WWII 93rd Armored Field Artillery

8/7/2019 WWII 93rd Armored Field Artillery

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AFTER FIVE

IL. - - - ~ - J I ,iI I : "Perform the Mission at Hand",:'.1

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.. HISTORY OFTHI; 93RD ARMORI;D FIRD ARTILLI;RY BATTALION


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HISTORY COMPILED BY 1ST LIEUT. LEIF C. REINERTSEN, F.A.

'PRINTED IN GERMANY . I ? ~ U < ; : K UND EINBAND: WIL!'!. ROC;K, WEINS!'lERG


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LJ. COL. JOHN SHANKLIN IIID ~ ' D I C A T ~ D

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OUR -HON'OR(;O DEADS/Sgt John A, McWilliams, killed' in action 6' November' 1943 2nd Lt FRANK A, REID, killed in action 9 November 1943 Pvt Noah H, Dolan, killed'in action Ii 'November 1943 Tee 4 Homer- C .Couch, killed in action 18 November 1943 Tee 5' Harold Keiler, killed in action 18 November 1943 Pvt Albert J, Pittman, killed in action 18 November 1943 Pvt Paul W, Miller, killed in action 18, November ,1943 Pvt George W, Temples Sr., killed in action 18 November 1943 Tee 5 Howard W. Rector, killed in 'action 21 November 1943 Pvt William R. Carter, died of wounds 8 December 1943 Cp l Herbert B . .Ehrgott, died of wounds 5 February 1944Pvt Fred W, Apoldo, killed in action 17 February 1944 Pvt Fearonce G, LaLand, killed in action '17 February 1944 Tee 5. J


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C O N T ~ N T S


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~ O R ~ W O R D

"AFTER FIVE" brings to a close the history, of the93rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion., When ourstandards are furled and cased for the last time therewill be only this' short narrative and your memoriesto remind you of the battalion;, This history is notconcerned witli t h ~ "bigpicture", but rather is i ~ t e n d e d to preserve a memory of our days in combat.

I t is noteworthy that the 93rd A.F.A. was one of thefew self-propelled artillery battalions in the U.S, Armyengaged in combat before the invasion of France.Its employment as non-organic artillery was' evenmore exclusive in the field' of pioneering at thattime. That t h i ~ new type of American artillery provedits worth has been of great satisfaction to ,us and wecan feel justly p r o ~ d of our part in its development.

'Because . many requests have been received forcopies of "AFTER THREE", written for the battalion'by Lt. Col. Shanklin,. theorigina:l_ has been i n ~ o i p orated as a part of this narrative. In addition, rosters,pictures, and a map showing our route' of :rp.archthrough Italy,France, Germany and Austria are included as part of this history.


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I t would be difficult to recognize the .outstandinglymeritorious and brllve actions, of many individuals ill:the course of this short narative. Your deeds havebeen too 'numerous, and, where possible, have beenaccorded reward by decoration and. commendation.I t is hoped you all can enjoy sufficient tribute toyour work in the accomplishments of. the battalioncontained herein.

I cannot close' without adding my personal heartfelt 'wish that you will all be successful in your nextundertaking whether as soldiers, or civilians; and mymany, many thanks for the loyalty, cooperation, andwonderful fighting spirit contributed by each one ofyou in the destruction of our enemy.

GERMANY JAMES E.' DOWNES, JR.1945 Major


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FOREWORD(The following F o ~ e w o r d was written by'

U. Col. Shanklin for. "AFTER' THREE")

This is not the history of t ~ e 9 3 ~ d Armored F ~ e l d .Artillery Battalion. That will be written' at the' endof the war,"

. This is a brief a ~ c o u n t of the campaigns and battlesin which, the battCilion figured during i ts first year of. combat., , - ", When you read i ~ you will. not remember the discomforts, the dangers, and the deaths of your comrades; they are all a part 'of the story, it i ~ true, hl,.t~ h o s e memories are deep inside you.

You will remember that: it wasn't bad all of the,I, time, you did have some fun; you. always accomplished ypur m.ission,r

'iFRANCE JOHN SHANKLIN1944 " -- 'U;CoL'-


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* 'O,ur Status * , .The United S t a i e ~ infantry d i v i s i ~ n has' four ,organic

artillery battalions; ,three light battalions '," one fore a c ~ . rifle regiment, and one medium howitzer battalion. The ,War Department has long . r ~ c ( ) g n i z e q the"fa,ct that this is an insufficient amount of artillery tosupport the division in'ma:qy t y p ~ s of actions, Le, theassault of prepared defensive positions, river-crossiilgs,establishrrient. of beachheads, aiid' many" others. \In' addition, other artillery is needed for, speciahzedmissions, S o ~ e of these are: counter-battery fires, longrange interdiction fires, and' fires to destroy fieldfortifications,

Separate artillery ba,ttalions were formed to meetthis need. Now, with the exc'eption of the medium battalion in each division, all artillery larger than' the1 0 5 I I ~ m howitzer is organized in that manner.The case of the 93rd AFA.' is'Qnusua1.inthat it is Oneof the few separate light artillery battalions in: thearmy. In the summer of 1942 the final planning for theinvasion of N_O!!!l:_-Mri


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umns which were to be used after the landing. Theartillery of the ,6t1). Armored Division had distingui.sheditself in training and was therefore selected for thismission. In August of i942 the three ,battalions of thatdivisIon were detached therefrom. They were reassigned' to the newly-formed 6th Armored ArtilleryGroup . . . the old Division Artillery.

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and are handled tactically by the Division ArtilleryCommander.

A description of the types of missions which the93rd AFA is assigned follows:Direct Support . . . the battalion is responsible for theclose-in fires which support the attacking infantry andtanks in the advance, and for the fires which protectthe infantry and tanks from enemy counter-attack.When the battalion has this type of mission, the battalion commander works closely with the commanderof the supported troops, and forward observers movewith the commanders of the leading companies. Thisis the most difficult type of mission, but, at the sametime, i t is the most satisfying and the battalion hasalways performed in an outstanding manner in accomplishing these missions. The organic battalions ofthe division handle the direct support fires for theirinfantry. \Vhen special task forces are formed, the93rd AFA is often selected to provide the directsupport.General Support. . . the battalion, when called upon,fires in support of any unit within its range. Missionsare usually received from Division Artillery Headquarters. Forward observers are not sent out with theinfantry. A battalion OP is maintained, and the observer fires upon any observed enemy activity.Reinforcing Mission . . . the battalion reinforces the firesof a direct support battalion. Close liaison is maintained, and the observers of the direct support unitfire the 93rd AFA in addition to their own battalion.Forward observers are sometimes sent out to improvethe coordination of the fires, but this is not the rule.

I t is noted here that the mission which the battalionwas assigned at Gap, France, is not covered in the13


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textbooks published at the Field Artillery School. Thebattalion commander, in this instance, was told, "youwill prevent the enemy from moving through thepasses at Col du Larche and Mont Genevre". Thesepasses were a hundred miles apart, and Gap wasseventy-five miles from either of them. No actionresulted as the enemy did not attempt the passage.

Due to the special equipment and training of the93rd AFA, it is always remembered and called uponwhen an opportunity arises to make a bold infantryarmor thrust through the enemy. I t is during theseactions that the battalion more than justifies the expense of its equipment and training.

* Our lot *

Shortly after the disassociation from the 6th Armored Artillery Group, i t became apparent to all thatthere was no higher headquarters deeply concernedabout the welfare of the battalion. Or, if there weresuch a headquarters, its concern was never convertedinto active aid. The battalion quickly developed thehabit of looking out for itself.

The headquarters to which the battalion has beenattached have always been courteous, solicitous, andvery-nice-to-work-for. I t still remains that in mattersof all kinds of supply, in the procurement of recreatiolland rest facilities, in finding books and radios, and indoing all the little things that have to be done tomake the soldier's life in the field more bearable, thebattalion has had nothing upon which it could depend except its own resourcefulness.14


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The 93rd AFA does not begrudge this lot. On thecontrary, i t rather enjoys it. The very feeling that i tis on its own has built esprit to such a degree thatmembers of the battalion can smile patronizingly uponthe men of other units around them. " feeling somewhat sorry for them because they will never beallowed to join this exclusive club.

The past of the 93rd AFA is a very satisfying thingupon which to reflect. The battalion motto

"SUSCEPTUM PERFICE MUNUS","Perform the Mission at Hand", was always accom plished in a manner which brought highest praise fromall supported units. Those who met and fought withthe 93rd AFA in Italy, France Germany and Austriawill remember how well this battalion played its parttowards winning final victory over the enemy.

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BeforeThe 93rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was ac

tivated at Fort Knox, Kentucky on February 15, 1942.I t was an organic artillery battalion in the 6th Armored Division.

The cadre came from the older armored divisions,most of them from the 2nd Armored Division, thenstationed at Fort Benning, Georgia.

On March 15, 1942 the cadre moved from Fort Knoxto Camp Chaffee, Arkansas with the Division. Thiswas the permanent station. The fillers were receivedduring the month of April. Basic training was com menced early in May and completed in July. The 6thArmored Division was scheduled to maneuver in 1Louisiana in September. The battalion did not ac company it.

The battalion was relieved from assignment to theDivision on August 23rd and alerted for overseasmovement. This movement was delayed and, in January 1943, the 93rd AFA was placed under the com mand of the Replacement and School Command, ArmyGround Forces.

The Field Artillery School's interest in self-propelledartillery had increased after the Armored Force developed it successfully. That interest resulted in thebattalion's move to Fort Sill where it joined the listof school troops.

As a military post Fort Sill was generally disliked16


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by the members of the battalion. However, the train ing absorbed there was invaluable. In the perform ance of school requirements a great deal of firingwas done and, Service Battery not excluded, all per sonnel developed into fast and accurate gunners.

After several additional alarums and excursions the93rd AFA, at long last, closed in Camp Shanks, N.Y.on August 14, 1943 ready for overseas shipment.

The United States Naval Transport, USS Thurston,with the men of the 93rd AFA stowed safely belowdecks, slid quickly through the waters of New York'sLower Harbor on August 21st and joined a fast con voy . . . destination Oran. Landing in Oran on the sec ond of September, the battalion moved immediatelyto a stagIng area near Fleurus, Algeria.

A complete set of new combat equipment was drawnin Oran, and more than a month was spent getting i tready for action. One day of firing checked the gunsand, on October 14th, the battalion loaded on LSTs forthe voyage to Italy.

The battalion landed in Bagnoli, Italy on October23rd, moved to the Crater to bivouac, and was immediately greeted with. its first good air raid.

* * , ~ By the end of October the VI American Corps had

fought its way across the plains of Salerno, throughthe mou.ntains to the east and north, forced a crossingof the flooded Volturno River, and was pursuing theenemy who was falling back on his winter positions.The 93rd AFA was attached to the corps and, at last,occupied its first firing position near Pietravairanoon October 31, 1943.

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Th e Fi rstThe 3rd Infantry Division advanced rapidly around

the western edge of the mountain at Pietravairano,north up Highway 6, and bogged down in front ofMignano on the second of November. The battalion,in a reinforcing role with the Division, displaced twicein that time. The second position was the unforgettableone at the base of Mount Fiello. I t was in this positionthat all men learned one lesson ... if the German cansee you he can get you.

Until the sixth of December the battalion stayed atFiello, firing first for the 3rd Division, and later, forthe 36th Division. On December 2nd, the First USSpecial Service Force was committed for the first time.I t cleared the Camino hill mass in half a day. I t thenbecame possible for the battalion to advance fromFiello.

The battalion had taken many casualties at MountFiello. I t had taken them and had continued to fire allmissions for which there was a call.

The second position in the Mignano valley wasnearer to the village. On December 20th, a displace ment into the valley west of Venafro was made. Thebattalion was placed in direct support of the FSSF forthe operation at Mt. Sammucro, Mt. Majo, and Hill1109.

While supporting the Force in this operation thefires of the 93rd AFA were highly successful. On two18


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different occasions the Landsers of the 44th GermanInfantry Division raised the Geneva Convention Flagto gain time in which to evacuate their casualties. Morethan a hundred litter-loads were carried from the reverse slope of Hill 609 near Radicosa. The battalionhad fired only one volley, timefire. Again, after theForce had secured Mt. Majo the enemy launched acounterattack up a rocky draw toward the summit. Theobserver quickly brought fire into the force which wasestimated to consist of seven hundred men. Fragmentation was perfect against the solid rock walls and nota German reached the top. . . not one left the draw.

With rest for an objective, the battalion moved toGioia di Sannitica on January 12th. The rain and mudwere as wet and deep as they were at .the front, however, and little rest was possible.

* * *Mt. Trocchio, overlooking Cassino, had fallen quickly.Plans were laid to take advantage of this success immediately. The 36th Division was given the missionof establishing a bridge-head over the Rapido Riverat San Angelo, just south of Cassino. Combat Com mand B, 1st Armored Division, was held in readinessto exploit the breakthrough into the Liri Valley. The93rd AFA was attached to the Combat Command onJanuary 15th.

* * *On January 19th, the battalion moved into position

near the south end of Mt. Trocchio, a thousand yardseast of the Rapido River. From this position, the battalion was to support the crossing, then move acrossthe river when the first Bailey bridge was built.

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That night, the 36th Division crossed the river.After several days of the most bitter fighting of theItalian Campaign, they were forced to fall back underthe weight of a severe enemy counter-attack. This circumstance placed the batteries of the 93rd AFA in theMLR in that sector. Local defense and security patroling were increased accordingly.

By the end of January, the 34th Division had successfully crossed the Rapido River north of Cassino,and had taken the northern third of the village. Sniperactivity was so serious that rq.tions were brought inby tanks.

During the first week of February the Second NewZealand Corps relieved all American units in thatsector with the exception of the corps artillery battalions and Combat Command B.

The plan of attack remained the same: Second NewZealand Corps would establish the bridgehead acrossthe river and CC B would pass through and advancerapidly up the Liri Valley.

After many delays, due to bad weather which prevented the employment of the Mediterranean Strategic Airforce, on March 15th, Cassino was erased fromthe map by the heavy bombers and the New Zealanders drove forward.By last light of the first day, every ruin in Cassinohad been taken, with the exception of the ContinentalHotel. The fighting swirled back and forth for the nextten days. I t was impossible to move tanks throughthe piled debris of the broken village; it was impossible to throw the Germans back enough to allow theengineers to clear the route. The tank attack was never launched.

The failure at Cassino a reality, Combat Command20


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THE VAST AND COMPLEX HAND OF INVASION WAS LAID DOWN

"MAKE STRAIGHTWAY FOR THE BEACH"


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THE RADAR TOVvEH LfD A C/I/\Hfv!ED I.IFE

THE INFANIHY Vi AS ENCiACil:lJ IN A l lG l fJ iN 11ft PINE WOODS


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A TASK FORCE WAS IN ORDER

... THE RATIONS WERE "c "


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LONG TIME BETWEEN HAIRCUTS

. . . . BUT NOT FOR SOME


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THE /,vl0NTELlMAR DESTRUCTION WAS COMPLETE

THE MONSTER OF MONTELll'lAR


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TlIE CiERlvlAN NTII !W,\IY H h"/) {N T/\TTE/IELJ i lL \1;\' . \ , \ " [ : ,I '/ ' TilE II/ lONE \ ; \ULY

\ \ i f n l THE . ' iTINnE/I ()( T


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THE MOSELLE WAS FASTFLOWING ..

CROSSED BY COURTESY OF THE . .. TH ENGINEERS


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IN THE VOSGES VVHERE TOVl'NS HAD NAlvlES ENDING IN"MENIL" OR "RUPT"

ClfECl";'fNG COMMUNICATIONS TO CP IN IICMIl?l'.f\10NT


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B was ordered to move to the vicinity of Capua forrest.

This, then, was the end of the first . . . .

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Between One and Two IiI t is not far from Mt. Trocchio to the banks of the

Volturno River near Capua . . . not in miles. I t was amarch long in meaning for the men of the battalion.Here was the long anticipated period for rest and refitting. The battalion closed in bivouac on the twentyfifth of March in an olive grove three miles east ofCapua . . . camping grounds used long ago by Hanni bars army in another war.

On March 29, 1944 the battalion held its first cere mony in Italy. Major General Geoffrey Keyes, com manding I I Corps, presented awards to members of theunit who had distinguished themselves in combat. Inan address to the troops, General Keyes praised thecombat record of the battalion and all its membersWhen asked i f he would take a review, the generalsurprised his aides by accepting. This was the firsttime he had reviewed troops in Italy.

Training schedules were restfully light during theperiod and opportunities to visit nearby towns andplaces of historic interest were available. Many tripsto Naples were arranged but, generally speaking, TorreAnnunziata, a small coastal village near the ruins ofPompeii, was the favorite vacation spot for the mem bers of the 93rd AFA.

I t was at this time that Lt. Col. Beverley E. Powellleft the battalion to take up new duties on the starrof II Corps. Colonel Powell had trained the 93rd AFA,22


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fought i t through its first campaign, and with it achieved distinction. Both Colonel Powell and the battalionwere sorry to see the separation. Major R. J. Meeker,former executive officer, assumed command.

* * *The II Corps Artillery Section had made a thorough

study of the enemy artillery picture in the corps sector, which extended from Castelforte to the sea justsouth of Formia. A program was devised to confusethe enemy and, at the same time, provide information tothe corps counterbattery section. This was called the"Pistol-gun battery" program, or, locally, "de Shazo'sCommandos",

A composite battery, consisting of M-7s, M-l0s, andM-4s, moved out each night to occupy several differentpositions, two guns at each location. On a synchronized time schedule, the guns fired at maximum rateinto prearranged targets and then moved on to otherpositions to repeat the fires,

This fire program was believed to be effective inharrassing the enemy. In several cases, it was hairraising to friendly troop installations which were afforded the unpleasant sight of armored vehicles blasting away from positions close by them. Despite theirnatural concern, very little enemy fire was drawndown upon them. A certain corner by a bridgeis remembered, however, as being very near the centerof a German concentration.

* * *The preparation for the big May offensive was well

underway, On the first of May, positions were selectedon the north side of the Garigliano River. The approach

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to these positions was under observation for a distanceof five miles. In view of this, elaborate steps weretaken to conceal activity. The positions were completely dug-in and camouflaged; all work was done atnight. After dark on May 10th, under cover of thenoise provided by friendly artillery, the battalion idled the tanks across the river and into the positions.

The ammunition was clean, the gunners were rested,the hands laid heavy on the lanyards.

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The Second ..At 112300B May, on the front from Cassino to the

sea, two thousand cannon spoke. The Allied Armiesin Italy moved forward.

For six days of heavy fighting, the battalion firedfor the 88th Division. The fortifications in the GustavLine were reduced one by one . . . the line was broken..A pursuit force of tanks and infantry was formed; itwas supported by the battalion.

The fighting swept quickly through Formia to Gaeta,through Itri and on to Fondi. The next determined enemy resistance was encountered at Terracina, where along bare ridge ran down to the sea. On top of thisridge was a heavy stone building which the enemyused as an OP. One battery fired direct fire into thisposition, and white flags soon were seen flying aboveit. The infantry dismounted from the tanks and tookover a hundred prisoners from the ridge.

Displacing around the mountain into the plains ofthe Pontine Marshes, the battalion marched on Sezzewhere it took its worst pasting in the campaign. Threeenemy tanks caught one battery just as it was leavingthe road; casualties were high.

On the twenty-third of May, the beachhead forcesat Anzio made their breakout. By the twenty-sixth, theSSF was in Artena and under heavy attack by the enemy. The battalion was placed in direct support of theForce once more. After Valmontone was captured by

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the 3rd Division, the SSF was ordered to move onRome as quickly as possible.

One battery had been attached to the Ellis TaskForce, which had the same mission as the SSF. Thereis a question still unsettled within the battalion.which force entered Rome first?

The battalion had a curious experience south ofRome. Upon occupation of a position which had beenhastily evacuated by the enemy, a search of the areaproduced the official history of the 93rd Field ArtilleryRegiment of the German Army. I t had been reportedby intelligence that this unit was operating in Italy,but the pleasure of overrunning their positions wasunexpected, indeed.

From a position in a factory in the south edge ofRome, fancies and desires of the men of the 93rd AFArambled far. Ah joy! Ah Rome! The Eternal City . . . thecrumbled Forum. The city where Keats had died . . .I f there could be a pass . . . Ah Pass! A few daysstrolling through the white-walled city ... This wasJune the fifth.

In position slightly west of the 27th kilometer postnorth of Rome, in midafternoon of June sixth, the battalion was in support of another pursuit force. Two moredays carried it northward another forty kilometers.Then . . . orders were received directing that the battallion return to an assembly area about ten milesfrom Rome. This march was made in a rapid and orderlymanner. Ah Rome.. . the Sistine Chapel, a few daysstrolling . . .

* * *The new IV Corps had the mission of pursuing the

enemy to the north. The 93rd AFA had been assigned26


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to this corps on the eleventh of June. The corpsformed a new task force which included the battalion.On the 12th, the battalion was fighting in the TuscanHills 120 kilometers north of Rome. Ah Rome.

The fighting carried on past Orbetello, past Grosseto,on to the north.

In the last week of June, Major Meeker washospitalized, and Lt. Col. John Shanklin assumedcommand.

With Task Force Howze, 1st Armored Division, thebattalion moved on through Lardello, Pomarance . . . onnorth of Volterra. From the last positions short of theArno River, the 93rd AFA turned its back on the ItalianCampaign and moved on the night of July 11 th toassembly areas near Piombino.

With Italy i t was finito.

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Between Two and ThreeBy LST from Piombino, and by marching down the

length of Italy, the battalion moved back to NaplesPort where it had landed eight months before, By thetwentieth of July, the battalion was closed in bivouacand the preparation for invasion had begun.

For long months, the high army staff had beenplanning for the invasion of Southern France. Now, itwas time for the small units. . . the ones which wereto do the fighting . . . to make their own plans.

* 1: *The 93rd AFA had been relieved from assignment

to Fifth Army and assigned, first to AFHQ, then, later,to Seventh Army. I t had been further attached toVI Corps which was to make the assault. The Corpshad attached i t to the 36th US Infantry Division. TheDivision had the mission of securing its part of theinitial beachhead line. . . the right flank of the corpsThe 141st Infantry was selected to make the assaulton the division beaches. Due to the fact that the93rd AFA was an armored battalion, and to the factthat while moving its guns are pointed at the enemyinstead of away from him, i t was chosen to be thefirst artillery ashore. The assigned mission was thatof direj:t support of the 141st Infantry until such timeas the organic battalion could get ashore and intoposition. Actually, its mission was to get ashore and28


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STRASBOURG WAS REACHED WITHOUT INCIDENT

... AND WAS ALREADY IN FRENCH J{ANDS


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PAST C()LNTLES8 ROAD BLOCKS

AND BLOWN nF?lJ)(;[;,


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THE ASSAULT ON HAGENAU If AD BEGUN

IvlEALS WERE LEFT UNFINISHED AS WE RECEIVED A HURRIED MARCH ORDER


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THE KITCHEN CRE'N SET UP

BATTi \UON MAINTENANCE ,'V14NNED THE 8811111l S


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MAINTENANCE PERIODS WERE SCARCE

ARTILLERY KEPT FORBACH OFF LIMITS


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ONE BAT,[ElI ' l C.'lPT(!RED , "L \N} PRISONERS

,[;{E NOT SO S( P E I ~ S(PER,\ l f \ '


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THE GUN MECHANICS KEPT BUSY

... NOT ALWAYS EASY


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I

THE ENEMY FELL BACK TO ITS SIEGFRIED LINE DEFENSES

AND ENTRANCE WAS DENIED liS FOR THE TL\lEBEING


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shoot back at anything which was shooting at thebattalion or at the infantry preceding it.The planning within the battalion was conductedwith two objectives in mind: one, that no excesspersonnel be included in the assault echelon, this to

prevent unnecessary casualties; two, that everyman inthe assault be equipped and trained to shoot at theenemy both with cannon and his personal weapon.

In amphibious operations, there is always thepossibility that the hmding craft will be unable toreach the beach proper. This can be caused byuncharted sand-bars of which the navy is 'unaware;beach and under-water obstructions, or, as in othersimilar operations, heavy enemy fire. The vehicles ofthe battalion were therefore waterproofed to providefording ability in water to the depth of seven feet.

The firing batteries, stripped of all vehicles whichwere not absolutely necessary, loaded on LCTs on Aug ust 8, 1944.. The necessary Headquarters and ServiceBattery vehicles loaded on an LST on the eleventh.They were to sail in different convoys.

On August 9th, the LCT convoy moved smoothlyfrom Baia Port. The voyage was uneventful, and onthe thirteenth the convoy stood into Ajaccio Bay, inCorsica, to await the faster convoys then moving outof Naples. A pleasant day was spent on the beaches.I t was a long day.

* * *At dawn, on the fifteenth of August, the sea wasglassy and smooth off the coast of the Riviera. During

the night, the LST and troop transport convoys hadjoined the LCTs and they lay together, for the firsttime since the embarkation, in a large and disorderly

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pattern. In the first grey hour before seven o'clockit was strangely quiet. Then, the vast and complexhand of invasion was laid down. . . battleships andcruisers opened fire, fighter-bombers wheeled and doveinto the haze over the beaches, destroyers and gunboats stood in close with cannon blazing. The radartower on the hill facing the fleet led a charmed life . . .i t was never hit. The first wave went roaring by likewaterbugs over the sea, the rocket-ships moved in tofire, the smoke on the beach grew dense, and the craftcarrying the battalion moved quickly around themarker-ship, and the boatmaster gave the thumbs-upsign and shouted through his megaphone "Makestraightway way for the beach".

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The ThirdWhen the ramps dropped down on the beach in

Southern France, the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry was already across the sand and was engagedin a fight in the pinewoods just beyond. Every manknew what he was supposed to do. Get across thebeach. . . keep moving. In a matter of minutes, onebattery had moved through the woods and was in aposition from which it could fight; another battery hadmoved quickly along the coast road toward Agay,capturing many prisoners who. had quit their pillboxesthe instant the guns were laid on them.Although the beach was raked by machine-guns. anddirect-fire cannon in casemates to the right flank, andalthough every landing craft used by the battalionwas hit by this fire, only two casualties were sufferedin the landing. Enemy artillery fire increased throughthe day, and one battery lost a section by a direct hitin the early hours of the afternoon.

In order to exploit the initial success of the landing,the division commander ordered the 142nd Infantry tomake a flanking march to the right on the night afD Day. This regiment then cut back to the left andmoved west into the valley north of Saint Raphael.The 93rd AFA was ordered into the support of thisregiment on the morning of D plus 1.

In the course of marching along the infantry route,which had not been cleared, the battalion was forced

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to spend the best part of D plus 1 fighting infantry skirmishes with enemy forces who had not yet decidedto surrender.On the seventeenth of August, after the long, rapidmarch to Draguignan, the junction with the air-bornetroops was made. Three days were spent in thatcity while reconnaissance elements searched forthe enemy.

The fog was thick in the Basses Alpes on the morning of August 20th when the battalion, as the advance guard for an infantry column, made the ninetymile march from Draguignan to Sisteron. The routeused was the same as that of Napoleon upon his returnfrom Elba.

No contact was made with the enemy, although wewere using his Main Supply Route for the Rivierafront. On the following day, the battalion moved onto Gap.. . another eighty miles. One battery was detached to move on Grenoble.

The war had taken on a carnival-like character. Theprincipal danger during this period was from the fastflying fruit, sometimes soft, which the grateful Frenchpeople insisted upon hurling at the marching vehicles.By August 24th, Task Force Butler had located theenemy. He was trying to withdraw up the Rhone Valley with a force of two infantry divisions and onepanzer division, the Eleventh. On that day, the batta lion marched westward for 110 miles with its infantryriding the decks of the tanks. I t passed through. Dieand Crest and by nightfall was in the middle of thefight in the Montelimar Pocket.Placed in support of Task Force Butler on the 27th,the 93rd AFA marched the next day to the vicinity ofMirmande, outflanking the enemy column.32


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The best shooting in the history of the battalion waaenjoyed for the next two days. One tank. and one M-7were moved up onto the ridge overlooking the valleyroad and the helpless German column. At a range ofless than a thousand yards, these guns blasted at theenemy. They scored hits on enemy ammunition halftracks, thereby jamming traffic on the road so that thebattalion was able to smother them with fire.By dawn of August 30th, the battle in the RhoneV a l l ~ y was ended. The battalion marched around andthrough the countless enemy vehicles and formationswhich they had destroyed. The pursuit flew on . . . ,toLyons, to Macon, to Besanc;on. The battalion marchedby night for hundreds of miles. The problems of supplywere incredible. Ammunition and gasoline werehauled from the beaches hundreds of miles to therear. Rations were "C", but the French were generous,and the men ate well.

The American Armies were now against the borderscompleted sweeping the Nazis from Southern France.On and on, to Vesoul. . . and then on the fifteenth ofSeptember, one month after landing on the beaches ofthe Riviera, the battalion marched into Luxeuil-IesBains. . . the campaign was ended.

33


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The Fourth, I I I ,The German 19th Army had fled in tattered rem

nants up the Rhone Valley and the pursuit was onagain. Could this German Army reach the safety ofBelfort Gap before the Seventh and Third Armies cutit ~ f f from this avenue of escape? General Dahlquistof the 36th Division posed the problem and said theanswer would lie in the willingness of the troops toendure further privations in order to maintain thepursuit that would spring the trap.

The guns rolled forward, churning up huge cloudsof dust, but not for long. Luxeuil-les-Bains was left inthe distance as the first rains began to fall, the seasonwas changing. Meadows turned into bogs and roadsdisappeared under the mud. The pursuit slowed andmany Germans got away. We were entering theVosges foothills.

* * *The Moselle River as it runs through Remiremont

is fast-flowing although it is a narrow channel measured by American standards. I t was along this riverline that the Germans had determined to make theirfirst stand in the Vosges. The Battalion, still in supportof the 36th Division, took up positions just west ofthe river in the wooded hills. There were memoriesof Rapido days but this time everything went smooth34


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ly, thanks to the enthusiastic assistance of a seventyeight year old French Major. A bridgehead was wonand secured after intense opposition had beenovercome. The Battalion moved across the river tothe town of Eloyes and ran into the first. German airactivity in over a month. The Germans fell backslowly, grudging every foot of easily defended ground.At Chenimenil i t became apparent that it was goingto be a slow process to clear the heavily-wooded Vosges mountains. Plans were made for shower bath unit,rest center, and the rear installations moved into thetown where they stayed almost the entire month ofOctober.

I f October in the Vosges was unusual it was because even the French were willing to admit that itwas raining a lot. Where towns had names ending in"menil" or "rupt" and sometimes beginning with an"X" the only solution to the cold damp climate thatsurrounded this ocean of mud was a pair of woodenshoes. Whether the French used them for dryness orjust to keep afloat was hard to tell but they used theIr!to good advantage in digging up their potatoes andburying their stock beets.

* * *The German Vosges winter line stretched in the

sector of the VI Corps from Raon l'Etape down to St.Die and then on to Gerardmer and Belfort in the sector of the French First Army. As the French assumedmore of the front, the Corps sector moved north. Theprogress of the Corps was measured in yards as eachhill became a successive obstacle.Suddenly new vehicles and freshly equipped person

35


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nel began to arrive. Talk soared about relief. Threenew divisions made their appearance on the lineduring November with a combat team of Japanese Americans. But there was no relief; everyone just moved over and took up a more normal division front.

The German determination to make a stand in theVosges was evident in his employment of artillery,mines, and booby traps, the first we had encounteredsince Mirmande and Besanc;on. Our roads and crossroads and often battery positions felt the weight of hiscontinuous harassing program. Our counterbattery targets grew in number and an artillery slugging matchdeveloped. The German was bound to lose this contest just as he had lost previous ones but it was hardon the French towns, particularly Bruyeres, whosepro-Nazi mayor had to be led away, screaming after theBattalion had fired a preparation along one street ofthe town to permit our infantry to advance acrossopen ground to assault and capture the town.

As the Battalion moved into a muddy plateau besidethe vi1lage of Belmont the fog turned to frost at thehigher elevation . " Here the ammunition trucksstruggled through fields of mud as they resupplied ourguns which kept up harassing and counterbattery missions on the enemy, hidden in the fog and cloud-ladenhills before us. The nights grew colder and one morning we awoke to find the first snow had effectivelycamouflaged the many wheel ruts and trails it hadseemed impossible to hide.

* * *

During this time extensive plans were made to breakthrough the German winter line before us. The 36th36


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WE MOVED TO POSITIONS IN THE VICINITY OF MERLEBACH

THE GERMAN SELF-PROPELLED


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THE SIEGFRIED LINE WAS l;OMPLETELY PENETRATED

. AND WE CARRIED INFANTRY THROUGH THESIEGFRIED LINE


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TYPICAL TASK FORCE MENU OF "EAT WHAT YOUCAN, WHEN YOU CAN"

... NOT LIKE HOME, BUT GOOD


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NON-FRATERNIZATION REMINDER

BATTALlON MAINTENANCE STOOD BY


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.

WHITE FLAGS REPLACED THE SWASTIKAS

OUR M-7s ROLLED OVER THE "WEINSTRASSES"


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ON MARCH 28TH WE CROSSED THE RHINE . . .

TffE A('TOBAHN WAS SMOOTH RIDING


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,

IT WASN'T BAD ALL THE TIME; YOU DID HAVE FUN . ..

. . . . A LOT OF LAUGHS


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THE GERM.ANS BLEW ALL THE BRIDGES

WE \ lE,{ THE LlFTWAFFE O,V TIlE ( , iWi ND


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Division which we had supported since the day of ourlanding in Southern France was now firmly entrenchedjust beyond the town of Bruyeres. The Division wason the Southern flank of VI Corps. To their north wasthe American Third Infantry Division and to their souththe French First Army . . . All of these on a line runningroughly north and south through Bruyeres. The 36thDivision was astride an excellent route of communi cations leading to st. Die and through the Vosges.Avoiding this obvious route of approach the Corpsmassed its strength to the north behind its veteran3rd Division. The newly arrived 100th Division wasput into line north of the 3rd Division. The Corps artillery was infiltrated into position behind these twodivisions in tremendous strength on a narrow front.Prior to the final assault of the winter line howevercertain important ground had to be secured west ofthe Meurthe River. The 3rd Division started into thehills with the mission of going to the Meurthe Riverto the northwest of St. Die. The 36th Division was totake certain ground west of st. Die. In the course ofthis action, the 141st Infantry had a battalion isolatedby a strong German force which prevented suppliesfrom reaching them. TheJapanese-AmericansheroicaUybattered their way to this "Lost Battalion" and broughtrelief to the doughboys who had existed for seven dayson a shell delivered chocolate diet and had sustainedmany attacks during this period. With the attackacross the Meurthe all set the Battalion was relievedfrom attachment to the 36th Division and attached tothe 3rd Division.

* * *

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The approach to the Meurthe from the west wasacross a wide valley in plain view of the enemy'sprepared positions on the opposite hills. Positions wereselected in the valley as close as possible to the riverand were prepared by details working under coverof fog or at night two days prior to the occupation.Each battery became its own engineers as bridgeswere built and roads corduroyed. Occupation in thedark added difficulties to an already trying situation,but in spite of a few casualties sustained, the occupation was completed and a large pile of ammunitionlaid ready beside each gun.

"H" hour was 0700, November 20, 1944. The enemyawoke to the tune of a "serenade" from a valley filledwith artillery. The thoroughness of the plans of attackrouted the enemy from their inadequately manneddefenses and the river was bridged with light casualties. A task force was in order . . .One battery became attached to Task Force "Whirlwind" together with the 3rd Division's Combat Patrol,a few medium tanks, and two reconnaissance cars.A meeting in the candle-lit, map strewn War Confernce Room soon disclosed that the mission of thetask force was to move on Strasbourg, only 80 milesaway. The enemy having the problem of guarding themany mountain roads through the Vosges and determining the location of the attack, was completelyoutmaneuvered and outguessed. The task force movedout just before dusk and followed little traveledmountain roads through snow and mud and halted atthe foot of the mountains before St. Blaise. SingingGerman soldiers leading horse-drawn wagons loadedwith mines and artillery ammunition up into theirseemingly impregnable mountain positions were

..

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amazed and confused when American guns far behindtheir lines opened up. During this time, the batteryin support of the task force had its hands full withsnipers and stragglers and had to supplement the smallinfantry force accompanying it for protection againstthe constant threat of infiltration and sniping. Theother two batteries, following close behind the taskforce, opened the wedge further through this corridorand assisted in the prepared fires on St. Blaise. Afterthe attack on St. Blaise, the task force moved rapidly

f though this town and countless other small townsencountering light resistance, but not without casualties, to Rothau, where a confused garrison of enemyservice troops laid down their arms. The Wehrmachtfood supplies they had brought up the night beforeadded sardines and canned fish delicacies to what hadbeen a typical task force menu policy of "eat what youcan, when you can."The old Franco-Prussian border had been passedand the people now spoke German as their nativetongue; the names above the shops were German andthe "Cafe" now became the "Gasthaus". As the longcolumns of American troops and vehicles woundthrough the narrow mountain roads and debouchedon to the Alsatian plain they saw their first flatground in months. Everyone heaved a sigh of relief. . . the German winter line was smashed.

"J':

Task Force "Whirlwind" was dissolved when the3rd and 45th Divisions joined near Mertzig. The battalion was then placed in direct support of the 117thReconnaissance Squadron with the mission of screening the left flank of the 3rd Division drive to relieve

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Strasbourg. Strasbourg had been captured in a light ning like thrust of the French 2nd Armored Divisionafter breaking through the Saverne Gap to our north.The French 2nd Armored Division was operating withthe American XV Corps to the north of the VI Corps.Outstripping the rest of the XV Corps, GeneralLeClerc's famous division found itself in Strasbourgwithout adequate infantry support. All of which gaverise to General LeClerc's much quoted laconic suggest ion that some infantry be sent. Under a thick groundhaze the only contact we made was with friendly ~ troops and Strasbourg was reached without incident. I

ISome months later we received a lithographed calen dar from the mayor of Strasbourg in commemorationof the liberation of his city.

* 'lit 'litEffective the 27th of November 1944, the Battalion

was transferred from the VI Corps after having foughtfrom "D" day on through Southern France as part ofthis Corps. The new assignment placed us in theXV Corps attached to the 79th US. Infantry Division.

The Battalion joined the Division Artillery near thetown of Brumath. The 79th Division was on the rightflank of the XV Corps . . . with its right flank in turnsecured against the Rhine. I t began moving northtoward the Siegfried Line.

The Black Forest of Germany was now visible andGerman shells from the other side of the Rhine beganto fall in our sector. It was rather disconcerting tohear shells coming in from the right rear as well asfrom the front and right flank.

The assault on Hagenau had begun and the 93rdwas employed in the common task of clearing its40


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approaches through the Hagenau Forest. Bischweilerwas taken and the way ahead was clear except for afew of the Wehrmacht who did not show on the map.The enemy fell back to its Siegfried Line defenses andthe Battalion rolled into position in the Rhine bordertown of Lauterburg, 2000 yards from the infantry,poised and ready for an assault and breakthrough.German artillery concentrated on this small town andthe shell reports turned in covered an azimuth arc of260 degrees from the northwest around to the eastand then south. The guns of the Siegfried Lineboth on the east and on the west side of the Rhinehad opened up. The initial assault made little progressand entrance to the Reich was denied to us forthe time being. Two captured 88mm guns went intoaction with the Battalion maintenance section as thegun crews.

During this time the Battalion mission was changedto protecting the right flank of the Division XV Corps - Seventh Army, in fact all forces in theEuropean theater. The Battalion was on constant alertwith rations and full fuel tanks in readiness for whathas often been referred to as our "Rhine River PatrolMission". The alert materialized and the Battalionmoved out one night under blackout conditions forDamback La Ville in Alsace, 40 miles south of Strasbourg. We were now supporting the 2nd French Armored Division. part of the French First Army.

." ." ."

The French First Army was containing and attempting to destroy the Colmar Pocket, stretching frombelow Strasbourg to Mulhouse. Several Americanunits were attached to them for this purpose. Coinci

41


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dent with the offensive in the Ardennes the Germanslaunched a series of strong local counter-offensivesseeking to enlarge their Colmar Pocket.

Life here was anything but tranquil as the frontlines consisled of a series of unconnected strongpoints. Enemy agents were constantly being reportedin ,the sector and guards had to be always on thealert. Wearing colored scarfs was death, for enemyagents identified each other that way. Passwordswere good but if you didn't know in addition whyfiremen wore red suspenders, or that Sinatra's firstname was Frankie, you found two rifles leveled in abusiness-like manner, and you were regarded as morethan suspicious.

Christmas Eve came and each gun section had itsown Christmas tree selected from the nearby wood,and decorated with tinsel made from cut strips of antiradar silver paper. Alsace white wine and Christmassongs provided a peaceful spirit until the gun phonesrang with a fire mission.

When New Years' Eve came along, the 93rd AFA wasmoving over snow and ice-covered roads to meet thenew German threat which was developing in thenorth. After travelling 53 miles, the Battalion wentinto a defensive position near Hunspach to meet anexpected German thrust. The German was now turninghis attention away from Colmar to the Saar andNorthern Alsace Plain. The attack did not developand at the following noon, meals were left unfinishedas a sudden immediate march order was received. TheBattalion was on the road again, this time to Mulhausen where a rough session was in store for allconcerned.

We were now attached to the 70th US Infantry Di 42


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vlslOn and were functioning as the organic artilleryof the 276th Infantry Regiment. None of the Divisionartillery units had arrived in the Theater and so wefilled the role of the normal support artillery of oneof the Regiments.

The German was trying to gain control of the highground north of Rothbach, excellent for observationon the vital pass which would have enabled him topour his armor out and onto the Alsatian Plain unmolested. Guns were continuously laid on "NormalBarrage", in anticipation of the expected counterattacks. The counter-attacks came, but the Battalionwas ready and over 18,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition made a definite impression on the enemy elements, particularly the elite 6SS Nord Division whichmust have made a considerable change in theirstrength reports ('.fter having caught one of thesebarrages.' During the 48-hour period 101800 to 121800over 4000 rounds were expended and one hundredeighty-six fire missions were cleared. At one timeduring this operation, the Battalion was in directsupport of seven infantry battalion. The furious andvicious counter-attacks were stopped and while theenemy licked his wounds, the 93rdAFAwas given a newmission. . . The German effort had shifted to the east.Marching miles to meet this threat we took up positions near Niederbronn-les-Bains in support of the 274thInfantry Regiment of the 70th Division. After a seriesof bitter encounters here the German attacks dwindledoff and we reverted to the support of the 276th.

The 276th Infantry Regiment still awaiting itsorganic artillery, was in defensive positions nearTheding. The 93rdAFAwas placed in direct support andthe only thing it fought here was the snow and cold

43


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weather. However, inasmuch as friendly forces werelimited and the Germans were of such attitude tolaunch an offensive-defensive action of some strengthin order to protect his Saar River industrial area, allunits carefully deepened defenses more than usual.Engineers prepared road blocks, laid wire and minefields. The Battalion had alternate surveyed positionsin the defenses of the Maginot Line so that an organ ized retrograde movement might be made with maximum artillery support, i f the Germans launched aconcentrated attack in the sector.

The Battalion settled down to its snow covered defensive position. Intelligence personnel tediouslystudied air photos and analyzed all intelligence reports for unusual enemy activity. When no activitywas observed and our forces were slightly reinforcedwe launched local attacks, attacks which never wouldreach the pages of a history book, but attacks duringwhich men bled and died.

* * *The organic artillery of the division having arriv

ed, the 93rd AFA left these positions and moved to newpositions in the vicinity of Freyming on the 9th ofFebruary. Our mission was to render direct supportto the 106th Cavalry Group and later the 101st Cavalry Group.

The firing batteries now had positions just insideGermany with such cryptic names as "ScorpionStinger", "Scorpion Battle", and others so labeled indicating their locality and potency. These were thefiring positions that were occupied only when firing.In the event the Germans launched an attack thebatteries were to fire from reserve positions.44


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WE LEARNED THIS LAUNDRY SYSTEM ON THE U.S.S. THURSTON

rEFIFlY DOSEN'T LIVE flEFIE ANY \101?E


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ON MAY 1ST, SNOW FLURRIES

WE TOURED THE SCHWABIAN ALPS


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RENDEZVOUS IN AG'STRIAN ALPS

i ~ ,

THE FER,V PASS OBSTACLE WAS O\ERCO.\1E


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MISSION ACCOMPLISHED - READY FOR SALVAGE

r

"AFTER FIVE"


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KILLED IN ACTION

SALUTE TO THE DEAD


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WE CELEBRATED THE 4TH OF JULY

THE U.S.O. CAUGHT UP WITH US


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THIS WAS HEILBRONN

THE LAST MARCH ORDER


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,

With an Armored Division in a reserve position andan elaborate defensive system completed, the tacticalsituation was well under control and the next movewould likely be an attack by our forces to finish theKrauts which would no doubt be an arduous under taking. No rest appeared likely for the Battalion.Col. Shanklin decided that two missions; the one ofgetting sorely needed relaxation, and the other ofcontinuing direct support for the cavalry might beaccomplished simultaneously. Dances were permittedas long as enough men were left at each batteryposition to carryon fire missions if needed. Themission of the Cavalry was to hold down the leftflank of the Seventh Army and to maintain theMaginot Line defenses.

Taking advantage of the unusual lack of enemyactivity, dances were held in Freyming and CiteJeanne d'Arc. These were the days to which ColonelShanklin must have referred when a long while beforehe had said, "You will remember that it wasn't badall of the time, you did have some fun . . . . ". Thepeople in this part of Lorraine accepted us with openarms and particularly the young girls who for fiveyears could not dance, but were forced to work inGerman industries instead.After supporting the 101st Cavalry in an offensivewhich cleared the south side of the Saar River of Ger man troops and accomplishing our mission in thissector, the 93rd AFA was on the move again. Thistime the Battalion, still in direct support of the 101stCavalry Group, moved to Kleinblittersdorf, sevenmiles north of Saargemund.

The Battalion was again in position to force theSiegfried Line exactly three months from the day i t

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had first delivered its fires against the line at Lauter bourg. The 101st Cavalry Group claimed to bethe first troops in the 7th Army to completelypenetrate the Siegfried Line. When the line wasbreached and the breakthrough made the Battaliontransported Infantry through the Siegfried Line on ourvehicles and proceeded into the Rhine Valley toassist the 71st Division in clearing the enemy from thewest bank of the Rhine.

American mechanized equipment, rolling over the"Weinstrasses" where once had marched German sol diers with their: horse-drawn artillery and supplies,left the German people gaping in amazement. Fulltruth and realization of American strength and thelies of German propaganda struck them with a terrificblow.

46

1


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The Fifth On March 27th the Battalion was attached to the10th Armored Division and put in direct support of

Task Force Richardson. A CCB spearhead unit com posed of three teams of tanks, TD's and Armored Inf antry. With a battery following each team, our artillery was always well forward. On March 28thwe crossed the Rhine River near Worms and headedsouth towards Mannheim. With the capture of thecity by the 63rd US Infantry Division the Task Forcepassed through the infantry and spearheaded thesouthernmost attack of the 7th Army until the end ofthe war.

The initial mission was to drive south and clearthe valley east of the Rhine and join the FrenchForces who were to establish a bridgehead north ofKarlsruhe. I t was a battle through the Rhine flak belt. . . chiefly against the respected dual purpose Ger man 88. Rapid delivery of fire at all times was largelyresponsible for the slight losses suffered in men andmateiiel prior to joining the French at Bruchsal. Thenight before this junction was made, a clean breakthrough the enemy was effected, and dumbfoundedKrauts were greeted with direct 105 mm fire as well assmaller calibers. I t was a new experience for us also,but was only a foretaste of things to come. With theentire Rhine Valley c l e a r ~ d in the 7th Army sector oursights turned east and in that direction lay Heilbronn.


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In Unterowisheim, a name that never made a battlereport, the Germans launched their first determinedcounterattack since we crossed the Rhine. A large pro portion of over 200 SS troops died for Hitler due toour artillery fire, which was strictly charge 1 range.Battery outpost defenses increased the prisoner bag.After their stinging repulse the Krauts recoiled to Heil bronn, except for small delaying forces.

* * *Upon arrival on the outskirts of Heilbronn by CCB,i t was found that CCA of the 10th Armored had driven

to Crailsheim on a more northernly route and hadbeen cut off. I t was vital to reopen the supply line tothese troops who were being threatened by a reported3000 Krauts.

Thus began the trip down the now famous "BowlingAlley". The journey was long and dangerous and thesituation was at all times critical. Numerous strongpoints were by-passed only to later become seriousthreats to our own supply trains.

Infantry troops were to follow up the Task Forceand clean out the woods and pockets of Germans leftbehind. They were unable however to keep pace withthe armor and the supply road remained dangerousfor any "soft" vehicles. Single vehicles were subjectedto artillery, direct fire, sniper fire and Panzerfausts fromthe side of the road. It was considered as risky to goto the rear as to lead the point of attack.

On one occasion an officer was attempting to comefrom the rear to the forward Command Post, and washeld up by a road block. 1be road passed throughwoods filled with Germans. Using a radio, the officercalled for fire from an artillery battalion in the rear48


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and adjusted i t on the road and woods bordering it.At the conclusion of the fire for effect the road wasonce again open for traffic.

I t was on April 8th that the battalion suffered oneof its greatest shocks. Our battalion commander hadgone to a forward observation post in the town ofHerbshausen to adjust fire on self-propelled guns whichhad been firing from the left flank of the advance ofthe Task Force. After knocking out one self-propelleagun our battalion commander while returning to theheadquarters of the Task Force, was killed by enemyartillery. The death of Lt. Col. John Shanklin waskeenly felt by all. We lost a friend and a great leader.

It was with a vengeance that on the same day acounterattack of 400 Germans was wiped out. Our airobserver spotted the Krauts emerging from a woods.Knowing the position of our guns he requested Pozitand on the two round adjustment the Krauts conveniently gathered in a ditch that ran through thecenter of the field. Everyone realizes the effect of airbursts on personnel in the open. One of our forwardobservers passed the area a short while after the firefor effect. He said he saw the greatest number of deadGermans he had ever seen in one area in all his combat experience.

On April 9th the road to Crailsheim was open. However, the decision was made to abandon Crailsheim.Task Force Richardson was selected to cover the withdrawal of CCA and other elements of CCB. The nightof April 10th was one of the most anxious nights ofthe month. The battalion covered the withdrawal toMulfingen and the Crailsheim incident was closed.

Three relatively quiet days were spend in Mulfingenduring which time maintenance was stressed. A two49


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day attachment to the 117th Cavalry Squadron was abruptly ended at midnight of the 15th when CCB wasordered to pass through the 63rd Infantry Division atKupferzel and get in behind and cut to pieces the enemy then facing the 63rd and tOOth Infantry Divisions.

Despite difficult terrain, defended road blocks, blownbridges, and self-propelled guns, Task Force Richard-,son succeeded in driving through the enemy by-passingSchwab ish Hall, Schwabish Gmund, and arriving inKirchheim the, evening of the nineteenth.

On this drive, as on the journey to Crailsheim, themain threat was from enemy on the flanks and rear.Pockets of Germans which had been by-passed wereagain a constant threat to the main supply route. Theinfantry, following our task force kept up very well,however there were still many cases of ambushedparties.

On April 21st, in the vicinity of Ebersbach, aconvoy of our vehicles consisting of a peep, T-2,M-7, half-track, and 3/4-ton was ambushed and ourcasualties were very heavy. The convoy was goingfrom Service Battery to the forward Command Post.The driver of the lead vehicle had employed the sameroad the day before and assumed it to be clear.The ambush was as sudden as it was effective.The leading, vehicle was instantly knocked out; thehalf-track was set afire and destroyed by a direct fireweapon; the 3/Hon vehicle was completely riddled bysmall arms fire and could not be evacuated until thefollowing day; and the M-7 suffered two direct hitswhile withdrawing with the wounded personnel. Oneman was not able to escape until later that night whenhe was aided by a friendly Russian to bypass a Germanoutpost and made his way back to prevent a friendly50


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convoy from taking the same road and encounteringa similar fate.

Perhaps no day in combat proved the ability andflexibility of the battalion as the 22nd of April. The daystarted out cold and cloudy. Before us were the highest of the Schwabian Alps. Initially tliere was noopposition, but as we approached the area of a military maneuver grounds all road junctions and townswere zeroed in. The S-3 half-track was knocked out byartillery fire and the Liason half-track was disabled byone of our own TDs. With memories of Fort Sill thethoughts of running the gauntlet across the reservation were foreboding. At this time a heavy snowstorm of short duration occurred and, for the first timein combat, was a godsend. With the enemy's observation cut we made the run without serious accident.

The Danube River loomed within range and ourforce drove forward to attempt to capture a bridge intact. As we moved into the narrow valley just shortof the river the Germans lay in wait at the bridgesite. The German's planned ambush was supported byself-propelled guns and mortars, and had not one ofthe batteries rapidly laid down a smoke screen, itwould have taken a heavy toll of men and equipment.The bridge was blown, but there were others in thevicinity and after reorganization, attempts were madeto seize them.During the day the batteries had literally shot fromthe hip. Many small columns of Germans, infantry andartillery, were shot at attempting to flee from theattack. Battery positions were occupied and evacuatedon a minutes' notice. The battery fire direction sections performed well.As night closed in i t was decided to await daylight

51


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before attempting to seize another bridge intact. Thebatteries fired harassing missions all night on bridgesites, to prevent the Germans from destroying themalthough everyone was greatly in need of sleep.

The harassing fires paid dividends. At the bridgesite that was attacked the next day, captured Germanscomplained that the artillery fire had cut their wirelines and as a result they didn't receive an order toblow the bridge. The Battalion crossed the Danubenear Rotternach on April 23rd and the drive turnedsoutheast to outflank VIm and seize a bridge acrossthe Iller river south of that city.

After making slow progress all night, at which timeFrench First Army Forces were contacted, the leadteam of the Task Force was bogged down on analmost impassable road. A reconnaissance was madefor an alternate route over an uncleared and untravelled road to the town ahead. The battalion usedthis route and was waiting in the next town for thelead team to clear their obstacle.

The Germans took no chances on the bridges overthe Iller; they blew them all before we came withinarti1lery range. Positions were occupied in Dietenheimand some by-passed German columns came into thetown unescorted to surrender. Everyone hoped tospend the night sleeping while the engineers constructed a pontoon bridge. Most everyone slept, but twoincidents made the night unusual.

About 2200 radio transmissions from the air sectionswere heard. The group air strip had received reportsof a large body of Germans moving in the directionof the airstrip. Although the sun was down the decision was made to take off and locate another airstrip.After much confusion and radio transmitting all pilots52


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landed safely without incident except for one whobecame lost. Flares, bon-fires, and all sorts of pyrotechnics were used to guide him in. Finally, after heseemed hopelessly lost, he picked up some 50 cal. tracer bullets and landed safely. No radio act in thestates ever contained the drama and realism that wasput out over the FMs that night.

The other incident was indicative of the confusionof the Krauts and of the resourcefulness of our engineers. About 0300 a German column skirted the townof Dietenheim and attempted to cross the Iller on thebridge the engineers were constructing. Before the dismayed Germans could recover from the realizationthat the old bridge had been blown, the engineers hadgrabbed their weapons and began to operate as infantrymen. Some Germans escaped but many werekilled or captured. A team was alerted to go to theaid of the engineers, but the help was not needed.

The Iller river, the last important river barrier, wascrossed on the 25th of April and our attack turnedsouth. By this time we had so disrupted the enemystear that opposition was usually of short duration.Memmingen was taken the afternoon of the 26th andagain we got a nights sleep probably due to the factthat CCA on the left was some distance behind.

We started out again early the 27th and by daylightof the 28th we entered Fussen. On the drive from Memmingen to Fussen many unexpected contacts weremade with the Germans; at least they were unexpected by the Germans. We had long before learnedto expect anything when operating with more ofthe enemy to the rear and flank than to the front.A decided break-up of resistance on the part of theGermans was also evident. Whole columns surren

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dered when fired upon. We entered Fussen withoutfiring a shot but after occupying the town for onlytwo hours it was obvious that there were at leastfive times as many German soldiers in the town at thetime of our entry as there were in our entire TaskForce.

The Battalion crossed the Austrian border at 0230hours on the morning of the 29th and proceeded toLermoos; where we were in position at the close ofthe month.At the beginning of April the German resistancewas stubborn to the point of fanaticism. His fight forCrailsheim seemed to indicate that he held a definiteline and would fiercely contest each and every attemptto break south into the redoubt area. Combat Com mand "B" to which the Battalion was attached facedthe difficult problem of crossing the Lowenstein Moun tains of the Schwabian Alps and the Danube and IllerRivers. The terrain was in no way suitable for Armor.However, after the fall of Heilbronn, CCB was ableto penetrate far behind the enemy lines and disrupthis communications, thus making organized resistanceon a large scale impossible. Towards the latter partof the month prisoners were streaming in by the thousands, and it became evident that complete victorywas to be ours.

During the month of April, the battalion traveledseven hundred and twenty-four miles. Road marches atnight in the attack, under blackout conditions, accounted for over two hundred of these miles. The cam paign was one of constant movement, and the strainon both men and vehicles was terrific. At all times thetlanks were exposed and the supply road was indanger of being cut. Reports were constantly being54


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received of enemy columns of thousands of troops tothe flanks, which i t seemed might well wipe out theTask Force. I t was necessary to keep attacking andadvancing to survive.

During this month the battalion fired eight thousandtwo hundred and seventy-four rounds of 105 mm ammunition. Several hundred prisoners of war w e r ~ captured or sent to the rear without formal capture.

In other months the battalion had fired more rounds,but never had the fires of the battalion been moreimportant or significant.On May 1st the battalion was still in Lermoos, Aus tria. Heavy snow flurries were an unusual sight forthis time of the year. On this day the battalion wasrelieved from attachment to the 10th Armored Divi sion and was attached to the 44th Infantry Divisionwith the mission to reinforce the ,fires of the organicdivision artillery.The infantrymen were temporarily held up by terrain and enemy action at Fern Pass. On May 2nd, twoof our batteries were harrassed by some of the last artillery fired by the German in the war. Although abouttwenty rounds landed in or near the battery positions,no casualties were inflicted, nor any great damagedone.

The Fern Pass obstacle was overcome and the battalion moved into the Imst Valley. From the 2nd ofMay until the 5th, various cease fire orders weregiven to encourage the negotiations for surrender ofthe Germans facing us.

On the morning of May 5th the battalion participated in an Artillery Show of strength in conjunctionwith the 44th Division Artillery by firing sixteen battalion concentrations in draws and wooded areas in

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the Imst Valley. The last concentration fired before theGermans surrendered was at 1146 hours, 5 May 1945,all batteries firing. The German 19th Army signedunconditional surrender terms the afternoon of the5th of May.

As for the record, the bare statistics do not reallysay much . . . such things never do ... except to themen who made them. Three Armies . . . Seven Corps... Fifteen Divisions ... Groups ... Task Forces ...like the rivers, mountains and villages, they cameand went. Two hundred and thirty-five thousand, eighthundred and fifty-five rounds of 105mm fired at targetsranging from, artillery, motorcycles, canal boats downto Tiger tanks and everything else that the Germanrode in, carried on his shoulder, or pulled behind atruck. Yes ... 235,855 rounds ... a lot of cursing, alot of sweating, a lot of laughs, a lot of sore arms andbacks ... one hell of a lot of shooting. .~

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LETTERS OF COMMENDATION


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LETTER FROM MAJOR GENERAL KEYES COMMANDING GENERAL II CORPS

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS Office of the Commanding General APO 19. U. S. ARMY

27 May 1944.TO II CORPS:

In an operation that will long be cited as an outstand ing example of speed, skill, courage and stamina youhave as a team accomplished in a little over two wecksthe juncture with the ANZIO BEACHHEAD, the conquest of 472 square miles of enemy held- territory, thecapture of over 2000 prisoners of war together withmuch armament and equipment.

You have operated and fought through terrain unbelievably difficult, and broken the enemy's stronglyfortified positions. You have advanced nearly 50 miles.You have accomplished successfully the missions assigned by the Army Commander. The feats accomplish ed and the high standards set in your victorious bat tles will incite envy and admiration in your comraciesand will instill fear in and exact respect from theenemy.

You are American soldiers and you should be proudof that fact and of the record you have just made. Butremember your reputation will endure only if jealously guarded and nourished by you.

I am proud of you and of the privilege of havingcommanded you in this operation.

GEOFFREY KEYES Major General, U.S.A., Commanding.

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II COMMANDING 91ST RECONNAISANCELETTER FROM LT. COL. ELLIS,SQUADRONHEADQUARTERS 91st RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

APO No. 464, U.S. Army. CAElrbb/ljsIn the Field, Italy,

22 June 1944.SUBJECT: Commendation.TO: Commanding Officer, 6th AFA Group,

APO 464, US. Army.1. I t is with genuine satisfaction to inform you of the

excellent cooperation and support rendered to thisSquadron by the 59th AFA and 93rd AFA Battalions.The batteries of each battalion responded eagerly andefficiently whenever called upon for fire missions,during our continuous operations, with TASK FORCERAMEY.

2. I desire to add the same expression of cooperationby the 6th AFA Group for its missions enroute to andNorth of ROME with TASK FORCE ELLIS.

3. The liaison officers, Captains Rush and Tutwilerwere efficient, attentive and displayed excellent init iative at all times. I t is inspiring to work with suchcommendable combat efficient units.

4. The pleasant and cooperative efforts of your head quarters under exemplified leadership has enhancedthe morale of all personnel of this Squadron. We hopeto have the privilege of your continued support in thefuture.

CHARLES A. ELLISLieut. Col., CavalryCommanding.

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LETIER FROM LIEUT. GENERAL CLARK, COMMANDING GENERAL, FIFTH ARMY

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMYA.P.O. 464, U.S. Army.

TELlMWC/vv/lys8 July 1944

Colonel Thomas E. de Shazo,Commanding Officer,6th Field Artillery Group,A.P.O. 464, U.S. Army.Dear Colonel de Shazo:

I t is indeed a sad day for your Fifth Army comradesto witness the separation from our ranks of the officersand men of the 59th, 69th and 93rd Armored FieldArtillery Battalions comprising the 6th Field ArtilleryGroup.

The armored field artillery battalions of your Grouphave been assigned many and varied missions duringthe Italian Campaign. You have supported parachutetroops, infantry of special task forces, reinforced thefires of division artillery and lately directly supportedtanks of the 1st Armored Division. Your three battal ions have accomplished all assigned missions in asuperior manner and are held in high esteem by allsupported units.

I am well aware of the difficulties and hardships ofboth operation and maintenance that were overcomein keeping your fires continuously "on call" during therecent rapid advance from the Garigliano to Cecina.The difficult terrain, scarcity of roads, long supplylines and the rapidly changing tactical situation pre sented greater obstacles to armored field artillery thanto other types.60


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I have passed throught the territory strongly defend ed by the .enemy and the scenes of death and destruction caused by accurate artillery fire eloquentlytestify to the efficiency of Fifth Army artillery.

Your leadership and combat efficiency throughoutthe entire campaign have been of the highest. Theflexibility of your organization, weapons and trainingand the skill and boldness with which you fought havesolicited many commendations from corps and divisioncommanders to which you were attached.

Together with my congratulations, I extend my verybest wishes to you and your armored field artillerymenin your new assignment. I shall follow your futureachievements with great pride.Sincerely,

MARK W. CLARK Lieutenant General, United States Army,

Commanding. LEITER FROM MAJOR GENERAL DAHLQUIST

COMMANDING GENERAL, 36TH DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 36, U.S. Army9 December 1944

MEMORANDUMCOMMENDATION

The following commendation for the 36th InfantryDivision has been received from Major General EdwardH. Brooks, Commanding General, VI Corps:"As you pass to another command I want to expressto you my deep appreciation for the part played by the

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36th Infantry Divsion in clearing the enemy fromhis strong positions in the Vosges Mountains."Your sagacious handling of the troops at your dis posal, spread over an extended front, and their con stand pressure and aggresive attitude for several daysprior to the Corps attack, held the attention of theenemy and forced him to commit local reserves whichlater were not available to oppose the main thrust ofthe VI Corps.

"The capture by the 36th Infantry Division of theSt. Marie Pass and its continued attacks, culminating inthe debouchment into the Alsatian Plain near Ribeau ville, not only blocked the enemy on the right butforced him to fight and continued to deny him theuse of his troops elsewhere.

"This was all done without fuss or feathers and ina manner worthy of the splendid Americans underyour command."I wish to add my personal appreciation to everymember of the Division and of the attached troops.Your continued splendid work marks you as membersof one of the great divisions of the U.S. Army.

JOHN E. DAHLQUIST Major General, U.S. Army

Commanding.

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LETTER FROM MAJOR GENERAL WHITE,COMMANDING GENERAL 6TH ARMY GROUP

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMYAPO 158 US.Army

BULLETIN) 1 April 1945NUMBER 46)COMMENDATION

The contents of the following commendation fromthe Commanding General, 6th Army Group, to theCommanding General, Seventh Army, will be broughtto the attention of all members of this command:

"After nearly three months of aggressive defensivefighting, the Seventh Army and attached Allied troopslaunched an attack on the 15th of March. That attackwas a complete success. Seventh Army troops areon the east bank of the Rhine River."I want the officers and men of your great Army toknow that their feats are recognized and appreciated.For years the Germans have trumpeted to the worldof the impregnability of their vaunted Siegfried Line.It is now obvious to the world that their words meantnothing to the Seventh Army. In less than ten daysyou cleared France from the Moder River to the Ger man border, breached the Siegfried Line and in con junction with the Third Army, cleared the Saar pocketand closed to the Rhine River. The losses which theenemy suffered from your operations were staggeringin both men and materiel.

"Then, acting baldy and without giving the enemya chance to recover from your aggressive and rapidadvances, you crossed the Rhine and established a firmbridgehead on the east bank.

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"The last great barrier to entering Germany has beencrossed. With the other six Allied Armies, you areready to deliver the final blow on the Western front.Through long, black, and tedious years, the free worldhas awaited this moment when the scourge of Europe,Naziism, would be eradicated from its face. I havelearned what to expect from the Seventh Army, andI want all ranks to know that I look forward to yourcoming operations with complete confidence.

"To every officer and man of the Seventh Army andthe attached Allied troops I say I am proud of you.You have made and are still making a record that willbe forever bright in the annals of military history."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUT. GEN. PATCH:ARTHUR A. WHITE.Major General, GSC

Chief of StaffLETTER FROM COLONEL METZGER

COMMANDING 10TH ARMORED DIVISION HEADQUARTERS DIVISION ARTILLERY

10TH ARMORED DIVISION APO 260, US. Army

11 May 1945SUBJECT: Commendation.TO: Commanding General, VI Corps.THR U : Channels.

1. I t is desired to commend and express appresiationfor services rendered by the following Corps Artilleryunits attached to or assigned in direct support of theoperations of this Division during the period from1 April to 1 May 1945. This period covered all oper ations immediately following the crossing of the64


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RHINE by VI Corps units, to include the final oper ation in which the Division participated.

Hq & Hq Btry 405 Field Artillery Group59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion93rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion17th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)141st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)634th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)939th Field Artillery Battalion (4.5" Gun)Btry "B", 976th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun)Unit commanders and other personnel have been

recommended for appropriate awards.2. The following units performed outstanding serv

ices as indicated and are especially commended:a. Hq & Hq Btry, 405 Field Artillery Group were indirect support of Combat Command "B" in all of itsoperations and acted as the coordinating agency andthe division artillery headquarters for this command.By aggressive reconnaissance and command, excel lent liaison and the superior functioning of communi cation, the assigned mission was performed in a su perior manner.

b. The 93rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion at tached from 26 March to 1 May 1945 were placed indirect support of Task Force Richardson of CombatCommand "B". Though at first the personnel of thetwo units were not acquainted as is desired betweendirect support artillery and its supported unit, throughdiligent effort and the superior performance of thisbattalion, they gained the same confidence from thesupported unit as held by the organic division bat talion. The aggressiveness and good judgment exer cised by the Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. JOHNSHANKLIN III. (killed in action) and Maj JAMES E.

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DOWNES, JR. was of particular note as the battalionsuccessfully participated in many difficult and danger ous actions throughout this period.

c. The 634th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)was reinforcing the fires of the armored battalions insupport of Combat Command "A" and Reserve Com mand. Though the advance of the Division was rapid,with changes of direction and situation which requiredartillery support in all directions, this battalion bythe aggressive spirit which prevailed throughout thecommand was at all times in position to give mediumartillery support where and when required. Withoutthe protection of armored units and though necessaryto pass through areas not cleared of the enemy, thebattalion at all times moved forward without hesitationinto forward areas in order to accomplish its mission.d. The 939th Field Artillery Battalion (4.5" Gun) wasin direct support of Reserve Command from 1 Aprilto 9 April 1945 and in general support of the Divisionfrom 9 April to 29 April 1945. During the first periodthis unit, although equipped and trained primarily forgeneral support and reinforcing missions, undertook adirect support role of Reserve Command in its oper ation against elite troops of the 17th SS Division inthe area east of HEIDELBERG and north of the NECKARRiver; this mission was in difficult terrain with exposed flanks and rear. The 939th Field Artillery Bat talion without armored protection and adequate facili ties supported this operation in a very commendablemanner and contributed measurably to the success ofthe operations.

EDWARD H. METZGER Colonel, Field Artillery Artillery Commander.

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1st IndOFFICE OF COMMANDING GENERAL, 10TH ARMDDIV, APO 2

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WWII 93rd Armored Field Artillery