The Effect of Anti-Immigration Elite Rhetoric on Ethnic Voting and Racial Violence

in Miami, Marseille, and Dublin

Joel S. Fetzeri

Professor of Political ScienceSocial Science DivisionPepperdine University

Malibu, CA 90263-4372joel.fetzer@pepperdine.edu

Abstract: Although some scholars of “realistic group conflict” argue that immigration-related ethnic conflict usually increases with a sudden influx of foreign-born residents, Daniel J. Hopkins’ theory of “politicized places” suggests that the effect of immigrant flows may partly depend on “salient national rhetoric.” To help adjudicate between these two theoretical explanations cross-nationally, this paper analyzes over-time, aggregate voting data and qualitative accounts of inter-ethnic violence from three urban natural experiments: the arrival of the Mariel Cubans to Miami, Florida, in 1980; the influx of Pieds-Noirs and Harkis “repatriates” from Algeria into Marseille, France, in 1962; and the migration of new European Union citizens from Eastern Europe into Dublin, Ireland, in 2004. Based on elite interviews, archival materials, newspaper accounts, and Gary King’s method of ecologically inferring the degree of ethnic voting, the study generally confirms the “politicized places” interpretation. While rapid, “uncontrolled” migration fueled ethnic voting and violence in Miami, where the media and many elites blamed economic woes on the immigrants, migrant inflows had few such effects in Marseille and Dublin, where media treatment was relatively positive and most leaders welcomed the newcomers relatively early on. Theoretically, this investigation thus expands Hopkins’ theory to immigrant-rich urban settings in three different industrialized countries. The paper might also guide local and national political leaders wishing to avoid a popular backlash against an unexpected wave of recent immigrants.

Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hollywood, CA, March 28-30, 2013

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The Effect of Anti-Immigration Elite Rhetoric on Ethnic Voting and Racial Violencein Miami, Marseille, and Dublin

The ethnic vote is often the one based on fear. . . . We still use identity as the only factor in voting.

- Maina Kiai, Kenyan human-rights advocate,in Gettleman (2013)

Although some scholars of “realistic group conflict” argue that immigration-related

ethnic conflict usually increases with a sudden influx of foreign-born residents, Daniel J.

Hopkins’ theory of “politicized places” suggests that the effect of immigrant flows on

ethnic conflict may partly depend on “salient national rhetoric.” According to realistic

group conflict theory, the rapid addition of a hundred thousand or more individuals into

an urban area would almost inevitably boost conflict because these newcomers would

compete with established urbanites for already-scarce resources such as jobs, dwellings,

and education (Sherif et al. 1961; Campbell 1965; Bobo 1983). In the words of authors

the classic “robbers’ cave experiment” (Sherif et al. 1961:151) conflict between the two

groups “was produced systematically through the introduction of conditions of rivalry

and frustration perceived by the subjects as stemming from the other group.” The only

way to reduce such friction, realistic group conflict suggests, is to convince people that it

is in their own interest to cooperate with the other subset of individuals, or to establish

“superordinate [or common] goals . . . the attainment of which is compelling but which

cannot be achieved by the efforts of one group alone” (Sherif et al. 1961:183). In most

western industrialized countries, newly arrived immigrants and natives would only rarely

share common aims, however, making the achievement of this condition—and hence

harmonious relations between the two groups—exceptional indeed.

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On a slightly less pessimistic note, Daniel J. Hopkins (2010) contends that the

degree of immigration-related conflict partly depends on how much nationally important

leaders scapegoat new arrivals. Given a large wave of immigrant into a locality, well-

established residents are more likely to express “hostile political reactions” when “salient

national rhetoric” in the media or “politicizes immigration.” Assuming that “people

are highly selective in incorporating environmental information and that information

acquisition needs to be explained,” the model focusses on citizens’ perceptions of change

in the size of the foreign-born population rather than in the overall, static numbers of

immigrants per se. Yet ethno-political conflict only occurs when prominent national

media—presumably echoing national political leaders or policy entrepreneurs—establish

“frames” linking this local demographic change to immigration politics. Absent such

framing, local ethnic relations should remain relatively peaceful despite widespread

migration.

To help adjudicate between these two theoretical explanations cross-nationally,

this paper analyzes over-time, aggregate voting data and qualitative accounts of inter-

ethnic violence from three urban natural experiments: the arrival of the Mariel Cubans to

Miami, Florida, in 1980; the influx of Pieds-Noirs and Harkis “repatriates” from Algeria

into Marseille, France, in 1962; and the migration of new European Union citizens from

Eastern Europe into Dublin, Ireland, in 2004. I selected these three cases because they all

occurred relatively recently in large cities in three industrialized countries of the Atlantic

community and because roughly 100,000 people immigrated into each community almost

overnight. If anti-immigrant reaction did not reveal itself under such extreme conditions,

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it is unlikely to take place anywhere. If it does, in contrast, we will be better able to

estimate the upper bounds of such hostility.

Although the scholarly literature on the roots of ethnic conflict and racial violence

is vast (Allport 1954; Myrdal 1962; Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985; Cordell and Wolff 2011),

relatively little looks in detail at how the sudden influx of massive numbers of refugees or

economic migrants affects large, modern, industrialized cities in particular (but see Olzak

1987; 1994). Related investigations of ethnic voting (Wolfinger 1965; Dunning and

Harrison 2010) likewise often neglect the immediate electoral consequences of sudden,

widespread migration. And at least U.S. studies of racial rioting and violence tend not to

pay too much attention to migratory aspects of such disturbances (Ransford 1968; Tuttle

1970; Giroux 1996; but see Pagán 2003). This present study should therefore help expand

the boundaries of the literature on ethnic conflict and immigration politics.

Historical Background

After Fidel Castro allowed Cuban citizens to leave the port of Mariel for Florida

beginning in April of 1980, a flood of refugees (and, apparently, some former prisoners

and patients from mental hospitals) arrived in South Florida. Miami-based Cuban exile

groups also facilitated the migration by sponsoring boats for the round-trip from Florida

to Mariel and back. In the end, close to 100,000 migrants from Cuba would move to

Miami for good during a six-month period in 1980 (Nijman 2011:54-55).

Marseille’s migrant flow also consisted primarily of refugees. Following the

signing of the Évian Accords ending the Algerian War in 1962, the remaining European

colonists (“Pieds Noirs”) and their ethnically Algerian allies (“Harkis”) were forced to

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choose between remaining in newly independent Algeria and risk being massacred by the

now ruling Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) or moving to a metropolitan France

many had never known. Most, wisely for their health, opted for the latter (Stora 1992;

Azni 2002; Moumen 2003; Clarke and Costelle 2010). After the resulting chaotic voyage

or flight across the Mediterranean, tens of thousands of refugees found themselves in

Marseille. Between March of 1962 and the local census of July 1964, the population of

the city increased by 14 percent, amounting to about 105,000 repatriates from Algeria

(Jordi 1995:138). So great was the Pieds-Noirs population in greater Marseille after 1962

that they eventually created their own middle-class suburb, Carnoux-en-Provence, in the

mountains above Marseille proper (Jordi 1993:119-123).

Migration to Dublin was more orderly. As one of the three older European Union

countries to open their borders to the newly admitted “EU-10”ii states in May of 2004,

Ireland received as many as 85,000 immigrants from the “New Europe” within the first

year alone. By 2006, almost 15 percent of the Republic of Ireland consisted of

immigrants, giving the formerly emigration-oriented society the demographics of a

traditional country of immigration (Hughes et al. 2007:219; Fanning 2011:16). As the

largest city in the Republic, Dublin hosted a plurality of these newcomers (Central

Statistics Office 2008:12).

Hypothesized Effects on Ethnic Voting and Racial Violence

The two theories imply contrasting levels of ethnic voting and violence for the three

cases.

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Since the number of immigrants into each city is roughly comparable and a common goal

appears elusive, realistic group conflict would hypothesis relatively high levels of both

ethnic voting and racial violence (see Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998) for Miami,

Marseille, and Dublin. Hopkins’ “politicized places” explanation, on the other hand,

allows for more differentiation among the three urban areas. In Miami, national

(generally negative) media reports about the supposedly crime-prone and mentally

deranged “Marielitos” were common and remained relatively frequent into the mid-1980s

(see Figure 1). This uncomplimentary coverage largely reflected anti-Mariel scapegoating

by both local and national political and community leaders (Croucher 1997:61-101; Ojito

2005). According to the second theory, Miami should therefore show high levels of both

ethnic voting and racialized violence.

Figure 1 Articles on “Cuban Immigration” in New York Times, 1978-1985

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Source: query.nytimes.com (accessed March 12, 2013)

While the national French press covered the plight (and problems) of the rapatriés

extensively (see Figure 2), national and Marseille politicians appear to have been

somewhat less critical of these migrants than their American counterparts had been of the

Mariel migrants. The overall amount of press coverage seems lower than that for Mariel,

and the number of related stories rapidly drops to zero. Gaston Defferre, socialist mayor

of Marseille, at first did engage in a little anti-Pieds-Noirs scapegoating. During an

interview on July 26, 1962, he urged the repatriates to “leave Marseille in haste” and “try

to readapt elsewhere.” According to one disputed account from about the same time, he

even said the Pieds Noirs should be “thrown in the sea” (Jordi 1995:56-57), a

recommendation only a little harsher than those put forward by such national figures as

Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, and

President Charles de Gaulle (Benkemoun 2012:47-50). By the time of his reelection

campaign in 1965, however, at least Mayor Defferre apparently realized that the

ethnically European and generally right-wing repatriates were in his city for good and

that they constituted a natural constituency for his relatively conservative form of

socialism (as opposed to that of his political rivals in Marseille, the pro-Algerian-

independence and anti-Pieds-Noirs Communist Party; cf. Roncayolo 1965). Just before

the 1965 election, his newspaper Le Provençal therefore published such pro-socialist

feel-good articles as “The Repatriates: Already Marseillans” (Cassagne 1965) and

“Appeal of Mr. Pascal Aléman [father of a war hero] to All Repatriates” (Aléman 1965).

Hopkins’ interpretation thus implies that ethnic voting and violence should be lower in

Marseille than in Miami.

7

8

Figure 2 Articles on “Rapatriat -e/-es/-ion” in Le Monde, 6/1962-1967

Source: English-language Index of French edition of Le Monde, June 1962 to December 1967, number of times word mentioned in section “social welfare”/“social security”

Finally, available evidence suggests that the level of ethnic conflict in Dublin

should also be moderate if Hopkins is correct. Even at its height in 2006, Irish press

coverage about immigration from Poland (the source country of the plurality of the A8

migrants) never reached the levels seen for the Mariel Cubans in 1980 or Algerian

refugees in 1962 (see Figure 3). And one searches newspaper and broadcast archives in

vain for harsh, scapegoating rhetoric by Irish leaders about the Eastern Europeans. The

closest one comes to an anti-immigrant campaign during this period is the ultimately

successful effort to limit the ability of immigrants’ Irish-born children to claim jus soli

citizenship in the Republic of Ireland. This 2004 Citizenship Referendum, however,

seems to have primarily targeted non-European asylum seekers and “baby tourists” (i.e.,

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pregnant visitors) instead of the almost wholly “white” migrants from the newly admitted

European Union member states. The Irish government did limit the rights of such new

EU nationals to receive welfare, but this policy never became part of a referendum, and

the attendant public discussion remained much more subdued (Fanning 2009:99-113).

Figure 3 Articles on “Polish Immigration” in Irish Times, 1997-2010

Source: www.irishtimes.com (accessed March 12, 2013)

Analytical Framework

In contrast with most other sections of the book, this chapter is forced to dispense with

“control” cities or similar areas other than Miami, Marseille, and Dublin. Municipal

elections in other countries, even in different European states, are likely not comparable

(c.f. the Dublin/Sheffield comparison in the fiscal chapter) because of varying party

systems and voting rules. If a change occurs at the same time that the migrants arrived in

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an urban area, the migration might have caused this phenomenon, or perhaps some third

variable that we were unable to control for given available data influenced the level of

ethnic conflict. The results in this section are therefore probably less reliable than are

those in other chapters.

Although this study estimates levels of racial violence qualitatively based on elite

interviews, archival materials, secondary accounts, and newspaper articles, I mainly rely

on Gary King’s (1997) method of ecological inference to evaluate the degree of ethnic

voting. In particular, I focus on municipal elections because large cities usually report

voting data for smaller subsections of the metropolis instead of just for the county or

département in which the city is located. Uniform electoral data for simply the county

does not allow one to determine how much different ethnicities or racial groups varied in

their voting behavior.

Since no publicly available individual-level, exit-poll surveys appear to exist for

relevant local elections in Miami, Marseille, or Dublin, this investigation employs the

King method of analyzing “ecological” data. Although official voting and census

statistics are probably relatively trustworthy for these locales and periods, one may not

simply infer individual behavior from such aggregated data (Robinson 1950). This

“ecological fallacy” problem hindered statistical analysis of aggregated voting data for

decades, but Gary King’s (1997) development of a maximum-likelihood approach to this

issue made possible the kind of analysis employed in this chapter. In a nutshell, this

method relies only on actual, official, voting and census data, which usually are more

readily available for historical or comparative settings than are datasets from exit polls.

The model thus estimates what the underlying individual-level relationship would have to

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be given the observed relationship between the two aggregated variables, such as the vote

for a given mayoral candidate and the ethnic background of the individual voter.1

Although a few statisticians have critiqued the technique (Freedman et al. 1998), King

(1997:197-245) has demonstrated its general reliability by comparing the results of his

ecological analysis of aggregated data with the actual population statistics from all

individuals. In their systematic comparison of various ecological methods, moreover, Liu

(2007) and Leemann and Leimgruber (2009) demonstrate that overall, King’s EI

approach performs slightly or significantly better than its competitors. Nonetheless, while

the method is ideal for an historic election such as 1959 local voting in Marseille, where

individual survey data clearly do not exist, even King’s technique has some potential

limitations. As an example, multivariate analysis is cumbersome, and variables whose

averages are close to 100 or 0 percent often do not allow precise estimations (i.e. large

standard errors and/or a failure of the maximum-likelihood routine to converge to a

plausible result).

Quantitative Results for Ethnic Voting

Overall, empirical testing of hypotheses about ethnic voting shows that the such cleavage

was not roughly equal across all cities, as realist group conflict would predict. Rather,

1 As King details in his book-length explanation of the technique (1997:28-140), the maximum likelihood routine estimates two major parameters. The first, labeled βb, could be the proportion of some subset of all citizens (e.g. African-Americans), who turn out to vote in a particular election. The second, labeled βw, is the proportion of all remaining citizens (i.e. not members of that subset) who turned out to vote. EI also provides standard errors for both of these estimates, which allow researchers to calculate the precision of EI’s estimates of βb and βw. MLE triangulates in on the most plausible values for these two parameters by searching across a two-dimensional plane that represents all possible combinations of βb and βw and plots all observed pairs of the independent and dependent variables by district (e.g. the proportion African-American in a given county versus the proportion of citizens who turned out to vote in that same county). EI represents this plane as a MRI-like tomography plot that highlights the most likely combination of these two statistics in the underlying population of individuals.

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ethnic voting was highest in Miami, moderate in Dublin, and not even statistically

significant in Marseille. As Table 1 indicates, voters from the three main ethnic groups in

South Florida differed significantly in their support for Puerto-Rican Mayor Maurice

Ferré in 1979, and those differences are statistically significant. Yet by 1983, three years

after the Mariel Boatlift, Latinos (largely Cuban Americans) and African Americans have

become almost polar opposites in their political behavior (roughly 97 percent pro-Ferré

among African Americans versus only about 18 percent among Latinos).

Table 1 Ecological Analysis of 1979 and 1983 Miami Mayoral Elections________________________________________________________________________

Year Ethnic Group Plausible Range Estimateof Vote for Ferré (%) (Std. Error)

________________________________________________________________________

1979 Latinos 53.6 – 55.8 0.5470 (0.0057)

African Americans 43.2 – 44.3 0.4432 (0.0055)

Anglos 29.6 – 39.4 0.3448 (0.0251)

1983 Latinos 16.6 – 19.0 0.1777 (0.0062)

African Americans 97.2 – 97.9 0.9753 (0.0018)

Anglos 54.3 – 62.2 0.5826 (0.0202)

________________________________________________________________________Note: Estimates obtained with EI2 (see King 1997). Confidence intervals computed at 95 percent certainty. Data on race and ethnicity from October 1, 1983; 1979 proportion of a precinct of a given race or ethnicity assumed to be the same as in 1983 because 1979 EEO data not available. 1979 election on November 6; 1983 contest on November 15. N = 82 (1979) or 85 (1983).Source: Miami City Clerk’s Office, internal records (“Unofficial Results with Absentee Ballots”).

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Even according to the politicized-places theory, one would expect some level of

ethnic voting in Marseille. Table 2, however, reveals no statistically significant difference

between Repatriates’ and non-Repatriates’ voting for Mayor Gaston Defferre’s socialist

S.F.I.O. (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) bloc in either the 1959 or 1965

city council elections (a few Repatriates from North Africa had already moved to the city

by 1959). Although EI’s best-guess estimate of the socialist vote suggests that the

Table 2 Ecological Analysis of 1959 and 1965 Marseille Mayoral/City Council Elections________________________________________________________________________

Year Ethnic Group Plausible Range of Estimate Vote for Socialists (%) (Std. Error)

________________________________________________________________________

1959 Repatriates 31.4 – 45.3 0.3835 (0.0357)

non-Repatriates 31.7 – 33.8 0.3275 (0.0055)

1965 Repatriates 37.0 – 54.8 0.4591 (0.0453)

non-Repatriates 40.5 – 45.6 0.4309 (0.0130)

________________________________________________________________________Note: Estimates obtained with EI2 (see King 1997). Confidence intervals computed at 95 percent certainty. Additional residents in given arrondissement between censuses all assumed to be citizen repatriates. Statistics on new population for 1959 election interpolated from 1954 and 1962 censuses. Extra residents in 1968 census all presumed to have been present in 1965. Voting data represent second- or last-round results for each arrondissement (not always the same round for all districts). 1959 election on March 8;1965 polls on March 14 and 21. Arrondissement 6, with suspiciously high turnout, deleted to achieve convergence in 1959 model. N = 15 (1959) or 16 (1965).Source: INSEE (1954:186; 1962:136; 1968:160); Le Provençal (1959; 1965a; 1965b).

Repatriates might have been slightly more pro-Defferre (or anti-Communist) than native

Marseillans (see Roncayolo 1965), these estimates are statistically reliable enough (i.e.,

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have sufficient small standard errors) for us to reject the possibility that no difference

existed in actuality (cf. the overlapping plausible ranges).

Analysis of the Dublin case is complicated by the relatively small proportion of

A8 migrants who would likely have voted in the City Council elections of 2004 and 2009

and by the lack of publicly available data on their voting behavior. Instead, this chapter

uses the most prominent political cleavage in Irish politics, religion. Although the census

also contains information on Irish language ability by Local Electoral Areas, I chose the

Catholic/non-Catholic divide because it is more potent politically than that between

Gaelic and non-Gaelic speakers. The number of Irish citizens actually comfortable in the

language is pitifully small, moreover, the 25 percent figure in the Irish Census

notwithstanding (Magan 2007). Overall, this study hypothesizes that the arrival of

fervently Catholic Polish immigrants might provoke further Catholic/non-Catholic

political conflict among voters over such hot-button Irish political issues as divorce,

abortion, birth control, and relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church.

Table 3 likewise models the vote for the Labour Party, which is probably more

hostile to traditional Catholic norms than the other two major parties, Fianna Fáil and

Fine Gael. Since it was also the only major party to oppose the citizenship-related Article

27 revisions in 2004 (Fanning 2009:105-108), newcomers to Ireland may have viewed is

as the most pro-immigrant party likely to be elected. Labour likewise has an

internationally recognizable name, unlike the Gaelic monikers of its main competitors. In

the end, the arrival of the Eastern European immigrants beginning in 2004 does appear to

have coincided with a marked increase in ethnic- or religious- voting (which are pretty

much synonymous in the Irish context). While the 1999 data demonstrate no statistically

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significant difference between Catholics and non-Catholics, in 2004 and 2009 the

cleavage was stark: at least 35 percentage points different in 2004 and 10 in 2009.

Table 3 Ecological Analysis of 1999, 2004, and 2009 Dublin City Council Elections________________________________________________________________________

Year Ethnic Group Plausible Range of Estimate Vote for Labour (%) (Std. Error)

________________________________________________________________________

1999 non-Catholics 00.0 – 25.3 0.0867 (0.0848)

Catholics 16.5 – 20.7 0.1859 (0.0108)

2004 non-Catholics 54.0 – 100.0 0.7936 (0.1296)

Catholics 15.5 – 18.5 0.1702 (0.0076)

2009 non-Catholics 36.9 – 100.0 0.7393 (0.1888)

Catholics 21.5 – 26.8 0.2413 (0.0134)

________________________________________________________________________Note: Estimates obtained with EI2 (see King 1997). Confidence intervals computed at 95 percent certainty. Percent non-Catholic from census, interpolated for year of election, and includes “Other stated religion,” “No stated religion,” and “Not stated.” Religion variables for 1999 interpolated backward from 2002 and 2006 because 1996 census lacked a religion question (O'Rourke 2012). If instead use 2002 religion data for 1999 model, EI2 estimates are .0707 (.0526) for non-Catholics and .1897 (.0076) for Catholics. Proportion Labour vote is total number of votes for any Labour candidate divided by “valid poll,” or number of valid votes cast in the given Local Electoral Area. N = 13 (1999), 13 (2004), or 11 (2009).Source: Central Statistics Office (2002; 2006; 2011); Dublin City (2004; 2009); Elections Ireland (2013).

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Qualitative Results for Racial Violence

Next, how did the varying levels of media coverage and elite anti-immigration rhetoric

affect the levels of racial violence in the three cities? Unfortunately, rigorous hate-crime

data do not exist for these three historic cases; in fact, reliable statistics on racist violence

are very rare even today (Green, McFalls, and Smith 2001). This chapter therefore relies

on more qualitative analysis of the historical narrative of ethniciii violence in Miami,

Marseille, and Dublin.

If one measures racial conflict by large-scale inter-ethnic confrontations, Miami

would have to rank as showing the highest levels of migration-related, violent hostility.

On May 17, 1980, just a few weeks after the beginning of the Mariel Boatlift, the city

exploded in the “Miami Riot of 1980,” which left 18 people dead—some burned alive or

stabbed to death as large crowds looked on—and roughly $80 million in property

damage. Though an all-white jury’s acquittal of five white police officers for killing

African-American businessman Arthur McDuffie precipitated the uprising (Porter and

Dunn 1984), media and elite assertions that the Mariel immigrants threatened to displace

black workers and were receiving “special treatment” seem to have fueled much of the

rage. According to Governor Bob Graham’s special committee to determine the roots of

the disturbance, “As many blacks see it, the recent influx of Cuban refugees into the

Miami area has exacerbated the jobs problem.” New workers supposedly needed to have i The author is grateful for research funding from Pepperdine University’s Frank R. Seaver Endowed Professorship in Social Science and Dean’s Research Grants, for release time from Pepperdine’s Seaver College Dean’s Office, and for voting data provided by Dwight S. Danie, Elections Coordinator for the City of Miami.ii The EU-10 states included Poland, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. Within Ireland, one usually refers instead to the “A8 [short for ‘accession 8’],” or Eastern European members of this group (i.e., minus the Mediterranean islands Cyprus and Malta).iii While American social scientists often speak of “racial violence,” Europeans are more likely to refer to “ethnic violence” or “violent xenophobia.” This chapter uses “racial violence” and “ethnic violence” interchangeably to suit the pan-Atlantic cases. Technically, however, U.S.-American “race” is yet another socially constructed “ethnicity.”

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Spanish skills, and hence African Americans were being replaced with “Cubans,

Haitians, and other Latins in a wide variety of unskilled jobs” (quoted in Croucher

1997:74-75).

In Marseille, nothing comparable occurred. True, natives of Marseille hardly

welcomed the Pieds-Noirs and much less the Harkis. Yet the historical record is devoid

of any anti-repatriate riots in the city. Instead, an arsonist destroyed a prefabricated

welcome center for refugees on February 7, 1963 in La Rouguière. Local ruffians would

loot or throw into the water the few items of furniture that the Pieds Noirs had been able

to have shipped from Algeria. And many cars bearing the French-Algerian initial license

plate numbers of 9A or 9G were “mysteriously” vandalized (Jordi 1995:41 & 56). The

right-wing terrorist group Organisation de l’armée secrete (OAS) likewise was being

forced to wind down its anti-Arab and anti-independence campaign in the streets of

metropolitan France, including Marseille, by the early 1960s (Associated Press 1962;

Bocca 1968).

In Dublin, meanwhile, anecdotal evidence suggests that some new Eastern

European migrants have injured or killed each other since arriving in Ireland. In many

such cases, alcohol appears to have fueled such knife attacks. In February of 2008, a

racially motivated Irish teenager also stabbed two Polish mechanics to death in South

Dublin, leading to widespread soul-searching among more tolerant Irish citizens

(Bracken 2010:xi-xii & 238-250). Although many ethnic African immigrants suffer

moderate to severe levels of discrimination and even violence (Fanning et al. 2011), no

record of any large-scale race riots between A8 migrants and native Irish individuals

exists.

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Conclusion

Overall, the empirical analysis in this chapter tend to support Hopkins’ theory of

politicized places rather than that of realistic group conflict. As Table 4 documents, the

three cities do differ in their levels of ethnic voting and violence, contrary to realistic

conflict’s predictions. More in line with politicized places, however, Miami’s highly

charged anti-immigrant rhetoric appears to have led to ethnically polarized voting as well

as a bloody race riot. The only mildly xenophobic atmosphere in Dublin seems to have

resulted in limited ethno-religious voting and minimal inter-ethnic violence. Lastly,

Marseille represents a slight anomaly for Hopkins because ethnic voting patterns were

not statistically discernible. In accordance with his theory, a few A8 migrants did become

victims of anti-immigrant hate crimes.

Table 4 Summary of Findings________________________________________________________________________

City Elite Anti-Imm. Rhetoric Ethnic Voting Racial Violence________________________________________________________________________

Miami high high high

Marseille moderate low moderate

Dublin moderate moderate low________________________________________________________________________Source: author’s analysis.

Theoretically, this investigation thus expands Hopkins’ theory to immigrant-rich

urban settings in three different industrialized countries. The chapter might also guide

local and national political leaders wishing to avoid a popular backlash against an

19

unexpected wave of recent immigrants. If massive immigration does not inevitable cause

ethno-political conflict in host cities, the odds are certainly stacked against harmonious

local relations when the national media and political leaders publicly scapegoat the new

arrivals.

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Wickham, James [Professor of Sociology, Director of Employment Research Centre, and Head of School of Social Science and Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin]. 2011. Interview with author, March 8, Dublin.

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