grow plants, they foster the environment in which plants can grow—seems to be more applicable across the range of military operations. The scope and scale of the metaphor’s applicability can be argued as there are times when decisions need to be taken by military commanders that have immediate and drastic effects. Additionally, if the respective teams in the team of teams are indicative of individual plants flourishing in disparate gardens, then there will be a requirement for gardeners at many levels. One of the challenges will be to maintain the relative value of a gardener’s approach as organizations scale upwards in size. Another major challenge will be to cascade the same philosophy down to the lowest level and have the impetus to embrace a wider horizontal integration spread across the garden, at the grass roots level. The value of empowering individuals and organizations to flourish individually and also provide mutual support based on the cultivation of appropriate relationships is not an easy task. Additionally, for the commander himself, it can be difficult to practice a gardener methodology as it takes him away from his role as a decision-maker.


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-Describe what Gen McChrystal means by the term ‘blinks’ (horizontally, vertically, internal, external)?

-What do you make of the following quote? “Great teams are less like ‘awesome machines’ than awesome organisms.”

-Do you feel there are times when a ‘Command of Teams’ approach may be more appropriate than a ‘Team of Teams’ approach? (perhaps for more short duration missions…?)

-Do C2 organizations, systems or style change with the range of military operations (i.e. stability ops versus major combat ops)? How?

-Harkening back to 8903, do you see any similarities between Gen McChrystal’s ‘Team of Teams’ approach and Field Marshall Slim’s theoretical approach? (Both of these commander’s demonstrated an ability to understand ill-structured problems and find opportunities for change. This knack for successful adaptation and problem solving will continue to be necessary in the contemporary and future operating environments.)

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LESSON 8: HIGHER-LEVEL STAFF WORK

Module 1

Identify and explain three ideas or techniques from the readings or viewing that you feel are particularly useful for a staff officer.

Open question. There are many topics raised in the readings that should spark useful discussion.

The Joint Officer Handbook addresses CCDR joint staff organization; roles and organization of the JCS; and developing work products.

The Hammes article highlights the limitations of PowerPoint as a decision-making aid, offering that it is fine as a classroom tool or to provide a general background brief.

BGen Dunford’s recorded presentation addresses the need for quality officers on higher staffs and offers some of his insights regarding serving on the joint staff. He covers joint staff organization and the roles of the CJCS, how the joint staff works with Services and CCDRs, and the increasing need for the joint staff to synchronize CCDR efforts. Some of the takeaways from BGen Dunford to future staff officers include:

Communications skills, competence, and teamwork are the hallmarks of good staff work.

Don’t confuse how busy you are with how effective you are as a staff officer.

Don’t send a message out to subordinate commands without providing them an opportunity to chop it first.

The Action Officer Keys to Success article, though somewhat dated, contains timeless principles and TTPs for a higher level staff officer. Among some of the highlights offered by the author:

Administration– Use the “bottom line up front (BLUF)” principle as much as possible when

communicating with others, especially seniors.– Keep up other people’s situational awareness via e-mails, and you’ll be

pleasantly surprised to have your situational awareness kept up by their e-mails.

– Always have a copy of your organization’s correspondence manual close by.


Character/Relationships– An action officer chooses how happy or miserable he is while assigned to

a staff.

Good vs. Bad Action Officers– A good action officer recognizes the importance of establishing and

maintaining effective relationships.

Leadership– One of the best leadership opportunities for an action officer is planning,

organizing, and leading meetings.– Every office, section, branch, and division should have a mission

statement that tells what the organization does and how it fits in and relates to the adjacent and next higher level organizations.

The Napoleon’s Shadow article advocates for a fundamental shift in how we organize staffs. The author proposes adopting cross-functional teams that are organized temporally (i.e. a preparation directorate and an execution directorate). These entities would not just form for an exercise or contingency and then dissipate back into a more traditional structure, rather they would be standing bodies. Implementation of this construct would start with the Joint Staff and then proceed out to all administrative and operational staffs.

Reference: all Module 1 assignments.

What are the key attributes of a good information paper? A good position paper? Describe the strengths and weaknesses of the example staff papers in the readings (two information papers and two position papers).

NOTE: The example staff products in the reading contain subject matter that is pertinent to course content in 8904 Joint Operations (support relationships, staff organization, Service organization, CCDR authorities). Hopefully, you can achieve a “two-fer” by engaging in discourse with learners that uses this joint content as a vehicle for learning about good writing. Critical thought and the discussion/online posting that will flow from this will naturally involve reflection on this important material, but the main intent is to imbue our learners with better staff writing skills (e.g. sentence/paragraph organization, syntax, rhetorical strategy, following guidelines for applicable type of paper).

Staff products should be written clearly and in the active voice, with a mind towards who the audience is. Per the Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation Manual, an information paper is written to pass information between staff officers or up the chain of command. The writer should be brief while

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capturing all pertinent information. Many inexperienced officers do not appreciate the utility of being able to reduce a complex issue into a one-page paper for their peers/bosses. This is a learned skill which is very important. On the final exam, your learners will be asked to summarize material that has been addressed in several lessons into an information paper. Please impress upon them that this is not a rote drill that does not involve critical thinking. They cannot simply lift random text without thinking; they must discern which information is most critical and capture it in their paper.

First Information Paper (Advantages of Supported/Supporting Relationships):- This is a generally a clearly written and informative paper offered as an example of what “right” looks like. Second Information Paper (Comparison of the traditional J-code staff versus functional staff relationship to that of organizing forces along Service versus functional lines):- The subject line is wordy and somewhat unclear. Perhaps a better line would read: J-code/Functional Staff Relationship Compared with Service/Functional Joint Force Organization). Additionally, the first letter of all words in the Subject line should be capitalized. - It is generally accepted that one page is the limit for an information paper. Senior leaders are only going to wade through so much reading. Staff officers need to master the mantra of “less is more” in their writing.- This paper also concludes with a recommendation that must be approved. This is more appropriate for a position paper.

Position Papers are used to provide a rationale to support a decision or position the recipient should take. They should be composed in a short, direct, conversational style that allows the reader to understand the key points of the issue and come to a logical conclusion. A writer should take care to objectively lay out all sides of an argument or position before offering a recommendation.

First Position Paper (Utility of Service Expeditionary Organizations):- The topic is addressed in considerable detail. However, the information provided in the discussion section is not easily digested. The descriptions of the BCT and the AEF both need to be broken down into smaller sections for the reader. Some sentences could be combined. Some details could be omitted. - The “Arguments against…” section is considerably longer than the “Arguments for…”, which seems odd for a paper that recommends a retention of the current organizations. - The paper is too long. Per the position paper example from the Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation Manual, length should not exceed two pages.Second Position Paper (Authorities of the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs):-Subject line is in different font than remainder of paper.

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-Paragraph numbering starts with ‘4’ vice’1’.-Information and issues are clearly laid out for the reader, but the author has saved too much of his argument for the “Recommendations” section. Most of this material would be more appropriate in the “Discussion” section. Not only would this read more logically, it would also make the recommendation more effective (“short and sweet”; more hard-hitting).

Reference: Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and Action Guide, pp. 15-17; Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation Manual, pp. B-69 and B-73.


-What does a staff do for a commander?

-How are the attributes of a good staff officer different from those of a good commander?

-Are the ideas/techniques for a higher HQ staff officer in the readings similar, additional to, or divergent from the leadership traits, principles, and troop leading steps you’ve been taught during your career?

-Look at the joint staff concepts from Joint Pub 1(Module 1 Overview - bottom of page 2 and top of page 3). Aren’t these just common sense? Why does JP1 bother to list them?

-Is the U.S. Joint Staff a general staff for U.S. military forces? (No - see first page of overview). Would the establishment of a centralized, directive command in the uniformed portion of the DoD allow creation of a more coherent, interagency-integrated, and holistic approach to transnational and borderless adversaries? What risks are posed with the creation of a General Staff supporting a Chairman with command authority? What problem is such a proposal trying to solve?

-Did BGen Dunford offer any relevant takeaways for officers pending assignment to a higher-level staff?

-Gen Mattis has been heard to say that “If you want to get your ass kicked, build a big staff”. Does the size of a staff reflect its quality and ability to function effectively? (consider the following from a 2015 Joint Staff Focus Paper on forming a JTF HQ:

Guard against the tendency to build a large HQ. First, its sourcing may not be feasible nor sustainable. Second, large HQs are often hobbled by their sheer size in sharing understanding and purpose, lack a bias

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for action, have challenges in communications and delegation of authority, and develop extensive and often convoluted staffing in an attempt to ensure all are included in the staffing processes. Focus on building agile HQs that have a “bias” for action. Lean HQs stay in their lane at the operational level, leverage reach-back and others’ capabilities, and continually review requirements to retain focus on the important tasks.)

-What is the ‘Napoleon’s shadow’ that Price refers to in the Joint Force Quarterly article? What does he suggest as a way to get out from under it?

-Differentiate among the various staff work products. What’s the difference between an information paper, a position paper, coordination papers, decision papers, and staff studies? When is it appropriate to use each? (Keep in mind that learners will be writing an information paper and a position paper for the final exam. The format for an info paper and position paper from the Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation order are included in the reading, please draw attention to them.)

Module 2

Describe the different methods of organizing staffs for operational effectiveness. How do functional or mission-based staff constructs reconcile with the concept of a traditional Napoleonic staff (J-1, J-2, J-3…)?

B2C2WGs are functional integrating structures that provide a forum for bringing together expertise focused on specific problems to provide coherent staff recommendations to a commander. They are essentially teams of persons from across a staff that deal with certain issues on a recurring and informal basis. Examples of CCDR-level B2C2WG entities include:

-Force Protection Working Group-Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center-Joint Interagency Coordination Group-Information Operations Working Group-Joint Targeting Coordination Board

A mission-based organization is typically structured to deal in an environment where a HQs has standing relationships with numerous external actors. They may have sections such as ‘Policy and Strategy’, ‘Partnering’, and ‘Stability’. MNFI was one such HQ. SOUTHCOM was also organized in this fashion, until the onslaught of assistance for the 2010 Haiti earthquake revealed that their non-traditional structure made it too difficult to integrate

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additional external actors effectively. They then adopted a more traditional J-code structure.

The J-code (or Napoleonic ) structure is still the preferred basic staff structure as it provides a common reference point on where expertise, staff oversight, and accountability exists on the staff. It also facilitates cross talk with external organizations and the infusion of staff augments as it shares commonality with many Service staff organizations. Perhaps most important, the J-code structure provides staff members an “address” that is readily-recognizable across the Services and, increasingly, but our coalition and interagency partners, and thus enables our commonality and reduces barriers to cooperation and collaboration. Unfortunately, this type of organization tends to induce “stovepipe” thinking. B2C2WGs are all cross-functional entities that overlay horizontally on the vertical J-code staff structure to enhance staff integration (see graphic portrayal of this on top of p. 5 of Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration and Battle Rhythm.) However, functional organization presents significant interoperability drawbacks in steady-state interactions with higher, subordinate, and adjacent HQs staffs, but especially during crisis operations.

When it comes to choosing how to organize a staff, it is not an ‘either-or’ choice between a traditional Napoleonic staff and a B2C2WG organization. B2C2WGs are used extensively in every joint HQ regardless of staff organizational structure. Although cross-functional in their membership, most boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups fall under the principle oversight of a staff directorate.

A challenge related to using B2C2WGs deals with the issue of ‘how much is enough?’ A balance needs to be struck between the large number of B2C2WGs required for full staff analysis and integration with the limited number of personnel on the staff, time available, and other competing scheduling requirements of leaders. Multiple B2C2WGs may allow better cross-functional communications among JFC staff organizations, but too many may create a battle rhythm that is too cumbersome to efficiently facilitate rapid decision-making. All B2C2WGs should have a defined purpose, input requirements, output products, attendees, and linkages to other B2C2WGs.

The Joint HQ Org, Staff Integration and Battle Rhythm reading starts out with a useful table that provides options and examples for organizing a staff along various lines: by J-code, functionally, mission-based, or a hybrid of these methods.

Yet another method of staff structure is offered in the Military Review excerpt on CJTF-HOA. It involves country-focused teams known as fusion actions cells, which coalesce around each other in large, open rooms to form

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a hive for the purpose of conducting theater security cooperation planning in an unclassified environment. It would seem that there are some potential benefits to tempo and flexibility/freedom of action so long as the sections of the hive are actually empowered through mission command. The potential to reinforce sections throughout the hive with additional capabilities (cells) to address emerging challenges may also offer promise.

Reference: Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration and Battle Rhythm, pp. 2-6. USSOUTHCOM Staff Organization JTF-Haiti, pp. 1-2. Globally Integrated Ops in the HOA Through the Principles of Mission Command, pp. 12-13.

Analyze the relationship between centers, working groups, OPTs, and decision boards, explaining how they contribute to a commander’s decisionmaking.

These nodes are all cross-functional entities that overlay horizontally on the vertical J-code staff structure to enhance staff integration.

Centers are cross-functional organizations with dedicated manning and facilities to integrate current operations. They serve as a coordination hub for dynamic processes that involve numerous elements of the joint staff. Perhaps the most commonly employed center is the joint operations center, typically managed under the auspices of the J-3. Other centers include: humanitarian assistance coordination center (J-3), joint movement center (J-4), joint reception center (J-1), and the network warfare center (J-6).

Working Groups are bodies that develop and maintain expertise from within and external to the joint HQ in providing analysis to the staff across all three event horizons (future plans, future operations, and current operations). Working Groups can be enduring or ad-hoc. Examples of working groups include: force protection working group (J3), information operations working group (J3), intelligence working group (J2), and the joint targeting working group (J3).

Operational Planning Teams (OPTs) are ad hoc teams formed to solve a single problem related to a specific task or requirement on a single event horizon. OPT membership is typically determined by the staff officer responsible for the event horizon in which the OPT is working (J5 for future plans, J35 for future ops, J33 for current ops).

Boards are a grouping of senior staff members that meet for the purpose of gaining guidance or decisions. They generally synchronize assets, prioritize plans, and allocate resources. Examples of boards are: collection management board (J2), joint targeting and coordination board (J3), logistics coordination board (J4), and joint munitions board (J4).

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Pages 5-6 of the Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm focus paper has three good graphics that depict the relationships between OPTs, working groups, and the J-codes.

It is important to note that there is a general hierarchy to these B2C2WGs within their combatant command. Generally speaking, working groups operate at the lowest level on a staff, making plans, doing studies, making estimates, and leading projects. Some staffs utilize councils in the middle of the hierarchy who recommend priorities and synchronize activities. At the top of the hierarchy, boards are responsible for making decisions about command and operational priorities and integrating and synchronizing them. Usually, there are more working groups and teams than there are boards.

Reference: Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and Action Guide, pp. 82-84; Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration and Battle Rhythm, pp. 5-8.


What are the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional Napoleonic staff? (Strengths: establishes clear responsibilities; can accommodate new constructs within existing framework – e.g. IO cell with J-3, facilitates staff augmentation; Weaknesses: compartmentalization; wire diagram of staff only describes a limited description of staff’s actual behavior).

-Have you observed effective staff organizations that did not employ the traditional Napoleonic staff construct? How were they organized?

-Why did USSOUTHCOM make the decision to re-align back to a J-code structure shortly after JTF-Haiti commenced its humanitarian assistance operations related to the earthquake in 2010?

-What do you think of the analogy made in one of the example information paper about the relationship between traditional j-coded staffs/task organized functional staffs being analogous to that of Service /functional components of the joint force?

-How might the concept of information superiority, which promises increased access to information by all levels, alter the time-honored hierarchical C2 structure? What effect will these advances have on the make-up of staffs, their overall planning function and the increasing tendency towards centralized control?

-What is it that a good battle rhythm does? (translates the staff schedule of recurring activities into a model that provides purpose and

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direction and allows the commander to relate his specific activities to their actions).

-What are some considerations for establishing a staff’s battle rhythm?

-The Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm focus paper makes numerous mentions of event horizons. What are event horizons?

-What did you think of the required listening of LtGen Flynn’s insights on commander and staff information management?

-Assess the military’s efforts to train leaders to use technology. Do you feel prepared to use the various technical systems available to staff officers to organize and share information with the joint force?

-Also of interest, in the May-June 2010 issue of Military Review, several members of the Army’s 25th Infantry Division wrote of the novel manner in which the 25th ID organized its staff for a deployment to Northern Iraq (full article available on 8904 FacDev site under Additional Materials/Lesson 6; synopsis follows). Given the complexities of their operating environment, challenges included unclear staff responsibility lines, various OPTs from across the staff being in session at any given time, and a ‘pick-up team’ mentality for ad hoc planning resulting in the inability to focus on persistent problems. Accordingly, the 25th ID departed from a traditional Napoleonic staff structure and re-organized the division staff into four permanent work groups: security, advising, economics, and governance. A fusion cell synchronized the efforts of the four groups. Each working group consisted of a core group (expertise required daily by the group) and contributing members (expertise required routinely or else provided by a small staff section that couldn’t spare rep daily). Additionally, the division stood up a robust future ops section. Hence, they operated along the three time horizons with the following groups: Current Ops (managed by Div Ops Center, focused on 0-72 hours out), Future Plans (managed by the G5, focused 4+months out), and Future Ops (comprised of the fusion cell and four work groups, managed by the division effects coordinator, focused between 3 days to 4 months out).

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The G3 managed the synchronization of efforts across all three time horizons. The 25th ID claims that this organization, being centered around their future ops cell, proved effective in their staying in front of their subordinate BCTs. Additionally, the power of permanent versus temporary groups allowed for a proper focus on campaign objectives and planning priorities. It should be noted that their higher HQs also organized along a similar construct, so interface proved simpler.

-Not necessarily related to staff structure, but pertaining to higher staff officer survival is the following comment from an action officer in the EUCOM AOR. It advocates for officers developing a presence on social media and nurturing online connections to develop a reach well beyond traditional spheres of influence.

I recently spent some time working at U.S. Army Europe Headquarters in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Unfortunately, my knowledge of affairs in Eastern Europe was somewhat limited. In addition to the standard practice of reading books, articles, and white papers to gain a better understanding of the area, I leveraged my online networks for assistance. I reached out to one of my followers who was very active in Eastern European social networks, and within the hour, I was following 25 separate Twitter accounts of reporters, bloggers, and activists in Russia, Poland, Estonia, and Ukraine. These new connections gave me additional and unfiltered insights into the dynamics of the problems facing this region of the world. By the combination of self-study, on-the-job experiences, and taking advantage of my online networks, I was quickly able to gain a better understanding of current affairs.

- “Harnessing Social Media for Military Power” by Joe Byerly in 20 Aug 15 War on the Rocks

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http://www.eur.army.mil/atlanticresolve/

LESSON 8

It may be worth asking your students what their thoughts/insights are on the potential for social media positively influencing the networking and awareness of action officers within their operating areas.

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