WWII 1st Mountain Division

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-(So o. l4OMILITARY STUDIES

MS No. P-14

MOUNTAIN

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rE 2 8 1990

PO REGIS-

1954

WARFARE

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INST R.__

HISTORICAL DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS US ARMY, EUROPE

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S # P-14

MOUNTAIN WARFAREA Brjef Treatise Based on Operations of sl t Mountain Division

in Caucasus, August - September 1942

By

Lieutenant Colonel a.D Hans Roschmann

WITH A FOREWORD BY GENERALMAJOR a.D. HEUMUTH REINHARDT

Topic LeadersTranslatorEditorReviewer

Hellmuth Reinhardt,Generalmajor, aD .P. KlamerthCaptain E. K. StewartCol W, S, Nye

HEADQUARTERSUNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPEHistorical Division


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F011ORP

The following study by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Roschmann is a summaryof information contained in the reports of the 1st Mountain Division oncombat in the Caucasus Mountains during the period from 8 August - 11 Sep-tember 194g2 These reports were compiled under the pressure of time andduring action, and have not been reviewed or revised by higher headquarters;thus th e source material is limited and incomplete. Roschmann has, however,derived excellent lessons therefrom and has furnished a brief but valuablehandbook on combat in high mountainous terrain.

The author was directed to base his study only on that informationcontained in the original reports. He has added a few footnotes givingsupplementary data.based on his own knowledge or experience as a'member ofth e mountain forces. He has also supplemented the report with a descrip-tion of the area, a narrative of the action, several illustrations and anappendix showing the divisional organization used by th e Germans in th eCaucasus.

The study is restricted to experiences in the truly high mountaincountry, the west central Caucasus region. It omits the activities in theKolehian forest region near Tuapse on the coast of the Black Sea, whereparts of the ist Mountain Division also fought.

Hellmuth ReinhardtGenera? aj or , a.D.

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C ON TENTS

Pan.OEIIORD. . * a a a 0 . * $ e " 8 0 0 a 1 0i S 4o 0 6CHPTEal. TAEARE OF OPERAIONS . . . . aSection, I._ ,LlmterriII. Ci ae.' ea 0o4In. Vegetation o a * . a *

V. Economy 0 .r o . . . .

CHAPTER 2. THE M4ILITARY ACTION SUIHfY a3. PRINCIPLBE OF MOUNIN CO$T .'

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Section 1. Bibligraphy0.... . *56 0 6.~..II. Principles fo r the ployrnt of !oinr fros 6

Combat. ! *1b .:6: .a '. . a 6 .' 6 40 d rCHAPTER 4:. MAiPS, COI4NI TIO(S, A1MD SPEIAL EQ~TS 44 6 ..Section I. Maps and Cmpasese o.aasa a

ICoIIAPTER5"., soUPYi .a. *.. 46 0' a i4 s" d6..

Section I.. Supe rnilsa. .da. 000IIo Evaluation of the, Variou Means o t fMpzt.IIIK Supplies and Transportation R ese for aReinforced Regiaenta Combat, Tez ,., mIV0 Regulationt of Taffix' long Suppl Roue . 04GRAPTER 6, PESNN LPROMES. , Q j d ai * . * 6Section I. Selectio .nd Tdi ig. ,. 4, 5 *a' .6.a

III'~ Clothing' and Personal Equimit> aw a~.IV. Food, 0 s 0 * 0 0 * 4 a 'd 5e 0 *V0 Health 6 0 a *0' .-O . . *r' * 0

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C 0 N T E N T S--continued

CHAPTER 7o CONSTRUCTION WORK, .Section I. Roads and Bridges.

II. Emplacements . a .III. Shelters , , .

CHAPTER 8. TRANSPORTATION . . .

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Section I, Motor Vehicles . .. .* . . .. . .II Pack Animals . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 9. THE EEMN o .a a .PPENDIX As AVALANCHES. . . . .

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* 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Illustrations

Map 1o 1st Mountain Division in the Caucasus, 1942 . precedingPlate 1. Mountain Infantrymen on the Elbrus Glacier with

Mt.Uschba in the Background .* . ** *Chart 1, The 1st Mountain Division .*. . .

2. The 98th and 99th Mountain InfantryRegiments . . o o . o . o . . .

3. The 79th Mountain Artillery Regiment, .4. The Semi-motorized Engineer Battalion,54th Mountain Antitank Battalion, and the54th Semi=motorized Reconnaissance

Battalion o . . . . .* * * * * *5. Service Units . .* o . . . . . . .6&o The 2d High Mountain Infantry Battalion . .6B, The 54th Semi-motorized Mountain Signal

Battalion and the 54th Field ReplacementBattalion . . * * . * 0 . *

. .). .)0 0))). .). .)* .)preceding

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20212123

2324


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REFERENCE MAP lst MOUNTAIN DIVISION IN THE CAUCASUS, 1942

CherkessTemnolesskaya

LEGEND:~ailroadHard surface rood

- -- - Dry weather or dirt rood--- Track or trail/%..Most orward positions-Rutes of advance

SCALE0 10 20 30

KILOMETERS40 50


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CHAPTER i

THE AREA 0 OPERATIONS

I. TERRAINThe Caucasus mountains, the natural bulwark between Europe and the

Near East,. are higher and more rugged than th e European Alps, but, l ikethe European mountain chains, they have sharply defined granite ridgeseThe main peaks include th e Elbrus* (5633 meters) and the Kazbek (168meters), whose extensive ramifications inclose deep, steep-walledvalleys and canyons, The secondary ranges, which parallel the line ofthe main divide, usually do not form continuous chains, but rathershort ridges and groups of peaks, which are connected to the main ridgeby diverging spurs and which are often separated from one another byvalleys and canyons leading from the main ridge , The foothills of theCaucasus extend north to the upper courses of the Kuban and Terek Rivers;to the south the spurs descend more steeply to the plains of Georgia.II o CLIMATE

There are two contrasting climatic zones, that of the warm Riviera-like coast of the Black Sea and that of the much dryer south Russianplaen, both of which have their own great extremesa Despite the basicdifferences in the two types of climate, they have one thing in commonsthere is more rain in the spring than during the summer, whose drymonths are normally followed by heavy precipitation in the fall, Ingeneral, precipitation increases from west to east; the yearly averageof 2000 millimeters of rain on the Black Sea coast contrasts with th e190 millimeters at Baku on the Caspian Sea. Rainfall in the highmountains is estimated at 4000 millimeters annually.

*Plate 1, Mountain Infantrymen on the Elbrus Glacier with Mt. Uschbain the background, gives an approximate idea of the height and appearanceof this mountain mass.

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As a rule, one can count on dry, pleasant weather in the centralCaucasus during the summer months. Long periods of bad weather are rare,but completely clear skies are also not the rule, Changes in weather occurrapidly, although the sudden storms rarely bring lasting periods of rain.Thick, wet fogs, frequently descend in the large, glacier-filled valleysduring the afternoon and seem a genuine omen of bad weather, However theyusually are entirely dispelled, sometimes within an hour, though often notuntil evening or during the night. Like the fog, tremendous eloud massesappear out of the south at midday and cover the ridges and crests of themountains. (See Plate 1.) Even during the summer one can seldom counton continuously beautiful weather.

Summer precipitation on the north side of the central Caucasus oftentakes the form of snow, which then remains for long periods in the deeplyout valleys and ravines, Thus the high passes which are often negotiableon foot in February cannot be traveled without skis in May and June. Thepermanent snow line is approximately 3300 to 4000 meters above sea level.The huge glaciers which extend far down into the valleys are an especiallystriking physical feature,

In summer at midday the temperature at the high passes does notexceed ten degrees centigrade; at night it may fall to minus fifteendegrees, In winter a temperature of minus twenty-five degrees centigradecan normally be expected, and during the heavy storms, minus fifty degreescentigrade.

At altitudes above 3000 meters snow drifts four meters deep and a windvelocity as high as twelve meters per second is frequent. There is drift-ing snow on the crests and a great danger of avalanches on the steepslopes0 On the warm south side a regular and abundant rainfall occursduring the summer. During the rainstorms even the smallest mountain streammay swell into a rushing torrent in a surprisingly short time.III. TVEGETATION

Because of the heavier precipitation the tree and vegetation lineextends much higher than in the European Alps: the deciduous tree line isnear the 1600 meter contour, and the evergreen limit is at about 2200meters altitude. The heavily wooded northern foothills present a markedcontrast to the Pontian and Caspian steppea, which are treeless and withlittle vegetation., The woods and graszing lands often extend into theglacier zone; one rarely finds a middle zone of barren, stony ground asis usually the case in the Alps. There is a great deal of mixed forest.-land of magnificent conifers and giant birches, alternating with the mostvaried types of underbrush, especially boxwood and rhododendron, Wildfruit trees thrive as high as 1500 meters and in the woods there aremany types of edible berries,


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Plate 1

Elbrusgletscher nit Uschba (4696 m)

GE(; R (SJAGER I KA I' KAS 'S

Mountain Infantrymen on the Elbrus Glacier with Mt. Uschbain the background

Xufn. [)r. Hiaanitrr

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IV, POPULATIONThe manner of living as well as the external appearance of th e

mountain peoples is as rough as the climate and as wild as the country-side. During the period from 1919 through 1924, as in centuries past,they fought with th e greatest tenacity against the domination of SovietRussia, and were subjugated in the end only by th e superiority of th eRed Army artillery.

The most important tribes are th e Cherkessians and the Karachaians,who like th e Georgians and other south Caucasian tribes under the influ-ence of Islam became bitter feoes of the Russians. The survivors of theseonce proud mountain peoples, those left alive after th e bloody batt lesagainst th e Bolsheviks and th e subsequent mass deportations, are oftenexcellent marksmen and good mountain climbers. They earn a modest l ivingby agriculture and stock raising. Their domestic animals are horses,donkeys, sheep, goats, and cattle. Their zone of habitation in theCaucasus extends as high as 1000 meters, and the pasture lands continueto the eternal line of snow, approximately 2000 meters. The availablegrazing land is sufficient.V. ECONCmY

In addition to the abundant forests of the foothills, the petroleumdeposits near Maykop, the coal mines near Kutaisi, and the silver andlead mines near Alagir are especially worthy of mention, In the northernfoothills of the Caucasus are several spas which are famous for their hotsprings and their climate Among them are the ancient Pyatigorsk andTeberda, recently well known. Opportunities for local billeting are veryrare, and th e shelters are usually unsuited for troops because of theirfilthiness With the exception of meat it is impossible to obtain foodsupplies from local sources,VI. ROADS

In th e western part of th e Caucasus, exclusive of the forest landsaround Tuapse* and the passes east of Mount Elbrus, certain roads andpasses over th e mountains are worthy of mention. The military road toSukhumi over the Klukhor pass (2816 meters) can be negotiated by two-wheeled vehicles after suitable repairs. The main passes, over which theroads were unusually well laid out originally, include: Pseashkha (2010meters), Adzapsch (2500 meters), Chmakharo (2592 meters), Marukhskiy

*The spelling of all place names and physiographie locations followEastern Europe Series, 1:250,000, A ..N501. (Ed

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(2769 meters), Nakhar (2867 meters, Chiper (3200 meters), and theneighboring Azau pass (3450 meters )*

'Two famous military roads lying east of Mount Elbrus are notincluded since they were outside the area of operations of th e 1st MountainDivision and in th e area of a German armored unit, These are the Georgianor Grussnian road leading from Ordzhonikidze to Tiflis over the Daryalpass and the Ossetian road from Ordzhonikidze to Kutaisi over the Mamissonpass,


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CHART 6 A

HIGH MOUNTAIN INFANTRY BATTALION

2dHIGH MOUNTAIN INF BN(CO: MAJOR D. R. BAUER)

CHART 6 B

54th SEMI-MOTORIZED MOUNTAIN SIGNAL BATTALION54th FIELD REPLACEMENT BATTALION

IMOTORIZED LIGHTRANSPORT COLUMNI


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CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY ACTION SUMMARY

The German Seventeenth Army had forced its way across the Don Riverin July 1942. Its XLIX Mountain Corps, consisting of the ist and 4thMountain Divisions (Charts1 - 6), in a move which was completely unexpectedby its officers and men, was ordered to the western part of the Caucasusmountains by way of Maykop with instructions to break through to Sukhumion the Black Sea, On the west the XLIV Corps was to proceed by way ofTuapse over the coast road along the Black Sea; on the left elements ofthe First Panzer Army were to move forward by way of Ordzhonididze intothe Georgian plain.- The mission of the three columns was to capture bya rapid., combined attack the oil fields of Baku and Batumi.

The original force for the mountain operation had included anItalian mountain corps of three alpine divisions, whose pack animals andmountain equipment could have at least partly compensated for the lack ofsupply trains in the XLIX Mountain Corps. These troops, however, werediverted to Stalingrad before they reached the Caucasus,

Because the operation was ordered unexpectedly, the preparatorymeasures, such as reconnaissance and the securing of mountain equipmentand pack animals, could be carried out by the command elements in Germanyonly to a limited extent. Valuable time was lost through postponementsbecause of differences of opinion as to the command of the operation andthe method of committing the troops.

The XLIX Mountain Corps made rapid progress across the northernridges, On 25 August, together with elements of the 4th Mountain Division,it crossed the Adzapsch and $ancharo passes. On 28 August the troopscaptured Achavchar pass (1600 meters), which lay twenty kilometers southof the main divide and only one day's march from the coast.


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In the meantime, on 16 and 17 August, units of the Ist MountainDivision captured the important Klukhor pass on the Sukhumi militaryroad and secured the Elbrus passes on the left flank. In doing so, acombined patrol from the Ist and 4th Mountain Divisions surprised aRussian strong point located at the 4200 meter level on Mount Elbrus.

The mountain troops performed excellently. However, the early,difficulties at Stalingrad, the failure of the attack by the XLIVCorps in the forests south of Maykop, and the lack of mountain supplytrains forced higher headquarters to halt the offensive in the westernCaucasus, especially after it was realized that supplying the troopsby air across the main ridge was not practicable. 'Following thedecision to withdraw, the XLIV Mountain Corps was transferred to thewooded area of the Caucasus in order to revive the abandoned attack onTuapse.

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CHAPTER 3

PRINCIPLES OF MOUNTAIN COMBAT

I. BIBLIOGRAPHYThe manuals and pamphlets which were available to the German forces

prior to the attack in the Caucasus proved valuable.* The followingpublications are mentioned particularly:o1 "Leadership and Combat," Army Field Manual 300, 599-620o

2. "Required Training for Mountain Troops," inrainRegulations fo r Mountain Troops. *3, "Instructions fo r Infantry Mountain Warfare." Pamphlet.4. "Introductory Principles in Training and -ombat Utilization

of Ski Troops." Pamphlets5. Handbook of Winter Combat,6. "Engineer Operations During Winter0 " Pamphlet.7. "The Pack Animal: Pack Horses, Mountain Saddle Horses, andOz Teamsa" Army Manual 375.8. "Care of Weapons, Equipment and Ammunition in Winter,"

Manual 158.

*These manuals did not entirely anticipate, however, the possibilityof such an extensive mountain operation. Too little significance wasgiven to the importance of supply operations in the mountains,,

*"The Handbook of Military Mountain Climbing" was not publisheduntil 6 November 1943, and although prepared especially for alpine train-ing and very well illustrated, it was not available to the troops0 Itwas compiled, at the army mountain school at Fulpmes in the Tyrol andbased in part on the action in the Caucasus.


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IIo PRINCIPLES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MOUNTAIN TROOPSThe basic principles for th e employment of mountain troops as out-

lined in the publications indicated above proved to be correct ones. Thefollowing principles are particularly applicable:

1. The premises on which the training of mountain troops were predi-cated in peacetime are valid for combat. The equipment was adequateo

2. All movements proceed slowly in the mountains and require muchtime.

3. Officers and especially combat arms officers entrusted withindependent missions must be able to make long range decisions and assumeresponsibility; they must have extensive mountain experience and outstand-ing physical ability.

4. The commitment of available troops, which because of the networkof roads usually extends over a much broader area in mountains than onlevel terrain, requires that independently assigned combat groups be givenfull control over all medium artillery and all special units such as theengineers and supply trains which may be needed for independent, lengthycombat missions

5. The correct disposition of troops must be accomplished at theoutset. Any later displacement to the right or left is .difficult becauseof th e mountain crests usually lying between the flanks0 Subsequentchanges in the supply system to correspond with any new deployment areextremely time-consuming.

60 The attack on a specific objective can sometimes be carried outwith fewer forces than are needed for the defense of a single sector 0

7, The early utilization of motorized forces and air support cansave a great deal of blood and time and can assist in winning decisiveobjectives,III. ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT LEARNED IN COMBAT

1. An efficient, sufficiently strong air force, once it has acquiredthe necessary specialized experience, is able to harass enemy daytime move-ments even in narrow mountain valleys

2, Factors such as the snow line, weather, and avalanches necess-tate a distinction between the location of summer and winter emplacements.

3. Fairly large glaciers can be defended with comparatively fewtroops by including crevasses and seracs (fragments of glaciers) insideone's main battle position.


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4a Moving into a mountain position and establishing a fire plan byadjustment firing of th e medium artillery requires considerably more timeand ammunition -than 'on level terrain5, Artillery Oerations

a The employment of mountain artillery both as single ple'esand by platoons at the point of attack proved successful. dne artillerypiece with a greater than normal amount of ammunition is more effectivethan several pieces each with the normal amount of ammunition. The oldprinciple, "preferably fewer weapons with more ammunition than manyweapons with little ammunition" should be adhered toob. A greater use must be made of observation posts located onthe right and left of a position, since the nature of the terrainfrequently permits observation only from the flanks0 However, an ele-vated observation post, if available, is to be preferred to one situatedon the flank,c. The practice of using a forward artillery observer from a

medium artillery battalion with combat groups attacking in a narrow,deep formation along a valley proved very successful. The observer, whoaccompanies the forward element, must be able to direct the fire of thebattalion in case of sudden enemy resistance0 In a fast moving attackwith rapidly displacing batteries, it was found effective to furnishthe forward observer with three or more radio teams to assist him indirecting artillery fire. The teams operating in relays formed anadvance communications system which was not interrupted even by rapid,forward movements over long distances and over terrain technically un-suited to the establishment of telephone communication lines.

d, In both offensive and defensive operations on the broadfront which la y diagonally across a valley, th e medium arti l lery unitsunder regimental control were used either independently in mass or inbattalions combined with mountain arti l lery batteries. It was foundadvantageous to set up two telephone switchboards one behind the l inefor communication with the firing positions and one forward fo r communi-cation with battery observation posts, th e battalion forward observer,and the artillery commander of the mountain units.

e, Forward observers found the information contained in"Introductory Principles for the Training of Tank Observers and forFiring from Tank Observer Cars," Artillery Pamphlet 24 , of value, es-pecially the section on designation of targets by thrust lines and bypreviously established reference points using azimuths and ranges (polarcoordinates )

6, In the mountains a platoon, contrary to the usual practice onlevel terrain, is th e smallest tactical unit which can carry out

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CHAPTER 4

M4APS, CGIMUNICATIONS, AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

I. MAPS AND COMPASSES*1, The old 1s42,000 Russian map, which was the only one available forissue to troops at the beginning,; was very inaccurate2., The 1100,000 Russian 'map with German overprint was usable as anorientation map except in high mountain terrain,3,:The 50,000 Russian map with German overprint was especially goodfor combat use in the high mountain areaso This map is most suitable fornormal use.4. The most efficient altimeter, which was also suitable for use asa barometer, was the one made by the Lufft Manufacturing Company.'5, The ordinary prismatic compass used by the German Wehrmacht is notsuitable for use on difficult glacial terrain; the Bazard declinator isthe only one suited for use on glaciers,

II o C 4MUNICATIONS1, For distances up to five kilometers, especially when visualcontact between units separated by deep valleys was possible, the Navyflag system, which has long been used by German mountain forces, proved tobe the simplest means of communication*

The maps, 1l1,000,000 and 1:s2000,000, issued by the German ArmyGeneral Staff were very useful as general maps. The Army General Staffpublication, "Military Geography of the Caucasus," was a good referencefor orientation purposes, Unfortunately combat activities left no timefor checking the data and correcting it.

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2. Telephones During the advance two trunk circuits were installedbehind the omaln combat groups by the division signal battalion. Toachieve such a feat presupposes a maximum degree of efficiency. In thehighest mountain ranges, as in those of medium height, telephone cablesmust be raised as high as possible above the surface. It proved effectiveto lay the telephone lines approximately fifty meters to one side of theroute of advance, in order to avoid disturbing the cables where the routewas widened by felling trees or blasting. The practice of laying aparallel ground to extend the range of a single telephone station--onewas extended as far as two kilometers at Klukhor pass-greatly improvedaudibility. In this way good audibility was obtained without the use ofamplifiers.

3. Radio Communications The sites for radio stations in themountains must be selected with special ca:re. High antennas are a pre-requisite for good communication between two stations separated from oneanother by a mountain ridge, so that the angle created by hypotheticallines drawn between the tops of the two antennas and between the top ofan antenna and the top of the intervening ridge is as small as possible.Mounting antennas on tree tops stripped of their foliage proved to beespecially successful, In order to secure good signal communications,radio stations often had to be set up far away from th e command post; orintermediary stations had to be established. Atmospheric disturbancesfrequently disrupted electric communications. Even during the summer,heavy fogs and thunder storms can completely paralise radio communi-cations in the mountains. In the high Elbrus region atmospheric dis-turbances are particularly prevalent from 1500 hours until 0500 hoursda ly.III, SPECIAL FACTORS

1. A trained military mountain guide must be assigned to eachplatoon as an advisor, unless the platoon leader himself has the necessarymountaineering experience.

2. Dangers in the Mountain.a. Special attention must be given to the danger of avalanches

and their prevention (Appendix A),b. If at all possible, separate routes should be selected forascents and descents.c. Rope railings should be constructed at difficult points.d. Ice bridges across glacial crevasses must be checked daily.


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3, Marking the Trail0a. On dangerous glaciers and in rocky regions, routes of

advance and communications lines between positions must be marked bycairns or poles, and when possible with red flags,

b. On particularly rough terrain, road signs should alsoinclude compass readings to the various locations.c. In glacier regions remote from the enemy, simple noise

devices, made of metal cartridge cases which are jangled by the almostever present wind, have proved effective.

4. Mountain Eouipment.a. In high, snow-covered mountains skis are indispensable asa means of travel.*b, In a region where there is danger of avalanches, each unitmust be equipped with red avalanche ropesoc, For normal movement over glaciers the four-pronged, lightcrampons, the so-called Groedeln such as are used in the Austrian Alps,are sufficient. Ten- or twelve-pronged crampons are necessary only forpassage over particularly difficult ice.d, Snow goggles for each man are an absolute necessity for all

operations above 2000 meters.

According to the most recent experiences, she skis (one and one-half meters long) are best suited for military use in high mountaincountry,

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CHAPTER 5

SUPPLY*

I. SUPPLY PRINCIPLESBased on the availability of roads and paths and on the steepness of

the terrain, supplies were progressively forwarded by motor vehicles;four-wheeled, horse-drawn vehicles; two-wheeled, horse-drawn vehicles;pack animals; and finally porters .

Motorcycles equipped with caterpillar treads fulfilled a specialfunction by providing a means of transportation from the motor vehiclesto the pack animals and eliminating the necessity of horse-drawn vehicles.The sleds proved their usefulness here as well as elsewhere in Russia,as an emergency measure in transporting supplies during the muddy seasons.

Of the varied means of transport, the division supply officer hadonly motor vehicles and horse-drawn supply train vehicles at his disposal;the pack animal and porter units still had to be organized. To bringsupplies from the depots, motorized trains had to be improvised from theSThe supply services and the combat troops succeeded in assuringadequate supplies for a considerable length of time even at the highest

passes, in spite of the totally insufficient preparations for supplyoperations. This should not obscure the fact that any success was achievedonly through the maximum effort of the German .troops, thoroughly trainedin peacetime and unswervingly determined in their fight against Bolshevism,under the leadership of daring, high-calibered officers.

*The mountain troops did not have helicopters. In future operationshelicopters should be provided and used in fighting, carrying supplies, --an d evacuating the wounded. Note the experiences of the United Nationstroops in Korea with helicopters, and their most recent use by th e SwissHimalaya Expedition.


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units" vehicleso Supply dumps must be located at the extreme limitwhich can be reached by motor vehicles, These bases must be stocked inadvance to offset periods of bad weather or supply shortages due toother causes. The supply bases at the operational l imit of motorvehicles is stocked with four weeks supply, and th e combat bases stockedfor two weeks.

Troops not assigned to the front lines must not be allowed to draw onsupplies intended for combat troops.

Entirely different principles than those valid for supply operationson level terrain apply to operations in the high mountains away from thelarger roads and routes. The negotiability of terrain and weatherconditions, rather than the enemy's position are the determining factorsin supply operations. Long-range .planning and strict, uniform managementof supply services are required to a greater than usual degree.

Only energetic officers, with clear insight, a talent for organization,the ability to improvise, and with an exact knowledge of supply items willbe able to meet the high requirements and find the right procedures indifficul t situations,II, EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS M'EANS OF TRANSPORT

1i Motor vehicles. Attention is again called to the particularimportance of motorcycles equipped with caterpillar treads,

S Of the horse-drawn vehicles only the Ipanye't type vehicle and the_Russian military vehicle equipped with brakes proved usable; neither thevehicle of German manufacture, which is common here, nor-the Germanmilitary vehicle, which is much too heavy, could be employed, The two-wheeled, rubber-tired military vehicle type 8 with a loading capacity upto 150 kilograms was useful

3m ck animals. The assignment of pack animal trains to divisionsupply services:::proved to be absolutely necessarys eight pack animaltrains of 200 animals each for a division.

.4 Porters must be able to carry at least fifteen kilograms; theircapacity decreases very rapidly, however, at altitudes above 3000 meters,

5. The most important auxiliary means of transportation over steepterrain was th e cable railway

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III. SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIRED FOR A REINFORiED REGIMENTALCBAT TEo (Approximately 3,000 men and 1,000 horsesa)

1. Daily Supply Requirements.at Foodstuffs fo r troopss four and one-half tonsb. Oats and other grains: three tons,.e. Hay (fall through spring only)s three tonsod. Ammunitions five tonsTotals fifteen and one-half tons.

2, Minimum Transportation Facilities Required.Approximately 900 pack animals are needed, each carrying anaverage load of fifty kilograms in a triple relay system. Porters musttransport supplies up to the front lines; there must be at least oneporter battalion for every four 150-man companies,On the average the distances covered from army supply baseswere: by motor vehicle, 60 to 120 kilometers; by motorcycle equippedwith caterpillar treads, forty kilometers; by horse-drawn vehicles,forty kilometers; by pack animals, up to seventy kilometers.

IVo REGULATION (F TRAFFIC ALONG SUPPLY ROUTEThe following organization proved effective in regulating traffic

along narrow mountain roads:e1 A road commander with the necessary subordinates and roadrepair detail to inspect the roads and to insure the rapid repair ofdamaged sections.

2. Oneway traffic controlled by road signs, on short stretches ofroad where there is poor visibility.3. Road blocks on longer stretches of road with poor visibility,to maintain one-way traffic. In using road blocks these arrangementswere practicables

ao The assignment of one officer and three assistants at thebeginning and end of the block.b. The installation of a telephone line between the two endpoints; and a maintenance man assigned,c. The assignment of a traffic guard at each end of the roadblock. The barriers must be closed during periods of light traffic andshould be lighted at night, The guards must warn drivers of any diffi-culties, report immediately any road damage, and prevent unauthorizedpersons from using the roads.d. The officer in command of the road block must have authority

to enforce the traffic regulations on officers of higher rank.

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CHAPTER 6

PEONNEL PRBLIc~

Io SELECTION AND TRAININGTroops must be trained and prepared during peacetime for highmountain warfare. Personnel for new activations and replacements mustbe selected and trained in time. Troop commanders must be specially

trained, not only in technical mountain lore but also in th e tacticsof mountain combat Officers and enlisted men with previous experience.in mountaineering must be trained as alpine technical advisors andmilitary mountain guides. All members of mountain units must possess ahigh degree of physical stamina so that they can be fully utilized ataltitudes above 3000 meters after a short period of acclimatization.All mountain troops must be trained to ski long distances with heavyloads, Mechanized units must have personnel who are familiar withloading and unloading pack animals with weapons and equipmento Other-wise they must rely on the help of the native population in an emer-gency; and the natives may be inclined to commit sabotage or otherwisebe unsatisfactory. It is impossible to wage mountain warfare withoutsufficiently welltrained personnel to handle pack animals.II. A MENT

Mechanized units committed in the high mountains must be providedwith appropriate equipment. Cooking kits, water barrels, packsaddles,and pack reels must be furnished in sufficient quantities. Packsaddles,carrying baskets, saddle blankets, check ropes, and similar items can beimprovised in small unit workshops, but these makeshifts cannot completelytake the place of standard equipment.

The machine gun type 42 proved satisfactory even in the highmountains; no particular difficulties arose. It would be practical to

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introduce, in place of the awkward ammunition boxes used with MG 42,canvas bags holding about 150 rounds, which can be carried slung over theshoulders* Attempts to transport the dismantled 4,2-cm antitank gun andthe Russian 4o5-cm antitank gun across the passes were unsuccessfuls theweight of the dismantled partsA~etoo great for the pack animals. Itwas possible to transport the\,20=mm antiaircraft gun, advantageouslyused in air defense even in the -pases, by distributing its parts intoeight pack animal loads. The medium 8=cm mortar was obviously inferiorto the Russian 12 cm one The 8=cm mortar was not effective in snow-covered terrain and on glaciers. Only one report favorably mentioned thelight mountain infantry ~un."

In the mountains, even more than on level ground, vital importanceis attached to the well-aimed, single shot. For this reason all troopsexpressed the desire that their weapons be equipped with telescopicsights. Without such an aid the probability of a hit on the first roundis extremely small because of the frequently rather long range.III. CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The special clothing issued to mountain troops, which included areversible ,parka an d field trousers, was excellent, although these twoitems were available only in limited quantities. The mountain boots usedby the German Wehrmacht generally proved good. Occasional cases of frost-bite could not be entirely avoided and were chiefly due to the manner inwhich the soles of the boots were nailedo, Opinions differed greatlyon the manner in which the cuffs of the field trousers should be fastenedaround the legs. One group found the wrapped leggings of the fieldtrousers unsatisfactory because they restricted freedom of movement andsuggested that the trousers be fastened below the knee with long woolenstockings and canvas leggings0 Another group favored the clothing as ithad been issued****

. The so-called disintegrating steel belt was not developed until 1943.eIt appears that these guns were seldom employed and their issue tothe mountain infantry battalions might be discontinued, providing themountain artillery regiments are appropriately equipped with type 36mountain guns"RMn the basis of recent experiences in mountain expeditions by

civilian sportsmen, the most suitable equipment fo r such purposes is thefelt-lined mountain boot with rubber=tread soles.****The writer is of the opinion that the clothing worn by the Italianmountain troops is more suitable, especially because of the numerous combi-nations which are possible. This clothing consists of a hat with a highbrim turned up in back, which furnishes protection against sun and rain,and a knitted, close-fitting cap to go with it; a turtleneck sweater; parka,long, woolen stockings; woolen shirt; loose-fitting blouse; knee-lengthtrousers; canvas leggings; combination mountain and ski boots with rubber.tread soles; and a rain cape of a loden-like material for protectionagainst both rain and snow.

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IVo FOODIt is particularly important to choose high calory foodstuffs which

at the same time do not occupy much room, such as canned meats andvegetables, bacon which has been prepared to keep for long periods oftime, dehydrated vegetables and potatoes, hard-baked bread or crackers.Raw potatoes and legumes are not suitable because it takes too long tocook them at high altitudes and requires too much fuel, which is diffi-cult to supply. As supplementary rations chocolate, dried fruits, andgrape sugar are good. Concentrates for th e animals, since hay and grainoccupies too much space in the supply columns, were used successfully.

All units requested that the large company field kitchens be re-placed by smaller stoves. Gasoline stoves were found to be particularlygood, but th e stoves using solid fuels, such as the Esbit type, did notgive sufficient heat at altitudes above 3000 metew.Vo HEALTH

For operations at altitudes above 3000 meters it is especially im-portant to select troops who have the proper physical stamina. It wasproved that any healthy mountain infantry soldier between the ages ofeighteen and thirty-five who has good health habits and who is properlyfed is capable of meeting the physical requirements imposed by mountainoperations above 3000 meters. Cases of frostbite were encouraginglyrare because of appropriate preventive measures such as adequate pro-tective clothing, continual checking by the unit commanders, and frequentchanging of sentries. The lack of ambulance sleds to evacuate the woundedwas a great disadvantage,* A porter company must be placed at the dis-posal of each medical company to transport the wounded to the nearestmotor vehicle point, unless evacuation can be accomplished by helicopter.A trained and experienced physician must be permanently assigned to eachcompany committed in the high mountains.

After a prolonged drinking of snow water or melted ice, several casesof diarrhea were noted. Snow or glacier water apparently lacked theminerals normally contained in spring water.

*Rescue sleds with boat-type, metal runners, which were introduced byRed Cross mountain rescue stations as a result of experiences gained inRussia and Finland, are particularly well suited,"Himalayan mountain experts, those who climbed Nanga Parbat forinstance, recommend that salt be added to snow water. However, no illeffects were observed even when this practice was not followed. Apparent-ly at high altitudes th e men did drink too cold water.

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CHAPTER 7

CONSTRUCTION WORK

I. ROADS AND BRIDGESAll-weather roads extended far into the mountains in most eases, The

gradients on these roads never exceeded the capacity of the motor vehicles.By dint of continual repair the roads were kept in good condition. Themountain paths used by cart and pack animals were also kept in repair bysmall road details. Although most of these paths had been well laid outoriginally, they did have to be improved fo r use in supply operations. Newconstruction of cart roads was not feasible because of a lack of construc-tion workers and time. The pack animal paths were improved as far as thepasses by prisoner of war labor details, These trails entailed lengthydetours in order to minimise th e danger of rock slides and avalanches andto have the least angle of incline. Since pack animals could move onthese trails even in snow one meter deep, there was no necessity for thesubsequent construction of separate roads for winter use.

Numerous small, wooden bridges across mountain streams and rivers wereconstructed or repaired for the use of porters and pack animals. The typesof bridges which were already there proved to be completely satisfactory.A mountain engineer company built a large, stone crib bridge in five days,despite high water during the period of construction. At the bridge sitethe river was thirty meters wide, two and one-half meters deep, and flowedat a speed of five meters per second. The sinking of bridge piling andeven th e floating of pontons were completely out of the question due tothe violent disturbance of the river. All bridge projects were carried onat a decided disadvantage, since the construction equipment had been left300 kilometers away from the Caucasus front, The bridge engineer truckshad to be used for troop transportation.

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Special preventive maintenance measures must be taken to keep thevalley roads clear of snow in the winter,*

II EMPLACEENTS

No experience in the construction of planned military emplacementswas acquired, since neither time nor supplies were sufficient for buildingthem, At the passes and other front-line locations the usual installationswere erected, using stones, snow, and ice as building materials, andtraditional construction methods were followed0

There is no available information on laying mine fields on valleyroads, In the opinion of the commanding officer of th e 54th MountainEngineer Battalion th e use of mines in high mountain passes is feasibleonly in the spring on the crusted snow and glacier ice and during thesummer, In th e fall and winter the surfaces of th e passes an d r idges isso continuously altered by the daily winds and snowstorms that mines wouldbe buried deeply under the snow and be useless.'

II1 SHELTE1SParticular importance should be accorded the construction of shelters

in high mountain areas. If there are no.regularly constructed sheltersavailable, improvised shelters, making use of snow or ic e caves, can beused, These were successful ly utilized in the Caucasus. Other than tempo-rary shelters, sometimes set up with help of tent squares, stone huts wereused, which had double inner walls of wood filled with moss for insulation.A strong wooden frame, reinforced on all sides to withstand thrust an dpressure, prevented the stone wall, which had been braced with iron bars,from collapsing. To provide additional protection against high velocitywinds, enemy shell fire and bombs, another stone wall, one meter thick,was erected around th e hut approximately one meter awayre*** None of the

The Organisation Todt Winter Service Handbook proved especiallyvaluable during winter warfare in Russia, A ll the details of preparatorymeasures, necessary equipment and th e l ike are discussed.

**There are other, more favorable reports on the use of mines in thefar north during winter, even though drifting snow and weather conditionsin that area are s imilar in many respects to . those of the high hmountains

***One platoon suggested in its report that the huts not be built inspots protected from the wind as they usually were, since shoveling one'sway out after a heavy snowfall required a great amount of unnecessaryeffort. General experience, however, including that gained in constructingshelters in the far north and on all high mountain expeditions, does notsupport this suggestion. The main purpose of this shelter is to provide.protection from the cold wind, and for this reason it must always be builton the lee side of a natural barrier.

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logs used in building should be more than two and one-half meters inlength; otherwise it is impossible to transport them by pack animal.For th e construction of shelters at base installations located nearerthe valley, the block construction proved best,

Finnish plywood huts, which can be dismantled and transported bypack animal, were especially good as temporary shelters. Reconnais-sance patrols at high altitudes used the excellent Zardsky type double.sleeping bag.

To have light in a shelter is vitally necessary, Candles andpetroleum lamps were found superior to electric lights, because it waseasier to supply petroleum than electric light bulbs Candles and oillamps also provided warmth. Even in summer it is mandatory that eachman carry a woolen blanket as part of his equipment. Captured Russianfur sleeping bags were highly prized by the troops in the Elbrus areao*

ai ght, down quilts, which take up extremely little space when rolledand used by all high mountain expeditions, should always be available forspecial operations. They are considerably warmer and take up less spacethan the blankets ordinarily issued to troops of the German Wehrmacht.

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CHAPTER 8

TRANSPORTATION

I o MOTOR. VEHICLESeveral types of motor vehicles proved useful in th e Caucasus. The

motorcycle equipped with caterpillar treads, manufactured by th e NSU andOpel firms, can with a trailer transport 700 kilograms. Its averagegasoline consumption is 100 kilometers per twenty-five liters, Its narrowgauge and exceptional maneuverability, which even permits its use inheavily wooded areas, is a particular advantage. The trailer, however, isto o narrow to accommodds unwieldy items. Only th e last third of its treadtakes hold on steep slopes, and the machine can slip backwards too easily.Since it also has a tendency to slip on side slopes th e vehicle must as-cend any steep hill in th e direction of the incline. Rain-soaked hill-sides and mud more than fifty centimeters deep limit the maneuverabilityof the motorcycle.

Lightweight vehicles of the Volkswagen type were good on any terrain,The two and one-half ton standard diesel truck was also good on any type ofground. The 1.3 and 8 ton prime movers, the Steyr A 1500 type used as acommand ear, the three ton Mercedes L 3000 type, and the three ton OpelBlitz were all used and were good on any terrain for which they were suited.However, none of these vehicles were used on snow-covered terrain. Themotorcycles with caterpillar treads were used generally only on th e valleyroads.

*The motorcycles with caterpillar treads also worked well in deep snowin the far north. They can be driven along the sides of roads in snow asdeep as forty centimeters. In th e winter a sled can be used in place ofth e usual trailer.

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Technical defects were noticed particularly. Uncased brakes failedand water penetrated the differential gear and crank case, as a resultof driving through fords, which was frequently unavoidable, and throughheavy rainstorms. Motor vehicles used in the mountains will have agreater tire wear, a 75 percent higher gasoline consumption, and 100percent higher oil consumption than normal.

11. PACK ANIMAISExperience in the Caucasus revealed that it is best, as elsewherein Russia, to use the native pack animals and vehicles on difficult ter-rain during the rainy and muddy periods . Pack animals suffered lessstrain when they carried loads than when they were used to pull cartsalong poor, stony mountain paths.The small, native mountain donkey proved to be particularly usefuloIt is capable of carrying loads weighing forty kilograms over long dis-tances. It cannot be used after fairly heavy snowfalls, This animal isnot at all particular about his fodder and even eats the foliage ofoleander and rhododendron bushes, which are among the most common plants

in the Caucasus. A complicated packsaddle is not required; an old skinand a few bags in place of the hampers are sufficient,The mule, which has long been used by all troops, continued to giveexcellent service. Mules can be used in snow as deep as one meter ifthe paths are marked fo r them in advance; they move faster than donkeys,Their average carrying capacity is from sixty to 100 kilograms, and someespecially strong mules can carry loads of 120 kilograms, Their com-

parative high requirement in fodder is a disadvantage. The Russianhorses of the "panye" type, especially the small, wiry strains, servedvery well as pack horses; and they have a very low food requirement.The practice of unloading the animals completely even for a fifteenminute rest period paid good dividends. If the rest period was to bemore than one hour long, the animals should be unsaddled.

similar experiences were had by the author during action in .he farnorth where reindeer and boat-type sled runners were used,

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CHAPTER 9

THE ENEMY

The Russians were inferior in aggressiveness, mountain climbing, andleadership, but showed themselves to be masters in the exploitation ofterrain, camouflage, and the rapid construction of hasty field fortifi-cations, They were skilled in the use of tricks, For example, a Russiancombat patrol would hide for days in the debris created by an avalanchein the hope of enticing a German platoon into ambush. The Russians didnot undertake daring operations in the rear of German troops, but insteadstubbornly continued to attack known German military positions, evenafter having suffered heavy, bloody casualties. Antitank rifles werevery successfully employed by the Russians even at altitudes above 3,000meters, to cause rock fragmentation and ricochets.

The Russians were inferior to the Germans in all aspects of equip-ment and training. Some of their better items of equipment included mapsof the Elbrus region, warm clothing and fur sleeping bags, oil for theRussian leather mountain boots, and the easily digestible and tasty hard-baked bread.

The support given us by the mountain people, who were usually friend-'ly to the Germans' especially the Karaschaians, was very good. Thesepeople rendered yeomen service, particularly as mountain gides . Opinionsdiffer as to the suitability of using local inhabitants for th e trans-portation services. In general, they probably could, like all the natives,give valuable help.

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APPENDIX AAVALANCHES

I, PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES1, Check weather and snow conditions before starting out. The finer

the snow flake the greater its specific gravity. The colder the temper-ature of the snow the more powerful are the pressures which hold the snowmasses together, and correspondingly, the danger of- avalanches is less.Examine maps for slopes especially threatened by avalanches. The inter-national map symbol for avalanche areas may appear on the ski maps, butone must not be lulled into inattention on slopes not marked by thissymbol on the maps.

2. Establish the proper intervals before starting.3. Take safety and rescue equipment including avalanche ropes; skiteams and.larger groups should be equipped with snow probes and shovels.Fasten the avalanche rope around the body and not to the knapsack.4, Select the proper trail to be followed. A U-shaped valley,

which has a fairly broad floor, is always safer than a narrow, V-shapedone. In narrow valleys, as a general rule, -one should walk along thebase of the warmer slopes in cold winter weather and along the base ofthe cooler, more shaded slopes in warm spring weather, Ridges, crests,and spurs are always safer than the slopes, hollows, and ravines, Everysteep slope must be well probed. Detours, even long ones, are not to beshunned. If slopes have to be crossed, follow the upper edge, perhapseven directly under the rocks, rather than the lower one, Tracks leftby previous parties should not be followed without further investi-gation if they lead into avalanche areas. If slopes must be crossed andthere is danger of avalanches, a caterpillar-like movement by the groupis best, especially if the route is downhill. In this method the firstman proceeds from one safe point to the next and waits there until theothers, coming singly, have caught up with him, before he proceeds to thenext safe point, In a fog the same trail should be used when returningwhich was used when going. Generally the lee side is safer from ava-lanches than the shaded, winward sideo One should be careful of abruptslopes, especially those at the base of ridges and snow drifts. One

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must watch for local snow fences. The trail selected for the descentshould not be too steep.

5. Maintain a safe interval of about thirty meters between personswho are roped together; an even safer precaution is to have 150 to 200meters between each member. Pack bindings should be loosened and handsremoved fromn wrist straps of the ski poles.

6. The nose and mouth should be covered with a cloth to prevent themfrom becoming elogged with snow.

7. If for urgent reasons it should be necessary during either theascent or the descent to cross an area imminently threatened by an avalanche,the area should be negotiated on foot without skis either at the fall lineor the edge, The same intervals between footsteps should be maintained andt ransverse lines avoided. If each man walks exactly in his predecessor asfootprints, the snow is tamped down firmly and crenelated. Ice axes orinverted ski poles should be rammed in deeply,

8. Hollows where avalanches threaten should be crossed with a safetyrope; otherwise th e use of the safety rope is not advisable

9. Rest periods should be taken only at points which are definitelyknown to be safe from avalanches,

10. Under conditions of poor visibility all members of th e group shouldremain together. If necessary, skis should be removed and th e groupdescend on foot, keeping close together along the fall line. If the descentis nade on skis, a connecting rope is used to ensure that th e party staystogether .

II. WHAT TO DO WHN CAUGHT IN AN AVALANCHEWhen one is caught in f ront of a descending avalanche, it is possible

that a quick dash on skis to either side may avert being overtaken by theslide. If this is not possible, then the ski bindings should be unfastenedand the skis removed immediately, and each individual should anchor himselfto any firm object obstructing the path of the avaianche, If this cannotbe done, the individual must try to remain on th e surface of the avalancheby making swimming motions with his arms and legs, The most important thingis to keep ones head clear and work one's way to th e edge of the avalanchepath. The arms should be raised out of th e snow, If th e snow is loose an dpowdery, it is a good idea to bite firmly on any reachable bit of one'sclothing in order to prevent the penetration of snow into th e respiratorysystem.' As soon as the avalanche has stopped moving, a buried personshould try to get into a crouching position, and hold out his arms and handsas a screen in front of his chest and face,. In this way he can exercise acertain counter-pressure and avoid having his chest crushed by the weight

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of the snow and make sure there is a breathing space in front of hismouth. Often a person buried by an avalanche will remain conscious andalive for a long period. It is very important to conquer the firstfeeling of panic and remain calm. The most dangerous moment occurs whenth e avalanche actually stops moving, for it is then that th e masses ofsnow are quickly compressed into a wall of ic e which envelops th e victimlike a sheet of armor. He should attempt to get at least one arm freeand out of the snow and work his way out, He should make no violentmovements and should not try to shout, for this merely uses up preciousbreath. He should not call out until rescue parties are in his vicinity,He should stand perfectly still if a signal pipe is used by th e rescueparty. If the victim is able to move his arms and hands, he should tryto enlarge his breathing space.IIIo SEARCH AND RESCUE METHODS (according to Paulcke)

Basic Rules Remain calm, observe carefully, consider all possi-bilities and then act quickly but not rashly. Steps to be followed inrescue operations:

1. Watch for victim; keep an eye on the point at which his bodydisappeared; observe carefully th e direction of th e flow of the snow massin order to determine the point to which th e body may have been dragged.Special attention should be paid to whether the line of flow may have beenshifted by some terrain feature below the point at which th e body disappeared from sight, and whether the victim may have been caught by anobstructing object or carried beyond it in such a way that he may be lying,on th e sheltered side of it.

2. Determine th e manner in which th e avalanche has come to rest. Itmay come to a stop gradually on either a slope or on level ground, result-ing in a wedge-shaped field. In this case th e victim is usually buriedfairly near th e surface. The avalanche may be dammed by some obstructionin its path such as a hammock or a lateral moraine, resulting ordinarilyin a heavily compressed avalanche field. In this case rescue is difficult,because of th e closely packed snow,

3. Be on the lookout for secondary avalanches; if possible, stationwatchers to warn of their approach.

4. With a ski pole or similar object mark th e points at which thevictim disappeared from sight, his probable location in th e avalanchefield, and parallel reference points on th e side of th e avalanche in caseof subsequent slides dislodge th e field markers.5. Search th e avalanche field from th e point of disappearance downmwards for signs of ayr objects lost by the victim or of any projecting

portions of his body or equipment such as his avalanche rope.

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6, Listen carefully for shouts or sounds of knocking Rescurersmust periodically observe a brief period of complete silence.

7. If the victim was accompanied by only one person and if allefforts on the latter's part to locate the point at which the.victim isburied have failed, help must be summoned immediately from the valleyor from the nearest mountain base. It is, of course, vitally im-portant to mark the location exactly before going for help. If thevictim was a member of a group, one of the group should go for helpwhile the others begin the search.

8, A systematic search, beginning at the lowest point of theavalanche field, must be made with snow probes or with inverted ski poleswith the leather loops removed. If probing is unsuccessful, excavationshould be started immediately. Search ditches should be cut deep enoughand close enough together to permit a thorough examination of thatportion of the avalanche field which has not yet been investigated withsnow probes. Thin, flexible metal tubes, which can be folded up ortaken apart when not in use such as the Lindemann, Bilgeri, and Paulcketypes, and Iselin type shovels can be used in this work. In an emer-gency inverted ski poles and the skis themselves can be used for probingand digging.IV. RESCUE PARTIES

In committing a resuce party, the following principles must be takeninto considerations

1. In an avalanche accident only rapid help is of any use,. and thispresupposes the commitment of a fairly large rescue crew provided withadequate rescue equipment. The first rescue crew must comprise at leasttwenty men,

2. Before starting out, the rescue equipment carried by the .group'andthe personal equipment of each man must be checkeds avalanche ropes, extraunderclothing, outer clothing, ski equipment, food rations carried inknapsacks.' It should be determined which participants are not insured,and an accident insurance policy immediately taken out for them.

30 The rescue crew should be composed of strong, healthy individualson whom inclement weather has little effect. Otherwise they are liable tocollapse after a few hours of performing the difficult work of probing.4o The chief of the group must be given clear, unequivocable

instructions. A reporting system of runners and signals must be workedout .exactly before the group departs on its mission.

5o Immediately after the departure of the first party, arrangementsmust be made for supplying it with additional rescue equipment, food, andreplacements. The man in charge of rescue operations is responsible forthiseo

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Documents

WWII 1st Mountain Division