June 3, 2016 VIA EMAIL & U.S. MAIL Nooksack Indian Tribe ATTN: HEARINGS PO Box 63 Deming, WA 98244 meetings@nooksack-nsn.gov RE: Written Statement in Response to Notice of Hearing Re: Banishment of Gabriel S. Galanda

Pursuant to Resolution No. 16-28

I. BACKGROUND

My name is Gabriel S. Galanda. I belong to the Round Valley Indian Confederation. I descend from the Nomlaki and Concow Peoples of today’s Northern California. My great great-great grandfather is Ira Charles Hoxie and great-great grandmother is Marry Ann Grist. My great-great grandfather is Eugene Wesley Hoxie and great-great grandmother is Maggie Pollard. My great grandmother is Mamie Grace Hoxie Pina and great grandfather is Clay Webster Jamison. My grandmother is Maxine Molly Jamison Pina and my grandfather is Peter Mortensen. My great grandmother and my grandmother were each born in Round Valley. My mother is Maxine Edith Mortensen and my father is Steve Galanda. I am Noxwtsí7qen—“Speaker” in the Nooksack Lhéchalose language—for 331 Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan (Nooksack) citizens. I speak for nearly 20% of the Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan Citizenry. I am also syá7ya—“friend and relative”—of those Nooksacks, and have come to love many of them as my own family. I am Noxwtsí7qen for not only the Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan Rapada, Rabang and Narte-Gladstone families—the “Nooksack 306”—but also for those of your relatives who are of the Adams, Alexander, Kelly, Johnny and other families. I am Noxwtsí7qen for some of your own children and next of kin. I have served as Noxwtsí7qen since getting called to Nooksack on February 16, 2013, and, with permission, first setting foot in Nooksack territory on March 8, 2013. I speak for your 331 relatives, who cannot speak for themselves; those who are in mourning and have been in mourning since at least late 2012. Today, I also speak for myself, having been denied my due process right to my own Noxwtsí7qen. I defend myself in the face of an undated and unsigned “Notice of Hearing” that says I am being “barred from Nooksack lands and Tribal Court.” A. Shared Asláq'alhsólh/Culture. According to my Peoples’ creation narrative, our world began with Water. The Water—a vast, blank sea—covered our entire world. From the Water, a Creator made the earth and man. We come from Water. According to the Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan creation story, you, too, come from the Water. You come from Ta P'óhom (“the Flood”). Your People—those who did not take what they had for granted

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and, thus, who were prepared for the Water—survived Ta P'óhom. Your People were reborn from Ta P'óhom. In this profound way—being of the Water—we are the same. We are not different. We, too, should be syá7ya7ya. My Peoples’ current homelands are the Round Valley Indian Reservation, which was originally established in 1863 as an Indian concentration camp. Eight tribes who today comprise the Round Valley Indian Confederation were forcibly located or kept there. Each of my named Nomlaki and Concow ancestors who came before my grandma were all laid to rest in our burial grounds in Covelo, California, at the heart of today’s Round Valley Indian Country. Their remains rest there today. But many of our Nomlaki ancestors never made it to Round Valley; they did not survive our own Trail of Tears, a treacherous walk over a desolate mountain pass, which the U.S. Cavalry forced upon them. As a U.S. Cavalryman noted: “[A]bout 150 sick Indians were scattered along the trail for 50 miles . . . dying at the rate of 2 or 3 a day. They had nothing to eat . . . and the wild hogs were eating them up either before or after they were dead.” Our Nomlaki-Round Valley legacy begins with genocide. Decades later, my great grandmother, who was of Nomlaki and Concow lineage, was issued a federal Indian allotment; today we herald her as an original allottee of the Round Valley Reservation. My great grandmother’s legacy is in great part how my relatives and I belong to Round Valley; how we track our lineage and heritage; how we belong. That is because when my grandmother was eight years old, she and her brother were sent hundreds of miles away from home, to Riverside Boarding School. My grandmother enlisted in the military and never returned to live in Covelo; she never learned our languages and many of our traditions were lost on her. Addiction, mental illness and domestic violence have afflicted my mother’s generation, causing further detachment from what makes us indigenous. Our family’s legacy—of removal and assimilation—mirrors your family’s legacy. As Noxwtsí7qen for your relatives, I am grateful have learned a great deal about your People and your history. Twenty years after my people were removed to Covelo, the United States attempted to remove your people from Nooksack indigenous lands to the Lummi Reservation. But your ancestors resisted removal and the United States military was by then no longer positioned to force their removal. Although your people were not provided reservation lands until 100 years later, your ancestors were afforded homestead allotments. Your ancestors were sent away to boarding schools. But for your elder George Adams—who has authorized me to use those certain Lhéchalose words that are mentioned herein—your indigenous language would be lost. Many of your indigenous traditions have also been lost. Instead, drug and alcohol addiction, gambling vice, mental illness, and violence against women afflict your People, and have especially overcome your Chairman and Council. My heart breaks for the countless Nooksack women who I know fear for their safety and their lives by way of your Chairman. Sadly, all of that affliction and vice has supplanted your asláq'alhsólh—your traditional ways, has left you beholden to greed and power—to xwenítem-ólh—and has caused your People so much anguish. Yet by way of the tragic loss of tradition, and the resulting affliction, we, too, are the same, as Indigenous People. Like you and your People, my People and I have survived. It is these commonalities that bind us, and that should not allow our division. Again, we should be syá7ya7ya. B. The Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan/Nooksack Tradition Of Noxwtsí7qen/Speaker. I am an attorney at law, licensed by and in good-standing with the Washington State Bar Association. I have practiced law continuously since 2000. I am admitted to practice law before Washington State courts, the U.S. District Courts for Western and Eastern Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals, the United States Court of Claims, the United States Supreme Court, and sixteen Tribal Courts throughout the country. I own and operate Galanda Broadman, PLLC, a law firm with offices in Seattle and Yakima, Washington, and Bend, Oregon. I have dedicated my life’s work to obtaining justice for Indian People. It is what I was called to do, and I am proud to do it, especially in sobriety. I was called to Nooksack on February 16, 2013 and first set foot at Nooksack on March 8, 2013. Again, traditionally speaking, I am Noxwtsí7qe, the appointed Speaker for at least 331 Nooksack citizens. In traditional Coast Salish and Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan ways, the Speaker carries great power and responsibility. The Speaker would speak in the Longhouse and other formal settings for relatives who could not or should not speak for themself, like those in mourning. The Speaker was always afforded great respect, traditionally. The Speaker was never dishonored. He was never affronted; he was certainly never “barred” from tribal territories; his livelihood was certainly never attacked. This proceeding, therefore, flies in the face of Coast Salish and Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan custom and tradition. Your relatives mourn their and their other relatives’ proposed disenrollment. They mourn their loss of human rights, like their termination from employment and denial of educational opportunity, housing assistance and health care. They mourn the lack of Nooksack General Council meetings and discourse. They mourn the lack of public Tribal Council meetings and decision-making. They mourn the cancellation of Tribal Council elections. They mourn the termination of the Tribal Court Chief Judge and closure of the Tribal Court to them. They mourn over attempts to bar me as Noxwtsí7qen. They mourn the dishonor to the Nooksack Constitution and the Nooksack rule of law. They mourn the complete breakdown of Nooksack democratic government and process. They mourn their loss of asláq'alhsólh. They mourn their loss of humanity. They mourn the loss of Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan. C. The Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan/Nooksack Tradition Of Kw'ómot/Adoption. The Nooksack 306 family members also mourn the dishonor of their lineage, especially by way of their ancestor, Annie George. Annie’s biological mother is Marie Siamat and her stepmother is Madeline Jobe. Her biological father is Matsqui George, Chief of the Nooksack Village of Matsqui. Annie never knew Marie, because Marie died two days after her birth. Chief Matsqui later remarried, Madeline Jobe, a Nooksack blood relative. As the non-Indian world deemed it “incest,” the Catholic Church was required to, and did, bless Chief Matsqui and Madeline’s marriage. In keeping with the Nooksack asláq'alhsólh—“tradition”—of kw'ómot—“taking over/taking care of a child as you would if she was your own”—Madeline became Annie’s mother. Madeline Jobe was the only mother Annie ever knew. So also, in the normative indigenous ways of kinship, adoption and belonging, Madeline was also Annie’s mother, as reflected on an 1881 Census. In 1942, Annie could not be found when the United States Census-takers arrived to Nooksack country. Annie’s biological brother Louie George was found. So he is listed on the 1942 Census as Nooksack, but she is not. Yet that omission by the United States does not make Annie or her direct lineal descendants non-Nooksack. That does not make them “frauds” or “erroneously enrolled.” Nor is it a fraud for them to claim Madeline Jobe as their ancestor, or the Jobe Allotment as part of their heritage, in keeping with the Nooksack asláq'alhsólh of kw'ómot. Nor should there be any claim that Chief Matsqui, Marie, Madeline, Annie and their direct lineal descendants are not of Nooksack lineage or at least “one-fourth (1/4) degree Indian blood” as contemplated by Nooksack law. Of course Nooksacks are a unique mix of Nooksack and other American Indian and Canadian First Nations blood. Blood quantum is immaterial to what it means to be indigenous or tribal—blood qua lineage can matter, but blood percentage is a colonial mode of tribal identity, for sake of Indian land dispossession and tribal extermination. But please realize that as many

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of you cannot establish any degree of American Indian blood—a concern that the Bureau of Indian Affairs expressed to the Tribe in 1980—your disenrollment exploits risk imperiling the Tribe’s very existence. You risk termination. See also Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927, Art. 12. I appreciate that the federal forces discussed above have dulled your sensibilities regarding what it really means to be indigenous, or tribal, or Nooksack—it is not an incomplete federal Census. But we are all being reeducated about what those things mean. It is not too late to look again at what it really means to be Nooksack. Nor is too late for the Tribe to devise a solution to its current disenrollment crisis, before the entire Tribe finds itself in ruin. Although the Tribal Constitution was amended at your behest to disqualify the Nooksack 306 from membership, readily obtainable solutions remain, including petitioning the United States to add Annie George on the 1942 Census; or adopting her direct lineal descendants into the Tribe like the Tribe did for four adult siblings in the Gladstone family. Indeed, your adopted Chairman—a benefactor of kw'ómot—admitted on August 30, 2013, that “the Tribal Council has the ‘option of adopting all 300 people into the Tribe.’” He said: “I know I should fill the gym up so we could all talk because I know that’s what needs to happen.” But blinded by his own afflictions, he has not allowed that to happen. But it is not too late. Kw'ómot remains a solution. D. Dishonor To Noxwtsí7qen And Nooksack Asláq'alhsólh/Traditional Ways. The undated and unsigned “Notice of Hearing” says: “On February 24, 2016, the Nooksack Tribal Council took emergency action barring [me] from Nooksack Tribal lands and Tribal Court.” This means I am being banished from Nooksack territories. The Notice references a Resolution No. 16-28. But I have never been provided a copy of Resolution No. 16-28, despite my and others’ multiple requests and a March 21, 2016, Order from since-terminated Nooksack Tribal Court Chief Judge Susan Alexander that Resolution No. 16-28 be produced. See Belmont v. Kelly, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, 13 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Mar. 21, 2016) (ordering the Clerk to produce Resolution #16-28 that same day). What I do know is moments before Resolution No. 16-28 was passed on February 24, 2016, Nooksack Chairman Bob Kelly said:

I have a resolution here to bar Gabe Galanda and his firm. For practicing in Tribal Court. Not for bullshit violation of a business code because he’s being a jerk . . . The real reason that I want to do this is not because of that stupid business license . . . .

Over three months later, I still do not know exactly what legislative action has been taken against me. In any event, the dishonor to me as Noxwtsí7qen, goes against Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan asláq'alhsólh. The Notice further says: “Although the hearing procedures provide for a maximum of thirty (30) minutes to present [my] case by oral argument during the hearing, the Chairman has agreed to allow you sixty (60) minutes, should you need additional time.” Nevertheless, the hearing process violates Nooksack asláq'alhsólh, most notably because it does not allow be to face my accuser. Indigenous People were not, and are not, banished without being able to confront those who seek to exile them. Nor have I been allowed my own Noxwtsí7qen as is my due process right. The process is a farce. E. Dishonorable Behavior Of Nooksack Tribal Attorneys/Xwenítem/Pástan. Resolution No. 16-28 was and this process was created by two Nooksack Tribal Attorneys: Raymond Dodge and Rickie Armstrong. Both are xwenítem or pástan. Both manifest xwenítem-ólh. Neither

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know anything about what it means to be indigenous or tribal. I am being barred or banished at their behest, because neither man could defeat me in any fair legal process. It is cowardice. Mr. Dodge used to work for the Quinault Nation as its Attorney General. Mr. Armstrong also used to work at Quinault. In 2013, Mr. Dodge caused another Seattle law firm, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, to be disbarred from the practice of law before the Quinault Tribal Court. Mr. Dodge brought this idea to Nooksack in February 2016, after losing several hearings to me and realizing that he would not be able to quickly, if ever, accomplish the disenrollment of the Nooksack 306 with me as Noxwtsí7qen. By February 24, 2016, Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong developed the new N.T.C. § 10.02.070’s “Disbarment and Discipline” provision. Actually, as the former Tribal Court Chief Judge explained, Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong “borrowed” (i.e., plagiarized) N.T.C. § 10.02.070 “nearly whole from the Tohono O’odham Rules of Court, Section 14, Code of Ethics for Attorneys and Advocates Practicing in the Courts of the Tohono O’odham Nation.” Belmont v. Kelly, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, 14 n.4 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Mar. 21, 2016). Mr. Dodge was present when Chairman Kelly’s “rationale” for Resolution No. 16-28 was offered. Mr. Dodge resigned as Senior Tribal Attorney in May 2016. While those xwenítem/pástan have devised this hearing process against me, including the April 18, 2016 “Procedures For Tribal Council Hearings,” both men have obstructed the administration of justice for me and my colleagues in Tribal Court, as the Nooksack Court of Appeals recently suggested. Galanda v. Nooksack Tribal Court, No. 2016-CI-CL-003, 2 n.2 (Nooksack Ct. App. May. 27, 2016). Indeed, in an April 1, 2016 unsigned letter from the Nooksack Tribal Court, the Tribe admitted that Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong provided the Clerk “legal counsel regarding whether a lawyer who is acting pro se is ‘practicing in tribal court,’” on an ex parte basis. Appendix A.1 Based upon Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong’s unethical and incorrect legal advice, the Clerk rejected my and my colleagues’ pro se lawsuit filings, which the former Chief Judge authorized. See Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 14 n.3 (“the Galanda Broadman attorneys have not lost their right to self-representation . . . .”). Mr. Armstrong has also caused:

• The Tribal Court Clerk to send me another unsigned letter on May 9, 2016, reminding us “that until such time as the Nooksack Tribal Council takes further action, the Nooksack Tribal Courts are bound by Resolution No. 16-28 barring [me] from practicing in the Tribal Court.” Appendix B. Mr. Armstrong ghostwrote for her: “Under Washington’s Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who is pro se is “representing a client.” Id. He is wrong. • Katherine Canete, the Tribe’s General Manager, to deny my law firm a Nooksack business license for purposes of legal practice at Nooksack on May 16, 2016. Appendix C. Mr. Armstrong ghostwrote wrote that Galanda Broadman, PLLC, “threatens the political integrity, economic security, peace, safety, morals, or general welfare of [the] Tribe.” Id. • Ms. Canete to deny my lawyers, Corr Downs, PLLC, a Nooksack business license on May 16, 2016, too, because, as Mr. Armstrong wrote, their firm also “threatens the political integrity, economic security, peace, safety, morals, or general welfare of [the] Tribe.” Appendix D.

1 The Appendices are intended to constitute “Exhibits” as contemplated by the Procedures for Tribal Council Hearings. Given the gravity of the allegations against me, I am unable to confine my response to ten pages, double-spaced.

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Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong have gone to astonishingly unethical lengths to eliminate me, and in particular, to deprive me of my own Noxwtsí7qen, as discussed below. They have done so, as xwenítem/pástan, via xwenítem-ólh, to eradicate those Nooksacks for whom I speak.2 Indeed, this is all a ploy to continue delaying a Tribal Council election, and “fast-tracking the disenrollment process at nearly every turn” as the former Tribal Council and counsel have conspired to do since 2013. Lomeli v. Kelly, No. 2013-CI-APL-2013-002 (Nooksack Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013).

II. GENERAL OBJECTIONS A. The Complainant Has No Legal Authority To Take Any Governmental Action On Behalf

Of The Nooksack Indian Tribe. The undated and unsigned “Notice of Hearing” document seems to come from the “Nooksack Tribal Council” insofar as it states that “the Nooksack Tribal Council will conduct a hearing” pursuant to N.T.C. § 10.02.070’s “Disbarment and Discipline” provision. This provision—added to the Nooksack Tribal Code moments before Resolution No. 16-28 was issued—allows the Nooksack “Tribal Council” to “revoke any privileges provided” and bar “from further practice in any administrative tribunal . . . before the Nooksack Tribal Court” any advocate who’s “behavior and/or practices reflect so poorly upon the proper administration of justice before the Nooksack Tribal Court.” The Nooksack Tribal Council is currently prohibited from taking any valid governmental action, however. As explained by Councilwoman Carmen Tageant:

The Tribal Council was required by law to conduct a general and primary election by March 19, 2016 for the purpose of electing new council members. The Tribal Council failed to do so. Four members of the Tribal Council’s term of office expires as of Marcy 24, 2016 . . . . The Tribal Council cannot govern because there are only four validly elected members of the eight member body and they can only act if a quorum (five) of members exists.

Appendix E (Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, Tageant v. Kelly, No. 2016-CI-CL-003, at 2 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Apr. 25, 2016) (citing Nooksack Bylaws, Art. II, §4). It is unclear who exactly the Notice of Hearing came from—i.e. who is the Complainant? Bob Kelly? Katherine Canete? The holdover Tribal Council? Rickie Armstrong? I suspect that it was issued by Tribal Council Chairman Bob Kelly, Councilmember Bob Solomon, Ex-Vice Chairman Rick George, Ex-Treasurer Agripina Smith, Ex-Councilmember Lona Johnson, and Ex-Councilmember Katherine Canete. I know it was written by Mr. Armstrong. These persons—or whoever issued the Notice—have no legal authority to take any governmental action on behalf of the Nooksack Indian Tribe. Per N.T.C. § 10.02.070, only the Nooksack “Tribal Council” may “revoke any privileges provided” or bar me “from further practice in any administrative tribunal . . . before the Nooksack Tribal Court.” Currently, though, there is no “Tribal Council.” Nor was there a “Tribal Council” on April 18, 2016, when “Procedures For Tribal Council Hearings” were apparently promulgated. Indeed, until an election is held at Nooksack, there can be no valid or legal governing body at all. Nooksack Bylaws, Art. II, §4. This process lacks any force or effect whatsoever. It is my respect for the rule of law— particularly tribal law—that compels me to even indulge the process, or submit this response statement.

2 Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong’s various exploits have exposed themselves to personal liability. See, e.g., Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 357 (Pa. 1986). They will each be dealt with, in time.

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B. The Notice Of Hearing Does Not Provide Sufficient Due Process Or Equal Protection. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, incorporated into the Nooksack Indian Tribe’s Constitution via Title IX, prohibits any “Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government” from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or depriv[ing] any person of liberty or property without due process of law.” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (emphasis added). 1. N.T.C. § 10.02.070 Is Unconstitutionally Vague. “[D]ue process of law . . . ensures that the individual need not ‘speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes’ and is ‘entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.’” Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)). This “void-for-vagueness” doctrine “incorporates notions of fair notice or warning” and “requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); see also Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”). N.T.C. § 10.02.070 reads, in relevant part:

Whenever the Tribal Council becomes aware that any advocate’s behavior and/or practices reflect so poorly upon the proper administration of justice before the Nooksack Tribal Court of the Nooksack Indian Tribe, the Tribal Council may revoke any privileges provided to such person(s) and bar them from further . . . proceeding before the Nooksack Tribal Court.

The statute fails the vagueness test on multiple levels. First, N.T.C. § 10.02.070 doesn’t even make sense grammatically. The subordinating conjunction “so” is missing its subordinate clause.3 What is more, the statute punishes advocates who are bad at reflecting—i.e., advocates who “reflect” (verb) “poorly” (adverb). This is nonsensical. Second, what could it possibly mean for an advocate’s behavior or practice to “reflect . . . poorly upon the proper administration of justice before the Nooksack Tribal Court”? It is for the Tribal Court itself to administer justice. An advocate’s behavior or practice has no role in how the Tribal Court’s administration of justice is perceived. A Tribal Court’s order should speak for itself. Third, even assuming that N.T.C. § 10.02.070 refers to an advocate’s behavior or practice in some other capacity, the statute does not hint as to what types of behavior or practices are prohibited.4 Arguably,

3 If drafted properly, the statute might read, for example: “Whenever the Tribal Council becomes aware that any advocate’s practices reflect so poorly (subordinating conjunction) upon the proper administration of justice before the Nooksack Tribal Court of the Nooksack Indian Tribe that the Tribal Court can no longer be taken seriously (subordinate clause), the Tribal Council may revoke any privileges provided to such person(s).” 4 It does not, for instance, prohibit conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration of justice”—a term that “is universally found throughout the legal and judicial system” as meaning “injurious, hurtful and detrimental to the orderly trial of the case before the court.” Howell v. State, 559 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Ironically, the Nooksack Court of Appeals has recently noted that the Complainants’ counsel is likely in violation of this ethical term. Galanda, No. 2016-CI-CL-002, at 2 n.2 (citing Wash. RPC 8.4(d)).

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publishing statements that critique the manner in which the Tribal Court administers justice might “reflect so poorly [sic]” upon the Court’s administration of justice, but in that case the statute would have to be narrowly construed as to not chill free speech. See, e.g., Wis. Right To Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A] statute will be struck down as facially overbroad if it ‘punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech . . . .’”) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003)). In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court aptly explained the reasoning of the void-for-vagueness doctrine:

It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government.

United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221(1875). Here, though, that is exactly what has occurred—but on another, more disturbing level. Not only has the Tribal Council set a “net large enough” to catch every advocate who represents political dissidents, but it has named itself as the entity to “say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.” Id. The Tribal Council, in other words, has named itself judge, jury and, of course, executioner and has armed itself with a statute so nebulous that every advocate admitted to the Nooksack Tribal Bar—whether practicing before the Nooksack Tribal Court or not5—is in the henchman’s sights. This is not due process. 2. Resolution No. 16-28 is an Ex Post Facto Law That is Prohibited by Title IX of the Nooksack

Constitution and 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(9). Title II of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, incorporated into the Nooksack Indian Tribe’s Constitution via Title IX, prohibits tribes from “pass[ing] any bill of attainder or ex post facto law.” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(9). As described by the U.S. Supreme Court:

The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. . . . The constitutional prohibition and the judicial interpretation of [the ex post facto doctrine] rest upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive, and that the criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused. . . . To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment—and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment . . . .

Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-41 (1997) (citation and quotation omitted).

5 See, e.g., Explanation of Exhibits Illustrating Galanda Ethical Issues [hereinafter “Explanation], at 1 (describing conduct before the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”)). I also object to this document in that it purports to have something to do with “Ethical Issues,” yet discusses aspects of litigation such as filing deadlines. See, e.g., id. at 2. As discussed in more detail below, failure to meet a filing deadline, while regrettable, “is neither immoral, unethical, oppressive, nor unscrupulous.” Peterson v. Capstead, Inc., No. CV 990432823S, 2000 WL 1658498, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2000). The Explanation is also libelous and its author will be dealt with in other proceedings.

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Here, Resolution No. 16-28 undoubtedly falls within the ambit of an ex post facto law to the extent that it applies N.T.C. § 10.02.070 “to events occurring before its effective date” of February 27, 2016. United States v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.C. 1985). The large majority of Complainant’s “documentation supporting the actions taken by the Tribal Council in adopting Resolution #16-28” consists of pleadings and related papers filed with the Nooksack Tribal Court and the IBIA prior to February 24, 2016 (when N.T.C. § 10.02.070 was purportedly passed via Resolution). And all of the referenced documents were filed prior to March 4, 2016, (when N.T.C. § 10.02.070 was provided to me by counsel for the Complainant, Tom Schlosser). Appendix F. 3. The Tribunal Is “Plainly Biased.” A touchstone of due process is an unbiased tribunal. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”); S. Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D.S.D. 2011) (“A fair and unbiased tribunal is a fundamental requirement of the Due Process Clause.”); All Am. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Corley, No. 16-0055, 2016 WL 1173120, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 22, 2016) (“[W]hen structural infirmities create inherent bias on the part of the adjudicator, due process is compromised.”) (citing cases); State ex rel. Kalt v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs for City of Milwaukee, N.W.2d 408, 412 (Ct. App. 1988) (“[A]n unbiased tribunal is a constitutional necessity in a quasi-judicial hearing and that the denial of such a tribunal is the denial of due process.”). Here, the Nooksack Tribal Court has already determined that the Complainant is “plainly biased” against my clients and I. Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 8. Thus, categorically, I will be deprived of due process if this matter is adjudicated by the Complainant. 4. N.T.C. § 10.02.070 is Being Applied in Violation of the Equal Protection Doctrine. As the Nooksack Tribal Court made clear in St. Germain v. Kelly, “[e]qual protection requires that persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” No. 2013-CI-CL-005, at 6 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Dec. 18, 2013) (quotation omitted). This applies to both “facial and as-applied challenges,” in that a statute may neither be facially discriminatory or discriminatorily applied. Britell v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (D. Mass. 2001). Here, N.T.C. § 10.02.070 is being discriminatorily applied. The evidence is replete:

• Between September 8, 1983, and February 24, 2016, no law firm was required to obtain a Nooksack Business License pursuant to N.T.C. Title 54. Longtime Nooksack Chairman Narz Cunanan does not recall any person ever having been required to obtain a tribal business license before February 24, 2016. Appendix G. • Again, on February 24, 2016, Chairman Bob Kelly said he wanted to “bar Gabe Galanda and his firm . . . [n]ot for bullshit violation of a business code because he’s being a jerk. . . .” Id. Indeed, there was not then, and has never been any legitimate reason, to banish me from Nooksack lands or bar me from practice in the Tribal Court—for want of a tribal business license or otherwise. • Again, on February 24, 2016, the former Tribal Council passed Resolution No. 16-27, to amend N.T.C. § 10.02.070 and adopt an “Advocates Code of Conduct” provision, thereby withdrawing lawyer disciplinary from the Tribal Court; and then Resolution No. 16-28, which

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apparently banished me from Nooksack lands and barred me from practicing in the Nooksack Tribal Court.

5. I Have Not Been Given Proper Notice. Due process also requires that I be given an opportunity to know the charges against me and the anticipated penalty. Fasheun v. Morgan, 211 F.3d 1268 (6th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Nunez-Rodriguez, No. 10-3713, 2012 WL 3527889, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (“A defendant has a right to know the charges against him and to have adequate information from which to prepare his defense.”); United States v. Bencent, No. 93-10093, 1995 WL 311747, at *1 (D. Kan. May 11, 1995) (“Due process requires, at a minimum, that the defendant know what charges have been brought against him and the penalties he faces if convicted, and that the defendant have such information in a timely enough fashion that he can make meaningful decisions about how to proceed with his case.”). This right exists so that I “may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present a defense.” Usher v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1992). “The starting point in the analysis” is “the information filed against” me. Id. And, here, this is where the analysis ends. Somewhat ironically, since I am being accused of acting unethically—despite an Order from the Nooksack Tribal Court instructing that the Complainant to produce Resolution No. 16-28 over two months ago6— I have not been provided the Resolution purportedly “barring [me] from Tribal lands and Tribal Court.” Belmont, No. No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 14; Notice of Hearing. In addition, the only document that I have been provided here, the Notice of Hearing, does not indicate whether I am being banished per Title 54 (i.e., “for bullshit violation of a business code,” Appendix G), per Title 10, or per some other provision of Nooksack law. It is difficult to imagine a more prejudicial hearing than one where, as here, I do not know what law applies, the charges have been brought against me, or the penalties faced if the Complainant’s “emergency action” is upheld. 6. I Have Denied Representation and Civil Counsel of My Choosing. Since February 26, 2016, we at Galanda Broadman, PLLC, have attempted to obtain a Nooksack business license, but to no avail. Appendix G. We have repeatedly been denied a license. See id. Since March 14, 2016, my lawyers at Corr Downs, PLLC, have also attempted to obtain Tribal business license in order to represent me and my firm. Appendix U. As of today, they also have been denied a license. See id. Both firms await responses to May 31, 2016, requests for reconsideration of their respective business license denials. Appendices U, W. Also on May 31, 2016, I submitted a Representation Form to allow Jacob Downs of Corr Downs to represent me in this proceeding. Appendix T. He explained:

Mr. Galanda is subject to an administrative banishment proceeding, in which a telephonic hearing is set for June 9, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. . . . To that end, Mr. Galanda and I are also submitting a completed Representation Form to allow me to represent him during his June 9th administrative banishment hearing. I presume that my law firm must possess a Nooksack business license to also allow me to represent him administratively, but please let me know if my presumption is mistaken. Appendix V.

6 See also Galanda v. Nooksack Tribal Court, No. 2016-CI-CL-002 (Nooksack Ct. App. May 24, 2016) (ordering Complainants to explain why “there has been noncompliance with [the Court of Appeals’] April 25th Order”).

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On June 2, 2016, I also emailed “To Whom It May Concern” at meeting@nooksack-nsn.gov, that: “I submitted a signed Representation Form, along with my lawyer at Corr Downs. Please advise if Mr. Downs will be able to advocate for me during the hearing.” Appendix J. Later that day, Mr. Downs wrote the same address: “Given the impending June 9, 2016 administrative hearing, we look forward to hearing back from you regarding business licensure very soon.” Appendix K.

To date, nobody has responded to Mr. Downs or me. My right to “representation” by an advocate of my choosing, as guaranteed by Section VI, Part C of the new Procedures For Tribal Council Hearings, has been denied. My right to civil legal representation has been denied. See N.T.C. §10.02.010 (“Any person appearing as a party in any civil or criminal action shall have the right to be represented by an advocate of his/her own choice and at his/her own expense.”). The fact that I am submitting this written response myself is not a waiver of my right to representation or counsel.7 The Nooksack Court of Appeals has ruled that “prohibiting a [person] from being represented at the proceeding violates due process,” noting “the right to representation is crucial.” Roberts v. Kelly, 12 NICS App. 33, 41 (Nooksack Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970)). Indeed, according to the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldberg, the “fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” 397 U.S. at 267. This right to be heard “would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Id. An individual “must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.” Id. (emphasis supplied). I have chosen an attorney to speak for me, yet that due process right has been vitiated, with malice. B. N.T.C. § 10.02.070 Does Not Discuss Banishment. Per N.T.C. § 10.02.070, if an advocate is found to have practiced in a manner “reflecting so poorly upon the proper administration of justice before the Nooksack Trial Court” as a sanction “the Tribal Council may revoke any privileges provided to such person(s) and bar them from the further . . . proceeding before the Nooksack Tribal Court.” This statute says nothing about complete banishment “from Tribal lands.” Notice of Hearing. Perhaps in its “emergency action barring [me] from Tribal lands and Tribal Court” the Complainant is revoking the privilege of my entrance onto Nooksack Tribal lands via banishment. While the Tribe possesses a “traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands,” if this is the action that it is taking against me, as discussed above, I have the right to know and I have a right to due process at law. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).

III. RESPONSES TO COMPLAINANT’S ALLEGATIONS As noted above, without having received or reviewed Resolution No. 16-28, I am unable to address the charges therein. That being said, the Complainant’s Notice of Hearing does include “a narrative that discusses the issues that [my] conduct during the representation of [my] clients before the Nooksack Tribal Court, and other venues, has raised [sic].” The Nooksack Tribal Court already rebuked a similar narrative prepared by the Tribe’s former outside counsel, which took the form of a libelous Declaration of Sue Gearhart. Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 2-5. Although I am unsure as to (1) what raising “issues” means, in the legal sense, or (2) what conduct in “other venues” has to do with N.T.C. § 10.02.070, I nonetheless address the accusations as follows, without waiver of the foregoing objections.

7 Nor is my self-advocacy intended to constitute the practice of law or transaction of business at Nooksack.

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A. Allegation 1 – Misrepresentation, Failure/Refusal To Comply With Federal Regulations, Ex Parte Contact.

Complainant argues that I “made material misstatements of fact to the IBIA” by stating that a motion that I filed as “unopposed” was actually opposed by the Tribe. Explanation, at 1. What the Complainant fails to acknowledge, however, is that the Tribe was not a party to that action when the motion was filed. On December 23, 2015, the IBIA docketed St. Germain v. Acting Northwest Regional Director, No. IBIA 16-022. Early on February 18, 2016, I filed an unopposed continuance request in that action. I contacted the defendant, through counsel, to obtain consent.8 At this time, the Tribe had yet to enter appearance, despite being notified by the IBIA that the action was docketed on December 23, 2015—nearly two months previously. There was no misrepresentation. When a potentially interested party does not enter a notice of appearance, a motion will be treated as unopposed unless that party appears. Perdue v. Batterman, No. 92-1544, 1993 WL 77282, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1993). It is not an appellant’s job to seek consent from every potentially interested party who fails to make their interest in the case known by filing an appearance. I had no obligation to represent that the Tribe opposed the motion. Ultimately, it was counsel for the Tribe’s error for not timely filing a notice of appearance. See, e.g., Frye v. Acting S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 54 IBIA 246, 247 n.3 (2012) (“Appellant was not required to serve counsel because counsel had not yet entered his appearance at the time Appellant filed her brief.”). Complainant is also mistaken in the assertion that the aforementioned unopposed motion had something to do with a “request and order” that “were made ex parte.” Explanation, at 1. “[C]ourts generally apply the term ex parte communication to communications made by or to a judge, during a proceeding, regarding that proceeding, without notice to a party.” State v. Watson, 122 P.3d 903, 905 (Wash. 2005) (emphasis added). Here, on February 18, 2016, the only parties to the St. Germain IBIA matter are Appellants and the Acting Northwest Regional Director. Until the Tribe filed its notice of appearance, these were the only entities privy to any communications to the IBIA—the Tribe was not a party to that action. What is more, the Tribe did receive notice of the unopposed motion. It was sent to the Tribe’s counsel, as a courtesy, the very same day that it was sent to the IBIA. Appendix I. The Tribe was not a party, but nevertheless did receive notice—this is not ex parte communication. B. Allegation 2 – Failure/Refusal To Comply With Tribal Law And Competence. Complainant alleges that I lack competence because I (1) did not possess a Nooksack Tribal Business License, and (2) filed a pleading three hours late. Again, Complainant is mistaken. Explanation, at 2. As to the alleged lack of a business license, Complainant paints a picture that does not match the facts. According to Complainant, the fact that I swore to have “read the Constitution and ordinances of the Nooksack Tribe, and the rules of the Nooksack Tribal Court” somehow means that I was supposed to have had knowledge of and complied with an alleged “business license” ordinance that, for all intents and purposes, did not exist. Explanation, at 2. Here are the actual facts:

• Between September 8, 1983, and February 24, 2016, no law firm was required to obtain a Nooksack Business License pursuant to N.T.C. Title 54. Longtime Nooksack Chairman Narz Cunanan does not recall any lawyer ever having been required to obtain a tribal business license

8 In December 2015, counsel for the Acting Northwest Regional Director also filed an “unopposed” motion for extension of time, without seeking the Tribe’s consent. She did so, just as we had, because the Tribe was not yet a party. Appendix H.

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before February 24, 2016. Appendix G. The Nooksack Tribal Court confirmed this, noting that “historically, NTC Title 54 has not been enforced against advocates.” Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 10 (emphasis added). • Again, in the Fall of 2013, Mr. Dodge, while then Quinault Attorney General, caused another Seattle law firm, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, to be disbarred from the practice of law before the Quinault Tribal Court. Appendix J. • On March 8, 2013, Ryan Dreveskracht and I were admitted to practice law in the Nooksack Tribal Court, per N.T.C. §§ 10.02, et seq. At no time then, or prior to February 24, 2016, did the Tribe ever publish Title 54 or notify either of them of the need for a Nooksack business license. See also Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 12 (noting that Complainant has “[r]epeatedly” used a tactic of relying on statutes “while refusing [my clients and I] access to” those same statutes). • Once again, on February 24, 2016, Chairman Bob Kelly said: “I have a resolution here to bar Gabe Galanda and his firm . . . The real reason that I want to do this is not because of that stupid business license . . . .” Appendix G. • Beginning on February 24, 2016, and continuing for several weeks thereafter, I requested the Tribe provide us a copy of the former Tribal Council’s Resolution No. 16-28 and any business licensing laws that existed prior to that day. Appendix K. • On February 26, 2016, Galanda Broadman remitted the $100.00 business license application fee contemplated by N.T.C. § 54.02.010. Appendix L. As of that day, the Tribe did not have any business application form; it had never before used such a form. • Because Complainant did not even have a means in place to grant a business license, on March 21, 2016, the Nooksack Tribal Court ordered Complainants’ counsel to “submit to the Court a plain-English description of the procedures to be followed and a copy of the application form to be used to obtain a Nooksack business license . . . .” Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 13. If Complainants’ counsel did not do this, the Court stated that it would “waive the business license requirement for all advocates.” Id. To my knowledge, Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong never did so. Yet Complaint continues to impose a business license requirement upon me and my counsel. • On March 28, 2016, and instead of complying with the March 21, 2016, Order, Complainant, with help from Messrs. Dodge and Armstrong, fired the Nooksack Tribal Court’s Chief Judge. Appendix M (Memorandum from Hon. Susan M. Alexander, former Nooksack Tribal Court Chief Judge, to Samantha Wohlfeil, Reporter, the Bellingham Herald (Apr. 21, 2016), available at http://media.bellinghamherald.com/static/downloads/AlexanderMemo.pdf. To my knowledge, Complainant has never complied with the Order issued in Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, and is therefore in contempt of Court.

The Nooksack Tribal Court has already ruled that until February of 2016 (1) “NTC Title 54 has not been enforced against advocates,” and (2) neither my clients nor I had prior access to the statute. Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 10, 12. The problem with Complainant’s attempted enforcement of this statute against me is obvious, and desperate.

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First, “[d]ue process requires that a statute be published in order that citizens be given a notice of prohibited conduct.” Com. v. Duncan, 321 A.2d 917, 922 (Pa. 1974). Again, I was given no notice that Title 54 existed or applied to advocates. Second, the doctrine of laches prevents the enforcement. “Laches conceptualizes the inequity which may adhere when a stale claim is permitted to be enforced.” Ruffing v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 71-473, 1975 WL 1057, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1975). Under this doctrine, a person “has the right to expect that . . . claims will be outlawed” at some point after a long period of non-enforcement has been relied upon. Id. And “bureaucratic ineptitude cannot be permitted to preclude an otherwise valid defense.” Id. Here, due to the nearly three years of non-enforcement, Complainant’s claims are barred by latches. Third, the Complainant’s actions, if upheld, would violate the “selective enforcement” rule, which prohibits persons from being “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated” when there is “no rational basis for the disparate treatment.” Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 656 F. Supp. 2d 662, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd sub nom., 669 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2012). Here, I was the only advocate banished from Tribal land and barred from practicing in the Nooksack Tribal Court, despite that no advocate, ever, has had a Nooksack business license. Fourth, the Complainant’s actions are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel—the business license requirement has not, as far as I am aware, been applied to anyone in the past ten years, let alone Tribal Court advocates. See, e.g., Montalvo Huertas v. Rivera Cruz, No. 89-0112, 1989 WL 46713, at *3 (D.P.R. Mar. 10, 1989) (“While the government . . . certainly has a strong interest in seeing that one of its laws, even an unpopular one, is enforced, that interest in this case has been diluted by the fact that for the last ten years this statute, for whatever reasons, has not been put into force.”). Finally, the Complainant’s argument that I somehow acted unethically by allegedly filing a pleading three hours late is ridiculous. Explanation, at 2. Complaint ignored the Tribe’s own tardy filings. Anyway, failure to meet a filing deadline, while regrettable, “is neither immoral, unethical, oppressive, nor unscrupulous.” Peterson, 2000 WL 1658498, at *2; see also Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Iowa 2012) (“[A] violation cannot be found where the acts or omissions complained of are inadvertent or the result of an error of judgment made in good faith. Thus, an ethical violation does not typically occur from one missed deadline . . . .”). C. Allegation 3 – Misrepresentation To A Judge, Failure/Refusal To Comply With Tribal

Law.9 Complainant uses incomplete, selected portions of emails to argue that I misrepresented to the Court conversations and instructions between my office and the Nooksack Tribal Court Clerk. This is false, as borne out in the full, non-redacted correspondence. Explanation, at 2-3. While I did attempt to e-file emergency TRO motion papers—the first pleadings ever filed by me in the Nooksack Tribal Court—with full notice to opposing counsel. I did so “[a]t the Nooksack Tribal Court Clerk’s instruction.” Judge Montoya Lewis initially wrote in response to my office’s e-filings: “If you have paperwork to file, you must file it in accordance with Title 10. . . . We do not have electronic filing procedures at this time. Should you wish to file, you may do so with hard copy documents.” Appendix N. I responded by letting Judge Montoya Lewis know that I was “advised by the Clerk that we could ‘e-file’ our emergency TRO motion papers” and that, in doing so, “[w]e followed the instructions as we understood them, and proceeded in accordance with generally accepted protocols of TRO motion practice.” Id.

9 This allegation is wrongfully labeled as “ISSUE 4” in Complainant’s Explanation. There is no “ISSUE 3” in the Explanation. Thus, my responses will follow the correct numbers, and Complainant’s will be disregarded.

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After speaking with the Court Clerk, Judge Montoya Lewis acknowledged that the error was on the part of the Clerk and a misunderstanding of filing instructions, not because of any wrongdoing on my part: “It is my understanding that [the Court Clerk] told you to email her a copy of the filings. . . . [But to clarify, a]nything that needs to be formally filed with the Court should be filed in hard copy or via fax. We do not have email filing procedures yet.” Id. (emphasis added). There was no misrepresentation, and I did not refuse to comply with Nooksack law. Indeed, if anything it was the Court Clerk that failed to comply with Nooksack law—which she has very recently developed a pattern of doing. See, e.g., Galanda, No. 2016-CI-CL-002, at 2 (noting that the “court clerk’s willful failure to comply” with its orders “is contemptuous, mocks the Nooksack Tribe’s judiciary, obstructs official judicial proceedings, and undermines the Tribe’s self-governance” and threatening to “find her in contempt and order the Nooksack Chief of Police to hold her in jail until she purges the contempt” by complying with the Court’s order). D. Allegation 4 – Submitting False Evidence. Complainant submits that I “submitted false evidence” by failing to testify that a document appended to my declaration was a “draft” copy of meeting minutes, and not a copy of the final version. Explanation, at 3. Complainant is mistaken again. The document appended to my declaration speaks for itself—clearly, it is a draft copy of meeting minutes; the word “DRAFT” is written in bold across the document. I did not represent to the Court that the copy of the Nooksack Tribal Council Special Meeting Minutes appended to my declaration was in its final form. I did not alter or otherwise tamper with the evidence. The evidence submitted—the “DRAFT” Meeting Minutes—was not falsified.10 E. Allegation 5 – Disrupting Court Proceedings And/Or Contemptuous Behavior. Complainant also submits that my “shout[ing] at the Chief of Police Gilliand outside the courthouse” constituted contempt of court. Explanation, at 4.11 Complainant is wrong. First, some context is in order. As I declared to the Tribal Court on June 24, 2013:

On June 5, 2013, at 11:00 AM, as I was leaving a federal court hearing in Seattle, I received an email from the Tribal Court Judge requesting that I provide the Tribal Police a list of the names of who will be in attendance at the hearing the following morning, by 4:00 PM that afternoon. I quickly advised the Tribal Court and Tribal Police: “I am out of the office and will not be able to ascertain by 4 PM who of my clients will be able to attend the hearing but we and they are aware of the space restrictions and we intend to use our 5 seats.” The Judge replied: “If you could please provide Lt. Ashby with a list well before court tomorrow, I know he would be grateful.” I in turn replied to the Tribal Court and Lt. Ashby: “I will so my very best but am being forthright in advising

10 Cf. documents appended to Complainant’s Explanation. As noted above, many of these documents are incomplete. See In re AE’O, LLC, No. 08-0851, 2009 WL 1322330, at *3 (D. Haw. May 11, 2009) (when an “exhibit is incomplete,” the “omission makes the document incomprehensible”). 11 Complainant also submits that “[t]he Court reserved determination as to [my] contemptuous behavior.” Explanation, at 4. Complainant provides no evidence for this. Exhibit Q, cited for this proposition by Complainant, does not even reference the term “contempt.” Again, for the reasons above, due process requires that I be given a “reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [me].” Singh v. Holder, 405 F. App’x 193, 194 (9th Cir. 2010). Yet, here, the evidence cited by Complainant is incomplete—much of the cited evidence is not appended to the Explanation.

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everyone that it may not be practically possible for me to do so given my situation in the next 20 hours. I appreciate everyone's understanding.” The Judge replied: “Thank you for trying. I appreciate it.” By 5:00 PM that afternoon, having still attempted to comply with the Court's request, I advised the Court and Lt. Ashby: “All, as of now I know only that Rudy St. Germain will be in attendance among those filling our 5 seats tomorrow. . . . I apologize that I was not able to provide more information under today’s circumstances.” At about 10:20 AM on the morning of June 6, 2013, just ten minutes before the hearing, I was confronted by the Tribal Police Chief, again in request of which of my clients would be attending court with me that day. At that moment, I still did not know. At the moment I was confronted by the Tribal Police Chief, I was literally stepping out of my vehicle, having had to park on the far side of two lines of yellow crime scene police tape, which was manned by four armed police officers. Defense counsel was allowed to park on the other side of the police “perimeter.” The Tribal Police Chief obstructed my movement as I attempted to walk away from my vehicle and into a prayer and drumming circle that my clients had formed for me. I was required to alter my course to the circle and in turn the courtroom to ensure that I did not make physical contact with him. As I walked, he walked with me shoulder to shoulder, which I felt was to intimidate me. Again, the purpose for his confronting me was supposedly to ascertain attendance at a hearing. There was no security concern regarding me that would have made it reasonable for the Tribal Police Chief to restrict my movement or assail or intimidate me. As he initially confronted me and in turn we walked shoulder to shoulder, I candidly told the Tribal Police Chief that I had already explained the matter of the client list and did not appreciate his discriminatory treatment of my clients and now me, especially in that moment. That was simply not the time or place to demand the client list that I did not have and that I told the Tribal Court and Tribal Police I would not have that morning. I was angered by the Police Chief’s disrespect and irrationally aggressive conduct toward me but did not raise my voice when explaining that to him. Then, unprovoked by me, the Tribal Police Chief shouted at me. He yelled, “I am just doing my job!” In response, I then did raise my voice and told him that he knew better than to behave like he was behaving toward my clients and me, who were peacefully gathered outside of the courthouse in hope for a good court hearing. I walked away from him, without any further controversy. I do regret that my emotions eventually got the better of me in that moment but I responded reasonably to the Tribal Police Chief's unreasonable conduct. . . . I am deeply affected by the accusation by the Court that I have disobeyed its security orders and by the attacks against my ethics and integrity. The Tribal Court ordered me to provide a list of attendees, if any. Under the circumstances, because I could provide no list, I presumed the Tribal Court or Tribal Police would not allow unlisted attendees access. I explained as much in my June 21, 2013, email to the Tribal Police. If the Court had wanted me to provide the Tribal Police a list without any names on it, I could have done so, but I presumed that was not the spirit or intent of the Court's actions in this regard.

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Appendix O. I have gotten to know Police Chief Gilliand over the last three years, albeit with me and my syá7ya7ya having to still “park on the far side of two lines of yellow crime scene police tape . . . manned by four armed police officers.” But we have made amends with each other, and now we joke and laugh about June 6, 2013. Today, Police Chief Gilliand and I, too, are syá7ya7ya. Second, according to the plain meaning of the term “contempt is defined as ‘the failure to obey a court order that was issued for another party’s benefit.’”12 In re Singleton, 284 B.R. 322, 325 (D.R.I. 2002) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 313 (7th ed. 1999)). While facing off with a police officer outside of a courthouse was and remains an admittedly regretful moment in my years of staunch advocacy for my clients’ civil rights, Complainant does not cite to a single court order that I might have violated by having a heated discussion with this officer outside of court—because there isn’t one. And although exchanging words with an officer outside of the courthouse may have upset Judge Montoya Lewis, the rancor “was not directed to the judge in h[er] official capacity” and, therefore, she lacked the authority to hold me in contempt had she wanted to. Kress v. State, 790 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In the end, she issued an Order, without any contempt finding. Res judicata. F. Allegation 6 – Misstatements Of The Law. Complainant alleges that I made “misstatements of the law” in a motion to disqualify Judge Eric Nielsen, and deserves to be barred and banished from Nooksack lands because of it.13 Explanation, at 4. Complainant is, again, mistaken. An attorney need not be right all the time in his interpretation of the law. Were that the standard an adversarial judicial system would be meaningless. Of course, “an ethical lawyer should only advance reasonable interpretations of authoritative texts—interpretations that are plausible from a public-regarding point of view.” Harry T. Edwards, Another "Postscript" to "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession", 69 Wash. L. Rev. 561, 566 (1994). And even where an interpretation is wrong—so wrong that it can be deemed a misstatement of law—“inadvertent misstatements of law” are not sanctionable. Douglas v. Norwood, 132 F. Supp. 3d 834, 845 (N.D. Miss. 2015). Only “an attorney's reckless misstatements of law and fact[,] coupled with an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings to gain a tactical advantage” are sanctionable. Guerra v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1281 (W.D. Wash. 2014). Here, though, I didn’t even misstate the law. I quoted from Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp. and other cases for the proposition that “so long as a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, recusal is required ‘even though no actual partiality exists . . . because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible.’” 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). Appendix P. The cases that I cited in that brief, as the Nooksack Court of Appeals correctly noted, counseled only that a judge must recuse himself if there is “an appearance of bias against a party, rather than the party’s representative.” Lomeli v. Kelly, No. 2013-CI-CL-001, at 2 (Nooksack Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2013). I did not represent otherwise. Instead, I urged that, because “Judge Nielsen is intimately involved in an ongoing dispute in which Galanda Broadman PLLC is counsel of record and adverse to a close member of Judge Nielsen’s family,” the same standard should apply. Appendix P. Ultimately, the Nooksack Court of Appeals did not agree. We accepted that and moved on. But there’s

12 The term “contempt” is not defined at N.T.C. § 10.02.080. 13 Complainant also argues that “[s]everal judges at both the trial and appellate court have commented on [my] consistent misstatements of law,” but cites no evidence for this statement—it is libel, which will be dealt with elsewhere. Explanation, at 4; see also generally Explanation, at 1-7 (consistently submitting that other examples of impropriety exist, but failing to provide evidence thereof). Without more, I cannot address the charges against me, which, again, violates my due process rights. See generally § II(B)(5), supra.

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nothing unethical about “urg[ing] the court to apply [a] more relaxed standard.” United States v. Khan, No. 06-0255, 2009 WL 152582, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009). G. Allegation 7 – Attempt To Influence With Unnecessary Exaggeration. Complainant argues that an order in the Lomeli litigation “indicated that [my] use of hyperbole was unnecessary.” Explanation, at 5. Complainant also submits that in two emails from 2013 I “use[d] name-calling and attempts to guilt staff members.” Id. First, the exhibit cited in regard to Complainant’s allegation that I was admonished for the use of “hyperbole” in the Lomeli litigation does not mention the word. Complainant puts forth no evidence to back up this claim. But even if it did, there is nothing wrong with using hyperbole—it’s what zealous advocates do at times. See United States v. Vaccaro, 115 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that an attorney “should and must perform his duties vigorously, and may, at times, do so even zealously” and that fact-finders should use “common sense to discount the hyperbole of an advocate”). Second, I did not have to resort to “name-calling” in order to “guilt” anyone. I called the recipients of the emails produced as evidence by their names. That these recipients felt guilty it is because they should. They devised and implemented a scheme to “exclude[e] Indian families from $250 in much-needed Christmas support” and “ruin[ed] the holidays for over 300 Indians.” Explanation, Exhibit T. This is not “unnecessary exaggeration”; it’s the truth. Only xwenítem/pástan, or xwenítem-ólh, would create an “ethical” issue of calling a spade and spade. H. Allegation 8 – Attempt To Influence With Unnecessary Exaggeration. Complainant argues that my “attempt[] to schedule a hearing in St. Germain v. Kelly . . . on less than the notice required in Title 10” somehow constituted an “attempt to influence with unnecessary exaggeration.” Explanation, at 5. Complainant’s allegation is completely nonsensical. How could attempting to schedule a hearing possibly be construed as an “attempt to influence with unnecessary exaggeration”? Complainant does not explain this, and I cannot address such nonsense.14 Assuming, however, that Complainant is suggesting that all advocates are absolutely bound to the timelines included in Title 10, and that seeking relief from them is somehow improper, Complainant is mistaken. While it is true that “procedural rules are important case management tools,” it is, of course, also true that “courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets.” Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2006). What is more, here, Complainant has purposefully changed the rules as to deter proper filing and timing, and then refused to provide me with the updated code, so that I might comply with it. Since the inception of this litigation Complainant has changed the rules on my clients an astonishing number of times—and counting.15 As the Tribal Court recently noted in this regard: Complainant “rel[ies] upon

14 Indeed, I cannot even make an educated guess by examining the cited Exhibits because, as is the case with much of the evidence produced by Complainant, they are incomplete. Exhibit X, for instance, is missing in its entirety. See generally § II(B)(5), supra. 15 See, e.g., Resolution No. 16-___ (Apr. 18, 2016) (adopting “Procedures for Tribal Council Hearings”); Resolution No. 16-27 (Feb. 24, 2015) (amending provisions of Title 10 applicable to tribal court systems and rules, specifically N.T.C. § 10.02.070); Resolution No. 16-28 (Feb. 24, 2015) (barring me “from Nooksack lands and Tribal Court,” apparently); Resolution No. 15-133 (Dec. 18, 2015) (amending provisions of Title 10 applicable to tribal court systems and rules); Resolution No. 15-___ (Dec. 18, 2015) (amending provisions of Title 62 applicable to tribal elections); Resolution No. 14-

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statutes where [Complainant] ha[s] full access to statutes, while refusing such access to [me],” a practice that the Court deemed an “extreme tactic[].” Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007, at 12. The Court also recently remarked about the lightning quick pace by which Complainant serially amends its laws. I have never witnessed such an abuse of the tribal legislative process. Again, xwenítem-ólh. I. Allegation 9 – Lack of Diligence And/Or Competence. Complainant submits that I lack diligence and/or competence because (1) an appeal that was sent by my office to the Nooksack Tribal Court was not received, (2) my office did not pay a filing fee for said appeal, and (3) my clients moved to voluntarily dismiss an appeal to the IBIA. Explanation, at 6. None of these incidents, even if true,16 proves a lack diligence and/or competence. First, Complainant fails to illustrate how the U.S. Mail’s failure to deliver a pleading to the Nooksack Tribal Court can either be attributed to me, personally, or how this shows a lack of diligence and/or competence on my part. As my office’s Office Manager, Alice Hall stated in a sworn declaration:

On July 2, 2014, I caused to be mailed, via U.S. Mail, Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal to the Nooksack Tribal Court and to the Nooksack Office of Tribal Attorney. I have served and filed dozens of papers in the six lawsuits and various appeals relating to the “Nooksack 306” disenrollment litigation, since March of 2013. I routinely mail those papers to the Court for filing, and to the Nooksack Office of Tribal Attorney for service, via U.S. Mail. I use pre-printed mailing labels for all of my mailings in this litigation to help ensure that everyone who needs to receive our papers, is mailed them. Our office also routinely emails Thomas Schlosser our papers at his request, with a courtesy copy to various people with the Nooksack Office of Tribal Attorney. I do not know why my July 2, 2014 mailing did not arrive to the Tribal Court.

Appendix Q. As far as I am aware, the pleading was sent from my office via a staff member. I am at a loss as to what more Complainant expected me to do here. Second, my office did not pay a filing fee for the allegedly misplaced Notice of Appeal because we were not required to. On February 14, 2014, we received from the Court Clerk a Standing Administrative Order of the Court re: Filing Fees listing the court fees taxed for various pleadings to be filed. Appendix R. The new filing fees schedule did not, and does not, indicate any fee taxed for the filing of a notice of appeal.17 Id.

112 (Oct. 10, 2014) (readopting amended version of Title 63); Resolution 14-110 (Sept. 23, 2014) (adopting amended version of Title 63 with amended disenrollment procedures); Resolution 13-139 (Sept. 3, 2013) (amending provisions of Title 80 applicable to appellate procedure); Resolution No. 13-__ (Aug. 30, 2013) (amending provisions of Title 10 applicable to tribal court systems and rules); Resolution No. 13-52 (Mar. 26, 2013) (amending provisions of Title 60 applicable to constitutional petition ordinance process); Resolution No. 13-03) (Feb. 12, 2013) (amending provisions of Title 60 applicable to constitutional petition ordinance process); Resolution No. 13-111 (Aug. 8, 2013) (amending provisions of Title 63 governing involuntary disenrollment meetings of the membership ordinance); Resolution No. 13-04 (Feb. 12, 2013) (amending provisions of Title 10 applicable to tribal court systems and rules); Resolution No. 13-37 (Mar. 1, 2013) (adopting Title 65, entitled “Nooksack Indian Tribe Conflict of Interest and Nepotism Code”). And these are just the amended laws that we are aware of. There are surely more that have not yet been released from the Star Chamber. 16 Again, the evidence cited in support of Complainant’s allegations are incomplete and, as received, does not stand for the proposition for which they are cited. See generally Explanation, Exhibits BB-DD (half of an email; a single page of what appears to be a multi-page opinion; single page of a multi-page IBIA order). 17 Yet, out of an abundance of caution I emailed the Court Clerk:

The reason we didn't have our clients proffer the new $75 fee when they filed the appellate motion the other day is because we believed that the Trial Court's new Filing Fees Order applied only to Trial Court motions

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Third, “[a]s a matter of professional responsibility, an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his client. This duty encompasses an obligation to defer to the client’s wishes on major litigation decisions.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1986). Where, as here, a client wishes to voluntarily dismiss an appeal there is, surely, no lack of diligence or competence attributed to counsel. Just the opposite, I owed this duty to my clients “[a]s a matter of professional responsibility.” Id. J. Allegation 10 – Lack of Diligence And/Or Competence. Complainant contends that I conducted myself with a “lack of diligence and/or competence” by “creat[ing] new law for the Quinault Indian Nation by extending the reach of the Ex Parte Young doctrine to Quinault” in a dismissal opinion that I drafted in my role as a pro tem Judge at Quinault. Explanation, at 7. In addition, Complainant submits that the issuance of this opinion in that capacity “evidences incompetence in [my] role as a judicial officer and a failure to abide by known Quinault law.” Id. Complaint fails to observe that: Mr. Dodge was counsel of record for the Quinault Nation in that proceeding. Neither party to that case liked my dismissal ruling; both asked that I recuse myself. So I did, and vacated my dismissal order on February 11, 2014, thereby wiping my slate clean for the next judge. Due to the ongoing antics of Mr. Dodge—recall, he had caused another firm to be disbarred from another proceeding at Quinault—I soon thereafter resigned as a Tribal Court appellate and pro tem judge at Quinault. Simply, life was, and remains, too short to deal with such nonsense. More fundamentally, complainant is wrong. Employing the Ex Parte Young doctrine in a tribal court is nothing novel. See, e.g., Arendt v. Ward, 9 Am. Tribal Law 443 (Ho-Chunk Trial Ct. 2011); Cleveland v. Garvin, 8 Am. Tribal Law 21, 35 (Ho-Chunk Trial Ct. 2009); Honyaoma v. Nuvamsa, 7 Am. Tribal Law 320, 324 (Hopi Ct. App. 2008); Fox v. Brown, 6 Am. Tribal Law 446, 449 n.2 (Mohegan Trial Ct. 2005); Kirkwood v. Decorah, 6 Am. Tribal Law 188 (Ho—Chunk Trial Ct. 2005); Whiieagle v. Cloud, 5 Am. Tribal Law 178 (Ho—Chunk Trial Ct. 2004); Fletcher v. Grand Traverse Band Tribal Council, 2004 WL 5714967, at *9 (Grand Traverse Tribal Ct. Jan. 8, 2004); McDade v. Individual Members of T e-Moak Council, No. SF-CV-004-99, 2000 WL 35782656 (Nev. Inter—Tribal Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2000); Lynch v. Yomba Shoshone Tribe, Nos. CVC—YT4003—96, CVC—YT—004—96, CVC—YT—005—96, 1997 WL 34704354, at *4 (Nev. Inter—Tribal Ct. App. Jul. 16, 1997). It is certainly not improper. And it definitely does not exhibit a lack of diligence or competence. To the contrary, my now vacated 22-page opinion in that case was thorough and exact, and I stand by my work. Appendix S. That Complainant assumes that the issuance of that opinion had something to do with Complainant, exhibits a striking display of hubris on Complainant’s part, not a lack of diligence or competence on my part.18

and other matters, as it says nothing about appellate motions or matters. Please let us know whether or no[t] a motion fee applies to appellate matters such as the Motion at bar.

Appendix R. The Court Clerk did not respond to this email. Id. 18 Complainant appears to have abandoned its original public complaint against me, that I “acted improperly by later citing [my] own ruling . . . while arguing on behalf of the ‘Nooksack 306.’” Nina Shapiro, Nooksack Leaders Disbar Lawyer Fighting Tribal Disenrollments, Seattle Times, Mar. 16, 2016, available at http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/nooksack-leaders-disbar-lawyer-fighting-disenrollments. This is likely because the allegations have been rebuked by legal experts:

[T]here’s nothing in attorneys’ rules of professional conduct that prevents this kind of self-citation. If Galanda cited himself while he was a sitting judge in the same court in which he was arguing a case, that would be different, said John Strait, a Seattle University law professor who specializes in ethics. Then, Galanda might be exploiting his relationship with judges he sat beside, Strait said. That was not the case.

Id.

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IV. CONCLUSION This is not who we are as Indigenous People. This is not Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan. This is not asláq'alhsólh. This is xwenítem-ólh. This is the work of xwenítem/pástan. It is not too late for you to return to asláq'alhsólh; to cast aside xwenítem/pástan, instead of me and your Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan syá7ya. It is not too late for you and me to be syá7ya7ya. It is especially not too late for kw'ómot. I will continue to pray for you and yours, and for all of my Noxwsá7aq-ólh-chan relations. Very truly yours,

Gabriel S. Galanda Citizen, Round Valley Indian Tribes Noxwtsí7qen cc: Rickie Armstrong (w/ Appendices via Email) Raymond Dodge (w/o Appendices via U.S. Mail)