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Written evidence submitted by Sandhya Dass 1. Quality of work by the Ombudsman’s investigators:
• There is no requirement to provide referenced sources as to the law, documentary or other evidence or facts used to come to a decision. FOI requests do not achieve this, as experience indicates that LGO investigators do not make a list of the evidence considered by them. This could make it very difficult for a claimant to assess whether the complaint had been understood correctly if particularly complex, to determine which evidence was used and whether the decision appears to reflect the evidence provided by the complainant. These matters create difficulties to determine whether to challenge a decision through judicial review where claimants resources / time are limited.
• There is no requirement for the LGO staff to pass on in a timely
manner the information from contact made with and enqueries of the local authority in dispute with the claimant. A failure to provide timely information will make it more difficult and lengthy for the complainant to refute any element of information provided should further sources of information be required to do so.
• There is no external independent academic / legal scrutiny of
complaints / evidence used / laws applied in cases / decisions, i.e. audits to assess quality and consistency in approach across teams / offices in LGO investigation work. It is assumed it is robust by government, because there is no ‘political involvement’.
Refer as an example to:
The Case of Mr and Mrs Wain verses Stoke-on-Trent City Council http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/personal_accounts/wain/mw_intro_doc.html Especially the report from the independent barrister.
As well educated claimant with professional knowledge of the subject area of my complaint to the LGO I found the same matter of very poor work by an investigator and her assistant ombudsman. I raised the matter in a very detailed letter directly to Jane Martin. Following a subsequent formal complaint I was confronted with the same poor work again, showing documents had not been read or understood. It was not possible then to take up a judicial review because the decision was not changed, so fell outside of the time limit for JR. This is not helpful to claimants raising maladministration by local authorities.
• Independent assessment by external independent skilled auditors (not ex-local authority personnel) for complainants is required as regards the quality of work of the Local Government Ombudsman in cases that are challenged.
• The period for Judicial Review application should be extended for
complaints about LGO decision. Many people such as carers in adult social care disputes will not manage this timeframe, unless a lawyer has already been involved at either public or personal expense. In which case the LGO not paying for people to have legal representation to make complex complaints becomes an issue.
2. Sources of Evidence for LGO investigations
• For evidence to support a case of maladministration injustice The LGO
website states: ‘ We have the same powers as the High Court to obtain information and documents’
• Very recently I called and spoke to someone called Val Stevens, (and then the investigator she passed me onto), in the Coventry LGO office and asked about this. I asked to be definitively told whether sources of information other than from the Council records are considered in an investigation. I tape recorded the call, in which it is very clear that the question was evaded completely, so very irritatingly I had no answer.
• Evidence in the statement of reasons given by the investigator making the decision on my case was that no evidence other than that given by the local authority had been considered.
• I would ask for independent audit of cases, selected by the auditor, to seek to ascertain what evidence actually is used in each office and to get clarification on the website so that potential claimants are not misled.
3. The cost of the LGO / its effectiveness
• The LGO themselves undertake limited surveys about the experiences of a few claimants. This is not an independent process, and the results do not explain the improbable, statistically, consistent low proportion of injustice reports, etc on a year by year basis.
• Lambeth Council for the last two years or more has had the greatest /
near greatest number of residents complaining to the LGO nationally of any local authority. The maladministration reports raised for Lambeth do not reflect this.
• A national LGO service is not the most cost effective, modern way of
dealing with 25,000 complaints yearly to 3 offices from diverse areas of the country, nor can local authority behaviours change with a centralised process. A single investigator is not a suitable model for claimants.
• As with many other areas where local issues are addressed locally,
local (possibly virtual) panels with diverse skilled (e.g. academic legal)
people with no conflict of interest in regards to local authorities might be better used to assess the cases locally in confidence, allowing personal representation by claimants if required. There would be no office / pension costs etc. of regular employment for such panels. This could raise public confidence in the process dealt with currently by the LGO, where few people know of it and are possibly discouraged by the low number of public reports made by it, unless advised to use it by say CAB / lawyer.
• A root and branch review of the LGO- as to whether it is fit for modern
purpose is the only way forward for the public purse and greater accountability of local authorities for their decisions.
Sandhya Dass March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Mr Gary Powell
1 Summary
• Overwhelming evidence indicates that the CLAE is institutionally biased against complainants, and very heavily so.
• The CLAE’s own customer satisfaction polls reveal widespread dissatisfaction with the LGO’s service among (even successful) complainants.
• The previous Government was impervious and indeed resistant to evidence of the CLAE’s systemic injustice against the public.
• The real level of maladministration committed by local authorities is being massively underreported by the CLAE.
• Most employees at the CLAE previously worked in local government, and lack a proper degree of professional and emotional distance from the councils they are investigating.
• There is no adequate appeals system to challenge a decision of the LGO, who is able to act with absolute discretion and impunity.
2 Introduction
2.1 In 2003 I founded Local Government Ombudsman Watch (LGOWatch), established a campaign website and co-ordinated efforts to expose the pro-council bias of the Commission for Local Administration in England. I retired as Director in 2008.
2. 2 My serious concerns regarding the claimed impartiality of the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) resulted from my experience of submitting a complaint to the LGO on behalf of a family in distress on account of maladministration by their local authority. The concerns increased as a result of my subsequent investigation and analysis of data in the LGO’s Annual Reports.
2.3 I submitted evidence to the 2005 ODPM Committee Evidence Session on ‘The Role and Effectiveness of the Local Government Ombudsman for England’, which was published in its Report. Unfortunately, the ODPM Committee aborted its investigation of the LGO because of the announcement of the General Election. It is very disappointing indeed that our subsequent efforts to encourage the Committee to resume its investigation, consider the evidence, and publish its findings, were unsuccessful.
2.4 Given the evidence that was submitted to the Committee for the 2005 Evidence Session, and clear matters of concern arising from the Ombudsmen’s own oral evidence, the reluctance of the Committee to complete its investigation and publish its recommendations does not in my view reflect well on the willingness of the previous Government to respond to clear evidence of systemic and deliberate maladministration at the heart of the Commission for Local Administration in
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England. In fact, my colleagues in Local Government Ombudsman Watch and I had the clear impression that the previous Government played an actively obstructive role to our attempts to expose how the CLAE was letting our citizens down.
2.5 Colleagues in LGOWatch identified that the LGO did not have the legal authority to ‘locally settle’ complaints, to refer to maladministration only as ‘administrative fault’ if the local authority agreed to the remedy proposed, or only to report the bad practice as ‘maladministration’ if the local authority rejected the remedy. The LGO was in fact obliged by statute formally to report maladministration, but under the guise of their statutory discretion to terminate an investigation at any time, they did so if the council agreed to the proposed remedy, and then instead reported the outcome as ‘Locally Settled’.
2.6 As a result, it seems, of Freedom of Information requests by and pressure from LGOWatch colleagues, the LGO requested from the previous Government that they be given the statutory authority to locally settle complaints, and the Government responded by meeting this request. This raises the concern that, for the period until the new legislation was passed, the LGO’s reporting of maladministration as ‘local settlements’ was illegal, as the maladministration should have been reported as maladministration, regardless of whether the council agreed to the proposed remedy. It is also a matter of dismay that the previous Government actively facilitated the LGO’s underreporting of maladministration by giving legal validity to their use of the term ‘local settlement’ that represented a clear case of using a euphemism and a contorted technicality to keep the reported statistics for local authority maladministration artificially low.
2.7 The role of the previous Government is also a matter of concern in respect of developments following the significant decline in the number of people taking their complaints to the LGO, following the work of LGOWatch over several years in highlighting via its website, which has been very high on Google rankings for some time, the low probability of a complaint being dealt with fairly. The fall in the number of complaints to the LGO is evident from study of the LGO’s Annual Reports. However, instead of demonstrating concern and investigating why people were increasingly unwilling to take their complaints to the LGO, the previous Government repeatedly extended the remit of the LGO, resulting in the impression that the number of complainants using the LGO’s service was actually increasing.
2.8 Although I have now retired from the campaign, I still feel strongly about the ongoing harm caused by the CLAE to people who turn to it in the hope of receiving justice after being seriously let down by their local authorities. The founding of Local Government Ombudsman Watch, and the hard work we did as a community to support people who had experienced injustice from their local authorities, seems to me to be a paradigm example of what is envisaged by the current Government’s concept of ‘The Big Society’. I have been motivated to submit this memorandum by the hope that the current Government might genuinely be committed to a new
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concept of active citizenship and social justice, as well as to the defragmentation and depolarisation of society, where concerned citizens are no longer treated as enemies of vested political interests and find their rock-solid evidence of wrongdoing disregarded.
2.9 There will always be a significant number of complaints about local authorities submitted to the LGO that are trivial, misguided or vexatious. Despite the systemic injustice and pro-council bias at the CLAE, it was ironically the case that I developed some sympathy for CLAE officers who regularly had to deal with the stress caused by some persistent and vexatious complainants without a valid complaint, as such people would often then turn to LGOWatch for advice and assistance, and their vexatious and unreasonable behaviour would continue.
2.10 My concern remains that there are very many people who turn to the LGO with completely valid complaints, who do not receive the justice that they deserve. I came to this conclusion as a result of my own personal experience, the experience of the hundreds of dissatisfied complainants who contacted LGOWatch while I was Director, and statistical evidence in the LGO’s own published documentation. The CLAE is very reluctant indeed to identify or report maladministration by local authorities, and regularly dismisses completely valid complaints where evidence of council bad practice is incontrovertible.
2.11 Although my active involvement in LGOWatch ended in 2008, my understanding from regular communication with the current Director is that the matters about which I expressed concern in my 2005 submission have not been addressed in the interim.
2.12 Many people contacted me as Director of LGOWatch in a state of real anguish as a result of the LGO having unfairly sided with a council despite compelling evidence. The number of good people contacting me who were suffering from stress, depression or even suicidal ideation as a result of being let down by the LGO on a matter of great importance, was truly disheartening.
2.13 The effect of maladministration on the part of the LGO can be devastating to a complainant who has already experienced maladministration from his local authority, and has turned to the LGO in the hope of having a fair hearing and receiving justice. Without having access to LGOWatch evidence before making their complaint, they would have no reason to doubt the LGO’s claims to be fair and impartial.
2.14 It is truly lamentable that taxpayers are funding an institution that is systemically working against their interests and successfully undermining their efforts to gain redress when local authorities have been guilty of bad practice. The behaviour of the CLAE in fact actually increases the incidence of bad practice among local authorities, as the latter will be fully aware that there is in fact no truly independent and fair body to hold them accountable for acts of maladministration.
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2.15 Many of those who had contacted LGOWatch after being let down by the LGO were highly articulate, professional people, with a university education, shell-shocked at how they had been let down by an institution that purported to be independent. The category of people who turned to LGOWatch about whom I was most concerned was those in difficult economic and social circumstances, whose basic security of existence was in jeopardy because of maladministration by their local authority and then by the LGO. Such people were rarely in a position to challenge unjust and inaccurate findings of the LGO; and sadly, even if they had been, it would have made no difference.
2.16 It remains to be seen whether the current Government will be willing to grasp this nettle and demonstrate a commitment to ensuring that citizens have access to a truly fair and impartial arbitrator when they have suffered maladministration at the hands of their local authority. The CLAE in its current form uses statistical and semantic spin-doctoring to protect vested interests, and falls far short of the standards we as a Nation have a right to expect. The CLAE should be safeguarding the rights of the good citizen to fair treatment when he complains about maladministration at the hands of his local authority. Many people, and particularly vulnerable people, suffer serious harm as a result of the current cosy alliance between the LGO and local authorities.
3 The evidence 3.1 When Director of LGOWatch, I soon became aware that the LGO commissioned a MORI Customer Satisfaction Poll in 1999 that revealed a 73% complainant dissatisfaction level with its service. 61% of complainants expressed themselves to be ‘very dissatisfied’ with the final outcome of their complaint.
3.2 The poll revealed that even among those whose complaints had been upheld, roughly 50% reported dissatisfaction with the outcome. The results of this poll are similar to the previous and subsequent ones.
3.3 There would clearly have been complainants interviewed for these polls without a valid or significant complaint, who would have expressed unjustified dissatisfaction. However, it should be borne in mind that the complainants interviewed would have already passed through an initial filter, as the LGO only investigates cases where there is prima facie evidence of maladministration with injustice. Therefore, a dissatisfaction level of this order, including high levels of dissatisfaction among those whose complaints had been upheld, should surely be a cause for concern.
3.4 The dissatisfaction statistics are even worse than the MORI poll revealed, given that, prior to the poll, the LGO was permitted to remove 11% of the random sample selected by MORI for interview. The sample removed included ‘complainants who might have been emotionally unsettled or abusive if contacted'. The LGO was permitted to exclude this 11% at its own complete discretion. When I attempted to
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discover from MORI what proportion of this figure was represented by putative potentially ‘unsettled or abusive’ complainants, I was informed they had no breakdown by category available. As the interviews were conducted by telephone, with the interviewers therefore in no personal danger, I was very concerned indeed to hear that such a potentially large sample was removed at the LGO’s compete discretion, and in my view without justification. I suspect that the potentially ‘emotionally unsettled and abusive’ complainants were mostly people who were understandably very angry at how unjustly they had been treated by the LGO, and that the motivation for their removal from the interview sample was highly questionable.
3.5 After the 1999 Customer Satisfaction Survey, there have been two further quantitative-type customer satisfaction surveys. Each time the LGO has removed more and more complainants from the sample selected for interview. For the survey following that in 1999, the LGO removed 14% of the sample. For the subsequent survey, the LGO removed 18% of the sample. There is clear evidence of significant and increasing statistical manipulation, and it is very disheartening that the CLAE has been allowed to continue behaving in this way with impunity.
3.6 The LGO’s own published statistics prove there is an under-reporting of maladministration. The majority of cases of maladministration are reported as ‘local settlements’. This is a euphemism that is made possible by a technicality: where the LGO finds that a council is guilty of bad practice, and the council agrees to comply with his remedy, or volunteers to put things right during the investigation, regardless of the harm the complainant has been caused or the seriousness of the maladministration in question, the LGO officially terminates the investigation, and reports the maladministration as a ‘local settlement’. However, the local settlements are beyond any question still cases of maladministration, as the former ombudsman, Mr White, attested in his oral evidence during the 2005 evidence session. This results in under-reporting of local authority maladministration on a grand scale.
3.7 The LGO generally only applies the term ‘maladministration’ to a council’s actions if it refuses to comply with the local settlement requested. When this happens, the LGO publishes a report.
3.8 Maladministration surely does not become ‘non-maladministration’ just because a council agrees to comply with a remedy. The LGO logically cannot request that the council agree to a ‘local settlement’ unless he has determined that maladministration has already taken place. Indeed, a noted above, Mr White admitted that ‘local settlements’ were cases of maladministration.
3.9 The result of this misreporting of the true levels of maladministration is that members of the public are given heavily massaged figures regarding the actual incidence of maladministration committed by their local councils. This in turn encourages councils to commit maladministration with impunity, as they know it is
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very unlikely it will ever be reported as such in the media. Maladministration does not become non-maladministration just because the offending council agrees to a settlement.
3.10 In the LGO’s report for 2003/4, for instance, for every one case of maladministration reported (i.e. normally, where the council has refused to accept the LGO’s ‘local settlement’ proposal), there were a further nineteen cases of maladministration hidden in the ‘local settlements’ statistics. (Of the 11,600 complaints submitted that the LGO regarded prima facie as representing ‘maladministration with injustice’ in 2003/4, the LGO reported that only 180 cases (1.6 %) represented maladministration. There were however a further 3,368 cases (29%) of maladministration reported merely as 'local settlements'.)
3.11 The staff at the CLAE, including the senior staff, are mostly recruited from local government. They are far too emotionally and professionally connected with the bodies they should be investigating impartially. The Ombudsmen themselves are usually former Chief Executive Officers of local authorities. In that former role, they would inevitably have experienced findings of maladministration against their own councils - albeit even if only described as ‘local settlements’ - and it would be hard to believe that they did not have an inappropriate degree of sympathy and identification with the CEOs of councils their Commission is investigating.
3.12 It is interesting to compare this situation with the Independent Police Complaints Commission, where few or no senior staff are former police officers.
3.13 The LGO has been allowed to behave with impunity, and this reinforces bad practice. There is no adequate mechanism for appealing against a finding of the LGO. The measure of judicial review is only available to the wealthy. Even then, only very rarely is it possible to bring a successful challenge against the LGO via this route. The reason why this is the case would be a matter for a very interesting debate.
3.14 Where the LGO requests a ‘local settlement’, this generally involves very paltry sums of pecuniary compensation that do not properly reflect the harm and suffering caused to the complainant. The irony is that it is local taxpayers who have to foot the bill for these local settlements, and that raising the sums requested in compensation is to the detriment of those taxpayers. I believe that, in many cases, complainants would be happy to forgo these very modest compensation payments if instead they had a proper acknowledgment of the injustice they have been caused in the form of a finding of maladministration that is not disguised by any euphemism, and an order to the council that it put things right for the complainant in practical terms. The council would then be better motivated to good practice by the knowledge that any finding of maladministration will be reported as such by the LGO, and might then be reported as such in the local media.
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3.15 Often, what complainants need most is an acknowledgment that they have suffered injustice, and to know that there is an institution that can order the council to put things right in practical terms, if it is possible to do so. At the moment, most complainants to the LGO, even those with rock-solid evidence, have their complaints dismissed. The LGO currently has absolute discretion to discontinue an investigation, and to give any excuse or subterfuge that comes to mind for doing so. The CLAE is a biased and profoundly unjust institution that actively works against the good citizen, and that exists to preserve its own interests, the interests of local authorities, and the interests of its political supporters.
4 Recommendations 4.1 The CLAE should be abolished and replaced by a truly independent Local Government Complaints Commission, or else radically reformed.
4.2 There should be a quota to limit the number of senior and junior staff appointed to work for the CLAE or any new replacement commission who previously worked in local government.
4.3 There should be an independent appeals board to consider complaints against the findings of the CLAE or any new replacement commission.
4.4 Judgments of a reformed CLAE or any new replacement commission should be made legally binding.
4.5 Every case of maladministration should be reported as maladministration, even when a local settlement has been agreed as a remedy to the maladministration.
4.6 There should be a grading of maladministration according to levels of gravity, so that the most serious cases are easily identifiable in published statistics.
4.7 The LGO should be forbidden to remove anywhere near the historical 11% - 18% of an interview sample for any future customer satisfaction survey. Unless the LGO can provide evidence to the company carrying out the survey that the complainant has suffered a bereavement or similar trauma, it should be expressly forbidden for him to use his absolute discretion to remove from the telephone interview sample any ‘complainants who might have been emotionally unsettled or abusive if contacted'. Furthermore, any complainants that are removed from a sample should be reported by category.
4.8 It is clear that both the process and the outcome of the LGO’s future satisfaction surveys need to be monitored and evaluated. I would hope that the CLG Committee will take on that responsibility.
4.9 The concept of ‘The Big Society’ is an excellent paradigm, and represents the spirit that inspired the setting up of Local Government Ombudsman Watch and its long and arduous campaign for fairness and justice in the domain of public administration in England. With one or two noble exceptions, our politicians have
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been indifferent to the clear evidence of injustice and bad practice at the CLAE that has been brought to their attention. It is a matter of great concern that the CLAE has been permitted to continue acting against our citizens’ interests for so long with complete impunity. If ‘The Big Society’ is to result in meaningful and fruitful outcomes, then our elected politicians must work with their citizens, and not against them. This now requires the principled intervention of the CLG Committee as a matter of urgency.
Gary Powell
March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Joseph David Abrams (I) Introduction
*1. All the members of this Committee of Inquiry are former members of a Local Authority, as have been many past Local Commissioners , the Local Government Ombudsmen.
*2. Former Local Authority members have without doubt therefore been party, directly or indirectly to the arrangement known as “Decision by letter”, recognised as without Statutory basis until the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, 2007.
*3. The “Decision by letter” is more commonly known as a Local Settlement. In this, the Ombudsman’s Investigation of a complaint by a member of the public to have “sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration” by a Local Authority, is terminated if that authority promises to mend its ways ,and pay compensation to the complainant, with the unspoken agreement that no formal, s 31 Report, as was required by the 1974 Act, will be issued.
*4. As a consequence, a Local Authority is able to protect itself from adverse publicity, which such a Report might give, when the Local Commissioner, the Ombudsman concerned exercises his legally entitled Discretion as to whether or not to issue a Report. In most cases he does not do so, and future maladministration is not inhibited. It was the clearly expressed intention of Parliament, in the proceedings leading to the Local Government Act 1974 that there should be Reports so as to prevent such future actions
*5. There are about 20,000 complaints of injustice sustained in consequence of maladministration, every year. The number of Reports issued is paltry.
*6. The figures have not altered materially since the Ombudsman Jerry White’s evidence to the 2005 ODPM Report on the Local Government Ombudsmen in England - about 30% Local Settlements and 1.5% Statutory Reports.
*7. The evidence given by members of the public to the ODPM Committee showed great dissatisfaction with the Local Settlement-Decision by Letter, arrangement, see *2 and *3 above.
*8. That ODPM Report was never properly acted upon, because the 2005 General Election changed membership of the Committee afterwards .No members of that Committee are on the present one.
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*9. This memorandum concerns the deliberate subverting of the democratic process before and during the Parliamentary process relating to statutory approval of Local Settlements.
(II) How due democratic process in relation to the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 was traduced by the Commission for Local Administration in England with the complaisance of Civil Servants.
Relevant Law and Documents
Section 23(12) of the Local Government Act 1974 (as amended) requires a Triennial Review by the Commission of that legislation. Although not officially published, the Review has always been generally available to the public for comment. In this submission, reference is made to the following documents, which are not included but, except for (viii), are publicly available, and from the writer if required, to substantiate assertions and comment made:-
(i) Extract from 2003 Triennial Review.
(ii) The 2005 ODPM Report on the Local Government Ombudsmen in England.
(iii) Proceedings of meetings of the Commission for Local Administration in England (CLAE), 2005 and 2006
(iv) ‘Review of Local Government Act 1974’. A 4 page document, dated 11 November 2005, sent by the Commission to the ODPM which devolved the DCLG in May 2006.This was to be considered for the Local Government White Paper.( I refer to this below as the wish list) See next.
(v) An extract from “Strong and Prosperous Communities”. The Local Government White Paper of October 2006
(vi) Preamble to the “Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill 2007”
(vii) Hansard for 17 May 2007 with reference to Columns 848 to 864
(viii) A letter from Tony Redmond to Paul Rowsell Head of Democracy and Local Government Division, at the ODPM, dated 24 April 2006.(i
(ix) Article by present writer concerning s31 of Local Government Act 1974
Items (viii) and(ix) are attached or posted
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(III) Dealing with the Complaints Burden
To obey the letter of the law, to investigate all complaints of maladministration causing injustice, and to then issue a Statutory Report of the case would be an enormous , if not impossible, task. This is the situation which the practice known as Local Settlement, described in the preamble, *3 above , was intended to deal with. It now covers about a third or of complaints.
(IV) The Legal Situation of Local Settlements
Apart from the absence, until the 2007 Act of any Statutory basis for such settlements, there are other inadequacies in the legal situation:-
First, there is no statutory definition of “maladministration” and the Commission has resisted there being one. See evidence to the ODPM 2005 committee: Question 78 to Mrs.Thomas the then York Ombudsman.*6
I offer the following:-“Interference, incidental or intentional with the administrative process appropriate to reaching or implementing a decision or action of a public authority”.
This would cover the suggestions of the Crossman list of 1967 and that of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of 1993
Secondly, the Decision that an investigation that does not come to a Result i.e. it is not complete, and so does not require a Statutory Report was based on an Appeal Court judgment , totally unrelated to the circumstances of Local Settlements. See my Article
Thirdly, the widespread discretion given to the Commissioners by the 1974 and 2007 Acts is incompatible, or at least sits uncomfortably, with their former relationship with Local authorities. This, I submit, should be a consideration in future appointment of Commissioners
(IV) The 2005 ODPM Report and the Public
The answer by Jerry White, a now retired Ombudsman to Q 76 by Chris Mole MP, a member of the 2005 Committee, gives the game away. See *5 and *6 in the first section above. Other evidence by members of the public without doubt alerted readers to the way Local Settlements were being employed.
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I submit that the members of the Commission became aware that seeking statutory approval of the Local Settlement arrangement (an intention noted in (i) above) might not be straightforward
(V) Events preceding the passing of the 2007 Act (vi) above
The Bill was enormous and it is the writer’s contention that the desired statutory changes were to be introduced by subterfuge and away from public awareness.
(1) First Reading
The Bill was presented to the House at First Reading, on 12 December 2006 by Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.
The Preamble to the Bill stated that it followed the Government White Paper “Strong and Prosperous Communities” where a single paragraph, 2.35, of 15 lines, relating to the Ombudsmen refers, in vague and general terms “.... to modernise....working practices....” (See (v) above) However there was no actual mention of the Commission and Ombudsmen in the Preamble to the Bill
This is where concealment from public scrutiny commenced. As will be seen, thatsingle paragraph was all that the ODPM considered adequate to be presented to the public in the White Paper representing the wishes of the Commission. But in fact the ODPM had received from the Commission a detailed wish list of Statutory changes (item (iv) above).Nevertheless the Bill in its originally presented form, had no Part which referred to the Commission or the Ombudsmen.
At that point, the public was unaware of possible implementation of the Commission’s desired Statutory changes, or what they were.
(2) The Committee Stage
The Bill appeared in Amended form on 8 March 2007 after the Committee Stage, and now included 4 items in a new Part 9:-
THE COMMISSION FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN ENGLAND,
Part 9 was 4 items again bear little relationship to the wish list sent to the ODPM in November 2005, item (iv) above.These concerned appointment of Commissioners, Expenses. Electronic Complaints and
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annual reports
(3) Report Stage and Third Reading. Events of 17 May 2007
I submit that the events of that day were a constitutional disgrace.
I was some days later informed that at approximately 7.30 a.m. on 17 May 2007,the Parliamentary Website had announced Amendments to the Bill.
At mid day Mr. Phil Woolas the Minister for Local Government and Communities moved the adoption of a programme for the Bill , departing from the original one of January 22nd 2007: this included amendments to Part 9.
The House was occupied with other important parts of the Bill. There were two divisions and consideration of the Part 9 amendments , presented by Ruth Kelly as Amendment papers in the morning of that day, never reached consideration until 6 pm.( One of your Committee members David Heyes MP was in the House onon 17 May 2007 )
Hansard .(vii above) records 10 New Clauses, each one. :-
Brought up read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill
These gave the long practised Local Settlements the statutory status sought by the Commission and restated the discretion which became related in particular to completion of investigations, as a prerequisite to the issuing of a Report
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According to the Record, all the 10 New Clauses occupied precisely 5 minutes.
There was no way that these amendments were properly debated; certainly no consideration of the way that the facilitation of Local Settlements and with it, concealment of local authority maladministration, from the public was being statutorily authorised.
Erskine May must have been turning in his grave.
For constituents who were aggrieved, myself included, many years ago, at the treatment of their complaints and had been brushed off by the
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cealment.
ealment.
offer of a Local Settlement, any opportunity forthem to complain to their MP before the matter was raised in the Bill, was circumvented. And I submit deliberately.
Please look at Redmond’s letter of 24 April 2006 to Paul Rowsell (viii)),where he asks for the wish list of statutory changes to count as the Triennial Review. A second official, Cathryn Evans agreed Redmond’s request that a formal Triennial Review 2006, was notnecessary, confounding the con
That list was never published. Yet in the proceedings of the Commission, (iii) above, for December 2005 , a consultation draft for a statutory 2006 Triennial review was to be considered at a later meeting “whereupon it will be published”. It never was, nor was the wish list, (iii) above.This was more conc
CONCLUSION
It is humbly submitted that Parliament must look again at Part 9 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, in particular to
(1) Its genesis, as detailed in the above Memorandum. (2) Its anti democratic facilitation of the concealment, from the
public of maladministration, a term which Parliament itself must define.See my suggestion,in (iv) above
(3) The unconstricted use and abuse of Discretion by Commissioners facilitating bias against complainants and against the public interest.
22 March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Mr and Mrs Wain
The LGO in its present form is a system of Justice that does not exist, it needs radical changes to ensure that Government bodies confirm to their own statuary obligations, once you take the route of complaining to the Local Government Ombudsman you forfeit all rights to have your case heard before a proper court of law, your case will be investigated by council biased, unqualified investigators who will lead you to believe you will get a fair hearing, they will lie telling you once their report is issued it is final and there is no appeal, when in fact there is, but by the time you find out it will be to late as they will have delayed you. Our ancient laws “The Magna Carta and” the “Bill of Rights “state every man has a right to a fair trial/hearing these rights are overridden by the LGO.
In our case our barrister who was an expert in the field of Compulsory Purchases and Clearance areas ( he acted for claimants and acquiring authorities ) described the LGO Report as so bad it bordered on being unlawful, not once in her report does the LGO state the Statuary Procedures for a City Council declaring a clearance area, instead she delayed and diverted the course of justice by falsely accusing The Government office of West Midlands as being at fault for not notifying the Council where money could be spent. The Parliamentary Ombudsman Investigated The Government Office West Midlands who reported back and totally refuted the claim put forward by the Local Government Ombudsman and said (that procedures had been in place for years and the Council should have been fully aware of them, the papers before me confirm that.)
We now have two Government bodies coming to a different conclusion on the same case! By now through no fault of our own we are out of the three month time limit imposed by The LGO for us to get a Judicial Review, she successfully blocked any attempt by our Solicitor to get our case heard before a proper Court of Law. Barrister’s advice to our Solicitor was that we would have every chance of getting reimbursed for our heavy losses if we could get a hearing before a Court of Law, those heavy losses were the result of our lifetime’s work. In our naiveté we thought the LGO would have investigative officers familiar with the legal obligations of Councils and investigate on our behalf, how wrong we were.
All that is written above and in our report is rock solid, I have all original documents, you may out of interest read our case here. http://t.co/89MOSs8B
I have a hard copy of a detailed analysis of our case which our solicitor described as being an excellent piece of work.
Mr and Mrs Wain
March 2012
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Written evidence submitted by Devon County Council's Local Government Ombudsman Link Officer
I am writing to you with regard to the Communities and Local Government Committee’s inquiry into the Local Government Ombudsman. Summary
1. Council has constructive working relationship with Ombudsman 2. Confusion between Ombudsman’s advice team requests and investigators’
"informal enquiries” 3. Challenging timescales for responses 4. Inconsistency in the application of timescales for responses 5. Inconsistency in the formats and addressees in which information requests are
sent 6. Confusion resulting from anonymised information 7. Lack of triggers for joint investigations with the Parliamentary and Health
Service Ombudsman 1. Submission The Council has developed a constructive working relationship with the Local Government Ombudsman and the Council’s staff who handle complaints consult regularly with the Ombudsman’s investigators regarding possible local settlements of complaints while these are still being considered under the local complaints procedure. There are, however, a few points which I would like to bring to the Committee’s attention. In general terms, increasingly complex enquiries, especially regarding more complex social care cases or cases where multiple agencies are involved, make it difficult for the Council to provide comprehensive responses within the timescales set by the Ombudsman and in light of the points I set out below. 2 and 3. Types of enquiries and challenging timescales There seems to be some confusion between what information the Ombudsman’s advice team request and what investigators ask for under "informal enquiries". The Council receives “informal enquiries" on occasions from investigators where the Ombudsman wishes to establish whether a complaint has been considered under the local procedure. Usually the Council will be asked to fully consider the complaint in question if it has not completed all stages of the local procedure and it will be recorded as premature. The deadline the Ombudsman sets for informal enquiries is usually ten working days. If the Council has already dealt with a complaint there is a significant amount of information to collate and send to the Ombudsman and this deadline often proves a challenge to achieve.
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3 and 4. Inconsistency in timescales for responses The timescale for responses to formal enquiries is 28 days from the date the enquiry letter is received. This timescale does not represent working days, i.e. it includes weekends and bank holidays. This automatically puts those responses under additional constraint where a number of public holidays occur, e.g. the Easter or Christmas periods. On one occasion the Council received a formal enquiry at 6:31pm via email and after the Council sought clarification, the investigator confirmed that the day the email was received would count into the 28 day timescale although it was received in the evening. It is my view that all responses to enquiries should benefit from identical timescales. In some more complex cases, the Council may ask for an extension to the 28 days to provide responses due to the large amount of information which has to be collated, often from different agencies. Even if the Ombudsman agrees an extension, the original deadline of 28 days does not get adjusted. This means the Council gets criticised for breeches of agreed response times in the Ombudsman’s annual letter and report. Consistency should be applied in the way the Ombudsman sets deadlines both with local authorities and her own investigators. The Council is not aware of any timescales for investigators to consider complaints. In the past, investigators themselves have been delayed and this seems to be acceptable. In one case, the Council provided a response to the Ombudsman on 22 July 2011 and received an email on 4 November 2011 stating that a different investigator had taken on the complaint offering his apologies that he had “not written to [the Council] before now”. In another case, the Council provided a response on 19 December 2011 and received correspondence on 10 February 2012 stating that the investigator was “considering the information”. In yet another case, the investigator wrote to the Council stating that a delay had occurred due to “personal circumstances”. 5. Inconsistency in information request formats The Ombudsman sends enquiries in electronic format or in hard copy, addressed to the Council’s designated Local Government Ombudsman Link Officer or its Chief Executive and some correspondence is encrypted while some is not. More consistency in the Ombudsman’s correspondence would be desirable, especially in cases where the inconsistency might impact on the Council’s ability to respond to requests within the specified timescales, e.g. the sending of enquiries to different addressees or with different encryption practices. For example, the Council received an encrypted formal enquiry on 20 June 2011. The Council requested the correspondence in an alternative format as its IT system did not support it. This, combined with the lack of the investigator’s immediate response, led to delays in the response to the enquiry. 6. Anonymising information Although the Council appreciates the reasoning behind the Ombudsman’s practice to anonymising her statements of reasons, investigators need to carefully consider the names or initials they chose to represent complainants, involved parties and/or provider organisations in order to avoid confusion. In one case, the name of a residential home had been supposedly anonymised but the name chosen actually
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denoted a third party residential home within the same local authority area. In another case, the complainant’s name was changed to “Mrs P” but the Council’s officer who signed the complaint response was also a “Mrs P”. 7. Joint investigations There does not seem to be a clear set of criteria as to what triggers a joint investigation by the Local Government Ombudsman and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. For example, a past complaint was considered by an NHS organisation without the Council’s knowledge. The complainant subsequently complained to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman who ruled that the complaint was outside their jurisdiction and handed it to the Local Government Ombudsman. The Council then dealt with the complaint without having had any prior involvement. Devon County Council's Local Government Ombudsman Link Officer March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Paul and Gill Robinson Function, purpose and remit of the LGO The Ombudsman’s role states that, “ it must consider whether the council has acted reasonably in accordance with the law”. This has not happened in our cases, although pointed out with legal references. The LGO do not bother to investigate illegal activity or criminal offences in our instances, even when this has been proved by themselves. This is actually condoning the activity – Amazing! We don’t really know, after 4 years, what the LGO’s function, purpose or remit is, for when you raise issues with Investigators, some say, “cannot look at that or this” and yet it is stated in their foundation statements (as above), so you do not know where you stand. Arrangements for handling complaints. What arrangements? – It seems to change every few months and with each Investigator. – Obviously, it appears, they and us never know what the procedure is. We have dealt with over 11 different Investigators, Assistant Ombudsman and area Secretaries and PA’s plus in addition public advisors on the telephones.
We have as Complainants to give the information and questions for the LGO to ask in detail, for them to look at the case, in the situations we have been involved in. That takes time and then they turn round and say there is too much information. The LGO rarely visit cases. Only 6% a year we have been informed, usually nasty cases, We were visited 3 times, but other than that they judge from afar or from GOOGLE, in relation to planning issues. The Investigators are not experts in the investigations they cover – planning, social care etc. They admit they know nothing about the area that they are dealing with. Amazing!! So statements from Local Authorities and trusts can easily hoodwink them and blind them with supposed science! You cannot question the LGO’s ruling without going to a Judicial Review. Where do people get the money to do that? As OAP’s and ordinary paid members of the public the law is too expensive. Why is the LGO needed in its present form? Should it not be able to deliver enough punishments, compensation to stop recalcitrant authorities doing the same again. The LGO are toothless and the local authorities say this and know it.
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Many of the employees of the LGO have an arrogance in their manner: An advisor on the telephone on 13/03/2012 at 9.10am said, “We answer to no-one. Don’t bother to complain as it won’t get you anywhere”. (We could name names and it is from the assistant ombudsmen down the ranks). Not very helpful at all! We requested a letter to be faxed as we had not received it in two weeks, we were told that the “Fax is not working today”, when it actually was working, (When there had been a delay of a month and a half sending out a letter.) 14/3/2012. Cannot get through to Assistant Ombudsman, Secretaries or PA as requested, we have been informed at times, it was not allowed unless we were Corporate institution. This is discriminatory. Sometimes they put you straight through, and there is no problem. Very confusing. The LGO does not bother to ask Complainants for additional information, even when it is offered. - Statement from one of the Investigators, themselves. Statement from the LGO – “ Don’t bother to send information as there will be too much to look through”. Unbelievable. Names and paperwork can be supplied as proof. The LGO told us to “Wait until you have all the statements from the Local Authority before you reply to this letter, then the investigator issued a decision without allowing us to reply to what the Local Authority had said. They are only paper pushers in the main and may as well not be there. Good ones are like gold. In the past 7 months or so the confusion and performance has got even worse. The LGO do not ask the Local Authority for written proof of their statements. They take their statements on face value, which we have found broke the realms of fantasy. The ICO, Audit Commission, Planning Inspectorate Bristol, in the main ask the authorities for proof. There seems to be an implicit view at the LGO that the Local Authorities tell the truth, nothing could be further from the truth than that. Where is investigating and objectivity, it does not exist. The LGO do not even know the legal framework of the complaint they are dealing with, nor do they bother to find out because if they did, they would not come to the assumptions, decisions they do which is complete goblygook. They seem in the main to think the public are deaf, daft and stupid! Their premise seems to be complainants are liars, stupid and can be railroaded and that is from us who have had 5 decisions go our way against 2 Local Authorities, but this is after 4 years of persistence and fighting. As Complainants, we have to back up every statement, action with written evidence. Quite rightly.! The Local Authorities make “amazing” (for want of a better word,) statements in their replies by telephone and in writing without written proof to back them up, and what is worse they are accepted by the LGO. The Local Authority in some cases vindicates the statements of the complaints, and yet the LGO still find in favour of the Local Authority in the face of the evidence!
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The Local Authorities don’t bother about the LGO. In fact, they actively encourage you to go to the LGO as they say “ it doesn’t matter, they won’t do anything”. The LGO is apparently no deterrent to illegal activity, criminal offences and mal administration to mention a few. Complainants do not know in general what the LGO have suggested to improve the Local Authorities workings. Nothing has changed in our instance for 4 years; it is still the same old !!!! No recommendations stated in our judgements. Why not? Ordinary people should be given the opportunity to voice their concerns about the LGO. Complaints to you should be taken seriously and like wise by the LGO, otherwise it is no point them being there, as a government body, Members of Society with clout, connections or money, don’t have to go through this debacle, it appears. The Secretary of State must have powers to censure the LGO and intervene and take responsibility for law and order and make the LGO accountable for their actions or inactions as the case might be! The LGO do not get in touch with other Government Departments to verify the Complainants statements or cooperate with each other. E.g. Environment Agency, Parliamentary and Health Ombudsman. One of our Investigators wished to combine a complaint with the P&HO, but was stopped, she informed us by letter. The LGO need to work with other organisations and vice versa if they are to be of any use. We feel that there is a reluctance for the LGO to go against the Local Authorities, even in the light of evidence It seems implicit in the LGO’s workings, that the authorities are right. There seems to be no basis for justice, objectivity or transparency in their investigations in general. The LGO’s handling of complaints is naïve. They do not realise the bullying that complainants suffer from the Local Authorities, nor the physical threats to complainants by the people that the Local Authority protect. i.e. .the person going against the law that are being supported by the Local Authority. No penalty for Local Authorities that break the confidentiality of the complainant which can put the claimant in physical risk against the person/situation they are complaining about. It is quite dangerous to embark in criticising the Local Authority, through the LGO, or people who have been let get away with things by the Local Authority as the Local Authority do not keep professional silences and can actively work against complaints. It takes a great deal of time and effort on behalf of the Complainants to complain, and the rudeness from Local Authorities and LGO department members, some at Assistant Ombudsman level, make the situation unpleasant if not fearful. The Internal Appeal process of the LGO is a sham. Just useless – Nothing else to say! No objective reasoning or common sense. They should not be able to police themselves. The appeal process consists of looking at what they have done, not what they should have done for a complete case, to the detriment of the complainant not the Local Authority .Where, in the judging of a situation and balancing views in our
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country, is it one sided, when the complainant is not allowed to provide evidence or their paper evidence is ignored completely. The appeal process just rubber stamps the many inadequacies and idiosyncratic procedures of the investigator concerned. A sheer waste of time and effort. Paper filling exercise that is all. Adequacy of redress when Maladministration is found The value of the fine imposed (if any) is so small it is not worth the Local Authority investing in time, to write out and change office procedures. It is easier to continue as can be seen in our cases. It is cheaper to wait until the next time. When very little punishment will be given. The LGO has no mandate to demand the updating of procedures, nor does it give timescales when improvements are to be completed, it appears. Staffordshire County Council was found guilty on 1 major count of maladministration and although it was the lead authority (East Staffordshire Borough Council being the second), it received no penalty. Unbelievable. There is no follow-up by the LGO, to either party to see if things have improved. This will not happen obviously if complainants are not told what recommendations have been made so as the situation does not arise again. The LGO does nothing about the Local Authority criticising the LGO or telling the LGO untruths it just points out that what was said was not true to them as investigators. This can as in our case go on for 2 years!!!!!!!. What good is that! That untruth was fed to the complaints for 3 years as justification of the LA’s illegal activity and criminal offences as pointed out to the LGO Planning consultants nationwide and solicitors of other residents where the Local Authorities have to be more careful in their correspondence. All costs time and money! What happens about cases of Malpractice/ Malfeasance?? Are these just ignored? They should not be! Courts of Law are just too expensive for us lesser mortals. A revamped LGO should be given teeth! Looking at what the government pays the LGO, money and value of fines do matter as they act as a deterrent to recalcitrant public bodies. Making authorities payback when they have not followed the laws of the land, paying compensation, would concentrate the LA’s mind wonderfully well. Naming and Shaming the authority and officials and not moving them off to better paid jobs would be a start, as in the case of Stafford hospital, That was a crass and unbelievable decision and an insult to those who died. Disgusting! This was the P and H Ombudsman but they are even worse than the LGO! In our opinion as residents (the first expressed in this letter) the LGO are not fit for purpose, a lot of pen pushers getting paid for solving nothing, with the exception of a very few officers.
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Impact of LGO’s work on local Authorities, which leads to better administration and improved quality of service. None of the above statement is true in the 4 years we have been dealing with them. We have direct and personal experience of 4 LGO separate nasty and large cases. Nothing has really changed. We did not see the recommendations for ESBC and SCC to behave better. Were there any?? They certainly are still behaving in the same negative way. The Local Authorities view is that the LGO has no teeth, could not care what they say and in the local newspaper article (Burton Mail, Burton on Trent), the CEO remarked that the LGO were wrong and ESBC was right. There was no follow-up by the LGO to his remarks, as far as we know. However this just makes the LGO look ridiculous in the eyes of the general public, and possibly is part of the contempt in which they are held by public and professionals alike. The Local Authority does not pay any heed to decisions by the LGO or if the LGO is bought in. Often told in writing by the LA – “ if you are not happy, go to the LGO”. No threat at all. We have been told as residents “nothing will happen anyway”. Witness proof. 65 concerns were raised by us with documented proof about our LA, not acting within the law and procedures. The LGO said that was too much for them to cope with and would only go back as far as a year. These were covering 3 years as it takes time to find out about issues. (when local authorities stop you getting information as they have done on 2 occasions with us and the ICO have had to take over) As ordinary people you may think things are not right but when you are blocked from getting information as we have been on 2 occasions and the ICO have had to take the authority to court. Seven years should be the minimum that the LGO regularly looks back too, not just in occasional cases. The LA’s culpability should be for that length of time at least if not longer. Paul and Gill Robinson March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Peter Ranken This memorandum is based on an experience of making a complaint to the Local Government Ombudsman and covers the following matters on the work and activities of Local Government Ombudsman in England. Summary The arrangements for handling complaints
• Lack of overall transparency in the complaint process including refusal to handle all aspects of a complaint and a refusal to give reasons why it would not handle all aspects of a complaint
• The lack of a right of appeal against a decision by or on behalf of the
Ombudsman and the lack of an independent process to deal with complaints against the way the Ombudsman has handled a complaint
• The lack of an independent process for taxpayers to question the Local
Government Ombudsman as a value for money Government grant funded service in the way it handles complaints
The adequacy of redress when maladministration is found
• Lack of suitable redress for a complainant Submissions
Lack of overall transparency in the complaint process including refusal to handle all aspects of a complaint and a refusal to give reasons why it would not handle all aspects of a complaint In its handling of a complaint, the Local Government Ombudsman says it is not obliged to explore all aspects of a case as requested by a complainant and chooses to ignore issues raised by a complainant that could be central to a case. This does not allow for a fair hearing of the complainant’s case and negates the very reason for the existence of the Ombudsman to provide a fair and just service in investigating complaints against local councils and other bodies. It also does not provide for transparency and clarity in its dealings with members of the public who, as taxpayers, fund the Ombudsman through a government grant. The following evidence supports the above statement: In a published letter dated 9 December 2011 (Exhibit ‘A’), Richard Shaw, an Assistant Ombudsman states: ‘the Ombudsman is not required to address every point a complainant might raise and I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to have pursued this matter’…. ‘It does not appear to be central….’
The matter in question referred to the fact Council Officers had admitted to the Independent Adjudicator investigating the complainant’s complaint on behalf of the Council in question, that they gave her false information as to why they did not carry out a request by Mayor and Cabinet to support the complainant which the Independent Adjudicator confirmed in writing to the complainant. When the Assistant Ombudsman was asked why, despite there being irrefutable evidence that Council Officers lied to the Independent Adjudicator, he refused to investigate and why such an action was not central, he replied in an email dated 27 February 2012 (Exhibit ‘B’), ‘The Deputy Ombudsman has considered what you have said, but does not consider a response is necessary. As you have been told, your case is closed and we cannot assist you further’. This evidence clearly shows that the Local Government Ombudsman behaves in a totally arbitrary way in handling complaints and does not provide an unbiased and transparent assessment of the facts. Irrespective of the merits of the case as a whole there was irrefutable evidence from an inscrutable source that Council Officers lied and attempted to cover up why they had not carried out instructions from Mayor and Cabinet which amounted to maladministration and seriously affected the complainant. Yet the evidence shows the Ombudsman ignored the evidence and refused to investigate and refused to give the complainant a reason why he would not investigate. The public are misled into believing they will receive a fair and just hearing of their case which is clearly not so. This therefore questions why the Local Government Ombudsman exists as a taxpayer funded service designed to support the taxpayer in fair and just way with complaints against local government bodies as it clearly does not do and, by not doing so, is wasting both public money and taxpayers’ time. The lack of a right of appeal against a decision by or on behalf of the Ombudsman and the lack of an independent process to deal with complaints against the way the Ombudsman has handled a complaint In a response to the complainant challenging an Investigator’s report and requesting the right to appeal against its findings, the Assistant Ombudsman states in a letter dated 26 November 2011(Exhibit ‘C’): ‘There is no right of appeal against a decision by or on behalf of the Ombudsman, but I have reviewed matters in accordance with our usual procedures.’ The Local Government Ombudsman’s website states that it has the same powers as the High Court to obtain information and documents yet, unlike the High Court, it does not have an appeals procedure. Its usual procedure is a complaints procedure which is undertaken by Local Government Ombudsman staff. An Assistant Ombudsman will investigate a complaint into an Investigator’s report and there will be no further recourse against the Assistant Ombudsman’s review of the complaint. Any complaint by a complainant against the way the Local Government Ombudsman has handled a complaint is then handled internally by the Ombudsman which investigates itself. Complaints are not investigated by an independent source and therefore the complaints process cannot be seen to be fair and unbiased, unlike the appeals system in the High Court.
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The only other recourse a complainant has, is to seek a judicial review, but this would only be on the basis that the reasoning for the Local Government Ombudsman not upholding a complaint is legally flawed. Seeking a judicial review is an expensive process which is way beyond the means of an ordinary member of the public and based on the evidence provided in this memorandum, refusing to handle aspects of a complaint and not giving reasons for the refusal is not based on a legal premise. A complainant is therefore powerless to seek additional recourse if he/she is unhappy with the nature of the investigation as the Local Government Ombudsman is only accountable to itself and does not provide a fair service or spend public money effectively, as it claims on its website. The lack of an independent process for taxpayers to question the Local Government Ombudsman as a value for money Government grant funded service in the way it handles complaints By handling complaints the way it does and being only accountable to itself, the Local Government Ombudsman is not regulated to ensure it is providing the service it claims to provide and is good value for money. There is no process that allows the taxpayer to question the capability of the organisation and the ability of its staff, who are allowed to make decisions without providing the reasoning behind those decisions. This is dangerous as it allows staff to reduce caseloads through dismissing cases without proper investigation and to make subjective, arbitrary decisions knowing the complainant has no recourse to an independent opinion. The taxpayer funds the Local Government Ombudsman, yet there is no way for the taxpayer to hold the Local Government Ombudsman accountable for its actions or non-actions and whether it is being run efficiently and providing the service it is required to do to the taxpayer. Lack of suitable redress for a complainant The Local Government Ombudsman cannot make bodies do what it recommends if maladministration is found, which means complainants cannot seek immediate enforcement of a decision if a body decides not to adopt the Local Government Ombudsman’s recommendations. If the matter is a serious one such as involving losses of livelihoods due to council officers’ maladministration, without the power of enforcement any decision becomes meaningless, as the body will not seek to provide remedy to the complainant who will have to resort to the Courts to obtain enforcement, which in most cases he/she will not be able to afford. This therefore negates the purpose of the Ombudsman. Conclusion From the evidence submitted in this memorandum, I would ask the Communities and Local Government Parliamentary Committee to recommend the following when examining the workings of the Local Government Ombudsman:
1. That the Local Government Ombudsman’s arrangements for handling complaints are made transparent and clear and do not allow for officials to make arbitrary decisions that they are not accountable for.
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2. That the Ombudsman is required to respond to all a complainant’s requests
for information and not be able refuse to answer without providing a reason. 3. That an appeal procedure to investigate complaints against the Ombudsman
is set up independently of the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman is bound by any decision through such procedure.
4. That the Local Government Ombudsman is accountable to all taxpayers
through regulation to ensure it is providing a fair and efficient service and is not wasting taxpayers’ money.
Peter Ranken 3 March 2012
Supplementary written evidence submitted by Peter Ranken This memorandum is supplementary to the memorandum issued to the Committee dated 3 March 2012. Summary The arrangements for handling complaints
• Lack of accountability to the taxpayer of the actions and effectiveness of the Local Government Ombudsman in the way it handles complaints.
• Lack of external regulation on behalf of the taxpayer of the Local Government
Ombudsman’s use of its Government grant. Submissions In answer to the question of who is responsible for issuing the Government grant that funds the Local Government Ombudsman and who is the Local Government Ombudsman accountable to for the use of its grant The Treasury says (Exhibit A): ‘As you note, the department for Communities and Local Government has policy responsibility for the Ombudsman; the Treasury is at some distance from all of this. Clearly the checks and balances that have been put in place are those that were considered by Parliament as appropriate and proportionate. As such with any service, there cannot be an infinite recession of appeal mechanisms.’ It is clear therefore that the checks and balances considered by Parliament as appropriate and proportionate on how the Local Government Ombudsman uses the grant it is given by Government to carry out is duties on behalf of the taxpayer are non existent as the Local Government Ombudsman deals with all complaints against it itself and therefore regulates itself. There also needs to be clarity as to which Department is responsible for handling the funding of the Local Government Ombudsman. Will the Committee please investigate this issue and in their report recommend that the Local Government Ombudsman is regulated in such a way that any taxpayer wishing to appeal against any decision or complain about the way a case has been handled can do so to an independent source in the knowledge that it is done so in a fair and just way. Peter Ranken 23 March 2012
Written evidence submitted by LGO Watch and Public Service Ombudsman Watchers
1) Summary The LGO (Commission for Local Administration in England (CLAE)) 1.01) Operate the most perverse and publicly criticised system of administrative justice in the world. 1.02) Is institutionally biased in favour of the public body under investigation. 1.03) Has a track record of rejecting complaints based on a short telephone discussion with a senior member staff from the body being complained about. 1.04) Manipulate their statistics and customer satisfaction surveys to enhance their perceived effectiveness and performance. 1.05) Under report the true level of maladministration. 1.06) Abuse their absolute discretion with impunity because their is no adequate appeals . mechanism or complaints system with which to challenge their decisions. 1.07) Employ too high a percentage of staff (investigators and assistant managers) who have previously worked in local government. Consequently they are seen to be lacking any real independence from the bodies under investigation. 1.08) Since the mid 90s all LGOs and the majority of their Deputies have previously worked in local government. Consequently they are seen to be lacking any real independence from the bodies under investigation. 1.09) Have a significantly higher percentage of dissatisfied customers than any other Public Service Ombudsman. 1.10) Has introduced a number of dubious practices and procedures to minimise the number of complaints they have to properly investigate. 1.11) Introduced a policy of maximising good publicity and minimising bad publicity. The results of which can be seen in the way their annual reports have changed over the years. The factually based reports of the 70s and 80s have slowly been replaced with documents better described as self promoting spin. 1.12) Accordingly the LGO is no longer fit for purpose. A situation which has been getting worse year on year since the early 90s. 2) Introduction 2.01) LGO Watch was founded in 2003 by Gary Powell and Public Service Ombudsman
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Watchers in 2006 by Trevor R Nunn. LGO Watch was originally set up as a campaigning website whilst Public Service Ombudsman Watchers was set up to expose Public Service Ombudsmen to public scrutiny. They were merged in 2009 but due to other commitments the original objective of LGO Watch was changed to one of helping others campaign rather than initiating and coordinating campaigns ourselves. 2.02) Whilst the LGO is quick to dismiss criticism from dissatisfied complainants (by suggesting such criticism is to be expected from complainants who were unsuccessful) it should be noted that two of the most active and outspoken critics of the LGO, Gary Powell and Trevor R Nunn, were successful on three separate occasions in obtaining a finding of maladministration against different councils. 2.03) Both Gary Powell and Trevor R Nunn gave evidence to the 2005 select committee investigation into the Role and Effectiveness of the Local Government Ombudsman. 2.04) Unfortunately, due to the then impending election the investigation was curtailed until after the election and the formation of a new government. The original chair of the committee, the driving force behind the 2005 investigation, retired at election time and the new chair unwisely closed down the investigation. 2.05) Understandably we now have little faith in a select committee having the willingness to confront let alone the motivation to do something about the unfair, unjust and perverse practices introduced by the LGO over the last 20 years. 2.06) Nevertheless, we have been motivated to submit this memorandum in the hope that this Government will now do something about the perverse system of administrative justice now being operated by the LGO once and for all. 2.07) Based on the hundreds of dissatisfied complainants who have contacted us over the years we are seriously concerned that many people who turn to the LGO do not receive the justice that they deserve. 2.08) It would appear there is a strong correlation between the LGO's ever growing reluctance to find local authorities guilty of maladministration and report it as such to the ever growing levels of local authority wrongdoing. 2.09) As a result, whistle-blowers, the press and bloggers now highlight more local authority wrongdoing than the LGO. This is a bizarre situation when you consider that the LGO are funded by the taxpayer to the tune of £20 million a year to do something that they are demonstrably failing to do. That is, to identify and report maladministration and help local authorities to improve.
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3) Evidence 3.01) Much of the evidence we rely on is already in the public domain. Therefore, we are in a position to keep this part of our submission short by providing a summary with links, when necessary, to the available on-line evidence. 3.02) The LGO operate the most perverse and publicly criticised system of administrative justice in the world because it is built on Fifteen Pillars of Injustice.
1) They work in private.
2) You can't appeal their findings of fact.
3) They don't have to be qualified for the job.
4) They can, and indeed do, delegate their job to a junior member of staff no matter how unqualified or incompetent.
5) They don't have to show all the evidence to the complainant and they usually
don't.
6) They can, and often do, talk to the council without the complainant being aware any discussion took place.
7) They settle the complaint with the council. A complainant can't refuse such a
settlement.
8) They don't have to follow previous decisions/precedents/case law.
9) They are free to define maladministration as they see fit, there is no statutory definition.
10) They are free to determine the level of injustice you must suffer before
investigating your complaint, there is no statutory definition.
11) They are free to engage in propaganda (or as Justice Lightman calls it an evangelical agenda).
12) They probably don't meet the requirements of the Human Rights Act.
13) They often accept false statements from a council officer as the truth without
any validation. (Their 5th pillar of injustice ensures nobody else is in a position to challenge this ludicrous pillar of injustice).
14) They don't ask for action to be taken against any local authority officer who has
lied to them.
15) They don't report any potentially criminal act they identify during their investigations to the Police.
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Now compare the LGO fifteen pillars of injustice with the Courts/Tribunal fifteen pillars of justice below. Courts & Tribunals and their Fifteen Pillars of justice
1) Court proceedings are normally held in public.
2) Either side can appeal a judgement on a finding of fact.
3) The judge is qualified.
4) A judge can't delegate their job to a junior member of staff.
5) All evidence is shown to both sides.
6) A judge can't talk to one side without the other side being present.
7) Any out of court settlement is agreed between the two parties. The judge plays no part.
8) They have to follow case law or provide a valid reason for not doing so.
9) Statutory definitions exist for all legal wrongs.
10) A judge can't stop you taking court action even if the injustice you have suffered
is slight.
11) A judge cannot use self promoting publicity (propaganda).
12) All court/tribunal cases have to be human rights compliant.
13) Statements are not accepted as the truth by a judge without (a) being made under oath and (b) tested by counter argument and cross examination by the other party.
14) Action can be taken against anyone who commits perjury in court.
15) A judge would report any potentially criminal act they identify during a trial to the
Police. 3.03) The LGO do not even meet their Public Value Vision statement.
Their website states The Commission's Public Value Vision is: "to provide a high quality and efficient service, accessible to all, that remedies injustice for indiviudals (sic) and maximises the value of investigations to make public services better." Looking at these bold statements individually, there is no independent evidence to support their assertions that they
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Provide a high quality service. (Their own surveys suggest over 70% of users are
dissatisfied. In spite of the fact that they fiddle the results by deviously excluding a large percentage of dissatisfied complaints.)
Provide an efficient service. (Their own statistics suggests otherwise.)
Provide a service that is accessible to all. (See 2 below.)
Provide a service that remedies injustice for individuals. (See 1 below.)
Have made public services better. (Evidence suggests otherwise.)
If you exclude the self generated spin, most of the evidence available in the public domain suggests that they don't provide any of the above. Here are a couple of contradictory statements from their own website.
(1) They can't provide a service which remedies injustice for individuals because they are legally restricted to recommendations only. Recommendations which can be ignored and indeed often are. "When we find that a council has done something wrong, we may recommend how it should put it right. Although we cannot make councils do what we recommend, ....."
(2) Their service is not accessible to all because they can arbitrarily refuse access
to their service to anyone they choose."We do not have to investigate every complaint received, even if we have the power to do so."
The LGO are free to engage in propaganda, something a real system of justice, such as a court or tribunal, can't do. The LGO hold no independently commissioned evidence that they are effective. 3.04) The LGO is not fit for purpose. Freedom of Information requests identify that the Commission for Local Administration in England (CLAE), AKA the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO), is not fit for purpose. 'FOI Act shines a torch on public services, says Information Commissioner.' “Freedom of Information has a key role to play in helping to deliver greater transparency and accountability. These are key priorities in public policy”, says Information Commissioner Christopher Graham in a message to mark International Right to Know Day". From a number of FOI requests submitted to the Commission for Local Administration in England (The LGO) over the last few years one can confirm that their faults are not just limited to their inability to carry out fair, just and above board investigations. These are some of the failures that the FOI 'torch' has highlighted as far as the CLAE/LGO is concerned on the What Do They Know Freedom of Information website. http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/body/lgo
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Failure to keep adequate records Failure to maintain adequate audit trails Failure to scrutinise expense claims Failure to scrutinise proposals Failure to follow their own code of conduct Failure to provide information Failure to discipline staff for mistakes or wrongdoing Failure to protect personal data Failure to meet statutory deadlines
FOI has also exposed the CLAE/LGO for
Fabricating records from memory years after the event . Playing silly semantic games to delay/avoid requests for copies of documents. Making up policy on the fly.
As far as we are concerned if they can't keep their own house in order what chance have they got keeping other public authorities in order? They are not setting an example of how to run public organisation as they should be be doing. 3.05) Extracts from some of the letters/emails we receive about the LGO which support our assertion that the LGO are not fit for purpose.
"I am not the slightest interested in the LGO looking at my complaint again. They have no idea how to investigate and quite honestly I don't value their opinion. In my eyes they are nothing, nobodies who twist logic and I would never recommend anyone approach them, pointless exercise. "
"I think he [LGO investigator] just wanted to put me off suing the Council."
"I got nothing off the ombudsman."
"I can see their methods/modus operandi. Give you loads of sympathy, build you up
and drop you like a piece of dirt."
"I was pleased that I read your web pages before I contacted the LGO, the shock of their actions was easier to accept."
"the whole system stinks of the gentleman's club.
"I am hearing lots of complaints locally about the LGO."
"The LGO [actual name of LGO given] is a worthless excuse for justice and a total
waste of space."
"I have experienced the corrupt local government ombudsman and his toady investigator."
"I am still reeling in shock at the bare-faced audacity of this organisation."
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"The local government ombudsman has as much integrity as a racetrack shyster
manipulating three egg cups and ball."
"The idiom about "moving goalposts" springs to mind. We have very serious misgivings."
"They LGO [actual name of LGO given] recommended utterly derisory
compensation."
"I am still going through exactly the same thing that caused me to complain in the first place."
"The lgo agreed with us but did not believe the case was worth pursuing. The
ombudsman's investigations was cursory and inaccurate and totally prejudiced against us and for the council."
"No wonder the local council urged us to complain to the LGO."
"The LGO report was characterised by the fact that the bulk complaints were
completely ignored."
"Had we known that the lgo was so ineffective, biased and incompetent we would not have bothered."
"Everything I said to the ombudsman required proof but everything the council said
to them was taken on face value." 3.06) The LGO's customer satisfaction levels getting worse. Both the LGO's 1995 and 1999 customer satisfaction surveys were quantitative in nature involving 1000 complainants. However, following the extremely poor customer satisfaction levels highlighted in both the 1995 and 1999 surveys (over 70% of all complaints dissatisfied in one way or anther with the LGO) the LGO switched to a qualitative customer satisfaction survey involving just a handful of specially selected and filtered complainants. They switched back to a quantitative survey in 2007 but were exposed for removing nearly 20% of potentially dissatisfied complainants from this survey. However, even after the removal of a significant proportion of potentially dissatisfied customers they still received an extremely poor customer satisfaction level. Essentially, if you strip away their obvious attempts at manipulating the outcome in their favour they have not improved their atrocious customer satisfaction levels highlighted in the 1995 and 1999 surveys. Even though they promised to heed the results of the 1995 and 1999, they had demonstrably failed to do so by 2007. For their 2010 customer satisfaction survey they once again decided to switch back to a qualitative survey involving just a handful of specially selected and filtered complainants.
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If you ignore the positive spin you will observe that the picture is very bleak for the Local Government Ombudsman as far as real customer satisfaction levels are concerned. 3.07) The fact that the Local Government Ombudsman have had more websites and blogs set up to expose their failings over the years should have set alarm bells ringing years ago. It is clearly a symptom of their appalling customer satisfaction levels and the perverse system of administrative justice which they operate. Just a few of these are
LGO Watch (http://www.ombudsmanwatch.org)
Public Service Ombudsman Watchers (http://www.psow.co.uk)
Ombudsman Watchers Resource Centre (http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk)
Local Government Ombudsman Watcher (http://www.lgowatcher.blogspot.co.uk)
Local Government Ombudsman Corruption & Cover Ups (http://www.local-government-ombudsman-lgo.blogspot.co.uk).
I addition there are a many case studies which further highlight the problems with the system of administrative justice the LGO operate. These are just a few examples, there are many more available on-line.
The Case of Mr and Mrs Wain. One in which the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman actually came to different conclusions on the same case. Unfortunately the Local Government refused to correct their mistakes leaving the complainant to suffer not only the original injustice but the injustice of their wrong decision.
http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/personal_accounts/wain/mw_intro_doc.html
The case of Keith Edmunds. One in which the Local Government Ombudsman repeatedly accepted the word of a council in spite of available evidence to the contrary. This is one of the main complaints we receive about the LGO.
http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/personal_accounts/edmunds2/summary.html
The case of Mr P Kerr. One in which the LGO actually committed maladministration themselves whilst reaching a decision on the case. Losing evidence or failing to take evidence into account is another common criticism of the LGO.
http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/evidence_archives/incompetent/evidence_incompetent_york_kerr_intro.html 3.08) It is worth highlighting that the main complaint about the LGO is that they regularly accept the word of a local authority in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
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Something which we can prove has been going on for some 20 years. The first example of this tactic we can identify was during the famous Balchin case. When Mr & Mrs Balchin initially complained to the LGO the LGO just rang up the CEO of the council in question and accepted the CEO's word that the council was not guilty of maladministration. As a result the LGO refused to investigate Mr & Mrs Balchin’s complaint. It took Mr and Mrs Balchin 14 years of further legal battles before both the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman agreed to properly investigate their complaints. As far as the LGO's was concerned they found the council in question guilty of maladministration and recommended they pay Mr & Mrs Balchin £100,000 compensation for the injustice they had suffered all those years earlier. 14 years of added injustice because the then LGO accepted the word of a council officer without validation and without looking at any evidence. http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/articles/balchins.html One would think that the LGO would have stopped using this discredited practice; however, the reality is that LGO continue to use this discredited practice to this day. This is by far the most common complaint we receive against the LGO. 3.09) The true cost of the Local Government Ombudsman Using their 2009/10 figures as an example. The Government could (except for the self financing local government training section) have closed down the LGO and given every single complainant, not just the lucky 23.6% £533.88 each (the average compensation recommended by the LGO) and still save the taxpayer nearly £12 million pounds. £16.145 million from LGO savings + £1.3 million saved in Council compensation payments less the £5.5 million total compensation for the 10,309 complainants. http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/lgo_statistics/lgo_statistics_true_cost_0910.html 3.10) Wirral Council Scandal: Where was the Local Government Ombudsman? Extract from a press article about the Wirral Council Scandal. 'Mr Morton’s claims of bullying, cover-ups and maladministration led an independent inquiry to conclude that the authority needs a root and branch change in its culture. The council was in the grip of a “corrosive” and “inward-looking culture where the needs and rights of residents had become submerged under its bureaucratic machinations. ' Therefore, it is only right to question how such a badly run council could have such a low
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number of findings of maladministration against them by the LGO? 2010/11 34 complaints NO maladministration reported by LGO. 2009/10 166 complaints NO maladministration reported by LGO. 2008/09 43 complaints 1 finding of maladministration reported by LGO. 2007/08 87 complaints 1 finding of maladministration reported by LGO. 2006/07 95 complaints NO maladministration reported by LGO. 2005/06 100 complaints NO maladministration reported by LGO. Between 2005 and 2011 there was 525 complaints against Wirral Council and only 2 findings of maladministration reported by LGO. Unless the objective is to hide the true level of council wrongdoing it is a statistical impossibility. If a very badly run council like Wirral can get away with only 2 out of 525 complaints being reported as maladministration over a 6 year period just how much wrongdoing is reported by the LGO against the average council in any one year? Answer Less than 1%. However, if you think that is a ridiculously low figure, the LGO responsible for Wirral Council only found maladministration in only 0.1% of all complaints submitted in 2008. That's only 1 in 1000 complaints submitted were reported by Ann Seex, LGO as maladministration. Ten times lower than the national LGO average. No wonder councils like Wirral can get away with cover-ups and maladministration for years....until of course someone else does the LGO's job and exposes council cover ups and maladministration. 4) Recommendations 4.01) Ideally the LGO should be abolished and replaced by a truly independent and fit for purpose system of administrative justice for England. However, if it is decided to keep the LGO the following should be considered. 4.02) An independent tribunal should be available to consider appeals to the findings of the LGO. One is already available for hearing appeals against decisions of the Information Commissioner (ICO) and it appears inconsistent that none is available for hearing appeals against the decisions of the LGO. Currently the only avenue open is by way of a judicial review which can only consider errors in law not in fact. It is too expensive an option for most people, and with the LGO's statutory based absolute discretion regarding whether to initiate or discontinue a
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complaint, complainants have found it practically impossible to succeed. 4.03) Recommendations made by the LGO following a finding in favour of the complainant should be made legally binding and enforceable. 4.04) The LGO should also be able to fine Public Authorities for wrongdoing. The Information Commissioner (ICO) can already do so and this should be extended to the LGO. 4.05) LGOs and their staff should not, and should never have been, recruited from the authorities and bodies they are expected to investigate. 4.06) Change the LGO's absolute discretion to a conditional discretion over their decision to initiate or discontinue an investigation. 4.07) Maladministration needs to be legally defined. 4.08) The level of injustice a complainant is expected to suffer from before the LGO will investigate needs to be legally defined. 4.09) Maladministration should be reported as such and graded to levels of seriousness. This would allow for proper statistical interpretation of maladministration. 4.10) Customer satisfaction surveys should be commissioned, monitored and validated by an independent body, not by the LGO. 4.11) All LGO statistics should be independently audited and verified. 4.12) The LGO need to be made properly accountable. The current system in which the LGO produces their own statistics and their own report which are used as a yardstick to measure their effectiveness has been abused in the past and without independent validation as to the veracity of their statistics and the claims they make in their reports they will always be open to abuse. 4.13) The DCLG and Politicians need to work with citizens to improve the system of administrative justice in England rather than just tinkering with the current system to disguise it's inadequacies for the benefit of themselves and the LGO. The fairly recent introduction of the statutory provision to empower the LGO to locally settle complaints, something they had been doing illegally since the early 90s, is a prime example of that. Another example is when the number of people submitting complaints to the LGO fell dramatically. (Partly due to the adverse publicity on our websites) Rather than investigating the reason for this fall in numbers the Government just increased their remit thus masking the fact that complainants were beginning to desert them in droves. 5) In summary
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5.01) There are hundreds of pages of evidence available in the public domain. 5.02) The only thing that has been lacking over the last 10 years is the willingness of those with the power to improve the system of administrative justice to actually do so. 5.03) Tinkering with the current system to hide its deficiencies is no longer acceptable to complainants. Local Government Ombudsman Watch Public Service Ombudsman Watchers March 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman As the Parliamentary and Health Ombudsman, I very much welcome the Committee’s inquiry into the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) and I value the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Committee. In my role as Parliamentary Ombudsman I am also an ex-officio member of the Commission for Local Administration, the body that runs the LGO service. My evidence will focus on how my Office, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, works with the LGO.
• the function, purpose and remit of the LGO, including the proposed restructuring of the Commission
The role of the LGO to provide an independent service that considers complaints about councils (and other authorities) is a crucial one in our democracy. In considering how the LGO operates both the LGO and the Department for Communities and Local Government should keep in mind the British & Irish Ombudsman Association’s (BIOA) five key criteria for membership:
• Independence • Fairness • Effectiveness • Openness and Transparency • Accountability
• the arrangements for handling complaints
The jurisdictions of my Office and that of the LGO do not overlap, however complaints from members of the public can often relate to the actions of two different bodies, such as a Local Authority and a central Government agency regarding planning and the environment, or involve both NHS services and social care provision. Both my Office and the LGO are committed to providing a comprehensive and seamless service to the public wherever possible. A 2007 Regulatory Reform Order empowers our offices to conduct joint investigations, enabling us to work together collaboratively to address the issues raised by the complainant. This arrangement for handling complaints is increasingly being used with specialist staff in each office working closely together to improve the efficiency of the investigation and the benefit to the member of the public as a result. In the past year we have jointly published, amongst others, reports relating to the living arrangements and care provided to a man with Down's syndrome and about
the care and support provided to a vulnerable person living independently in the community. The legislation, systems, and procedures that enable bodies to work together to deliver services jointly are often complex, especially to the layperson. In turn, the complaints processes by which someone can complain about them are also confusing especially as the roles of the bodies are often intertwined. Conducting joint investigations enable us to tell the full story. Had we looked separately at only the matters within our own jurisdictions we would not have been able to come to a view on the overall impact of the failings to these individuals. As with many of our investigations, in these instances there was a personal remedy for the complainant, with responsibility apportioned where things had gone wrong, tangible recognition for what they had been through and an apology and financial remedy. There was also a wider public benefit through systemic change and improvement in the way that services are delivered as a result of the bodies in question producing an action plan describing what each had done to ensure that they had learnt the lessons from the failings identified and what they planned to do, including timescales, to avoid a recurrence of these failings in the future.
I stand ready to assist the Committee with the Inquiry in any way I can and to offer further written or oral evidence if the Committee would find that useful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any additional information or clarification.
UK Parliamentary Ombudsman and Health Service Ombudsman for England March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Robert Murrow and Debbie Sayers
Summary
• These submissions are made by a group of parents who have used the LGO to
complain about failures in Local Authority provision for their children who all have
statements of special educational needs.
• The authors and contributors wish to comment, primarily, on the LGO's arrangements
for handling complaints and the impact of its work in this area.
• Common problems have been encountered including a failure to understand the law
relating to the LGO's remit and its powers and a failure to work effectively within a
human rights and public law framework to promote the rights of the child.
• Concerns are also raised relating to apparent bias, the lack of appeal against decisions,
a general lack of transparency in decision-making, an over-reliance on local
settlement and the failure of LGO determinations to bring about real systemic change
at local authority level
• Suggestions are made for reform.
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Introduction
1. This submission is the result of collaboration between an informal group of private
individuals who have experience as parents/carers of the statutory special educational
needs ("SEN") system. Experiences have been shared by parents living in a variety of
different locations in England and Wales and in a range of different ways, for
example, through personal association, internet forums and support groups or via
local support groups and organisations.
2. The delivery of provision to children with SEN is fundamental to any concept of
effective inclusivity in our mainstream schools. One in five pupils – 1.7 million
school-age children in England – are identified as SEN.1 Pupils with special
educational needs are categorised, using the 2001 Special Educational Needs Code of
Practice, according to the degree of support they require. Support is organised via a
graduated pathway: School Action, School Action Plus and a statement. At January
2010, only 2.7% of school-aged children and young people had a statement of special
educational needs. 2 These children represent the most vulnerable in our school
system.
3. The term SEN encompasses a wide range of complex and significant difficulties. The
established categories of SEN are: specific learning difficulty, moderate learning
difficulty, severe learning difficulty, profound and multiple learning difficulty,
behavioural, emotional and social difficulties, speech, language and communications
needs, a hearing impairment, visual impairment, multi-sensory impairment, physical
disability and autistic spectrum disorder.3Many of these SEN also constitute
disabilities and the vast majority of children with SEN have a disability under the
Equality Act.4 This means that overlapping but distinct legal duties arise in relation to
these children: statutory duties under the Education Act 1996 to support their
1 Ofsted, ‘The special educational needs and disability review: A statement is not enough’ 14 Sep 2010
2 This includes all maintained, non-maintained and independent schools.
3 DfE SEN SFR (2010)
4 Children with Special Educational Needs 2010: an analysis 19 October 2010
http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/STA/t000965/osr25-2010.pdf
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educational needs and duties under the human rights framework which includes the
Human Rights Act, the Equality Act and other international obligations. These duties
should inform the way we treat children generally and, specifically, children with
disabilities. It also means that the majority of children within the SEN framework are
exceptionally vulnerable and reliant on specific provision to support their inclusion in
education. If a child has a statement of SEN, failure to put this provision in place will
breach the Education Act but it may also constitute an act of discrimination under the
Equality Act.
4. In England and Wales, the responsibility for assessing SEN and arranging the
provision to meet it falls to the local authority (“LA”) for the area in which the child
resides. The difficulties that parents face in securing provision for their children have
been consistently highlighted in a variety of reports, including the Lamb Report and
the Government’s recent Green Paper: Support and aspiration: A new approach to
special educational needs and disability - A consultation. Securing effective SEN
support for a child may be a lengthy, costly, time-consuming and emotionally
draining business for parents and carers. The system is complex and lines of
accountability between health and educational professionals can be easily blurred.
The existence of an effective and impartial system of accountability to secure a
child’s provision is of paramount importance.
The oversight role of the LGO in the SEN process
5. Unfortunately, our experience is that many parents of children with SEN encounter
significant problems with either the assessment or delivery of provision (or both) to
their children by LAs. These problems include poor communication, delay, a failure
to provide reasons for decision-making and, commonly, a failure to arrange the
provision as legally required by the child’s statement. It is here that the Local
Government Ombudsman (“LGO”) can play a very valuable role by overseeing
administrative practice in this area and encouraging compliance with the law.
Ombudsmen are intended to be ‘the independent upholder[s] of the highest standards
of efficient and fair administration’. They are guardians of good practice who are able
to investigate the effectiveness of systems of local administration rather than just
adjudicate on the facts of the specific complaint. The LGO has the power to
investigate maladministration in a variety of ways, for example, it can investigate a
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6. The LGO is intended to be a thorough, impartial investigator, pursuing direct primary
evidence where possible to investigate local authority practice on behalf of the
complainant. It may also provide direction on lawful and effective administrative
practice to prevent future injustices. In connection with its general remit, the LGO is
promoted as being an inexpensive and informal means for a private individual to seek
redress where there has been maladministration by a LA. It is promoted as a useful
alternative to more costly and formal litigation. In the case of SEN provision,
however, for certain things, the LGO represents the only feasible means for a private
individual to seek redress for certain wrongs. Further, a key difference between the
courts and Ombudsmen is that the Ombudsman’s approach to fact-finding and dispute
resolution is intended to be more proactive, inquisitorial and detailed than the courts’,
basing their investigation on direct primary evidence.5 The LGO, therefore, has a duty
to be looking for a culture of compliance with the law and best administrative
practice.
7. For the parents/carers of vulnerable children, the LGO offers a crucial safeguard, not
only because it has the capacity to offer protection by way of determining
maladministration, but precisely because it has the ability to conduct an impartial and
broader investigation into local authority practices to “prevent injustice being caused
in the future in consequence of similar maladministration”. In this way, the
Ombudsmen play a critical role in making sure that providers of public services
comply with the law and continue to strive for higher standards. However, we are
concerned that the LGO is not currently fulfilling this mandate in relation to
complaints about local authorities and SEN provision. We believe that a pattern of
practice has emerged which reflects potentially systemic deficiencies in the conduct
of the LGO’s investigatory and adjudicative functions in this area. The authors make
no claim as to the statistical significance of these submissions but our understanding,
5 See generally M Harris, “The Ombudsman and Administrative Justice” in M Harris and M Partington (eds), Administrative Justice in the 21st Century (1999) 133, p 136. See also the LGO’s own internal guidance on conducting an investigation.
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from the feedback we have received, is that the types of issues we seek to highlight
represent the common experience of those parents/carers who lodge complaints with
the LGO. Consequently, we believe that it is possible to draw out some common
themes from our shared experiences.
Common problems with the practice of the LGO in the oversight of SEN framework
(i) Failure to understand its remit and/or a failure to understand the law
8. “Maladministration” is not defined in legislation but it has been interpreted broadly
and is understood to encompass a broad range of administrative failure, including
“bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude [and]
arbitrariness”6. The LGO website sets out specific examples of administrative actions
or omissions which may constitute maladministration including the failure to follow
procedures or the law, to provide information, to reply and to liaise and consult
adequately. These duties are particularly important to the parents/carers of vulnerable
children within the SEN system. They are further reiterated in the LGO’s published
principles of good administration.7 It is clear, therefore, that whilst maladministration
can apply to matters beyond the strictly unlawful, the LGO should seek to uphold and
promote compliance with the law as a matter of basic, good administrative practice.8
Consequently, although acts of maladministration will not necessarily be unlawful,
unlawful actions by public bodies are highly likely to involve maladministration.9
9. It is not always clear, however, that LGO investigators are trained sufficiently well to
understand and apply these broader principles of good administration practice. Indeed,
it sometimes appears that investigators are unaware of the LGO’s own guidance in
this area. For example, despite the very clear statutory structure for the protection of
the provision supporting children with SEN, we believe that in many cases, the LGO
consistently refuses to find maladministration despite clear evidence of non-
6 Richard Crossman (the Minister in charge of introducing the Parliamentary Commissioner Bill), cited with approval by Lord Denning in R v Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte Bradford City Council [1979] 1 QB 287
7 The Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Good Administrative Practice: Guidance on Good Practice 2‘
8 The Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Good Administrative Practice: Guidance on Good Practice 2‘ confirms that ‘compliance with the law is a basic necessity’.
9 Broach, Clements and Read, Disabled children: a legal handbook, Legal Action Group 2010 at 2.46.
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compliance with the law to the detriment of a child with disabilities. This frequently
arises where a LA has failed to put in place the provision required by a child’s
statement of SEN. Section 324(5)(a)(i) of the Education Act 1996 makes this duty
very clear. The scope and content of this duty has been further defined by
caselaw.10The courts have consistently rejected LA arguments that LAs should not be
blamed where delay or absence of provision is the fault of the health service. The
LA’s duty is owed personally to the child and is non-delegable. LAs have plenty of
time to arrange provision before the issue of a statement as the statutory assessment
period is long and detailed. Put simply, there is “no best endeavours defence in the
legislation”.11
10. However, despite the clarity of the jurisprudence in this area, the very clear
obligations at public law to perform this statutory duty, and the possibility that failure
to provide also breaches the Equality Act in some cases, the failure to arrange SEN
provision will not necessarily result in a determination of maladministration. The
LGO will seek instead to provide the LA’s reasons for the failure, effectively
establishing a ‘best endeavours’ defence where none exists at law. There is no
evidence that the LGO considers whether the LA it is investigating has a functioning
system in place to meet the clear and immediate duties imposed by statute and
caselaw. No public guidance has been issued on this topic by the LGO to inform the
decision-making and actions of LAs and parents. This is worrying and it undermines
accountability because it is not at all clear how assessments of maladministration are
made in such cases. Put simply, when does non-compliance with the law become
maladministration? This also means that very rarely are broader questions relating to
the effective functioning of LA SEN systems investigated. Our evidence is that this
may result in parents being compelled to make repeat complaints about multiple
failures of provision.
11. Similarly, in relation to issues of injustice, the LGO often seeks evidence of any
‘progress’ made by the child in spite of an absence of its statutorily entitled provision.
The broader question of injustice in the sense of the denial of a child’s right, distress
10 R v London Borough of Harrow ex parte M [1997] ELR 62
11 R (N) v North Tyneside Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 135
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to the child, and the loss of opportunity to make more significant progress is
disregarded. Injustice is not statutorily defined but has been construed flexibly to
include pure economic loss, distress, lost opportunity and even “the time and trouble”
spent in pursuing a complaint. Injustice is, therefore, broader than the recognised
heads of loss in tort and it requires no legal causation. It is sufficient that the
“injustice” arises from the fault of the local authority and there is no definition in law
that injustice has to be of any specific level or quantity. However, even in cases where
the LGO finds maladministration, it has frequently resorted to relying on the decisions
of third parties such as SENDIST (Special Educational Needs Tribunal) to determine
questions of injustice, even though such Tribunals have a wholly distinct and far
narrower remit in relation to SEN. We are concerned that this approach to injustice is
erroneous. Injustice following maladministration in failing to arrange statementing
provision is not a matter for SENDIST but for the LGO and it is a much wider issue
than the presence or otherwise of educational progress. The impact of
maladministration must be assessed, primarily, through the eyes of the child who has
been failed.
(ii) Failure to take account of the human rights framework
12. This failure to find injustice where a child with SEN and/or disabilities is deprived of
its legal entitlements is particularly significant in light of the human rights framework
within which the LGO must operate. The LGO is a ‘public authority’ under Human
Rights Act (HRA) and so is subject to the same legal duties as providers of public
services. The Act requires all public authorities to uphold these rights. The HRA
creates a broad legal and ethical framework to ensure fairness and respect for users of
public services and to promote a ‘human rights culture’. Public bodies are required to
promote rights which in turn will help to build confidence in public services. The
LGO is subject to this obligation and has confirmed that “[The Human Rights Act
has] brought clarity to what we already do.”
13. In respect of the LGO, the human rights framework should form part of the criteria for
good administrative practice in all relevant investigations. It should also influence any
guidelines which advise on good administrative practice as they aim to provide a
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practical application of human rights principles based on the concept of fairness.12
Indeed, the courts have lent judicial weight to the view that Ombudsmen have a
potentially distinctive human rights role to play.13
14. This human rights work extends beyond the HRA and the ECHR it implements. It is
submitted that other rights and duties fall within this framework and that perhaps the
most obvious of this is right to be free of discrimination for a protected characteristic
under the Equality Act. The protection against disability discrimination is contained
within the Equality Act 2010 and must also form part of the LGO’s frame of reference
when considering maladministration, prioritising the Ombudsmen‘s protective
purpose in safeguarding the individual from the effects of poor administrative action.
Consequently, although it is not the LGO’s job to make findings of law, it has an
obligation to ensure that public bodies within its remit recognise and respond to the
rights and individual needs of disabled people. This is an approach that is informed
by, but distinct from, the legal enforcement of those disability rights contained in the
Equality Act 2010 .This explicit duty to take into account the rights of the individual
in the oversight process is made clear in the Ministry of Justice‘s 2009 guidance
“Human Rights Framework as a Tool for Regulators and Inspectorate” which
confirms that:
“where the public services you are regulating or inspecting are provided to disabled
people you should take account of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights
of Disabled Persons, as well as the Human Rights Act“.14
15. In reality, although the LGO itself confirms that it regularly uses these human rights
standards to assess complaints and that such a framework “adds moral weight and
authority to [its] decision“,15 we have come across no evidence from the
parents/carers of vulnerable children with disabilities that this framework forms part
of the LGO’s reasoning in judgments. The rights of the child, and in particular the
12 The Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Good Administrative Practice: Guidance on Good Practice 2‘
13 Anutrijeva v Southwark LBC ([2003J EWCA C/V 1406; [2004J Q.B. 1124, at [78]
14 Page 14.
15 Page 16.
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rights of the child with disabilities, are constantly compromised in assessment against
the excuses made by LAs for breaching these rights.
(iii) Failure to understand its public law obligations
16. The LGO also functions within a broader statutory and public law framework. Like
local authorities, its actions are governed by general public law principles. This is
because all public bodies must act in accordance with the law even if they are
afforded a degree of latitude when deciding how best to exercise their discretion.16
Consequently, the actions of the LGO, like those of local authorities, may be the
subject of judicial review to request that the courts strike down decisions which are
unlawful, that is that they are illegal, irrational or made without procedural
impropriety. This is a way of holding public bodies to account for their acts and
omissions.17
17. However, our experience is that LGO investigators frequently have very little
understanding of the overriding duty of the LGO as a public body to act in
accordance with the basic principles of public law, namely to act lawfully, reasonably
and with procedural propriety. We have encountered numerous examples of incorrect
statements relating to the purported role of the LGO, the nature of maladministration
or injustice and erroneous applications of the law.
(iv) Failures in the investigative process
(a) Perceived bias
18. There is a general sense among the contributors that the conduct of an LGO
investigation is considerably biased towards LAs. In all cases of complaints to the
LGO considered herein, the investigator appeared to prioritise the evidence given by
LA witnesses, often relying on secondary opinion evidence rather than seeking
primary evidence in the event of a dispute. Very little effort, if any, was made to
investigate the complaint from the complainant’s point of view and to seek
independent evidence where it existed. Indeed, many authors experienced an active
16 R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, per Lord Bingham at [556]
17 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at [410] to [411
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refusal by the LGO investigator to speak with a complainant's witnesses. It was felt by
all contributors that consistently, in conducting their investigation, the LGO
investigator put much more effort into assisting the council to make defensive
submissions to the LGO, and conversely, made it difficult for the complainant to
elucidate their complaint. It was also perceived that while the LGO investigator may
be happy to arrange a face to face meeting with the LA complained about, it offered
no such face to face meeting with the complainant or their witnesses.
19. It was felt by all of the contributors that their LGO investigator(s) had consistently
chosen to believe the evidence of the officer of the LA complained of in preference to
the evidence of the complainant or one of the complainant's witnesses. This was the
case even where documentary and witness evidence was available to the LGO
showing that a claim made by the LA was demonstrably false.
(b) Failure to include the complainant in the process
20. Frequently, there is little contact between a complaint being made and initially
discussed with an investigator and the provisional view being issued. This means that,
where an investigator fails to understand the complaint or where other issues arise as a
result of inquiries to the LA, clarification was rarely sought. Even where clarification
was provided, the investigator sometimes failed to understand nuance or to discuss the
issues with the complainant before making a final decision. It was also noted that LAs
may undergo many months of discussion with the LGO before a agreeing the terms of
a provisional view (or local settlement) with the LA but that a complainant, when
confronted with the agreed fait accompli, is generally given only a couple of weeks to
respond.
21. Investigators also failed to seek advice on legal issues. It is not uncommon for
complainants to have to raise legal issues and request further investigation, resulting,
sometimes in recourse to paid legal representation and more than one provisional
view being issued. This can mean lengthy delays. Complaints may take over a year to
resolve despite the fact that they concern children’s provision. Some commentators
also noticed reticence on the part of the LGO investigator to ensure transparency as to
the procedure of the investigation and the rights of a complainant in relation to the
process.
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22. These concerns about the investigatory process are particularly alarming given that a
private individual is often at a disadvantage in comparison to an LA which has
extensive experience in fielding such LGO complaints and investigations.
Additionally, parents/carers of children with SEN are often very busy dealing with the
daily challenges of having a child with complex needs. Having to pursue a complaint
to the LGO is an additional burden which for many is too much. The LGO should be
actively assisting complainants to explain their complaint as fully as possible and
helping them to resolve the complaint impartially and fairly. It should be giving
children a voice.
(c) Delay
23. For SEN complainants, time is of the essence. The most vulnerable children in our
society are missing valuable and often much needed time and support in education.
For a government so very concerned about parents taking their child out of school for
a week for a holiday, and proposing draconian and severe punishments to those
parents who cause their child to miss a week, SEN children are often out of any
education (or provided with a significantly inadequate education) for weeks, months,
and sometimes years, in spite of parents best efforts to secure an education.
24. Complaints to the LGO may take a year to resolve in which time, parents and carers
report that placements may have broken down and relationships deteriorate with
schools and LAs because of lengthy investigations. Delay in such circumstances is
unacceptable.
(d) Local settlements and insufficient deterrence
25. The result of a failure to find maladministration is that some LAs act with impunity as
they face very little penalty for their failures. There is no evidence that the LGO
considers the functioning of such systems as part of its investigation in to failure to
arrange provision. This is not an onerous task. The law is very clear. LAs should be
asked to explain what their system is for putting provision in place and that policy and
practice should be carefully considered to ensure that the child’s rights are prioritised.
26. Even when maladministration is found, cases are often concluded via the local
settlement mechanism. This is not a statutory one and it deprives the complainant of
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any voice. Complainants may be deeply frustrated by the LGO’s reliance on local
settlements.
(e) The Council may just ignore the decision
27. All contributors have yet to receive the suggested remedy. It is not uncommon for
multiple complaints to be taken in these types of cases.
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Suggestions for reform
We would recommend that consideration be given to reform in the following areas:
1. The LGO should have binding powers to enforce its judgment.
2. LAs should be legally compelled to share maladministration determinations with
their elected members, even in the case of local settlements. Democratic
accountability must be established. This should be done openly.
3. Elected members should be compelled to act on maladministration determinations
and report on action taken annually.
4. Local settlements should be discontinued. The LGO should comply with its
statutory mandate to find maladministration or not and should declare
maladministration openly on its website where it is found.
5. The LGO should seek to promote the active participation of complainants in the
process, particularly in those cases concerning children. It should be creative
about bringing parties together to resolve differences. It should welcome feedback
from the public and it should map responses which reflect consistent areas of
dissatisfaction. It should address these areas openly and it should consult widely.
6. The LGO has the power to move beyond individual complaints and facilitate
systemic change by recommending reviews of procedure, policy and practice. In
this way, individual complaints can result improvements to administrative practice
for all. This also promotes good governance. The LGO should use this power in a
consistent and transparent way, pulling together evidence from its cases in a
thematic and non-adversarial way. It should publish evidence on its website.
7. The LGO should publish every maladministration determination on its website,
including cases involving local settlements.
8. LGO caseworkers should be trained on the basic public law framework, including
the human rights obligations. They should understand the basic principles of good
governance, transparency and accountability.
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eek to apply that guidance.
9. LGO caseworkers should be better trained in the LGO’s statutory remit. They
should seek to apply the term maladministration causing injustice in a way which
encourages consistent good administrative practice.
10. With the aim of meeting its good governance functions, the LGO also promotes
institutional development by producing good practice guides for local
government.18 The LGO has published principles of good administration with the
stated aim of helping public bodies avoid maladministration.19The LGO should
publish more guidance on key issues such as SEN and human rights The LGO
plays a critical role in making sure that providers of public services comply with
the law and strive for higher standards. 20 These documents have a key
influencing role in promoting improvements in services by providing clear
guidance and examples of expected good practice to local authorities. 21 The
LGO’s guidance should have the status of statutory guidance and LGO
caseworkers should s
11. Complainants should be provided with a right of appeal to a specific internal unit
with personnel who have a more detailed understanding of the legal issues.
Debbie Sayers
Rob Murrow
23.3.12
18 The Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Guidance on Good Practice‘, http://www.lgo.org.uk/guidance.htm
19 The Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Good Administrative Practice: Guidance on Good Practice 2‘
20 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘The impact of human rights on public services’ page 65
21 ibid
Written evidence submitted by Care for Community Living Ltd Introduction and Executive Summary: This submission details some of the key issues for Complainants who use the LGO System in respect of the function, purpose and Legal Status of the LGO, including its arrangements for handling complaints and the adequacy of redress when maladministration is found.
1. The Purpose and Legal Status of the LGO. 2. Current Issues for Complainants. 3. Commercial and ‘Whistleblower’ Considerations for the LGO System. 4. Recommendations. 5. Notice of the Potential for Future Judicial Proceedings.
About the Author: The author of this submission is a Charity Director with 20 years experience of dealing with front Line Mental Health accommodation and services and has extensive experience of Councils’ and the LGO’s Complaints systems.
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1 The Purpose and Legal Status of LGO Investigations
1.1 The positioning of the LGO investigations between the internal processes of Local Authority investigations and the fully independent processes of a court gives rise to two primary issues concerning its purpose and legal status.
1.2 The first issue is the lack of a clear and contiguous statutory framework governing the entire complaints system for Local Councils / Authorities and the LGO.
1.3 The LGO is part of a contiguous and sequential system for the public and for organisations to report and submit complaints about Councils.
1.4 The LGO system therefore sits atop the systems used by Local Councils to investigate, rule on and record complaints. Consequently, the arrangements and statutes governing the way in which each Council deals with a complaint and how it compiles evidence in the first instance, are relevant to the LGO’s work.
1.5 To be clear, complainants must normally submit their complaints to Councils before they can access the LGO.
1.6 Crucially however, there is no clear statutory requirement for local authorities to respond to, address or even record formal complaints, at all. (Please refer to the DCLG List of Statutory Duties Placed on Local Government - Revised June 2011, 18927821.xls). Obviously, this is deeply problematic.
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1.7 The absence of statutory requirements and provisions for Councils to investigate, process and record complaints, to a standard that would satisfy a High Court, is then crucial in understanding the limitations of the entire system that the LGO is part of, at present.
1.8 This is because the legal status of evidence submitted to the LGO is considered the same as that of evidence gathered for a High Court.
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1.9 Regrettably however, there is no evidence in our experience of the LGO even acknowledging an attempt to mislead her or to provide false evidence, let alone of any sense that evidence is being treated in line with the standards of a High Court.
1.10 The combination of the absence of clear cut statutory provisions or requirements for Councils to investigate, address and record complaints and the lack of rigour in the LGO’s approach to the treatment of evidence conspire to give the impression of a system designed to derail complainants into a legal cul-de-sac, which serves the purpose of protecting Councils from any legal or financial consequences of Maladministration Misconduct or Misfeasance, on their part.
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1.11 This point is important. The public is rightly concerned when Councils appear to have mishandled or ignored first contacts or complaints (including whistleblowing), particularly when it appears that the deaths’ of children or vulnerable adults might have been prevented, by better responses to first contacts or complaints by the Councils. Please refer to the Baby Peter Case and the Victoria Climbie case.
1.12 Surely, it is unreasonable to expect the public to have any further faith in an LGO system whose entire purpose – dealing with complaints about how Local Authorities have dealt with complaints – is completely undermined by the fact that there is no statutory requirement for Councils to answer complaints in the first place.
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2 Current Issues for Complainants.
2.1 Organisational Credibility. It is a simple fact that most people who have grown up with the Common Law cannot accept that a body consisting almost entirely of ex council staff, is appropriately configured for investigating Council maladministration or Misconduct.
Unfortunately, experience of the LGO only serves to reinforce the perception of institutional bias.
2.2 Again, there are no statutes in operation governing local authority complaints which require any special knowledge – a member of the public could easily exercise the discretion needed to investigate and rule on maladministration. The number and proportion of LGO rulings against Councils compared with those of the Parliamentary Ombudsman against Parliament, might perhaps be worth checking, for consideration.
2.3 At any rate, the fact that Councils have already usually had a three stage chance to deal with complaints internally, before they go through to the LGO, should mean that the LGO stage of investigation needs to be truly independent and should never consist of any individual who has ever worked for a Council, in any capacity.
2.4 The current situation with LGO’s (ex council staff ) who work alongside Councils to draw up general annual complaints reports, is far too cosy and gives further impression of systemic and institutionalised collusion and bias, in favour of Councils.
2.5 Lack of Accountability. The LGO does not appear to be accountable to anyone. Certainly, the LGO has refused to detail whom if anyone she might be accountable to, when we have asked her to do so.
2.6 Clearly, it is not the fault of the DCLG, that it has very little control over the LGO. Councils are autonomous bodies and the LGO is commissioned by the Crown, meaning that outside the realms of an Inquiry there simply aren’t the statutes that would enable Parliament to hold the LGO or Councils to account for any malpractice or serious miscarriages / denials of justice. That being the case, the position of the public or whistleblowers when they deal with the LGO is particularly weak and is in practice unacceptable.
2.7 Lack of Transparency. The LGO works in private and you can't properly appeal their findings of fact. The LGO doesn't have to show all the evidence they rely on to the complainant and in our experience they have repeatedly refused, citing that they don’t have to show their workings if the case might go to court, where of course they definitely won’t share their evidence, since they don’t have to.
2.8 The FOIA does not extend to the LGO for all practical purposes then, since any case might go to court. However, the first major impediment for complainants wanting to challenge the LGO in a Judicial Review is the LGO’s protected status and the consequent ability to deprive the complainant of the quality of evidence that is needed for such a challenge in the first place.
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2.9 The Lack of a Statutory Framework for LGO and Council Complaints and the Lack of the Demonstration of Adequate Rigour in LGO Investigations. In our experience the LGO has not demonstrated an adequate understanding or exercise of investigative good practice, to anything like a standard as would satisfy either the police or a High Court. This deficiency is matched and to an extent stems from, the lack of an adequate, accountable or enforceable statutory framework, for evolving and ensuring such good practice.
2.10 There is then a mismatch here between the statutory consideration of evidence submitted to the LGO, which treats any such as evidence submitted to a High Court and the distinctly un-forensic practices and approaches allowed by the LGO system, in gathering and validating evidence, in the first place.
2.11 Obstruction, Contempt and Perjury are items which require the cross referencing of evidence to a fairly high standard and the LGO has simply not, in our experience, demonstrated a rigorous enough approach to investigative work in general and this item in particular , to be entrusted further with the task of enforcing this statute – ie the treatment of evidence as if it were being submitted to a High Court and the reporting of potential breaches of the statute by Council staff, submitting evidence to the LGO.
2.12 A straight calculation can be made by the Inquiry here to show the rate of contempt / perjury or obstruction per case in the High Court and the reported rate of incidents of the same offences, as recorded and reported by the LGO. These should both be available to the Inquiry from the relevant Public Records.
2.13 Neither Local Councils nor the LGO appear to demonstrate anything like the basic standards required to work with front line contacts and investigations that may subsequently have to involve the police or courts.
2.14 Due to the nature of our sector – Supported Housing for Mental Health clients – even the most junior staff members, if they are working in a front line capacity, have to constrain their first contact investigations, so as not to affect a police investigation and so as to ensure that nothing that might pervert the course of justice, is entered as evidence.
2.15 To that end most front line community service providers will have some binding procedural guidance for their staff to ensure, for example, that:
a) Any signal of a criminal act must be reported to the police on discovery of the signal (i.e. within 24hrs); crimes are tried by courts alone.
b) Any evidence that needs to be presented to the police should be formalised and counter signed by the relevant parties where necessary as quickly as is possible. (i.e. recorded on the same day as signal is received and reported).
c) An alleged victim and an alleged perpetrator of an act are treated equally. Both must have the same opportunities to provide evidence which must in turn be treated equally.
d) The statements of both parties are accorded equal weight. Both parties should have the right to respond to the other’s statements.
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e) Every effort should be made to ensure that neither party has an opportunity to collude with any witnesses they have named, before the witnesses’ initial statements are all taken.
2.16 Councils and thus the LGO, are responsible for using their complaints system to protect the public (e.g. Baby Peter) - not just themselves - and therefore, in the absence of proper statutory standards that can be enforced (in respect of complaints and evidence gathering), the public cannot be not properly protected as it expects to be, given the monies available to Councils and in light of, their significant powers and responsibilities.
2.17 The Lack of Impartiality. The LGO is demonstrably not even handed in the handling and consideration of the evidence she compiles and enters into her findings. The LGO will meet and discuss evidence - both circumstantial and substantive- with the Council but will not meet with the complainant or have any kind of oral discussion.
2.18 There is no reliable way of knowing what Councils say in these meetings or even if such meetings have taken place and there is no opportunity to check the veracity of what is said to the LGO, which may be highly prejudicial and inaccurate. (see LGO’s web site guidance to its investigators - 2011).
2.19 There is no sense that any consideration is given to the idea that the subjects of complaints might have a prejudicial interest which affects any evidence they give in these and other exchanges.
[***]
2.20 In our experience if the Council’s relevant staff member, in discussions with the LGO, denies an allegation, the LGO will accept that as substantive evidence that there is no case to answer.
2.21 If the staff member gives a retrospective account of an incident or action which is not in accordance with the documented evidence recorded at the time of the incident, the standard of the LGO investigation is not consistently rigorous enough, to cross reference and address the anomaly or even to identify and acknowledge it.
2.22 Crucially however, the complainant’s documented statements are not accorded the same weight nor, in our experience over the last 6 years, is an oral submission of a complainant’s evidence or case sought or agreed to, when requested.
2.23 This type of practice presents an impression of systemic bias which is completely at odds with the spirit and principles of English common law and of the standard treatment of High Court Evidence.
[***]
2.24 The Lack of and Failure to Enforce Reasonable Time Limits. There are no time limits at all for the LGO to produce a ruling; thus, it is feasible to keep case away from courts and public scrutiny for many years.
2.25 Similarly, the LGO does not hold Councils to any time limits when supplying their responses to her.
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2.26 The Council and the LGO, unfettered by time limits, are then free to proffer ever changing explanations to any allegation ad-infinitum, until regardless of its credibility, a defence that fits or can’t be disproved by the evidence submitted originally by the complaint, is found.
2.27 Conversely, the complainant is constrained to keep to the limits of the case and evidence that were submitted by them to the Council, in the first instance. That is, notwithstanding any failure by the Council to release key FOIA requested evidence that would be relevant to such a complaint, in the designated FOIA time frame for responding to such requests and at the time the complaint needed to be raised.
2.28 Regrettably, despite the Information |Commissioner’s existence, exceeding the time limits for providing information under FOIA is still the norm for our Council when responding to FOIA requests, as it is for our Council, on almost every occasion, when responding to the LGO.
2.29 The LGO does not regard this as obstructive nor does she enforce any time limits that apply to councils responding to her.
3 Commercial Considerations for Using the LGO in Contractual Disputes or Whistleblowing Reports.
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3.1 Similarly the LGO won’t report whistleblowing signals to the DCLG, even where the signals are backed up by clear cut documentary evidence, where the DCLG should be aware of them and where the complainant has requested that the LGO pass on the evidence and signal.
3.2 The LGO can ignore requests for updates for months.
3.3 The LGO is free to determine the level of injustice you must suffer before investigating your complaint and in assigning damages.
3.4 The LGO is free to define maladministration as they see fit,
3.5 Legal costs incurred in bringing a complaint that is upheld, even a whistleblowing complaint, will not usually be compensated.
3.6 The LGO has an institutional prejudice that most complaints can be redressed by talking things over or at most securing an apology. This is a clearly prejudiced constraint placed on the LGO by itself, and cannot be viewed as a credible or impartial approach to commercial concerns, which of course will require commercial remedies or in other words, proportionate financial redress for any financial damage caused by a Council’s maladministration or wrong doing.
3.7 The LGO does not offer the level of remedy or redress for maladministration that is needed for commercial enterprises working with Councils. Charities in particular are forced to rely on the current Council Complaints system and the LGO, neither of which have reliable enough processes or working timescales, for what may be at stake.
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3.8 The LGO does not have adequate institutional experience to understand the financial and reputational damage that maladministration can do to businesses that work with Councils – or to the individuals who run those businesses; these businesses, charitable or otherwise, are for all that, still working in the private sector and are bound by a plethora of relevant (in a functional sense) statutory requirements with legal penalties, for failures to comply.
3.9 There is not an interoperable match between the statutes, requirements for contractual adherence or penalties for wrong doing, in terms of the regulation of Councils and private sector companies.
3.10 Moreover, the LGO’s working practices are simply not adequate for the settlement of what may be contractual disputes or maladministration claims, involving substantial financial liabilities or serious organisational consequences for a private company.
4 Recommendations.
a) The urgent creation of binding statutory governance, requiring Councils to investigate, process and record complaints. The current unjustifiable ability to legally avoid doing this, enables Councils to legally withhold a full and honest account of their performance from the voting public. Our Council has done so. The current system is then self evidently, unacceptable.
b) The abolition of the current LGO System. Complainants and the public already pay through their hard pressed taxes for the already overly long-winded three stage 16 week process, of Councils’ complaints systems. If these were effective, fair, functioning and subject to statutory controls (i.e. they were fit for purpose), there should be no justifiable reason for a Council to have any more taxpayers money or time, given over to distancing itself from Judicial challenges. Any liability for the crown would be outweighed by the efficiencies this change would surely engender.
c) Alternatively, the urgent creation of a truly independent, transparent, effective and time limited local government watchdog, whose rulings are binding. This body must be seen to be free from any potential for bias or institutional proximity to Councils, Council staff or consultants providing advisory or legal services to Councils.
d) If an alternative to court proceedings must be made available, using such a system should not rule out, diminish or deprive the right to a Judicial hearing of the original complaint. Complainants should not be denied, as they are by the design of the current system, the opportunity of judicial redress, by the fact of engagement with the system.
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e) The overall standard of the investigative rigour of the entire complaints system requires immediate attention.
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5 Notice of the Potential for Future Judicial Proceedings. We have been advised by the DCLG to provide notice to the Inquiry that whilst there are no Legal proceeding imminent at the time of submission, there may be the potential for some of the above information to be required in Judicial Proceedings, at a future date.
We have therefore, tried not to include too many particulars of our case currently with the LGO. Where we do note any item, it is because we have experienced or have substantive evidence of, a particular practice or issue in our dealings with the LGO.
All the statements given in this memorandum are then, accurate to the best of our knowledge and are supported by documentary evidence, which can be requested if needed.
As advised, we will notify the Inquiry in writing if we issue any notice for a Judicial Review or any other form of judicial proceedings. However, the information above is not at present the subject of pending or imminent judicial proceedings.
Care for Community Living Ltd March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Sam Burns
The main role of the LGO is “to consider whether the council has acted reasonably in accordance with the law.”
One would assume that to make a qualified judgement, the LGO must:
• Understand the law in detail that relates to the specific dispute
• Know the area that relates to the case
• Have the ability to analyse all the facts in a timely manner
• Have a data base of disputes that relate to the area and specific council
Given the constraints on finance of local councils, it is important that planning judgements are applied in accordance with the law. “Right First Time” must be the mantra. It should be done in a fair and balanced manner that is fair to the applicant and fair to the neighbours that are going to be affected by it.
Follow‐ups should be essential to the planning process. If the applicant proposes to complete something in a specific time scale it should be followed up. So too should the local authority ensure that any Conditions applied to a planning decision are met in full. Failure to comply should be penalised by the local authority.
Planning applications on large sites should not be taken in isolation, but should be fed into an established data base providing details of:
• What was said in the application
• What was done
• What the follow up found
Eg: ‘I need to build an agricultural dwelling for my worker.’ (I then get the tie removed and sell the house, then apply for another house). This is not right and would be found in a specific data base (rather than having time spent by complainants pointing out the issues).
The LGO should be the police of the planning procedures and the arbiter of fairness.
It should have the strength and authority to enforce planning rules where constant failures are happening.
Normal hard‐working, tax paying citizens should be protected from unscrupulous farmers and developers who want to make money out of other people’s misery.
The government wants a big society; it wants people to be happy; it wants fairness and it wants to save money. This is an opportunity to improve systems to meet these objectives.
Would Politicians / Planning Officers or developers want to have these developments in their back yards? If the answer is yes, let them prove it by having the importation of 100,000 tonnes of building waste dumped illegally next to their house.
The LGO must listen to all sides and find out which local authority has the fewest complaints. Look at their system – see which authorities throughout the country have the best procedures – and apply Best Practice to the rest of the country.
Analysis of the facts and good consistent procedures and follow up should be mandatory – ie landscaping should be done in accordance with the submitted plans (but never checked by the local authority. Next planning application submitted with the same scheme – none has ever been implemented.)
People should be trained to do their jobs and not to be biased towards the applicant.
If the LGO analysed the facts and made their judgement in a timely manner, then they could complete a greater number of cases.
If they put procedures in place to avoid repetitive problems, then their workload would diminish.
The LGO’s function should be to do themselves out of a job by improving the standard of all planning departments.
This will never happen as prevarication and lack of progress keeps them in a job.
Sam Burns March 2012
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Written evidence submitted by the Commission for Local Administration in England (Local Government Ombudsman)
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 The role of the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) over nearly 40 years has been to provide independent resolution of complaints. In a time of financial constraint the LGO will continue to provide more proportionate dispute resolution with a single headquarters and leaner management structure.
1.2 The organisation has taken the lead in responding to changes in the provision of adult social care, such as direct payments, which resulted in an extension of our jurisdiction to all registered social care providers in October 2010. Our experience in this new area of work, incorporating private care providers, will stand us in good stead for other proposed changes in local public service delivery.
1.3 Independent research commissioned by the organisation has shown that our arrangements for complaint handling through our advice and investigative teams is well-regarded in terms of providing independent review and individual redress. Advocates, who deal with many of the most vulnerable in society, were particularly positive about the LGO.
1.4 In 2010-11 the LGO has met all of its key performance indicators for handling complaints.
1.5 The LGO adds public value in addition to achieving individual redress in a number of ways. This includes providing training to bodies under their jurisdiction to ensure that the effectiveness of local resolution of complaints is enhanced.
1.6 Value is also added through the publication of reports and focus reports on service areas, highlighting lessons learned from complaints. This supports the local resolution of complaints, effective public administration and improved service delivery.
1.7 By providing public data on complaints, through annual reviews and a plan to publish all decision statements, the Ombudsman will support and enhance its own accountability and scrutiny, and provide a greater wealth of information to support the local democratic function and to inform citizens about local services.
1.8 Looking ahead, the LGO remains an important and impartial arbiter of complaints, offering free and direct access to the public, many of whom are vulnerable. Changes to the provision of public services will no doubt present challenges. In this climate the LGO remains a key part of the administrative justice landscape ensuring fairness for all.
2 THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN
2.1 The Commission for Local Administration in England was established under the Local Government Act 1974. It is an independent body funded by annual grant from the Government to support the activities of the Local Government Ombudsmen (LGO). The Commission comprises the Local Commissioners (Local Government
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Ombudsmen) and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Parliamentary Ombudsman). The Commission’s statutory functions are:
• to enable the Ombudsmen to investigate complaints, in particular by allocating them staff, offices and facilities
• to provide bodies within jurisdiction with advice and guidance on good administrative practice.
2.2 There are currently two Local Commissioners (Local Government Ombudsmen), Anne Seex and Jane Martin. They are Crown appointments with individual authority to investigate and decide complaints. They have wide discretion to initiate investigation and decide complaints bearing in mind the most effective use of public funds. Their jurisdiction is currently allocated on geographical areas. Legislation requires that the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government appoints one Local Commissioner as Chair and one as Vice-Chair of the Commission.
2.3 As Vice-Chair of the Commission, Jane Martin has been the Acting Chairman and Chief Executive since the retirement of Sir Tony Redmond in November 2010. During this period Nigel Karney, Deputy Chief Executive and Secretary, has acted as Accounting Officer.
2.4 The Commission’s mission is to ‘Provide an independent means of redress to individuals for injustice caused by unfair treatment or service failure by local authorities, schools and care providers and use our learning to promote good public service administration and service improvement’. There are four strategic objectives to deliver this mission:
• Provide a complaints handling service direct to the public which is accessible, responsive, consistent and cost-effective.
• Ensure sound decisions and appropriate redress based on impartial, rigorous and proportionate investigations.
• Use our knowledge of complaints to identify best practice and issues of wider public benefit, promote good public administration and service improvement, and influence public policy.
• Ensure proper stewardship of public funds through the proper use of resources and effective public accountability.
2.5 Under the Regulatory Reform Order 2007, the LGO conducts joint investigations with the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). These complaints generally cover health and social care.
The changing landscape impacting on our role
2.6 From 1st October 2010 the jurisdiction of the LGO was extended to include all registered care providers in England, some 13,000 bodies operated by private or independent organisations. This change provides access to redress for all users of social care including those who fund their own care.
2.7 In April 2010 the LGO also gained jurisdiction over schools in relation to complaints about internal matters. This was introduced in fourteen local authority areas on a pilot basis. The Education Act 2011 repealed the LGO jurisdiction, restoring the Secretary of State’s power to consider school complaints. The LGO service will end in July 2012 with all complaints about internal school matters, having to be completed by 31st
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March 2013.
2.8 As a result of the Localism Act 2011, from April 2013 local authority tenants will take complaints about their landlord to the Independent Housing Ombudsman (IHO). We are currently in dialogue with the IHO about the transfer of responsibilities.
2.9 The Open Public Services White Paper in July 2011 highlighted the Ombudsmen as having a role in upholding people’s right to choice. The LGO has responded to the White Paper and are engaged, alongside other public service ombudsmen, in early discussions with the Cabinet Office.
Transformation and proposed restructuring of the organisation
2.10 In the context of a reduced budget over the Comprehensive Spending Review period the Commission has developed a Transformation Plan, which will maintain a stable and sustainable LGO scheme.
2.11 It will:
• Rationalise the LGO’s accommodation down to one head office base. • Reduce the staffing complement including a leaner management structure
and a reduced corporate services function. • Introduce a new business model with a refocused, more robust, intake and
assessment process which resolves complaints swiftly and proportionately, and provides for greater flexibility within the overall investigation process.
• Place greater emphasis on the impact and influence generated from insight from our complaints for wider public benefit and public value.
3 INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS
3.1 The LGO scheme provides free, direct access for citizens to an independent and impartial investigation of complaints of personal injustice caused by maladministration or service failure.
3.2 The LGO Advice Team deals with all initial contacts by phone, email, letter, or through the online complaint form. The advisers clarify complaints and will signpost complainants back to the body in jurisdiction if the complaint has not completed its internal process, or other relevant bodies. Independent research commissioned by the LGO has highlighted that the advisers dealt with a range of difficult and complex calls in a highly professional manner.
3.3 Advisers forward complaints to one of the three offices depending on the location of the body complained about. Where appropriate, complaints will be fast tracked to an investigator without referring back to the body in jurisdiction first, for example in urgent homelessness cases. All cases are dealt with by a dedicated investigator against time targets. Once an investigator has enough evidence of fault they will seek to remedy any injustice caused as soon as possible. They send a provisional decision to both parties for further comment before reaching a final decision. Although representation is not required, some complaints from our most vulnerable complainants are received through an advocate, or advice agencies such as the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB)
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and the Children’s Legal Centre. In 2010, customer satisfaction research1 showed that users were positive about the LGO service, although the research highlighted that satisfaction is often linked to the complaint outcome.
3.4 Complainants can request an internal review of their complaint within a three month period. A senior member of staff, who has had no previous involvement in the complaint and does not line manage the investigator, will carry out the review. The LGO considers lessons learned from reviews to help to improve the quality of the service.
The volume and nature of complaints
3.5 The details of the volume and nature of complaints are set out in our Annual Report 2010/11.
3.6 In 2010/11 the LGO Advice Team dealt with 95,000 contacts, and received 21,840 complaints and enquiries, an increase of more than 21% from the previous year.
3.7 In the same year, the investigative teams dealt with 11,249 complaints across a whole range of subjects, an increase of 7.5% from the previous year. Education and children’s services formed the largest category of complaints, increasing by 15% from the previous year. Complaints about special educational needs also rose significantly. Adult social care complaints concerning councils increased by nearly 50%.
3.8 Looking at trends in complaints over the last 5 years there has been a considerable increase in adult social care complaints, which constituted 4.3% of all complaints in 2006/07 and in 2010/11 constituted 9% of complaints. A rise can also be seen for education and children services complaints over the same period from 11.9% of all complaints to 24%.
Key performance indicators 2010-11
3.9 Investigation teams decided 10,725 local government complaints, compared with our target of 10,500 decisions.
3.10 The LGO exceeded its targets for the times taken to decide these complaints (54.2% decided within 13 weeks, 83.4% within 26 weeks and 97% within 52 weeks against targets of 50%, 80% and 96% respectively).
3.11 2% of complaints made about LGO decisions were found to be justified, following rigorous internal review, which out-performed the target of 3%.
3.12 There were no successful applications for judicial review. This is the only challenge to the Ombudsmen’s decisions following internal review.
1 Understanding expectations: customer satisfaction research for the LGO 2010, Ipsos Mori, October 2010 http://www.lgo.org.uk/about‐us/surveys/customer‐satisfaction‐2010/
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3.13 In 2010/11 the total number of complaints where redress was obtained or recommended for the complainant was in 2,474 cases or 27% of all complaints determined. Of these, 2,215 were remedied by a local settlement where the body agrees to undertake satisfactory actions to remedy the complaint during the course of an investigation. The LGO also decided that there was no maladministration or insufficient evidence of maladministration in 4,218 cases or 39% of complaints determined.
4 IMPACT OF THE WORK OF THE LGO
Remedying individual injustice and improving local public services
4.1 At the core of the LGO’s mission is a focus on providing individual redress as well as improving local public services.
4.2 The LGO always takes account of complainants’ views. We ask them at the outset about their views on injustice and appropriate remedies. But we are independent and arrive at our own view of what is a fair and appropriate remedy.
4.3 We seek to put the person affected by the injustice back in the position they would have been in, had the fault not happened, as quickly as possible. Our recommendations will ask the body in jurisdiction to take actions to do so where this is still possible. For example, to conduct a care assessment, offer adequate new accommodation or offer a fresh admissions appeal hearing. Only if it is not possible will we then consider asking for a compensatory payment.
4.4 Complainants appreciate recognition of fault and injustice by the body in jurisdiction and our recommendations very often include a request for an apology. In 2010/11, this remedy was obtained in 631 cases or 26% of cases where a remedy was recorded.
4.5 We will also often ask the body in jurisdiction to address systemic failings as part of the remedy. This can involve revising policies and procedures that have been revealed to be inadequate as well as ensuring staff undertake training. In 2010/11 there were 288 cases in which the LGO asked bodies to review policies and/or procedures. This ensures that the value of an individual complaint has a long term effect and should positively impact on other service users, preventing future cases of maladministration and injustice, as well as cases coming to LGO.
4.6 The LGOs have no powers to enforce their recommendations for remedy where they have found the council at fault. The LGO’s recommendations are accepted by Councils in all but a very small number of cases.
Recent cases
4.7 We achieve remedy for all categories of complaint, the following three brief examples give an indication of impact. A young man who had been a looked after child and subject to a care order since the age of 13 complained to the LGO about a number of matters. At the centre of the complaint was the fact that the council had failed to fulfil its duty as a ‘parent’ in a number of ways. They had placed him with a series of unsuitable carers growing up, exposing him to drugs, domestic violence and neglect. They failed to facilitate sibling contact, ensure that he was involved in care decisions, and to provide advice about education and employment opportunities. The investigation found incomplete records on the complainant by social workers. To
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provide redress the LGO recommended that the council explain procedures to the affected person, broker contact with his siblings and establish a fund to help him to enter into employment or training.
4.8 A school admissions complaint provided wider justice to pupils and parents affected. The complaint received revealed that due to the lack of effective admissions criteria set by the local authority, a primary school had been mandated to accept more pupils than they could accommodate, leading them to teach reception classes in the outdoors. In response to the investigation the council changed its admission criteria to include a distance tie-break in catchment area criteria, preventing a repeat situation. Additional classrooms were also provided at another site.
4.9 The LGO provided redress for a number of individuals in a recent parking case, where the council introduced charges for blue badge holders and evening users without adequate communication and publicity. A number of people were unfairly charged an excess charge notice of £80 as they were unaware of the policy change. The LGO’s finding of maladministration causing injustice led the council to fully reimburse those affected so that they were back in the position they would have been in, if maladministration had not occurred.
Adult social care complaints
4.10 We have over many years received complaints on a range of issues in this area including the quality of care, hygiene, neglect and abuse, nutrition, deprivation of liberty, hospital discharge and moving into residential care. Common complaints subjects included charging, safeguarding and council assessments. Since the extension of our jurisdiction in October 2011 to include all registered care providers, complaints have often covered several overlapping issues, with poor communication often being a key feature. Around three quarters of complaints investigated under the LGO’s new jurisdiction have been about residential care, the most common subjects were care quality and fees.
Education complaints
4.11 We have for many years handled school admission appeal complaints as well as complaints about special education needs, school transport and exclusion appeals. From April 2010, we have received (often multi-faceted) complaints about a range of issues, including bullying, curriculum, behaviour and discipline.
4.12 During this period the LGO has had a positive impact on the way in which schools deal with complaints. Independent research commissioned by the Government into school complaints2 found “tangible evidence that the LGO service has increased capacity for complaints handling” with regards to complaints about internal school matters.
2 Parents’ and young people’s complaints about schools, Ecorys for Department for Education, February 2012, https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/RSG/AllRsgPublications/Page1/DFE‐RR193
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Supporting good local public administration and complaints handling
LGO reports
4.13 The LGO issues and publishes a report on a complaint when it is necessary to bring it to the wider attention of the body in jurisdiction and the public. Through this process we make recommendations for remedy and follow up to ensure compliance. In 99% of these cases, bodies in jurisdiction comply. In 2010/11 we issued reports on 29 complaints. For 2011/12 to date, we have issued 47 reports.
Special and focus reports
4.14 The LGO publishes special reports and focus reports on specific service areas to communicate where things can go wrong and to identify lessons learned. In the last year we have published a number of focus reports on:
• School admissions – focused on the rights of parents and pupils to a fair and impartial school appeal hearing, and how councils can ensure that happens.
• Children out of school – urging councils to ensure that children’s rights to full-time education are met and to avoid some of the common mistakes made when providing education to children not in school.
• Ensuring justice for homeless people – asking councils to consider how the people who face homelessness get the help they are entitled to.
• Councils’ use of bankruptcy powers – highlighting flaws in the way councils pursue bankruptcy for council tax debts.
4.15 A recent survey of local government revenue officers provided positive feedback on the bankruptcy focus report. 85% said they found it useful, most followed the steps identified in the report for avoiding maladministration, and the vast majority said they would take action to put the other steps in place.
4.16 Comments included:
“Having read the report we will be looking at our current procedure and ways we can improve this.”
“This was useful to review the current procedure and can see how some steps already taken could be tightened further.”
Annual reviews of councils
4.17 Each year the LGO publishes annual reviews for councils which summarise : the numbers of complaints received by LGO about them in a business year; the outcomes; any lessons in handling complaints; and more generally, the services that complaints have focused on. These reviews should form a key part of the local authority’s own accountability and scrutiny function.
4.18 In July 2011 the LGO published a report in conjunction with the Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS) about how complaints information can feed into local authority scrutiny and business planning arrangements.
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Decision statements
4.19 During the next year, the LGO intends to establish an open publication scheme where the final decision statement on all cases will be published in an anonymised format on the LGO’s website This will provide a comprehensive picture of complaint outcomes for the public and for bodies in jurisdiction and a greater wealth of information on maladministration, service failure and injustice, as well as where practice is validated through an LGO investigation. This will help service providers and users of services to judge their own experience of local service provision and the role of the local authority.
Supporting local complaints handling
4.20 The LGO support local complaint resolution as the most speedy route to remedy. Councils and care providers should have full opportunity to review their own practice and to correct any mistakes. This is better both for the complainants and service providers.
4.21 Since April 2009 the LGO has operated a ‘Council First’ policy which requires complainants to have first gone through all stages of the council’s own complaints procedure before complaining to the LGO. The same principle is also applied to all other bodies in jurisdiction. Exceptions to this policy can be applied. These include urgent and high-risk complaints, such as those regarding homelessness and also some education complaints, as well as those where there has already been unreasonable delay.
4.22 To support local complaints handling, since 2005 the LGO has had an active programme of training on effective complaints handling for bodies in jurisdiction. In 2011/12, 76 courses were delivered to councils, reaching 1,230 individual learners.
4.23 We evaluate the effectiveness of our training and aim to constantly improve what we deliver. A survey of participants in 2010 showed that our training had helped 90% of respondents to improve complaint-handling practice, with 68% of respondents giving specific examples of improvements directly attributable to LGO training. Participants are also very proactive in sharing their new skills and knowledge with colleagues.
4.24 In each council the LGO has a link officer who is the key contact for the organisation. We maintain regular contact through information bulletins and hold regular link officer seminars where we discuss current issues.
5 STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES
5.1 The Commission sets out its strategic direction in a rolling three year Strategic Corporate Plan which sets out strategic objectives to deliver our mission, together with success criteria based on expected outcomes for service users and other stakeholders. This is supplemented by a one year Business Plan which specifies the initiatives that will achieve those outcomes and which forms the basis of the Commission’s request for funding from its sponsor Department. A Grant Memorandum agreed between the Commission and the sponsor Department (in the process of being updated) specifies the terms under which these funds are disbursed.
5.2 The Commission meets every eight weeks and, as part of business, receives monitoring information on financial and organisational performance.
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5.3 Our Annual Report (and Annual Accounts) is a key vehicle for accountability to stakeholders, and is laid before Parliament in July. This states the extent to which our strategic objectives and other performance targets and assumptions have been met.
5.4 In 2010/11, we were pleased to report that we met all of our performance targets for the year (as reported earlier).
5.5 The Commission has established:
• an Audit Committee, chaired by an experienced independent person, which advises on matters of probity, regularity, efficiency and effectiveness, and also monitors and reports on the operation of the Commission’s Risk Management Strategy (based on the HM Treasury model)
• a Remuneration Committee, responsible for advising and making recommendations to the Commission on the remuneration and succession of senior staff and staff pay schemes.
Staff
5.6 The Commission employs 215 people (195.8 fte), based in three offices in London, Coventry and York. Approximately half the workforce are complaint investigators. They deal with a varied caseload of complaints and have delegated authority to investigate and take decisions on behalf of the Ombudsmen. Each of the three offices has a number of teams of investigators (12 in total), each headed by an Assistant Ombudsman. In addition to general purpose teams dealing with local government complaints, there are specialist teams dealing with children’s and schools related complaints, adult social care complaints, and (in York) planning and housing complaints.
5.7 There are currently 3 Deputy Ombudsmen , one in each office, and one Deputy Chief Executive and Secretary. Commission’s corporate and business activity is supported by a corporate services department of 31 people. The functions cover communications, human resources, finance, IT, legal, policy and research, property and facilities. The Advice Team in Coventry has 19 staff, consisting of 1 supervisor and 18 advisers.
Funding
5.8 The Commission is funded by grant in aid. Its sponsor department and primary source of funding is DCLG, but it also receives funding from DH in respect of the adult care self funder jurisdiction and DfE to cover the schools complaints service. In 2011/12 the Commission’s combined DCLG/DH Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) was £14.839m and its DfE grant was £900,000.
5.9 The Commission’s DCLG/DH DEL is being reduced by £1m in 2012/13 - a 10.9% reduction. Its DfE funding for 2012/13 has yet to be settled but is expected to be £500,000; this is the final year of the schools service following abolition legislation in 2010; there will be no funding in 2013/14.
5.10 The Commission’s Transformation Plan addresses these reductions in funding with efficiency savings and changes in process, designed to minimise the impact on front
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line service delivery. The Commission anticipates an overall staffing reduction of 20.3 posts over three years in addition to voluntary redundancies currently being considered, bringing its total staffing to 175.5 fte. It will also rationalise its office space and senior management structure.
6 LOOKING AHEAD
6.1 Within a context of leaner resources the LGO plans to maintain and develop a relevant service for citizens and continue to support bodies in jurisdiction in improving public administration and service provision. By 2015, the scheme will have significantly reduced its expenditure while still achieving the strategic objectives and its statutory purpose.
Commission for Local Administration in England (LGO) March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Brian Thompson
SUMMARY
• Introduction • Fragmentation of Policy Development and Oversight • Remit • Complaint Resolution • Improving Administration • Corporate Matters
Introduction
1. This inquiry by the Communities & Local Government Select Committee into the Local Government Ombudsman for England (LGO) is a welcome initiative as the accountability arrangements for the LGO are weaker than for most of the UK’s Public Services Ombudsmen. With my colleagues I have conducted comparative research of public services ombudsmen in the UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand (Buck, Kirkham & Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice, 2011). This research focused on the role, methods, and relationships of the ombudsmen with other institutions in the emerging administrative justice system.
2. Some aspects of the LGO along with those of other ombudsmen in England and Wales were considered by the Law Commission for England and Wales in their report Public Services Ombudsmen, (Law Com No. 329, 2011). There were some recommendations in common made by my colleagues and I and the Law Commission, in particular, that there was need for a wider review of ombudsmen as institutions of administrative justice
Fragmentation of policy development and oversight
3. One of the reasons why my colleagues and I recommended a wider review of ombudsmen ( in our book and an article ‘Time for a “Leggatt-style” review of the Ombudsman system?’ [2011] Public Law 20-26) was that there had been piecemeal development from the first office, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, usually referred to as the Parliamentary Ombudsman (PO). This subsequent development expanded the range of public services covered from central government through NHS administration to local government. The expansion happened first in Northern Ireland and then the rest of the UK.
4. There have been various reforms to the LGO since it was established in 1974, and in recent years, we have had a consolidated set of changes in the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, and then additional bodies and services brought within remit: aspects of internal management of schools by the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009 and privately funded adult social care by the Health Act 2009. Although it seems that the current government wishes to have different arrangements for schools.
5. A more considered approach was to be seen in the 2000 Review of Public Sector Ombudsmen in England carried out by the Cabinet Office which had suggested merging the LGO, the PO and the Health Service Ombudsman for England (HSO). This restructuring was not carried out but the legislation of these three ombudsmen was amended by the Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc between Ombudsmen) Order 2007 which allowed them to work together on complaints which crossed their jurisdictional boundaries. The major areas in which collaboration, including joint investigations, have been carried out are in relation to health and social care.
6. While it is understandable that in particular service areas the relevant ombudsman overseeing them may develop differently, it is the case that the different ombudsmen are variations on the same institution and they share many common features. It was therefore odd when the Department for Communities and Local Government in the Localism Bill sought to require complainants to the Housing Ombudsman in England to be referred by a ‘designated person’. This provision was swimming against the tide as it is now extremely unusual not to allow direct access by complainants to ombudsmen. It was discussed in the Law Commission’s report where they were recommending the replacement of the requirement to have an MP to refer a complaint to the PO by ‘dual track’ access. Under this method of access it is up to complainants to decide if they wish to complain directly to the PO or seek the assistance of an MP who might refer the complaint. It remains to be seen how section 180 of the Localism Act 2011 will work following amendments which, in specified circumstances, will not require complainants to be referred by the ‘designated person’. In my view dual track access would have been preferable.
7. I suggest that this episode further confirms the conclusion of the analysis conducted by my colleagues and I, that policy development for ombudsmen is fragmented. While the Cabinet Office has a co-ordinating role generally on public services ombudsmen and takes the lead on the PO, DCLG leads on the LGO and the Housing Ombudsmen in England, the Department of Heath on the HSO and the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are responsible for the ombudsmen dealing with their devolved public services.
8. In addition public services ombudsmen are part of the administrative justice system which deals with redress for, and improvement of, people’s interactions with public services in which the primary responsibility in England and Wales lies with the
Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice has expertise in courts and tribunals but not in ombudsmen and there is concern as to whether the required high degree of co-ordination between the Ministry of Justice and the Cabinet Office on ombudsmen policy will be forthcoming, given the persistence of the ‘silo’ mentality throughout government.
9. Another important factor in the development of ombudsmen policy is the blurring of the public and the private sectors, already reflected in the LGO by its recent acquisition of complaints in relation to privately arranged or funded adult social care. I would suggest that this was a sensible change but it is different from the position that public services ombudsmen deal with public services whether delivered by public or private bodies. On the other hand developments in dealing with customer complaints in the private sector may also have implications for the public sector of which the relevant department is unaware.
10. Not only is there fragmentation in policy development for public services ombudsman but it is also to be found in their governance arrangements. My colleagues and I pointed out that it was desirable that the Parliaments in Westminster and Edinburgh, and the Assemblies in Cardiff and Belfast should improve their working relations with, and oversight of, the public services ombudsmen within their jurisdiction. We thought that the arrangements for the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman which reports to, and is overseen by, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee were good, as did the Law Commission. We recommended that this Select Committee might carry out the same role for the LGO whereas the Law Commission recommended that Westminster and the National Assembly for Wales consider
establishing formal relationships between select committees and the public services ombudsmen, other than the Parliamentary Commissioner and the Health Service Ombudsman who already benefit from such relationships.
11. Our recommendation was based on the expertise which the Public Administration Select Committee had in public services ombudsman matters and that its remit was a cross-cutting and not a departmental one. This, however, would not preclude departmental select committees from having a formal relationship with the ombudsmen, which could take into account the fact that the range of public services which the LGO deals with is wider than the remits of the departmental select committees. Examples of the LGO’s jurisdiction include: housing and planning which are within the remit of the Communities and Local Government Select Committee, as well as social care, schools and transport which are of interest to the Health, Education and Transport Select Committees respectively.
12. There is a balance which has to be achieved in ombudsman policy development between generic matters and issues particular to the remits of the different public services ombudsmen. The fragmentation of responsibility within and across the different jurisdictions of the UK make it more difficult to co-ordinate a review which
would focus on generic issues and their relationship with points in the various service areas responsibility for which will differ across the UK’s jurisdictions.
13. The issue of the accountability arrangements for the public services ombudsmen is a matter for UK’s Parliaments and Assemblies, although some general principles might be generated in the proposed wider review. While the particularities of which select committees might establish relationships have to be worked out, it would not be adding to the problems of piecemeal development if the LGO and Housing Ombudsman were authorised to lay the full range of their reports before Parliament as recommended by the Law Commission. Remit
14. As has been noted above the LGO has recently been authorised to deal with complaints about privately funded or arranged adult social care. This does take the LGO into the private sector but it is surely a sensible arrangement to take advantage of the LGO’s experience in handling complaints about children’s and public adult social care.
15. The LGO can consider complaints about public services commissioned by local authorities but delivered by private bodies and following the white paper Open Public Services (Cm 8145) it is government policy to promote a choice of providers of these services. It is the role of ombudsmen to be independent and impartial handlers of complaints about the quality of the services rather than to champion the promotion of a choice of service providers which, it is suggested, is a matter for regulation. Complaint Resolution
16. The LGO Advice Team based at Coventry is the initial point of contact for enquirers and complainants using the telephone and they offer advice about making a complaint as well as receiving complaints. The provision of advice not only includes tips on how to make a complaint but also directing people to other possible sources of help if the matter is outside the LGO’s jurisdiction. When dealing with a complaint they check if the complainant has given the council (or other body within jurisdiction) a reasonable opportunity to deal with the complaint, and if they have the case may be forwarded to an investigative team for further action.
17. The LGO pioneered expanding the way in which complaints are resolved by discontinuing an investigation if a satisfactory response had been made. In our book my colleagues and I recommended that complaint resolution be enhanced in line with the powers to be found in section 3 of the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2007. We noted that in relation to the PO, HSO and LGO the 2007 Regulatory Reform Order authorised the appointment of a mediator and this was a drawing back
from a wider power initially proposed in the consultation exercise which preceded the Regulatory Reform Order.
18. The Law Commission in their 2011 report recommended that an equivalent of the Welsh provision be included in the legislation for the other public services ombudsmen. Given that the statistics for 2011-11 show a rise in complaints which is not just attributable to the new jurisdiction of privately funded or arranged adult social care, then the LGO’s prediction in their annual report for 2010-11 that this is likely to be a continuing trend, is probably accurate as people will have greater recourse to services, and certainly demographic changes mean that more older adults will be placed in care institutions. This along with the combination of the economic downturn and the reduction in expenditure on public services is likely to lead to increased pressure on these services and a consequent rise in complaints. Improving Administration
19. There are a variety of ways in which the LGO can seek to improve administration. Proposals can be made in the recommendations to resolve an individual complaint. A digest of cases can disseminate more widely the lessons learned from individual complaints and special reports can be published which distil points of guidance on particular topics drawn from a number of reports. The LGO’s latest version of such themed reports begun in 2011 are called Focus Reports, and concentrate on particular subjects of complaint with recommendations on good practice.
20. Another activity in which the LGO was the pioneering ombudsman in the UK is the provision of training in complaints handling. The LGO provides written guidance on this but it is suggested that training is likely to be a more effective way of improving councils’ handling of complaints. If councils handle complaints better, then the result should be quicker resolution and also the gaining of insight which, if followed up, can enable them to get things right first time.
21. One recommendation made by my colleagues and I is to confer on ombudsmen the power to conduct investigations on their own initiative. In our research we found that none of the UK ombudsmen had such a power but that their counterparts in Australia, New Zealand and Ireland did, and that they could not conceive of doing their job without it. This power enabled them to conduct investigations into systemic issues without having to wait for them to be raised in a complaint. The LGO’s powers were amended with effect from 2008 so as to allow an investigation of matters arising in an investigation. This is a ‘half-way house’ to our recommended own initiative power of investigation. The experience in Australia, New Zealand and Ireland is that the power is not used frequently but that it can be helpful, particularly where there is a type of complainant who is less likely to be able to make a complaint, for example, a vulnerable person.
Corporate Matters
22. In common with local government the LGO has the challenge of coping with significant reductions in its budget. The Summary Statement of their Strategic Business Review published by the LGO in September 2011 considers not only efficiency savings but also making quality improvements. In terms of savings these include a reduction in staffing in senior grades, including not appointing a replacement for Sir Tony Redmond, eventual relocation to Coventry, and changes in practice including the processes for determining cases suitable for investigation, the way in which investigators are deployed on investigations, and seeking to maximise the reach of the insight derived from their handling of complaints.
23. It is essential that a body which is seeking to help others improve, practises what it preaches. The LGO has a good record of being a reflective organisation and being innovative. There is tension between efficiency and effectiveness. People who persist with their complaints to the LGO have to be determined and since the LGO is the ultimate rung on the ladder of complaining, they will want to be assured that the LGO has considered their case properly. Some complainants will be aggrieved if their case is not taken up or does not result in the outcome they desire. The LGO does have a review process in which some decisions can be reconsidered and where the decision is confirmed, as it usually is, the complainant’s dissatisfaction will now include the LGO.
24. If, as seems likely, public expenditure cuts in local government lead to an increase in complaints to the LGO, then the LGO has to ensure that its efforts to work effectively and efficiently within a reduced budget do not impair the service it provides. Possible complainants’ dissatisfaction with its service can be reduced by being clear about what the LGO can and cannot do. It is to be hoped that efficiency pressures do not reduce the reasonable help which the Advice Team can offer to those whose complaints are outside their jurisdiction and that the handling of complaints can be perceived as fair even though it did not achieve the complainant’s desired result. The LGO like all public services ombudsmen is seeking to remedy injustice and this has both tangible and intangible aspects which must be reflected in its resources.
25. In conclusion I invite the Committee to consider endorsing the recommendations of Law Commission, its call for a wider review as well as the specific ones on the LGO’s reporting practices and possible relationship with Parliament, and its powers of complaint resolution. I also invite the committee to consider the power of own initiative investigation and to be assured that the LGO is efficient and economic in its use of resources and has the appropriate level of resources to be effective as an institution of the administrative justice system.
Brian Thompson
March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Keith Edmunds 1. The Local Government Ombudsman is an Institution that has been corrupted by Local
Government over the years, so much so that it is now entirely unfit for purpose and operates well outside the parameters laid down in the 1974 Local Government Act, that set it up. The evidence for this is as follows:
2. The Local Government Ombudsman used to do an annual customer service survey.
Even though they themselves chose the participants of the survey, i.e. those they thought had received a satisfactory outcome to their complaint. The satisfaction, year after year, always came out at less than 20% of all those surveyed. The Local Government Ombudsman then ceased carrying out these surveys.
3. The most damning statistic about this corrupt Institution is in their annual report to
Parliament. Year after year their findings of ‘maladministration with injustice’ show that they have never found for more than 1% of complainants in any year. In fact, most years they find for much fewer than 1% of complainants. For those of you who understand statistics this outcome is a statistical impossibility. From a statistical viewpoint they should be upholding between 33% and 66% of complaints. They are therefore damned by their own annual reports.
4. The Local Government Ombudsman covers up for Local Government and in doing so
infringes the human rights of those complainants with legitimate complaints who are denied justice.
5. Most of the employees of the Local Government Ombudsman are ex Local Government
Officers so you have a Judge and Jury examining their Peers. The statements above are clear evidence that this does not work.
6. Websites exist providing much evidence that the above statements are true. Here are
links: http://www.ombudsmanwatchers.org.uk/ and here http://psow.co.uk/ The last inquiry by this committee into the Local Government Ombudsman in 2005 was covered up by its Chairwoman, Dr Phyllis Starkey, and the then Labour Government. Much like the Local Government Ombudsman Investigations: A. They were prepared to accept statements from the Local Government Ombudsman that
were not true. B. They ignored evidence proving that their statements were false. C. Issued a final report and ignored evidence presented against the Local Government
Ombudsman. 7. Please study the websites with the links above. You will see that my allegations can be
entirely justified with hard evidence. In any case if they were doing their job properly there would be no requirement for these websites to exist.
8. As it stands the Local Government Ombudsman is a corrupt Institution, that covers up for Councils, when it should be holding them to account. It is therefore a complete and utter waste of taxpayer’s money. It should either be closed down, or entirely reconstituted, banned from employing Local Government Officers and headed by competent managers from the private sector, not public servants.
9. Finally, if it is retained as recommended in 8 above, it should be given real powers to
punish incompetent and corrupt Councils and hold them properly to account. Keith Edmunds March 2012
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Written evidence submitted by the British and Irish Ombudsman Association (BIOA) This submission is made on behalf of the Chair and Executive Committee of the Association which was established in 1991 and includes as members all major ombudsman schemes and complaint handling bodies in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, comprising around 65 schemes in total. The Association’s objectives include:
• encouraging, developing and safeguarding the role and title of Ombudsmen in both
the public and private sectors • setting criteria for the recognition of Ombudsman offices by the Association • formally recognising those persons or offices who satisfy the criteria • facilitating mutual learning and providing services to members designed to develop
best practice • working to raise the profile of Ombudsmen and the understanding of their work
The Association welcomes this opportunity to comment on the work and activities of the Local Government Ombudsman, but with particular regard to the criteria for the membership of Ombudsman Offices and its principles relating to governance and good complaint handling. BIOA-complaint Ombudsman schemes The LGO is fully compliant with the Association’s criteria. Compliant schemes must meet the following five key criteria:
• Independence • Fairness • Effectiveness • Openness and transparency • Accountability
This is the model endorsed by the Cabinet Office in its ‘Guidance to Departments’ on Ombudsmen (copy enclosed). Paragraph 4 of the Guidance states: An effective (and BIOA compliant) Ombudsman scheme can be the hallmark of fair redress. The full Criteria for the recognition of Ombudsman Membership of the Association is in Schedule 1 to the Association’s Rules (copy attached). Governance and good complaint handling principles The Association has published guides to the principles of good complaint handling and good governance (copies attached). The principle of independence is paramount, and whatever governance arrangements are in place, it is vital that they support and promote the integrity of the scheme and office holder and, above all, protect the independence of the office holder, particularly from those over whom the scheme has jurisdiction. In the case of the LGO, its relationship with CLG, its sponsor department, is vital and it should not, in our view, be treated as any other ‘arms-length body’ as that might impinge adversely on independence. Also of importance is sufficient funding to allow the scheme to deliver quality outcomes efficiently, albeit whist representing good value for money. The Local Government Ombudsman is a very active member of the British and Irish Ombudsman Association, participating in its activities and governance, including permanent representation of its Executive Committee. BIOA is happy to provide any further assistance
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to the Committee and willing to participate as required in future consultations and discussions. British and Irish Ombudsman Association March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Mr Williams These observations are written with the experience of 4 years dealing with the local planning office ( East Staffordshire Borough Council) regarding illegal tipping and failure to follow planning guide lines and legal requirements. All facts can be backed up with written evidence. Ombudsman Procedure Handling Observations
1. The Ombudsman staff allocated to the complaint had no experience of planning procedures or the laws involved.
2. If the complaint, which was the case with myself involved another government organisation
the Ombudsman requested you raised a separate ombudsman complaint with the others departments, i.e. Environment Agency, Stafford County Council, Bristol Planning Authority,
3. They only acted on detailed information provided by complainant, they had no in-depth
knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the other departments stated above. This in effect meant the complainant had to use to Freedom Of Information Act themselves to obtain alleged evidence of Malpractice / Malfeasance. And the complainant had to supply the questions for the accused to answer based on information supplied through Freedom of Information which the accused often stalled and at time refused to supply, on occasions legal action having to be taken by the Freedom of Information staff to obtain said information.
4. The Ombudsman staff seemed unable to supply or be willing to obtain written proof of
statements off the offending authorities, they just accept they are being told true facts by the authorities which was not the case on several occasions during my experience. This was probably a result of the lack of knowledge on the subject they were investigating made in
Point 1
5. The Ombudsman staff do not appear to follow any legal framework in investigating complaints and appears reluctant to take any of the various departments to task on their procedures and practices.
6. The Ombudsman staff appear to be viewed by the accused authorities as an irritation and
time consuming inconvenience that does not have any disciplinary weight of authority to change proceedings or impose adequate penalties. i.e. no teeth. No improvement of procedures or practice changes were advised to complainant after 4 years of investigation.
7. The practice of requiring a separate complaint to be raised against each government
department involved in a dispute seems very unprofessional and in effect means mass duplication and makes the procedure very political as the accused authorities are very adept at exploiting the the `grey areas` between themselves and buck passing, i.e. Planning Authority >> Borough Council >> County Council >> Environment Agency >> Planning Inspectorate >> back to Planning Authority. And you have to take your complaint out against each one individually using their related Ombudsman or complaints body. And in the Environment Agency case your local MP.
8. After having had two judgements passed in favour of the complainant and published as such
in the local press the Borough Council CEO still stated the Ombudsman was incorrect and the Borough Council was correct, this shows almost contempt for the Ombudsman
investigations and findings, no change in attitude or regard for due process. Ombudsman System The system appears to have very little impact on the authorities pursued by it and seems to be used as a way of deflecting unwanted attention and inconvenience to another department which they know has no real authority and due to the procedures will result in the complainant giving up their fight for justice, Those that succeed in gaining a judgement in their favour having little or no compensation for the effort or injustice the claim warrants, i.e. £1200 between three people with proven cases awarded in my case which took 3 years, This to me seems a complete waste of taxpayers money on a Government department no better than the other departments it is supposed to be Policing and is in effect considered very menial by said authorities. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to express my disappointment. Mr Williams March 2012
Written evidence from Mr D A Burnett
Please find below our questions and recommendations I am deliberately going to keep this simple , so that there can be no misunderstanding the question, As this will force straight answers
Questions.
1 Why is it that the percentage of complaints investigated by the L.G.0 so
overwhelmingly favour the councils.
To but this in perspective out of 168 cases involving Somerset county council, only 3 appellants were supported , that is less than 2% When than national average for tribunals is from the research I have done about 38% , One doesn't have to be smart to see that there is a big problem, they will no doubt say its because the councils are doing a fair job , will all know that's not the case.
2. Why does the L.G.0 not use the current and normal form of investigating practice, as prescribed by law.
They will probably say that they rely on councils to do the investigating ,and simply cheque to see if they have filled the right forms, or words to that effect , The reality is however that they should be investigating independently as their charter seems to require, That is where it all falls down , they are not independent or impartial , As the law requires them to be.
3. From my own experience it appears that the L.G.0 does not have any in house legal experts , our use any other legal advisors in the pursuit of justice and current working practice.
4. The L.G.0 doesn't have an adequate way of get in re-dress , because it does not have the political will or independent integrity to be seen by other public sector organizations as supporting the public, they don't find maladministration because they aren't looking for it, its only if they can’t hide it , that it comes to light and then they only suggest ways of redress.
To us it is blatantly clear that the L.(3.0 does not wish to get involved in forcing councils to act in a responsible manner and seems to be doing its best to cover up as much as it can, in order to allow second rate tactics and performance to continue as normal, no change there then, mission accomplished the status quo continues Does your investigation have the will to change any of the above ???
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC
1. In order to save the government and more importantly the public any more needless
expense, than has already been incurred , and don't forget the pension pot still to come.
From the point of view, that it is INDEPENDANTS of operation ,and administration of impartial investigations that are required by law, it is glaring obvious that the public sector organizations councils etc cant become independent of one another because they are all the same beast , all have the same style of management all are interlinked in some way, staff members flit from one to another at will , for example I once had the acquaintance of a senior manager in the quality car commission who was moved to a similar position in ofstead. So overnight he had gone from being an expert in nursing , to being a ruler of education. With the best will in the world that is complete and utter nonsense, the management of the mad house, The example above say's it all and is without any doubt why the country is from an administrative view in the state it's in. But none of you seem have the will to change it and probably don't even see it.
THE SUGGESTION FOR IMPROVEMENT
There is in reality only one way of getting a fair view of any problem whether it be a tribunal or investigation of any kind , the public should have the say about 6 to 10 from all walks of life. Yes, a form of jury.
So I say get rid of the failed L.G.0 and simply replace it with an investigating team , to sit on a selected number of days per week/ month in every county, the members to be from all walks of life but with one legal member and one accountant, when required a doctor or R.G.N experts when required in all fields. These members could be selected in the same way as jurors or could be recruited from the ranks of the retired (but no public sector managers) they will be paid reasonable expenses, and a fee for the day. They will have a small clerical team as support possibly full time but mostly part time. They could sit in magistrates courts on days they are free.
The conduct of the public sector managers will come up to standard overnight complaints will fall because they will no longer be unfairly protected.
The above will ensure that all are treated in a fair and even handed manner and from the governments point of view it will save tens of millions per year , for all time From the public point of view democracy and justice will be seen to be done. Mr D A Burnett April 2012
Written evidence from the Department for Communities and Local Government I know you are now beginning your inquiry into the Commission for Local Administration in England ('the Commission'), and I am writing to update you on the latest developments with the Commission and on our plans for the transformation of that organisation. When I gave evidence to your Committee on 21 December 2011, I mentioned that because of the changing nature of the Commission's role, we were looking to the Ombudsman to have greater focus on being in effect a consumer champion. I also explained that there was a view that there should be a single Ombudsman rather than several Ombudsmen with at least one of them having in addition very significant managerial responsibilities. I indicated that we were actively considering as a way forward not appointing a third Ombudsman and reshaping the Commission's senior management structure, with the appointment of a Chief Operating Officer relieving the Ombudsmen of administrative and executive responsibilities, allowing them to focus much more on the Ombudsman role. I subsequently concluded that the way forward was indeed as I had indicated to you, and as you will know, on 16 April I designated Dr Jane Martin as Chairman, and Ms Anne Seex as Vice-Chairman, of the Commission. At the same time, I gave approval for the Commission to recruit a Chief Operating Officer who will assume the roles of Chief Executive and Accounting Officer for the Commission, both roles previously undertaken by the Chairman. This will leave the Chairman free to focus on the strategic direction of the Commission and her quasi-judicial Ombudsman role, while the Chief Operating Officer handles the day-to-day running of the Commission. This restructuring of the top management of the Commission, including the decision not to appoint a third Ombudsman, is a first step to radically transforming the Commission, making it more streamlined, cost-effective, and above all being more customer-focused, championing the rights of redress for local residents. This view of the future Commission reflects the future roles of the Ombudsman which we identified in our Open Public Services White Paper, and underpins the budgets (£13.859m for 2012-13; £12.879m for 2013-14; £11.9m for 2014-15) which we recently confirmed for the Commission for the remainder of this Comprehensive Spending Review period. With the reshaping of the Commission's top management there remain three further major elements to the reforms necessary to bring about the reforms we are seeking. First, there will need to be a comprehensive restructuring and downsizing of the Commission's staff. Secondly, all the Commission's activities need to be moved on to a single site which provides best value for money. Thirdly, the Commission's processes for handling complaints will be wholly re-engineered with the focus on those cases involving serious service failure. The Commission is now working closely with my officials to bring about this transformation programme which builds on a review of its future role which the
Commission itself undertook last year. Our expectation is that the whole transformation, including relocations, will be substantially completed during the remainder of this Spending Review period. Such a reformed Commission will mean that the Local Government Ombudsmen can in future years continue to play their vital role in the community of making sure that people get swift and fair redress if things go wrong in the delivery of their local services. I am copying this letter to Secretary of State for Health and the Secretary of State for Education. April 2012
Written evidence submitted by Mr M Stabler
I am emailing you in your capacity as chairman of the Communities and Local Government Select Committee to ask your committee to consider increasing the remit of the Local Government Ombudsman to finally include both Parish and Town Councils at the present time these bodies are unaccountable for maladministration under the current system.
M Stabler May 2012
Written evidence from Mike Rawson
I am writing to you as the Chairman of the Communities & Local Government Select Committee.
I was present on Monday during your Committees robust questioning of Ms Seex and Dr Jane Martin.
Unfortunately I missed the deadline for submitting written evidence but I feel strongly you and your colleagues should be aware of the treatment I have received from the Local Government Ombudsman in respect of a strong complaint I have made against my local council.
My complaint alleges maladministration and deliberate dishonest behaviour on the part of officers of the council when preparing a report for councillors. I submitted compelling evidence to the LGO and was informed my complaint would not be investigated on the grounds I have not been personally affected by the council's behaviour.
It seems the Ombudsman is angry with me for using the FOI Act to discover the costs to the taxpayer of this quango and for writing to government to suggest it be relocated from some of the capitol's most expensive real estate at Millbank Tower.
I spoke to a number of people whose business has been personally affected by the actions of the council and they signed declarations repeating the allegations against the council and I handed the forms and my evidence to an investigator at Millbank Tower.
I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from a Mr Chris Upjohn. In the second paragraph he states they are not investigating my complaint further which would suggest they have carried out some investigation. When, in a telephone conversation with Mr Upjohn this morning, I pointed out no investigation whatsoever had been carried out he became quite rude and told me Ms Seex would not investigate the complaint in any circumstances as, 'the time limit had now expired'!
When the Ombudsman refused to investigate my complaint, my MP, Charles Walker, asked Mr Norman Baker, MP, the Transport Minister, to whom could I take my complaint for investigation. Mr Baker, in his written reply to Mr Walker, suggested I go to the Local Government Ombudsman! I did, for the second time, and received the same response.
I am extremely dissatisfied with the treatment I have received and feel the
Ombudsman is, in its present form, not fit for purpose. I look forward to reading the Committees report in due course.
Perhaps I should add one final comment Mr Betts. In a telephone conversation with one of the investigators last year I was told, 'We are not answerable to anyone — we were set up to be at arm's length from Parliament!' Such arrogance I find wholly unacceptable.
May 2012
CCL‐ DCLG 30th April 2012
The DCLG Inquiry into the Local Government Ombudsman
Additional Updates for the Evidence Given by Guy Crivello on 23rd April 2012
1. Item 1: The Inquiry was reminded on the 23rd April 2012 that my organisation Care for Community Living had a current case before the LGO. That information was correct when I left my office on the morning of the 23rd April (my solicitor had written to confirm this) and it was correct to the best of my knowledge when I went into the inquiry. However, it now transpires that the LGO had closed off the case that day (23rd April) and had sent her confirmation of this to our solicitors at just before 1600 that day (1538) and thereafter, my solicitors forwarded the notice to my mail box at 1554. I understand that the LGO was aware I was giving evidence at 1600 and that her very specific timing was intentional since the LGO has noted in her contact: “I have therefore arranged for this response and my final decision to be delivered to you at around 4.00 p.m.” I was not aware of this last minute update when I went into the Inquiry on the 23rd; had I been so I would of course have informed the DCLG representative (Glen) prior to the start of the meeting. Therefore, it is now necessary for me to note for the record that when the Inquiry started at 1600 on the 23rd April 2012, my organisation no longer had a pending case with the LGO, as the Inquiry was originally told. I do not know if the matter is important to the Inquiry but for my own part I did feel constrained by the need to avoid referencing specific examples from what I believed at the time was still a ‘live’ case. Had the LGO given my organisation any reasonable notice (e.g. even 24hrs) that she intended to close the current case off before the Inquiry sat, I could certainly have provided the panel with more specific and helpful evidence on the day, particularly with regard to the articulation and exampling of the key systemic issues that my evidence referred to (e.g. the Legislative Framework and Statutory / Non Statutory issues). To be clear, we had been asking the LGO for an update on the position of cases with her that were awaiting a final decision for almost 4 months without any response at all from the LGO. In light of this, I believe the LGO’s timing of her contact of the 23rd April and her failure to
give any reasonable notice of her intention in respect of a consideration she knew would affect the scope of a witnesses’ evidence – i.e. closing off the live cases and freeing up the evidence therein for use, before the Inquiry sat ‐ was both unhelpful to this witness and to the needs and aims of this Inquiry.
2. Item 2: Having referred in my evidence of the 23rd April 2012 to the information displayed on the LGO web site, I must now note for the record that that the LGO’s web site has been updated since then on at least one occasion 25 April 2012 and in respect of the areas my evidence referred to – i.e. the Legal Framework. Clearly, my evidence could not take account of any changes that have been made since.
3. Summary: I have noted the above to keep to the high standard set by the DCLG for the treatment of evidence for Select Committees and to ensure that everything that I know is passed on to the DCLG and the Inquiry. I should however be clear that the above information does not, as far as I can tell, require me to withdraw or correct any of the evidence that was given in writing or any of my evidence given to the Committee on the 23rd April 2012. Guy Crivello – Care for Community Living 30th May 2012
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Supplementary Information from the Commission for Local Administration in England (Local Government Ombudsman) to the Communities and Local Government Select
Committee
The Local Government Ombudsman welcomes the opportunity to provide additional information, to help fully answer the questions put by the Committee on 30th April 2012. This further information is being provided about the role of the Commission for Local Administration in England (CLAE) and the operation of the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) Scheme, in response to questions asked by the select committee. It is structured in accordance with the order in which questions were asked at the oral evidence session and uses the question numbering used in the uncorrected transcript of Oral Evidence.
Interregnum and appointment of Chair and Vice Chair
Question 75
The interregnum, prior to the appointment of a Chair and Vice Chair of CLAE was a prolonged period of uncertainty. During this period, the Commission adopted a proactive approach in initiating an independent Strategic Business Review and proposing transformational change. The proposals in our transformation plan were developed in response to the recommendations made by the strategic business review and in a constructive effort to help achieve budget reductions. We very much welcome the Secretary of State’s support for our plan. A chronology of this period is given below.
November 2010 Sir Anthony Redmond retired as third Ombudsman (Local Commissioner) and Commission Chairman.
December 2010 DCLG commences appointment process to replace Sir Anthony
March 2011 DCLG confirms budget for 2011-12 and indicative budgets of 33% for the following 3 years subject to budget review in October 2011
April 2011 Commission initiates Independent Strategic Business Review. A full copy of the review is attached.
July 2011 Commission accepts strategic business review recommendations and initiates a Transformation Plan.
September 2011- Commission submits Transformation Plan to DCLG to the budget review process , including approval for transition costs. The Commission suggests that a third Ombudsman need not be recruited.
December 2011- DCLG halts third Ombudsman and Chairman appointment process (until this point a new chairman was expected)
February 2012 DCLG confirms Commission budget for 2012-13, equivalent to a £1m reduction on the previous year.
March 2012 DCLG confirms the Commission budget for the remaining CSR period equivalent to a 27% reduction.
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16 April 2012 The two remaining Ombudsmen (Local Commissioners) are confirmed in the posts of Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission in line with the statutory requirement in Section 23(7) of the Local Government Act 1974, which says that the Secretary of State should appoint one of the Local Commissioners as Chair and one as Vice-chair. It is further proposed to appoint a Chief Operating Officer to the Commisson who will act as Accounting Officer.
3 May 2012 First meeting convened by DCLG to consider transition costs of Commission transformation plan
Secretary of State’s letter
Question 77 & 78 The ‘Secretary of State refers to the independent strategic business review commissioned by the Commission in April 2011.The ‘fitness for purpose’ of the LGO Scheme, was one of the key objectives set by the Commission for the strategic review.
Delay in agreeing a grant memorandum with DCLG
Question 81
Discussions to date concerning a framework document between the Commission and DCLG have highlighted the ‘special’ status of the Commission as the governing body of a quasi judicial LGO Scheme , rather than an arms length body established to deliver departmental objectives. This has focused on the need to ensure proper accountability for use of public funds without fettering the discretion and independence of the Ombudsmen to deal with complaints.
LGO implementation of audit recommendations
Question 82
The Commission is subject to rigorous internal and external audit. During the interregnum period much progress has been made in responding to outstanding recommendations from internal audit which was noted in the minutes of the Audit Committee meeting on 16th June, 2011. The current situation is as set out in the attached record.
Case processing numbers, times and delay
Questions 83, 84, 85 & 86
Published figures in the Annual Report 2010-11 show that 21,840 contacts were made with the LGO advice team, 11,249 complaints were allocated for investigation and 10,792 cases were decided.
Of these, over half, 54.2%, were decided within 13 weeks. 83.4% within 26 weeks and 97% within 52 weeks. In summary, of 10,792 cases decided, 133 took over 52 weeks. Over the period 2011-12 45.5% of complaints were decided in 13 weeks ,77.7% in 26 weeks and 95% within 52 weeks.
The Commission Transformation Plan
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Question 91, 96, 97, 98, 99
A copy of the Commission’s Transformation Plan is available on request.
There are four key components to achieving the Transformation Plan :
1. Rationalisation of our accommodation onto one headquarters site in our existing Coventry offices.
2. A reduced staffing complement, a leaner management structure and a reduced corporate services function
3. A refocused, more robust, intake and assessment process which resolves complaints swiftly and proportionately and provides for greater flexibility within the overall investigation process.
4. Greater emphasis on the impact and influence generated from insight from our complaints for wider public benefit and public value.
In order to achieve greater efficiencies and value for money the Commission’s Transformation Plan introduces a new business model of intake and assessment. 30% of complaints under the current business model are not investigated. Under the new business model the intention is to arrive at more decisions at the earliest possible stage in the complaints process, at lowest possible cost, sifting out more serious cases (and those cases which overlap with other ombudsman jurisdictions) and passing these rapidly on to the investigation teams. We will apply the following criteria to assess complaints:
o The level of apparent injustice involved; o The scale of maladministration alleged; o The wider public interest issues raised by the case; o The prospect of achieving a satisfactory outcome; o The potential implications for other ombudsman jurisdictions.
We estimate that we will make prompt decisions ‘not to investigate’, or quickly resolve, at least 5,000 complaints each year, equivalent to 40% of all complaints and we will make these decisions within 28 days of receipt.
We will continue to provide clear and simple access for potential complainants by phone, email and post. We will make use of push-button telephone technology and structured webmail formats to streamline access to help to significantly limit the number of misdirected, incomplete and incomprehensible enquiries that we handle.
Question 94 & 95
The Commission Transformation Plan assumes a reduction in the number of investigators to 101fte posts by 2015, a reduction of 17.7%. This compares with a reduction of 25.3% in the total number of fte posts by 2015. We are doing everything we can to protect the investigative workforce, and our intention is that this group will not be proportionally reduced as much as other groups.
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Joint Investigations
Questions 125 & 126
Since the Regulatory Reform Order 2007, LGO has been able to conduct joint investigations and issue joint reports with the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. In 2011-12 we issued 7 joint reports. Notably in 2009, we jointly investigated complaints brought by the charity Mencap on behalf of the families of six people with learning disabilities who died whilst in NHS or local authority care between 2003 and 2005. This ‘Six Lives’ Report has resulted in all NHS bodies and all 152 Local Authorities confirming that they have carried out a local review and reported to their Boards. The Care Quality Commission, Monitor and the Equality and Human Rights Commission have also written to the Ombudsmen outlining what they have done in response to the recommendations in ‘Six Lives’. The Department of Health (DH) supported the implementation of the ‘Six Lives’ recommendations through the following actions :
• The Chief Executive’s of the NHS and Director’s for Social Care, Learning Disabilities and the Director’s for Primary Care have all written to NHS and local authorities at different times to remind organisations of their responsibilities to people with learning disabilities. DH also established a Directed Enhanced Service to deliver annual health checks to people with learning disabilities.
• (DH) established a confidential inquiry into premature and avoidable deaths of
people with learning disabilities
• DH has also set up a new Learning Disabilities Public Health Observatory.
• DH has published guidance to support NHS and social care organisations to deliver improved healthcare for people with learning disabilities.
• DH commissioned the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) to
work with its member organisations and report on how they are ensuring healthcare professionals are able to meet the needs of people with disabilities, particularly learning disabilities
In 2011 a joint investigation highlighted significant failings in the care provided to a man with Down’s syndrome. His basic human rights were ignored after he was detained unnecessarily in hospital for months and was then moved into inappropriate locked accommodation until his death. The NHS Trust and the Council agreed to provide the man’s family with a full acknowledgement of the serious mistakes and an apology. £2,000 was also paid in recognition of the distress caused, which the family have said they will donate to charity. The Ombudsmen have also asked the Trust and the Council to prepare, and report progress on, an action plan setting out what they have done (or will do) to ensure that these mistakes are not repeated in future.
Remedies
Question 129
It is important that citizens are aware of their right to come to the Ombudsman with their complaint. Local authorities will signpost complainants to the LGO Scheme when they have
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completed their internal complaints process. We would support promotional work which raises citizen awareness of how the whole system works for them. LGO advisers make it clear when complainants first make contact how we can help them. Investigators always ensure that complainants understand at the outset what sort of remedy we might achieve and how it might redress their injustice.
The LGO Scheme is primarily concerned to achieve restorative justice and our first priority is to require action to correct an injustice. This may include asking the local authority to take a decision again. We cannot consider the merits of a decision taken by a democratically elected authority but this does not apply to private, independent bodies. We only consider payments to complainants when they have incurred a material financial loss or when it is not possible to take action. In such cases we will recommend payments in recognition of distress, inconvenience or time and trouble caused. A copy of the Principles on Remedies guidance to investigators is attached.
Concerns about Institutional bias in favour of Councils
Question 134
It is critical that the public have confidence that they will get an impartial investigation and decision. An Ombudsman, or an investigator under their delegated authority, will not deal with any cases where they may have a conflict of interest because of previous work connections or past or present family or other close relationships with serving officers or members. In such circumstances where an Ombudsman is involved, a transfer of delegated authority is made to another Ombudsman. This has to be authorised by the Commission and is on the public record.
Question 135
There were 74 reports issued about local authorities in 2009/10, 26 reports issued in 2010-11 and 82 reports issued 2011-12. The number of reports issued ‘remedy agreed’ during 2011-12 is 18.These are reports issued in the public interest even though the local authority has agreed to implement the remedy to the satisfaction of the Ombudsman.
Customer care
Question 138
Investigators acting under delegated authority in handling complaints will always seek ‘restorative justice’ at the earliest opportunity based on the facts of the matter. Where appropriate we will use mediation techniques and have skilled mediators on our staff. Research conducted by Ipsos MORI shows that people primarily value a remedy which deals with their injustice but also acknowledges fault, provides an apology and makes changes to practice or policy so that others are not affected in the future. The LGO role does not require remedy which is punitive on the body in jurisdiction.
Local authority complaint numbers
Question 142
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Figures for 2011/12 requested by the Committee are shown below, in respect of the 20 local authorities with the highest and the lowest number of LGO complaints. These figures, will reflect the size of the resident populations in the local authority area and should be treated with caution without supplementary information about the outcomes of each complaint
Local authority most complained about Number of complaints in 2011/12
Birmingham City Council 258 Southwark London Borough 180 Lambeth London Borough 174 Kent County Council 152 Cornwall Council 142 Leeds City Council 141 Camden London Borough 127 Haringey London Borough 119 Croydon London Borough 115 Hackney London Borough 113 Ealing London Borough 111 Islington London Borough 110 Buckinghamshire County Council 109 Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough 105 Bristol City Council 102 Newham London Borough 100 Essex County Council 94 Sheffield City Council 92 Redbridge London Borough 89 Brighton and Hove City Council 88
Local authority least complained about Number of complaints in 2011/12
Durham County Council 1 Erewash Borough Council 1 Isles of Scilly 1 Oadby & Wigston Borough Council 1 Purbeck District Council 1 Rushmoor Borough Council 1 Chiltern District Council 2 Gosport Borough Council 2
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Hyndburn Borough Council 2 Rutland County Council 2 South Northants District Council 2 West Somerset District Council 2 Cambridge City Council 3 Carlisle City Council 3 Copeland Borough Council 3 Craven District Council 3 East Northants Council 3 Eden District Council 3 Melton Borough Council 3 North Dorset DC 3
Customer satisfaction research
Questions 145–150
The last quantitative customer satisfaction survey was undertaken in 2007. This was an independent survey carried out by Ipsos Mori and published in full on the CLAE website. The research found that 26% of people surveyed were satisfied with the outcome of their complaint, whilst 71% were dissatisfied. It also found that around half (49%) were satisfied with the way their complaint was dealt with and 44% were dissatisfied. The research concluded that ‘A positive outcome is a major driver in whether a complainant is satisfied or dissatisfied with the handling of their complaint’. The Ombudsmen were keen to understand more about the different attitudes of those who were satisfied with the outcome of their complaint and those who were not. Ipsos Mori produced additional tables of analyses. These showed that those who were satisfied with the outcome of their complaint recorded very positive opinions about staff and the way the complaint was handled (only 3% said they were dissatisfied and the number was too small to use for further analysis). The people who were satisfied with the outcome of their complaint reported positive scores of between 90% and 98% on how their complaint had been dealt with, fairness, investigator’s understanding of the complaint , the amount and clarity of the information provided and politeness, helpfulness, efficiency, professionalism of staff.
The CLAE commissioned a further piece of research Ipsos Mori in 2010, with a qualitative methodology in order to explore in greater depth perceptions of the service delivered by CLAE (also published in full on the CLAE website). This found that many complainants were positive about different points of the complaints process, but again that the complaint outcome coloured their perception of the service; those who received a negative outcome were unlikely to express satisfaction with other aspects of the service. Respondents generally found CLAE staff to be polite, respectful and professional. In 2011 LGO commissioned mystery shopping and Communications research from BDRC , instead of a customer satisfaction study. The research, which included telephone and
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email mystery shops, depth and group interviews found that considering the difficult job LGO advisers have to do (handling difficult calls and a range of sometimes complex complaints) overall LGOAT advice line is well executed, almost impeccable in terms of politeness, professionalism, friendliness and clarity. The next satisfaction survey, subject to resources, is planned for 2013.
Working with regulators
Question 151
Insight from complaints supplements the work of the regulators and we have arrangements in place to share information with regulatory bodies. We have a Memorandum of Understanding with with the Care Quality Commission which sets out the arrangements in relation to adult social care matters and with Ofsted for complaints related to the internal management of schools. We will always act as a ‘good citizen’ in immediately alerting the relevant authorities to any case brought to us where there appear to be safeguarding issues
Strategic focus
Question 152
Having reviewed our mission and strategic objectives in 2010, the Commission has remained focused on its core business of ensuring fairness for citizens and providing remedy for injustice cased by maladministration or service failure. This is incorporated into our corporate strategic plan and annual business plan. The corporate management team review forthcoming legislation on a fortnightly basis and respond to consultations to advise on the appropriate role for LGO. For example, since 2010 we have responded to policy initiatives on: health and safety complaints; housing complaints; complaints from members of the armed services; and complaints from voluntary bodies in relation to the local authority Compact arrangements. Detailed parliamentary and consultation logs are maintained. We have raised issues for legislative change with the sponsor department in our Triennial Review which will be submitted at the end of May, eg. Town and Parish Councils.
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Outstanding Audit Recommendations for the Commission for Local Administration in England (LGO) as at 9th May 2012 Summary Sheet
Risk Management and Governance ( 2 March 2011)
2 outstanding recommendations; awaiting action by DCLG.
Business and IT Continuity (24 October 2011)
1 outstanding recommendation; will complete in May 2012
NAO Management Letter on the 2009-10 Financial Statement Audit (August 2010) Recommendations arising from the NAO’s audit of the accounts to 31 March 2010
2 outstanding recommendations; one awaiting action by DCLG, the other will complete in May 2012.
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Internal Audit Recommendation Prio
rity1
Management Response Original
Due DateLead Officer
Any revision to management response Progress
Projected Completion Date
Risk Management and Governance ( 2 March 2011)
Rec. 9 Agreement of grant memorandum At the time of our review Grant Memorandum had yet to be agreed with CLG. The main areas of dispute are the ability of CLG to alter the terms of the agreement unilaterally; and the discretion allowed to LGO to set pay. This should be resolved with CLG as soon as possible.
H Agreed
Not possible to set a date
DCEx2
The GM is being replaced with a Framework Document
Previous: Latest draft is with DCLG for comment since November 2011. It is unlikely to be ready in time for the March Commission meeting, so will need to wait until the following meeting in May Current: No change. Next Commission meeting is in July
May 2012 July 2012
Rec. 10 Commissioners’ Code of Conduct document A governance statement incorporating the Code of Conduct for commissioners has been drafted but its implementation has been delayed due to concerns over the statutory basis for the delegation of authority. Since production of the governance statement is likely to be delayed, LGO should consider issuing a separate update to the existing Code of Conduct for Commissioners.
M AgreedThe Cssn will be asked if it wishes to update the Code of Conduct.
March 11 DCEx
The Commission decided not to take any action on the code until a decision on Governance has been made by the Government.
Previous: A decision on governance is expected from DCLG shortly. It will then take several months to consider if any amendment to the code is required. Current: Decision taken on Chair and V/Chair in April. Governance review commenced, (to include Code). Will report in July 2012.
June 2012 July 2012
Business and IT Continuity (24 October 2011)
Rec. 1 Update BIA
The Business Impact Assessment for each LGO site has not been revised since the plans were restructured, by an external consultant, in 2008. Although LGO do not expect this to have greatly varied, the business impact analysis may be inconsistent with current business operations which may translate into incorrect continuity requirements being addressed in the BCPs
L Accepted. We will put a review of the business impact assessment in hand, to be completed by the end of this financial year.
April 2012 DCEx None. Previous: work not yet commenced. Current: BIAs drafted; awaiting confirmation so the plan can be updated
April 2012 May 2012
1 Priority ratings, as provided by the internal auditors (KPMG) are H (High), M (Medium) and L (Low) 2 Deputy Chief Executive and Secretary of the Commission
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External Audit Recommendation Prio
rity3
Management Response Original
Due DateLead Officer
Any revision to management response Progress
Projected Completion Date
NAO Management Letter on the 2009-10 Financial Statement Audit (August 2010) Recommendations arising from the NAO’s audit of the accounts to 31 March 2010 3 Grant Memorandum Although the Commission has actively tried to agree a Grant Memorandum to supersede the one agreed in 1999, we suggest that the Commission now escalate its concerns to the most senior levels in the Department in order to try and resolve this issue.
M A letter has been sent from the Chairman of the Commission to the Deputy Director, CLG on 24 June 2010, reminding him that a response has been awaited from the Department since our letter of 15 April 2010. 2010/11 commentary DCLG submitted a revised Grant Memorandum to the Commission in April 2011. However the Commission has not been able to agree to its terms. DCLG has agreed that the Memorandum will be replaced by a Framework Agreement. A timetable for the creation of this document has been agreed with DCLG. A draft agreement will be presented to the Commission meeting in July 2011.
Unable to set a date
Acting Chair
New framework agreement being drafted.
Previous: DCLG Permanent Secretary has requested a new Framework Document is agreed as soon as possible to replace the Grant Memorandum. Draft to be considered by the Commission in November 2011. Draft will now be considered at July 2012 Commission meeting Current:, No change. Further letter sent to DCLG enquiring about progress. Further letter sent 4th May 2012
July 2012 July 2012
6 IT Service Level Agreements We recommend that revised Service Level Agreements are introduced between the IT department and the rest of the organisation.
L We agree it is no longer appropriate for there to be SLAs for individual offices. From 2010/11 onwards IT services are charged per capita, with a standard service across off three offices. A single SLA will be agreed with the Deputies Group on behalf of the whole organisation. 2010/11 commentary The IT department is configuring their Helpdesk to capture performance statistics to support an SLA. The SLA will be put in hand when resources can be directed, primarily from the COIN project; we anticipate this will be put in place by October 2011.
Jun-11 DCE&S4
Previous: SLA drafted and awaiting approval Current: SLA will be finalised in discussion with Deputy Ombudsman
March 2012 May 2012
http://spire:8082/SPIREWEBDAV/Users/MCILVENNAS/My Workspace/Spire - CLG Inqiries/INQUIRIES/2010-12/21 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN/EVIDENCE - WRITTEN/Circulated to Members/LGO 17b - Commission for Local Administration in England.doc 04 May 2012
3 Priority ratings, as provided by the external auditors (NAO) are H (High), M (Medium) and L (Low) 4 Deputy Chief Executive and Secretary of the Commission
