Appendix 2 – Noise

2.1

HS2 Phase One Environmental Statement Consultation

Individual Response by Michael Woodhouse

Little Acre, Ingestre, Stafford ST18 0RE

e-mail: michael.woodhouse1@btinternet.com

Introduction

I am responding only to Volume 5, Appendix SV-001-000, Annex D2: Operational Assessment – Airborne Sound

I am a retired professional engineer. My wife and I are residential home owners, living close to (but not directly on) the proposed route of HS2 Phase Two. We both oppose HS2 on principle and believe it is an inappropriate use of tax-payers' money. HS2 should not be built. However, should it proceed, Parliament must ensure that the impact on the environment is as low as possible.

Our home is approximately 490 metres from the proposed Birmingham-to-Manchester leg of the route, at a point where the track is raised on a 13 metre-high embankment  

Because Ingestre is located in tranquil estate parkland and all the residential properties in the parish (except two) lie within 1km of the proposed route, noise has been a particular concern to me. As a result, I have taken a close interest in the assessment of noise from HS2; initially as outlined in the documentation for Phase Two but, following completion of the Phase Two Route consultation at the end of January 2014, also to the more detailed description contained in Annex D2 of Appendix SV-001-000 of the Environmental Statement (ES) for Phase One (Volume 5).

Although I have spent only a short time looking at the Phase One ES, my findings lead me to conclude that HS2 Ltd has made questionable and in some cases false assumptions about noise. This means that Parliament, and the public-at-large, have been presented with an overly optimistic view of the environmental impact of noise on affected communities.

Because problems exist at the fundamental level of noise source representation, the impacts are route wide. It is essential that these deficiencies are highlighted in the summary report to Parliament to be prepared by Dialogue by Design. This should be accompanied by a recommendation for Parliament to initiate an independent expert review of HS2 Ltd's assessment of the noise impacts of HS2.

The total response (including this one) is 10 pages long.

1. Preamble

Noise is a complex and highly technical subject. I have reservations about the noise limits used by HS2 Ltd to indicate the likely impact of HS2 but, in the time available to me, I have chosen to examine, in detail, only the sound source model and propagation characteristics that have been used for the route-wide studies.

As will be appreciated, discrepancy at the level of noise source representation will produce erroneous and misleading results for every affected property and community along the whole route.

Given the essentially non-technical audience to whom the Dialogue by Design report will be addressed, I will highlight only the most blatant examples of where I believe the methods described in Appendix SV-001-000, Annex D2, are questionable so that Parliament may be alerted to the more general issue of model validation and the need for a full, independent, review. Should such a review be initiated, I will be happy to make a more detailed submission to the reviewing authority.

2. Representation of sound sources

HS2 has to comply with the EU Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI) – see ref [14] cited in Annex D2, 1.1.31. The TSI sets maximum values for overall noise (which are lower for high speed trains ordered after 2010) but makes no judgement on what the individual contributions are to the total. This is something that HS2 Ltd must do as a prelude to carrying out environmental noise studies.

There are three recognised main contributors to railway noise: traction noise, rolling noise and aerodynamic noise. Traction noise dominates at low speed, rolling noise dominates at medium speed and aerodynamic noise at high speed. Figure 1 illustrates the typical speed dependencies.

Figure 1: Typical relative dependence of railway noise sources(taken from ref [27] of 1.1.40 of Annex D2)

In Annex D2, individual sound sources are developed that, for a TSI-compliant train, sum to the TSI noise limits (post 2010 values) at the corresponding speeds. The aerodynamic component has been divided (Annex D2, 1.1.27) between body aerodynamic noise which is represented as a noise source 0.5m above the rail-head and two sources higher up on the train: pantograph noise at 5.0 m above rail-head and pantograph recess noise at 4.0m above rail-head. I believe, the last item has been incorrectly described and has resulted in a false deduction being made (see 3.2 below).

Aerodynamic noise is strongly dependent on the train speed, the peak value rising as the 7 th

power of the speed. Additionally, the split assumed between the aerodynamic noise sources at 0.5m and at 4m/5m is critical, as the former can be shielded by noise barriers whereas the latter will not be (a maximum noise barrier height of 3m has been assumed by HS2 Ltd in all noise calculations).

Trains ordered for HS2 are assumed will be specified to have a lower noise level than the TSI requirements. The greatest reduction (5dB) is made to the high-up noise sources, assuming the adoption of low-noise pantograph technology from east Asia (Annex D2, 1.1.53). I have doubts about the validity of this assumption as discussed in section 3 below.

The train speed above which aerodynamic noise becomes dominant is widely accepted to be around 300kph. Because HS2 will operate at up 360kph and potentially to the design maximum speed of 400kph, it is important that the dominance of aerodynamic noise above 300kph is taken into account, something that was not required when HS1 was being designed (HS1 has a maximum speed of 300kph).

Much is said in Annex D2 about how the models have been developed to do this but no attempt has apparently been made to validate the result against the basic premise.

As a simple test of consistency, I sought to check if the noise source models developed by HS2 Ltd gave a transition speed of 300kph for the TSI-compliant train.  It did not.   From 1.1.29 and 1.1.52 of Annex D2 the following values for contribution to the maximum sound level, LpAF,max, relevant to this issue, are:

Rolling noise assumed by HS2 Ltd is: (16.6 + 30logV)dB  . . . . [1]

Body aerodynamic noise assumed by HS2 Ltd is: (–85.5 + 70logV)dB . . . . [2]

Pantograph aerodynamic noise assumed by HS2 Ltd is: (–92.3 + 70logV)dB . . . . [3]

…. where V is velocity in kph and log is base 10.

From the above, it can be shown that the value of V at which the logarithmic sum of [2] and [3] exceeds [1] is just under 345kph. This is well above the accepted value of 300kph. 

The model therefore appears inconsistent and immediately raises the suspicion that, even before the benefits of east Asian low noise pantographs are assumed, the split of contributing noise sources for TSI-compliant trains is biased towards rolling noise, thus understating the aerodynamic component.

Furthermore, the aerodynamic component of noise has apparently been split so as to understate the component from the pantograph, which cannot be shielded by noise barriers, in favour of the body aerodynamic component, which can be shielded. The work cited in 1.1.39 of Annex D2 indicates measured values for the pantograph noise at 320kph of 85 – 87dBA, yet HS2 Ltd has used 83dBA (1.1.49). On examination, it appears that this lower value is a self-fulfilling outcome of using HS2 Ltd's own (optimistic?) model for pantograph noise!!  It thus appears that HS2 Ltd has already squeezed 3dB out of the pantograph noise level even before applying further reduction on the back of the work carried out in east Asia (Japan).

3) Claimed reductions in pantograph noise for HS2 trains.The noise source levels for HS2 trains have been set lower than the limits applicable to TSI-compliant trains. The reductions used are listed in Tables 2 and 3 of 1.1.54 of Annex D2, together with an indication of the assumed design improvements believed capable of giving rise to these reductions. All the stated assumptions can be challenged but I want to focus on two:

3.1 Pantograph Noise

A reduction of 5dB is assumed relative to European pantographs (on top of the apparent 3dB understatement as noted in section 2) above.

The Japanese have spent considerable time and money in investigating noise reduction measures for their high-speed trains, particularly pantograph noise, as this is the dominant source at high speeds. Annex D2 does not cite any work that compares a current European design of pantograph with that of a current Japanese design of pantograph to see what is potentially achievable. It is therefore not clear that the improvements achieved in Japan are necessarily attainable for a HS2 train.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the improvements made in Japan result from the combination of two principle measures: the streamlining of the pantograph itself and the addition of train-mounted noise insulation barriers. Figure 2 shows the current state-of-the-art configuration as used on the Shinkansen E5 bullet train (maximum speed 320kph).

Figure 2: Shinkansen E5 Pantograph with noise barrier

The Shinkansen E5 is the result of development carried out for the FASTECH360S high speed train1, later proven by tests at full-scale2. Fig 3 shows the FASTECH360S pantograph with shield.

1 A. Ido, T. Kurita, Y. Wakabayashi, M. Hara, H. Shiraishi and M. Houriuchi, 2006, Development of Technologies for Minimizing Environmental Impacts2 H. Yamada, Y. Wakabayashi, T.Kurita and M Horiuchi, Noise Evalution of Shinkansen High-speed Test Train (FASTECH360S,Z)

Figure 3: FASTECH360S showing Pantograph with noise barrier

When considering the pantograph noise component, the key finding of the Japanese work is that the noise insulation barriers are the most effective element, achieving around 4dB reduction compared with around 2dB for the streamlined pantograph arm.

While the pantograph arm will almost certainly be transferable to a European situation, it is not at all clear that noise insulation panels of the appropriate size and position on the train body can be accommodated within the European loading gauge UIC GC limits, to which all trains operating over the HS2 track have to comply (see Figure 4 below).

Unless noise insulation panels can be accommodated, within GC limits, in a manner that is functionally equivalent to those on the Japanese trains, the assumption of a 5dB reduction in pantograph noise for HS2 trains relative to TSI-compatible trains looks optimistic.

Figure 4: UIC Railway loading gauge profiles (GC applies to HS2)

3.2 Recess Noise

Each train unit (200m long for HS2) has two pantographs, one raised and one lowered. Which one is raised depends on the direction of travel and is usually the trailing one.

In addition to a noise source for the raised pantograph, P(pantograph), at 5m height above rail-head, HS2 Ltd has used an aerodynamic noise source, at 4m above rail-head, called “recess noise”. The term “recess” is misleading since the noise source to which it refers corresponds, in reality, to the second, lowered, pantograph.  Because European TGV-type trains retract the lowered pantograph into a recess within the roof of the train, this has led to the term “recess noise” being used synonymously with “lowered pantograph noise”.

The first point to make is that, for TSI-compliant trains, HS2 Ltd has assumed that the noise from a raised pantograph, P(pantograph), is the same as for a lowered pantograph, P(recess) – see Table 1 in 1.1.52. This is at variance with the observation, made in 1.1.39 of Annex D2, that Gautier et al (footnote [25] of 1.1.39) showed that the noise from the lowered pantograph (recess noise), at 320kph, was 2dB greater than that from the raised pantograph. 

The modern Japanese Shinkansen trains use roof-mounted pantographs, without recess, in combination with noise barriers, as discussed in 3.1 above. HS2 Ltd has assumed that a similar arrangement can be used for HS2 trains (Table 2 of 1.1.54 refers) which will result in an arrangement generally as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: FASTECH360S showing pantograph positions (from Yamada et al3)

When pantographs are directly roof mounted, as suggested in 1.1.54, Table 1, there will still be a minimum of two pantographs per 200m train unit, one of which will be raised and one lowered.  There will thus always be a noise contribution from both pantographs, whether or not there is a “recess”.  It is therefore wrong for HS2 to eliminate “recess” noise from the source model for HS2 trains.

All the values for HS2 trains assumed in Table 3 of 1.1.54 are suspect but the “N/A” for P(recess) is technically wrong and will result in all noise predictions for HS2 trains being incorrect.

NB 1: A lowered roof-mounted pantograph will be at a greater height above the rail-head than one that retracts to within the train body. As a result, the noise source height for a lowered pantograph on a HS2 train, with roof-mounted pantographs, is likely to higher than the one assumed by HS2 Ltd for “recess” noise on a TSI-compliant train. In addition to adding a noise source to the HS2 train model, to represent the lowered pantograph, it will be necessary

3 H. Yamada, Y. Wakabayashi, T.Kurita and M Horiuchi, Noise Evalution of Shinkansen High-speed Test Train (FASTECH360S,Z)

to assign a different noise source height to this term.

NB 2: The work by Ido et al4 shows that, with the Japanese arrangement, the shielding effect of the noise insulation barriers is greater for the lowered pantograph (as might be expected), making the raised pantograph the larger noise source. This is the opposite to that observed by Gautier et al for TGV (see reference earlier in this section).

NB 3: The text header within Table 3 of 1.1.54, incorrectly states “Values for TSI-Compliant Trains at 25m” whereas it should read “Values for HS2 Trains at 25m”.

4 A. Ido, T. Kurita, Y. Wakabayashi, M. Hara, H. Shiraishi and M. Houriuchi, 2006, Development of Technologies for Minimizing Environmental Impacts

4) Missing Sound Source

Conspicuous by its absence is any treatment of noise impacts from structures, especially viaducts.

Figure 6: Structure radiated noise

Figure 6 (taken from HS2 Ltd Phase Two Sustainability Statement, Appendix E6) illustrates the phenomenon.

Many people live near viaducts yet nothing is said in Annex D2 about airborne noise from them.

The elevated nature of the track, the fact that slab track will be used and not ballasted track, that only low-height noise barriers can be used and, of course, the fact that the structure itself will be a noise source in its own right all appear to be ignored.  The sound source models developed in Annex D2 will not be appropriate and will give misleading results if applied to any section of the above-ground route that involves a viaduct.

As a minimum, the rolling noise component must be increased (the rolling noise from slab track is typically 4dB greater than from ballasted track) and a new noise source added to represent the direct sound emissions of the structure itself.

5) Inconsistencies and misleading statements

Annex D2 contains many inconsistencies and misleading statements. Four that I single out to mention are as follows:

5.1 Justification for using HS1 modelling method: Clause 1.1.18 makes the claim that: “measurements have shown that [the HS1 method] provided an overestimate of actual in-service sound levels” thus conveying the impression that the HS1 method is conservative. This claim is repeated in 1.3.3 but is not supported by the measured vs predicted results depicted in figure 7. For both SEL and LAmax, the median value of the measured vs calculated plot shows that, on average, there is an overestimation only at the lower noise values, with the trend reversing to an underestimation at the higher values. If the validity of

the claim hinges on the words “actual in-service sound levels” (for HS1) this is doubly misleading. This is because, even if HS1 in-service noise levels are generally in the lower part of the range (where an overestimation is more likely), HS2, because of its much higher speed, will be towards the upper end where the HS1 model is more likely to underestimate the real effect.

5.2 Claimed accuracy of HS1 modelling method: The unnumbered first paragraph of section 1.3 (presumably intended to be 1.3.1) makes the claim, for the HS1 method, that: “the difference between predicted and measured levels is typically within ±3dBA”, thus conveying the impression that it conforms with conventionally accepted tolerance for such studies. As with 5.1 above, this is not supported by figure 7. Figure 7 shows a spread between the 5 th

percentile and the 95th percentile lines of 9dB. This gives a nominal accuracy of ±4.5dB and, even so, 10% of all results will be outside this range. The claim for ± 3dB accuracy is highly misleading and can only be true if an extremely liberal interpretation has been placed on the word “typically”.

5.3 Sound propagation model: Clause 1.3.14, through to the end of Annex D2, deals with outdoor sound propagation.  The described empirically-derived terms (1.3.16) are, presumably those developed by Hood et al, as referenced in 1.1.8, based on TGV pass-by measurements made in 1989/90 (1.3.23).  I do not have the knowledge to challenge the basic equations given in 1.3.16 except to note that the final term, representing ground absorption, is shown as a train speed dependent term (in mph!) which certainly does not reflect any known physical effect that I am aware of.  From other reading, I understand ground attenuation to be strongly dependent on the ground surface condition: from very soft (eg freshly fallen snow = high sound absorption) through to very hard (eg paved surfaces = low sound absorption) and to the frequency content of the sound source, with high frequencies being attenuated much more rapidly with distance than low frequencies.  Neither the type of ground cover nor the frequency content of the source are accounted for in the stated expression. More generally, I would be much happier if HS2 were using a modern physics-based sound propagation model rather than some empirical rules derived from field measurements of a first generation TGV, undertaken a quarter of a century ago.

5.4 Inconsistency re ground attenuation: As noted in 5.3 above, the stated sound propagation model is empirically derived and contains a ground attenuation term that is independent of ground condition. On the other hand, the statement is made, in 1.1.10, that the sound propagation model includes (amongst other things) “ground cover types”. If the underlying equations do not include a “ground cover type” term, how can the predictions take it into account?

6) Noise Mitigation

While much of Annex D2 is devoted to describing the development of the models for representing the noise sources, there is no section describing the development of the models representing noise mitigation measures (barriers and earth bunds etc). 

Almost as an afterthought, there is a graph (Figure 11) slipped into section 1.3 (Limitations and Sensitivity Tests) showing the speed-dependence of noise attenuation for a 3m high barrier for both TSI-compliant and HS2 trains (1.3.12 refers).

Confusingly, the speed-dependence is detailed for a distance from the track of 150m, which is six times the distance for the reference sound levels (which are defined at 25m). The

illustrated attenuation values are therefore a combination of barrier attenuation and of attenuation, due to distance, as given by the expressions of 1.3.16. A quick calculation shows the distance effect to be 9dB so barrier insertion loss (in SEL terms) can be inferred by subtracting 9dB from the values given. I have not examined the resultant value for consistency with other published work.

Many communities along the route have been offered noise mitigation equivalent to a 3m-high noise absorbing barrier. The noise maps and individual receptor noise levels given elsewhere in the ES, where noise mitigation is proposed, will be critically dependent on the noise barrier performance. Nowhere in Annex D2 is this addressed. As a result, there is no possibility for Parliament (or anyone else) to critically review HS2 Ltd's assumptions in this regard.

7) Disingenuous Assumptions

All the preceding sections address the representation of sound sources and the way they propagate. The end result of this work will be a prediction of the speed-dependent noise profile at any given receptor for a single train pass-by.

The principal (but not exclusive) noise assessment criterion is the 16-hour logarithmic average, LAeq,07:00-23:00. This depends principally on the number of train pass-bys, the speed of the passing train and its length.

HS2 is designed to operate at up to 18 trains per hour in each direction (i.e. 36 pass-bys per hour) at an initial service speed (where the track design permits) of 360kph. HS2 trains are 400m long, comprising two 200m units coupled together to make a 400m train -- though some services may operate as 200m units depending on demand and all 400m Classic Compatible services will have to divide before entering the classic network.

Throughout Appendix SV-001-000, HS2 Ltd has repeatedly claimed that all assessments of noise are on a “reasonable worst case basis”. By any normal interpretation, the reasonable worst case basis for operational noise prediction should be with HS2 operating at its rated service conditions; namely: 36 pass-bys per hour of 400m-long trains, travelling at 360kph (or lower if the design of the particular section of track dictates a lower maximum service speed).

This is not what HS2 Ltd has done. While they have spelled out in section 1.2 of Annex D2 what they have done, I consider many of the assumptions disingenuous and not a proper reflection of a “reasonable worst case approach”. The result of the assumptions is that the prediction of noise is not a reasonable worst case but merely an anticipated value based on an expected (year 15) pattern of use.

Amongst the most disingenuous assumptions is that 90% of train pass-bys will be at the “timetable maximum speed” of 330kph, with only 10% at the service speed of 360kph (1.2.10). Timetables change regularly and, additionally, it will be the high speed sections of track where time will be made up for all services that have experienced delays.  Using 330kph is not, in my mind, assuming a reasonable worst case.

By using the year 15 service pattern, only one section of the route is assumed to operate at 18 trains per hour in each direction (Euston to Birmingham Interchange). All other route

sections will have the noise assessed for use at below capacity. People living near to route sections, where below-capacity train usage has been used for sound mapping, will be misled and, potentially, exposed to noise increases in future if the service pattern is changed in a way that utilises the available capacity more fully. The 15 year service pattern has additionally been used to define a mix of 200m vs 400m trains and a mix of HS2 trains vs TSI-compatible trains. 10% of pass-bys are assumed to be TSI-compatible but no information is given about how many pass-bys have been assumed to be 200m long trains and how many 400m long. As in the previous paragraph, any change towards a better utilisation of available capacity – e.g. by running 400m trains where a 200m train has been assumed, will result in people along the affected section of the route being exposed to higher noise levels than predicted.

A potential inconsistency exists in that the assumed 10% TSI-compatible content translates to 2 trains per hour in each direction on the most heavily used section. This section also carries all traffic to Europe via the HS1/HS2 link which, at year 15, is speculated could be 3 trains per hour in each direction. If trains to/from Europe are only TSI compatible then, in principle, the figure for TSI-compatible trains is 3 out of 18 (17%). NB: If travel to/from the continent proves to be more popular than anticipated then there is a real possibility that a greater number of TSI-compatible trains (which have a higher noise profile than HS2 trains) will travel over the HS2 track than has been assumed (though, in this case, a speed limitation could be applied so that TSI-compatible trains do not exceed the noise level produced by HS2 trains at the normal service speed).

A further, to my mind disingenuous, assumption is to factor into the noise calculations the overlap of the 07:00 to 23:00 16 hour “averaging” period with the end-of-day service taper-off that commences at 21:00. This has the effect of lowering the “average” noise level relative to peoples' actual experience, over the shorter 14 hour interval, ending at 21:00, for which the train pass-by rate is at the scheduled rate.

Sensitivities to many of the above assumptions are included in section 1.3 of Annex D2 but I consider it an unreasonable expectation for Parliament and the public-at-large to try and work out for themselves what might be a realistic worst case – HS2 Ltd should have done this!!

8) Conclusions

The operational air-borne sound levels for Phase One (and potentially for Phase Two) of HS2 have been calculated using methods described in Volume 5, technical appendix SV-001-000, Annex D2, that give cause for concern.

My assessment of the description of the methods employed shows them to contain errors and omissions as well as dubious assumptions, misleading statements and questionable practices. Taken together, these will most likely have resulted in environmental noise predictions that significantly understate the likely real impact of HS2 on affected communities.

Because problems exist at the fundamental level of noise source representation, all calculations will be affected and the resultant impacts will be route wide.

As a priority, Parliament must commission a detailed independent expert review of the air-borne sound assessment methodology that has been developed by HS2 Ltd and an

independent assessment made of the likely errors and uncertainties in the published results.

Although not examined here, the doubts raised regarding the assessment of airborne sound means that the methodology used for assessment of ground-borne sound and vibration, as detailed in Annex D1 of Appendix SV-001-000, has to be considered equally suspect and should be included in the independent expert review.

Parliament should not approve HS2 until it has assured itself that it has accurate and meaningful environmental noise information on which to base its decisions.

A ppendix 3 – Property Compensation 3.1

Experience relating to property sales in Ingestre and Tixall

Introduction:

The information below has been gathered from direct contact with local residents and on-line searches – principally from Zoopla and RightMove. Data was collected in early February 2016. It is as correct as it has been possible to ascertain and is presented in good faith as examples of the local experience with property sales.

On-line searches were conducted by Post Code, all within ST18, using 0RE, 0PZ, 0ZF and 0RG for Ingestre and 0XJ, 0XN and 0XT for Tixall. Only properties from Ingestre and Tixall within 1 km of the confirmed route for Phase 2a of HS2 were considered.

The examples gathered have been assigned to one of the four following categories:

1. Property sales completed since the announcement of the Phase 2 Initial Preferred Route (IPR) in January 2013.

2. Properties which are advertised for sale but which are currently unsold.3. Properties which owners have attempted to sell but who have given up through lack of

interest from potential buyers and withdrawn them from the market.4. Properties which have never been put on the market but whose owners have actively

sought a professional valuation of their property.

No specific attempt has been made to determine homeowners who are, or have been, in contact with HS2 Ltd in respect of claims for assistance under the Exceptional Hardship Scheme (EHS). Where mention of EHS is made in the examples below, this is with the agreement of the owners involved.

The views of housing market specialists; estate agents, property surveyors, conveyancing agencies etc has not been sought – this is an entirely community-focused exercise.

Examples are presented in a standardised format, comprising: Property identifier, Category (as defined above), Distance from HS2 (approximate only – measured from the centreline of the route) and Commentary. Actual properties are not identified.

Examples from Category 1 (properties sold):

Property A: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 470m.

Sold in July 2014, for an undisclosed sum, to HS2 Ltd under EHS. This property had been on the market since before the IPR for Phase 2 was announced. Reasons for acceptance under EHS were compelling and the owners were relieved (but emotionally drained) at the outcome. The property is now rented.

Property B: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 440m.

Sold in June 2013 for £180k, through private offer, having been valued at £240k prior to going to auction (i.e property was sold at 25% below the pre-auction valuation). Purchaser knowingly used HS2 as leverage.

Property C: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 630m.

Sold in March 2015 for £585k, in desperation, after having been continuously on the market (and empty for much of the time) since 2012. Property was originally acquired for £720k in Sept 2008 and, based on Halifax house price inflation indexing5, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q3/2008 and Q1/2015, would have been expected to be worth £762k at the time of sale. Effective loss in value is 23%. See notes at end of examples.

Property D: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 680m.

5 Part of suite of Lloyds Banking Group house price calculation tools, available here.

Originally placed on the market in 2012, prior to announcement of HS2, at £460k, with an expectation of sale at £425k - £430k based on real market value. Property was withdrawn from sale following the announcement of HS2. The following year (2013), it was re-advertised with a different agent, at the reduced asking price of £395k (i.e. roughly 10% below originally expected sale price). After little interest, even at this reduced value, the owner “walked away” in desperation, accepting an offer of £335k, in July 2014, in order to secure a sale. This was nearly £100k below the pre-HS2 realistic valuation, corresponding to an effective loss in value of 22%.

Property E: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 640m.

Sold in April 2015 for £500k. This is the same as the value paid by the owners when they bought in April 2005. Based on Halifax house price inflation indexing, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q2/2005 and Q2/2015, this property would have been expected to be worth £561k at the time of sale. Effective loss in value is 11%. See notes at end of examples.

Property F: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 620m.

Sold in June 2015 for £290k after being competitively priced for a quick sale (see NB). This property was originally acquired for £272k in July 2002 and, based on Halifax house price inflation indexing, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q3/2002 and Q2/2015, would have been expected to be worth £462k at the time of sale. Effective loss in value is 37%. See notes at end of examples. NB: The blighting effect of HS2 was exacerbated by other factors.

Property G: Category 1; Distance from HS2: 630m.

Sold October 2015 for £342k. This property was originally acquired for £314k in March 2010 and, based on Halifax house price inflation indexing, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q1/2010 and Q4/2015, would have been expected to be worth £351k at the time of sale. Effective loss in value is 3%. See notes at end of examples.

Property H: Category 1/3; Distance from HS2: 670m (average value spread across 10 units).

This is a multiple-unit barn conversion development that commenced before the announcement of HS2. Eight out of ten terraced units have been sold as new build. Two (units 5 & 6) remain unsold and have been withdrawn from the market. Two units have been re-sold in the period since January 2013: Nos 8 & 9, both in October 2013; No 8 for £285k and No 9 for £222.5k. Within the time available for this study, it has not been able to pin down specifics related to these two sales, however the following observations can be made: i) the asking price for the unsold units, before withdrawal from sale, was “Offers in excess of £290k”; ii) average market value of the other units prior to HS2, worked out using the Halifax house price inflation index calculation tool, is £281k. This implies that No 8 was sold with no obvious impact of HS2 while No 9 appears to have been sold with a 20% reduction against the average. See notes at end of examples.

Examples from Category 2 (Properties on the market but currently unsold):

Property I: Category 2; Distance from HS2: 460m.

This property was initially put on the market in October 2014 with an asking price of £275k. It did not sell and, eventually, the property was withdrawn from the market. In November 2015, circumstances dictated that the property was re-advertised, this time at a reduced asking price of £260k. Some interest has been shown but, on more than one occasion, this interest has evaporated the moment the proximity to HS2 was discovered. Recently, a formal offer was made at the asking price but was subsequently withdrawn because of HS2. The property remains unsold. It is understood that the owner is now considering an EHS application. See notes at end of examples.

Property J: Category 2; Distance from HS2: 470m.

This property was valued at £375k in August 2009 when the owners originally contemplated selling. Before it was sold, it was withdrawn from the market. In December 2015, the property was re-advertised but, because of HS2, was offered with a reduced asking price of £350k. Based on Halifax house price inflation indexing, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q3/2009 and Q4/2015, the pre-HS2 (2009) value of £375k would

have been expected to have grown to £434k. The current asking price is therefore 20% below the expected (unblighted) market value. See notes at end of examples.

Property K: Category 2; Distance from HS2: 700m.

This property was bought for £485k in November 2003 and, based on Halifax house price inflation indexing, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q4/2003 and Q4/2015, would be expected to be worth £622k at the present time. The owner has been trying to sell since before 2013. It is currently advertised at £575k. Loss in value at asking price is 23%. See notes at end of examples.

Property L: Category 2; Distance from HS2: 600m.

Recently (Jan 2016) put on the market with an asking price of £250k. At the time of writing, there is no further information on this property.

Property M: Category 2; Distance from HS2: 670m.

This property was put up for sale in February 2014 for £460k. After remaining unsold for more than 18 months, in October 2015, a prospective buyer came forward, prepared to pay the asking price. It turned out the the purchaser was unaware of HS2 until the day that contracts were to be exchanged. Having been informed of HS2 by their solicitor the purchaser withdrew. This was a devastating setback to the owner. The property was immediately put back on the market at a revised asking price of £450k. The property remains unsold. It is understood that the owner is now pursuing an EHS application.

Property N: Category 2; Distance from HS2: 930m.

This property was placed on the market in April 2015 with an asking price of £320k. It remains unsold. It was purchased by the owners in August 2001 for £206k. Using the Halifax house price inflation indexing tool, for a property in the West Midlands area, a value of £206k in Q3/2001 corresponds to £412k in Q4/2015. It would appear that this property is

being offered for sale at roughly 22% below the expected open market price. See notes at end of examples.

Examples from Category 3 (Unsuccessful previous attempts to sell):

Property O: Category 3; Distance from HS2: 660m.

On-line searches show that this property was advertised for sale with an asking price of £340k, effective from April 2014. It failed to sell and has subsequently been withdrawn from the market (date of withdrawal not found).

Property P: Category 3; Distance from HS2: 450m.

Following the announcement of HS2, the owners wanted to move away and, in March 2014, put the property on the market with an asking price of £360k. There was little interest. In July 2014, at the recommendation of their estate agent, they lowered the asking price to £330k. This attracted a potential purchaser and a sale was agreed at an offer value of £320k. Regrettably, the purchaser was refused a loan by their mortgage provider, who cited the proximity of HS2 as the reason for the rejection of a loan. The sale collapsed. In frustration and annoyance, the owners withdrew the property from the market, moved away and placed the property in the hands of agents to rent it out. It is now successfully rented.

Property Q: Category 3; Distance from HS2: 690m.

On-line searches show that this property was placed on the market in December 2014, with an asking price of £395k. No sale was achieved and, in 2015 it was withdrawn from the market.

Property R: Category 3; Distance from HS2: 640m.

On-line searches show that his property was placed on the market in May 2011, with an asking price of £285k. No sale was achieved and, in 2015 it was withdrawn from the market.

Property S: Category 3; Distance from HS2: 680m.

This property was the subject of a failed attempt to engage with HS2 re EHS. It was put on the market in early 2015 for £350k as pre-qualification for EHS. In October 2015 a private buyer made an offer of £290k. In the interests of achieving a quick settlement this offer was accepted,– only for the sale to collapse due to complications, including HS2. Engagement with HS2 re EHS proved traumatic and insensitive which eventually resulted in withdrawal from the EHS process. The property remained unsold and is no longer on the market. NB: This property was originally acquired for £340k in November 2009 and, based on Halifax house price inflation indexing, using the regional average for the West Midlands between Q4/2009 and Q4/2015, would have been expected to be worth £393k at the time of the failed sale. Had the sale gone through at £290k, the effective loss in value would have been 26%. See notes at end of examples.

Example from Category 4 (Separate private valuation):

Property T: Category 4: Distance from HS2: 400m.

The owner engaged two estate agents to each give two valuations for the property: one an open-market unblighted value and the other taking into account HS2. The unblighted value was £650k, while the blighted value was £525k. This corresponds to a reduction in value of 20% due to HS2.

Notes:

Where use has been made of the Halifax house price inflation tool, it is important to note that this uses the average regional trend in house prices and will not capture local effects. At an individual property level, considerable deviation from the average may occur depending on such factors as the amount of investment in the

property by the owner (both positive, in terms of refurbishment/extensions etc., and negative, in terms of neglect/lack-of-maintenance etc.) and other externally imposed factors. No attempt has been made to correct for such factors.

Property sale values and headline asking prices, when marketing, are strongly dependent on personal circumstances. Some properties might be priced for a quick sell (thus understating the true market value) while others might be deliberately priced high on an opportunistic basis and/or to provide a negotiating margin (thus overstating the true market value).

A particular complication arises from the fact that for anyone contemplating assistance from HS2 Ltd, through EHS (or the proposed follow-on scheme NTS), a precondition of both schemes is that an attempt is made to sell the property at the realistic, unblighted, open-market price. Property owners intending to engage with HS2 in this way will inevitably be disadvantaged compared with others wishing to move and whose circumstances allow them to market their property at a competitive value, taking the effect of blight into account. Except where owners volunteered the information, no attempt has been made to differentiate those that are being marketed with EHS in mind as opposed to those that are not.

Summary and Conclusions:

Information has been gathered on 20 properties in Ingestre and Tixall, all lying within 1km of the route of HS2 Phase 2a, whose owners have actively sought to market/sell their homes since Phase 2 was announced in January 2013. This represents 20% of the residential properties within that distance.

The blight due to HS2 is seen to be extensive and widespread, with many owners experiencing a loss in value in excess of 20%. The blighting effect extends well out towards the 1km limit used in this study.

An important observation is that many of those seeking to sell appear to be prepared to accept the financial loss imposed on them by HS2, without seeking help through EHS.

The extent of engagement with HS2 Ltd on EHS has not been fully determined but appears to be quite low. As far as has been ascertained, there has been only one successful EHS application in the period up to February 2016.

The views, concerns and aspirations to sell of the “silent majority” – i.e. the remaining 80% of residents living within 1km of the route, are undetermined.

Appendix 3 – Property Compensation – 3.2

HS2 Phase Two: West Midlands to Crewe, Property Consultation 2015

Response by Ingestre with Tixall Parish Council

c/o Dr A Andrews, Parish Clerk

2 The Hanyards, Tixall, Stafford ST18 0XY

e-mail: tixandrews@madasafish.com

Introduction

Tixall and Ingestre are rural parishes, set in tranquil estate parkland, located approximately 5km east of the town of Stafford. We have a combined resident population of approximately 400.

The parishes are directly affected by the proposals for Phase Two of HS2 (Birmingham to Manchester leg) and are located on the section of route, between Fradley and Crewe, now designated as Phase 2a, which is the subject of this consultation.

The Parish Council is opposed to HS2 but wants to make sure that, should it proceed, the impacts of construction and operation of HS2 are minimised and that residents who are adversely affected are properly and fairly compensated.

Question 1: We believe that the compensation and assistance schemes that are available for Phase One of HS2 are also suitable for those living along the Phase 2a (West Midlands to Crewe) section of HS2. Are there any circumstances which you think should be considered to make the proposed schemes more suitable for the Phase 2a section of HS2? Please provide as much detail as possible.

1.1 The Parish Council has previously responded to both the HS2 Property Consultation, 2013 and the HS2 Property Consultation, 2014.

1.2 We are deeply concerned that our views, along with those of the majority of other respondents, have been disregarded and that the Government has put in place on Phase 1, proposals that fail to provide adequate compensation for those adversely affected by HS2.

1.3 We are now advised that it is the Government's intention to impose the same inadequate compensation and assistance schemes on Phase 2a. Because the compensation and assistance schemes for Phase 1 are inadequate to start with, the basis of the current consultation is flawed. Changes to the proposals are required, with any changes arising from this consultation being applied not only to Phase 2a but also retrospectively to Phase 1. Our detailed comments on the current proposals are given in the following paragraphs:

1.4 The proposals for Express Purchase are considered acceptable and we welcome the decision to launch this component immediately; i.e. prior to consultation.

1.5 We welcome also the provision of Homeowner Protection. However, the exclusions set out at paragraph 5.2.9 of the consultation document are incompatible with the objective of the scheme as set out at paragraph 5.2.8. Clause 5.2.9 should be deleted.

1.6 The proposals for Rent Back appear broadly sensible. Annex B of the consultation document makes clear that, in order for the seller to rent back their property, the Government must first assess the property and bring it up to the minimum legal standards for renting. We ask that the Government arranges, where possible, for there to be continuity of occupancy during this process. To the families involved, the property will still be the family home, even if the legal title has changed. This transition needs to be handled with care and sensitivity and, wherever possible, be achieved without requiring participants to temporarily move out of their home with all or part of their possessions – only for the move to be reversed upon commencement of the rental agreement.

1.7 In previous consultation responses, we registered our concerns about the use of a Rural Support Zone (RSZ); favouring a Property Bond instead. We objected to the Government's proposal for a fixed limit for the RSZ of 120m because it is too small and ignores the real effects of topology and characteristics of the line on the distribution of blight. On the Alternative Cash Offer, we considered 10% of the property value to be too little to significantly reduce the number of property owners in the RSZ who apply for Voluntary Purchase. We restate these views and ask that the Government yet again reconsider their proposals for the RSZ, along the lines previously indicated.

1.8 As noted at paragraph 1.9.1 below, under current proposals, there are no properties in our Parish that lie within the RSZ and only a very few are in the Homeowner Payment (HOP) Zones. As a result, nearly all the parishioners who are adversely affected by HS2 only have recourse to help via the Need to Sell Scheme (NTS).

1.9 We ask that both HOP and NTS schemes are reviewed and revised, taking into account the following observations based on the current proposals:

1.9.1 Within the parish, there is one property in the safeguarded zone, none in the Rural Support Zone and just seven in the Homeowner Payment Zone. Of the latter, only three of these are owner-occupied (two in HOP Zone 2 and 1 in HOP Zone 3); the remainder are rented.

1.9.2 As a result, under the discretionary parts of the scheme, a paltry £37,500 in total will be paid out to just three households who happen to live within 300m of the line. Additionally, none of the payments are in the form of compensation but, instead, are what is cynically described as: “ an early share in the benefits of the scheme”. To offer a few thousand pounds to a minority of the property owners who have seen the value of their properties fall by tens of thousands, in some cases by more than a hundred thousand pounds, is an insult. HOP should be abandoned or substantially upgraded.

1.9.3 There are over 100 properties, representing over half the population of the parish, within 1km of the route that are seriously affected by blight as a result of HS2. The only recourse, if any of these owners wish to move without incurring a significant financial loss, is currently the Exceptional Hardship Scheme (EHS) – which is to be replaced in late Spring 2016 by the Need to Sell scheme (NTS) following analysis of the responses to the present consultation.

1.9.4 As evidence of the impact of HS2, we submit, at Annex 1, a commentary on the experience of some of the home-owners from within the parish who have attempted to market their properties since the announcement of the Phase 2 Initial Preferred Route (IPR) in January 2013.

1.9.5 Generalised blight due to HS2 was immediate and severe from the moment that the IPR for Phase 2 was announced three years ago. Even with the proposed acceleration by six years of Phase 2a, commercial operation will not commence until the end of 2027, with eligibility for compensation under Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act commencing one year later, at the end of 2028. If the Government is correct that generalised blight is temporary and will evaporate once the railway is in operation, this still means that residents close to Phase 2a will have had to endure 16 years of blight and, for approximately half that time, the additional disruption arising from the construction of the railway, during which the blight will intensify.

1.9.6 Residents living close to the remaining parts of Phase 2, which are not scheduled to be completed until 2033, will experience blight for over 20 years.

1.9.7 In the UK, changing family needs and/or work-related factors results in the median interval between families moving home being 8 years6. Hence, compared with the 16/20 year period of blight caused by HS2, many families affected by HS2 will find that they are unable to move, at the normal time of their choosing, without incurring a substantial financial penalty. In this respect, we consider that the Government is being disingenuous in describing the blight caused by HS2 as “temporary”, when “temporary” extends up to 20 years (a whole generation!) and is two or more times the median residency time. Under present proposals, the Government will only intervene in exceptional circumstances to help those trapped. This is further discussed below.

1.9.8 The Parish Council, along with the majority of respondents to previous property consultations, strongly supported a Property Bond scheme as a means to ease the problems highlighted at 1.9.7. The Government rejected this and, instead, made only minor adjustments to EHS, re-branding it as NTS, and introducing Homeowner Payments. None of the changes have provided any meaningful relief to the problem of blight: the Homeowner payments being too small, too tightly confined and having no relationship to the blight experienced, while evidence from the initial operation of NTS on Phase 17 shows that its complex, intrusive and adversarial procedures have resulted in little uptake and caused considerable frustration, annoyance and distress.

1.9.9 Consequent on 1.9.8, it is imperative that the Government takes action to address the shortcomings of the present proposals. In this respect, and in the light of the observation at paragraph 1.8 above, this means changing the NTS scheme. As has been stated in previous consultations (and referred to at 1.9.8 above), the preferred solution is abandonment of NTS in favour of a Property Bond scheme. If the Government is resolute in not pursuing this option, in spite of the widespread support for it and the low cost to Government, then it is the NTS operating criteria that need revision.

1.9.10 With regard to NTS, we commend and support the observations and recommendations of the Phase 1 Hybrid Bill Select Committee as set out in their report2. With reference to that report, we make the following specific points as being of particular relevance to our Parish:

1. Whilst the Government's view is that NTS is performing well8, paragraph 4 of

6 ONS Social Trends: Housing – ST417 High Speed Rail (London – West Midlands) Bill Select Committee, First Special Report of Session 2015-16, published 17 December 2015.8 DfT Report on the Performance of the Need to Sell Scheme – Early Trends, dated November 2015

ref [2] points out the abysmally low take-up rate, citing that: “many people who should probably be applying still find the scheme off-putting by its sheer complexity.” We note that there have been only 116 applications over 10 months out of a potential of 43,000 properties that lie within 500m of the Phase 1 route. The extent of blight is known to extend much further (ref [3] indicates that 20% of successful NTS applications lie further out than 800m) but, even so, out of 43,000 properties within 500m, ref [1] would suggest that roughly 10% (4,300) would have been expected to change hands during the 10 month period. The figure of 116 applications (of which 45 have been accepted) represents just 0.27% of the property sales that would be expected in a normally operating housing market. Hence, it is clear that NTS is not helping most of the people that are adversely affected by HS2. We therefore urge the Government to simplify the NTS scheme and revise the acceptance criteria to better achieve: “the availability and fairness of the means of redress for reductions in property value” that is required (clause 4.1.2 of the consultation document refers).

2. Many of our parishioners who are trapped in their homes are elderly. We fully support the view, at paragraph 8 of ref [2], that “Age and Stage” should suffice as a compelling reason to sell, and concur with the statement: “Neither a couple nor a person alone should be required to stay on in a large home when previously resident children have become non-resident adults. It will often be right for homeowners in such positions to be able to sell without having to go to any length to demonstrate their inability to sustain home running costs. Applicants should not have to show that they will be penniless in order to demonstrate an “unreasonable burden”. Retirement is as acceptable a reason to move as is a new job.”

3. We are concerned about and share the view of the Committee expressed in ref [2] that: “financial scrutiny is excessively intrusive” (paragraph 16) and that there has been: “an over-zealous approach to seeking medical evidence” (paragraph 17).

4. At paragraph 18 of ref [2], we especially welcome the observation that: “where local estate agents have a policy of insisting on up-front fees for marketing because of HS2, that should normally be assumed to be a sufficient indication of blight to meet the criterion on failure to market successfully.” Requesting up-front fees is a practice that local residents have encountered and we therefore endorse the view of the Committee that the NTS guidelines be amended to make clear that the charging by estate agents of up-front fees is sufficient evidence that a property is blighted and would not sell if marketed at the unblighted open market price.

5. A significant number of the residential properties in the parish, which are affected by HS2, are rented and not owner-occupied. We are seriously concerned that the proposed property compensation schemes are restricted to owner-occupiers. Under the current schemes the only concession to the rental sector is to accept the category of “reluctant landlords”, where previous owner-occupiers have been compelled to move away but been unable to sell and have had to resort to renting the property in order: “to avoid a situation of unreasonable burden.”  This has left the bulk of the rental sector out in the cold. Yet, for many landlords, these properties are key sources of income and/or represent capital set aside to support future needs.  They, too, are negatively affected by HS2 because of potentially reduced rental income

and/or loss of capital value of the property.  We note the observation, by the Select Committee, at paragraph 24 of ref [2], that although the effect of HS2 on rental property may be different from that on freehold property, there is still an impact. We therefore welcome and support the statement by the Committee that: “we would like the Department to look at whether exceptions or provisions should be made to the overall approach on rented properties”. We urge the Government to take this request on board.

6. We note the Committee's conclusion, at paragraph 29, that; “There remains some disparity between the aspirations for the scheme and the way it is actually working.” and urge the Government to address and rectify the points raised by the Committee. Particular attention should be paid to those points highlighted above.

1.10 Clause 4.2.3 of the consultation document states: “ It is not the purpose of this consultation to invite comments on the Compensation Code or the statutory blight regime .” Nevertheless, we restate our view as first expressed in our response to the 2013 Property Consultation: “All parts of the present compensation proposals default to statutory compensation under Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, 12 months after the scheme becomes operational. This act is outdated and not fit for purpose in the 21st century. The Government should thoroughly overhaul this act and include within its provisions the means for addressing general property blight due to all causes (not just physical effects such as noise, dust, vibration etc.).” It remains our view that this legislation needs to be fully revised and updated, and brought into force before Phase 1 of HS2 is completed.

1.11 It is now known to us that revision of legislation that surrounds the Compensation Code has been an aspiration of Government for at least 15 years but that successive administrations have failed to allocate Parliamentary time to it. That this is the case is brought to our attention by the evidence brought before the HS2 Phase 1 Hybrid Bill Select Committee by the Country Land and Business Association (CLA). Details were given as part of the presentation to the Committee by Mr Richard Honey, Counsel for petitioners (CLA), on Monday 17 November 2014. The full transcript can be found here. Paragraphs 22 through 36 provide a pertinent summary of the situation as it stood at that date. These paragraphs are reproduced at Annex 2. NB: Even though emphasis is placed on those parts of the Compensation Code of importance to members of the CLA, revision of the code is equally of importance to residential property owners.

1.12 We recognise that there are many complex issues that need to be addressed in any revision of compensation law. The current Compensation Code is a collective term describing principles that are derived from Acts of Parliament and case law that go back over centuries and this makes consolidating and updating the code difficult. Nevertheless it is a responsibility of Government to ensure that legislation is fit for purpose in the present era and it should not hold back from addressing difficult cases. HS2 has highlighted many problems with the present system. The Government must bite the bullet and act now to rework the Compensation Code as requested by us, the CLA and many others.

Question 2: What are your views on the proposed boundary of the Rural Support Zone (RSZ) at the south side of the A500? Please provide any alternative proposals and as much detail as possible.

2.1 We found this question opaque. Only after clarification had been obtained from HS2 Ltd, was it determined that the question referred to the proposal to make the A500 at Crewe the boundary between “urban” to the north and “rural” to the south.

We have no opinion on this point.

Conclusions:

3.1 The main compensation packages for properties outside the safeguarded zone are inadequate.

3.2 The geographical distribution of residents in the Parish is such that over half the resident population lives within 1km of the route and is adversely affected by HS2. The only scheme available to most of these people is the NTS scheme, the provisions of which are overly restrictive.

3.3 We join with the Phase 1 Hybrid Bill Select Committee in calling for a radical overhaul of NTS.

3.4 Even though the present consultation does not seek views on aspects of statutory compensation, we restate our position that the Government must bring forward legislation to make statutory compensation law fit for the 21st century.

End

Annex 2

Extract from Evidence to the HS2 Phase 1 Hybrid Bill Select Committee

Relating to Statutory Compensation

The extract below is taken from the uncorrected transcript of the oral evidence to the Phase 1 Hybrid Bill Select Committee9, presented by Mr Richard Honey, Counsel for petitioners, Country Land and Business Association (CLA), on Monday, 17 November 2014:

Mr Honey speaking:

22. Now the issues, sir, that we raise, are not new, we have been looking at them for quite some time. The CLA and the NFU jointly produced a report in 1996 that dealt with the compulsory purchase and compensation system and many of the issues that we raise today were raised in that report as well. And we raise them again, because they’ve been unresolved, despite it being recognised that there are serious problems. And they include blight, accommodation works, dispute resolution, a way of dealing with complaints, the Crichel Down rules, to do with surplus land, advanced payments and interest. All of those are issues that we’ll be raising before the Committee. And we have many years of experience of dealing with those in practice; the statutory regime, how it works in practice reflected through our members, and projects up and down the country, and, of course, experience of the unfairness that results from the operation of the current statutory regime, frankly how it doesn’t operate properly in practice. So, that need for change we say, undoubtedly exists, and it has been recognised by Government repeatedly, over the last 15 years or so, but nothing has been done, due effectively to competing priorities, not because it wasn’t thought that something needed to happen.

23. So, that need for change, that’s been recognised over the last 15 years or so, remains and is now frankly more acute than ever, given the HS2 project and the impacts that it will have. And this is something that we have been stressing repeatedly in relation to HS2. We published a report in 2012, called Fair Play which set out what was required to make the compulsory purchase and compensation system fair, and indeed, we produced a manifesto for HS2 more recently which set out what we said needed to change in order to create fairness, so the issues that we raise today have been foreshadowed in those documents and they won’t be new to HS2.

9 Full title: House of Commons High Speed Rail Committee on the HIGH SPEED RAIL (LONDON – WEST MIDLANDS) BILL

24. There have been some discussions between the CLA and HS2 and other Government departments but frankly, there’s been less engagement than we would have hoped for, and as usual, from HS2, we’ve had some draft assurances provided at the last minute, as usual, again, they are caveated, qualified and general in their terms, and they go no way near meeting the concerns that we have, hence our need to present our case to the Committee today and tomorrow.

25. I want to address a particular point now, sir, if I may, which is why changes need to be made to the regime for compulsory purchase and compensation, in relation to HS2. It is a unique infrastructure project inasmuch as it will have undeniably major impacts in areas that will see no benefit at all, because they are so far removed from the stations. That’s not the case with CTRL – it may be that Mr Green will be able to tell you more about that later, but Kent had stations at Ashford and Ebbsfleet and therefore, although it took the brunt of the impact, also saw the benefit of it. That is simply not the case with HS2; on any analysis, the rural areas between London and Birmingham, will have to grapple with the very large effects of HS2, with no local benefits coming at all.

26. Early on in the process of developing HS2, The Secretary of State recognised that HS2 was a special case in relation to compulsory purchase and compensation. Going back as far as July 2012, Justine Greening, the Secretary of State, said in a written statement, that her intention, ‘Is to deliver a generous compensation package for those affected by the route which goes over and above the minimum required by law’. And she went on to say, ‘We’ve committed to going above and beyond the statutory requirements for property compensation’. And that’s something that’s been repeated since; Simon Burns, as Transport Minister, for example, in the preparation bill debate in July 2013, said, ‘The Government are committed to establishing a fair and general package of compensation for property owners affected by the scheme’, and he said that the Government wants to do as much as it can to minimise problems and to seek to help people, so the position is, sir, that the Government has accepted the principle that the current statutory regime is simply not good enough to deal properly with the effects of HS2, because it is such a unique project, and indeed, it remains common ground that changes to the statutory regime need to be made for HS2.

27. Most recently, Robert Goodwell said in the HS2 compensation debate in October, where, sir, I think you were present to hear it, and I’ll quote if I may, ‘Although the Government remain confident that reliance on the existing compensation code is appropriate for the majority of infrastructure schemes, we believe that the exceptional nature of the HS2 project justifies a different approach’. Now, the Government have long been committed to introducing measures for those directly affected by HS2 that go beyond what is required by

law. So, the minister has said – recognised, that it is necessary to go beyond the current statutory regime for compulsory purchase and compensation, in order to ensure that it is fair, as far as HS2 is concerned. The question for the Committee to consider is whether the bill provisions, the information papers and the like achieve this. We say that it doesn’t, and that there is more for the promoters of this scheme to do, in order to achieve those objectives which minsters have set out repeatedly over recent years.

28. I will briefly sketch, if I may, the history of how law reform proposals in this area have panned out over the years. In the 1990s, the Government commissioned research on the operation of the compulsory purchase and compensation regime, and that fed into something that was called the Compulsory Purchase Policy Review Advisory Group, which was made up of industry experts, together with Government representatives, covering all areas of compulsory purchase and compensation. They produced a report which was published by DETR, as it then was in July 2000, called, ‘A Fundamental Review of the Laws and Procedures Relating to Compulsory Purchase and

Compensation’. There was also published at the same time, a separate research project into the Crichel Down rules. Following that, the then minister, who was Nick Raynsford, in July 2000, said that that research had confirmed the Government’s suspicions that the Crichel Down rules were not working well.

29. Following that, there were proposals by DTLR as they were at that time in 2001, for change. DTLR recognised, and I quote, ‘The current arrangements for the payment of compensation are convoluted, heavily dependent on case law and not always fair and consistent in their application’. And that, sir, is as true now, as it was then.

30. They said then, that there was a need for major changes, and the way that it was proposed to deal with that was through a Law Commission project. Now that stage, DTLR committed to giving effect to the Law Commission recommendations, and they said, in fact, that it would be brought before Parliament at the earliest opportunity, but sir, as I’ll explain in a second, that the Law Commission recommendations were shelved rather than being implemented, they were kicked, if I can put it this way, into the longest of long grass.

31. But notwithstanding that, things continued – at the time, in 2002, the Government published a policy statement which was linked to the planning green paper then, where ODPM, the next iteration of the relevant Government department at that time, accepted that compulsory purchase powers were not always fair to those people whose property was affected. One of the issues that they raised at the time, was capital gains tax, which I’ll mention just very briefly if I may, because this is an issue that the NFU are dealing with,

primarily. At that stage ODPM recognised that all unavoidable additional taxes should be reimbursed in full. But that, in relation to capital gains tax remains unaddressed. It echoed what had been said by DTLR in 2001 as well, when the Government said compensation should include any additional taxation that arose as a result of compulsory purchase, including capital gains tax. Now we, sir, have put before the Committee our proposals for capital gains tax in relation to compulsory purchase payments, and they are, in a nutshell, first, that the relevant statutory provision should be extended to permit rollover relief for a new asset, not just land, but a new asset, because it may be impossible for a rural business to replace land in practice, given its limited nature, and they may therefore decide to invest in the business in other ways, and it should be possible, in our view, to get rollover relief for a new asset, not just replacement land.

32. The second point is to lengthen the rollover period, to be more reasonable. We are proposing that it should run, effectively from Royal Assent through to a period of five years after payment of compensation so that it is more closely aligned, in practice, to how long the search for replacement land would take, if a rural landowner is actually lucky enough to be able to find replacement land. So, those, sir, are our proposals in relation to capital gains tax, which are set out in our solution sort document.

33. So, as far as the course of normal reform continues, we then had the Law Commission project which reported in 2003 and they recommended fundamental changes to the law of compulsory purchase and compensation. It was frankly a complete overhaul that was recommended, and the way they put things, quoting from their report in 2003, was that, ‘The current law of compulsory purchase is a patchwork of diverse rules derived from a variety of statutes and cases, over more than 100 years, which are neither accessible to those affected, nor readily capable of interpretation, save by specialists. The case for reform has been recognised for many years. In July 2000, DETR reported that the law was an, “unwieldy and lumbering preacher”’, and that, sir, still remains the position today. Because, whilst there has been some law reform in this field, it has been piecemeal, giving effect a particular small parts of those Law Commission report. And in reality, very little has changed.

34. What we raise before the Committee in our submissions in evidence, are issues where it has been recognised, for many years, that change is needed, but where it is simply not happened, and this is the opportunity, particular where HS2 is going to have the effects that it will have, for this Committee to ensure that the Secretary of State here, does what has been proposed for many years.

35. Now, following the Law Commission report in December 2005, we had a ministerial response to that, and what was said in the written statement by the minister at the time, was

that, ‘Finding legislative time for implementing the Law Commission’s proposals is not a practical proposition for the foreseeable future’. That’s the position. The only reason that was given by Government at the time for not implementing the Law Commission’s report was lack of Parliamentary time, and that has remained the position. For example, in 2009, January 2009, Hazel Blears, when she was the Secretary of State, said that she had recently responded to a letter from the Law Commission, which again, seeks primary legislation. All I can say is that there are clearly other priorities at the moment for primary legislation.

36. So, that, sir, is where the programme of reform left itself when we had the change of Government in 2010, but the commitment to reforming the law has lived on. We are still in a situation where the Government is committed to reforming the law. So, for example, in a written answer, Nick Boles, when he was the relevant minister, in April 2013, and we’ve got a copy of this that I can put up on screen for the Committee; if I can ask please for Exhibit A241 to be put up, and it’s the penultimate paragraph of A241, where the minister says, ‘We do recognise some of the problems highlighted by the report, such as advance payment and access to an easier form of dispute resolution, which we believe can be addressed through our current work on guidance and regulations’, and you’ll see there, sir, that he was responding to references to the CLA’s Fair Play Report, but also submissions made by the compulsory purchase association, who I will mention again later. And referring to it in positive terms, so the Government recognises still that these problems remain.